

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DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939

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
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1919-1939

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Central Europe, the Balkans, and Germany
January-October, 1925

The Conference of Locarno, October, 1925

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PREFACE

THIS Volume, the last in Series I, is mainly concerned with the negotiations leading to the Locarno Agreements, which were initialled *ne varietur* on October 16, 1925. From that point the completed Series IA takes over. Chapter I of this Volume, however, continues the documentation in Chapter I of Volume XXVI on British policy in Central Europe and the Balkans. That policy, during the period January to October, 1925, remained, amid various developments in those regions, basically the same as during the previous year (see Preface, Volume XXVI, page v). His Majesty's Government continued to insist that both Austria and Hungary should comply with the military provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, although they stopped short of supporting drastic measures to secure compliance (see Nos. 12, 13, 23, 29, 53, 71, 159, and 164). Their preference for persuasion, rather than the forceful measures advocated in certain quarters, derived from their reluctance to impede the economic recovery of those two states, the promotion of which was one of the foremost aims of British policy. During 1924, Hungary had made considerable progress on the road to financial stability (see Nos. 18 and 82), but like Austria, who experienced a severe economic crisis, was much handicapped by the protective policies of neighbouring states (see No. 129).

Although His Majesty's Government hoped that freer trade might do much to stabilise Central Europe and even the Balkans (see No. 74), they realised that stability in both areas might be jeopardised by the activities of communists and left-wing parties, which received funds and encouragement from Soviet Russia. In 1924, the Third International had operated from an advance base in Vienna. During 1925, it transferred its activities to Berlin and Prague, and subsequently opened sub-centres in Salonika and Constantinople (see Nos. 104 and 144). Realising only too well that Marxist ideas were alien to the peasant proprietors of South Eastern Europe, it adopted a policy of exploiting economic and political grievances, the aim being to create disorder and ultimately to establish a number of small states, nominally forming a federation, but each being dependent on Russia (see No. 95). In October, 1924, the Russians had created the Moldavian Republic, thus providing a base for armed raids across the Dniester and the formation of a revolutionary centre in Bessarabia. In February, 1925, the Roumanians, citing information supplied by Bulgaria of Soviet troop concentrations near Bessarabia, requested His Majesty's Government to let them know whether they had information of Soviet political plans (see No. 67). Needless to say, His Majesty's Government were not in the habit of answering questions of this

order. In the event, no serious situation developed on the Roumanian frontier (see No. 179). Much the same is true of other regions. There were indeed plenty of reports of Soviet activities. In the S.C.S. Kingdom the Russians supported the Croatian leader Radić, who was in opposition to the Belgrade Government. In Athens, the Soviet Legation attempted to spread disaffection among the Asia Minor refugees and ex-soldiers. Likewise the Russians spread propaganda among refugees in Bulgaria, where they encouraged the raids of the Federalist Macedonian bands on the frontier and generally supported opposition to the Tsankoff regime. The Bulgarian Government were much alarmed and requested the Liquidating Organ for permission to raise 4000 militiamen to deal with the situation. In support of their request, they stated, citing information from Roumanian sources, that a Communist rising was planned to take place between March and May (see Nos. 75, 78 and 81). In reporting this request, the British Minister at Sofia stated that a large scale insurrection was most unlikely and recommended that it should be refused. His Majesty's Government adopted this recommendation and pressed the French and Italian Governments to do the same (see No. 85). The Allied Military Committee at Versailles, however, were of the opinion that the proposed recruitment should be allowed, largely on the grounds that the Liquidating Organ had already given its sanction and that the Bulgarian Government would recruit the militiamen in defiance of the Allies who would then need to concert a plan to deal with this eventuality. His Majesty's Government decided to accept the *fait accompli* provided the Liquidating Organ were instructed never again to take similar action without reference to the Versailles Committee (see Nos. 89-92). Subsequently the Bulgarian Government made a request for permission to raise an additional 10,000 men (see No. 99). This request His Majesty's Government were prepared to grant, provided the Bulgarian Government were warned that they should not seize the opportunity merely to persecute political opponents. The additional recruitment aroused protests from the S.C.S. and Greek Governments. In view of these protests, the Allied Governments, at His Majesty's Government's instigation, made representations to the two governments concerned expressing confidence that they would abstain from any action that might complicate the situation (see Nos. 102, 103, 105 and 106). In reply both governments demanded that the 10,000 militiamen should be disbanded by May 31. This demand, which His Majesty's Government considered perfectly reasonable (see No. 103), was accepted by the Allies, who informed the Bulgarian Government accordingly (see Nos. 113-115). Their action greatly disappointed the Bulgarians, who complained that the Allied Powers should be more aware of the dangers from the Third International (see No. 118, n. 2), and subsequently sent M. Kalfoff, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on a visit to the western capitals, where it was hoped to arouse sympathy for the Bulgarian cause. The Allies, however, quickly organised (His Majesty's Government again taking the lead) a united

front: they impressed on M. Kalfoff the imperative need to disband the militiamen by May 31; they told him that any extension of the time limit was quite unacceptable; and they advised him that his government should take immediate steps to broaden their political base (see Nos. 123–127, *passim*). In eventually accepting the Allied demand for the disbandment of the militiamen by May 31, the Bulgarian Government intimated that, if the troubles should again assume dangerous proportions, they would have to recall the volunteers—a reply against which the Allies, again at the instigation of His Majesty's Government, protested strongly (see Nos. 134 and 139).

Although the Allied Governments, and His Majesty's Government in particular, were convinced that the Bulgarian Government were making the most of the communist danger in order to evade treaty obligations and to silence political opponents of all kinds, they were nevertheless much concerned at the activities of the Third International. In December, 1924, His Majesty's Government had instructed their representatives in the Balkan capitals to keep a close watch on the situation (see Volume XXVI, No. 281) and the result was that the Foreign Office was able to amass a considerable amount of information which demonstrated the need for political stability in Central Europe and the Balkans as any violent conflict in those regions might give rise to a situation which the Soviet Government might exploit to their advantage. This need became all the greater when the Russians attempted to impede the Allied–German negotiations which led eventually to the Locarno treaties. That danger of conflict in Central Europe or the Balkans was enhanced by Italian policy, which, though satisfactory on the German problem, was, to all appearances, disturbingly opportunist on other issues. In February, a report reached the Foreign Office stating that Italy was attempting to form an alignment of the S.C.S. Kingdom, Bulgaria, Roumania, and, possibly, Albania (see No. 54). In June, according to Greek reports, the Italians were hindering the negotiations for the renewal of the S.C.S.–Greek alliance (see No. 142), which had been denounced in November, 1924 (see Volume XXVI, No. 264). These reports, taken in conjunction with their general picture of the situation in the Balkans, caused the Foreign Office some concern: believing that the S.C.S. Government were inclined to seize the opportunity of the disunion or indifference of the Allied Powers to advance their ambitions and being uncertain of the precise nature of Italo–S.C.S. relations under the Pact of Rome of January, 1924 (see No. 24, n. 5), they feared that matters might get out of hand if the three Western Allies failed to show a common front on Balkan issues. As Mr. Nicolson pointed out in a memorandum of June 4, joint Anglo–French representations at Belgrade carried no weight unless supported by Italy, and he went on to propose that the Secretary of State, on his visit to Geneva for a meeting of the League Council, should raise the matter with the French Foreign Minister, M. Briand (see No. 137, n. 2). The result was a joint Anglo–French telegram of June 10 to Signor Mussolini, which,

having referred in flattering terms to Italy's special authority in the Balkans, appealed to Italy to join a united front (see No. 137). The following month it was reported from Belgrade that rumoured Italian military preparations at Trieste were designed against Greece or Turkey, or possibly against the S.C.S. Kingdom (see No. 148). These rumours were probably without foundation: Italy had already begun to seek an accommodation with Greece (see Nos. 146 and 153), which accommodation was eventually accomplished in September (see No. 175).

That same month the Greek and S.C.S. Governments reached a substantial measure of agreement during the negotiations which had been transferred to Geneva (see Nos. 170 and 177). His Majesty's Government had for long been pressing Greece to provide for the better regulation of the Salonika-Ghevgheli railway line (see Nos. 14 and 26). The negotiations, however, had made little headway (see Nos. 70 and 120), and, as the S.C.S. Government tended to increase their demands as the price for the renewal of the Greco-S.C.S. alliance, the Greeks began to consider seriously a Roumanian proposal for the formation of a Balkan *bloc* consisting of Roumania, Greece, and the S.C.S. Kingdom (see No. 93). This proposal was unlikely to find favour with the S.C.S. Government: they already had an alliance with Roumania and they had no immediate need of the assistance of the Greek forces, on which they placed no value (see No. 132). Having little hope of success in following this line, the Greeks tried to persuade His Majesty's Government to press the S.C.S. Government to make concessions and endeavoured to convince them that the suspension of negotiations at the end of May was the result of Italian policy to divert the ambitions of the S.C.S. State from the Adriatic to Salonika (see Nos. 131 and 135). By the end of June, however, Greco-Italian relations had improved, mainly as the result of General Pangalos's *coup d'état* (see No. 142) in Athens and Italy began to seek commercial advantages in Greece. There were immediate repercussions in Belgrade. The S.C.S. Government hastened to reach agreement with the Croatian Party (see No. 143) and shortly afterwards accepted in principle a French proposal for the formation of an entirely new company to run the Ghevgheli-Salonika railway, this company to have a neutral chairman and a joint Greek-S.C.S. board (see No. 149). On the Greek counter-proposal for the internationalisation of the railway, His Majesty's Government refused to give an opinion until it had been considered by the countries more directly interested (see No. 162). It was becoming clear, however, that the Greeks were in a stronger position to resist the S.C.S. Government's demands and indeed to assert themselves generally. They began to take a strong line with Bulgaria: they reinforced their frontier troops (see No. 158); and they came forward with a proposal for a Balkan pact of compulsory arbitration (see No. 165). This proposal stood very little chance of being accepted (see Nos. 168 and 169). His Majesty's Government, on being consulted, expressed the view that Greece should concentrate on the negotiations with the S.C.S. Government at Geneva

under the auspices of M. Briand, and they pointed out that, if a western pact were concluded (see Chapter II, below), there would be many repercussions on the Balkan Powers (see No. 171). For that same reason His Majesty's Government discouraged a Bulgarian proposal for a Balkan security pact (see No. 172).

Many documents in this Volume deal with Albania, where Ahmed Bey Zogu had become Prime Minister (see No. 3). He was quick to announce that he had no arrangements with the S.C.S. Government, who had undoubtedly facilitated his assumption of power (see No. 7). Italy, too, in view of certain disclosures by the S.C.S. King Alexander, to the effect that certain Italian proposals had been rejected (see Nos. 24 and 30), was quick to assert that there was no secret understanding between Italy and the S.C.S. Government for the partition of Albania (see No. 28) and that Italy had no designs in that region (see No. 32). Nevertheless, Italy was far from being disinterested in Albanian affairs. When Ahmed Bey, wishing to rid himself of dependence on Albanian army factions, proposed to establish a gendarmerie trained by Colonel Stirling and other British officers, Signor Mussolini, despite His Majesty's Government's assurances that they had no political interest in Albania (see No. 34), protested strongly against the employment of exclusively British officers (see No. 40). His Majesty's Government, who had no enthusiasm for the scheme, promptly warned the Albanian Government, but to no avail, of the risk, in view of the Italian attitude, of employing solely British personnel (see Nos. 43, 52 and 51). On this issue, Signor Mussolini did not follow up his protest: he reserved his fire for that of the oil concession awarded to the Anglo-Persian Company. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Durazzo, contending that the concession was a monopoly, threatened the Albanian Government with serious consequences and demanded that the British Government should secure the postponement of the ratification of the concession in the Albanian Assembly (see Nos. 31, 35, 36, 39, 41 and 44). His Majesty's Government firmly contested all Italian arguments but were fully prepared to humour Signor Mussolini and arrange a compromise (see Nos. 45-51, 55-62, 64-66 and 72). The result was that the Italians obtained a concession in some 50,000 hectares which lay outside the area that the Anglo-Persian Company intended to exploit (see Nos. 76, 79, 84). Meanwhile the French and American oil interests had demanded concessions, and these, like the Italians, managed to find some satisfaction (see Nos. 48, 57, 58, 68, 73, 80, 111, 145, 151 and 161). In March, an Italian financial group came to an agreement with the Albanian Government for the establishment of a Bank of Albania, which was formally constituted at a meeting in Rome on September 3 (see No. 173).

Chapter II of this volume deals with the problem of European security from January to October 1925. Up to that time the problem had been mainly the concern of France who, having failed at the Peace Conference to obtain a frontier on the Rhine and having suffered the disappointment of American and British failure to ratify guarantee pacts promising

assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany, attempted to provide for her security by every possible means. Not content with the meagre provision of an Allied occupation of the Rhineland for fifteen years, France had attempted to encircle Germany by alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom and to exploit the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, notably reparation and military control of Germany. In January, 1923, French and Belgian military forces had occupied the Ruhr as a means of enforcing the payment of reparation and the opportunity had been seized to promote a Rhineland Separatist movement. This action produced in Germany a storm of hostility and a feeling of national insecurity as severe as that which obtained in France.

As a result largely of His Majesty's Government's policy, the London Agreement of August, 1924, provided a satisfactory solution of the reparation problem and reduced considerably the tension in Europe. This solution involved the dismantlement of the Franco-Belgian régime in the Ruhr, which had been a failure. In recognition of this failure and in agreeing to work towards a settlement of the reparation problem, the French Government had been encouraged by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's promise that, as soon as that settlement was made, the British Government would do their best to provide for French security. This promise was to involve Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in discussions with M. Herriot (who, in June, 1924, had replaced M. Poincaré) at the Fifth Session of the League of Nations. Here they expounded their different views on the means of strengthening the League's machinery for the maintenance of peace. On October 1 a new instrument, the work of various committees, was presented to the Assembly of the League as a draft Protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the essential provision of which was the undertaking of all member states to submit their disputes to arbitration. In Britain and in the British Dominions, this Protocol aroused much opposition. Mr. MacDonald's Government were undecided whether to ratify the Protocol and before they could reach a decision they were defeated in the elections at the end of October.

The in-coming Conservative Government were strongly opposed to the Geneva Protocol which would have extended British obligations far beyond those deriving from the League Covenant but they were nevertheless disposed to seek means of providing for French security. On January 4, 1925, Mr. Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, circulated in the Foreign Office a memorandum defining the problem and calling for the preparation of various papers to supply the basis of discussions on January 22 (see No. 180). The resulting papers (see Nos. 185, 186, 187, 191 and 205) provided a thorough and wide-ranging presentation of the problem. Just two days before the Foreign Office discussions took place, the German Government communicated confidentially to Lord D'Abernon, H.M. Ambassador at Berlin, a memorandum (see No. 189, Enclosure) and requested His Majesty's Government's advice

how its contents could best be brought to the knowledge of the Allied Powers. This memorandum (it originated with Herr von Schubert of the German Foreign Ministry (see No. 263), who was probably encouraged by Lord D'Abernon) began by pointing out that France considered the questions of disarmament and the evacuation of German territory from the standpoint of security, expressing fears of possible German aggression. Wishing to allay French fears, the German Government proposed a special treaty—a pact of security—and went on to suggest a mutual undertaking not to resort to war, a comprehensive arbitration procedure, a guarantee of the existing situation on the Rhine, and the fulfilment of Germany's obligation to demilitarise the Rhineland. The German Government further intimated that they were prepared to conclude pacts with other powers, even with those with frontiers bordering on Germany in the east. On January 30, Mr. Chamberlain discussed the German memorandum with the German Ambassador (see No. 195). Although he welcomed Germany's good intentions, he made it clear that the proposals could not be usefully considered until the British attitude to the Geneva Protocol had been defined: in any case His Majesty's Government were not prepared to negotiate behind the back of their French ally. To this observation Herr Sthamer replied that his government had no design of dividing France and Great Britain: it was their intention to make the same proposals to the French. On February 9, the German Government carried out this intention by handing a confidential memorandum to M. Herriot (see No. 197). This communication differed somewhat from that addressed to Great Britain: it made no mention of the connection between the question of French security and the issues of German disarmament and the evacuation of the Cologne zone, and it included the suggestion that a security pact might be so drafted as to enable it to be embodied in a world convention on the lines of the Geneva Protocol. M. Herriot put the memorandum in his pocket and for fifteen days kept it secret from his ministers and the press. On February 17 he told the German Ambassador that he welcomed the German move (see No. 204) and the next day he informed Lord Crewe, H.M. Ambassador at Paris, to whom he showed a French version of the memorandum, that he had sent a polite reply stating that it would be impossible to proceed in the matter except in concert with France's allies (see Nos. 207 and 208). On February 20, the German Government communicated similar memoranda to Italy and Belgium (see No. 209). These developments seem to have encouraged Mr. Chamberlain to drop his attitude of reserve: speaking to the French and Belgian Ambassadors, he emphasized the importance of the German proposals (see No. 212) and on March 5 spoke to the same effect in the House of Commons (see No. 223).

The next day Mr. Chamberlain, on his way to attend the League Council, had a long conversation with M. Herriot in Paris. Much to M. Herriot's consternation, he stated that His Majesty's Government were averse to an Anglo-French security pact and had decided not to sign the

Geneva Protocol: they were, however, prepared to consider a security system on the lines of the German proposals; and they would remain firm in their obligations under the League Covenant, which, as the French Government were already aware, did not give France adequate security (see No. 224). He went on to suggest that Britain and France should agree on the terms to be put to Germany for a quadrilateral pact, making it clear that there must be a single pact and not two pacts, not an Anglo—Franco—Belgian pact and then a pact of those three powers with Germany (see Nos. 225 and 227). Despite this suggestion, Mr. Chamberlain, in view of his conversations in Paris and Geneva, began to doubt the wisdom of the policy he was following: he feared that His Majesty's Government would lose their influence over France and endanger their relations generally not only in Europe but also elsewhere: he was moreover particularly alarmed at the attitude in Germany. After conversations with the German Government, Lord D'Abernon was able to report that the Germans fully recognised the services being rendered by His Majesty's Government and that they expressed willingness to give precision to their pact proposals. On the issue of their entry into the League their attitude was less satisfactory, but, in Lord D'Abernon's view, they were likely to meet Allied wishes if the matter were dealt with simultaneously with the negotiations for a pact (see No. 241). On the question of the Polish frontier they contended that, unlike the Franco—German frontier which should be settled immediately, that with Poland could not be decided in the near future and that, for the time being, it were better that disputes with Poland should be settled by arbitration (see No. 242). In France, public opinion was exceedingly suspicious of the Germans who were thought to be attempting to drive a wedge between the French and British Governments (see No. 245). The British declaration at Geneva during a discussion of the Protocol (see No. 240, n. 13), was of little comfort to the French public and rendered M. Herriot's parliamentary position more precarious than ever (see Nos. 248 and 251). Hence Mr. Chamberlain decided that it would be unwise to move too fast (see No. 249). Nevertheless he had some hopes of ultimate success, provided that the Germans did not insist that they had spoken their last word and that the spirit of France did not become again 'the spirit of Poincaré' (see No. 255). These two dangers receded, and Mr. Chamberlain persevered with discussions with the French and German Governments (see Nos. 258—92, *passim*), during which the Germans showed some willingness to meet the difficulties raised by France and even offered not to make an issue of the Polish frontier, at the same time renouncing all intention to alter it by force (see Nos. 264, 269, 271, 274, 283 and 287). Within Germany, the Nationalists, although displaying much suspicion, continued to support the Luther Government (see Nos. 267 and 268). Meanwhile the favourable views expressed by the Belgian Government of the German proposals and of His Majesty's Government's policy (see Nos. 282 and 286) certainly produced some effect upon French official circles and

facilitated Mr. Chamberlain's negotiations, as did also Italian approval of British policy (see Nos. 281 and 288). Less encouraging, however, was the attitude of the Polish Government. Although eventually the Polish Ministers acknowledged that His Majesty's Government's intentions towards Poland were in no way hostile, they remained highly suspicious of Germany and in the country at large there was a widespread feeling that Great Britain was about to purchase security in the west by selling out Polish interests in the east (see No. 295). The election of Marshal von Hindenburg as President of the Reich (see Nos. 292, 305 and No. 611, n. 2, below) caused great consternation in Poland, there being much less readiness than in the western states to accept the German explanation that he would uphold the Constitution and the policy of the Government to which his election would bring considerable support (see Nos. 300, 301 and 303).

In Lord D'Abernon's view the most serious danger to the German Government was the failure of the French to give a constructive reply to the German proposals for a pact (see No. 304): it was vitally necessary, he said, that His Majesty's Government should make strong representations in Paris against the long delay. Mr. Chamberlain was not so sure: he left it to Lord Crewe to decide whether such representations would do more harm than good (see No. 306). Lord Crewe took no action: he knew that the French would retort that His Majesty's Government had not concurred in the proposed French reply on the subject of military control and he knew also that M. Sauerwein, recently returned from Germany, intended to impress upon the French Foreign Ministry the urgency of replying to the German proposals (see Nos. 308 and 310). It came then as no surprise when on May 14 the French Ambassador communicated to His Majesty's Government a draft of a proposed reply to the German memorandum of February 9 (see Nos. 318 and 322). This draft, however, only gave rise to protracted discussions between the two governments and indeed between the British, the Italian and Belgian Governments (see Nos. 328, 329, 330, 333, 338-40 and 348). The chief British objection to the French draft was that it sought to link up a western pact with a guarantee of the Polish-German frontier, thus imposing on the British Government an obligation over and above their obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. All that His Majesty's Government were prepared to do was to guarantee the Rhineland frontier and even then there must be a proviso that the guarantee should be subject to His Majesty's Government's existing commitments under the League Covenant. Following discussions in the Cabinet (see No. 343), Mr. Chamberlain submitted to the French Government a revised draft reply (see No. 349) and, in informing the French Ambassador of this step, requested him to make it perfectly clear to M. Briand—he had replaced M. Herriot on April 17—that the revised draft represented the limit to which His Majesty's Government were prepared to go (see No. 350). M. Briand raised no great difficulties (see Nos. 351, 353 and 354). The British draft, moreover, was

favourably received by the Italian and Belgian Governments (see Nos. 359 and 362). Meeting at Geneva, Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand quickly arrived at an agreed text of the French reply to Germany (see No. 365). At this point, however, an incorrect Havas Agency communiqué, claiming erroneously to be official, caused much consternation in many quarters, including Rome (see Nos. 366–75 and 378–81), and it was not until June 16 that the French note was presented at Berlin (see No. 382). This note welcomed the German initiative and went on to state that, before negotiations could be usefully undertaken, agreement must be reached on certain general principles. These were: Germany should agree to enter the League on the conditions laid down by the League Council (see Nos. 219 and 261); the pact to be negotiated should not modify the peace treaties or the arrangements for the occupation of the Rhineland; the arbitration treaties contemplated should apply to all forms of dispute; and the participants in the proposed Rhineland pact should have the option of extending their guarantee to arbitration treaties concluded with Germany's eastern neighbours. On all these principles the French note requested the precise views of the German Government.

The French note met with some hostility in the German press and the German Government, despite unofficial British advice that they should reply promptly accepting the general principles, expressed the fear that the request for their views 'avec précision' would tie their hands unless they were first given clear explanations of certain points (see Nos. 388, 391 and 393). In London, the German Ambassador drew attention to passages in the British White Paper (Cmd. 2435) which had been published on June 18. As Mr. Chamberlain explained to him, the passages concerned merely related to the Anglo-French negotiations that had led to the agreed text of the French note: nevertheless the German Government would obviously need some explanation of matters referred to in the note itself, but it was to be hoped they would refrain from meticulous criticism and accept promptly the basis of a pact in broad and general terms, whereupon a conference of ministers or of experts would conduct the detailed negotiations which could not be adequately carried out by an exchange of notes (see No. 395). The Germans, however, gave no immediate reply: the Luther Government continued to meet with internal difficulties (see Nos. 398–401, 403, 404, 406, 409 and 416) which were all the greater because the Russians, who had opposed the German pact proposals from the beginning (see Nos. 211, 212, 290, and 296), maintained some influence in certain German circles. Not until July 20 did the German Government reply (see No. 418): while expressing the hope that the negotiations would end in success, they stated that a general answer would have committed them to every detail of the French proposals; and they expressed the presumption that the proposed pact would not rule out the adaptation of the treaties to changed circumstances, as provided for in the League Covenant; they suggested that the arbitration treaties they had already concluded—treaties which did not

provide for the settlement of all disputes by arbitration or conciliation—should serve as the models for further treaties to be negotiated; they presumed that coercion would never be used without recourse to some procedure to reach a settlement; and they stated that any unilateral application of force was incompatible with the spirit of the League, which they were indeed prepared to enter, but they wished to point out that the League Council's Note of March 14 (see No. 261) had not removed their objections previously formulated.

This German reply did not satisfy fully the French and British Governments (see Nos. 420, 426, 428, 429, 431 and 434), but M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain decided to persevere with the negotiations. Lord D'Abernon had reported that in the Reichstag the German Government had received a majority of 235 to 158 in a vote of confidence (see No. 422) and that the evacuation of the Ruhr and the announcement of the decision to evacuate Duisburg, Düsseldorf and Ruhrort (see Nos. 635 and 645, below) had put them in a better position to negotiate (see No. 433). On August 11, Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand, accompanied by their advisers met in London at the Foreign Office to discuss a French draft reply to the German Note (see Nos. 438 and 439). The agreed reply, after submission to the Belgian and Italian Governments for approval (see Nos. 443, 444, 447 and 448), was delivered to the German Government on August 24. It answered the objections that the Germans had expounded and it concluded with an invitation to them to enter into conversations on the basis suggested. This invitation was elaborated in verbal representations: the Germans were invited in the first instance to send Dr. Gaus their legal adviser to London to meet the British, French and Belgian jurists to discuss, without committing his government, the general lines of the proposed pact (see Nos. 428, 443-6 and 449). This proposed pact had already been cast in the form of a draft treaty. Ever since May, the Foreign Office had been engaged in translating general ideas into a concrete form, making the necessary amendments that arose out of their discussions with the French and other parties concerned (see Nos. 316, 317, 319 and 384) and on July 4 Mr. Chamberlain had communicated to the French Government the draft of a suggested treaty of mutual guarantee, which draft had been later communicated to the Belgian Government (see Nos. 405 and 413). This had given rise to further Anglo-French negotiations (see Nos. 408, 410 and 412), the outcome of which had been a decision that M. Fromageot, the French legal adviser, should meet Sir C. Hurst in London with a view to their drawing up an agreed text (see Nos. 415 and 423). At the end of July, M. Briand had submitted to Mr. Chamberlain a redraft of the treaty based on the text drawn up by M. Fromageot and Sir C. Hurst (see Nos. 423, n. 2 and 424, n. 6). This redraft had been discussed by M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain in London on August 12 and they had arrived at an agreed proposed treaty of mutual guarantee (see No. 440). It was this document that Dr. Gaus had been invited to discuss. The five jurists (an Italian request to be represented had been

agreed (see Nos. 456 and 461-3)) conducted their discussions from September 1 to September 4; certain modifications were made at the request of Dr. Gaus, and a text was prepared for consideration by a Conference of Ministers (see Nos. 466 and 467). On September 15 a formal invitation to the Conference was addressed to the German Government by the French, British, and Belgian Governments (see Nos. 471 and 476). Because of their internal difficulties and their usual disposition to raise small points and indeed extraneous issues (see Nos. 484, 485 and 488-90), the Germans delayed their reply until September 26. In that reply they accepted the invitation, agreed to Locarno as the place of meeting, and suggested that the Conference should begin on October 5: at the same time they submitted a memorandum raising, besides the question of the evacuation of the Cologne zone (see Chapter III), the issue of Germany's war guilt (see No. 493). Having reiterated their condition that the negotiation of a security pact could not modify the Treaty of Versailles or alter their judgement of the past (see Nos. 496, 497, 499 and 500), the Western Powers decided to ignore the German declarations, stating that their content had formed no part of the exchange of views (see Nos. 502 and 503). Despite last minute attempts of M. Chicherin (who, following a visit by M. Litvinoff (see No. 436) in early August, had gone to Germany ostensibly for medical treatment) to prevent Germany from signing a western pact and from joining the League of Nations (see Volume XXV, Nos. 490, 492 and 493), the German Delegation proceeded to Locarno.

Here they met the four Western Delegations on October 5. All had reached substantial agreement beforehand. There was no formal chairmanship of the Conference, which, although it met on nine occasions, spent relatively little time in session. Most of the discussions took place outside the conference room (see No. 516). There was no secretariat. In this Volume the documentation of the Conference consists of the British Secretary's notes of the nine meetings (these are printed in the Appendix) and telegrams, despatches, and memoranda, composed chiefly by Mr. Chamberlain but occasionally by other members of the British Delegation. These are printed at Nos. 516-51, *passim*. As will be seen from these documents negotiations were conducted in a friendly atmosphere and in a spirit of give and take, which much impressed Mr. Lampson, who had less happy memories of other Conferences (see No. 529). Nevertheless there were several awkward obstacles to surmount. The German Delegation, always with an eye on the parliamentary situation in Berlin, raised difficulties with regard to Germany's entry into the League of Nations and to the French guarantee of the arbitration treaties between Germany and her eastern neighbours; and when these two issues had been dealt with they raised the matter of the war guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty, demanded an undertaking from the Allies to evacuate the Cologne zone, and requested an amelioration of the remaining areas of occupation. Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand, always determined to keep Germany

detached from Russia and to prevent another Rapallo (see Vols. XIX, No. 75, n. 1 and XX, No. 497), showed the Germans much sympathy, made a few kindly gestures, but remained firm on all essential points. Concurrently with negotiations for a western pact they facilitated the conclusion of Germany's arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, in which His Majesty's Government had no direct interest, having certainly no intention of extending British obligations with regard to frontiers other than the Rhine. On October 17, Mr. Chamberlain transmitted to London a list of treaties and conventions which had been initialled at Locarno the previous day (see No. 549). These instruments, together with a protocol and a draft collective note, were to be published in all countries concerned on the morning of October 20. The treaties were to be signed in London on December 1. On October 17, Mr. Chamberlain had sent to London for issue in the press a commentary (see No. 550) on the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy who, almost at the last moment, had requested to be included in what became a five-power pact (see Nos. 530 and 539). Mr. Chamberlain's relatively brief commentary deals only with the western pact and was intended merely to emphasize, in view of erroneous press comment, the limits to the obligations to which he had committed His Majesty's Government. As for the significance of the Locarno Treaties in the history of European relations, this has been dealt with in the preface to Volume I of Series IA, which moreover includes a memorandum by Mr. J. C. Sterndale Bennett (No. 1) giving the assessment of the Locarno Treaties made in the Foreign Office.

Chapter III of this Volume deals with military control of Germany and with the related problem of the Cologne zone. According to Article 429 of the Versailles Treaty, the first stage of the evacuation of the occupied territory of Germany, envisaged for January 10, 1925, need not be undertaken by the Allies until the German Government had faithfully carried out their treaty obligations. It was most unlikely that the Germans would be able to satisfy the Allies. Effective military control had long been in abeyance (see Volume XXVI, Chapter III) and the Allies were not in a position to say what still remained to be done by the German authorities. It was not until September 8, 1924, that the Military Control Commission had embarked on a general inspection (see Volume XXVI, No. 703) and, owing to German obstruction, its task could certainly not be completed by January 10. On January 5, the Allies informed the Germans that the first stage of the evacuation would be postponed (see Nos. 553 and 555). In reply the Germans complained that the Allies had given only a general indication of the defaults on which their decision was based, intimating that it must have been founded on small points of detail (see No. 556). This allegation the Allies refuted in a note of January 26, to which the Germans replied reiterating their view and requesting to be furnished as soon as possible with the facts (see No. 570, n. 3). Not until February 15 was the final report on the general inspection completed (see No. 592).

Already the question of the form of the report and the procedure to be followed in considering it, combined with the problem of the determination of a date for the evacuation of the Cologne zone had been the subject of much discussion between the French and British Governments (see Nos. 573, 574, 577-83). This discussion, into which the French often dragged in the question of security, was continued even after the Military Commission's report had been passed to the Versailles Military Committee for consideration (see Nos. 584-628, *passim*). Throughout His Majesty's Government insisted that the mode of communicating the report to the Germans should not be offensive and they pointed out that the Allies must avoid the danger of driving Germany into the formation of an anti-western *bloc* with Russia (see No. 590). During the course of this discussion, the French managed to switch the emphasis from the important issue of the evacuation of the Cologne, which His Majesty's Government wished to expedite, to the less important and less urgent question of the withdrawal of the Military Commission (see No. 600). Meanwhile the Germans were demanding that the report on the general inspection should be published immediately (see No. 594) but it was not until the end of May that the Allies reached agreement on the form of a note to be presented at Berlin (see Nos. 630 and 631). The note was eventually presented on June 4. Along with the note the Ambassadors presented also a schedule, but not the report, which, having undergone further revision, was published in the Allied press on June 9. The note stated the points on which Germany had failed to give satisfaction and listed the measures required to be taken. It gave, as His Majesty's Government had always insisted, a definite commitment that, as soon as Germany satisfied the Allied demands, the Allies would evacuate the Cologne zone without delay. His Majesty's Government had also insisted that the Control Commission should be instructed to confine their work to the supervision of those demands. Almost for the first time, the German Government displayed a readiness to collaborate with the Allied powers. In July they appointed a commission under General von Pawelsz to facilitate co-operation with the Control officers (see No. 641). The French officers however refused to respond, and it was not until the Versailles Committee, following British action in Conference of Ambassadors, instructed the Control Commission to facilitate the task of General von Pawelsz and M. Briand had given separate instructions to the French Control officers (see Nos. 644-6) that the execution of the Allied demands made satisfactory progress (see No. 650). But when the Locarno Conference began its sessions, the Allied demands had not been fully met. At the Conference the Germans made every effort to induce the Allies to fix a date for the evacuation of the Cologne zone. In response the Allied Governments agreed that the German Government should address a note to the Conference of Ambassadors stating their case and explaining their difficulties. As will be seen in Series IA, Volume I, Nos. 28, n. 3 and 33, the note was despatched on October 23.

Although the Military Control Commission had always met with much obstruction and faced considerable arrears of work, the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee had been able to report on January 5, 1925, that it had met with no obstruction and that German aviation did not pose an immediate military danger. There remained, however, the on-going task of supervising the 'nine rules' (see Volume XX, No. 208) which the Germans had accepted in 1922. These rules defined the distinction between military aircraft, which were forbidden to Germany by the Versailles Treaty, and civil aircraft which Germany was free to manufacture. Attached to the rules was the statement that, in view of developments in aircraft design, the rules would need revision every two years. In May, 1924, the French had refused to revise the rules but under British pressure agreed to a compromise which was approved by the Conference of Ambassadors on February 23, 1925 (see No. 589). At the same time, it was agreed that a further modification of the 'nine rules' might be made after consideration of the report of the Air Clauses Committee on their discussions with German air experts. Although the modifications proposed were not likely to be accepted by the Germans, the French had wished to make the original modifications conditional on Germany's joining the International Air Convention. This demand the Germans had ignored and their experts in Paris put forward proposals which went far beyond the modifications proposed by the Allies. In an attempt to obtain an immediate solution of the problem His Majesty's Government proposed that the original modifications of the 'nine rules' agreed by the Allies should be notified forthwith to the German Government (see No. 610). As for the French demand that Germany should accede to the Air Convention, they were disposed to ignore it, for they were fully satisfied with their own arrangements with Germany for civil flight over German territory (see No. 625). In retaliation the French rejected the British proposal for the immediate notification to Germany of the agreed modifications of the 'nine rules' (see No. 632). Eventually His Majesty's Government agreed to discuss with their Allies the question of Allied Civilian Aviation in Germany (see No. 633) and on June 24 the revised 'nine rules' were notified to Germany. On August 10, conversations on the question of Allied civil flight were held in Paris. Certain recommendations were made. These His Majesty's Government refused to accept and they lapsed altogether after the Locarno Conference.

I have to thank Miss E.C. Blayney, Head of the Library and Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and her Staff for all the assistance they have given in the preparation of this Volume. I have had unrestricted access to the papers in the Foreign Office Archives. Again, I wish to thank the Staff of the Public Record Office and of Her Majesty's Stationery Office for their co-operation. Finally, I have to acknowledge my debt to Miss Kathleen Jones B.A. who has played a large part in the production of this Volume.

DOUGLAS DAKIN

December, 1984

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>B.F.S.P.</i>	<i>British and Foreign State Papers</i> (London).
<i>Cmd.</i>	Command Paper (London).
<i>D.D.B.</i>	<i>Documents Diplomatiques Belges 1920-1940 . . .</i> , vol. I (Brussels, 1964); vol. II (Brussels, 1964).
<i>D.D.I.</i>	<i>I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani: Settima Serie: 1922-1935</i> , vol. I (Rome, 1953); vol. II (Rome, 1955); vol. III (Rome, 1959); vol. IV (Rome, 1962).
<i>F.R.U.S.</i>	<i>Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States</i> (Washington).
<i>H.C. Deb. 3 s.</i>	<i>Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report, 3rd Series</i> , House of Commons (London).
<i>H.C. Deb. 5 s.</i>	<i>Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report, 5th Series</i> , House of Commons (London).
<i>H.L. Deb. 5 s.</i>	<i>Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report, 5th Series</i> , House of Lords (London).
<i>L.N.O.J.</i>	<i>League of Nations Official Journal</i> (Geneva).
<i>L.N.T.S.</i>	<i>League of Nations Treaty Series</i> (Geneva).
<i>Parry</i>	<i>The Consolidated Treaty Series</i> , edited and annotated by Clive Parry (New York, 1969, ff.).
<i>S.T.S.</i>	<i>Soviet Treaty Series . . .</i> , compiled and edited by Leonard Shapiro, vol. I (Washington, 1950).

An asterisk following the file number of a document indicates that the text has been taken from Confidential Print.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

CHAPTER I

Central Europe and the Balkans January–October, 1925

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
1 SIR H. DERING Bucharest No. 4	Jan. 1	Gives an account of the Bulgarian Prime Minister's visit to Roumania and of his statements in respect of the Bolshevik peril, Bulgaria's relations with other states and Bulgaria's need for the re-establishment of compulsory military service.	1
2 MR. BARBER Sofia No. 2	Jan. 5	Reports account given by the S.C.S. Minister of the Bulgarian Prime Minister's visit to Belgrade, during which, according to M. Rakić, although general proposals regarding united action against the communist danger were discussed, nothing concrete was decided.	4
3 MR. EYRES Dufazzo Tel. No. 1	Jan. 6	Suggests that he should accept notification of Ahmed Bey Zogu's appointment as Prime Minister but should not raise question of recognition. n. 6: F.O. minute of Jan. 7 discussing the situation.	5
4 MR. SARGENT Paris	Jan. 6	Explains to Mr. Lampson that the Conference of Ambassadors have gone slow on the questions of St. Naoum and Vermosh as they hope to extend their consultations to the Albanian and S.C.S. Govts.	6
5 LORD CREWE Paris No. 41	Jan. 7	Reports a conversation with King Alexander of the S.C.S. State touching on the Albanian frontier question and on the recognition of the Soviet Govt. by France and Great Britain.	8
6 SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens No. 16	Jan. 9	Reports that the P.M. (M. Michalakopoulos) states that he will declare in the Assembly that, as the govt. was not responsible for the signature of the Geneva Protocol (see No. 2, n. 7), he does not consider he is bound by it; comments that the P.M.'s motives are (i) to improve relations with the S.C.S. State (ii) to strengthen his position in the Assembly.	10

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
7 MR. EYRES Durazzo No. 5	Jan. 9	Reports that Ahmed Bey (i) states that in forming his new govt. he was free from any arrangements with the S.C.S. State (ii) has decided to substitute a gendarmerie for the existing army (iii) intends to apply to the League of Nations for a loan.	11
8 SIR C. BARCLAY Budapest	Jan. 12	Informs Mr. Lampson that he unofficially called the P.M.'s attention to Hungary's obstruction of the Control Commission (failure to abolish universal compulsory service, to supply attestation sheets, to create a single state munition factory and submit documents called for) and pointed out that Hungary was in danger of failing to obtain credits abroad to complete her reconstruction programme.	14
9 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 27	Jan. 15	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors decided to request the S.C.S. and Albanian Govts. to instruct their delegates on the Boundary Commission which was being summoned from Florence to Paris in such a way as would enable the Albanian-S.C.S. boundary to be delineated in the summer: suggests that S.C.S. Minister in London be urged to impress upon his govt. the need to assist the Allied Govts. and the League in settling the questions of St. Naoum and Vermosh, and execution of the Djakova Protocol of Nov. 21, 1924.	17
10 SIR C. BARCLAY Budapest No. 20	Jan. 16	Reports that in a speech in the Finance Committee of the National Assembly, the Defence Minister stated that (i) the responsible Powers had not imposed disarmament as required by the Trianon Treaty on Hungary's neighbours (ii) failure to hand over military control to the League was to be deplored (iii) it was necessary to secure a thorough modification of the terms of voluntary service.	18
11 MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Jan. 19	Records that he (i) informed M. Vintila Bratiano, Roumanian Finance Minister, (who was accompanied by the Roumanian Minister and the Governor of the Roumanian National Bank) that H.M.G. could not give a commitment to send ships through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea and that if Roumania wanted British protection her best course was to interest Britain in her economic development (ii) gave him a list of the questions which the F.O. have outstanding against Roumania. <i>Encl: List of outstanding questions.</i>	19
12 To SIR C. BARCLAY Budapest No. 17	Jan. 20	Instructs to submit his views (having sounded his French and Italian colleagues) on the advisability of sending a firmly worded joint note to the Hungarian Govt. protesting against their failure to carry out their treaty obligations.	22

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
13 MR. AVELING Foreign Office	Jan. 21	Memo. on the situation of Military Control in Hungary.	24
14 SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens No. 33	Jan. 21	Reports that he (i) has been unable to obtain precise information of negotiations for the renewal of the S.C.S.-Greek alliance (ii) has already made five representations regarding the suggestion (see Vol. XXVI, No. 309, n. 5) for the provision of expert advice for the better regulation of the Salonika-Ghevgheli line but to no avail.	27
15 MR. NICOLSON Foreign Office	Jan. 22	Records the detailed and satisfactory information given by M. Venizelos concerning the denunciation by Belgrade of the Serbo-Greek Alliance (see No. 14, n. 4), the negotiations for a new treaty, and the concessions which he advises the Greek Govt. to make in order to arrive at satisfactory relations with the S.C.S. Kingdom and Italy: adds that M. Venizelos stated that any federation between Bulgaria and the S.C.S. Kingdom, which would threaten Greek Macedonia, was not at the moment practical politics.	28
16 TO LORD CREWE Paris No. 280	Jan. 23	Refers to No. 9 and states that, although the two litigant states would be wise to settle out of court, it is not the function of one of the judges to advise one party on a course of action.	31
17 MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS Vienna No. 23	Jan. 23	Reports that he impressed upon the Chancellor, who complained of Austria's economic difficulties and London's lack of confidence in Austria, the need to keep the budget within the estimate agreed at Geneva and to execute the reforms Austria had undertaken to carry out: adds that the Chancellor, who anticipated political difficulties, outlined the plans he had in mind.	32
18 SIR C. BARCLAY Budapest No. 28	Jan. 24	Informs that the League Controller-General's VIIIth Report on the progress of Hungary's reconstruction has made a good impression and has silenced many critics, there being still, however, much dissatisfaction with the rise in prices.	34
19 MR. ERSKINE Sofia No. 13	Jan. 27	Reports that (i) M.F.A. who stated that the Govt. were organising village bands to combat communist and agrarian bands, went on to give a most optimistic account of the situation in the interior (ii) M.F.A. stated that (a) his relations with the S.C.S. State and Roumania had improved (b) he did not propose to renew recent negotiations with the Turks (c) relations with Greece had deteriorated as the Greek failure to ratify the Minorities Protocol (see No. 2, n. 7) meant a large influx of refugees from Macedonia.	36

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
20	MR. EYRES Durazzo No. 16	Jan. 27	Reports that the Constituent Assembly proclaimed Albania as a republic and that the new Constitution will make Ahmed Bey a virtual dictator.	39
21	TO LORD CREWE Paris No. 336	Jan. 28	Instructs to move at the Conference of Ambassadors that the various decisions of the Albanian Frontier Commission be notified officially to the Albanian and S.C.S. Govts.	40
22	TO MR. EYRES Durazzo No. 18	Jan. 28	Refers to No. 7, para. 4; assumes that suggestion for the neutralisation of Albania means that the integrity of that country should be jointly and severally guaranteed by Italy, the S.C.S. Kingdom, Greece, France and Great Britain; points out the difficulties involved; and states that the League Covenant renders unnecessary the neutralisation of any state.	41
23	LORD CREWE Paris No. 227	Jan. 28	Refers to Vol. XXVI, No. 251, reviews the recent negotiations on the question of Hungarian disarmament, discusses various proposals for breaking the deadlock, and suggests that to threaten Hungary with the indefinite continuance of the Commission of Control (a course which French and Italian representatives seem to favour) would only perpetuate the present undignified situation.	42
24	SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade No. 24	Jan. 28	Reports that King Alexander (i) gave him an account of Italian proposals for the partition of Albania, which he turned down as it was his policy not to allow a non-Balkan State to set foot in the Balkans or to tolerate an Italian mandate in Albania (ii) expressed the view that Albania was the responsibility of the League of Nations: goes on to give an account of conversations with General Bodrero and M. Ninčić.	46
25	MR. ERSKINE Sofia No. 14	Jan. 28	Discusses the motives for M. Tsankoff's visit to Belgrade and comments generally on Serbo-Bulgarian relations with reference especially to Greece and to Macedonia.	50
26	MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Jan. 29	Records that the Greek Minister, who is about to return to Athens for the negotiations for the renewal of the Greco-Serb Alliance, stated that (i) he hoped that the Greek Govt. would buy the Serbian shares in the Ghevheli-Salonika railway (ii) he recognised the need to deal with the maladministration and hindrances encountered by S.C.S. trade in Salonika (iii) promised to do all he could to obtain settlement of claims of British nationals against the Greek Govt.	52

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
27 SIR C. BARCLAY Budapest No. 34	Jan. 29	Reports M.F.A. as saying that he did not think an agreement on preferential treatment between Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be beneficial unless it were extended to Roumania and the S.C.S. State: requests H.M.G.'s views on this matter.	54
28 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 21	Jan. 30	Reports that the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry stated categorically that there was no secret understanding between Italy and the S.C.S. Govt. for the disposal of Albania.	56
29 SIR C. BARCLAY Budapest No. 39	Jan. 30	Refers to No. 12 and states that (i) military sanctions, which could only be applied by Hungary's neighbours, are out of the question (ii) severe financial pressure would destroy reconstruction (iii) proposed joint note with certain revision might be effective, but it might be better if it were addressed by the Conference of Ambassadors.	57
30 SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 13	Feb. 1	Refers to No. 28 and states that (i) he did not make to King Alexander the remarks attributed to him by the Italian Govt. (see No. 24) (ii) the King's revelations of Italian overtures were confirmed but attributed not to the Italian Ambassador at Paris but to General Bodrero.	59
31 MR. EYRES Durazzo Tel. No. 7	Feb. 4	Reports that M.F.A. would be glad to know what diplomatic support he can expect from H.M.G. in face of Italian threats in view of exclusive grant of an oil concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. n. 7: F.O. Minutes on this matter.	60
32 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 109	Feb. 5	Reports that, although the Secretary General assured him that Signor Mussolini had no designs on Albania, the attitude of local Italian agents does not inspire confidence.	62
33 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 54	Feb. 6	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors decided, in view of an Italian alternative proposal, to refer back to the Versailles Military Committee their report recommending that the Hungarian Govt. should be told to hand over all the material illegally manufactured since the Commission's order of September, 1924 to cease manufacture of war material in private factories.	63
34 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 33	Feb. 7	Instructs to explain to Signor Mussolini that Colonel Stirling, who is employed by the Albanian Govt., cannot be prevented from recruiting nine gendarmarie officers in the United Kingdom, and to make it clear that H.M.G., who would have preferred some other arrangement, have no political interest in this matter.	64

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		n. 4: F.O. tel. No. 34 of Feb. 7 giving the text of a letter it is proposed to send to Colonel Stirling.	
35 To MR. EYRES Durazzo Tel. No. 5	Feb. 7	Refers to No. 31 and instructs to advise Albanian Govt. to reply to Italian representation to the effect that (i) Anglo-Persian Co. have excluded area demanded by the Italians (ii) concession is not a monopoly (iii) contract was signed nearly four years ago.	67
36 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 35	Feb. 7	Refers to No. 31 and instructs to request Signor Mussolini that Italian Minister at Durazzo should dissipate the unfortunate impression given and, if necessary, express astonishment that Italian Govt. should threaten an independent and sovereign state for according to a British firm a perfectly legitimate commercial concession.	67
37 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 512	Feb. 10	Refers to No. 23, transmits copy of No. 29 (including n. 7), calls attention to F.O. despatch of Oct. 31, 1924 (see Vol. XXVI, No. 251), and goes on to give reasons for postponing action until the situation has become clearer.	68
38 MR. ERSKINE Sofia No. 26	Feb. 10	Refers to No. 19 and reports that M.F.A. complained that H.M.G. had given less support at Geneva than the French and Italian Govts. in the matter of the rejection by the Greek Govt. of the Minorities Protocol (see No. 2, n. 7).	71
39 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 29	Feb. 11	Refers to No. 36 and reports that (i) his strong representations were made at an un-appropriate moment as there was an acute crisis within the Fascist party over Albania (ii) Signor Mussolini promised to give a considered reply. n. 6: Record of Mr. Lampson's and Mr. Nicolson's conversation with Sir J. Cadman of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co.	72
40 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 31	Feb. 11	Refers to No. 34 and reports that Signor Mussolini stated that there were likely to be strong protests in Italy and at Belgrade if the Albanian gendarmerie were entrusted to foreign control.	74
41 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 32	Feb. 13	Refers to No. 39 and states that the Italian reply (i) gives history of Italian explorations for oil in Albania (ii) asserts that concession to Anglo-Persian Oil Co. constitutes virtual monopoly (iii) proposes that discussions should be held with a view to reaching an agreement.	75
42 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 43	Feb. 13	Refers to No. 40 and instructs to inform Signor Mussolini that (i) as H.M.G. wish to take into account his difficulties, they have decided to make the letter to Colonel Stirling even more categorical (ii) that it is	76

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NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		hardly correct to say the gendarmerie is 'to take the place' of the Albanian army.	
43 To MR. EYRES Durazzo Tel. No. 11	Feb. 13	Refers to No. 40 and instructs to inform the Albanian Govt. in forwarding a message, authorised by H.M.G., from Colonel Stirling, of substance of what has passed between Signor Mussolini and H.M.G. (see Nos. 34, 39, 40 and 42) and to explain the risk they will be incurring by the engagement of British officers. n. 2: Text of Colonel Stirling's message.	77
44 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 34	Feb. 14	Refers to No. 41 and reports that he has received personal message from Signor Mussolini requesting H.M.G. to secure postponement of ratification of Anglo-Persian Co.'s oil concession by the Albanian Assembly.	78
45 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 50	Feb. 14	Refers to No. 44 and instructs (i) to inform Italian Govt. that it is quite impossible at the eleventh hour to prevent the Albanian Assembly from exercising their rights (ii) to point out that the Anglo-Persian Co. obtained a concession over the whole of Albania four years ago and have since reduced the area claimed to 100,000 hectares (iii) to request the Italian Govt. to state the areas in which they are interested in order that some form of compromise might possibly be negotiated. n. 3: F.O. tel. No. 52 of Feb. 17, substituting figure of 200,000 hectares.	78
46 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 36	Feb. 14	Refers to No. 44, gives account of Italian press campaign and of his reply to Secretary-General's further representations, and states that Signor Mussolini should be able to make effective reply to his critics if he could say that since a previous govt. scuttled from Albania he had done all he could to safeguard Italian interests.	80
47 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 51	Feb. 17	Refers to No. 46; instructs to act on No. 45 (which crossed No. 46) and to say that if Italians will state what areas they desire H.M.G. will, if possible, endeavour to meet them.	82
48 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 40	Feb. 17	Refers to No. 45 and reports that (i) the Secretary-General expressed appreciation of H.M.G.'s offer (ii) U.S. Ambassador stated that the Sinclair Co. was interested in question of oil concessions.	83
49 MR. EYRES Durazzo Tel. No. 15	Feb. 17	Reports that Ahmed Bey states that he is going to send a letter to Signor Mussolini stating that he is not animated with any unfriendly attitude towards Italy.	84
50 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 41	Feb. 17	Refers to No. 48 and reports that Italian Govt. (i) are annoyed but seem disposed to accept the situation on learning of the	84

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		ratification of the Anglo-Persian oil concession (ii) do not desire to participate in Anglo-Persian concession but to have a concession of their own.	
51 Mr. NICOLSON Foreign Office	Feb. 17	Memo. on Italy, Great Britain and Albania discussing the Albanian offer of a tobacco concession, the appointment of gendarmerie officers, and the oil concession, and suggesting the line to be taken when the Italian Ambassador calls. n. 10: Record by the Secretary of State of his conversation of Feb. 17 with the Italian Ambassador.	85
52 Mr. EYRES Durazzo No. 29	Feb. 17	Reports that when Ahmed Bey, who was much discouraged by Colonel Stirling's telegram (see No. 43, n. 2), stated that he was prepared for Italian obstruction but hoped for better things from H.M.G., he counselled moderation which course Ahmed Bey agreed to follow.	88
53 To SIR C. BARCLAY Budapest No. 55	Feb. 18	Informs that he (i) told the new Hungarian Minister of the need of the Hungarian Govt. to carry out the requirements of the Control Commission (ii) informed him that a British Officer had been appointed as Chairman of the Control Commission which was eventually to function under the League.	90
54 To SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade No. 94	Feb. 18	Informs that, according to information from the Czech Minister at Belgrade, Italy, having adopted a policy of double dealing in the Balkans, is attempting to form an alignment of the S.C.S. State, Bulgaria, Roumania, and possibly Albania; and instructs to watch the situation carefully.	91
55 Mr. EYRES Durazzo No. 30	Feb. 18	Reports that Ahmed Bey, while expressing appreciation for H.M.G.'s suggestions and action taken (see Nos. 31, 34, 35 and 45) stated his determination to proceed with his gendarmerie plans and the Anglo-Persian oil concession, adding that Italian capitalists would never risk money in Albania.	92
56 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 59	Feb. 19	Refers to No. 50; informs that Mr. Eyres put no pressure on the Albanian Govt. (cf. No. 55, n. 6) and instructs to inform the Secretary-General that Italy's rejoinder to their friendly offer gives no encouragement to H.M.G. to proceed further in urging the Anglo-Persian Co. to notify the Albanian Govt. of their intention not to take up certain areas within their concession.	94
57 Mr. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Feb. 19	Letter to Mr. Chilton at Washington stating that (i) a despatch is being sent on oil question in Albania (ii) unreliability of American Minister at Durazzo (of whom	95

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		Mr. Eyres complains) is well known in the State Department and his reports about British intrigues are not likely to be taken too seriously.	
58 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 50	Feb. 21	Refers to No. 56; reports that (i) Signor Mussolini is so incensed with ratification on Feb. 16 that he is likely to throw in his lot with the Americans and contest the validity of the Anglo-Persian concession (ii) not without difficulty he has induced the Secretary-General to have a map prepared of the area the Italians desire to claim.	96
59 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 52	Feb. 21	Transmits communication from the Secretary-General expressing astonishment at H.M.G.'s demand for withdrawal of representation made by the Italian Ambassador (see No. 61, below), stating that they had never objected to a British oil concession in Albania, and explaining in some detail the Italian viewpoint. n. 6: F.O. tel. No. 70 of March 6 to Rome stating that the Italian Ambassador has been informed that the incident may now be considered as closed.	98
60 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 54	Feb. 23	States that (i) it seems possible that Italian map and statement of areas desired will be considered just as objectionable as suggestion of the Skumbi line (see No. 50) (ii) claims should not be regarded too literally (iii) possible that Italians could be satisfied without prejudice to the interests of the Anglo-Persian Co.	99
61 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 62	Feb. 23	Informs that on Feb. 19 the Italian Ambassador, verbally to Mr. Lampson, accused H.M.G. of bad faith and of forcing the Albanian Govt. to grant oil concession to the Anglo-Persian Co. and that, on the following day, Sir E. Crowe suggested to him that the representation should be withdrawn.	100
62 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 63	Feb. 23	Refers to No. 61; outlines compromise under consideration by H.M.G., the second stage of which would be direct negotiation between the Anglo-Persian Co. and the Anglo-Italian Corporation.	103
63 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 74	Feb. 23	Reports that Conference of Ambassadors (i) agreed to British suggestion that if Albania and S.C.S. State failed to reach agreement by March 15 then Conference will notify decision on St. Naoum and take decisions on outstanding points (ii) decided to instruct the Military Committee to draw up a statement for the League and the Reparation Commission showing how decision on whether the reconstruction scheme relieves the Hungarian Govt. of the obligation to meet treaty charges may	104

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		affect adversely the execution of the military clauses.	
64 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Unnumbered Tel.	Feb. 24	Informs that No. 62 will have shown H.M.G.'s desire to seek accommodation with Signor Mussolini and instructs to suggest text of a personal message.	105
65 MR. EYRES Durazzo Unnumbered Tel.	Feb. 24	States that (i) Greek, Bulgarian, German, Italian, S.C.S., Hungarian, French and U.S. representatives have acknowledged notification of govt. formed by Ahmed Bey (ii) there is no plausible reason for attacking the legality of the Assembly which has ratified the oil concession.	106
66 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 56	Feb. 25	Reports that, having been informed of No. 61, the Secretary-General stated that (i) the instructions sent to the Italian Ambassador did not contemplate any official representation but merely told him to support the representations made in Rome (ii) No. 59 could be taken as Italian reply. n. 4: Comments by Sir R. Graham and by Mr. Chamberlain.	107
67 SIR H. DERING Bucharest Tel. No. 8	Feb. 26	Reports that M.F.A., in view of discovery by Bulgarian Govt. of communist plans to establish a republic and of Soviet concentration of troops near Bessarabia, would be glad to learn if H.M.G. have any indication of Soviet political plans.	108
68 MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Feb. 26	Records conversation with U.S. First Secretary who (i) stated that American oil interests were complaining that whereas Italians were to participate in the British concession the Americans were excluded (ii) requested information to enable his Govt. to answer their critics: adds that he gave Mr. Atherton a detailed account which disproved the allegation that it was simply blackmail which had resulted in the possibility of Italian participation in the British concession.	109
69 SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade No. 63	Feb. 26	Reports that M.F.A. stated that (i) negotiations with Albania had come to a standstill (ii) his Govt. could not give up St. Naoum and Vermosh without the consent of Parliament and would never evacuate St. Naoum except before a vast army.	111
70 SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens Tel. No. 52	Mar. 3	Reports information given by the S.C.S. Minister on the progress of negotiations (which will be continued at Belgrade in early April) for a renewal of the S.C.S.-Greek Treaty (see Nos. 14 and 26). n. 3: Athens tel. No. 53 of Mar. 3 reporting information from Greek sources on the negotiations.	113
71 MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Mar. 3	Records that when the Hungarian Minister asked on behalf of his govt. for an	114

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		indication of how they could show their good faith (see No. 53), he mentioned five points which needed to be dealt with and stated that this meant complying with the demands of the Control Commission, whereupon control might then be handed over to the League.	
72 Mr. NICOLSON Foreign Office	Mar. 3	Letter to Sir J. Cadman briefing him on his projected visit to Rome for negotiations concerning Italian participation in oil concession.	116
73 Mr. EYRES Durazzo Tel. No. 21	Mar. 5	Gives an account of the negotiations of the Sinclair Consolidated Oil Co.'s negotiations, which began in Sept. 1922, for an oil concession in Albania.	118
74 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 775	Mar. 5	Transmits copy of letter from Sir O. Niemeyer on various expedients under discussion for amelioration of the Austrian financial and economic situation and informs that he intends during meeting of the League Council to impress upon the French and Czechoslovak Govts. the need for commercial treaties and reduction of existing tariffs.	119
75 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 7	Mar. 10	Expresses view that Bulgarian request to raise 4000 volunteers to deal with Agrarian and Communist extremists (see n. 1), should be refused, as the danger is less than last year (see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 195-292, <i>passim</i>) and as the govt. have organized a system of communal guards in defiance of the Control Commission.	120
76 Mr. EYRES Durazzo Tel. No. 23	Mar. 10	Reports that Italian Minister obtained an oil concession over 50,000 hectares, which concession does not affect that of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co.	121
77 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia No. 49	Mar. 11	Transmits translations of declaration published by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation Central Committee, stating the aim of complete autonomy for Macedonia either as an independent state or as member of a Yugoslav or Balkan federation; reports that he learns from secret sources that the Central Committee have undertaken to support the Tsankoff Govt. and to refrain from causing embarrassment to the S.C.S. Govt.	122
78 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia No. 50	Mar. 12	Refers to No. 75; explains in greater detail why it is inadvisable to grant the Bulgarian Govt.'s request to recruit a further 4,000 men; and reports that the Organ of Liquidation have given consent for the preparatory measures required for the enrolment.	123
79 Sir R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 71	Mar. 13	Reports that Sir J. Cadman arrived on March 11 and that the negotiations seem to promise well.	125

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80 MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Mar. 13	Records that the U.S. First Secretary when informed of the Italian Oil Concession in Albania (see No. 76) stated that this contradicted the Italian complaint that the Anglo-Persian concession constituted a monopoly.	125
81 MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 9	Mar. 19	Refers to No. 75; reports that Minister of War, citing information from Roumania, states that the Communist rising is planned for March, April, or May (cf. No. 67); and adds that he sees no reason to modify opinion expressed in Nos. 75 and 78.	126
82 SIR C. BARCLAY Budapest No. 80	Mar. 19	Reports that despite press criticism of League Commissioner's Report for January, the British Adviser to the Hungarian National Bank states that the financial position is sound and that, though too much is spent on personnel, Hungarians are not really overtaxed.	127
83 To MR. EYRES Dufazzo Tel. No. 36	Mar. 20	Informs that S.C.S. complaint that British Representative is encouraging Ahmed Bey's opposition (see n. 1) is entirely unfounded; instructs, if asked for advice, to counsel conciliation and to impress upon the Albanian Govt. the wisdom of making sacrifices.	128
84 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 77	Mar. 20	Refers to No. 79 and reports that, despite grasping attitude of the Italian experts, agreement has been reached. n. 4: F.O. tel. No. 89 of Mar. 23 agreeing to a communiqué, providing it is in general terms and affords no pretext to the American Govt. to claim that, through Italian Govt. pressure, Italy has been admitted to participation.	129
85 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 92 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 87	Mar. 21	Instructs to ask Govt. to agree to a joint communication by Allied representatives at Sofia refusing Bulgarian request to recruit 4000 extra volunteer militia (see Nos. 75, 78 and 81).	130
86 MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS Vienna No. 81	Mar. 21	States that (i) he sees no particular point in approaching the Austrian Govt. with regard to the making of commercial arrangements with Austria's neighbours (see No. 74) (ii) any advice or pressure could best be attempted at Prague, Belgrade and Budapest.	131
87 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 108	Mar. 22	Refers to No. 85; reports that the Allied Military Committee proposed to recommend that Allied Govts. should allow enrolment because (a) it would not lead to excess of that allowed by the Treaty (b) if refused, enrolment would still take place in which case Allied Govts. would need to decide on action they would take.	132

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88 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1013	Mar. 23	Reviews the position of Hungarian indebtedness as a consequence of the League's reconstruction scheme; points out that cost of single munition factory will have to be credited against annuities payable by Hungary; sets forth the arguments for splitting the factory into sections; and instructs to adduce these arguments in the Conference of Ambassadors.	132
89 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. [109]	Mar. 24	Refers to No. 87; reports that the French Govt. agree with H.M.G.'s views (see No. 85); requests to be informed whether he should press the Versailles Military Committee to instruct the Liquidating Organ to suspend its decision concerning increase of the Bulgarian militia.	135
90 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 94	Mar. 24	Refers to No. 87; states that (i) No. 85 was drafted in ignorance of the Liquidating Organ's decision (ii) in these circumstances proposal of the Versailles Committee should be accepted, provided it is understood that the Liquidating Organ should be instructed not to take any similar decisions without reference to the Versailles Committee.	135
91 MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 10	Mar. 25	Refers to No. 90 and states that, although Liquidating Organ are informing the Bulgarian Govt. that they are obliged to submit matter of militia enrolment to the Allied Govts., in their letter of March 19 they had stated that they were taking responsibility of granting permission on behalf of Allied Govts., subject to certain conditions which Bulgarian Govt. have accepted.	136
92 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 115	Mar. 26	Reports that Conference of Ambassadors (i) agreed to wait for arrival of further documents from Sofia before coming to a decision on the Bulgarian militia question: requests to be informed whether H.M.G. still hold view (see No. 90) that enrolment should be authorised (ii) instructed Allied Military Committee of Versailles to reconsider splitting up of single state factory in view of No. 88 (iii) communicated to League of Nations and Reparation Commission effects of treating as treaty charges expenditure incurred in execution of military clauses of Versailles Treaty.	137
93 SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens No. 114	Mar. 31	Reports that (i) M. Caclamanos suspects that postponement of Greek-S.C.S. negotiations (see No. 70) means an increase in S.C.S. demands (ii) Greece is considering a Roumanian suggestion for negotiation by Greece, Roumania, and the S.C.S. State with a view to forming a Balkan <i>bloc</i> .	138

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94	LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 124	Apr. 2	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors decided to put into force its resolution of Feb. 23 (see No. 63) to notify the powers concerned of the decision on St. Naoum and to summon the Boundary Commission to meet in Paris on April 20.	140
95	CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	Apr. 6	Notes on the activities of Soviet Govt. in the Balkans.	141
96	SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens No. 122	Apr. 13	Gives an account of speeches by Dr. Zervos, M. Michalacopoulos, General Gonatas and M. Papanastasiou in the Greek Chamber on March 26 and 27 on the subject of the Dodecanese.	143
97	LORD CREWE Paris No. 893	Apr. 15	Refers to No. 92, n. 5, and states that he approved the Report of April 4 of the Versailles Military Committee without waiting for an actual meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors.	144
98	MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS Vienna No. 90	Apr. 15	Refers to No. 86; comments on the Austrian Govt.'s hope to be able to claim at the June meeting of the League Council that they have practically fulfilled all the requirements in so far as financial reforms are concerned; adds that Austrian Govt. probably intend to ask the League to arrange for an expert enquiry into the economic situation in Central Europe and into the means of removing restrictions on Austrian trade and communications.	145
99	MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 15	Apr. 18	Transmits message from Military Attaché to D.M.I., informing that M.F.A., having stated that govt. regarded recent terrorist action as a preliminary to organised Communist campaign, requested Organ of Liquidation for permission to raise an additional 10,000 militia: expresses view that govt.'s anxiety is genuine. n. 1: Details of terrorist acts.	147
100	MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 18	Apr. 20	Reports that (i) he acted on instructions to warn the Bulgarian Govt. of folly of arresting moderate Agrarian leaders and of indiscriminate killings of Communists (ii) M.F.A. admitted regrettable reprisals by the civil guard but stated that strict orders had been issued to prevent further incidents.	149
101	LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 152	Apr. 20	Reports that British representative on the Versailles Military Committee withheld his consent to draft telegram authorising enrolment of 10,000 men for the Bulgarian militia (see No. 99) pending receipt of instructions.	150
102	TO LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 106	Apr. 21	Instructs (i) to agree to the enrolment of 10,000 militia but, in doing so, to endeavour to couple the permission with the warning to the Bulgarian Govt. not to use the situation to persecute political oppo-	150

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		nents (ii) to sound French and Italian colleagues as to a communication to the S.C.S. Govt. expressing confidence that they will abstain from any action which might complicate the situation.	
103 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 154	Apr. 22	Refers to No. 102; reports that a draft communication to the S.C.S. Govt. has been prepared; and suggests that, as the French and Italian Ministers in Belgrade have already made representations, Sir A. Young should be instructed to speak to the S.C.S. Govt. independently. n. 4: F.O. instructions to Sir A. Young.	151
104 MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS Vienna No. 99	Apr. 22	Reports that (i) M.F.A., having expressed indignation about British press articles stating that Vienna is the headquarters of the Pan-Balkan Communist Union, explains that during last two years Vienna has ceased to be a Communist centre, the chief centres being now Berlin and Prague (ii) the President of the Police explained to Mr. Leeper that the Austrian Police had the Communists and other Balkan revolutionaries under control.	152
105 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 160	Apr. 23	Reports that (i) Ministry of Foreign Affairs would prefer that communication to S.C.S. and Bulgarian Govts. should be addressed to their representatives in Paris and that the texts should also be presented in Sofia and Belgrade jointly by the Allied representatives (ii) he had agreed to this and also to a similar communication to be sent, with the same procedure, to the Greek and Roumanian Govts.	155
106 To SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens Tel. No. 38	Apr. 24	Instructs to inform the P.M. of H.M.G.'s anxiety on receiving Greek protest against enrolment of 10,000 Bulgarian militiamen and threat to take military measures in event of an emergency, and to point out the dangers to Greece's economic recovery. n. 7: Athens tel. No. 75 of Apr. 25 stating that P.M. promised to exercise restraint until May 31.	155
107 To MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 25	Apr. 27	Informs that S.C.S. and Greek insistence that the 10,000 Bulgarian militiamen should be disbanded by May 31 is perfectly reasonable; instructs to make this clear to the Bulgarian Govt. and to keep H.M.G. fully informed of use to which the additional troops are put.	157
108 SIR H. DERING Bucharest Tel. No. 21	Apr. 27	Reports that M.F.A (i) although agreeing to principle of increase of the Bulgarian militia believes that Roumania and other neighbouring govts. should have been consulted (ii) states that he has counselled moderation at Belgrade, Athens and Sofia.	158

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109 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia Unnumbered Tel.	Apr. 29	States that (i) recent outrages were sporadic and not part of a plot for a general rising (ii) it is doubtful whether documents discovered by the govt. will prove much more than that money has been supplied by Moscow (iii) Third International have fomented what is essentially an internal struggle (iv) no reason to believe that S.C.S. Govt. had previous knowledge of outrages.	159
110 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 33	Apr. 29	Refers to No. 107 and reports that he warned M.F.A. that postponement of disbandment would lead to grave complications with Bulgaria's neighbours.	160
111 To THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Apr. 29	States that French Note of April 3 stating that the Anglo-Persian Oil Concession constitutes a virtual monopoly and is in breach of the San Remo Agreement of April 25, 1920, is based upon an entire misapprehension of the facts: proceeds to give an account of the concession and to examine the text of the San Remo Agreement.	161
112 SIR G. CLERK Prague No. 150	Apr. 30	Reports that M.F.A. stated that (i) in order to survive, Austria must export (ii) Czechoslovakia would facilitate this provided countries having commercial treaties with her would forego their rights in regard to special favours accorded to Austria and provided the S.C.S. State and Italy collaborate. n. 5: Vienna despatch No. 111 of May 7 giving comments by Mr. Akers-Douglas on Dr. Beneš's statements.	163
113 SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade No. 136	Apr. 30	Reports that, on being presented with the Allied note (see No. 105), M.F.A. stated that his Govt. would insist on disbandment of additional forces by May 31.	166
114 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 42	May 4	Reports that Italian Minister, having received instructions (see No. 107), states that he will inform M.F.A. that additional militiamen must be dismissed by May 31 and advise him to abandon proposed visit to London, Paris and Rome.	167
115 To Mr. ERSKINE Sofia No. 124	May 4	Transmits record of Mr. Lampson's conversation of Apr. 30 with the Bulgarian Minister regarding (i) alleged S.C.S. complicity in the Sofia outrage (see No. 99, n. 1) (ii) the need to disband additional militiamen by May 31 (iii) the Minister's request for League of Nations' financial aid for Bulgaria (iv) Bulgaria's refusal to allow Col. Wedgwood, M.P., to inspect prisons.	168
116 To Mr. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 36	May 5	Instructs to inform M.F.A. that H.M.G. view his proposed visit to London, Paris and Rome (see No. 114, n. 4) with great	171

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		disfavour and to point out that S.C.S. and Greek Govts. would view it with suspicion.	
117 WAR OFFICE	May 5	States that Bulgarian Govt. may have difficulty in raising 10,000 unpaid volunteers and points out that they may resort to illegal means of raising men. n. 4: Sofia tel. No. 41 of May 4 stating that 9,625 nominal volunteers out of total of 13,000 were enrolled by May 1.	172
118 MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 46	May 6	Refers to No. 116, which arrived too late for action as M.F.A. had gone to Belgrade, and states that, as there is great resentment at alleged British unsympathetic attitude, he does not propose to speak to the President of the Council in sense of that telegram unless specially instructed to do so. n. 2: Belgrade tel. No. 53/54 of May 6 from Sir A. Young reporting that he drew the contents of No. 116 to the attention of the Bulgarian M.F.A. who argued that it was essential for the morale of the Bulgarian people that the Great Powers should be aware of the dangers of the activity of the Third International.	174
119 MR. PETERS Moscow No. 276	May 6	Transmits text, as published in <i>Izvestiya</i> , of proclamation of the Balkan Communist Federation denying connection with terrorists in Bulgaria but expressing sympathy for them for fighting against the white terror.	175
120 SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade No. 143	May 6	Reports that (i) renewed negotiations for reviving the S.C.S.-Greek Alliance (see Nos. 14, 26, 70 and 93) have made no progress as the S.C.S. Govt. demand control of the Salonika-Ghevgheli railway and a great extension of the Salonika Free Zone (ii) M. Caclamanos admitted that Greece had let slip two occasions on which they might have acquired the railway.	176
121 To SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 39	May 7	Informs that French Govt. have adopted H.M.G.'s suggestion (see No. 116) that Bulgarian M.F.A. should not visit London, Paris and Rome and instructs to speak to M.F.A. in the strongest terms in hope of dissuading him.	178
122 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 118 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 147	May 7	Informs that, as Bulgarian M.F.A. has gone to Switzerland, H.M.G. has instructed H.M. Minister at Berne to speak to him in sense of No. 121.	179
123 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 122 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 151	May 8	States that H.M.G. do not consider Mr. Erskine's argument for hearing the Bulgarian M.F.A. sufficiently strong to cause modification of instructions in No. 121 but instructs to inform French/Italian Govt. that, if in the light of recent information,	180

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		they consider he should be received, H.M.G. will waive objection.	
124 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 124	May 10	Instructs to suggest to govt. that, as it is likely that Bulgarian M.F.A. will be received by the three Great Powers, identic language should be held to him to the effect that no extension of the time limit will be allowed for the disbandment of the additional militiamen. n. 8: Rome tel. No. 113 of May 14 stating that Italian Govt. agree that there should be no extension of time limit.	180
125 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 178	May 13	Reports that M.F.A. states that he told Bulgarian M.F.A. that time limit could not be extended and advised him on need for reconstruction of Bulgarian Govt. so as to include Agrarian element.	182
126 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 303	May 13	Transmits memo. communicated by State Secretary on May 11 concerning reported secret political agreements between Czechoslovakia and Poland.	182
127 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 139 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 167	May 19	Informs that on May 18 Bulgarian M.F.A. was told that (i) he greatly exaggerated dangers to Bulgaria (ii) a serious effort should be made to promote internal unity (iii) repressive measures should not be taken against political opponents (iv) the additional troops must be disbanded by the appointed date.	184
128 MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 57	May 20	States that any danger involved in disbanding volunteers by May 31 would be less than that arising from hostile attitude of Bulgaria's neighbours in the event of postponement.	185
129 To SIR G. CLERK Prague No. 211	May 21	Briefs him on H.M.G.'s views on the economic crisis in Austria; discusses various suggested solutions (<i>anschluss</i> with Germany, Danube Confederation, preferential tariffs); and pronounces for reduction of tariffs in Central Europe, removal of import and export prohibitions, and closer economic ties between Austria and her neighbours.	186
130 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 144 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 171	May 22	Expresses agreement with views in No. 128 and instructs to invite French/Italian Govt. to instruct their representatives on the Organ of Liquidation to the effect that disbandment of additional troops must be completed by May 31.	188
131 To MR. KEELING Athens No. 310	May 27	Informs that he told the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, who submitted an account of the critical position of the S.C.S.—Greek negotiations, that H.M.G. could not approach the S.C.S. Govt. on behalf of Greece, particularly as he himself had urged that his communication should be kept confidential.	189

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132 Mr. KENNARD Belgrade No. 168	May 27	Reports that M.F.A. (i) expressed regret at the departure of Sir A. Young (ii) stated that, though Italy favoured a rapprochement of the S.C.S. State and Austria, he himself believed it were better if there were a closer understanding between Vienna and Prague (iii) explained that the S.C.S. State, having an alliance with Roumania, had no need of Greek military assistance (iv) went on to indicate demands on Greece, S.C.S. relations with Bulgaria, the need for Balkan Federation, and the internal problems facing his govt.	190
133 Sir H. DERING Bucharest No. 290	June 1	Reports that, according to M.F.A., the Bulgarian M.F.A., on his visit to Bucharest, stated his Govt.'s intention to respect the terms of the Treaty and to accept the advice of the Little <i>Entente</i> to disband additional troops by May 31.	193
134 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 62	June 2	Reports that, in informing Organ of Liquidation that orders had been given for the disbandment of additional militia, the Bulgarian Govt. stated that if trouble again broke out they would have recourse to recall of volunteers: suggests that the Organ of Liquidation should be instructed to protest against this statement. n. 5: F.O. tel. of June 4 to Paris and Rome instructing representatives to propose to French and Italian Govts. that a protest should be made.	195
135 Mr. KENNARD Belgrade No. 180	June 3	Reports that M. Caclamanos gave him a full account of the recent S.C.S.—Greek negotiations which have been suspended and went on to express his view that Italy was encouraging the S.C.S. State to turn from the Adriatic to Salonika.	196
136 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia No. 117	June 3	Transmits information supplied by Mr. Webster of Save the Children Fund concerning the brutality of Bulgarian military personnel at Stralja, a large village 40 miles from Bourgas.	200
137 Mr. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 237	June 10	Transmits text of telegram sent by Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand from Geneva to Signor Mussolini stating that instability in S.E. Europe requires the vigilance of the Three Great Powers and requesting his personal support. n. 2: Memo. by Mr. Nicolson of June 4 suggesting this approach.	201
138 Sir C. BARCLAY Budapest No. 157	June 11	Reports that the British P.M.'s success at Geneva (see No. 137, n. 2), the denunciation of the Little Entente, and the financial arrangements made for Hungary were all received by the Hungarians with much satisfaction.	202

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
139 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 222	June 12	Reports that Conference of Ambassadors approved terms of reply to be sent to the Bulgarian Govt. (see No. 134).	204
140 To MR. EYRES Durazzo Tel. No. 48	June 15	Informes that (i) H.M.G., having insisted on reference of Albanian frontier question to the International Court, cannot intervene at Belgrade (ii) nevertheless H.M. Minister at Belgrade may have opportunity of unobtrusively sowing the seeds of common sense.	204
141 MR. NICOLSON Foreign Office	June 17	Records conversation with M. Caclamanos, who stated that (i) the explanation given by M. Ninčić of the failure of S.C.S.—Greek negotiations (see No. 130) was entirely devoid of truth (ii) Greece must concentrate on economic recovery and wait until the S.C.S. Govt. became more reasonable.	205
142 SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens No. 198	June 24	Reports conversation with the Political Director of the Foreign Ministry and the P.M. who both accused Italy of preventing a Greco—S.C.S. alliance; adds that P.M. is now on better terms with the Italian Legation and that Italy is working for commercial advantages. n. 11: General Pangalos's <i>coup d'état</i> of June 24/25.	207
143 MR. KENNARD Belgrade Tel. No. 102	June 26	Reports that efforts are being made to hasten agreement with the Croatian party, the Govt. hoping thereby to be free to deal with the crisis which may develop from the <i>coup d'état</i> in Greece (see No. 142, n. 11).	210
144 To SIR G. CLERK Prague	June 29	Letter from Mr. Lampson informing that, according to intelligence sources, the Bolshevik organisation at Vienna is being decentralised, sub-centres, having been established at Salonika and Constantinople.	210
145 To THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	July 2	Reiterates statements made in No. 111 but adds that Anglo—Persian Co. would be prepared to discuss matters with the Crédit Général des Pétroles.	211
146 SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens No. 217	July 8	Reports that (i) Signor Grandi, Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, visited M.F.A. and informed Press that Greece and Italy had common interests (ii) attempts of Italians to conciliate Greek feeling have had no effect outside Royalist and Foreign Ministry circles.	212
147 To MR. EYRES Durazzo Tel. No. 53	July 13	Informes of the exact terms of the S.C.S. offer with regard to Vermosh and St. Naoum.	213
148 MR. KENNARD Belgrade Tel. No. 110	July 17	Reports that M.F.A. states that (i) rumoured Italian military preparations at Trieste may be aimed against Greece, or Turkey, or even the S.C.S. Kingdom but more likely Albania (ii) there is a pro-	214

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		nounced activity of Italian agents in the Balkans (iii) as it is essential that outstanding Balkan questions should be settled, he proposes to renew negotiations with Greece as soon as possible.	
		n. 6: Mr. Kennard's report (tel. No. 112 of July 17) that the Italian Minister had stated that as France was occupied with Morocco and Great Britain with the Far East, it was natural that Italy should play a major role in the Balkans.	
149 MR. KENNARD Belgrade Tel. No. 113	July 17	Reports that, according to the French Minister, the S.C.S. Govt. have accepted in principle a French proposal to the effect that an entirely new company, with neutral chairman and joint Greek-S.C.S. board, should be formed to run the Ghevgheli-Salonika railway.	216
150 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 247	July 17	Reports that the Ambassadors' Conference decided that, in the event of an unsatisfactory reply from the Albanian Govt., they will inform the two Govts. concerned that they will take matters into their own hands, demand necessary facilities to demarcate the frontier, and, should they refuse, will bring the facts to the attention of the League.	216
151 MR. EYRES Durazzo No. 93	July 18	Reports that the Standard Oil Co. has obtained a concession to exploit 50,000 hectares and that a British subject, Mr. H.H. Rushton, has been granted a concession to exploit 10,000 hectares.	218
152 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 183	July 20	Refers to No. 148 and reports that the S.C.S. Minister shares his disbelief in Italian military preparations.	219
153 SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens Tel. No. 122	July 20	Refers to Nos. 148 and 149; expresses view that Italian action against the S.C.S. Kingdom is unlikely, that there is no immediate design on Asia Minor, and that preparations for a naval demonstration for the annexation of the Dodecanese are inconceivable in view of Italian attempt to reach a general agreement with Greece.	220
154 MR. NICOLSON Foreign Office	July 23	Records that, in a conversation with the Greek Minister, he confined himself to asking questions about the French proposal for the Salonika-Ghevgheli railway (see No. 149).	221
155 SIR M. CHEETHAM Athens Tel. No. 126	July 24	Reports that M.F.A. is prepared, if necessary, to accept the French proposal (see No. 148) but would prefer that the new company should be international and insists that there should be no extra-territorial rights.	223
156 MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	July 27	Records that the Greek Minister (i) stated that his Govt. could not accept the French railway scheme if it involved a large S.C.S.	223

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		holding in the new company and were now contemplating an appeal to the League (ii) later suggested that the railway should be run by an Anglo-French Co.; adds that he showed no enthusiasm for this suggestion but promised to give an answer as soon as possible.	
157 Mr. PHIPPS Paris Unnumbered Tel.	Aug. 5	Requests Mr. Eyres to communicate to the Albanian Govt. the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors (which is also being communicated to the S.C.S. Govt.) regarding the frontier in the regions of Vermosh and St. Naoum and inviting an acceptance, without reservations, by Aug. 15.	225
158 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 68	Aug. 5	States that Greek reinforcement of frontier troops is a minatory rather than preventative measure and suggests that H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Athens should be instructed to warn the Greek Govt. and urge moderation.	227
159 Mr. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 277	Aug. 5	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors approved the Versailles Military Committee's report regarding measures to be carried out by the Austrian Govt. before the Organ of Liquidation is withdrawn.	228
160 Mr. ERSKINE Sofia No. 169	Aug. 6	Transmits copy of letter from British Delegate on the Control Commission to the Treasury suggesting a further reduction of the costs of the Commission after Jan. 31, 1926 from £12,000 to £6,000 a year; expresses agreement with this proposal.	229
161 Mr. PARR Durazzo No. 99	Aug. 11	Refers to No. 151 and reports that Notes have been exchanged between the Albanian Govt. and the French Chargé d'Affaires securing to the French Govt. an option on all petroliferous lands not already assigned to the four concessions already granted.	230
162 Mr. KEELING Athens Tel. No. 139	Aug. 12	Suggests that, in reply to M.F.A.'s request for H.M.G.'s view regarding the Greek proposal for the internationalisation of the Salonika-Ghevgheli line, he should say that it would be inappropriate for H.M.G. to offer an opinion before the proposal had been considered by countries most nearly interested. n. 2: F.O. tel. No. 106 of Aug. 15 approving Mr. Keeling's suggestion.	231
163 Mr. KENNARD Belgrade No. 315	Aug. 14	Reports that (i) M.F.A. expressed concern at Greek military preparations (ii) French Minister gave him such information as he had concerning Greek-S.C.S. negotiations.	232

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164 MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS Vienna No. 199	Aug. 19	Reports that he and his colleagues delivered Note to Austrian Chancellor (see No. 159) and impressed upon him the need for immediate and energetic execution of the allied demands.	233
165 MR. OGILVIE-FORBES Belgrade No. 338	Aug. 27	Reports that M.F.A. stated that Greek proposal for a Balkan pact of compulsory arbitration could not be considered until Greece had settled the Salonika railway and minorities questions.	234
166 MR. PARR Durazzo No. 110	Aug. 29	Reports and comments on rumours (there being no official information available) concerning the six secret visits of Signor Mussolini's personal friend, the Italian Deputy, Signor Lessona, to Ahmed Bey.	235
167 MR. PARR Durazzo No. 115	Aug. 29	Reports that (i) Bolsheviks are attempting to foment a subversive movement in South Albania (ii) certain Albanian exiles, probably backed by Russia and hoping to obtain support from Greece, are attempting to arrange an appeal to the League for a new form of Govt. under a High Commissioner.	237
168 MR. CHARLES Bucharest No. 417	Sept. 3	Gives Roumanian press comments on Greek proposal for a Balkan Pact (see No. 165) and reports that M.F.A. believes that the proposal is not likely to be accepted in view of existing Greek-S.C.S. relations.	239
169 MR. ERSKINE Sofia No. 189	Sept. 3	Reports that (i) although he favours the Greek proposal (see No. 165), M.F.A. believes that it was not put forward as a serious proposition (ii) Bulgarian Press states that the pact would be useless if Bulgaria were excluded.	240
170 MR. OGILVIE-FORBES Belgrade Tel. No. 128	Sept. 10	Reports his French colleague as saying that there is a good prospect of the settlement of the Salonika Railway and Minorities questions; adds that centre of negotiations is now at Geneva.	241
171 To MR. KEELING Athens No. 498	Sept. 10	Informs that (i) he advised the Greek M.F.A. at Geneva on Sept. 2 to pursue his negotiations with M. Briand concerning the Salonika Railway rather than attempt an appeal to the League, which would not be acceptable to the S.C.S. Govt., (ii) when he raised the questions of an arbitration pact and alliance with the S.C.S. state, he suggested to him that possibility of a western pact (see Chap. II, below) might have a great influence on the Balkan Powers.	242
172 MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 71	Sept. 14	Expresses hope that, as there has been no improvement in the internal situation, no encouragement will be given to M.F.A.'s attempt at Geneva to secure a refugee loan or to launch a proposal for a Balkan security pact.	243

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		n. 2: F.O. tel. No. 205 of Sept. 16 to British delegation at Geneva stating that no encouragement should be given to the Bulgarian M.F.A.	
173 MR. OVEY Rome No. 771	Sept. 14	Reports that a meeting was held in Rome on Sept. 3 for the formal constitution of the Bank of Albania following an agreement between an Italian finance group and the Albanian Govt. on March 15.	244
174 MR. PARR Durazzo No. 138	Sept. 23	Reports that Ahmed Bey, having quashed the Kortcha conspiracy, in which members of the Govt. were implicated has called for the resignation of the Cabinet, it being his intention to form a govt. composed of men hitherto outside politics.	245
175 TO MR. KEELING Athens Tel. No. 115	Sept. 29	Instructs to reply to the Greek M.F.A. to the effect that H.M.G. cannot express an opinion on the Greco-Italian Agreement without more precise information of its content.	247
176 MR. NICOLSON Foreign Office	Sept. 30	Records that he expressed to the S.C.S. Chargé d'Affaires doubt as to the accuracy of the report that the Greek Govt. were negotiating an alliance with Bulgaria.	248
177 MR. OGILVIE-FORBES Belgrade No. 373	Sept. 30	Reports that according to the new Greek Minister (i) the information concerning the Greek-S.C.S. agreement contained in No. 170 is substantially correct (ii) if negotiations over the railway question went well, the S.C.S. Govt. would not raise difficulties over minorities.	248
178 MR. STEVENSON Sofia No. 215	Oct. 8	Comments on the possibility of a ministerial crisis, examines the chances of various parties, none of which can afford to ignore the military element, and speculates upon the likelihood of certain coalitions.	250
179 SIR H. DERING Bucharest No. 461	Oct. 13	Transmits information supplied by Mr. Collins, <i>Times</i> correspondent in Sofia, following his tour of Northern Bessarabia and states that this report, combined with other information, points to the conclusion that disturbances in that province are most unlikely.	252

CHAPTER II

The Security Question January–October, 1925

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
180 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	Jan. 4	Minute stating that, as H.M.G. are likely to reject the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4), it becomes necessary to provide for French security and to prevent Germany from forming a combination with Russia	255

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		and asking the Foreign Office to prepare a clear statement of the problem for discussion on Jan. 22.	
181 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 17	Jan. 7	Transmits a memo. respecting the balance of power in Europe and its effect on the problem of security.	258
182 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 18	Jan. 8	Transmits information supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the state of the commercial treaty negotiations between Germany and France, Belgium, Italy, Poland and Russia.	261
183 MR. AMERY Colonial Office	Jan. 15	Transmits message from the P.M. for the Dominion P.Ms. stating that replies received from the Dominions respecting invitation to a special meeting of the Imperial Conference in March to discuss the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4) show that it has become necessary to deal with the problem by correspondence.	263
184 MR. AMERY Colonial Office	Jan. 15	Transmits message from the P.M. for the Dominion P.Ms. giving a summary of the views expressed by the Dominions on the provisions of the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4).	264
185 FOREIGN OFFICE	Jan. 15	Summary of the views of the War Office, Admiralty, and Air Ministry on the advantages and disadvantages of an Anglo-French Pact.	266
186 MR. McNEILL	Jan. 16	Notes on a substitute for the Geneva Protocol. n. 2: Comment by Mr. Headlam-Morley on statement that Germany has always dishonoured her signature. n. 7: Account by Mr. Chamberlain to the Committee of Imperial Defence of his meeting with Prime Ministers attending the League Council at Rome.	269
187 CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	Jan. 20	Memo. on Political Treaties, Agreements, Alliances and Relations at present in force in Central and South-East Europe affecting Questions of Security.	273
188 FO LORD CREWE Paris No. 270	Jan. 20	Informs that, in conversation with the French Ambassador, he stated that H.M.G. were engaged in studying the question of security (see No. 180), that the final result would depend greatly on the impression that French policy had on British opinion, and that France could not count in perpetuity on a combination of powers to hold down Germany.	281
189 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 49	Jan. 20	Transmits translation of a confidential German memo. indicating several alternatives which the German Govt. are prepared to discuss in the hopes of their leading to a feeling of security and pacification.	282

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190 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 39	Jan. 23	Reports M.F.A.'s explanation of the treaties of arbitration mentioned in the German memo. of Jan. 20 (see No. 189) and statement that German Govt. attaches great importance to their proposals being framed in a way acceptable to the French Govt.	284
191 SIR M. HANKEY Cabinet Office	Jan. 26	Letter to Mr. Lampson (i) asking whether he may include No. 185 in papers to be put before the Committee of Imperial Defence (ii) enclosing copy of his own memo. of Jan. 23 already sent to the P.M. and Secretary of State on the subject of the Pact.	286
192 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	Jan. 27	Memo. recording that from unofficial and confidential sources he learns that the U.S. Govt. consider that the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4) contains numerous sources of trouble and hope it would die a natural death.	289
193 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 40	Jan. 28	Gives brief summary of M. Herriot's statement in the French Chamber on (i) renewal of relations with the Soviets (see Vol. XXV, No. 260) (ii) inter-allied debts (iii) question of security and non-evacuation of the Cologne zone; adds comment that France is unlikely to evacuate the Cologne zone unless H.M.G. come forward with adequate proposal for security.	290
194 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 49	Jan. 29	Reports Dr. Stresemann as saying that he is inclined to postpone or withdraw proposals for a non-aggression pact (see No. 189) as it would seem that they would not be welcomed and properly appreciated.	292
195 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 175	Jan. 30	Informs that he told the German Ambassador that (i) he could not receive proposals (see No. 189) on the footing that he was not to mention them to France (ii) although he welcomed German readiness to appreciate French fears, he thought as did Dr. Stresemann (see No. 194), the proposals were premature as H.M.G. must first determine their attitude to the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4) and the question of French Security (iii) German entry into the League would be significant.	293
196 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 385	Jan. 30	States that (i) he informed the French Ambassador that he told the Swedish Minister that H.M.G.'s view is that the German Govt. must make up their mind whether to enter the League on the same terms as other nations or remain outside (ii) he gave him the substance of his conversation with the German Ambassador (see No. 195).	296
197 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 60	Feb. 10	Reports that, according to Secretary of State, the German Embassy handed to M. Herriot a memo. substantially identical	298

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		with that sent to H.M.G. (see No. 189) and that it is reported M. Herriot, who received it favourably, promised to keep it absolutely private.	
198 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 61	Feb. 12	Reports that M. Herriot informed him in confidence of the German communication of Feb. 9 (see No. 197), spoke in appreciative terms of the German Chancellor, and went on to discuss the problems of the evacuation of the Cologne zone and security which in his view are related.	299
199 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 122	Feb. 14	Transmits a memo. on future relations between Germany and Poland and the German attitude towards Alsace-Lorraine with special reference to the bearing of these two questions on discussions regarding a Pact of Non-Aggression.	300
200 To LORD CREWE Paris	Feb. 16	Private letter commenting on French and German policies, requesting him to proceed in any communication with the French on the basis that it is already agreed that a meeting of Ministers in London should precede the presentation of demands on Germany, and stating that the approach to security must be (unlike the Covenant and Geneva Protocol) from the particular to the general.	302
201 To SIR E. HOWARD Washington No. 268	Feb. 17	Informs that he discussed with the retiring U.S. Ambassador the question of disarmament, the general situation in Europe, and the enforcement of American law in cases of boot-legging.	305
202 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 585	Feb. 17	Informs that he told the Belgian Ambassador that H.M.G. could not consent to make the decision on Cologne dependent on the general question of security.	306
203 MR. SARGENT Paris	Feb. 18	Transmits a memo. by Lieut.-Col. Heywood commenting on Lord D'Abernon's memo. (see No. 181) and expresses the hope that it will be shown to the Secretary of State.	307
204 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 67	Feb. 19	Refers to No. 198 and reports that he is informed confidentially that M. Herriot welcomed the German note of Feb. 9 (see No. 197) and that he gathers that the German Govt. will await the next move from France.	310
205 MR. NICOLSON Foreign Office	Feb. 20	Memo. on British Policy considered in relation to the European situation: prepared in pursuance of directions from the Secretary of State (see No. 180).	311
206 SIR E. HOWARD Washington No. 280	Feb. 20	Gives a summary of American press comment on 'feelers' as to the convocation of a disarmament conference.	318
207 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 76	Feb. 22	Refers to No. 204 and reports that the President of the Council showed him a French version of the German note of Feb.	319

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		9 which suggests: (i) France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany should enter into a pact against war, separate arbitration treaties being concluded by Germany with France and other powers (ii) agreement ensuring the <i>status quo</i> in the Rhineland (iii) agreement on arrangements in the demilitarised zones; and which goes on to make an obscure allusion to similar agreements with countries to the East of Germany.	
208 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 78	Feb. 23	Refers to No. 207 and reports the President of the Council as saying that he intends to send a polite reply to the German note but indicating that it will be impossible to proceed further except in concert with the Allies.	320
209 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 69	Feb. 24	Reports that (i) he has learned confidentially that the French reply to the German note (see No. 208) states that the French Govt. cannot discuss the note without agreement with the Allies and without agreement with them as to security in accordance with the Treaty (ii) German Govt. have communicated to Italy and Belgium a similar memo.	320
210 To SIR C. ELIOT Tokyo No. 82	Feb. 25	Informs of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on the possibility of holding a Disarmament Conference at Washington (see No. 206).	321
211 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 150	Feb. 25	Gives a summary of views expressed by one or two persons who are in a position to know the mind of the German Govt. regarding their entry into the League of Nations and states his own views of German-Russian relations.	322
212 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 260	Feb. 26	Informs of a conversation with the Belgian Ambassador concerning the German démarche (see Nos. 189, 197 and 209), the evacuation of the Cologne zone, and the question of Russia.	325
213 MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Feb. 27	Records a conversation with the Italian Counsellor concerning the German proposals for security (see Nos. 189, 197 and 209); states that in reply to an enquiry as to the form the allied consultations were to take, he replied that this question was a matter still to be discussed.	328
214 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 106	Feb. 28	Comments on No. 199 and deals with the problem of German-Polish relations with reference to the questions of Upper Silesia, Memel and the Danzig corridor.	329
215 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 80	Mar. 1	Refers to No. 209 and reports that the German Ambassador at Rome has been informed that the Italian Govt. were extremely satisfied with the German initiative.	331

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216 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 81	Mar. 1	Refers to No. 209 and gives information from a confidential source of conversations between the French Ambassador and the German Govt. during which the Germans stated that they regarded the Polish frontier as a permanent solution and the French Ambassador made it clear that France could proceed only in company with Great Britain.	331
217 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 87	Mar. 1	Reports that M. Herriot went far in divulging the German proposals (see No. 197) to the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission and gives a brief summary of subsequent press comment.	332
218 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 86	Mar. 2	Advises against a formal allied defensive pact antecedent to a second pact including Germany as such an arrangement would estrange German public opinion.	333
219 FOREIGN OFFICE	Mar. 3	Memo. for the British Representative at Geneva on the attitude of H.M.G. towards the question of the entry of Germany into the League and on the reply to be sent by the League Council to the German Note of Dec. 12, 1924.	334
220 CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	Mar. 3	Memo. on the application to Germany's Eastern Frontier of the recent German proposals (see Nos. 189, 197 and 209) for a solution of the security problem.	336
221 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 158	Mar. 3	Transmits a memo. based on information supplied by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the commercial negotiations between Germany and other countries, excluding France, details of which have not yet been furnished.	338
222 TO LORD CREWE Paris No. 776	Mar. 4	Transmits record of a conversation between Sir E. Crowe and the French Ambassador, who gave his personal views on the question of an Anglo-French security pact and left a short note of his observations.	340
223 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 92	Mar. 6	Reports that Mr. Chamberlain's speech of Mar. 5 in the House of Commons on security produced an excellent impression in Germany and advises that action should be taken before an opposition can form.	343
224 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Paris	Mar. 7	Letter to Sir E. Crowe stating that he made it clear in his conversation of Mar. 6 with M. Herriot that, as public opinion would not allow them to enter into an Anglo-French pact, H.M.G. hoped that the German proposals might lead to another solution.	343
225 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Paris	Mar. 7	Letter to Sir E. Crowe giving an account of his further conversation with M. Herriot (see No. 224) during which they discussed, in relation to security, the position of Belgium and Holland, the Rhine, an	347

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		Allied Conference before putting forward proposals to the Germans, Poland, the southern boundaries of Germany, Germany's entry to the League, Germany's arbitration treaty with Switzerland, Danzig, the Patriarchate, and the Cologne zone.	
226 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 52	Mar. 8	Transmits message from Mr. Chamberlain for Sir E. Crowe saying that he agreed to French request to communicate to the Allied Ambassadors the nature of Nos. 224 and 225 and requesting Sir E. Crowe to take a similar step in London.	352
227 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Mar. 8	Letter to Sir E. Crowe commenting on his recent conversations with M. Herriot (see Nos. 224 and 225); states that M. Herriot was surprised and disappointed at the British view on security and this may possibly cause him to hinder the solution of the problems of German disarmament and the evacuation of the Cologne zone (see Chap. III) and to attempt to organise security in company with Belgium, Poland and Italy; requests Sir E. Crowe, in view of the seriousness of the situation, to obtain guidance from the P.M. and the Cabinet.	353
228 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 54	Mar. 9	Message from Mr. Chamberlain for Sir E. Crowe stating that his speech announcing to the League Council that H.M.G. would not adhere to the Geneva Protocol (see No. 224, n. 2) while welcomed by Germany who seems to think according to Lord D'Abernon (see Nos. 216, 218 and 223) that there is nothing more to be done, has been an immense shock to the French; and requests him to draft instructions for the approval of the P.M. requiring Lord D'Abernon to hold suitable language to the German Govt.	355
229 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 56	Mar. 9	Message from Mr. Chamberlain for Sir E. Crowe referring to No. 228 and stating that it is essential that Lord D'Abernon should realise that nothing can come of the German proposals (see No. 189) if the German Govt. refuse to join the League on the same footing as the other powers.	356
230 TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 53	Mar. 9	Informs of Mr. Chamberlain's conversations with M. Herriot, during which Mr. Chamberlain made it clear, among other things, that H.M.G. objected to linking together the question of the evacuation of the Cologne zone with that of security.	357
231 TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 54	Mar. 9	Instructs to make it clear to the German Govt. that they should not regard their memo. (see No. 189) as a complete statement, that it is essential for them to join the League of Nations, and that it is only with their help that H.M.G. can persuade	358

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		France to take the German overtures seriously.	
232 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Mar. 9	Memo. to the Cabinet giving an account of his conversation on a variety of topics with M. Briand who was appreciative of H.M.G.'s views particularly on the need for mutual agreements between States interested in particular boundaries and who, it may be possible to hope, will be able to influence M. Herriot.	359
233 LORD CREWE Paris No. 604	Mar. 9	Comments on Viscount Grey of Fallodon's speech of Mar. 4 to the Liberal Party and Mr. Chamberlain's speech of Mar. 5 in the House of Commons on the subject of European security.	363
234 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 95	Mar. 11	Reports that (i) debate on proposed pact in the Reichsrath passed off smoothly (ii) considerable opposition was displayed in the Reichstag Committee of Foreign Affairs by German nationals and communists (iii) Russia will make a definite effort to prevent Germany from joining a Western combine.	365
235 Mr. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Mar. 11	Letter to Mr. Selby (British Delegation, Geneva) stating, for Secretary of State's information, that M. Herriot was in error in saying that Germany had refused to conclude a treaty of arbitration with Switzerland and that in fact Germany signed such a treaty on Dec. 3, 1921, ratifications being exchanged on Apr. 25, 1922.	365
236 Mr. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Mar. 11	Records a conversation with the French Ambassador on the question of a security pact.	366
237 Sir E. CROWE Foreign Office	Mar. 11	Informs Mr. Chamberlain that he saw the Allied Ambassadors as requested (see No. 226) and that the Belgian, Italian and Japanese representatives expressed concurrence with British views.	367
238 LORD CREWE Paris No. 616	Mar. 11	Transmits a memo. by Mr. Phipps respecting his conversation of Mar. 7 with Marshal Foch who pointed out the dangers of a rapid recovery of Germany.	369
239 Sir R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 69	Mar. 12	Informs that Secretary General stated that the Italian Govt. dislike the idea of an Anglo-French-Belgian pact but hold the view that the German proposals constitute a useful base for discussion.	371
240 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Mar. 12	Informs Sir E. Crowe of his conversations with M. Hymans and Dr. Beneš.	371
241 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 97	Mar. 13	Refers to Nos. 230 and 231 and reports that (i) the German Govt. state that they are ready to cooperate, to give more precision to their proposals, and to recognise the services rendered by H.M.G. (ii) despite Russian attempts to prevent it,	373

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Germany's entry into the League is a possibility given certain developments.	
242 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 98	Mar. 13	Reports that the Chancellor stated that he was anxious not to impair the settlement of Franco-German frontier by linking it up with the Polish-German frontier which was a matter for arbitration.	375
243 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 99	Mar. 13	States that M. Herriot's assertion during Paris conversations (see Nos. 224, 225 and 227) that German offer (see Nos. 189 and 197, n. 1) was devised for internal political ends can be dismissed as groundless.	376
244 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 78	Mar. 13	Transmits Mr. Cadogan's account of the Public Session of the League Council, stating that (i) Dr. Beneš proposed the adjournment of the discussion of the Geneva Protocol to the next Assembly (ii) Mr. Chamberlain expressed concurrence but repeated his statement of the previous day (see No. 240, n. 13).	377
245 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 101	Mar. 13	Reports that M. Herriot's position is rendered more difficult by the resolution of the Foreign Affairs Commission to the effect that no occupied German territory should be evacuated until a pact provided an absolute guarantee of French security; suggests it would be better for H.M.G. not to press M. Herriot too hard on the issue of the Cologne zone.	378
246 MR. DODD Prague No. 76	Mar. 13	Reports that (i) the press in Czechoslovakia displays little interest in a security pact (ii) he gathers from conversations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that this lack of interest is because Czechoslovakia has no fear on account of frontiers.	379
247 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Mar. 14	Informs Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the Polish M.F.A who stated that he feared that a Western Pact with Germany would 'legitimise' German aspirations but who, on hearing an explanation of H.M.G.'s views, appeared to have a better understanding of the British case.	380
248 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 81	Mar. 15	Transmits Mr. Chamberlain's comments on the situation arising from his declaration at Geneva (see No. 240, n. 13) and from his conversations with Dr. Beneš, M. Briand and M. Hymans, which make it clear that M. Herriot has a difficult task as French public opinion is unfavourable to British plans.	384
249 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 82	Mar. 15	Transmits Mr. Chamberlain's view for Sir E. Crowe to use in his private conversations but not as coming from Mr. Chamberlain to the effect that Germany will spoil her case if she is in a hurry to press it.	386
250 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Mar. 15	Private letter to Mr. Chamberlain reporting solid progress during the last fortnight	387

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		on such issues as (i) the 26% levy (see Vol. XXVI, No. 417, n. 2) (ii) ratification of the Commercial Treaty (see <i>ibid.</i> , No. 606) (iii) entry into the League (see No. 241 (iv) the reciprocal Pact (see Nos. 234, 241 and 243).	
251 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Paris	Mar. 16	Memo. recording a conversation with M. Herriot who stated that the rejection of the Geneva Protocol and of all idea of a pact with France and Belgium came as a great shock to his colleagues and French public opinion and who went on to explain the French point of view on the question of security.	388
252 LORD CREWE Paris No. 660	Mar. 16	Transmits a memo. of Mar. 15 by Mr. Phipps recording a conversation with M. Blum.	393
253 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 107	Mar. 17	Refers to No. 249 and reports that German Govt. have received from M. Herriot a reply to their note of Feb. 9 (see No. 197, n. 1) asking for more precise details and take this to mean that the French agree to treat that note as a basis for discussion.	397
254 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 108	Mar. 17	Reports that German Secretary of State asserts that (i) Germany has no intention of obtaining a modification of the Polish frontier by arbitration (ii) Poland could exclude frontier problems from an arbitration treaty (iii) Germany has no desire to precipitate the Polish question (iv) there are alternative solutions to the corridor (see No. 205) which are unsatisfactory to both Germany and Poland.	397
255 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Mar. 18	Personal letter from Mr. Chamberlain summarising the lines on which H.M.G. are working in regard to the German proposals (see No. 189) and to the problem of security.	398
256 To SIR E. HOWARD Washington	Mar. 18	Personal letter from Mr. Chamberlain stating that, in view of the President's initiative on disarmament (see No. 251, n. 18) and of the attitude of France, he will refrain from any attempt to hurry the President, but if H.M.G. are approached they will express readiness to attend a Naval Conference provided other naval powers will do the same.	400
257 SIR H. DERING Bucharest No. 171	Mar. 18	Reports that M.F.A. stated that (i) Poland and Czechoslovakia were hasty in their acceptance of the Geneva Protocol (ii) in the event of a Western Security Pact, Roumania, who considered Russia a greater danger than Germany, would feel isolated.	401
258 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 983	Mar. 19	Inform of conversation with the French Ambassador who spoke without instructions and seemed to have nothing new to	402

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		say: states that in reply he expressed agreement with M. Herriot's essential conditions: (i) Germany must agree to enter the League (ii) no reduction of Allies' right to a fifteen-year occupation of the left bank of the Rhine (iii) Allies should agree among themselves before negotiating with Germany (iv) no weakening of existing treaties.	
259 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 514	Mar. 19	Informs that he told the German Ambassador, who had complained of lack of progress, that H.M.G.'s pronouncement on the German proposals (see No. 189) had opened up new and better possibilities and that it was essential that Germany should have confidence in the good faith of the British Govt.	404
260 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1009	Mar. 20	Transmits record of Sir E. Crowe's conversation of Mar. 20 with the French Ambassador who, on raising the question of procedure in the negotiation of a pact, was informed that it was for France to respond to the German Govt.'s initiative, it being appreciated that they were entitled to more precise details.	405
261 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 515	Mar. 20	Transmits English text of the League Council's reply of Mar. 14 to the German note of Dec. 12, 1924, on the subject of Germany's entry into the League of Nations.	408
262 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 235	Mar. 20	Reports that Signor Mussolini stated that he admired H.M.G.'s <i>coup de grace</i> to the Geneva Protocol (see No. 240, n. 13) and supported H.M.G.'s views on security.	410
263 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Mar. 20	Private letter acknowledging No. 255 and explaining why there is more than a fair chance of success in following the policy therein set forth.	411
264 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 113A	Mar. 22	Refers to No. 254 and reports that Secretary of State confirmed in a definite manner that (i) Germany was prepared to exclude all frontier questions from the scope of the arbitration treaties (ii) Germany had no desire to raise immediately the question of the Polish frontier.	412
265 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 114	Mar. 22	Reports that the Chancellor and M.F.A. are determined to carry through the pact policy either with or without the support of the Nationalists.	413
266 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 107	Mar. 22	Reports that (i) he took various remarks of M. Herriot on the question of security to mean that he is anxious to go on discussing it without committing himself (ii) M. Herriot feels that to show too cool a welcome to the German proposals would stimulate German Nationalists and too warm a welcome would encourage the <i>Bloc National</i> in France.	414

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267 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 115	Mar. 23	Refers to No. 265 and reports that German Nationalist leaders declared that they would support the Luther Govt. but made it clear that their electors were hostile to the pact and Germany's entry into League.	415
268 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 206	Mar. 23	Reports that extreme German Nationalists dislike any policy which renounces claims to Alsace-Lorraine or which endorses specifically or implicitly the Treaty of Versailles.	415
269 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 64	Mar. 25	Transmits extract of his speech of Mar. 24 in the House of Commons and of an additional statement concerning the German proposals (see No. 189) and instructs in view of remarks made by the German Ambassador to ascertain whether Germany definitely renounces all idea of changing the frontier by military force.	416
270 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 133	Mar. 25	Reports that M. Paul-Boncour recommended to the Foreign Affairs Commission that the Geneva Protocol should be ratified.	419
271 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 144	Mar. 25	Transmits a short summary of Polish press comments which are generally hostile to the German proposals (see No. 189).	419
272 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1078	Mar. 26	Transmits record of a conversation between Sir W. Tyrrell and the French Ambassador who seemed more optimistic than previously and who said that French public opinion is getting used to the idea of including Germany in the proposed pact.	420
273 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Mar. 26	Private letter referring to Nos. 263 and 269 and stating that he requested the German Ambassador, who probably does not report accurately his conversations, to repudiate the alleged intention that Germany does not rule out force as a means of changing the eastern frontiers.	421
274 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 129	Mar. 28	Refers to No. 269 and reports that the German Govt. expressly repudiate all idea of using force to change the Polish-German frontier and request that their reply should be confidential as they regard it merely as a measure to remove a misunderstanding.	423
275 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 155	Mar. 28	Reports that M.F.A. has enhanced his reputation by his visit to Geneva and summarises his speech of Mar. 24 in the Diet Commission of Foreign Affairs in which he gave an account of his attitude to the German proposals and of his conversations with the French and British ministers.	424
276 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 156	Mar. 28	Refers to No. 275 and reports that (i) he reminded M.F.A., who had expressed deep distrust of the German Govt., that	427

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		such distrust must render any negotiations abortive (ii) M.F.A. states that Germany's entry into the League would be intolerable unless Poland were given a seat on the League Council.	
277 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 117	Mar. 29	Gives a summary of an anti-German speech of Mar. 29 by M. Poincaré, who asked what was the purpose of Germany's signing an engagement not to attack France, which engagement was already embodied in the Peace Treaty.	428
278 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 119	Mar. 30	Gives a summary of press accounts of M. Herriot's interview with the Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission on the subject of security during which M. Herriot stated that the French Govt. intended to study all possible solutions.	429
279 MR. PHIPPS Paris	Mar. 30	Informs Sir E. Crowe of conversations with M. de Jouvenel and M. Massigli who both expressed strong suspicions of the German proposals (see Nos. 189 and 197).	430
280 TO SIR A. GRANT DUFF Stockholm No. 80	Mar. 31	Informs of a conversation with the Swedish Minister on the security problem, the entry of Germany into the League, and the German-Swedish Arbitration Treaty, which he recommended as a model.	431
281 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 446	Apr. 1	States that he informed the Italian Ambassador, who expressed satisfaction, of the position with regard to the security negotiations but said that he had some anxiety about the prolongation of the discussions concerning German disarmament (see Chap. III, below).	433
282 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 248	Apr. 1	Transmits translation of a press communiqué respecting Franco-Belgian conversations regarding a pact of security and a summary of a press article by M.F.A. on that subject.	435
283 TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Apr. 2	Private letter from Mr. Chamberlain reviewing the progress of the security negotiations, expressing fears that either Germany or France may halt this progress, stating that he relies on Lord D'Abernon for keeping things straight at the German end, and suggesting the lines on which it may be necessary to work.	436
284 SIR E. HOWARD Washington No. 549	Apr. 2	Reports that Mr. Kellogg informed the French Ambassador that his Govt. intended to sound all govts. before thinking of issuing invitations to a disarmament conference.	439
285 MR. CADOGAN Foreign Office	Apr. 3	Records a conversation with Sir A. Salter who gave his impression of the likely developments of deliberations on the Geneva Protocol in the next League Assembly.	440

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286 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 424	Apr. 3	Transmits a copy of a memo. left by the Belgian Ambassador and prepared by M. Hymans in answer to a request from M. Herriot for the views of the Belgian Govt. on the German proposals; gives an account of his conversation with the Belgian Ambassador on matters pertaining to negotiations respecting those proposals.	442
287 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 277	Apr. 3	Summarises the development of negotiations following the German proposals of Jan. 20 (see No. 189) and instructs to continue to urge upon the Polish Govt. that friendly discussion and negotiation with Germany may result in removing outstanding difficulties and possible causes of dispute.	444
288 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 279	Apr. 3	Transmits summary of communiqué issued by the Agenzia di Roma on the Italian view of the German proposals (see No. 189).	448
289 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 173	Apr. 3	Gives a summary of an article in the semi-official <i>Messenger Polonais</i> which shows the insurmountable distrust with which every move of the German Govt. is received in Poland: states that the same distrust is evinced by M.F.A.	449
290 CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	Apr. 6	Memo. on Soviet influence on Germany in connection with the questions of Germany's entry into the League and of a Western Security Pact.	451
291 MR. STERNDAL BENNETT Foreign Office	Apr. 7	Minute composed at the request of Mr. Chamberlain on the statement by Sir C. Mendl (News Dept.) to the effect that there is a lurking fear in France that, if France were to send troops to the assistance of Poland in the event of a German attack, France would be exposed to a <i>casus belli</i> with Great Britain for having broken the neutrality of the Rhineland.	452
292 To MR. ADDISON Berlin No. 757	Apr. 22	Transmits record of conversation with the German Ambassador on the German security proposals, the evacuation of Cologne, ministerial changes in France and the effect that the election of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg as President of the Reich would have on foreign opinion.	455
293 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 51	Apr. 23	Reports a conversation with Dr. Beneš regarding anti-British feeling aroused in Poland by H.M.G.'s attitude towards the German proposals (see No. 189), during which Dr. Beneš stated his view that, though a Western pact was acceptable to Czechoslovakia, he would oppose any attempt by Germany to raise the question of the eastern frontier.	457

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294	LORD CREWE Paris No. 941	Apr. 23	Gives an account of the debate of Apr. 21 in the Chamber of Deputies during which the govt. obtained a vote of confidence by 304 votes against 217.	458
295	SIR W. MAX MÜLLER Warsaw No. 205	Apr. 24	Refers to No. 287 and states that the P.M. and M.F.A., whom he invited to dinner, are still suspicious of the German proposals (see No. 189) but are less hostile to H.M.G. than the less informed circles of Polish society which have become more apprehensive of German designs because of happenings in Danzig and the selection of Marshal von Hindenburg as the Nationalists' candidate for the Presidency (see No. 292, n. 9).	460
296	MR. ADDISON Berlin	Apr. 25	Private letter informing Mr. Lampson that (i) Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann have resisted strong Russian pressure to prevent Germany from entering a Western Security pact and the League (ii) the Soviet Govt. ordered the German Communists to vote for von Hindenburg.	462
297	MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 176	Apr. 29	Gives a summary of a speech delivered by the Chancellor to representatives of trade and industry.	463
298	MR. PHIPPS Paris	Apr. 29	Private letter informing Sir W. Tyrrell that M. Seydoux has stated that French conversations with the German Govt. should continue and that time should be given to ascertain what they really have in mind.	464
299	TO LORD CREWE Paris No. 1502	Apr. 30	Informs of a conversation with the French Ambassador, recently returned from Paris where he had met the new ministers including M. Briand, who had stated that, although he could not visit London immediately, he hoped to reach an understanding with H.M.G. before the meeting of the League Assembly in September.	465
300	TO MR. ADDISON Berlin No. 797	Apr. 30	States that he informed the German Ambassador that (i) he regretted the delay in presenting the Allied demands in respect of disarmament (see Nos. 586, 592 and 608, below) (ii) election of Marshal von Hindenburg (see No. 611, below) had produced an unfavourable impression in Britain and France, but it would be assumed, in view of the Chancellor's and the Marshal's declarations, that the German Government would stand by their proposals (see Nos. 189 and 197) (iii) it was useless to carry on pact discussions unless Germany joined the League.	468
301	TO SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 506	Apr. 30	States that he informed the Belgian Ambassador that the election of Marshal von Hindenburg was unlikely to change the British and French attitude to the German pact proposals.	472

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302 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1533	May 2	Transmits record of a conversation with the French Ambassador concerning the Polish and German policies.	474
303 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 595	May 2	Informs that he told the Italian Ambassador that he agreed with the Italian view that the election of Marshal von Hindenburg gave no reason for the interruption of the pact negotiations.	475
304 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 185	May 3	Reports that a conversation with Dr. Stresemann shows that he is apprehensive about debates in the Reichstag on security if the Allies do not make a favourable reply to the German pact proposals.	476
305 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	May 3	Private letter informing Mr. Chamberlain that (i) although Herr von Schubert is optimistic, Dr. Stresemann is alarmed at the hostility of the Right (ii) von Hindenburg was persuaded to stand for election by von Tirpitz (iii) the attitude of the Allies will be of dominant importance not only for the conclusion of a national agreement but also for the survival of present German policy (iv) the Russians continue to attempt to prevent Germany from joining the League.	477
306 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 113	May 5	Refers to No. 304, states that he does not attach great importance to the picture it gives, and leaves it to Lord Crewe to decide whether suggested <i>démarche</i> in Paris is likely to do more harm than good.	478
307 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 57	May 5	States that Secretary of State's speech of Mar. 24 (see No. 269) disturbed Polish public opinion as its reassuring tendency was not made clear in the press.	479
308 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 167	May 5	Refers to No. 304 and reports that M. Sauerwein of the <i>Matin</i> , who recently visited Germany, intends to impress upon M. Briand that great harm will result if no early reply is sent to the German offer (see No. 197).	480
309 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 290	May 5	Reports that (i) Herr von Schubert recognises that, although it is difficult to abandon reserve about Article 16, the entry of Germany into the League is a <i>sine qua non</i> of the proposed pact (ii) to the German mind, French refusal two years ago to admit Germany to the League (see Vol. XXI, No. 339) and French present insistence that Germany should enter, suggests a trap (iii) Germany does not wish to break altogether with Russia but fears a combination of the Soviet Govt. and Poland.	480
310 LORD CREWE Paris	May 5	Private letter to Mr. Chamberlain referring to Nos. 304 and 306 and explaining that H.M.G. are not in a strong position to make representations until they concur on the reply proposed by France on the	482

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		subject of Military Control (see No. 620, below).	
311 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 170	May 6	Refers to No. 308 and reports that, according to the <i>Matin</i> , M. Briand will send a reply to the German proposals (see No. 197) sometime this week.	483
312 SIR E. DRUMMOND Geneva	May 6	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell containing suggestions on the way the negotiations for a pact can be best adjusted to League interests and action.	483
313 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	May 7	Private letter from Mr. Chamberlain referring to No. 305 and informing him that M. Briand would seem to intend to negotiate seriously for a mutual pact but is anxious to save what he can of the Geneva Protocol.	484
314 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 293	May 7	Transmits a translation of Herr von Schubert's letter of April 30 stating that the German Govt. have no intention of making arrangements with the French Govt. which would place British goods in a disadvantageous position on the German market as compared with similar goods from Alsace and Lorraine.	485
315 SIR C. HURST	May 9	Note drawing attention to the importance of compulsory arbitration in obviating difficulties arising from a guarantee pact.	486
316 SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	May 12	Text of a Draft Security Pact.	488
317 SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	May 13	Notes on his suggested draft of a Security Pact (see No. 316).	489
318 LORD CREWE Paris No. 1126	May 13	Transmits copy of French Govt.'s draft note in reply to the German memorandum of Feb. 9 (see No. 197, n. 1).	492
319 CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	May 13	Draft suggested as the basis for a Security Pact.	496
320 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 304	May 13	Gives an account of a conversation with Herr von Schubert who stated that (i) Dr. Stresemann was likely to meet opposition in the Reichstag (ii) the German Govt. were alarmed at the negotiations between Poland and Czechoslovakia (iii) German Govt. were not favourable to <i>Anschluss</i> with Austria.	498
321 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	May 14	Memo. for the Cabinet on the French draft note (see No. 318) pointing out the questions it raises which H.M.G. will need to answer.	499
322 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1709	May 14	Informs of his comments on the French Ambassador's explanation of the French draft reply (see No. 318).	501
323 MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	May 14	Letter to Sir W. Max Muller stating that (i) it is odd that the Poles should blame others for raising German-Polish frontier question (ii) Poles, in saying that the Germans	504

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		offer a pact on the West in order to be free to make war in the East, should realise that H.M.G. have extracted from the German Govt. a disavowal to use force to modify the Eastern frontier.	
324 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 306	May 14	Gives an account from confidential sources of the visit to Paris of representatives of the German Kontinental Politik groups and of M. Briand's insistence that there could be no co-operation of France and Germany without the participation of Britain and that Germany must join the League without conditions.	505
325 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 302	May 15	Informs that he replied to the German Ambassador, who had spoken of German anxiety excited by reports of a Czech-Polish defensive alliance, to the effect that (i) even if the reports were true there was no reason for a change of policy (ii) a Western pact would probably eventually relieve tension in the East (iii) if Germany joined the League, she would have the right under Art. 19 to appeal for treaty revision.	507
326 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 195	May 18	Expresses view that the French draft note (see No. 318) will be well received in Germany and advises it should be sent without delay and before the disarmament demands (see No. 620, below).	511
327 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 196	May 18	Reports that Dr. Stresemann, in a speech to the Reichstag, complained about the non-evacuation of the Cologne zone and went on to say that, as the French designs in the Rhineland arose out of fears for security, it was necessary for Germany to take the initiative in quelling those fears.	512
328 FRENCH EMBASSY London	May 18	Memo. communicated informally to the Foreign Office in reply to certain enquiries made by Mr. Chamberlain when the French Ambassador handed to him the French draft note to Germany on the question of security (see Nos. 318 and 322).	512
329 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 303	May 18	Informs that he told the Belgian Ambassador, who had asked for H.M.G.'s views on the French draft note (see No. 318), that he had not yet discussed it with his colleagues and that he would be glad in due course to have the Belgian Govt.'s views.	514
330 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	May 19	Memo. communicated informally to the French Ambassador regarding certain points in the French draft note of May 12 (see No. 318).	515
331 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 394	May 19	States that (i) he informed the Polish Minister that his impression of the general tone and purpose of the French draft note	518

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		(see No. 318) was very favourable (ii) the Polish Minister raised the question without being specific of the need to modify the minorities treaty before Germany entered the League in order to remove likely conflicts between Germany and her neighbours.	
332 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 199	May 20	Reports that the French Ambassador agrees with the view expressed in No. 326 and believes that the moment is favourable for pressing forward with security negotiations.	520
333 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 43	May 20	Reports that M.F.A. (<i>ad interim</i>) states that it is hoped shortly to submit to H.M.G. Belgian's views on the French draft note (see No. 318).	521
334 TO SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 579	May 20	States that (i) he informed the Belgian Ambassador that, until they were absolutely certain of the meaning of certain phrases in the French draft note (see No. 318), H.M.G. were not able to give detailed comments (ii) he agreed with Baron Moncheur that, as it was a draft of an Allied note, it was necessary to scrutinise every word.	521
335 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw	May 20	Private letter to Mr. Lampson replying to No. 323 and pointing out that the Polish attitude is not unreasonable in view of the perfidy of the Germans.	523
336 TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 935	May 21	Informs that H.M.G. cannot contemplate the possibility of returning to Germany any of her former colonies and instructs to let H.M.G.'s views be made known in unequivocal language.	525
337 TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 107	May 22	Refers to Nos. 326 and 332 and expresses regret that the matter should have been discussed with the French Ambassador as views expressed may give the French further excuse for delay in presenting the inter-allied note on Cologne (see No. 624, below).	526
338 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 47	May 25	Refers to No. 333 and reports M.F.A. as saying that the Belgian Govt. (i) wish to take part in the pact on the same footing as other powers (ii) desire explicit guarantee of Belgian frontiers (iii) do not insist on Germany's entering the League before conclusion of security pact (iv) are not prepared to guarantee distant territorial arrangements (v) are content to leave to the bigger Allies matters not concerning Belgium directly.	527
339 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 48	May 25	Refers to No. 338 and states that the P.M. is not in complete agreement with the M.F.A. who would never consider any alteration in the Versailles treaty.	528

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340 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1841	May 25	Informs of discussion with the French Ambassador who left a reply to the questions seeking elucidation (see No. 330) of the French draft reply (see No. 318).	528
341 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 284	May 25	Reports that M.F.A. deplored tone of Dr. Stresemann's speech (see No. 327) but affirmed that he would not engage in wordy warfare with him as he was most anxious that Polish-German relations might become more normal again.	532
342 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 204	May 26	Reports that Secretary of State wishes that H.M.G. should know of the danger to Germany of the long delay in the reply to the German proposals of Feb. 9 (see No. 197).	533
343 CABINET OFFICES	May 26	Notes on a meeting of a Committee of the Cabinet held in P.M.'s room in the House of Commons to consider the French draft reply (see No. 318) and subsequent explanations (see No. 340).	534
344 To SIR E. HOWARD Washington No. 843	May 26	Informs that (i) he briefed the American Ambassador on the position with regard to negotiations for a security pact (ii) any offer of American participation, which the Ambassador mooted, should not be discussed or encouraged but reported to the Foreign Office.	539
345 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 285	May 26	Reports M.F.A. as saying that he found proposed French reply (see No. 318), although not completely favourable regarding the Eastern frontier, satisfactory in that it insisted on Germany's entry to the League and on the sanctity of the peace treaties.	540
346 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 196	May 27	Summarises M. Briand's speech in the Senate on the proposed security pact, the gist of which was that France was ready to engage in conversations, provided the pact was concluded within the framework of the treaties and gave France desirable security.	541
347 SIR C. HURST	May 27	Minute discussing the view put forward in the Cabinet Committee on May 26 (see No. 343) that in respect of compulsory arbitration Great Britain's participation should be limited to guaranteeing a comprehensive arbitration treaty between France and Germany.	542
348 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 790	May 27	States that he informed the Italian Ambassador that H.M.G. found the conciliatory feeling in the French draft note (see No. 318) satisfactory but required further explanations of obscurities and that they hoped eventually to reach agreement with France and other Allies.	543

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349 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1887	May 28	Supplies detailed comment on the French draft note (see No. 318) and transmits a suggested alternative draft.	545
350 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1905	May 28	States that he informed the French Ambassador of the scope of No. 349 and requested him to make it clear to M. Briand that it represented the limit to which H.M.G. were prepared to go and to emphasize the danger of risking the policy of the pact by attempting to involve H.M.G. in wider obligations.	555
351 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 201	May 29	Refers to No. 349 and reports that, being unable to see M.F.A., he visited M. Berthelot, who gave the impression that the British view will receive fair consideration.	557
352 To MR. PHIPPS Paris	May 29	Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell stating that the Foreign Office have gone carefully into the point raised by M. Laroche and believe there is no need for specially guaranteed arbitration treaties to enable France to go to the help of Poland and Czechoslovakia as the remedy is already provided by the Covenant.	558
353 LORD CREWE Paris No. 1248	May 30	Transmits record by Mr. Phipps of a conversation with M. Briand who stated that he fully appreciated H.M.G.'s position, that he could see no difficulty in reaching agreement, and that, if France and Britain remained united, the Germans would fall into their own trap, that of seeking to divide them by putting forward security proposals.	559
354 MR. PHIPPS Paris	May 31	Informs Sir W. Tyrrell that (i) he communicated a translation of No. 352 to M. Laroche who seemed intensely relieved (ii) M. Briand stated he was aware of Mr. Chamberlain's difficulties and would do all he could to help him to overcome them.	560
355 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 620	June 2	Transmits a copy of an <i>aide-mémoire</i> containing views of the Belgian Govt. on the French draft note (No. 318) communicated to the Foreign Office on May 29 and states that it appears to be that summarised in No. 338.	562
356 To THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR London	June 2	Refers to the Belgian <i>aide-mémoire</i> of May 29, states that the Belgian Govt. already know H.M.G.'s views (see No. 350, n. 6), and goes on to say that H.M.G. agree that guarantee in the proposed Rhineland pact should cover the present German-Belgian frontier.	564
357 To SIR E. HOWARD Washington No. 884	June 3	Informs that he read to the American Ambassador the first seventeen paragraphs of No. 349 and pointed out to him that in the interests of European peace neither the Silesian settlement nor the Polish Corridor should be questioned for a long time to come.	565

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
358 To LORD CREWE Paris	June 4	Transmits a record of a conversation of May 27 with M. de Jouvenel during which he explained H.M.G.'s policy towards the League of Nations.	567
359 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 138	June 5	Reports that Italian Govt. agree with H.M.G.'s view that the reply to German proposals (see No. 197) should reflect a common policy of the Allies and states that they will do all in their power to bring about a pact so long as it is drawn up in agreement with Germany.	571
360 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	June 5	Communicates to the P.M. a copy of a French note of June 5 regarding the British draft reply to Germany (see No. 349, Enclosure) and suggests that H.M.G. should accept the French amendments, provided Section VI of the British draft is retained.	571
361 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1963	June 5	Informs that he told the French Ambassador who handed in the French note of June 5 (see No. 360, Enclosure) that before commenting on it he must discuss it with the P.M. and would give an answer as soon as possible.	580
362 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 476	June 5	Transmits a translation of a <i>note verbale</i> of June 4 from the Italian Govt. stating that they agree with H.M.G.'s view (see No. 350, n. 5) that the reply to the German proposals (see No. 197) should reflect the common policy of the Allies.	582
363 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	June 8	Letter to the French Foreign Minister commenting on the French note of June 5 (see No. 360, Enclosure 1) and stating that (i) Section VI of the British draft should be restored (ii) H.M.G. agree that proposed Rhineland pact cannot operate to prevent France from taking action in conformity with any guarantee to arbitration treaties between Germany and Germany's neighbours.	583
364 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	June 8	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell giving an account of a conversation with M. Briand on various subjects and stating that he told him that H.M.G. could not agree to any attempt to deprive the Great Powers of their control of the League and were not disposed to favour any attempt to define an aggressor.	584
365 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 227	June 9	Transmits message from Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon stating that M. Briand will send agreed reply to German pact proposals (see No. 197) in a day or so and that the Germans should now set to work with goodwill to carry out disarmament (see Chap. III, below).	589

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
366 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 233	June 10	Message from Mr. Chamberlain for Sir W. Tyrrell stating that (i) the Havas agency's report is incorrect (ii) the proposed arbitration treaty between France and Germany applies to all disputes and leaves no scope for coercive action except when undertaken in accordance with treaty stipulations, or with a new Rhineland pact, or with guarantees given to any arbitration treaty.	590
367 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 234	June 10	Message from Mr. Chamberlain requesting Sir W. Tyrrell to arrange with the French Ambassador the date and character of papers to be published and informing him that the Italian delegate on the League Council has informed M. Briand that Italy is ready to cooperate with France and Britain.	591
368 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 147	June 10	Reports that Signor Mussolini is much disturbed over the Havas communiqué (see No. 366) as it does not tally with H.M.G.'s views on the French draft reply (see No. 349).	591
369 To MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 158	June 10	Refers to No. 366 and states that in view of the Havas communiqué of June 8, opportunity was taken by the P.M. to make statement which is given in No. 370 below.	593
370 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 126	June 10	Informs that the P.M. stated in the House of Commons that (i) no security pact will be concluded without the House being given an opportunity for a full discussion (ii) the French and British Govts. have reached agreement on certain basic principles to which it is believed Belgium and Italy will adhere (iii) the settlement contemplated is of a strictly bilateral character (iv) text of French reply to Germany will be communicated to Parliament.	594
371 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 60	June 10	Reports that the Havas communiqué (see No. 366) has been well received but there is doubt whether Germany will accept the Franco-British conditions, and, if not, it is hoped that the way will have been made smoother for a return to the proposals for Anglo-Belgian and Anglo-French defensive military arrangements.	595
372 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 704	June 10	Transmits record of a conversation during which Mr. Lampson informed the Belgian Ambassador that he should wait for Mr. Chamberlain's return from Geneva for answers to the various points he had raised regarding the proposed security pact.	596
373 To MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 159	June 11	Message for Sir C. Hurst suggesting that he should seek Secretary of State's approval for a meeting with M. Fromageot with regard to the terms of the pact, as it is known that M. Briand's policy towards the pact is largely inspired by M. Fromageot.	598

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374 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 246	June 11	Message from Mr. Chamberlain addressed to Rome referring to No. 368, and to No. 377, below, and stating that it would seem that as the Italian Ambassador at Paris did not make a communication similar to that made in London (see No. 281), M. Briand had assumed that Italy did not wish to join the pact.	598
375 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 228	June 11	Reports that (i) atmosphere in Berlin is favourable to rapid negotiations on security and disarmament (ii) German Govt. propose to publish text of their memo. of Feb. 9 (see No. 197) (iii) Allied disarmament note (see No. 631, below) had been received quietly in military circles.	599
376 To MR. CHILTON Washington No. 935	June 11	Transmits record of a conversation between Sir W. Tyrrell and the American Ambassador, who, on being given an account of recent negotiations concerning the pact, expressed his willingness to put his services at the disposal of the Secretary of State.	600
377 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Unnumbered Despatch	June 11	Refers to No. 374 and explains in detail the cause of M. Briand's misunderstanding of Italy's attitude.	601
378 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	June 11	Informs Sir W. Tyrrell that M. Briand who rebuked the representative of the Havas Agency for its erroneous communiqué (see No. 366), believes that Germany can hardly refuse to follow up the pact negotiations.	603
379 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	June 12	Informs Sir W. Tyrrell that the press erroneously assumed that he and M. Briand had reached no understanding before arriving at Geneva and, when agreement was quickly reached (see No. 363), assumed that one or the other had given way; goes on to request him to beg the <i>Morning Post</i> to avoid giving the Labour Party any grounds for believing that the Pact is designed against Russia.	605
380 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 153	June 13	Reports that satisfactory reports from Geneva and assurances given by H.M.G. (see No. 374) have removed the unfortunate impression created by the Havas Agency's communiqué (see No. 366) and Count Bosdari's account of Lord D'Abernon's alleged language (see No. 368, n. 6).	607
381 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 223	June 13	Reports that M. Briand (i) requests that the P.M. should be informed that the Havas Agency should not have described their communiqué (see No. 366) as official (ii) states that he is absolutely satisfied with the results of the Geneva conversations (see Nos. 363-5). n. 7: Mr. Baldwin's reply to M. Briand.	608

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382 MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 235	June 16	Reports French Ambassador as saying that M.F.A. said that he would read the Allied Note (see No. 363) with care and went on to suggest that a conference of experts should draft the text of the agreement.	609
383 To MR. ADDISON Berlin No. 1099 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 470	June 16	Informs that the attempt of French Govt. to link up western security pact with German-Polish frontier question means that H.M.G. must scrutinise the problems of Danzig and the Polish Corridor; reviews the situation; and concludes that it would be wise for Poles and Germans to let this question sleep for a whole generation.	610
384 SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	June 17	Notes on the revise of the draft Security Pact of May 12 (see No. 316). <i>Encl.</i> Revised Draft of Security Pact (June 17).	614
385 FOREIGN OFFICE	June 18	Memo. on the proposed security settlement on Germany's Western Frontier in its relation to Germany's Eastern Frontiers.	618
386 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 228	June 19	Refers to No. 381, n. 7 and reports that M. Briand (i) is delighted with the reception by the French press of the White Paper on the pact proposals (see No. 367) (ii) information from Berlin leads him to hope German reply to the French Note will be satisfactory.	625
387 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 526	June 19	Transmits translation of the Italian response to the French communication of the French Note of June 16 to Germany (see No. 382, n. 2) and reports that Signor Contarini stated that his govt. did not intend to take up M. Briand's proposal for a separate pact regarding the Brenner frontier (see No. 368).	625
388 To MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 132	June 21	Expresses hope that German Govt. will not quibble over French Note of June 16 (see No. 382, n. 2) as it offers Germany the opportunity of regaining a position of full equality in the comity of nations and instructs to let these views be known unofficially in such quarters as he thinks best.	627
389 LORD CREWE Paris No. 1398	June 21	Gives a summary of French press comment on the White Paper respecting the German Pact proposals (see No. 197) and states that its reception marks a stage in the improvement of Anglo-French relations.	628
390 MR. PHIPPS Paris	June 21	Private letter to Sir W. Tyrrell stating that the great majority of French politicians and journalists approves H.M.G.'s policy.	630
391 MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 246	June 22	Refers to No. 388 and reports that Secretary of State said that (i) press comment must not be taken as the opinion of the German Govt. (ii) the German reply would	631

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		be conciliatory but it was necessary to ask for an elucidation of certain passages in the French Note of June 16.	
		n. 5: Letter from Mr. Addison to Mr. Lampson explaining the pressure on the Govt. of the Russian department of the German Foreign Office.	
392 Mr. BENNETT Foreign Office	June 22	Memo. showing the various verbal amplifications which have been made of the German proposals for a security pact (see No. 197).	632
393 CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	June 23	Memo. on the French claim, under paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, to take independent action against Germany, including the occupation of German territory.	637
394 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 2168	June 23	Informs of conversation with the French Ambassador on the question of the Italian attitude to the pact proposals and transmits a translation of a note provided by the French Ambassador summarising replies to questions put by the German Govt. respecting the French Note of June 16.	641
395 To Mr. ADDISON Berlin No. 1175	June 23	Informs that (i) he pointed out to the German Ambassador, who had asked for H.M.G.'s comments on the French Govt.'s elucidation of their note of June 16 (see No. 394) and who had called attention to certain points in the White Paper (see No. 389), that the German Govt. should be concerned only with the text of the French Note and that it would not be appropriate for him to comment on a conversation in which he had no part (ii) the German Govt. should not raise small points but facilitate negotiations that would lead to a conference of ministers, or experts to draw up the necessary treaties.	643
396 To SIR G. GRAHAME Rome No. 923	June 23	Informs that he told the Italian Ambassador that H.M.G. and no doubt the French Govt. would welcome Italian cooperation in any pact for the security of the Rhine frontier and that there was no ground for suspicion that the union of Austria and Germany would be facilitated by a western pact.	646
397 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 2220	June 26	Transmits record of a conversation between Mr. Gregory and the French Ambassador who expressed the view that, even when the Germans replied to the French Note of June 16, there should be no haste in calling a conference until ambiguities and misapprehensions had been removed and who went on to say that the French Foreign Ministry had not yet made a draft of treaty.	648

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398 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 245	June 28	Reports that (i) he contradicted Secretary of State's observation that the French Note of June 16 meant that the French Govt. could take action as guarantors of the German-Polish arbitration treaty whenever it suited them (ii) German Govt. are by no means sure of a majority (iii) Security Pact does not enjoy cordial support of the larger parties.	649
399 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 244	June 29	Reports that (i) Dr. Stresemann is determined to press forward the pact negotiation with maximum speed (ii) he has met with exceptionally severe opposition (iii) offer of France regarding evacuation of the Ruhr has helped German Govt. to meet criticism (iv) an early conference should reduce strength of opposition.	650
400 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 135	June 30	Refers to No. 399, states that all the alterations made at H.M.G.'s request should have rendered the French Note of June 16 acceptable; instructs to leave the German Govt. in no doubt as to the deplorable impression your reports have made on H.M.G.	652
401 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 388	July 1	Transmits notes of a conversation with Herr von Schubert and Dr. Gaus setting out their objections to certain points in the French Note of June 16.	653
402 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	[July 2]	Letter to M. Briand stating H.M.G.'s objections to (i) reopening the question of the Geneva Protocol at the League Assembly in September (ii) discussion of the question of unanimity for decisions of the League Council (iii) the attempts to define 'aggressor' (iv) efforts to amend the League Covenant. n. 7: Translation of M. Briand's reply of July 13.	655
403 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 250	July 3	Refers to No. 400, reports that situation has improved, and states Herr von Schubert's and Dr. Gaus's objections (see No. 401) are juristic and can be met without difficulty.	658
404 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 251	July 3	Reports that Secretary of State says he will draft reply to the French note of June 16 as far as possible on general lines but fears that French will reply that their demands for precision have not been met and insists that he must object to French demands to act as guarantor of a German-Polish arbitration treaty.	658
405 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 2286	July 4	States that, in order to facilitate progress of the security negotiations, he transmits British draft of a security pact; gives a commentary on each article; and explains that it is necessary that H.M.G. should retain the initiative.	659

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406 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 137	July 5	Refers to No. 404, approves his action, and instructs to point out to the German Govt. that the unilateral Franco-Polish alliance already exists whereas proposed French guarantee of a German-Polish arbitration treaty would be bilateral and that it is open to them to go fully into the terms of the proposed guarantee.	661
407 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 257	July 8	Reports that (i) Foreign Affairs Committee claim to see German reply before it is sent (ii) the German Govt. who are faced with internal opposition, are convinced that a conference of ministers or experts is essential to the progress of negotiations.	662
408 M. BRIAND [Paris]	July 9	Text of memo. communicated to the Foreign Office containing comments on the British draft of a guarantee treaty (see No. 405, n. 2).	663
409 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 259	July 10	Reports that (i) the German Chancellor stated that public opinion suspected traps in M. Briand's reply (ii) he pointed out to the Chancellor that M. Briand's reply was reasonable and all that could be expected (iii) the Chancellor would prefer to consider draft terms of an agreement (iv) Minister of the Interior expressed view that a concession with regard to the terms of Germany's entry into the League would facilitate matters.	665
410 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 2362	July 10	Informs of receipt of No. 408 and goes on to say that, when the French Ambassador expressed the fear lest Lord D'Abernon should offer explanations of the French Note of June 16 in Berlin, he explained that Lord D'Abernon had been instructed to induce the German Govt. to send a conciliatory reply without delay.	667
411 SIR C. HURST [Foreign Office]	July 11	Memo. on the extent to which the obligations of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (see No. 405, n. 2) exceed the obligations of the Covenant.	669
412 To THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	July 11	Letter commenting on No. 408 and expressing H.M.G.'s view that it is essential to set up some machinery for deciding when a <i>casus foederis</i> has arisen.	673
413 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 831	July 14	Informs that he handed to the Belgian Ambassador copies of the draft of treaty (see No. 405, n. 2), of M. Briand's comments (see No. 408), and of H.M.G.'s reply (No. 412) and goes on to summarise the discussion that followed.	676
414 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	July 16	Memo. on disarmament commenting on the paper on that subject by Lord Cecil circulated to the Cabinet.	679
415 To MR. PHIPPS Paris No. 2456	July 17	Informs of a conversation with the French Ambassador who called to communicate M. Briand's comments on No. 412 and his	682

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		agreement to the suggestion that M. Fromageot should visit London to work with Sir C. Hurst in order to arrive at an agreed text of a security pact.	
416 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1307	July 17	Refers to No. 401, comments that the Germans seem to be afraid of their own initiative and, if they now draw back, the nature and purpose of their original proposals will be questioned.	683
417 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 271	July 19	Reports that news of preparations for a rapid evacuation of the Ruhr (see No. 635, below) has led to approval of proposed German reply to French Note of June 16 by the leaders of the principal parties.	685
418 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1336	July 20	States that he informed the German Ambassador, who read and left a copy of the German reply to the French, that he would study it carefully and went on to remark that perhaps the long delay had educated public opinion in France and Britain.	686
419 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 274	July 22	Reports that Dr. Stresemann's speech in the Reichstag was conciliatory and was well received, though he scarcely referred to the German reply of July 20 (see No. 418).	687
420 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 252	July 22	Reports that German Note of July 20 (see No. 418) is recognised by most of French press as keeping the door open, but there is a strong undercurrent of suspicion that Germany is trying to secure a modification of the Versailles treaty.	688
421 To MR. CHILTON Washington No. 1186	July 22	States that he informed the U.S. Ambassador that H.M.G. (i) had made no proposals to France, Germany and Italy for action against the Soviet Govt. (ii) found the German note (see No. 418) satisfactory (iii) hoped that the U.S. Govt. would keep an open mind on the question of a German-Polish arbitration treaty.	689
422 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 276	July 23	Reports that (i) in the Reichstag the only opposition to the German Note (see No. 418) came from Right extremists and Communists (ii) vote of confidence was 235:158.	690
423 To MR. PHIPPS Paris No. 2515	July 23	Informs that (i) in a discussion with the French Ambassador in the presence of M. Fromageot and Sir C. Hurst of the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (see No. 415), he told the Ambassador that the power of H.M.G. to persuade public opinion to accept obligations would depend upon the limitation of the guarantee to provide for real dangers and that H.M.G. did not intend to take a direct part in arrangements for the German-Polish frontier.	691

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424 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	July 24	Letter in reply to M. Briand's letter of July 13 (see No. 402, n. 7) saying that he agrees that it may be impossible to avoid some discussion of the Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4) at Geneva in Sept. but that does not mean that France or Great Britain should take any initiative.	692
425 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 259	July 27	Reports M. Berthelot as saying that (i) the German Note (see No. 418) was not to his liking (ii) he intended to draft a reply stating the need for compulsory arbitration and for Germany's unconditional entry into the League before the conclusion of a pact (iii) it would be folly to enter a conference with Germany until France and Britain had reached complete agreement.	694
426 To MR. PHIPPS Paris No. 2539	July 27	Gives his impressions of the German note (see No. 418) and the situation created by it; instructs to bring the contents of this despatch to the notice of M. Briand.	695
427 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 285	July 28	Transmits message from the German Govt. stating that they fear that France might send a new formal note without previous diplomatic discussions.	699
428 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 261	July 28	Refers to No. 426 and reports M. Briand as saying that (i) the sooner informal conversations, the better, provided Great Britain and France present a united front (ii) Germans must adhere to provisions of the Versailles Treaty and Allies should observe their obligations respecting the occupation of the Rhineland (iii) he agreed with H.M.G. that it was necessary to detach Germany from Russia (iv) France must not be prevented from taking action in Germany by the dissentient vote of one power on the League council (v) he would like to visit London next week.	699
429 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1413	July 28	States that (i) although in No. 426 he tried to put a favourable construction on the German Note (see No. 418), he regrets that the German Govt. did not accept H.M.G.'s advice (see No. 388) (ii) German Govt. have known from the beginning that their unconditional entry into the League is essential (iii) German Govt. have led everyone to believe that they would not demand modification of Articles 428-432 of the Treaty (iv) the note again raises doubts as to Germany's real intentions.	701
430 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 592	July 28	Informs that, in reply to Polish Minister's request for H.M.G.'s views, he stated that (i) H.M.G. were interested in a French guarantee of a German-Polish arbitration treaty only in so far as it affects the British guarantee in the west (ii) that point has been made clear to France (iii) German	705

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		reply has made a rejoinder necessary and has therefore retarded the convening of a conference (iv) in working for a pact H.M.G. had no design of embroiling Germany with Russia.	
431 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 153	July 30	Refers to No. 427 and states that (i) German note of July 20 is nothing more than an election manifesto (ii) there is just a possibility that with M. Briand's help H.M.G. can save the Germans from the consequences of their folly.	707
432 THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	July 31	Note stating that M. Briand approves generally the suggestions resulting from Sir C. Hurst's and M. Fromageot's conversations (see Nos. 423 and 424) and wishes to submit two points for Mr. Chamberlain's consideration.	708
433 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 294	Aug. 6	Suggests that advantage of improved situation resulting from the evacuation of the Ruhr and decision to evacuate the three towns (see Nos. 635 and 645, below) and that a reasonable reply to the German Note (see No. 418) should permit of immediate verbal negotiations, provided Germans adhere to pre-conditions.	709
434 To MR. PHIPPS Paris No. 2675	Aug. 6	Transmits record of conversation between the French Ambassador and Mr. Lampson touching on the question of discussion of the Geneva Protocol at the League Assembly (see No. 165, n. 4), on the working of the League, and on a suitable place for a meeting with Dr. Stresemann.	709
435 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 297	Aug. 10	Gives a forecast, based on information from secret sources, of the German attitude to major points of security proposals under discussion.	711
436 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 298	Aug. 10	Reports that M. Litvinoff has had long interviews with M.F.A. and has made vehement protests against Germany's signing a western pact.	712
437 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	Aug. 10	Letter to the Belgian M.F.A. replying to his memo. of July 29 and stating that (i) he does not think it would be advisable to involve the League Council in the operation of a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (ii) Assembly would not agree to extend the provisions of Article 16 of the covenant (iii) H.M.G. are not prepared to assume fresh obligations.	713
438 BRITISH AND FRENCH REPRESENTATIVES 12 NOON	Aug. 11	Notes of meeting held at the Foreign Office: discussion of French draft reply (see Annex) to German Note of July 20 (see No. 418).	715
439 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Aug. 11	Mr. Chamberlain informs of meeting with French representatives (see No. 438) and states that (i) the French Note will contain an invitation to Germany to enter on	723

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		conversations (ii) Dr. Gaus will be invited beforehand to meet Sir C. Hurst and M. Fromageot (iii) Germany should realise that the Eastern guarantee is the only way of re-writing the Franco-Polish Alliance.	
440 CABINET OFFICE C.P. 309 (25)	Aug. 12	Parallel French and English texts of a proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee including amendments agreed upon by M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain on Aug. 12.	726
441 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 984	Aug. 12	Informs of agreement on text of French reply to German Note (see No. 438) and on a proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (see No. 440), which, at this stage, should not be mentioned publicly as it is not an agreed pact.	731
442 To MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 222	Aug. 13	Instructs to inform M. Briand that H.M.G. approve the terms of the draft reply to Germany (see No. 438) and the terms of the draft treaty as provisionally settled (see No. 440) and to give him assurance of personal regard and sincere friendship.	732
443 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 158	Aug. 13	Informs that (i) terms of the French reply (see No. 438) will be referred to other Allies (ii) proposed draft pact (see No. 440) represents an agreement between the French Govt. and H.M.G. and is not a cut and dried scheme to be put to Germany.	732
444 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 68	Aug. 16	Instructs to express to the Belgian Govt. the hope that they will approve the French draft reply to Germany (see No. 438), to support strongly the idea of a meeting of legal advisers, and to say that it may not be possible for Ministers to meet before the end of the League Assembly but that it is hoped they will meet soon after the jurists have completed preliminary work.	734
445 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 160	Aug. 20	Refers to No. 443; instructs to support French proposal that, if Germany accepts the basis of negotiations, British, French, Belgian and German legal advisers should meet in London to prepare for a meeting of Foreign Ministers; explains that Herr Gaus, though free to make suggestions, will not be called upon to commit his govt.	735
446 To MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 231	Aug. 21	Instructs to draw attention to words in the instructions to French Ambassador in Berlin implying that jurists are to prepare an agreed text and points out that these words are likely to lead the German Govt. to refuse to send Herr Gaus to London.	736
447 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 89	Aug. 21	States that he communicated substance of No. 445 to M.F.A. who (i) agrees with H.M.G.'s proposed action (ii) considers proposed treaty (see No. 440) excellent (iii) thinks that the negotiations will be successful.	737

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
448 MR. OVEY Rome No. 705	Aug. 21	Reports that Signor Mussolini's reply to the French Govt. respecting the draft note to Germany (see No. 438) is most satisfactory.	738
449 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 308	Aug. 24	Reports that French Ambassador (i) gave Dr. Stresemann the assurance that Herr Gaus would not be called upon to commit his Govt. in any way (ii) informed Dr. Stresemann that it was his impression that the meeting of Foreign Ministers would be held as soon as possible after the meeting of the jurists.	739
450 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 304	Aug. 25	Reports that, according to French Ambassador at Berlin, Dr. Stresemann stated that Herr Gaus could not leave Berlin until public opinion had had time to express itself on the French Note of Aug. 24 (see No. 449) and suggested that the meeting of Ministers should take place in mid-Sept. in the Swiss Mountains.	740
451 To MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 237	Aug. 25	Refers to No. 450, accepts proposal to publish the French Note (see No. 449) in the press on Aug. 27 along with the verbal communication regarding the meeting of the legal advisers; adds that H.M.G. agree that the meeting should take place on Sept. 1 if an earlier date cannot be arranged.	740
452 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 310	Aug. 25	Reports that (i) Dr. Stresemann has favourable impression of the French Note (see No. 449) although there was a good deal in it which he does not understand (ii) he pressed Dr. Stresemann to send Dr. Gaus to London at once.	741
453 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 165	Aug. 26	Refers to No. 449; informs that H.M.G. have agreed Aug. 27 for publication of the French Note and verbal communication (see No. 451); instructs to collaborate with French and Belgian ministers in drawing up a communiqué in consultation with Dr. Stresemann.	741
454 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 313	Aug. 26	Transmits text of communiqué (see No. 453) and states that it will be published at the same time as the French Note.	742
455 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 398	AUG. 26	Reports that M.F.A. states that (i) he welcomes a Western Pact provided it is so worded as not to weaken Poland's rights to her present frontiers (ii) he deplores poor state of Polish-German relations which he attributes to the anti-Polish German attitude but will do all he can to improve them (iii) he appreciates H.M.G.'s lack of direct interest in the German-Polish arbitration treaty but would welcome an expression of British approval of the French guarantee (iv) if Germany is given a permanent seat on the League Council, Poland must demand equal treatment.	743

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
456 Mr. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 312	Aug. 27	Reports M. Berthelot as saying that the French Ambassador at Rome is being instructed to point out to the Italian Govt. the impossibility of Italian representation on the Experts' and Ministers' meetings unless Italy decides to sign the Pact and guarantee the Rhine frontier.	745
457 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 169	Aug. 28	Instructs to see Dr. Stresemann before going on leave and to point out that, in spite of all that M. Briand has done to help, the German Govt. have stupidly published a White Book on the Rhineland Separatist Movement, have announced the intention to publish another White Book on the outrages of the Army of Occupation, and are voicing a claim to share in mandates.	746
458 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 45	Aug. 28	Instructs to point out to M.F.A. that H.M.G. have never said anything inconsistent about the position of Poland (see No. 247) and to define for his benefit H.M.G.'s attitude to Russia.	747
459 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 168	Aug. 28	States that H.M.G. are requesting the French and Belgian Govts. to send representatives to London for a meeting of jurists on Aug. 31, by which time Dr. Gaus will have arrived.	747
460 MR. OVEY Rome Tel. No. 205	Aug. 28	Reports that Signor Mussolini is unable to say at present whether he can go to Geneva to meet you and M. Briand but will sent a definite answer when circumstances permit.	748
461 MR. OVEY Rome Tel. No. 206	Aug. 28	Reports the <i>Chef de Cabinet</i> as saying that Signor Mussolini has received no reply from Italian Ambassador in London who was instructed to request whether an Italian jurist should attend jurists' meeting and whether Signor Mussolini could join the meeting of Foreign Ministers.	748
462 To MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 245	Aug. 28	Refers to No. 456; expresses agreement with M. Briand; and states that the Italian Counsellor will be informed that there will be an opportunity at the League Assembly at Geneva to explain to the Italian representatives the proposal for a pact and that Signor Mussolini's presence at the Conference of Ministers would be welcomed if he decides to attend.	749
463 Mr. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 317	Aug. 29	Refers to No. 462 and states that (i) M. Briand would welcome Signor Mussolini's presence and intends to do all possible to obtain an Italian guarantee of the Rhine frontier (ii) M. Berthelot suggests that the meeting of the jurists should be postponed to Sept. 1 to enable an Italian jurist to attend.	750

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464 To MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 184	Sept. 3	Report from Sir C. Hurst for Mr. Chamberlain on the progress of the jurists' meeting and stating that, on the question of the French guarantee of the Polish-German arbitration treaty, political issues can be settled only by the Ministers.	751
465 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Sept. 3	Record of conversation with M. Vandervelde who raised various questions with regard to the draft western pact and asked whether the German arbitration treaties were essential.	752
466 SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	Sept. 4	Report on the proceedings of the meetings of the jurists held at the Foreign Office, Sept. 1-4 in connection with the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.	754
467 SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	Sept. 5	Notes on the report of the meeting of legal advisers (see No. 466).	760
468 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Sept. 9	Records discussion with M. Briand, M. Vandervelde, and Signor Scialoja of the results of the jurists' conversations (see Nos. 466 and 467).	763
469 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Sept. 11	Transmits text of a resolution to be proposed in the League Assembly by the Spanish Delegate on the principles of the Geneva Protocol, namely arbitration, security and disarmament; explains that neither the French nor the British Delegation desired to take the initiative but they were prepared to support it if it came up from some other quarter.	764
470 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Sept. 11	Records conversation with Polish M.F.A. who expressed fear that, once the German Govt. secured a pact with France, they would seek revenge against Poland but seemed satisfied when it was explained to him that he could ask the Western Powers not to decide on the Eastern question in the absence of Polish representatives.	766
471 To MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 181	Sept. 12	Transmits translation of a French Note inviting the German Govt. to a conference and suggesting it should be held in Switzerland in late Sept. or early Oct.	767
472 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Sept. 12	Memo. reviewing speeches in the League Assembly and concluding that no one, except perhaps the Polish M.F.A., was prepared to shed tears over the Geneva Protocol.	768
473 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Sept. 12	Record of a conversation with Dr. Beneš, who explained the difference between the situation of Czechoslovakia and that of Poland, who welcomed a Western Pact with its proposed limitations and the proposed agreement between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and who pointed out the Czechoslovak Govt.'s need of a French guarantee.	770

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474 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 709	Sept. 12	Refers to No. 455 and states that (i) any representation at Berlin by H.M.G. would moderate German antagonism to Poland (ii) H.M.G. could not, in view of Article 19 of the Covenant, agree that negotiations to modify the German eastern frontier should be ruled out; draws attention to published correspondence and speeches showing H.M.G.'s attitude to Germany's eastern frontier.	773
475 To SIR G. GRAHAME Geneva Unnumbered Tel.	Sept. 14	Instructs to point out to M. Skrzynski and Dr. Beneš that they should not make pronouncements which might suggest that France and Britain have taken decisions which will be put in the form of a demand, as this would only add to the difficulties of the Western Powers.	775
476 MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 335	Sept. 15	Reports that M.F.A. states that a reply of the German Govt. to the French invitation (see No. 471) will be given shortly and will probably propose that the conference should begin on Oct. 5 at Lucerne.	776
477 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 324	Sept. 16	Transmits request from the British Delegation at the League Assembly for approval of a proposal in the Third Committee to ask the League Council what steps would be useful to take preparatory to disarmament conference and to appoint a committee for the purpose which they may think desirable.	776
478 To MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 207	Sept. 17	Refers to No. 477, approves suggested action, and states that it should be made clear that no conference will be summoned until satisfactory conditions of security have been attained.	777
479 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 331	Sept. 18	Refers to No. 478 and states that, while Delegates agree on question of a conference, they demand that preparatory work should begin at once and that the French delegation suggest unofficially a questionnaire to govts. indicating the lines the preparatory work should follow.	778
480 To MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 213	Sept. 18	Refers to No. 479 and states that proposed vague questionnaire will serve no useful purpose.	779
481 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 337	Sept. 19	Refers to No. 479 and reports that (i) British proposed text of terms of reference to a sub-committee, so drafted as to leave them free to examine resolutions already submitted, was accepted (ii) course of debate in sub-committee shows that British representatives have little support in urging moderation and delay.	779
482 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 341	Sept. 20	Refers to No. 480 and reports that (i) in the sub-committee Dr. Beneš proposed a text of a resolution which got rid of a proposal to the Council to begin prelimin-	780

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		ary work without delay (ii) following British objections, the French delegate withdrew his proposal to move a further resolution outlining a programme of work.	
483 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 344	Sept. 21	Reports that (i) owing to the attitude of the press, there is a marked anti-British atmosphere at Geneva (ii) Lord Cecil proposes to take the opportunity in the final debates in the Assembly to remove misrepresentations.	782
484 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 338	Sept. 22	Reports that M.F.A. states that (i) as Nationalists will probably not go to extremes, he hopes to send favourable answer to allied note (see No. 471) on Sept. 24 or 25 (ii) Oct. 5 at Locarno is suitable for meeting of Ministers (iii) Polish-German Treaty should be placed under the guarantee of the League, a solution similar to that suggested by M. Briand on Sept. 9 (see No. 468).	783
485 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 339	Sept. 22	Reports that M.F.A., on handing acceptance to proposed conference of Ministers, intends to state verbally that (i) Pact can be signed only if the Cologne Zone is evacuated (ii) Germany does not recede from German Note of Sept. 1924 regarding responsibility for the war (see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 566 and 569).	784
486 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 93	Sept. 23	Reports that M.F.A. states that Czechoslovak offer to open negotiations with Germany for a treaty of arbitration is generally regarded as disloyalty to Poland.	785
487 To MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 224	Sept. 24	Refers to No. 483, approves of Lord Cecil's suggestion, and expresses confidence that, as he agrees with H.M.G.'s views, he will make it clear that the League has no better supporter than Britain and that what is required is not platonic resolutions and elaborate questionnaires but similar action by others.	785
488 To Lord D'Abernon Berlin Tel. No. 187	Sept. 24	Refers to No. 485 and states that Dr. Stresemann should be left in no doubt that his proposed declaration is ill-timed and will have an unfortunate effect.	786
489 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 343	Sept. 24	Reports that German reply (see Nos. 471 and 476) cannot be made before Sept. 26 as representatives of the Laender and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag have to be informed.	787
490 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 344	Sept. 24	Reports that proposal by German National spokesman that Dr. Stresemann should go alone to Locarno was regarded as a trap and it was decided that he should be accompanied by Dr. Luther, Herr von Schubert, and Dr. Gaus.	787

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491 Mr. WELLESLEY Foreign Office	Sept. 24	Records that the French Ambassador called on instructions from M. Briand to suggest the procedure for the forthcoming Conference of Ministers.	788
492 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 57	Sept. 25	Refers to No. 486, states that he welcomes the step taken by Dr. Beneš and instructs to make it clear to M.F.A. that H.M.G. would not wish to stand in the way of direct and immediate conversations between Poland and Germany.	788
493 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1726	Sept. 26	Informs that (i) the German Ambassador delivered a reply accepting the allied invitation (see Nos. 471 and 476) and handed in a declaration (see No. 489), which, he said, had the approval of all sections of the German Cabinet (ii) he informed the Ambassador that there was no occasion to refer to the War guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty as it had not been previously mentioned in the pact negotiations and that it had always been made perfectly clear that there could be no question of the evacuation of the Cologne zone until the disarmament demands had been met.	789
494 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 100	Sept. 28	Refers to No. 492 and reports that M.F.A. states that (i) had he been informed earlier of H.M.G.'s view, it might have been possible to have taken joint action with Dr. Beneš (ii) it would be unwise now to take action at Berlin but it might be possible for the French to suggest to the German representative at the Conference that he should get in touch with the Polish M.F.A.	792
495 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 327	Sept. 28	Reports that M. Berthelot states that, with regard to the German declaration (see No. 493), the French Govt. have no intention of abandoning or postponing the Conference, but, if the German Govt. insist on publishing their declaration, a concerted allied communiqué in reply would suffice.	793
496 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 329	Sept. 28	Refers to No. 495 and reports that, according to M. Berthelot, M. Briand requested the German Ambassador to advise his Govt. to withdraw the declaration which was highly provocative and prejudicial to the Locarno Conference.	795
497 Mr. WINGFIELD Brussels Tel. No. 96	Sept. 28	Reports that M.F.A. states that he informed the German Minister, who communicated the German declaration (see No. 493), that (i) evacuation would take place when disarmament had been carried out (ii) in the case of Belgium there could be controversy about the war guilt clause as the German Chancellor had admitted in 1914 that the invasion was a violation of Germany's obligation; adds that M.F.A. had no objection to a concerted Allied reply to Germany.	796

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498 MR. WELLESLEY Foreign Office	Sept. 28	Records that he told the German Ambassador that he would pass on the suggestion (said to have been originated by the Italian Govt.) that, when the German declaration (see No. 493) was published, the Allies should issue a communiqué in a mild form so as not to arouse public sentiment in Germany.	797
499 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 330	Sept. 29	Refers to No. 496 and reports that M. Berthelot stated that, as the German Ambassador had informed M. Briand that the German Govt. could not withdraw their declaration and that publication would take place on Sept. 30, the French Govt. would reply, subject to M. Briand's approval, that it is noted that the German Govt. accepts the invitation to the Locarno Conference and that the German declaration in no way constitutes conditions preliminary to the Foreign Ministers' meeting on Oct. 5.	798
500 MR. WELLESLEY Foreign Office	Sept. 29	Records that (i) on instructions from the Secretary of State, he told the German Ambassador that there was nothing to add to the statement made to him when he handed in the German declaration (see No. 493) (ii) after some discussion the Ambassador denied any idea of wishing to destroy parts of the Versailles Treaty.	800
501 MR. WELLESLEY Foreign Office	Sept. 29	Records that German Ambassador (i) called again to say that German Govt. could not accept M. Briand's proposal that the German declaration should be published in the German press in an indirect form and that the French should reply in a press communiqué (ii) went on to give an assurance that the German Govt. hoped to bring the pact negotiations to a successful conclusion.	801
502 TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR London	Sept. 29	Expresses satisfaction that Germany accepts invitation to a conference on Oct. 5 without reservations and that German declaration (see No. 493) does not constitute conditions; adds that (i) there can be no modification of the Versailles Treaty (ii) date of evacuation of Cologne zone depends solely on fulfilment of disarmament obligations.	803
503 MR. SEYMOUR Rome Tel. No. 221	Sept. 30	Reports that Italian Govt. have replied to German declaration (see No. 493) saying that, as pact is based on absolute respect for treaties, in accepting the conference they cannot take into account questions raised in that declaration.	805
504 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 101	Sept. 30	Reports that German Minister states that his Govt.'s view is that (i) it would be useless to embark on a discussion of arbitration treaties with eastern powers	805

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		until it was certain a western pact would be signed (ii) simultaneous negotiations with Poland would have adverse political effects in Germany.	
505 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 337	Sept. 30	Reports that (i) M. Briand and M. Berthelot hope to arrive at Locarno on Oct. 4 (ii) French Govt., on being informed of the contents of Nos. 498, 500 and 501, express their pleasure at the close accord maintained in this matter.	806
506 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 275	Oct. 1	Instructs to telephone H.M. Minister to ask him to tell the Swiss Govt. that the conference will begin at Locarno on Oct. 5 and to say that, as proceedings will be informal, H.M.G. do not propose to trouble them by asking them to open the meeting formally.	807
507 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 357	Oct. 2	Reports that (i) he told the German Chancellor, who had complained of unfriendly tone of the British reply (see No. 502), that H.M.G. had repeatedly warned the German Govt. against the course they had adopted (ii) Chancellor reiterated all the various conditions that Germany had put forward and expressed hope that Locarno would mean a free interchange of ideas on a non-official basis.	808
508 MR. SEYMOUR Rome Tel. No. 223	Oct. 2	Reports that Signor Mussolini wishes to thank H.M.G. for soliciting his personal participation in the Locarno Conference and states that he will do his best to take part in the conference when his presence would be useful.	809
509 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	Oct. 2	Memo. summarising his latest impressions of the situation on the eve of his departure for Locarno in order that the Cabinet might like to see how his mind is moving.	810
510 MR. SEYMOUR Rome No. 833	Oct. 2	Reports that no decision has yet been taken on the composition of the Italian delegation for Locarno; gives a summary of Italian press comment on the forthcoming conference.	813
511 SIR G. CLARK Prague Tel. No. 33	Oct. 4	Gives a résumé of M.F.A.'s communiqué to the press.	815
512 SIR G. CLARK Prague Tel. No. 34	Oct. 4	Reports that M.F.A. has little to add to his press statement (see No. 511) but wishes H.M.G. to know that, as he desired to support Dr. Stresemann against his opponents, he made démarches at Berlin and Warsaw.	816
513 MR. LAMPSON Locarno	Oct. 4	Records that (i) on instructions from Mr. Chamberlain he and Mr. Selby called on Herr von Schubert to inform him that the French had proposed that Mr. Chamberlain should chair the Conference (ii) Herr von Schubert stated that Germany could	817

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		not agree to a French guarantee of the German-Polish arbitration treaty (iii) he went on to say that there was no idea of Germany's being drawn into the Russian orbit.	
514 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 4	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell stating that (i) M. Briand thinks that Poland should get on good terms with Russia and then Germany need have no fear of a French army marching through Germany (ii) he and M. Briand agreed that Turkey should not again get a hold upon the Arabs.	818
515 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 4	Memo. recording conversations with Signor Scialoja and Herr von Schubert: states that he informed Signor Scialoja that he had confirmation that the German delegation had stated that Article 16 of the Covenant presented an insuperable obstacle, that they would raise the issue of the Cologne zone, and that they would demand colonies: adds that he told Herr von Schubert that, provided M. Briand agreed, he would raise the question of the rotation of the presidency of the Conference.	820
516 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 4	Oct. 5	Reports that (i) Delegates agreed to a round table conference with no formal chairmanship (ii) during examination of the draft treaty articles 3, 5, 9 and 10 were agreed without comment; preamble and articles 7 and 11 were referred back to the jurists; drafting alterations were made to articles 1 and 2; the Germans proposed amendments to article 4; Germans raised objections to article 6 and to a lesser extent to article 8.	822
517 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 10	Oct. 6	Reports that conference discussed (i) leakage of information to the press (ii) German objections to article 6; adds that he defined H.M.G.'s attitude to the question of the Eastern frontier (see No. 509).	824
518 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 6	Records that he begged Dr. Luther, who had said that Germany could not accept a French guarantee of a Polish-German treaty, to remember that France had already treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia and could not repudiate them, that a Polish-German treaty would limit the obligations of France and Poland to one another, and that the failure of the Conference would have serious consequences.	825
519 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 12	Oct. 7	Reports that (i) the conference discussed changes proposed by jurists who were then invited to consider clause 6 (ii) Dr. Luther surprised M. Briand by saying that Article 16 of the Covenant was a greater difficulty for Germany than the guarantee.	827

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520 MR. LAMPSON Locarno	Oct. 7	Memo. examining, at the request of Mr. Chamberlain, possible alternatives to Article 6 with a view to overcoming the German objections to the French guarantee of a German-Polish treaty.	828
521 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno No. 14	Oct. 8	Reports that (i) he told Dr. Stresemann that there was no truth whatever in the story that H.M.G. were trying to organise an anti-Soviet bloc, that, on the contrary, H.M.G. had encouraged Russia's neighbours (and Germany might do the same) to get on the best terms they could (ii) Dr. Stresemann gave a long and interesting account of his conversations with M. Chicherin and stated that M. Chicherin's visits to Berlin and elsewhere had been a failure.	832
522 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno No. 15	Oct. 8	Reports that (i) in reply to Dr. Stresemann, who explained Germany's difficulties in accepting Article 16 of the Covenant, he admitted that the article imposed obligations that were uncertain, that the force of economic sanctions had been weakened by the abstention of America, that Germany, as a member of the Council of the League, would have a voice in the application of the principles of the covenant (ii) to Dr. Stresemann's suggestion that a solution might be found in an agreed interpretation of Article 16 in respect of a disarmed Nation, he replied that the issue might be referred to the jurists (iii) in reply to other points raised by Dr. Stresemann, he pointed out that on the questions of disarmament and of police, there seemed to be good progress.	836
523 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 8	Summarises discussions in the Conference on Article 16 of the Covenant, during which (i) M. Briand said that, if Russia had aggressive designs, Germany would have, despite her disarmed position, the protection of the League if she chose to join it (ii) he himself stated that public opinion in Britain supported the pact because part of the scheme was that Germany should join the League.	841
524 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 8	Letter to Dr. Luther confirming British and French statements that in the interest of the work in hand, the question of disarmament should be postponed.	847
525 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 562	Oct. 8	Reports that Dr. Schiele, Minister of the Interior and Leader of the Nationalist Party, made it clear that on their return Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann would have the support of the Nationalists only if certain conditions were fulfilled, these including removal of war guilt, no relinquishment of German soil, and a satisfac-	848

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		tory solution of the problem of Article 16 of the Covenant.	
526 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 9	Record of conversation with the Polish M.F.A. who stated that (i) he would be willing to substitute for the Franco-Polish Alliance a Tripartite Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between France, Germany and Poland (ii) Poland owed the detente in Polish-Russian relations to H.M.G. who had instilled fear into M. Chicherin (iii) Poland must respect her alliance and military arrangements with Roumania and remain interested in the security of the Baltic States.	850
527 BRITISH DELEGATION Locarno	Oct. 9	Memo. recording interview given by Mr. Chamberlain on Oct. 9 to the British press and stating that, after giving a confidential talk, he spoke of the meaning of 'open' and 'secret' diplomacy.	852
528 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 9	Memo. recording his visit to Dr. Luther during which they discussed generally several matters including the problem of Article 16 of the Covenant.	854
529 Mr. LAMPSON Locarno	Oct. 9	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell giving his general impressions of the spirit of the Conference.	858
530 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 16	Oct. 10	Reports that (i) the Conference sat for only one hour, it being felt that more progress would be made in personal discussions (ii) Signor Scialoja requested that Italy should be included in a five-power pact.	860
531 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno No. 25	Oct. 11	Transmits for the information of H.M.G. the amendments in the draft text of the Security Pact made since they last saw it and states that he will assume that the changes are acceptable unless he receives telegraphic instructions to the contrary.	861
532 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 22	Oct. 12	Reports that (i) agreement was reached on the text of a declaration to meet German difficulties with regard to Article 16 of the Covenant (ii) Germans request that the agreement should not be immediately announced (iii) question of the Eastern guarantee will be discussed informally by those concerned.	865
533 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 12	Memo. giving the text of his statement during a conversation with M. Briand and Dr. Luther regarding Germany's position in relation to the economic sanctions of Article 16.	866
534 Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 31	Oct. 13	Reports that the Conference (i) considered final report by jurists and the draft of the Pact (ii) decided not to sign the Pact but to initial the French text (iii) it is hoped that the arbitration treaties will come before the Conference tomorrow.	868

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535 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 13	Record of a conversation during which he told Herr von Schubert that (i) M. Chicherin made the mistake of viewing the good relations between any two other countries as a menace to his own (ii) it was only the loyal friendship between France and England that made a reconciliation with Germany possible.	870
536 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 32	Oct. 14	Gives a list of further amendments made by the Conference in the draft treaty.	871
537 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 34	Oct. 14	Explains for the assistance of the Cabinet the amendments (see No. 536) made to the text of the draft pact.	873
538 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 230	Oct. 14	Reports Signor Mussolini as saying that, if the German-Polish and German-Czech arbitration treaties are not immediately agreed, it would be best to sign the pact and leave those treaties for later consideration.	874
539 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 229	Oct. 14	Reports that Signor Mussolini states that he is leaving for Locarno in the evening.	874
540 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 369	Oct. 14	Reports that Cabinet approved action of German delegation at Locarno but attach importance to obtaining declarations to the effect that the régime in the Rhineland should be improved and that the Cologne area would be evacuated without delay.	875
541 BRITISH DELEGATION Locarno	Oct. 14	Memo. recording Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Dr. Stresemann during which (i) Mr. Chamberlain suggested that Dr. Beneš and Count Skrzynski should be invited to discussions on the Franco-German and Belgo-German arbitration treaties in the hopes that this might facilitate their arbitration treaties (ii) Dr. Stresemann suggested that it would help him if the wording of a declaration respecting alleviation in the Rhineland and the evacuation of the Cologne zone, to which suggestion Mr. Chamberlain showed sympathy but made it clear that the German Govt. should aim at a position with regard to disarmament which enabled them to give an undertaking to liquidate outstanding points by a certain date (see No. 650 below).	875
542 MR. LAMPSON Locarno	Oct. 14	Records that Herr von Schubert handed in two <i>aide-mémoires</i> , the one dealing with troops of occupation, the Rhineland Commission delegates, ordinances of the High Commission, and a Rhineland Reichskommissar, and the other with the question of the League's rights of investigation under Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty; states that he told Herr von Schubert that he thought M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain	878

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		had made it clear that they would not allow an element of bargaining to be introduced.	
543 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 39	Oct. 15	Reports that (i) the Conference approved the draft of the Pact (ii) Dr. Beneš and Count Skrzynski, who attended discussion of the Franco-German and Belgo-German treaties, said that, generally speaking, they would adopt the same text.	881
544 To MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 17	Oct. 15	Message from the P.M. congratulating Mr. Chamberlain and the British Delegation on their brilliant accomplishment of a delicate task.	882
545 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno	Oct. 15	Memo. recording visit to Signor Mussolini during which he suggested that, although disturbance in the Balkans was now less likely, France, Italy and Great Britain should be prepared to take united action in that region, to which suggestion he gave a sympathetic but somewhat hesitant reply.	882
546 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 43	Oct. 16	Expresses gratitude to the P.M. for his generous message (see No. 544) and his debt to the officials in the Foreign Office.	884
547 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 41	Oct. 16	Reports that (i) Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann, despite M. Briand's generosity in meeting their request for a general assurance of Allied intentions in regard to Cologne and the Rhineland, raised objection to the League scheme of military investigations under Article 213 of the Treaty (ii) he managed, using very direct language, to convince Dr. Luther that his difficulty was imaginary.	885
548 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 45	Oct. 16	Reports that date for signature of all treaties has been fixed for Dec. 1 in London.	886
549 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 47	Oct. 17	Gives a list of documents (treaties, protocol and draft collective note) which are to be published in all countries concerned on the morning of Oct. 20.	887
550 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno No. 46	Oct. 17	Transmits a commentary for issue to the press on the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy.	888
551 MR. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno No. 49	Oct. 17	Transmits record of a conversation with Dr. Beneš respecting the possibility of negotiating a Security Pact between Czechoslovakia, Roumania, the S.C.S. State, Austria and Hungary.	893

CHAPTER III

Military Control of Germany and the Evacuation of Cologne January–October, 1925

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
552 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 2	Jan. 1	Instructs to warn the German Govt. against the folly of encouraging the idea that an unfavourable decision regarding Cologne may have a disastrous effect on the working of the Dawes Scheme and to tell them plainly that Allied decision to postpone the evacuation of Cologne is based solely upon defaults in regard to disarmament (see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 712–29, <i>passim</i>).	895
553 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 3	Jan. 2	Instructs to present to German Govt. (provided other ambassadors receive instructions in time) Allied collective note (see Vol. XXVI, No. 728) on Jan. 5. n. 2: Draft of Allied note.	896
554 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 2	Jan. 2	Refers to No. 553 and instructs to request colleagues to urge their govts. to authorise publication of Allied note on Jan. 6 and to impress on them H.M.G.'s strong objection to mention of any of Germany's infractions of the Treaty not yet officially communicated to the German Govt.	897
555 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 5	Jan. 4	Reports that M.F.A., on being informed of the contents of No. 552, categorically denied that the German Govt. had any intention of throwing doubt upon Germany's obligations under the London Agreement (see No. 343, n. 9).	898
556 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 12	Jan. 7	Transmits text of German reply to Allied joint note (see No. 553), in which it is stated that the Allied Govts. should have communicated facts on which they based their decision.	899
557 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 10	Jan. 7	Reports that the French Govt., although they would have preferred to communicate to the Press the precise reasons for the Allied decision not to evacuate Cologne zone (see No. 553), are ready to proceed in agreement with H.M.G.'s views (see No. 554).	901
558 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 24	Jan. 8	States that although, despite hostile reception by the Press, the Allied note (see No. 553) has cleared the air, there still remains in Germany the preconception that, even though disarmament were carried out, the Allies would find some other pretext for postponing evacuation: comments on the points on which Germany is accused of breaches in the military clauses of the Treaty.	902

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
559	To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 18	Jan. 9	Instructs to propose in the Conference of Ambassadors that, although German reply (see No. 556) to the Allied note (see No. 553) is not acceptable, the Allied Govts. should not enter into controversy but should send an interim reply to the effect that a detailed reply will be sent when the results of the general inspection have been received.	905
560	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 22	Jan. 10	Refers to No. 559 and suggests that (i) note to German Govt. should be expedited (ii) probable date of note should be unofficially notified to German Govt. (iii) it should be made clear that satisfactory execution of disarmament will be followed without delay by the evacuation of the northern zone.	906
561	LORD CREWE Paris No. 78	Jan. 11	Transmits copy of Embassy memo. of Jan. 11 to the Ambassadors' Conference enclosing draft of Allied reply to German note (see Nos. 553, 556 and 559).	907
562	To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Jan. 12	Mr. Chamberlain states that No. 552 would have been more carefully worded if it had been foreseen that an <i>aide-mémoire</i> would have been handed to the German M.F.A. (see No. 555, n. 3); points out that the French have not yet formally agreed to statements made therein; and goes on to say that when H.M.G. have themselves made up their mind on issues involved it will be necessary to invite M. Herriot to a conference and that meanwhile the impression should not be given to the Germans that they can detach H.M.G. from the French.	908
563	To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 24	Jan. 13	Instructs to take the line in the Conference of Ambassadors that H.M.G., in the interests of public opinion, believe it necessary to send without delay an uncontentious interim reply to the German note (see No. 556) and, in that reply, to make it clear that the satisfactory execution of disarmament will be followed immediately by the evacuation of the northern zone, as suggested by Lord D'Abernon (see No. 560).	909
564	LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 27	Jan. 15	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors (i) decided to ask the Allied Govts. whether they still desired that an interim note (see No. 561, Enclosure 2, and No. 563) be sent to the German Govt., it having become clear that it would take much time to agree on the text and that the final reply would be ready earlier than expected (ii) agreed to British proposal that the Versailles Committee, the Naval Advisers and Air Clauses Committee should draw up list of categories of war	910

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		material which Germany is forbidden by the Treaty to manufacture, import and export.	
565 LORD CREWE Paris No. 132	Jan. 16	Refers to No. 564 and transmits (i) text of draft reply to German note, of which the first two paragraphs follow the British draft (see No. 561, Enclosure 2) and the third paragraph embodies the least objectionable portion of the French draft (ii) draft communiqué to be issued to the Press if no interim reply is sent. n. 6: Paris despatch No. 137 explaining that the formation of a new German Govt. (see No. 189, n. 3) has prompted the French Govt. to favour the sending of an interim reply.	912
566 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 227	Jan. 19	Instructs, should question of armament of future German warships be raised in the Conference of Ambassadors, to be guided by Admiralty letter and memo. except for the suggestion regarding intervention of an American arbitrator in the event of a difference of opinion between the Allies and the German Govt.	914
567 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 43	Jan. 19	Gives an account of a conversation during which Dr. Stresemann gave his views on the new ministry (see No. 189, n. 3), on disarmament, and on Franco-German relations.	915
568 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 10	Jan. 20	Refers to No. 563 and informs confidentially that Lord Crewe is being instructed to accept the draft interim reply to Germany as agreed in Paris (see No. 565).	917
569 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 30	Jan. 20	Requests to be informed whether he may agree to the French proposal that in the invitation to the German Govt. to send experts to Paris to receive the Allied revision of the 'nine rules' (see Vol. XX, No. 208) they should be asked to send with the experts their answer to question whether they will agree to the air convention now that it has been modified in the sense desired.	918
570 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 31	Jan. 21	Informs that all five Allied govts. have approved note to German Govt. (see No. 565) and presumes that it will be presented collectively at Berlin.	921
571 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 35	Jan. 23	States that he agrees with the Italian Ambassador's view that the French Govt. will endeavour to postpone evacuation of the Cologne area for a considerable time after the evacuation of the Ruhr in August (see No. 225, n. 16).	921
572 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 34	Jan. 24	Refers to No. 569; instructs to agree to proposal to invite German experts to Paris only if there is a general wish for this on the part of his colleagues; and points out	922

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		that the revised nine rules should be settled as soon as possible and communicated to the German Govt.	
573 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 38	Jan. 28	Instructs that when question of visits of inspection (even under the five points (see No. 23, n. 4)) comes before the Conference of Ambassadors, to propose that the Military Control Commission should be instructed not to carry out inspections while the final report (see No. 560, n. 5) is being prepared.	923
574 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 41	Jan. 29	Reports that when the Conference of Ambassadors drew up a draft telegram (which to some extent took notice of the objections (see No. 573) he had raised) to the Control Commission stating, that visits arising out of the 'five points' should be limited to those that could not be postponed, he reserved his decision pending receipt of H.M.G.'s views; advocates that the proposed compromise be accepted: reports further that, following British opposition, according to instructions (see No. 572), the Conference of Ambassadors decided to adjourn for further consideration questions of linking up the 'nine rules' with German adhesion to the Air Convention (see No. 569).	924
575 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 88	Jan. 31	Transmits a note by Mr. Finlayson showing that German Govt. have paid out of current revenue their liabilities to the Rhine and Ruhr industrialists to the extent of £32,000,000, a fact which shows that the German finances are vastly improved.	927
576 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 53	Feb. 1	Expresses agreement with the Army Council's view that suspension of visits will not render more difficult inspections required after receipt of final report (see Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5) and states that once German Govt. are persuaded that they are being fairly treated many difficulties will disappear.	930
577 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 43	Feb. 2	Instructs to make it clear to M. Herriot that H.M.G. cannot be a party to a final report which exaggerates Germany's defaults or unjustly attempts to postpone evacuation of the Cologne zone until the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4) has been accepted by Great Britain and that any attempt to enforce H.M.G.'s views will only render more difficult an attempt to work for the cause of French security.	931
578 To MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 44	Feb. 3	Refers to No. 574 and instructs (i) to agree if necessary to the despatch of draft telegram (ii) to oppose, in accordance with views of H.M.G.'s advisers in Berlin (see No. 576), surprise inspections under the five points pending consideration by	933

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		Allied Govts. of the final report. n. 5: Instructions from the War Office to General Wauchope.	
579 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 50	Feb. 4	Refers to No. 577 and reports that M. Herriot (i) denied that he had changed his policy towards Germany (ii) stated that, although no instructions had been sent to General Walch, he would nevertheless send to him via Marshal Foch H.M.G.'s message. n. 8: Foreign Office despatch No. 496 of Feb. 10 authorising Lord Crewe to state categorically that H.M.G. cannot agree to the clear wording of Art. 429 of the Treaty being called in question.	933
580 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 50	Feb. 5	Refers to No. 579 and instructs to inform M. Herriot that (i) the marked change in attitude of French members of the Control Commission to their British colleagues must have derived from some intimation from some French superior authority (ii) it would be a mistake to assume that the new German Govt. (see No. 189, n. 3) is less likely to meet Allied requirements than its predecessors.	935
581 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 51	Feb. 5	Refers to No. 579 and reports that, in view of M. Herriot's statements, he instructed General Clive to speak to Marshal Foch who stated that he had no information of any difficulties having arisen in the drafting of the report on the General Inspection and who agreed with General Clive that it would be unfortunate if the British representative, General Wauchope, had to submit a minority report.	937
582 MR. WINGFIELD Brussels No. 107	Feb. 7	Reports that M. Hymans stated that he was sure that the French military authorities, not M. Herriot, had influenced General Walch (see Nos. 577 and 579) and went on to point out that the only way of avoiding friction was for H.M.G. to enter in some sort of pact affording a sense of security for France and Belgium.	938
583 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 503	Feb. 9	Transmits an account of Sir E. Crowe's discussion with the French Ambassador on the procedure to be followed in the question of inter-Allied debts and the evacuation of Cologne, during which Sir E. Crowe suggested the calling of a London Conference to settle the conditions in which Germany's obligations and those of the Allies were to be carried out.	940
584 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 569	Feb. 13	Informs of a further discussion (see No. 583) with the French Ambassador on the question of the procedure to be followed in regard to the evacuation of the Cologne zone and the consideration of the Control Commission's final report; states that,	942

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		although he gathered that in the main M. Herriot was prepared to accept H.M.G.'s views, he still hankered after an agreement on security.	
585 LORD CREWE Paris No. 445	Feb. 18	Reports that the French Govt. may wish that an invitation to the German Govt. to join the Air Convention should be sent before the modification of the nine rules is communicated to them (see No. 572); states that he proposes to press in the Conference of Ambassadors, unless otherwise instructed, for meeting the request of the German Govt. that their representatives should be heard by the Air Clauses Committee on the subject of the nine rules.	946
586 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 72	Feb. 20	States that Marshal Foch has said that he intends to propose that the Versailles Committee should pass on the Final Report of the Military Commission without comment; requests to know whether General Clive will be instructed to refuse to agree to this course or whether he should insist in the Conference of Ambassadors that the report be sent back to the Versailles Committee for analysis. n. 5; F.O. tel. No. 76 of Feb. 21 instructing Lord Crewe to insist that Ambassadors' Conference be properly assisted by Versailles Committee.	948
587 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 74	Feb. 20	Refers to No. 585 and informs that (i) if the French insist, H.M.G. sees no insuperable difficulty to sending to the German Govt. an invitation to join the Air Convention before communicating the revised nine rules (ii) if it is agreed that the German representatives should visit Paris, it should be made clear to them that the French intend merely to hand to them the proposed modifications.	949
588 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 75	Feb. 22	Reports that M. Herriot stated that (i) Conference of Ministers, which should be held in Brussels, should not be unduly hastened (ii) the Germans might be summoned to discuss methods of carrying out Allied requirements but not to debate interpretation of Article 429 of the Treaty (iii) there was no reason why the question of French security should not be discussed concurrently with that of the evacuation of Cologne.	950
589 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 74	Feb. 23	Reports that at the Conference of Ambassadors (i) Marshal Foch agreed that the Versailles Committee should express an opinion wherever the Commission's report offers suggestions or proposes alternatives (ii) it was agreed that a final modification of the nine rules would be	952

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		made after consideration of the report of the Air Clauses Committee on their discussions with the German experts.	
590 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 686	Feb. 24	Informs of further conversation with the French Ambassador, who left a Note from M. Herriot, concerning the procedure of dealing with the report of the Versailles Committee (see No. 589) and particularly the mode of communicating the resulting Allied decisions to the German Govt. Adds that he emphasized to the French Ambassador the need to prevent Germany from forming an anti-western block with Russia.	953
591 Mr. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Feb. 26	Records that he informed the French Ambassador that H.M.G., who had taken highest legal opinion, could not agree that Articles 42-44 of the Treaty coupled with Article 213 conferred upon the League the right to establish permanent control in the Rhineland but merely to send in a commission of enquiry if there was any suspicion that Germany was evading not only the general disarmament clauses but also the special provisions of Articles 42-44, nor could H.M.G. agree that the League had any right to enforce infractions of the peace treaties.	956
592 CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	Feb. 27	Summary of the Final Report (Feb. 15) of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control into the General Inspection of German Armaments.	958
593 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 92	Mar. 3	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors agreed to invite the Versailles Committee to furnish a further report on the Final Report (see No. 592) of the Control Commission, it being left to the Secretaries to draft precise instructions.	965
594 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 413	Mar. 3	Informs that he told the German Ambassador that (i) the publication of the Control Commission's final report (see No. 592) as requested by the German Govt. ought to be considered solely with reference to facilitating satisfaction for the Allies' just demands, which satisfaction would facilitate the early evacuation of Cologne (ii) H.M.G. would advocate that question of the evacuation of Cologne should be considered solely in terms of the Treaty (iii) H.M.G. looked favourably on German proposals for security (see Nos. 189 and 197, n. 1) but their success would depend on Germany's attitude to the Allies and the Treaty.	967
595 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 84	Mar. 5	Refers to No. 593 and instructs to ensure that the Versailles Committee get to work immediately and that they are given no pretext, such as the question of when the Control Commission should be withdrawn, to delay matters.	971

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596	CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	Mar. 5	Statement prepared for the British Representative at the League of Nations regarding the application to the Rhineland of the League's Scheme of Investigation in Enemy countries. n. 6; Memo. by Mr. Headlam-Morley on the origins of Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty.	971
597	LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 98	Mar. 8	Refers to No. 595 and expresses view that as difficulties have arisen in drafting instructions to the Versailles Committee (the French exploiting fully the vague and comprehensive terms of the Treaty and refusing to be limited by the five points), to avoid further delay it would be better to accept the French draft, making it clear that in the Committee General Clive will be bound by the restrictions in No. 593, n. 3.	976
598	LORD CREWE Paris No. 673	Mar. 18	Reports that the German authorities complain of the delay in informing them of the conclusions of the general inspection (see No. 592) and suggests that the Versailles Committee should draw up, irrespective of the Cologne question, a list of measures that Germany must take to satisfy the military clauses of the Treaty.	977
599	TO LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 90	Mar. 19	Instructs to agree to a revised draft of instructions to the Versailles Committee (see No. 597), making, if possible, certain changes in the text.	979
600	MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Mar. 19	Letter to Mr. Sargent stating that the memo. (see No. 593) which the Embassy submitted to the Ambassadors' Conference raising the question of the Commission of Control (for which no instructions were given) has allowed the French to switch discussion from the important question of the evacuation of Cologne to a minor and unnecessary point.	979
601	TO WAR OFFICE	Mar. 20	Refers to War Office suggestion that League Council should negotiate with German Govt. with view to organize some scheme of continuous organization in Rhineland, and states that Foreign Office prefer that all such negotiation should be held within the Council after Germany has become a member.	981
602	LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 115	Mar. 26	Reports that, at the instigation of Mr. Phipps, the Conference of Ambassadors decided that the Germans should be sounded privately on the modifications, proposed by H.M.G., of the draft agreement drawn up by the Mixed Commission for valuing the Services in kind under Articles 8-12 of the Rhineland Agreement before considering a memo. on this question submitted by the French Govt.	982

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603 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 120	Mar. 31	Refers to No. 602 and reports that the German chief delegate agreed to all the modifications but objected to all mention in the Agreement of the Rhineland High Commission on which Germany had no representation. n. 6: F.O. tel. No. 99 agreeing to proposed commission provided it is understood that the nomination of the Arbitration Commission President will be made through the Rhineland High Commission.	983
604 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1130	Mar. 31	Informs that after some discussion of the question of a possible reoccupation of the Rhineland territories under Article 430 and of the question of replying to the German Note of Feb. 9 (see No. 197, n. 1), he urged M. de Fleuriau to press upon M. Herriot the urgency of coming to a decision about Cologne and to ask for his views on possible Spanish claims for a permanent seat on the League Council.	984
605 LORD CREWE Paris No. 790	Apr. 1	Reports that although the preparation of a list of war material Germany is forbidden to manufacture, export or import, has been held up pending instructions from Air Ministry to the British Member of the Air Clauses Committee, the list submitted by the Military Commission in Germany is already forming a basis for negotiations with the German Govt.	988
606 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 124	Apr. 2	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors agreed to modifications of Mixed Commission's draft agreement, to the compromise proposed by the German delegate, and to H.M.G.'s view of procedure for the nomination of the President of the Arbitration Commission (see No. 603).	989
607 LORD CREWE Paris No. 817	Apr. 5	Suggests two possible compromises to resolve the divergent views of the French Govt. and those of H.M.G. as to the means of consulting the German authorities regarding Allied requirements in the matter of German disarmament.	990
608 LORD CREWE Paris No. 880	Apr. 13	Transmits copy of Versailles Committee report, points out that General Clive has succeeded in obtaining acceptance of nearly all of the War Office views, explains that the report enumerates twelve infractions of the Treaty which the German Govt. will be required to make good, and requests to be instructed on nine matters arising from the situation created.	992
609 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1209	Apr. 17	Refers to No. 607, calls attention to modification of H.M.G.'s original views (see Nos. 562, 580, 584, 588 and 590) following discussions with the French (see Nos. 584	995

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		and 590), and, in suggesting a procedure to be followed, instructs to impress on French Govt. that H.M.G., having made such considerable concession, expect reciprocal consideration and acceptance of their view that there should be no display of harshness to the German Govt.	
610 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1359	Apr. 21	Instructs to take the line in the Conference of Ambassadors that, as the modifications of the nine rules (see No. 569, n. 2) have been approved in principle (see No. 589) and as the Air Clauses Committee recommend their immediate notification to the German Govt., no pretext should be given for further needless delay.	99
611 To MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 89	Apr. 27	Refers to No. 292, n. 1; informs that Lord D'Abernon is returning to Berlin, and instructs to inform the German Govt., but only if asked for H.M.G.'s views, that it is expected that the election of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg will in no way alter the policy of Luther Govt.	99
612 MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 175	Apr. 28	Refers to No. 611 and reports that information received shows that Field-Marshal von Hindenburg has no wish, and is indeed powerless, to change the Luther policy and that the election will silence much opposition.	100
613 To WAR OFFICE	Apr. 29	Requests that the General Staff should (i) draw up a memo., consisting of four sections, to form the basis of demands with regard to disarmament to be handed to the German Govt., taking note of the concession to the French Govt. in No. 609 and containing a paragraph relating to the withdrawal of the Control Commission (ii) give advice on the precise instructions to be sent to the Control Commission regarding the question of the German police.	100
614 WAR OFFICE	May 1	Refers to No. 613, transmits the memo. requested, and states that while mention should be made of the withdrawal of the Control Commission, that body should remain in Germany to supervise the execution of the Allied demands, its numbers being progressively reduced as the various infractions are made good.	100
615 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1570	May 5	Informs, with reference to Nos. 602 and 603 that (i) there is no objection in principle to the notification to the Rhineland High Commission of the decisions of the various commissions, it being understood that notification is for information only and that it should be confined, in the interests of economy, to decisions of general interest or principle (ii) H.M.G. cannot agree that the Rhineland High Commission should be the channel of	100

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		communication between the Reparation Commission and Agent-General on the one hand and the Assessment and Arbitral Commissions on the other (iii) question of costs of officials under the new schemes should not be mentioned in any communication to the German Govt. who might get the impression that the Allies are responsible for the cost of all officials.	
616 LORD KILMARNOCK Coblenz No. 184	May 8	Reports on the German celebrations of an anti-Allied character which are being organised in the Rhineland and suggests that, as any action by the Rhineland Commission may be limited, H.M. Ambassador in Berlin should be instructed to impress upon the German Govt. the need to ensure that the celebrations are not provocative.	1008
617 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 101	May 13	Refers to No. 616 and instructs to speak to the German Govt. in the plainest language.	1011
618 COLONEL RYAN Coblenz No. 189	May 13	Refers to No. 616, and reports the action taken by the High Commission after receiving further reports on the preparation for the German celebrations.	1012
619 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 194	May 15	Reports that in accordance with instructions (see No. 617), he spoke strongly to the German Govt. who promise to use their influence to keep celebrations on moderate and sensible lines.	1014
620 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1719	May 15	Refers to No. 613; states that the British Draft of the Note which is to be addressed to the German Govt. regarding military control and the evacuation of the Cologne Zone is better than the French, accepts the French note as a basis provided it is modified, and proceeds to give instructions as to the modifications required.	1015
621 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 889	May 15	Refers to Nos. 300 and 620, n. 5, and instructs to explain to the German Govt. after the Allied demands have been presented that H.M.G.'s decision to entrust discussions regarding execution of those demands to the Military Commission in Berlin arises from the changed situation and their desire to hasten evacuation of occupied territory.	1019
622 COLONEL RYAN Coblenz Tel. No. 12	May 19	Refers to No. 619 and states that, despite German Govt.'s statements, there is little doubt that they have encouraged the celebrations.	1020
623 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 105	May 20	Refers to No. 619 and instructs to inform his French and Belgian colleagues of his representations and of the German reply.	1021
624 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 186	May 20	Refers to No. 620, gives a detailed account of the state of the negotiations, and reports that he strongly contested the	1022

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		French accusation that H.M.G. were to blame for the delay.	
625 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 190	May 21	Requests authorisation to reply to a French proposal that H.M.G. accept in principle the agreement reached on Feb. 23 (see No. 589) but not to include in a joint communication reference to the question of flight over German territory which, in view of H.M.G.'s arrangement with Germany over civil flying rights, is scarcely a matter for the Conference of Ambassadors.	1025
626 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 146	May 23	Refers to No. 624 and states that (i) H.M.G. agree to the presentation of demands in one schedule on the definite understanding that they reserve absolute liberty to use the concessions made to enlighten British, neutral and German opinion (ii) General Clive has received instructions as to modifications required by H.M.G. (iii) H.M.G. would prefer to communicate to the Germans only the texts of documents already agreed on but would agree to communicate summaries of the annexes (iv) the French text regarding the immediate evacuation of Cologne must be unambiguous.	1027
627 LORD KILMARNOCK Coblenz Tel. No. 16	May 27	States that it were preferable that Rhine-land High Commission should not be called upon to veto proposed visit of the German President to Cologne but German Govt. should be recommended to abandon the idea. n. 2: Letter of May 28 from Mr. Lampson to Mr. Addison instructing him to let the German Govt. know the untoward results that might accrue from the visit.	1029
628 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 1884	May 28	Refers to No. 626 and instructs to propose in the Conference of Ambassadors that (i) note to German Govt. should be presented on instructions of Govts. by their Ambassadors at Berlin (ii) note should be issued to the press the day following its presentation.	1030
629 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 111	May 29	Refers to No. 627 and instructs to urge Dr. Luther to use his personal influence to prevent President's visit to the Rhineland as it would force on H.M.G. the question of war criminals and prejudice negotiations on security (see Chap. II).	1031
630 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 206	May 30	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors approved the draft note and schedules to be communicated to the German Govt. (see No. 628) and comments upon it.	1032
631 LORD CREWE Paris No. 1254	May 30	Transmits text of Allied Note (see No. 630), respecting the evacuation of the Cologne zone.	1034

civ

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
632 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 211A	June 4	Reports that in the Conference of Ambassadors (i) he failed to obtain agreement to the communication of the modified nine rules (see No. 625) owing to his refusal to adopt a common policy with the French in respect of flight over Germany (ii) it was decided to ask the Rhineland High Commission for their views on the question whether it should act as a liaison between the Valuation Committees and the Agent-General (see No. 615).	1038
633 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 169	June 11	Refers to No. 632; instructs (i) to drop non-possumus attitude and to say that Air Ministry is prepared to discuss international flying over Germany but not under the aegis of the Conference of Ambassadors (ii) to press strongly for communication of the modified nine rules to Germany without delay.	1039
634 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 2136	June 20	Instructs to ask the French Govt.'s views on H.M.G. proposals for fixing expeditely the amounts to be assigned out of the second Dawes annuity for the period beginning Sept. 1 for expenses of the armies of occupation, the Rhineland High Commission, and the Control Commissions.	1040
635 LORD CREWE Paris No. 1532	July 8	Transmits copy of Military Attaché's despatch of July 7 stating that the evacuation of the Ruhr will begin on July 15.	1042
636 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 2399	July 14	Informs of H.M.G.'s views on the procedure for making arrangements for the evacuation of the Cologne Zone.	1043
637 To MR. PHIPPS Paris No. 2422	July 16	Refers to No. 635 and instructs, if the matter is broached in conversation, to say that H.M.G.'s view is that Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort should be evacuated at the same time as the Ruhr.	1044
638 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 245	July 17	Reports that M. Berthelot stated that he had persuaded M. Briand and the French Govt. to agree to the evacuation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort simultaneously with the Ruhr.	1046
639 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 256	July 23	Reports that it is hoped that the Conference of Ambassadors will decide on July 27 the procedure for the evacuation of the three towns (see No. 638).	1047
640 To THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR London	July 24	Informs that the French and Belgian Govts. have agreed to H.M.G.'s proposal that the Italian, Japanese, and United States Govt. should be invited to take part from the outset concerning payments out of the Second Dawes annuity (see No. 634).	1047
641 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 205	July 29	Instructs to propose to the Ambassadors' Conference that instructions should be sent to the Control Commission and that	1049

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		these should include an instruction to discuss with the Pawelsz Commission the necessary measures required to execute the Allied demands (see No. 631).	
642 To MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 206	July 29	States that H.M.G. are not yet in a position to give instructions promised in No. 636; authorises him (i) to agree that the Versailles Committee are the competent military authority (see No. 636, n. 3) (ii) to agree to the Versailles Committee report.	1050
643 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 271	July 31	Reports that M. Berthelot states that, although M. Herriot is trying to retract his admission that he had given the Germans a verbal promise to evacuate the three towns (see No. 638), M. Briand has no intention of going back on his word, but believes that three weeks is needed to complete the evacuation.	1051
644 To MR. PHIPPS Paris No. 2629	Aug. 4	Instructs to request the Conference of Ambassadors to expedite execution of Allied demands (see No. 631) by every possible means including instructions to the Control Commission to facilitate the task of the Pawelsz Commission (see No. 641).	1052
645 MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 277	Aug. 5	Reports that the Conference of Ambassadors agreed that (i) the Versailles Committee was the competent military authority for making arrangements for the evacuation of Cologne (see No. 642) (ii) Versailles Committee should issue instructions to the Control Commission proposed by H.M.G. (see No. 644) and instructions for the evacuation of the three towns (see No. 643).	1054
646 To MR. PHIPPS Paris No. 2757	Aug. 14	Informs that M. Briand, when visiting Britain (see No. 428), stated that he had already informed the French members of the Control Commission of the necessity of a quick execution of the Allied disarmament demands (see No. 631).	1055
647 AIR MINISTRY	Sept. 2	Expresses view that it may not be feasible for the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee to be withdrawn simultaneously with the Military Commission of Control (see No. 596) as it exercises under the Nine Rules continuous post-disarmament functions.	1056
648 MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 329	Sept. 9	States that the visits of the German President to various Rhineland towns as announced in the Press are bound to degenerate into demonstrations hostile to France.	1057
649 To AIR MINISTRY	Sept. 17	Letter deprecating policy of the European Airways Agreement of Aug. 10 which, by attempting to form a united front against Germany, will merely mean that German	1058

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		retaliation would affect principally British aviation interests and asking whether in the light of this the Air Council approve of the Agreement.	
650 WAR OFFICE	Sept. 29	Transmits a copy of General Wauchope's notes, dated Sept. 19, on the extent to which Germany has fulfilled the Allied demands (see No. 631).	1060
651 TO AIR MINISTRY	Oct. 15	Informs that (i) in the case of Germany the new rules (see No. 633, n. 4) became operative from the date of their communication (ii) the new rules are not applicable to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.	1074
652 TO AIR MINISTRY	Oct. 16	Informs that the Foreign Secretary is advised that (i) the League Council, on assuming responsibilities under Article 213 of the Treaty, will define the difference between military aircraft forbidden to Germany and civil aircraft (ii) the future of the Aeronautical Committee of control will be decided by the Allied Govts.	1075

CHAPTER I

Central Europe and the Balkans January—October, 1925

No. 1

Sir H. Dering¹ (Bucharest) to Mr. Chamberlain² (Received January 6)

No. 4 [C 245/22/7]

BUCHAREST, *January 1, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 630 of the 30th ultimo³ reporting the presence in Bucharest of Monsieur Tzankoff, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, I have the honour to state that, as announced, he left this capital to return to his own country yesterday morning.

Before leaving he received the native and foreign press representatives. Monsieur Tzankoff has received from the King⁴ the Grand Cross of the Star of Roumania, and Monsieur Mincoff⁵ the same grade of the Order of the Crown.

After expressing his thanks for the friendly reception accorded to him by His Majesty and the Roumanian Government, Monsieur Tzankoff said that in former as well as later days Roumania had always been hospitable and kindly to Bulgarians. The present Roumanian Government had been the first to recognise the Bulgarian Government established on July [*sic*] 9th last,⁶ and to have realised the importance of the latter's action.

The object of his present visit was to establish personal contact between

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Bucharest.

² H.M. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³ Not printed. See, however, Vol. XXVI, No. 304.

⁴ King Ferdinand.

⁵ Secretary-General of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry.

⁶ The reference is to the *coup d'état* of June 8–9, 1923 by the League of Officers which overthrew the elected Stambouliisky government. See Vol. XXIV, Nos. 414 and 427.

the two Governments and as close relations as possible between the two countries. Both had a number of common interests, for instance defence against the Bolshevik peril, as well as other matters which enabled them to come more closely together. His Government were animated by sincere desire for peace and good neighbourly relations not only with Roumania but also with all the neighbours of Bulgaria.

The foreign press, notably the 'Neue Freie Presse', had declared that he had concluded a treaty at Belgrade⁷ for common defence against Bolshevism, and that he had a similar object in view in Bucharest. This was untrue. The Bolshevik danger in the Balkan States was not so great as to require a formal compact of that nature. Only an understanding of principles was required, in order to be able, if occasion arose, to consider means for common action.

Asked whether this understanding would be extended also to Poland, the Bulgarian Premier said that clearly the interests of Poland would be borne in mind, but that Poland was strong enough to defend itself.

The Bolshevik danger was common to all. No one would have thought of common action against the Bolsheviks had not these tried to stir up Balkan countries and foment disturbances there.

It was true that Bulgaria also possessed adequate means of defence. But Bolshevik propaganda was alike open and clandestine. It percolated by every method, by every frontier, even by the shores of the Black Sea. Parallel action by all neighbouring States could not but facilitate a common defence.

In reply to enquiry, Monsieur Tzankoff said he did not go so far as to think of solidarity in defence of frontiers. The danger was not so imminent and he did not believe that the Bolsheviks would go so far as to provoke incursions and attacks on frontiers. But they were carrying on incessant and harmful agitation, speculating on the unbalanced condition of the popular masses brought about by the late war. The common action of which he had previously spoken would be necessary to prevent this agitation.

To a question whether Bulgaria's army is sufficient, the Prime Minister replied that it would about suffice ('à la rigueur'), although limited by the Treaty of Neuilly to 30,000 men. The Bulgarian Government did not ask for an increase of its numbers. It was the method of recruiting for the army which was defective. Bulgaria asked for the re-establishment of compulsory service, for the present system of recruiting was far too burdensome. The upkeep of the army cost more than a third of the whole budget—more than two out of six milliards of leva, a burden which Bulgaria was unable to bear. With compulsory service the maintenance of the same number of men would not cost more than one milliard of leva.

As regards the questions still in abeyance between Roumania and

⁷ M. Tsankoff had visited Belgrade December 26–7 before arriving in Bucharest on December 29. See Vol. XXVI, No. 304.

Bulgaria, the specially appointed Commissions⁸ had already examined and verified them in considerable detail at Bucharest. There remained only a few points to settle and on the arrival at Sofia of Monsieur Bilciurescu, the new Roumanian Minister, this could be dealt with at once, so there was every hope that the final agreement on the subject which was so ardently desired would be reached.

Bulgaria, he repeated, only desired to live at peace and in harmony with all its neighbours. He hoped that before long a complete understanding would be reached on all the questions outstanding between Bulgaria and Roumania as well as between the former and Jugo-Slavia.

For the moment he had not come to Belgrade and Bucharest to sign agreements, but only to [m]ake contact and to have a preliminary exchange of views. He had however full confidence in a happy issue.

The same applied also to Greece. When occasion arose he would likewise go to Athens.

Asked what his intentions were in regard to the Little *Entente*,⁹ Monsieur Tzankoff said that Bulgaria was a small State which had to cope with its own and great difficulties. He did not see of what assistance it could be to the Little *Entente*.

Respecting the treatment of Roumanians in Bulgaria, the Prime Minister said Bulgaria was always ready to institute a *régime* based on reciprocity and equality.

He expressed his thanks to the Roumanian press for its sympathetic comprehension of the objects of his visit and its kindly attitude towards himself. The press of both countries should strive to bring these together as closely as possible, to their mutual benefit.

Before leaving Giurgiu the Bulgarian stateman addressed telegrams of cordial thanks for his reception to the Roumanian Prime Minister¹⁰ and Minister for Foreign Affairs.¹¹

Copies of this despatch will be forwarded for the information of His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade¹² and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Sofia.¹³

I have, etc.,

HERBERT G. DERING

⁸ A Mixed Commission for adjustment of frontier matters and other questions in dispute, presided over by M. Bilciurescu, had first met on November 27, 1922. See Vol. XXIV, No. 168.

⁹ i.e. the mutual defence arrangements between Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

¹⁰ M. I. Bratianu.

¹¹ M. I. Duca.

¹² Sir A. Young.

¹³ Mr. B. Barber.

No. 2

Mr. Barber¹(Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 12)

No. 2 [C 540/22/7]

SOFIA, January 5, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 42 of the 31st ultimo,² I have the honour to report that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister told me on his return from Belgrade that, although the President of the Council³ had been received courteously and according to the protocol by the Serbian Government, he had been outside government circles, as Monsieur Rakitch described it, 'Traité comme un chien'.

According to Monsieur Rakitch, it was Monsieur Tsankoff himself who first suggested that he should go to Belgrade.⁴ This apparently occurred during the course of last October upon the occasion of Monsieur Rakitch making representations to the Bulgarian Government over the three thousand extra militia illegally recruited during the summer.⁵ Monsieur Tsankoff had then protested against the continued attitude of mistrust of the Serbian Government and had asked whether it would be possible for him to go to Belgrade in order to try and dispel it. Monsieur Rakitch had informed his Government of Monsieur Tsankoff's words and had requested instructions as to what answer he should return when the subject was broached again. He was told to inform Monsieur Tsankoff that he might come to Belgrade at the end of December or beginning of January, if he still wished to do so.

Monsieur Rakitch said that no matter of any special importance had been discussed, beyond general proposals regarding united action against the communist danger and even in this nothing concrete had been decided. A certain détente had been established over the question of the

¹ First Secretary at H.M. Legation at Sofia, and Chargé d'Affaires November 14, 1924—January 20, 1925.

² Not printed.

³ M. Tsankoff. See No. 1, n. 7.

⁴ In Sofia despatch No. 7 of January 14, Mr. Barber gave the Bulgarian version '... [M. Mincoff] said that Monsieur Koumanoudi, the second Serbian Delegate at the Assembly of the League at Geneva, had asked Monsieur Kalfoff [Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs] to stop at Belgrade for a few days on his return journey. Monsieur Kalfoff had, unfortunately, made previous arrangements to visit Paris [see Vol XXVI, No. 239], London [see *ibid*] and Rome [see Vol. XXVI, No. 247, n. 3] and was therefore compelled to decline the invitation as it was imperative that he should be back in Sofia for the Congress of the Democratic Entente on October 15th. The Bulgarian Government, however, were unwilling to give the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government the impression that they did not wish to be friendly and Monsieur Tsankoff took the first opportunity available to suggest to the Serb-Croat-Slovene representative here that he would be only too glad to visit Belgrade when the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government thought it convenient. ...'

⁵ See Vol XXVI, Nos. 195, 200, 202 and 204.

frontier bands and both Governments were now agreed not to take these episodes so tragically as they had done previously, but to allow time to elapse before taking action. This of course was all to the good and should tend to eliminate one of the greatest causes of friction between the two countries.

Monsieur Tsankoff had asked the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to make representations at Paris against the handing over of Wrangel's fleet to the Soviet Government⁶ and this apparently the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had promised to do.

The President of the Council professes to be very satisfied with his journey and has announced his intention of visiting the European capitals in the spring, although so far he has said nothing definite regarding a visit to Athens. The Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed to consider it much too soon to begin overtures to the Greek Government, especially now that the latter were backing out of the Minority Protocol.⁷

I have, etc.,
B. H. BARBER

⁶ On November 13, 1920, the leader of the White forces in Southern Russia, General Wrangel, had concluded with the French Government an agreement by which they gained possession of his ships in return for French aid in the evacuation of General Wrangel's forces from Russia (see P. Wrangel, *The Memoirs of General Wrangel*. . . (London, 1929), pp. 317 and 321-2). The ships were taken from Constantinople to Bizerta in North Africa. In June, 1924, the French Government informed His Majesty's Government that these ships would be handed over to the Soviet Government when *de iure* recognition was granted (this was done on October 28, 1924). See Vol. XXV, No. 298, n. 2.

⁷ For the texts of these protocols of September 29, 1924, for the protection of Bulgarian and Greek minorities, see *L.N.T.S.*, vol. XXIX, pp. 117-27. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 234.

No. 3

Mr. Eyres¹ (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 1 Telegraphic [C 334/52/90]

DURAZZO, January 6, 1925, 11 p.m.

Ilias Bey returned to Tirana and resumed his office as President of the Council.² He subsequently sent in his resignation to the Regent (? Gjaffer) Upi whose mandate has still a year to run. Regent nominated Ahmed Bey

¹ H.M. Representative at Durazzo, with the local rank of Minister.

² Ilias Bey Vrioni had been President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs until he fled to Italy in June, 1924, after the revolution which established the régime of Bishop Fan Noli (see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 150, 153, 158-9, 164, and 169-70).

as Prime Minister.³ He is now forming his Cabinet and has summoned Constituent Assembly. Constitutional forms being thus observed, I propose subject to your approval to accept notification of government in ordinary way and not to raise question of recognition thus treating the past six months as an interlude. My Italian colleague⁴ is telegraphing in the same sense to his government and I think French Chargé d'Affaires⁵ will follow suit also.⁶

Repeated to Rome and Belgrade.

³ Ahmed Bey Zogu had lead the revolution in December, 1924, which had overthrown the Fan Noli régime (see *ibid.*, Nos. 308 and 310).

⁴ Marquis C. Durazzo.

⁵ M. J. Béguin-Billecocq.

⁶ Mr. C. Smith, a senior member of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, minuted on January 7: '... Ahmed Zogu's Government having come to power as the result of violence should not be recognised until there is some clear expression of the national will in their favour.'

'On the other hand, as Fan Noli turned out Ilias Bey and the latter first returned to his office as Prime Minister before resigning it might be held that technically Ilias was Prime Minister during the whole of Fan Noli's regime, and as Ilias was recognised by H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment], his successor Ahmed, who had been appointed Prime Minister constitutionally, is entitled to recognition.'

Foreign Office telegram No. 1 to Durazzo of January 10 replied: 'Your proposed action approved.'

No. 4

Mr. Sargent¹(Paris) to Mr. Lampson² (Received January 7)

[C 342/127/90]

PARIS, January 6, 1925

My dear Lampson,

Many thanks for your letter of the 31st³ regarding the Albanian frontiers.

I quite see your point as to going slow, and it is precisely for this reason that the Conference has hung up the question for the last four months in the hope of being able to find some compromise which will satisfy all parties. But hitherto the Conference has confined itself to consulting its own people i.e., the Boundary Commission and the Geographical Committee. As these consultations have ended in a deadlock, we have more recently been trying to extend their scope by bringing in the Yugo-slavs and Albanians. But in order to do this the first essential is for the Conference to state the facts as regards St. Naoum⁴ and communicate

¹ A First Secretary at H.M. Embassy at Paris, and charged with the work of the Conference of Ambassadors.

² Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office.

³ See Vol. XXVI, No. 307, n. 4.

⁴ The possession of this monastery was disputed by the Albanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments. See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 113, 115, 119, 122, 133, 140, 141, n. 4, 152, 175, 240, 241, 250, and 254.

them to the two interested Governments. So long as this is not done, the Yugo-slavs have no inducement to take up the question as there is no basis for discussion. It is not unnatural to assume that the Yugoslavs at present interpret the Allied Governments' silence to mean that the latter are not going to enforce the League of Nations' decision,⁵ whereas I take it that whatever compromise is arrived at the allocation of St. Naoum to Albania cannot be called into question, unless the two interested Governments jointly invite the Allied Governments to approve some other arrangement on which they have agreed between themselves. But as I said before, the only way to bring all this to a head is for the Conference to state the case and put the facts before the interested Governments.

Personally I am optimistic enough to think that the Yugoslavs will not, when it comes to the point, prevent the handing over of St. Naoum to the Albanians,⁶ especially with the new Albanian Government in power.⁷ Look at the Greek villages in the Koritza area. The Greek Government had far more cause for complaint in being made to evacuate these than the Yugoslavs have in the case of St. Naoum, but when they once realised that the Conference was not going to give way, the evacuation took place without difficulty.⁸ In the case of St. Naoum, the Conference's position is still stronger, since it has the whole weight of the League of Nations behind it.

Notification of the decision about St. Naoum to the interested Governments does not however constitute an order for the immediate withdrawal of the Yugoslavs from the Monastery. It is merely a notice to quit. If they obey it so much the better. If they don't, there can be no question of enforcing it before May, when the Commission can begin to delimit the frontier. So the notification will not you see precipitate a crisis. On the other hand the frontier line now proposed is in itself very favourable to the Yugoslavs, and the notification will give the Conference the opportunity of representing it as such (see our despatch No. 2364).⁹ Also the notification, far from being drafted in a peremptory style, will be so worded as to give the two Governments an opportunity of engaging in a bargain if they are so inclined.

As regards Vermosche, the French have always fondly hoped that there was scope here for the wished-for concession to the Yugoslavs and the Boundary Commission was asked to propose a new frontier line accordingly.¹⁰ But having been brought to Paris for this purpose, they have inverted the proceeding of Balaam, and have cursed instead of

⁵ Of October 3, 1924. This incorporated the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice that the Principal Allied Powers, by the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of December 6, 1922 (see Vol. XXII, No. 826) which awarded the monastery to Albania, had exhausted their mission. See *L.N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 1369-72. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 240, n. 2.

⁶ Mr Lampson here commented: 'I entirely disagree!'

⁷ See No. 3.

⁸ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 148, 152, 165, 167, 184, 187, 192, 223, 226, 240, 243, and 254.

⁹ See *ibid.*, No. 250.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, Nos. 142, 231, n. 1, 240, 241, 254, 259, and 307.

blessing. The fact is that there is really very little to be done in Vermosche. The Conference's hands are tied by the decision of 1913, and the line drawn in 1922 is the best in the circumstances.¹¹

You will by now have received our account of the discussion at the Conference of the 31st.¹² I hope that you will not think that we went too far. I do not see how the Conference could very well have done less in the face of the reprimand that it received last Autumn from the League of Nations for not settling the Albanian frontiers quicker. It would by the way be a good thing if the Council could be restrained from renewing this reprimand when it meets in March!

Yours ever,
ORME SARGENT

¹¹ The boundaries of Albania were established by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1913 (see G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (ed.) *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*, vol. IX, part II (London, 1934), Nos. 391-1226, *passim*, and Appendix V). The southern frontier was delimited, but the outbreak of war prevented the establishment of a northern frontier. In a decision of November 9, 1921, the Conference of Ambassadors recognised Albania as an independent sovereign state and set up a boundary commission to delimit the north and north-east frontiers (see Vol. XXII, No. 744, n. 2). The Boundary Commission began work in 1922 (see *ibid.*, Nos. 776, 777, 779, 784, 789, 795, 807, 813, 816, 822, and 826).

¹² See Vol. XXVI, No. 312.

No. 5

Lord Crewe¹ (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 8)

*No. 41 [C 383/383/92]**

PARIS, January 7, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that Lady Crewe and I attended today a luncheon given by the Yugoslavian Minister and Mme. Spalaïkovitch in honour of their Sovereigns,² who are paying an informal visit to Paris. Among others present were M. Millerand,³ M. Politis,⁴ the Czechoslovakian Minister⁵ and M. de Billy, the newly-appointed French Minister at Bucharest, accompanied by their respective wives, and comprising a tolerably full representation of South-Eastern Europe.

2. After luncheon King Alexander talked separately to the principal guests, and in conversation with myself said he knew that in England a very unfavourable view has been taken of what was believed to be undue

¹ H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris.

² King Alexander I and Queen Marie.

³ President of the French Republic 1920-24.

⁴ Greek Minister in Paris.

⁵ Dr. S. Osusky.

Serbian interference with recent events in Albania.⁶ It really was not true that his Government had fomented trouble in Albania, but what he particularly wishes His Majesty's Government to understand is that he positively welcomes the interest taken by Great Britain in the fortunes of Albania, because he knows it to be purely disinterested, which is more than can be said of the concern given to it by some other Great Powers. In the King's opinion, it will take some little time for a settled Government to be formed in Albania, owing to the well-known character of the population. But he looks forward to the establishment of a firmly-based Administration before very long.

3. Passing to the question of the Monastery of St. Naoum, King Alexander said he had been given to understand that the other Powers represented at the Ambassadors' Conference might have been willing to meet the desires of Yugoslavia; it has been the British Government which has been quite obdurate in its refusal. I said that I thought His Majesty had been misinformed, because it was not a matter of preference on the part of His Britannic Majesty's Government for one solution or the other, but of the fact that the proper course to pursue had been decided by the Permanent Court at The Hague at the instance of the League of Nations, to whom reference had been made.⁷

4. Profiting by what I understand to be the views held at the Foreign Office of a solution made possible by the recent revolution in Albania,⁸ I asked the King whether he did not think it possible that, while the new Albanian Government is getting into shape, some compromise on this difficult subject might not be achieved between the two Governments? The King did not reply, either agreeing or disagreeing with this suggestion, but he laid stress on the importance which this claim, though in itself almost trivial, has assumed in the minds of his people, and I was not able to conclude whether he thinks that there is a possibility of its settlement by direct negotiations.

5. Lastly, he said something of communism and the recognition of the Soviet Government by Great Britain and France.⁹ He does not consider that there is any serious menace of the kind in Yugoslavia itself, where the natural instincts of the people are opposed to Bolshevik ideas, and where he has complete confidence in the loyalty of the army. But he was conscious of the efforts made by the Russian Government to create agitation in the neighbouring country. He had been told, he said, that M. Herriot⁹ would have not recognised the Soviet Government, but that he had simply done it in order to oblige Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.¹⁰ I said that

⁶ See No. 3, n. 3. See also Vol. XXVI, Nos. 170, n. 5, 175, 180, 283, 285, 289, 291, 294, 300-03, and 305.

⁷ See No. 4, n. 5.

⁸ Great Britain gave *de iure* recognition of the Soviet Government on February 1, 1924 (see Vol. XXV, Nos. 207 and 208), France on October 28, 1924 (see *ibid.*, No. 260).

⁹ Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

¹⁰ Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain January—November, 1924.

I knew of nothing which could give foundation to this story, and saw no reason for disbelieving what M. Herriot had said to me, that his former relations with the Russian Government were influenced by his opinion that if Russia is boycotted by the Western Powers, the result might be to throw her and Germany into each other's arms. King Alexander said that this seemed to him a perfectly reasonable explanation.

I have, etc.,
CREWE

No. 6

Sir M. Cheetham¹ (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 26)

No. 16 [C 1147/168/7]

ATHENS, January 9, 1924

Sir,

I met Monsieur Michalacopoulos last night and had some conversation with him on the subject of the Geneva Protocol² signed by Monsieur Politis which, apart from its wider aspects, has become a highly controversial issue in Greek politics.

2. The President of the Council said that he proposed (I imagine on the reopening of the Assembly in about ten days from now) to take the line that his Government had not been responsible for the signature of the Protocol and that he saw no reason why he should consider himself to be bound by it. I suggested that the Protocol had nevertheless been signed by a qualified Representative of the Greek Government, and that it would be difficult to annul its effects. Monsieur Michalacopoulos however insisted on his point of view and attempted to draw a parallel between his proposed action and the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the Soviet Treaty.³ I pointed out that the circumstances were not the same but he adhered to his previous statement.

3. If the President of the Council has really decided to take the course to which he alludes and was not merely eliciting my opinion, he is of course influenced by two definite motives, the desire to improve Greek relations with the Serbian State and the advisability of strengthening his position in the Chamber. There is a very strong feeling among the deputies against the observance of the Protocol² and this opposition is led by Monsieur Papanastassiou⁴ who is rumoured to be ready to take office

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Athens.

² See No. 2, n. 7.

³ On November 21, 1924, the Soviet Government had been informed that His Majesty's Government could not accept the General Treaty and Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed on August 8, 1924, which had been negotiated by Mr. MacDonald's Government (see Vol. XXV, No. 267).

⁴ Prime Minister of Greece March–July, 1924.

should Monsieur Michalacopoulos fall.

4. A Royalist paper publishes this morning interviews, on the subject of the Protocol,² with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁵ the former of whom is made to say that 'for the Government there is no Protocol question. We neither signed nor have we applied the Protocol.' He added that the Protocol would be laid before the Assembly which would express its views.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported as saying that the Government had resolved in no case to apply the Protocol. What they had not yet decided was the exact manner in which the non-application would be brought about.

I have, etc.,
MILNE CHEETHAM

⁵ M. G. Roussos.

No. 7

Mr. Eyres(Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 10)

*No. 5 [C 816/52/90]**

Confidential

DURAZZO, January 9, 1925

Sir,

The President of the Council of Ministers, Ilias Bey, who was forcibly expelled from his post by the revolution of June last,¹ returned to Tirana on the 3rd instant and resumed the duties of his office. His ignominious flight and the painful impression created thereby did not seem to weigh with him in any way, and he was quite prepared to officiate as Prime Minister. But his nerve has been shaken by intemperance, and when it was represented to him that a strong hand was still needed at the helm, he gave way and sent in his resignation to the Regent, Gjafer Upi, whose mandate will not expire for another year.

2. The Regent then gave his decree to Ahmed Bey, who proceeded to form his Cabinet. He has appointed Mufid Bey Minister of Finance provisionally and M. Costa Kotta to his former portfolio at the Ministry of Public Works. He offered the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs to Bishop Collezzi, whose diocese is the Zadrima, and who is, I am informed, a man of education and intelligence. But he is well known for his pro-Serbian sympathies, *i.e.*, pro-Serbian as opposed to pro-Italian. (I reported in my despatch No. 107 of the 18th September last² on his internment by the revolutionary Government.) The bishop replied that he must obtain the permission of the Vatican, and up to date no reply has

¹ See No. 3, n. 2.

² Not printed.

been received to his application. This appointment gave rise to great heart-searchings on the part of my Italian colleague, who was clearly very much upset. I am told that pressure is being brought on the Vatican to cause it to refuse its consent. Though I believe that Ahmed Bey was solely actuated in his choice by the desire to find a Catholic who was suited for the post (and it is palpable that the dearth of suitable persons is one of his greatest difficulties), it is unfortunate that he should thus have given an additional cause for suspicion as to his own pro-Serbian leanings, for the Italian Minister is convinced that some conditions must have been imposed on him by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. Ahmed Bey gave the most categorical and formal assurance to the Marchese Durazzo as well as to myself that no conditions of any kind had been imposed on him and that he had made no arrangements of any sort with M. Pashitch.³ Rash though it may seem on my part, I am inclined to put faith in the President's declarations, partly because I am unable to perceive what demands, other than those of neighbourly loyalty, could have been made by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. Ahmed Bey is quite well aware that if he threw himself into the arms of Jugoslavia his power and influence in Albania would at once disappear and he could not maintain his position for a moment. It is, of course, the stock-in-trade of the partisans of the revolutionary Government to present that he is simply a nominee of Jugoslavia, established in Tirana by force of Serbian arms, and consequently abhorrent to all genuine Albanian patriots. And there seems to be genuine uneasiness on this point in Italian circles which I believe to be without foundation, and with regard to which the Italian Minister himself was unable to formulate any precise indication of what in fact he was afraid of. The latter does not appear to be clear in his mind as to the attitude of his Government, for in conversation on the subject of the appointment of Bishop Collezzi, he ended up by saying to me that possibly, if an agreement had been made with M. Nintchitch,⁴ his Government would welcome the appointment.

3. Ahmed Bey has suppressed the Ministry of War, and has announced his intention of doing away with the existing army. He intends to maintain for the future three battalions of militia, who shall be trained on the Swiss system, being called up for a month or so every year. This message is most salutary, and is exceedingly popular with the people. The officers, whose numbers were, even under the old system, far in excess of requirements, were simply parasites who spent their time in political intrigue, and were a danger to the State. The flight of a large number of these men has facilitated Ahmed's task. The budget will benefit and the country as well.

4. The practical disarmament of Albania seems to require as its corollary its formal neutralisation. This is a consummation devoutly to be wished, and would put an end to all the foreign jealousies and suspicions

³ Serb-Croat-Slovene Prime Minister.

⁴ Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs.

of which Albania is the centre. I should be glad of an indication of the view which His Majesty's Government takes of this suggestion.

5. In order to assure public security, the President has requested Colonel Stirling⁵ to undertake the reorganisation of the gendarmerie which is to consist of between 3,000 and 4,000 men. Colonel Stirling has addressed himself to this task.

6. Ahmed Bey expressed his desire to limit the number of Ministers to four, but no final decision has yet been taken. He has also made a drastic purgation of functionaries in all departments, as he is determined to make expenditure and revenue balance.

7. The Constituent Assembly has been summoned for the 15th instant. New elections will be made in the case of those Deputies who do not put in an appearance within a given time.

8. I have also been informed that it is the intention of the Government if and when they shall have been confirmed in office by the Assembly, to apply to the League of Nations for a loan, and if financial control should be demanded as a condition, they would be willing to submit to the same.

9. These measures have a very satisfactory appearance, and if carried to fruition will effect a great amelioration in the state of Albania. It remains to be seen whether the driving-power and consistency of the President will prove equal to the occasion. It is, I think, a fact that Ahmed Bey has learned wisdom by experience, and the flight of the clique and of many undesirable elements has given him a free hand. He has always been liberal minded, and though a mountain chieftain, is not a feudalist at heart. Hope revives once again, but it would be wise to await events. Everything, no doubt, depends on the personality of Ahmed Bey, and his life is none too secure, for he has many enemies, among whom the Bolsheviks figure prominently.

10. He has recently received an olive-branch in the shape of an emissary from the fugitive officers in Brindisi and Bari, who stated that they fled as they had feared he would take a savage revenge on his adversaries. As they perceived that he was making no reprisals they would be glad to return. They also asserted that two Italian officials had been sent to Brindisi to confer with the Albanian fugitives and to suggest to them that they should apply to the League of Nations for an Italian protectorate. In any case they declared their intention of not falling in with this insidious suggestion. Ahmed Bey told me that he could not answer for the truth of this assertion, but that that was the message he had received. He also observed that he had no desire whatever for the return of Shevket Kortcha⁶ and Kassim Qafzezi,⁷ who were the persons who made the communication to him.

⁵ A former British officer who was Adviser to the Minister of the Interior (cf. Vol. XXII, No. 828).

⁶ Former Commander of the Albanian Gendarmerie.

⁷ Albanian Minister of War June–December, 1924.

11. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty Ambassador at Rome.

I have, etc.,
H. C. A. EYRES

No. 8

Sir C. Barclay¹ (Budapest) to Mr. Lampson (Received January 22)

[C 1017/261/21]

Confidential

BUDAPEST, January 12, 1921

My dear Lampson,

With reference to your letter of December 10th² on the subject of the Control Commission I am sorry to say that I have had no brain wave productive of any luminous ideas as to a scheme of effective pressure on the Hungarian Government. I agree with you that military sanctions are out of the question, and that financial pressure cannot be applied now without endangering good work already done. As to the State factory,³ I consider that if any concession is made, this should not be as a *quid pro quo*, as this would be regarded here as weakness on the part of the Allies, but on economic grounds only.

Private conversations with Count Bethlen⁴ may do some good, though I am not very sanguine. They are anyway perhaps worth trying. In view of the holidays and the fact that he has been a good deal out of town it was not until today that I was able to speak to him on the subject.

I prefaced my remarks by saying that I was speaking quite *personally*, as a friend, and without instructions. I referred to the German outcry against the decision of the Allies not to evacuate the Cologne Zone,⁵ and pointed out that this decision was the result of Germany's policy of continuous obstruction against the Control Commission and non compliance with their demands.

The Hungarian Government, I said, were exactly in the same position; they also had not complied with the demands of the Control Commission and had not fulfilled their Treaty obligations, and they must not therefore be surprised if some disagreeable decision is likewise ultimately taken against them. In order to avoid this why should they not change their tactics now and gracefully submit to the demands of the Control Commission,⁶ who after all were the representatives of the Ambassador's Conference?

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Budapest.

² Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives. See however, Vol. XXVI, No. 237.

³ See *ibid.*, Nos. 167, 176, 182, 184, 237, 242, 244-5, and 251.

⁴ Prime Minister of Hungary.

⁵ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 711-30, *passim*, and Nos. 553 and 558, below.

⁶ See Vol. XXVI, No. 237.

I told Bethlen that I was convinced that he must be unaware of the acrimonious tone of the communications passing between the Control Commission and the Minister of Defence,⁷ and the stubborn[n]ess, if I might say so, of the latter which only served to annoy the Allied authorities and which might if continued lead to some step which the Hungarians would regret. The work of reconstruction is proceeding so favourably that it would be a pity if the non fulfilment by Hungary of her Treaty obligations were published, as it were, to the world as this might cast doubts on Hungary's peac[e]able intentions and would probably make it more difficult for her to obtain credits abroad.

Bethlen asked me what were exactly the points at issue. I replied that I could not enumerate them fully as their discussion was actually no business of mine, but I would mention some: for instance, in the opinion of the Control Commission, Art[icle] No. 103, of the Treaty of Trianon providing for the abolition of Universal Compulsory Service, had not been complied with; they are certain that men are not recruited for six years, but for much shorter periods and that in this way large reserves are being built up contrary to the Treaty.

Bethlen answered that *Universal Compulsory Service* had been abolished, though he admitted that some compulsion was used to enlist men as otherwise they would not obtain sufficient numbers. As to period of service he stated that it was quite impossible to secure men willing to serve for six years, and the number of recruits depended for the most part on the harvest; if that were good the men were not willing to leave the farms. He had already explained Hungary's difficulties on this point to Lord Curzon some two years ago.⁸

I also mentioned the difficulties experienced by the Control Commission in checking the personnel of the Army; they had asked the Hungarian Government to supply each man with an attestation sheet bearing the man's photograph and the stamp of the Control Commission. But the Military Authorities were now refusing to submit attestation sheets of men recently joined which rendered the system useless for control purposes. Since last June no notice had been taken of the repeated demands of the Control Commission. This refusal, coupled with specific cases of men found without sheets, and the frequent dispersal of men when members of the Control Commission visited barracks led the latter to believe that an excessive number of men were receiving military instruction.

Bethlen said he knew nothing about this.

I also stated that Art[icle] No. 115, as regards the creation of a single State Factory had not been observed. Count Bethlen replied that the cost

⁷ Count K. Csaky.

⁸ Lord Curzon, H.M. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs October, 1919–January, 1924, saw Count Bethlen in London on May 8, 1923. No record of this conversation has been traced in the Foreign Office archives. See, however, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 362 and 407, n. 5.

would have been too great and that moreover it had been recognised by the Allied Authorities that the creation of the factory at Diosgyör would not have been practical. The matter he knew was at present under discussion in Paris.³

I told Bethlen that I thought that the crux of the whole question was Art[icle] 135 of the Treaty. Its text was quite clear: 'The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Inter Allied Commissions of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the execution of their Mission. . . .' This the Hungarian Military Authorities have not done and they have never really recognised the authoritative position of the Control Commission but have adopted an aggressive attitude of resistance against them which has militated against a good understanding and created a very unfavourable impression among the higher authorities in Paris and London; the result has been constant demands from the Ambassadors' Conference to the Hungarian Government to execute the Treaty. I gave as instance the three notes, two dated December 4th⁹ and one December 18,⁹ addressed by M. Herriot to the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris¹⁰ copies of which I had just received (January 5th) for my information. All this seemed unfortunate.

Bethlen said he had seen these notes as he had given orders that all communications from the Ambassadors' Conference should be shown to him.

I went on to say that in my opinion no satisfactory solution would be reached until the Hungarian Military Authorities submitted to the demands of the Control Commission. (a) The Authorities concerned should issue instructions to their subordinates to meet all the demands of the Control Commission promptly and willingly.

At present the legality of most of their demands was disputed. The Hungarian Authorities should remember that they must supply all the documents such as attestation sheets etc, which the Control Commission may demand, and the latter are the Authority that decides what is necessary for control. (b) The Hungarian Government should comply promptly with the resolutions of the Ambassadors' Conference. At present no heed was taken of them. (c) There should be a cessation of Press campaign against the Control Commission. The Pesti Hirlap of January 1st contained an article giving minute and accurate details of the salaries and expenses of the Control Commission which could only have been procured from an authoritative source and laid stress on the heavy drain upon the finances of Hungary. I pointed out to Count Bethlen how misleading this was, as this expenditure is now credited to the Hungarian Government on the Reparations account.

He had not seen the article and I left him a copy.

⁹ Copies of these notes were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatches Nos. 2780, 2793, and 2794 of December 22. Neither the notes nor the despatches are preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

¹⁰ Dr. P. de Hevesy.

A serious endeavour I urged upon Bethlen should be made by the Hungarian Government to put an end to their policy of systematic obstruction if they wished to get rid of the Control Commission. Bethlen who had taken down notes of some of the points I had made told me he would look into the matter and would ask me to call again in a few days.

I must apologise for this long rigmarole, but I thought it as well to report the conversation fully. The tone was most friendly throughout. I hope you will approve, or at least not disapprove of what I said.

Yours ever

COLVILLE BARCLAY

No. 9

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 16, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 27 Telegraphic: by bag [C 712/127/90]

PARIS, January 15, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador¹ being also present, and considered the following questions:—

...² 4. The conference considered a telegram from the Albanian Boundary Commission stating that it will have finished by the end of the month the work relating to the Greco-Albanian frontier, on which it is engaged at Florence. It accordingly enquires whether it should thereupon return to Paris to deal with the various outstanding questions connected with the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier.

It was agreed that the commission should be instructed to come to Paris accompanied by the Yugoslav and Albanian delegates on the 10th February, in order to discuss the Vermosche³ and other outstanding questions. Monsieur Cambon stated that he was under the impression that the Yugoslav government had recently approached the new Albanian government⁴ with a view to discussing a direct settlement of these questions. Although this is hardly borne out by the conversation I recently had with the King of Serbia as reported in my despatch No. 41 of January 7th,⁵ I agreed that we should omit nothing to encourage the two governments to come to an amicable arrangement on these matters. It was decided therefore that with this object in view the conference should inform both the Yugoslav and Albanian governments that the Boundary Commission was being summoned to Paris to settle these questions and that it should suggest that the two governments should instruct their delegates in such a way as to enable the conference to arrive at a conclusion which will enable the commission to finish delimiting the

¹ Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy.

² The sections omitted referred to other matters.

³ See No. 4.

⁴ See Nos. 3 and 7.

⁵ No. 5.

Yugoslav–Albanian frontier this summer. It is to be hoped that when the Yugoslav government learn that the matter is to be discussed in Paris next month, they will make an effort to come to some arrangement with the Albanian government before that date. Such an arrangement in order to be satisfactory must of course apply to the disposal of Saint Naoum³ as well as to the Vermosche frontier and the Giacova protocol.⁶ In order to impress this still further on the Yugoslav government you may consider it useful to urge on the Yugoslav Minister in London⁷ the importance of his government making a serious effort to assist the allied governments (and incidentally the League of Nations) in settling these questions.

No further mention was made of notifying the two interested governments of the frontier line which has been decided upon in order to give effect to the League of Nations ruling in the matter of St. Naoum (see my telegram No. 682 of December 31st section 2.)⁸ . . .²

⁶ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 192 and 240. As the Albanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments had failed to come to an agreement for the facilitation of traffic across the Serb-Croat-Slovene frontier in the region of Djakova, the Conference of Ambassadors instructed the Albanian Boundary Commission to draw up a protocol on November 21 (a copy of this instruction was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2593 of November 27, 1924, not printed).

⁷ Dr. M. Gavrilović had died on November 1, 1924. The Counsellor, Dr. G. Todorović, was acting as Chargé d'Affaires.

⁸ See Vol. XXVI, No. 312.

No. 10

Sir C. Barclay (Budapest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 20)

No. 20 [C 884/261/21]

BUDAPEST, *January 16, 1925*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on the 14th instant the Hungarian Minister of National Defence made a speech before the Finance Committee of the National Assembly in connection with the discussion of the Army estimates.

I enclose a summary of the principal points¹ of General Count Csaky's statement as it contains interesting references to the question of disarmament, the Allied Control Commission and the organisation of the Hungarian Army.

As regards disarmament he emphasized the point that according to the Treaty of Trianon the disarmament of Hungary had been demanded as a preliminary to similar action being taken by neighbouring States. No steps had, however, been taken by these States to carry out the terms of the

¹ Not printed.

Treaty and Hungary would continue to draw the attention of the responsible Powers to this fact.

Turning to the question of Allied Control Count Csaky recapitulated the history of the Control in Hungary and deplored the fact that no steps had yet been taken to hand over the control to the League of Nations in accordance with the scheme propounded at Geneva.² He attributed this delay largely to the change of Government in England, as the new Government³ had not yet defined its attitude towards the Geneva Protocol.⁴ Count Csaky considered that 'the present Control was contrary to the Treaty of Trianon besides being unnecessary and vexatious'.

With regard to the army Count Csaky pointed out the reductions which it had been necessary to make in the estimates in the interests of National Economy. He also compared the pre-war with the present Honvéd⁵ and laid stress on the essential differences in expense and organisation

In conclusion he expressed his conviction that it was necessary to secure a thorough modification of the terms of voluntary service and explained his point of view in regard to the question of aviation, gas masks and the manufacture of war material in Hungary.

I have, etc.,
COLVILLE BARCLAY

² For the text of the scheme of organisation with a view to the exercise of the right of investigation in the four states subjected to investigation by the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly, approved by the League of Nations Council on September 27, 1924, see *L.N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 1592-95. See also Vol. XXVI, Nos. 214, 227, 229, 230, 698, 699, and 700.

³ A General Election had been held in Great Britain on October 29, 1924, at which the Conservative Party had gained a majority. The Labour Government resigned on November 4, and Mr. Baldwin became Prime Minister.

⁴ The reference is to the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which was approved by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations (held September 1-October 2) on October 2, 1924. For the text of the Protocol, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1924), pp. 498-502. For the discussions on arbitration, security, and the reduction of armaments, see *ibid.*, pp. 41-79, 192-226, and 228-30. See also pp. 479-502.

⁵ National army.

No. 11

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Roumanian Minister of Finance

[C 1367/241/37]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 19, 1925*

M. Vintila Bratiano, the Roumanian Minister of Finance, called today

accompanied by M. Titulesco¹ and M. Oromulu, the Governor of the National Bank of Roumania.

To begin with our conversation was of a purely general kind, the main point made by M. Bratiano being the importance to this country of Roumania as a bulwark against Bolshevik aggression. The one point which pre-occupied public intention in Roumania at the present moment was whether Great Britain was content to regard the Black Sea as a Russian lake or whether we were prepared to send our ships there in case of need. Roumania had no fleet and consequently such questions as a return to Russia of the fleet at Bizerta² were of vital importance to her. Would Great Britain in case of need send her ships through the Dardanelles?

I said that this was a question which it was hard for me to answer in any definite form. The Minister must know that in this country our whole instinct was to avoid commitments in advance. We were in fact an opportunist nation, as the events of 1914 had shown. When once it was clear that vital national interests were at stake the nation acted promptly, but it was impossible for any government in this country to commit themselves or their successors in advance to unforeseen eventualities. Surely the best policy for Roumania was to increase our commercial interest in her development; the greater our interest in Roumania's affairs the more likely was she to obtain sympathy in case of political troubles such as he feared.

Hanging my action on this peg of commercial interest, I then gave him a list of the questions which we (the Foreign Office) have outstanding against Roumania. These questions were all ancient history, and I explained that the only reason I produced them now and handed them to His Excellency was that failure to settle these particular questions had undoubtedly given Roumania a bad press and a hostile atmosphere in the City. At the Foreign Office our duty was to endeavour to increase friendly relations with foreign powers: it was frankly very often difficult to do so in the case of Roumania. Day after day we were bombarded by our nationals who had outstanding, and as we thought, just claims against Roumania, which were seldom if ever settled. The result was inevitable. No one deplored the state of affairs more than I did.

At this point M. Oromulu chipped in and hurriedly scrutinised the list; he asked one or two questions of detail which I answered. They then said they would take the list away with them and study it. Both M. Titulesco [and] M. Oromulu maintained that Nos. 9 [and] 10 had been disposed of. I said I was glad to hear it. But they were really Board of Trade matters.

The one definite piece of information which M. Bratiano gave me was that all these rumours here that Roumania was seeking for a loan were absolutely groundless. He was looking for nothing of the sort. I asked him

¹ Roumanian Minister in London.

² See No. 2, n. 6.

politely what then was the object of his visit, and he said it was to continue certain discussions which he had had with Sir O. Niemeyer³ in Paris during the past week regarding Roumania's obligations in reparation matters (such as ceded territories, ex-enemy loans, etc., etc.), and to attain some clear idea of what Roumania's obligations were to be. Such questions as compensation to the oil companies must obviously depend to a large extent upon the calls to be made on Roumania's budget to meet treaty obligations incumbent upon her. I said I understood that Sir O. Niemeyer had in point of fact made certain very generous suggestions. M. Bratiano readily admitted that this was so. Unfortunately, however, M. Seydoux,⁴ who would have dealt with the matter in an equally friendly spirit, had fallen ill and nothing definite had materialised so far as France was concerned. As to Italy, he was very much afraid that she would be far less generous than either we or France was prepared to be.

M. Titulesco was as usual very voluble, but nothing else of any material interest was said, so far as I can recollect. The main point is that they have carried off with them the list of our claims and it is just conceivable that, owing to their having been produced, something may be done to get a move on in connection with their settlement, but it would be rash to look for too much in this direction. In any case the presentation of the list can have done no harm; it is just possible it may have done some good.

The conversation throughout was of an entirely friendly and informal character.

M. W. LAMPSON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 11

List of Outstanding Cases

1. *Galatz Waterworks.*
2. *Messrs. Thomas Cook*
63000 francs.
3. *South Western Railways (Railways of Bessarabia).* 250,000 roubles and 300,000 lei lent in 1918.
4. *Hungarian 3% State Loan of 1895.*
Service as from July 1, 1919.
5. *Mr. Pitts' land at Orhei.*
See letter of October 26, 1920.⁵
6. *Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd.*
£400,000. Personal guarantee by Roumanian Prime Minister.

³ Controller of Finance at H.M. Treasury. He was attending the meeting of the Finance Ministers in Paris on German Reparation which met January 7-14 (see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 597, 599, 603, 614, and 616, n. 4).

⁴ Deputy Head of the Political and Commercial Affairs Department of the French Foreign Ministry.

⁵ Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

7. *City of Craiova Loan, 1906.*
No interest since 1915. Swiss francs at par.
8. *Lenberg-Czernowitz-Jassy railway.*
Position of British shareholders.
9. *Post-War Debts.*
Board of Trade.
10. *Pre-War Debts.*
Board of Trade.
11. *Oil Compensation*
Treasury.

No. 12

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir C. Barclay (Budapest)

No. 17 [C 382/261/21]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 20, 1925*

Sir,

I am considerably exercised over the attitude of calculated obstruction which the Hungarian Government are displaying towards the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Hungary. Your attention has already been called privately to this matter¹ and in your letter of December 18th to Mr. Lampson² you stated that you were considering what possible measures of effective pressure might be adopted to induce the Hungarian Government to adopt a more conciliatory attitude.³

2. In the meantime two interesting reports on the situation have been communicated to this department by the War Office, and I enclose copies of them herein.⁴ These reports bear out the opinion which I had already formed that the Hungarian Government are determined to continue their attitude of obstruction towards the Military Commission of Control, largely because they do not desire that it should be withdrawn and replaced by an organisation under the control of the League of Nations, as it was hoped would be possible during the course of the present year.

3. It is most undesirable to continue to permit the Hungarian Government to flout the justified demands made to them by the Ambassadors' Conference for the fulfilment of the military clauses of the treaty in the manner in which they are at present doing; as the Hungarian Government pay no attention to the demands addressed to them by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, and as no notice is taken of the representations which you from time to time have made to the Minister

¹ In Mr. Lampson's letter of December 10, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

² Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

³ For the measures adopted by Sir C. Barclay, see No. 8.

⁴ Of January 7 (C 382/261/21) and January 9 (C 532/261/21), not printed.

for Foreign Affairs, more definite and formal action on behalf of the allied powers is evidently required.

4. You will remember that in the case of the evacuation of the Cologne zone on January 10th, 1925,⁵ the allied governments, as distinct from the Ambassadors' Conference, made the requisite communication regarding non-evacuation owing to default in the fulfilment of treaty obligations direct to the German Government through their Ambassadors at Berlin and not through the Ambassadors' Conference;⁵ the idea suggests itself to me as worthy of consideration whether similar procedure might not now be taken in regard to Hungary. The Hungarian Government, having openly defied the Military Commission of Control, the latter have reported the fact to the Ambassadors' Conference who in their turn have referred the matter to their principals, namely the allied powers, by whom the treaty with Hungary was negotiated. In short what I have in mind is that the allied powers, in view of the attitude of the Hungarian Government on this question, might address to them a strong note of protest, so worded as to be suitable for effective publication, which would first define in concise form the various defaults under the treaty which still remain to be made good by Hungary before the Military Commission of Control can be withdrawn. Secondly, it would reprimand the Hungarian Government in dignified but firm language for the obstruction which they have placed in the way of the Military Commission of Control in the discharge of their legitimate functions under the treaty, and it would conclude by intimating that unless this attitude of obstruction ceases, the allied powers must formally take note of this deliberate evasion by Hungary of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, an evasion which must obviously profoundly affect the cordiality of their relations with the Hungarian Government. The note which I thus have in contemplation would be a joint note to be formally presented to Count Bethlen or even to Admiral Horthy⁶ (a point upon which I should value your advice) by yourself and your French⁷ and Italian colleagues.⁸

5. This proposal has not yet been submitted to the French and Italian Governments, because I first desire to have your observations with regard to it. I should be grateful if you would report as soon as possible whether you consider that action on the above lines would be likely to produce any effect, or alternatively, whether any other procedure occurs to you which in the circumstances you consider to be more likely to produce the result which we desire. It would be especially useful to know whether in your opinion the source of action outlined above would be in any sense effective or whether on the other hand it would merely serve to emphasise still further the impotence of the powers to enforce upon Hungary the compliance with her solemn treaty obligations. Much anxious thought has been given to this perplexing problem and it is only for lack of a better

⁵ See Nos. 552-4 and 558, below.

⁶ Regent of Hungary.

⁷ M. F. de Carbonnel.

⁸ Count E. Durini Di Monza.

that the suggestion embodied in this despatch has been put forward. In short His Majesty's Government would welcome some more effective means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Hungarian Government but for the moment have been unable to hit upon one.

6. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and the War Office.

I am, etc.,

(In the absence of the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

No. 13

Memorandum by Mr. Aveling¹ on Military Control in Hungary

[C 1072/261/21]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 21, 1925*

General Attitude of Hungarian Authorities

There is increasing evidence of the fact that the Hungarian Government have no intention of carrying out in their integrity the military clauses of the Treaty of Trianon. In the course of the past six months or so their general attitude towards the Allied Control Commission has been one of increasing obstruction and open defiance. The Minister of War has not made any effort to conceal his own opinions on the subject, which are well summarised in a speech made by him in the Hungarian Parliament quite recently,² and his communications addressed to the Commission are inspired by the same feelings. In a letter dated October 20th last,³ replying to representations made by the Commission, he stated, for instance, 'one cannot expect the Hungarian people and authorities to accept with pleasure the control organisation, more particularly since their operations have been, in our view, for a long time past illegal, superfluous and humiliating. Their activities recently have been of so meticulous and so vexatious a nature that one should consider it an exceptional piece of good fortune that up to the present there have been no grave incidents'. Under this lead, and possibly at the instigation of the authorities, articles have appeared in the Hungarian press (see *Pesti Hirlap* of January 1st) attacking the officers of the Commission and calling attention to the way that Hungary is being bled 'by the outrageous wages paid to the members of the Commission which has long terminated its work and remains on for its own convenience'. No effort has been made by the Hungarian Government to rectify the misleading impression given by such attacks,

¹ A member of the Central Department of the Foreign Office.

² See No. 10.

³ A copy of which, presumably, was enclosed in Budapest despatch No. 390 of November 1, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

which are entirely devoid of foundation since, apart altogether from the fact that the presence of the Commission is entirely due to the obstructive tactics of the Hungarian Government, the cost of the Commission of Control does not entail any direct expenditure by Hungary in that since 1924 all charges in respect of the Control Commission are placed to the credit of Hungary in the Reparation account.

The specific articles of the Treaty which the Hungarian Government are refusing to comply with, and which have been the subject of repeated representations by the Ambassadors' Conference are as follows:—

Compulsory military service

Article 103 prohibits the system of universal and compulsory military service. The Hungarian Government, giving as a pretext the necessity of diminishing military expenditure, have released on indefinite leave from 50 to 75% of the total effectives authorised under the Treaty. The Control Commission have strong reasons for believing that the real object of the Hungarian authorities in taking this step is to fill up the places of the men on leave with relays of recruits compulsorily enrolled for short periods. In order to verify the real position of affairs the Control Commission have repeatedly called upon the Hungarian Government to furnish them with the attestation sheets of men recently joined, the nominal rolls of the various army units, and other similar administrative documents. Although the request was made to the Hungarian Government so long ago as July last, none of the information required has been supplied. This, taken in conjunction with the fact that although 50 to 75% of the effectives are on indefinite leave, no reduction has been made in military expenditure under the head of 'Personnel', and also the fact that during the course of inspections by officers of the Commission, men have been dispersed in order that their numbers could not be checked has confirmed the Commission, the Ambassadors' Conference and the Allied Governments in the conviction that the provisions of Article 103 are being completely ignored.

*Single State Factory*⁴

Article 115 provides for the establishment of a single State factory, which alone shall be authorised to manufacture the war material required by the Hungarian army. Under this Article it is open to the Allied Powers to authorise the manufacture of munitions for such period as they may think fit in one or more other factories specially approved for the purpose pending the completion of the State factory. Although the Treaty was signed in June 1920, the Hungarian Government have taken no serious steps to establish the State factory, and in reply to repeated representations by the Ambassadors' Conference they now adduce as a reason for their inaction, the inability of Hungarian finances to bear the expenditure involved. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Government have already spent some 12,000,000 gold crowns on the erection of a new powder factory, built on

⁴ See No. 8, n. 3.

a most elaborate scale, although the former power factory already in existence was sufficient for all requirements. Moreover, had they wished to set up the State factory, they could have raised the necessary funds from the economy effected by the release on indefinite leave of practically three-quarters of the regular army.

Refusal to cease manufacture of War Material in Private Factories. The refusal of the Hungarian Government to establish the factory led the Ambassadors' Conference, after repeated warnings had been addressed to Budapest, to withdraw the permission to manufacture munitions in private factories. This decision was to become effective as from the end of August last. The Hungarian Government have, however, completely ignored the decision, and the production of war material in these factories continues as hitherto.⁵

Refusal to apologise for attack on French car. There are a number of outstanding questions with the Hungarian Government of minor importance, such as, for instance, their refusal to apologise for incidents which have arisen in connection with the work of the Commission. They have been called upon, both by the Commission and the Ambassadors' Conference, to express their regrets for the attack made on the car belonging to the French Delegation when shots were fired and the driver injured.⁶ The incident in itself is of no great importance, but the refusal of the authorities to issue any apology or assume any responsibility is characteristic of their whole attitude towards military control.⁷

A. F. A.

⁵ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 154, 176, and 184.

⁶ Reported in Budapest telegram No. 60 of September 8, 1924, not printed.

⁷ This memorandum was read to the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Nelky, on January 21. On January 22, Mr. Lampson sent a copy of the record of this conversation to Sir C. Barclay at Budapest, and stated: '... Nelky put up an admirable fight, but we gave him no encouragement that his point of view would be met. In fact he was told that the obstruction of his government had so embittered the atmosphere that any leniency that might earlier have been possible regarding the single state factory was now, in all probability, definitely ruled out: it was now simply and solely a question of following the advice of our military advisers.'

'A point which is not mentioned in the enclosed record is that I told Nelky the night before, i.e. on January 20th, when I happened to meet him at a party, that if Hungary persisted in her policy of deliberate defiance of the Great Powers she might quite easily find herself suddenly handed over to the tender mercies of her immediate neighbours who were watching the proceedings with lynx eyes. At yesterday's interview I dropped a *hint* (not a specific allusion) to the same effect based on what General Clive, our representative on the Versailles Committee, had told me in the interval, namely that in this matter we were acting as a safety valve, and that if too great a head of steam was raised amongst the neighbours Hungary would be in the gravest possible danger. I did *not* quote these words to Nelky, but merely alluded in veiled terms to the obvious dangers which might arise from others less dispassionate than ourselves if matters drag on.'

No. 14

Sir M. Cheetham (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 2)

No. 33 [C 1544/798/19]

ATHENS, *January 21, 1925*

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 803 (C 19564/175[37]/19) of December 30th¹ last enclosing an account of a conversation between Mr. Lampson and the Greek Minister,² on the subject of Greco-Serbian relations. The information contained in this record of the assurances given by Monsieur Ninčić to Monsieur Venezelos³ regarding the renewal of the Greek Alliance with Serbia⁴ is the first statement of an at all comprehensive character which I have received in this connection. I think that the optimistic views of Monsieur Venezelos are responsible for the very hopeful attitude which the Hellenic Government have adopted in regard to the forthcoming negotiations with Yugoslavia. On assuming the duties of Minister of Foreign Affairs⁵ the Prime Minister gave me a glowing account of Serbian goodwill but he confined himself, in proof of this, to the assurances offered by Monsieur Ninčić and to a statement of his personal belief that these assurances were genuine. On his own account he asserted that the Greek Railway tariffs, already lowered to the advantage of Serbian trade, ought to be made still more favourable to Serbia, should such a course be necessary to secure to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom the full advantages of a port on the Aegean. This policy should, he thought, be carried out even if it meant that Greeks would pay heavier rates than Serbians.

2. I asked to see Monsieur Argyropoulos, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the hope of obtaining a more definite estimate of Serbian intentions. He told me that Monsieur Gavrilovič, whose arrival has been announced at an early date,⁶ would probably do nothing more than present his credentials and then return to Belgrade. The opening of negotiations could not be expected before the end of February. He further informed me that the stipulation of Monsieur

¹ See Vol. XXVI, No. 309.

² M. D. Caclamanos.

³ Prime Minister of Greece 1910–15, 1917–20, and January–February, 1924.

⁴ For a text of the Treaty of Alliance of May 19/June 1, 1913, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 108, pp. 686–89. A copy of the Serb-Croat-Slovene note of November 17, 1924, denouncing the alliance was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Athens despatch No. 716 of November 27, not printed. See, however, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 263, 264 and 267.

⁵ M. Roussos had resigned on January 19 as he was held responsible for the Bulgarian-Greek Minorities Protocol (see No. 2, n. 7) which the Greek Government intended to repudiate (see No. 6). The Prime Minister was acting as Foreign Minister and Minister for War.

⁶ In Athens despatch No. 13 of January 8, Sir M. Cheetham had reported that the new Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister was expected in Athens about January 15.

Ninčič for freedom of transport of arms and munitions of war through Greek territory into Serbia even in time of war was one which Greece could only accept with great difficulty. The obligation to allow the transit of war material in the course of hostilities might easily lead Greece into a war with which she was in no way concerned. I could obtain no further information of Serbian demands and their acceptability.

3. It would appear that the Greek Government are either comparatively ignorant of or at any rate unwilling to disclose the conditions on which the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government are ready to renew the Alliance. On the other hand, the idea of a more general understanding between the Balkan States seems to have receded from view.

4. I took the opportunity of my visit to Monsieur Argyropoulos to ask what was the result of the report of Monsieur Caclamano regarding the suggestion for the provision of expert advice for the better regulation of the Salonica-Gevgeli line, which ought, according to Monsieur Caclamano, to have reached Athens a month ago.⁷ Monsieur Argyropoulos said that he had heard nothing more about the matter and confirmed this after sending for the dossier. He thought Monsieur Caclamano must have written privately to Monsieur Roussos who had not taken the matter up officially. It may be that the Greek Government have some reason for avoiding investigation of the conditions of the line. I have now made five representations in this matter without receiving any reply but it is conceivable that action is being taken on the advice of His Majesty's Government without its inspiration being acknowledged. (See my despatch No. 8 of January 7th.)⁸

I have, etc.,
MILNE CHEETHAM

⁷ See Vol. XXVI, No. 309, n. 5.

⁸ Not printed.

No. 15

Record by Mr. Nicolson¹ of a conversation with M. Venizelos

[C 1241/798/19]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 22, 1925

M. Venizelos, who is over in London in connection with Greek war debts, came to see me this morning and furnished me with a long and detailed exposition of the present condition of Greco-Serbian relations. His account of the reasons which led up to the denunciation of the old Treaty of Alliance² and the conditions under which the new treaty was to

¹ A senior member of the Central Department of the Foreign Office.

² See No. 14, n. 4.

be negotiated corresponded exactly with that furnished by the Greek Minister to Mr. Lampson.³

I told M. Veniselos that we had been at some difficulty here to explain the sudden denunciation of the Serbo-Greek alliance, followed as it was by the support given to Ahmet Bey's movement in Albania⁴ as well as by the somewhat dramatic visit of the Bulgarian Foreign [sic] Minister to Belgrade.⁵ We had felt for the moment that these curious developments might possibly represent some understanding between Italy and Jugoslavia under which the latter was to be given a free hand in the Balkans. M. Veniselos stated that he also had entertained similar anxieties and had questioned M. Ninčić and King Alexander directly on the subject. The King had been very embarrassed to reply. M. Ninčić, however, after a moment's hesitation, had said: 'Yes, the Italians have been trying to direct us towards Salonica. At the same time they suggested an arrangement by which we should partition Albania. We did not like either of these proposals and refused to pursue the discussion further. At the same time we agreed with the Italian Government that we should negotiate no new treaty with Greece such as could in any form be aimed against Italy. The new treaty would apply only to the Balkans and so no *casus foederis* would arise in the event of any dispute between Greece and Italy.'

M. Veniselos had agreed therefore that, in the new treaty now to be negotiated, there should be a clause especially confining the alliance to Balkan matters. He also, he explained, desired good relations with Italy. It was impossible for Greece to remain on such bad terms with a powerful and unscrupulous neighbour and he had advised his supporters at Athens to make friends with Italy on any terms that were reasonable. He was grateful to us for not having rendered the Dodecanese question⁶ more difficult than it was already by undue interference, and he hoped that we should continue to remain in the background so long as there was any chance of reaching a direct settlement with Italy on this question.

I then asked him whether he thought the Serbian alliance had been denounced solely on account of the Minorities Protocol⁷ or also with a view to exacting better terms at Salonica.⁸ He replied that he was quite convinced that the Minorities Protocol was the main reason, although of course the Serbian Government could not say so. It was true, doubtless, that the Serbs would take advantage of new negotiations to obtain better

³ See Vol. XXVI, No. 309.

⁴ See No. 5, n. 6.

⁵ See Nos. 1, n. 7, and 2.

⁶ The Greek-populated islands had been occupied by Italy since the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12. For previous documentation, see Vol. XXIV, Chap. I, *passim*, 496, 499, 503, 507, 513, 566, 599, and Vol. XXVI, Nos. 16, 18, 29-30, 60, 69, 76-85, *passim*, 92, 95, 105-118, *passim*, 121, 130, 137, 157, 166, 211, 215, 225, and 249.

⁷ See No. 2, n. 7.

⁸ For the text of the Greco-Serbian convention of May 10, 1923, for regulating transit traffic via Salonika, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 599-615. For the negotiations, see Vol. XXIV, Nos. 294, 350, 368, and 559. For Serbian complaints about the execution of the convention, see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 263, 271-2, and 286.

terms at Salonica and they had even suggested that they should be given by the French company which owns the port better rates than those given to the Greeks themselves. M. Veniselos had advised his Government to meet all reasonable requests from the Serbs, and it was his intention as soon as possible to propose that the harbour of Salonica should be considerably increased and that three separate ports should be created, the eastern one for Serb traffic, the western one for Bulgarian traffic and the central one for Greek and international traffic. He would offer the Serbs and the Bulgarians full possession of their respective ports and even give them the right to establish their own customs and clearances in the harbour itself.

There remained the question of railways and the condition of the permanent way between Salonica and Serbia. Here, again, it was the intention of the Greek Government, so soon as they could get the necessary funds, to improve the permanent way in conjunction with the large irrigation and reclamation works which have to be carried out in the lower Vardar Valley, and when this was done he really thought that all Serbian grievances would be removed. I asked him whether he thought that the Serbs would really like to see all their grievances in this region removed. He replied that it was quite possible that the Serbs would not like these improvements any more than they had liked the settlement of Greek refugees in the district between Serbia and the sea,⁹ but that none the less they could hardly complain openly of the steps being taken by the Greeks to remedy what was admittedly a highly deficient service. I said that we ourselves had been somewhat anxious on this point and had suggested privately that some neutral supervisor might be appointed by the League in order to have a League 'observer' at this highly dangerous point in South-Eastern Europe. I added that this proposal of ours had been somewhat misunderstood at Athens, and that they had imagined that we were out to find a post for a British railway manager and contracts for British railway workshops.¹⁰ M. Veniselos stated that he thought the idea an admirable one. It would be a little difficult to propose it at the present moment because it would irritate the Serbs unduly. But so soon as the three ports had been constructed at Salonica, and Bulgaria given an outlet as well as Serbia, then it would be possible, and indeed highly desirable, to find some means by which the smooth working of this arrangement could be put directly or indirectly under the League. He said that we could always count on him to advise his Government to adopt this proposal so soon as the action was opportune; but at the moment the introduction of the League at Salonica would be considered an 'outrage' by the Serbian Government.

⁹ For the settlement of the Greek refugees from Thrace and Asia Minor, see D. Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece* (Paris and The Hague, 1962).

¹⁰ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 271, 293, and 309.

I told M. Veniselos I was much comforted by what he told me, since we had been feeling rather uneasy about the whole situation. He said that he also was uneasy, but that he thought that with wise management, and so long as the Serbs and the Bulgarians remained at loggerheads, there would be no danger for the next five years. He did not think that any federation between Bulgaria and Serbia was practical politics for the moment, although he admitted that it might come one day and that when it came the position of Greek Macedonia would become precarious. If, however, Greece could have ten, or even five, years of peace in which to populate the district and to introduce British and American capital into the very large irrigation and drainage works which would be required, then she would be able to look with less anxiety towards the north. The conversation then passed on to the extraordinarily foolish way in which the Greek Government had treated British commercial undertakings, and M. Veniselos promised to write a very strong letter to his friends in Athens telling them to mend their ways. In any case he was determined that the very large irrigation and drainage works which he contemplated must be shared between British and American firms, and that it was useless to introduce French capital into the development of Macedonia.

HAROLD NICOLSON

No. 16

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 280 [C 712/127/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 23, 1925*

My Lord,

In section 4 of your telegram No. 27 of the 15th instant,¹ Your Lordship suggested that an opportunity should be taken to urge on the Yugoslav representative in London the importance of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government making a serious effort to assist the allied governments in settling the outstanding questions relating to the Albanian frontiers.

2. Before the receipt of your telegram I had had under consideration a similar proposal, made in this department, that His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade should be instructed to suggest to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs the desirability of coming to an arrangement with the Albanian Government on this question, but I considered that it would be wiser not to take any steps in this direction. As this is a question on which a legal decision has been delivered,² it is clear that, if the two litigant states choose to compose their difficulties and differences out of

¹ No. 9.

² See No. 4, n. 5.

court, it will be to the advantage of all concerned, but it hardly seems to be the function of one of the judges in the case to suggest to one party what course of action they should take in the matter.

I am, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

No. 17

*Mr. Akers-Douglas¹ (Vienna) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 27)*

*No. 23 [C 1252/298/3]**

VIENNA, *January 23, 1925*

Sir,

A few days ago the Chancellor, Dr. Ramek, asked me to call upon him, and he spoke to me for about half an hour upon the present situation here, which he feared was not at all good from the industrial and economic point of view. He was doing his best to find some way of combating one of the most serious features, which was the growing cost of living, and he had established a commission under his own presidency, which was making a very thorough enquiry into prices and profiteering. Of course Austria had as yet insufficient markets for her manufactures, chiefly owing to the import restrictions and tariffs of the succession States, and her export trade was not flourishing. Moreover, industry was sadly in need of capital, and it was particularly on this point that the Government was anxious, because they felt that London was dissatisfied with many things in the state of affairs here and had lost confidence in Austrian progress; this was particularly noticeable in foreign press articles. The Government, and indeed all Austrians, were most anxious to reacquire this confidence, knowing how extremely important was the favour of the London money market and the goodwill of England in general. Dr. Ramek said he thought the president of the National Bank, Dr. Reisch, would shortly pay another visit to London² for a further talk with the Governor of the Bank of England³ and other authorities.

I did not encourage this latter idea, and said that my private opinion was that if Dr. Reisch merely went to explain the position again I was doubtful if another visit after so short a lapse of time would serve any useful purpose unless there were any new facts or improvements to show. The points on which financial circles in London wished to see a change

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Vienna.

² Dr. Reisch gave an account of his visit in a press article of December 18 (copy enclosed in Vienna despatch No. 279 of December 18, not printed).

³ Mr. M. Norman.

were very well known; and, so far as I was able to judge, it would scarcely do much good to reproduce the same arguments. Moreover, if at the proper time it was desired to put forward a further case for the banking or financial position, or to ask for any favours, it might perhaps be found that a change in the person of the advocate would be desirable. Anyhow, I was sure that deeds and not words would best serve to improve Austria's case; and if it was seen that the budget was kept within the frame of Geneva⁴ and that the financial problems connected with it were being tackled successfully and with energy, there could be no doubt that Austria's credit abroad would rise of itself. I ventured to think that public opinion here was too sensitive in regard to criticisms in the foreign press. That people in England, and indeed in other places, should have been perturbed by some of the features in the Austrian situation and by certain phenomena of last year was natural enough: the reasons for any dissatisfaction in financial circles abroad were obvious.

As regards British feeling towards Austria, I could assure him there was no diminution in the goodwill and sympathy felt for the cause of her reconstruction. This was followed with the same interest and hope, and any steps taken in the execution of the reforms which Government and Parliament had undertaken to carry out would be noted and welcomed by England no less than by all the guaranteeing Powers. I added that there was room for a great deal more economy in the State.

Dr. Ramek said that he himself was convinced of the possibility of administering this Federal State even with a large and further reduction of a number of officials; but this was so complicated a problem of federal administration, and there were so many difficulties in the political situation, that such a work required time—indeed, several years. In reply to my question whether he expected to see the budget brought within the estimate agreed at Geneva,⁵ he could say he was hopeful, although it was exceedingly hard to cut down expenses when constant demands for new outlay were being made upon the Treasury. Within a few days there would be a new conference with the prefects of the provinces, and he was confident of reaching an understanding in that urgent problem of the financial relations between the Central and Provincial Governments. He had been impressing upon all the provincial administrations, including that of Vienna, that they could not possibly expect any credit or capital from abroad for this country unless they could show that they were economising and that a sounder basis had been found for the federal finances.

Dr. Ramek mentioned that he was perturbed by a rumour that the municipality of Vienna was securing a loan from America. He hoped this

⁴ i.e. the Protocols of Geneva of October 4, 1922, for the financial reconstruction of Austria. For the text, see *L./N.O.J.* 1922, pp. 1471–9. See also Vol. XXIV, Nos. 177 and 179.

⁵ Under Protocol No. III (see n. 4), and the Report of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations of September, 1922 (for the text, see *L./N.O.J.* 1922, pp. 1463–8).

was not true, for if Vienna, which certainly was not economising, succeeded nevertheless in obtaining a loan, no one would pay attention to what he, the Chancellor, had been saying.

The Chancellor, who is sincere in his efforts to do his best, seems rather overwhelmed by his cares, and he is suffering a temporary loss by the absence of his chief lieutenant, Dr. Mataja, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is ill and cannot assist him in Parliament. As to the budget, I find it difficult to be at all optimistic. As an example of the dilemmas in which the Government find themselves, it may be mentioned that the Christian Socialist party having introduced a motion for amending the Rent Restrictions Act (an amendment which is undoubtedly justifiable and necessary) the Socialists are up in arms again and obstructing the business of Parliament; and they say that if house rents are raised the State employees may come forward with new demands for higher wages.

I have, etc.,

A. AKERS-DOUGLAS

No. 18

Sir C. Barclay (Budapest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 27)

No. 28 [C 1261/260/21]

BUDAPEST, *January 24, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 459 of the 27th ultimo,¹ I have the honour to report that Mr. J[eremiah] Smith's² VIIIth Report³ on the progress of reconstruction was published here on the 22nd inst[ant], and has made a good impression. The Press declare that the Commissioner-General's assiduous efforts, although they led to his temporary breakdown, have not been in vain. The number of sceptics, who maintain that the reconstruction of State finances is doomed to failure owing to the desperate economic situation of the country, diminishes with every Report. Moreover, the apprehension expressed even by expert financiers that the amount of the foreign loan⁴ would be insufficient to cover the deficits of the Budgets until the end of the reconstruction period, appears to have been allayed by the series of favourable Reports so far published, or at least no more is heard of such fears at present.

In the beginning of the reconstruction period these fears seem to have

¹ Not printed.

² Mr. Smith was the League of Nations Commissioner-General for Hungary (see Vol. XXVI, No. 127, n. 2).

³ For December, 1924. For the text, see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 397-408.

⁴ An international loan of about £11,709,000 had been raised in July, 1924. See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 127, 131, 151, 155, Enclosure 2, and 197.

been justified, because larger sums were needed to cover deficits than had been anticipated, and in July and August these sums still considerably exceeded the estimates of the Reconstruction Budget.⁵ It was then that the Commissioner-General suggested to the Government the curtailment of certain items of expenditure. In his Report for the month of August⁶ Mr. Smith was already in a position to point to a decline of the actual, as against the estimated, deficit, and since this, State revenues have gradually increased so that they really exceed by 40% the estimate of revenues in the reconstruction Budget. Thus at the end of October out of the 250 million gold Crowns of the loan only 135.4 millions were available, the rest having been spent to cover the deficit, but by the end of December the balance improved to the amount of 156 millions.

The Press, in commenting upon this satisfactory result, point out that the sums which have already been used, include 20 million Swiss Francs advanced by the Banks and industrial establishments⁷ (which sum was refunded by the Treasury), the loan of 10 million Swiss Francs for the building of the Free Port, and also all expenses connected with the propaganda for the internal subscription of the foreign loan.

The present situation as regards the spending of the loan is described as follows: 8.5 million Gold Crowns per month may be used to cover the deficit, and thus the available sum of 156 million gold Crowns will in all probability prove sufficient for the remaining 18 months of the reconstruction period, seeing that the Treasury and State enterprises are amply provided with reserve funds, and that, for example, instead of using the above mentioned 8.5 millions in January, this month will probably yield a surplus of 1.8 million gold Crowns, whereas the Reconstruction Budget allows for a deficit amounting to 9.5 million gold Crowns for this month.

Thus the first year of the period will most likely show a satisfactory result, even should the first seven months be followed by five less favourable.

According to the Press comments the only alarming symptom of the present Report is that State expenditure and State Revenue have already reached the maximum amount contemplated for 1926 by the reconstruction scheme, and thus equilibrium can only be maintained by a policy of the strictest economy in expenditure, since the revenues do not admit of any increase, in view of the economic situation and of the burdens which taxpayers already have to bear.

⁵ For the budget for July, 1924–June, 1925, see *ibid.*, No. 295. The budget was required by Protocol No. II, signed at Geneva on March 14, 1924, for the reconstruction of Hungarian finances, and was based on the Report of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations of December 20, 1923 (for the texts, see *L./N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 803–7, and 413–29, respectively). See Vol. XXVI, No. 106, n. 2.

⁶ For the text of Mr. Smith's Fourth Report, see *L./N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 1741–8.

⁷ For the internal Hungarian loan of 1924. See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 86, 101, 127, 151, and 155, n. 14.

In spite of the encouraging features of the present Report, public opinion is still dissatisfied, owing to the fact that the stabilisation of the currency was not followed by a stabilisation or even fall in prices, and that, on the contrary, the disparity between the value of the Hungarian Crown on foreign markets, and its purchasing power in the country keeps on increasing, and is expressed in a slow but continuous process of rising prices. Thus the price of wheat, the staple of Hungary, has increased enormously, with the inevitable result of that rise in the price of all other commodities, of which I spoke in my despatch No. 27 of the 23rd instant.¹

I am not forwarding copies of Mr. Smith's Report, as very few of these in English are obtainable here, and I understand that they will be supplied directly to the Foreign Office by the League of Nations.²

I have, etc.,
COLVILLE BARCLAY

¹ A copy of the Report was received in the Foreign Office from the League of Nations on January 27.

No. 19

Mr. Erskine¹ (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 2)

No. 13 [C 1532/1532/7]*

SOFIA, January 27, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I was received by the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday on my return to Sofia.²

2. M. Kalfov began the conversation by referring to the internal situation which he professed to regard with some optimism. He said that he and his colleagues in the Cabinet had taken advantage of the Christmas holidays to hold a series of meetings at a large number of towns and villages in the country. They had been received everywhere with enthusiasm and had been the object of numerous demonstrations by the peasants who had congratulated them on their efforts to deal with the forces of disorder and had assured them of their whole-hearted support. He explained that the Government were organising bands among the villagers to deal with the Communist and Agrarian bands which had been giving much trouble in certain districts in the summer and autumn, and expressed confidence that these measures would prove effective in suppressing any attempts to renew their activity in the spring. He added

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Sofia.

² See No. 2, n. 1.

that the Sgovor³ was now established on a firm basis and that the Government was progressively strengthening its position in the country. Such independent information as I have been able to obtain does not confirm this somewhat rosy estimate of the situation. During the past two months the brutal methods and increasing corruption of the Administration, coupled with the recent alarming rise in the price of bread, appear to have increased the general discontent already existing in the rural districts, and are even giving rise to severe criticism of the Government among the active supporters of the Sgovor. There are, moreover, stories of serious dissensions within the Cabinet itself and of constant intrigues by certain prominent members of the Sgovor, not included in the Cabinet, to oust some of its members and take their places. The Government are also much embarrassed by a campaign of outrages which, now that their more ambitious plans have failed to mature, is being carried on by the Communists, both in the capital and in the provinces, against police and other Government employees, some sixty or so of whom have lost their lives in the past few months and which the police seem powerless to deal with.

3. M. Kalfov then proceeded to discuss the country's relations with the neighbouring States. He had nothing new to say about M. Tsankov's visit to Belgrade⁴ which he appeared to regard as a qualified success and as a small step on the way to better relations with Serbia. With regard to Roumania he was more satisfied, and, in view of M. Tsankov's cordial reception at Bucharest⁵ and the arrival here of the new Roumanian Minister, he anticipated a speedy solution of the difficult problem of the Bulgarian inhabitants of the Dobrudja. From a conversation I have had with M. Bilciuresco I gather that his hopes in this direction are doomed to disappointment.

With the Turks in their present frame of mind it was impossible to effect any progress, and he did not propose for the present to renew the recent negotiations.⁶

4. His Excellency's main preoccupation appeared to be in connection with the refusal of Greece⁷ to ratify the Minorities Protocol signed at Geneva,⁸ as to which he spoke at length and with bitterness. Its result

³ i.e. *Entente*. This organisation, formed in 1922 as a means of unifying opposition to the Stambouliisky government, and drawing members from various political parties and professions, had developed into a political party after the 1923 *coup d'état* in which its members had played a prominent part (see No. 1, n. 6) and formed part of the governing coalition.

⁴ See Nos. 1, n. 7 and 2.

⁵ See No. 1.

⁶ The unofficial Bulgarian representative in Constantinople, M. Radev, went to Angora in June, 1924, but the negotiations had gone so badly that he had been withdrawn in August.

⁷ See No. 6. In Athens telegram No. 19 of February 3, Sir M. Cheetham reported: 'After all night (? sitting) Assembly passed motion refusing to ratify minorities protocol signed at Geneva September 29th last.'

⁸ See No. 2, n. 7.

would, he said, be a fresh incursion on a large scale of refugees from Macedonia. The Bulgarian Government were at their wits' end to provide for the many thousands who had already come and would be quite unable to accommodate any more. Being faced with starvation they would fall an easy prey to subversive agitators and would without doubt constitute a grave danger to the maintenance of order and the peaceful development of the country. Apart from this, it represented a most disappointing set-back in the improvement of relations with Greece which he had confidently expected to follow the application of the protocol, and was at the same time a blow to the prestige of the League of Nations. He proposed to address a communication to the latter on the subject and also the Great Powers, but expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government might use their influence at Athens in favour of ratification or, if ratification was rendered impossible owing to pressure from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, of the application of measures which would to some extent fulfil the object of the protocol. Not knowing your views, I merely replied that the question seemed to me primarily one to be dealt with by the League of Nations, but that I would report what he had said. Perhaps you may find it possible to take some action at Athens in the sense suggested.

5. In the evening I met the President of the Council at a dinner party given by the King of Bulgaria⁹ to some of the foreign representatives. After dinner M. Tsankov spoke to me in the same sense and I returned a similar reply. He then spoke of the danger to which the country was exposed by reason of the intrigues of the Agrarian refugees in Serbia. His reference to these men, whom he described as Communist conspirators, whereas, they are, of course, Agrarians, was so abrupt and so totally unconnected with any subject of conversation which had preceded it that I could only conclude that he was thinking of the warning on the subject recently addressed by Mr. Lampson to the Bulgarian Minister in London¹⁰ (see your despatch No. 386 of the 23rd ultimo),¹¹ and wished to justify his attitude. I therefore thought it advisable to renew that warning in order to leave him in no doubt as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject. I also took the opportunity to express my personal opinion that he would be well advised to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards his Agrarian opponents and to ask why he did not enlarge the existing amnesty so as to include the Agrarian leaders abroad—a measure which the King tells me he is pressing him to adopt. He replied that to do so would merely be regarded as a sign of weakness by his enemies—a reply typical of the Bulgarian mentality which can conceive of no method of treating political adversaries but war to the knife. As a matter of fact, I do not think there is much danger of the acceptance of any Bulgarian proposals to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Govern-

⁹ Boris III.

¹⁰ M. P. Hadji-Mischeff, in a conversation of December 23.

¹¹ Not printed.

ment for the constitution of a united 'anti-Bolshevik front'—by which, of course, they merely mean the expulsion of these Agrarian refugees. The situation of the Government is so unstable that it seems unlikely that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government would definitely commit themselves to their support by such a step. In fact the Serbian Minister informed me that this request was put forward by M. Tsankov at Belgrade and refused.

I have, etc.,

WILLIAM ERSKINE

No. 20

Mr. Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 9)

*No. 16 [C 1865/1062/90]**

DURAZZO, January 27, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on the 21st January, the fifth anniversary of the assembling of the Congress of Loushnija,¹ the Constituent Assembly formally proclaimed that the State of Albania was a republic.

2. A Constitution is at present being framed, but if, as is probable, Ahmed Bey is elected President,² it is likely to undergo revision at expert hands and to be submitted in amended form to a new Chamber. Its most important feature gives the President the powers of the President of the United States, but for seven years. The real purpose of this move is, of course, to legalise Ahmed's position as virtual dictator of the country, and this is thoroughly understood. In fact, the tribesmen, when the republic was proclaimed, openly affirmed that Ahmed was King.

3. After his election the President will ask for special powers to deal with certain economic questions, and will then dissolve the Constituent Assembly, which he will take steps to replace by a Senate of nine or ten members and a lower Chamber numbering about fifty.

4. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.³

I have, etc.,

H. C. A. EYRES

¹ An Albanian national congress had been convened at Lushnja in January, 1920 to assert the sovereign rights of Albania, which was occupied by Italian troops at the time.

² He was elected President on January 31.

³ Sir R. Graham.

No. 21

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 336 [C 1014/127/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 28, 1925*

My Lord,

I have received and read with great interest report No. S.A.R./25 of the 19th instant¹ from Colonel Giles, the British Commissioner on the Albanian Frontier Commission.

2. I assume that a copy of this report is available to Your Lordship and that you have therefore observed that in section 27 thereof Colonel Giles recommends strongly that the outstanding questions, especially the decision with regard to the Monastery of St. Naoum, should be notified to the interested governments by the Ambassadors' Conference without delay so that the position may be perfectly clear when the commission returns to Albania in May next.

3. I am disposed to agree with Colonel Giles that some action of this kind is necessary. Ahmed Bey Zogu is now apparently firmly established in power in Albania² and his government may be expected to last at any rate for the next few months, and if, as suggested in the fourth paragraph of your telegram No. 27 of the 15th instant,³ there is any prospect of the Albanian and Serbian Governments coming to an amicable arrangement upon the question of St. Naoum, a communication from the Ambassadors' Conference to the governments of Tirana and Belgrade might facilitate the beginning of negotiations. Moreover, I understand from Colonel Giles that unless some definite start is made in this matter soon there will be little prospect of the commission being able to complete their labours during the present year.

4. In all these circumstances I should be glad if you would now move at the Ambassadors' Conference that the decisions on the various questions detailed in paragraph 27 of Colonel Giles' report be notified officially to the Albanian and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments.

I am, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

¹ Not printed (C 1014/127/90).

² See No. 20.

³ No. 9.

No. 22

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Eyres (Durazzo)

No. 18 [C 816/52/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 28, 1925*

Sir,

In the fourth paragraph of your despatch No. 5 of the 9th instant,¹ you suggest that it is desirable that Albania should now be neutralised, and you request an indication of the views of His Majesty's Government on this suggestion.

2. The exact proposal which you have in mind is not altogether clear from your despatch. As you are aware, in all cases up to the present in which a State has been neutralised, such neutralisation has been effected under the guarantee of a group of powers. The permanent neutrality of Switzerland was guaranteed by the declaration of March 20, 1815,² signed by Great Britain, Austria, France, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, Sweden and Russia. Switzerland's neutrality has never been violated and the guarantee is reaffirmed in article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles. Similarly Belgium and Luxemburg were neutralised respectively by the treaties of 1839³ and 1867⁴ and placed under the guarantee of the Great Powers. Both these neutralisations ended with the war of 1914–1918.

3. I assume, therefore, that by the neutralisation of Albania, you would suggest that the integrity of the country should be jointly and severally guaranteed by Italy, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and Greece, as the countries chiefly interested, and by Great Britain and France as the remaining Great Powers of Europe. Such a proposal appears to me to contain many elements of danger. Albania being a very weak State cannot, like Switzerland both in 1871⁵ and during the war of 1914–1918, defend her neutrality against violation. Her frontiers, though defined, are not considered satisfactory by the Albanians, who are in several places cut off from their natural markets which lie in Serbia, and it seems to me that in the best circumstances there would always be considerable danger of raids and forays across the frontiers either by the Albanians or the Serbs. It would seem, therefore, likely that at any moment the guarantors of the neutrality of Albania might be called upon to carry out their obligations, and it is not difficult to envisage a situation in which war would be likely to arise. It may be assumed that, should such a situation materialise, the matter would then be referred to the Council of the League of Nations as Albania is a member of the league and is thus entitled at least to claim the protection of the whole league in the event of the violation of her

¹ No. 7.

² For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 2, pp. 142–7.

³ For the text of the treaty of April 19, 1839, see *ibid.*, vol. 27, pp. 990–99.

⁴ For the text of the treaty of May 11, 1867, see *ibid.*, vol. 57, pp. 32–5.

⁵ i.e. at the time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1.

frontiers. Indeed, it would appear that now that the covenant of the League of Nations is in force, the necessity for the neutralisation of any State, a member of the league, has disappeared.

4. In these circumstances, therefore, the advantages of the neutralisation of Albania are not apparent, and His Majesty's Government for their part would not be inclined to accept a guarantee of Albania in which country they have practically no interest except that of preserving peace in the Balkans, and for the reasons mentioned above it is at least doubtful whether a guarantee of Albania's neutrality might not make for war rather than for peace.

5. In the circumstances, therefore, I consider that, should the Albanian Government ask your advice on this matter, you should intimate that the question is one that could best be discussed in the Council of the League of Nations, but that for the reasons explained above the suggestion is not one which appears likely to recommend itself.

I am, etc.,

(in the absence of the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

No. 23

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 29)

No. 227 [C 1330/261/21]

PARIS, January 28, 1925

Sir,

You will recollect that as a result of the instructions contained in your predecessor's despatch No. 3418 of 31st October last,¹ I submitted to the Ambassadors' Conference, as reported in my telegram No. 617 of 17th November, section 3,² a definite scheme for dealing with the deadlock which has arisen with regard to military control in Hungary, and more particularly to the question of the single State factory. My scheme, as you will recollect, was referred for consideration to the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, which has now submitted two reports on the subject, copies of which are enclosed herewith.³

Report No. 1 deals with the scheme as a whole, whereas Report No. 2 confines itself to examining the compromise regarding the single State factory, which forms part of the scheme.

In order to be able to deal with Report No. 1, it may be useful to recall the main outlines of the scheme, which I have put forward, and which may be summarised as follows:—

¹ See Vol. XXVI, No. 251.

³ Missing from the file.

² This section is not printed.

1. To draw up a list of essential points in Hungarian disarmament on which the Allied Governments must insist. This list to include the question of the single State factory (cf. the 'five points' in Germany).⁴

2. The Ambassadors' Conference, in communicating this list to the Hungarian Government to tell the latter that if they agree to carry out the other points on the list, the Allied Governments are prepared, as a concession, to allow the single State factory to be split up in various sections.

3. To fix a time limit within which the Hungarian Government must have carried out the requirements of the Allied Governments as set forth in their list.

4. If the Hungarian Government fail to do this within the time limit, to inform the League of Nations of the resistance and obstruction which the Allied Governments have met with and publish the situation to the world.

The Allied Military Committee of Versailles in its report has supplied a list of essential requirements but have been unable to fix any time limit, though they mention 3 months being sufficient if the Hungarian Government do not obstruct, except as regards the single State factory, which (even if split up) will still require 6 months.

On the other hand, the Committee recommends that no definite proposal such as I suggested should yet be made to the Hungarian Government, on the ground that the Conference should first wait to see what results have been produced by its letter of December 4th. This letter, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 2793,⁵ is the last of a whole series which have been addressed from time to time to the Hungarian Government calling upon them to cease obstruction and to execute the military clauses of the Treaty. None of them having produced any effect, I have assumed that it was the failure of the method hitherto employed that led His Majesty's Government to instruct me to put forward a scheme on the lines of that presented to the Conference on November 7th.² Not only would this scheme force matters to a head, but it has the additional advantage of enabling the Conference to get away from the vague generalities and indefinite accusations in which it has got itself involved, and to concentrate on the few important facts which are apt to be lost sight of amidst the mass of grievances and complaints on minor issues.

The letter of December 4th is no more likely to produce any result than its predecessors and as two months almost have elapsed now, I think that I ought, if your predecessor's instructions still hold good, to press the Conference not to postpone any longer the consideration of the situation as a whole and invite it to decide definitely in favour of the proposal made by His Majesty's Government as being the only method which any one has

⁴ i.e. the points on which the Allies were not satisfied with German disarmament and which were set forth in an allied note of September 29, 1922. See Vol. XX, Nos. 270, n. 5 and 277.

⁵ Of December 22, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

yet put forward for getting out of the present deadlock.

As regards Report No. 2, you will observe that the Allied Military Committee of Versailles definitely rejects the proposal of His Majesty's Government that as a matter of expediency and as a concession to the Hungarian Government, the Allied Governments should not insist upon the strict letter of the treaty with regard to the creation of a single State factory in one building, but should allow the State factory to be split up in various sections.

In accordance with the instructions contained in your predecessor's despatch No. 3418 of October 31st,¹ I propose, if you see no objection, to refuse to accept this report when it comes before the Conference and to urge the following reasons in favour of the policy of splitting up the single State factory:—

1. The British⁶ and Italian members⁷ of the Commission of Control (i.e. the majority) are in favour of this course.

2. The Allied Military Committee of Versailles' report—as well as other information received by His Majesty's Government—shows that from the purely *military* point of view there is not much to choose between the two courses. Of the reasons advanced by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, only two (*b*) and (*c*) are really *military* and they are both advanced in a half-hearted manner.

3. The splitting up of the Austrian single State factory⁸ affords a precedent, to which the Hungarian Government have appealed.

4. His Majesty's Government are anxious to get rid of Allied control in Hungary as quickly as possible, and this can only be done by abandoning the strict legal interpretation of the treaty, for, even assuming that Hungarian obstruction ceases, the organisation of a single State factory is bound to take far longer than an arrangement whereby the State factory is split up.

5. The cost of a single State factory would be greater and although the actual amount in question may not be very large, the Allied Governments must be careful during the period of the reconstruction of Hungarian finance under the League of Nations,⁹ not to impose any financial charge on the Hungarian budget which is not absolutely essential.

6. It is clearly laid down in the British proposal that the concession as regards the single State factory will only be granted if Hungary in return satisfies the Allied Governments on the essential points regarding disarmament which are to be communicated to her.

7. The Hungarian Government have for the last two years made it abundantly clear that they will not set up a single State factory, and as His Majesty's Government, and presumably the other Allied Governments, do not intend to use pressure, either economic, financial or military, or to

⁶ Lieut-Colonel C. Selby.

⁷ Colonel Campana.

⁸ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 116, n. 3, 167, n. 8, 182, and 205.

⁹ See No. 18, n. 5.

invite the Little Entente to do so on their behalf, it is necessary to find some compromise which the Hungarian Government will accept.

8. A continuance of the present situation in which the Allied Governments are being in reality, not perhaps openly, defied by the Hungarian Government, is much more damaging to their prestige than some general arrangement on the lines of the British proposal which will enable them to put a stop to the present deadlock while saving their faces.

The last two arguments apply equally well to the whole question of the future of Hungarian military control. The Allied Governments' attempt to enforce the military clauses of the treaty through the intermediary of the Commission of Control may be said to have broken down in the face of either actual obstruction or passive resistance of the Hungarian Government.¹⁰ As persuasion, rebukes and protests have for the last two years been unavailing, there remain only two ways of escaping from the present deadlock—either to compel the submission of the Hungarian Government by direct pressure, or else to use the threat of denouncing the Hungarian Government to the League of Nations in order to induce the latter to co-operate in an arrangement which would allow the present allied control to be wound up without undue loss of prestige on the part of the Allied Governments.

Direct pressure of a financial or economic character appears to be out of the question unless the Allied Governments are prepared to interfere with the League of Nations' scheme for the economic reconstruction of Hungary.⁹ The only other form of direct pressure is military intervention by the Little Entente and I can hardly believe that any of the Allied Governments would be prepared, over a matter which is intrinsically of such minor importance, to employ so dangerous a weapon.

There remains, therefore, either some arrangement with the Hungarian Government backed up by the threat of an appeal to the League (and His Majesty's Government's proposal is the only one that has yet been put forward on these lines) or else a continuance of the present deadlock which is rapidly rendering the position of the Commission of Control in Hungary ridiculous and at the same time destroying the prestige of the Allied Governments in Central Europe.

One of the arguments often employed in favour of maintaining the status quo is that the presence of the Commission of Control, even if powerless, tends to keep the peace between Hungary and her neighbours, and that if it were withdrawn before its work was completed the latter would be tempted to arrogate to themselves the right of enforcing the military clauses of the Treaty of Peace which the Principal Allied Powers had failed to exercise. It would be interesting to learn from His Majesty's Representatives in the neighbouring States whether there is any justification for this argument. It may have been the case that in the early days the Commission of Control exercised a calming influence on these Govern-

¹⁰ See No. 13.

ments, but since the impotence of the Commission has been made manifest and still more since the League of Nations has worked out the scheme¹¹ whereby on the withdrawal of Allied control the neighbouring States will take part in the exercise of the League's right of investigation, it is quite conceivable that the neighbouring States would now welcome the early withdrawal of the Commission of Control as enabling them to bring pressure to bear on Hungary not by direct intervention but through the legally constituted channel of the League of Nations. It would seem that the French and Italian Governments have not worked out any definite policy for dealing with this troublesome question. At any rate their representatives at the Conference and the Allied Military Committee of Versailles have suggested nothing more helpful than to threaten the Hungarian Government in the case of continued recalcitrancy with an indefinite continuance of the Commission of Control. This threat, which incidentally is employed in a modified form in the Conference's letter of the 4th December,¹² would no doubt be admirable if it were to produce the desired result without having to be applied, but it is doubtful whether the Hungarian Government are really prepared to sacrifice their independence in military matters merely in order to get rid of the Commission of Control, which, when all is said and done, does not cause them any great inconvenience. Moreover, if the Hungarian Government for one reason or another have to fear the pressure of the neighbouring States, either direct or through the League of Nations, on the withdrawal of the Commission of Control, they might even be inclined to welcome the continuance of the Commission as a guarantee of security. In any case the threat if actually applied would tend to perpetuate the present undignified situation which it is precisely the object of His Majesty's Government to escape from as quickly and as gracefully as possible.

I have, etc.,
CREWE

¹¹ See No. 10, n. 2.

¹² Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 24

Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 2)

*No. 24 [C 1513/52/90]**

Very Confidential

BELGRADE, *January 28, 1925*

Sir,

Last night the King was present at the annual Saint Sava Ball in aid of the University Students' Benefit Fund. On a previous occasion since his return from Paris His Majesty had told me that he had had a profitable

conversation with the Marquess of Crewe,¹ so when he came to me in the *cercle* I told the King that I had been reading with interest the Ambassador's report of this conversation. The King said that he had wished to impress on his Lordship his pleasure at recent manifestations of the interest taken by Great Britain in the Albanian question. I replied that M. Nincic had made the same observation to me.

2. Later on in the evening, when the King and the Court and the Diplomatic Body had retired, as is customary, to the Royal refreshment rooms, the King took me apart and began a conversation which proved of considerable length.

3. He first talked about the political situation in France and what he thought was the precarious position of M. Herriot. He compared that statesman's difficulties to those of M. Davidovic² during his term of office, who had been forced to make a series of dangerous concessions to his most extreme supporters. His Majesty then went on to say that he wished to develop what he had said to Lord Crewe. This he proceeded to do, and again, after an enlightening digression on the internal politics of this country, he reverted to the Albanian question, saying he might as well, now he was about it, make a clean breast of it all in connection with his relations with Italy. The result was as follows:—

When in 1923 General Bodrero³ (in his capacity of an old friend on the Salonica front) was sent to His Majesty privately by M. Mussolini⁴ furnished with what the King called stenographic notes in order to make the first overtures for a pact of friendship⁵ settling the Adriatic questions and establishing really friendly relations, the King had replied that he was willing to do this on the condition that Italy should pledge herself to retire absolutely from the Balkans. General Bodrero went backwards and forwards to Rome equally provided with stenographic notes, and the upshot was that it was distinctly understood that Albania was included in the term Balkans, in regard to which the Italians were to renounce political interest.

4. While in Paris last month, after the Ahmed Zogu episode,⁶ the Italian Ambassador⁷ made proposals to the King to the effect that the time was coming, or was very near, for a partition of Albania, saying how useful it would be to Jugoslavia to have Northern Albania and the Valley of the

¹ See No. 5.

² Prime Minister of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State July–October, 1924.

³ Italian Minister at Belgrade since March, 1924. For his mission to Belgrade, see *D.D.I.*, vol. II, Nos. 372, 432, 435, 470, 485, 499, 501, 538, 548–50, 571, and 632.

⁴ Italian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ A treaty of friendship and cordial co-operation was signed on January 27, 1924. For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 120, pp. 683–4. See also Vol. XXVI, Nos. 11, 14, 15, and 36.

⁶ See No. 3, n. 3.

⁷ Baron C. Romano Avezzana. For his account of his conversation with King Alexander, reporting that King Alexander had raised the question of the partition of Albania, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 671.

Drin. The King regarded this proposal as a rank breach of faith, and His Majesty assured me that from the incipient stages of the Pact of Friendship negotiations to that day there had never been any question of partition. I asked the King how he had met these overtures of the Italian Ambassador, and he said he had merely put him off on the plea that the question did not appear to him to be one of present actuality.

5. The King then said that it was his fixed policy to allow no non-Balkan State to set foot in the Balkans—there was the disastrous example of Austro-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina,⁸ and her subsequent pressing onwards. His country would rather fight than permit it. Serbia herself had no desire whatever to take over Northern Albania and its refractory tribes; and if it were otherwise, he would not take as a gift the whole of Albania if one square mile of it were to be given to a non-Balkan Power. The King was much afraid that other efforts might be made from the Italian side to reverse Ahmed Zogu in his turn, and that a state of things might evolve which would lead others to open up the question of Albania. (I understood him to mean that the Serbs would be prepared to put up with a troubled Albania rather than face the question.) The only thing to do was for us all to support the Albanian Government by all possible means. The Serbs would not tolerate an Italian mandate; that was quite excluded. Then, I said, since the Italians were not likely to tolerate a mandate to any other Power, whether a Great one or a Balkan one, there was no other solution than the direct control of the League of Nations. The King did not dispute this, though we agreed it might be a severe trial for the League. (I had fortunately studied the Foreign Office memorandum of the 5th January.)⁹

6. Finally, the great fear the King seemed to entertain was that Mussolini, finding himself in great internal difficulties, might wish to extricate himself by some theatrical *coup* abroad, such as one connected with this question.

7. In the course of this conversation I took the opportunity to explain to the King, who, as also M. Nincic, has made satirical remarks about our curious desire to support the Fan Noli Government as against Ahmed Zogu, that the motives which actuated my instructions¹⁰ to warn the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government of the danger of facilitating the recent incursion of Ahmed Zogu had no connection with any preference on our part for one particular Government or another—least of all, for Fan Noli in person. All that we saw was that a Government *de facto* existed, and was endeavouring *tant bien que mal* to carry on business and maintain order, and that an attempt was about to be made to overthrow it, in this course of which, or as the result of which, those very troubles might arise, and have,

⁸ By the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878, Austria-Hungary had been allowed to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 69, pp. 749–67). Austria-Hungary annexed the area in October, 1908 (see Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. V (London, 1928), chaps. XL and XLI).

⁹ Not printed (C 217/52/90).

¹⁰ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 280 and 281.

indeed, begun to take shape, which His Majesty was showing himself so perturbed to contemplate.

8. It was towards the end of this conversation that the King made me the more confidential part of his statements, and he broke off by saying: 'There is General Bodrero, "qui nous espionne,"' and enjoined great discretion on me. The King then had a long conversation with the general, who had returned that evening from a stay in Rome. At its close the King beckoned me to join them, and said, somewhat ostentatiously: 'All that the general has been saying has confirmed what I said to you, that we are neither of us going to interfere in Albania, and there are no bellicose dispositions on either side. You are witness of this.' I began to say that I had never thought it otherwise, but the King seemed to want me to say something else, and the conversation ended in the King's dictum that Albania was the League of Nations' child and that she must look after her own offspring. The one thing necessary was to provide her with money and similar assistance.

9. The next day I met General Bodrero, and, as I expected, he asked me what on earth the King meant. He, General Bodrero, had always told me that Italy and this country had agreed not to intervene in Albania. The King had told him that I had expressed great satisfaction at what His Majesty had told me; what was it all about? This was very bewildering, and it looked to me as though the King, while pledging me to silence about his own alarm as regards Italy, had been imputing to me similar doubts, and that General Bodrero, fresh from Mussolini, had given him assurances that had satisfied His Majesty.

10. Since General Bodrero went on to say that Italy did not want war with Yugoslavia nor Yugoslavia with Italy, and that in the event of necessity it would have to be the League of Nations or the Western Powers who should intervene, I can only arrive at the conclusion that both Italy and this country are equally afraid of being left alone with each other in the matter of Albania. How far Italy would expect to take part, assuming that she renounces any claim to a mandate, in any arrangement made by the League of Nations or France or Great Britain for the control of Albania seems to me the point on which trouble would arise from the side of the Balkan States if a fresh settlement of the Albanian question becomes inevitable.

11. I may here mention that, in the conversation which I had with M. Nincic on the 23rd instant¹¹ on the subject of Radic,¹² he turned for a moment to Albania, and expressed his conviction that Ahmed Bey's régime would not last more than three or four months. When I asked why, he replied that he was sure that he would be assassinated by agents of the Soviet. It is reported in the press here that Fan Noli is in Vienna in contact with the Soviet Legation.

¹¹ Reported in Belgrade despatch No. 26 of January 28, not printed.

¹² Leader of the Croatian Peasant Party. He had been arrested on January 5 and was to be charged with high treason for wishing to establish an independent Croatian Republic.

12. The press also reports that Zia Dibra,¹³ one of the principal links between the Kossovo Committee¹⁴ and the Bolsheviks, was captured by the troops in Albania and killed while attempting to escape. It has probably been reported to you, Sir, that Peter Chaulev,¹⁵ another link between the Katchaks¹⁶ and the Bolsheviks, was killed at Milan about a month ago, so perhaps Ahmed Bey's chances are not so black as M. Nincic painted them.

I have, etc.,
ALBAN YOUNG

¹³ Albanian Minister of Public Works October-December, 1921.

¹⁴ i.e. the United Committee of Kossovo and Tchamouria, which aimed at the reunion of Kossovo with Albania.

¹⁵ One of the leaders of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-IMRO. He was murdered in Milan on December 23, 1924.

¹⁶ i.e. outlaws and deserters of Albanian origin under Serb-Croat-Slovene rule.

No. 25

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 2)

*No. 14 [C 1533/22/7]**

Confidential

SOFIA, January 28, 1925

Sir,

In the course of a visit which I received yesterday from my Serbian colleague, he said that he had been much struck by a certain hesitancy evinced at the last moment by M. Tsankov to undertake his journey to Belgrade,¹ based, he learned unofficially at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the grave apprehension felt there that it would bring down upon the Bulgarian Government the serious displeasure of His Majesty's Government as signifying the first step in a combined descent on the Ægean. I felt that he was trying to sound me as to whether His Majesty's Government had in fact any suspicions regarding such a project, and mindful of the instructions contained in your despatch No. 368 of the 8th December last² to avoid giving the impression that such was the case, I expressed my surprise at these fears, pointing out with truth that, in pursuance of the general policy of His Majesty's Government in the Balkans, I had repeatedly urged the Bulgarian Government to work for better relations with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. I suggested that they were no doubt due to their deep-seated belief that His Majesty's Government had taken Greece under their special protection and to the consequent assumption that they would be suspicious of any move which

¹ See Nos. 1, n. 7, and 2.

² See Vol. XXVI, No. 281.

might appear to have even a remote bearing on the interests of that country. M. Rakitch seemed to be satisfied with this explanation.

2. That the Bulgarian Government should have these fears is all to the good, and shows that they have not forgotten the communication which I made to them on the subject last June, as reported in my despatch No. 124 of the 1st July.³

3. The fact, however, that they were made known to M. Rakitch, and that, in spite of them, the visit took place, suggests the possibility that he exercised his influence to reassure M. Tsankov, and that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government were at least as anxious as the Bulgarian Government that it should not be abandoned. It is in fact the opinion of those among my colleagues whose judgement I value that the initiative came from Belgrade and that this was the object of the visit to Sofia of M. Marinkovitch,⁴ who was chosen for the purpose as being unlikely, as a member of the Opposition, to arouse suspicion.

4. I see that His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade regards M. Tsankov's visit as mainly a manoeuvre of internal politics.⁵ I am insufficiently acquainted with the political situation there to appreciate the grounds for this view, but the opinion expressed by some of his colleagues that the object was to secure Bulgarian pressure on the Macedonian voters in favour of M. Pasic seems to me fantastic. Such pressure could only be exercised through the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, and apart from the unlikelihood of the Serbian Government having recourse to such a quarter for assistance, the influence of the organisation would certainly be exercised in the opposite direction, as the prevention of an understanding between the two countries is a fundamental feature of its policy, and it would see that every vote were given against the party which favoured it. It will be remembered that one of the main factors which induced the Greek Government to conclude the Salonica Agreement in 1923⁶ was the report circulated at the time in Sofia, which may or may not have been based on fact, that an understanding had been come to with M. Stamboliisky for joint action in regard to Salonica and Cavalla. It therefore seems legitimate to suspect that one of the main objects of the Serbian Government in receiving M. Tsankov was again to put the screw on Greece, even if it were not intended to prepare the ground for a policy even more disagreeable to that country.

5. Sir Alban Young believes that Serbia has ultimate designs on Salonica, and does not exclude the possibility of a move in that direction even in the near future should a favourable opportunity arrive. The annoyance felt by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government over the Geneva Minorities Protocol,⁷ based I think mainly on the fear that it may involve the recognition of the Slav population of the Vodena district of Greek

³ See *ibid.*, No. 179, n. 4.

⁴ Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs July-October, 1924. For his visit to Sofia in December, 1924, see Vol. XXVI, No. 306.

⁵ See Vol. XXVI, No. 306.

⁶ See No. 15, n. 8.

⁷ See No. 2, n. 7.

Macedonia as a Bulgarian rather than as a Serbian minority, and the fact reported to me by Colonel Corfe⁸ that Serbian emissaries have started propaganda work there is certainly not without significance, while the consideration that the longer the adventure is postponed the harder it will become in view of the rapidly proceeding Hellenisation of Macedonia by the settlement of Greek refugees⁹ may also have some bearing on the question.

6. It is, however, clear that no action of the kind could be carried out without a previous agreement with Bulgaria for a simultaneous advance by the latter into Western Thrace in order to forestall the otherwise inevitable occupation of that province by the Turks. In view of the categorical assurance on the subject given to me by M. Kalfov, as reported in my despatch already referred to,³ I think it may safely be said that no such agreement exists at present.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade.

I have, etc.,
WILLIAM ERSKINE

⁸ A New Zealander who was a League of Nations delegate on the Greco-Bulgarian Emigration Commission.

⁹ See No. 15, n. 9.

No. 26

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Greek Minister

[C 1633/798/19]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 29, 1925

The Greek Minister called this afternoon to announce his imminent departure for Athens on the receipt of instructions from the Prime Minister to proceed there forthwith in order to take up the negotiations with Serbia for the renewal of the Graeco-Serb Alliance.¹

He repeated a good deal of what he had already said on an earlier² occasion regarding the lines on which these negotiations were going to be conducted. He emphasised particularly the feature to which he had already called attention, namely, the appointment of an advisory committee composed of members of all the political parties in Greece in order that the policy to be adopted by the Greek government might be a national policy with all the political parties behind it.

He went on to discuss in some detail the question of the Salonica-

¹ See No. 14, n. 4.

² See Vol. XXVI, No. 309.

Ghevgheli Railway.³ He said that he had it in mind to make the following proposal. In order to meet the Serb complaints as to obstruction, etc., on this line he would be prepared to recommend to his government the duplication of the line at the expense of the Greek government; but a pre-condition to any undertaking must be the readiness of the Serb company who at present hold all the shares in this railway to sell those shares to the Greek government. He was sure that this was a wise and a sound policy.

I said that I fully understood his desire to regain control and ownership of the railway; I had never myself been able to understand how any Greek government could have tacitly allowed the ownership of the line to pass into foreign hands.⁴ But did he not fear that the Serbs would be entirely unwilling to entertain any such proposal? He said he had no such fear; he felt sure that if the Greeks offered enough the Serbs would sell; and he was prepared to see that the Greek government did offer enough.

I said that if the Greeks could succeed in getting the railway back they would obviously be wise to do so.

I then asked him whether M. Venizelos had shown him a paper which Mr. Nicolson had recently communicated to him, which contained in a very clear and unprejudiced form a resumé of the various grievances which trade in general, and Serb trade in particular, had against the maladministration and hinderances encountered at Salonica.⁵

He said that M. Venizelos had given him a copy and that he was taking it with him to Athens. He fully admitted that there was very grave ground for complaint in the way things had hitherto been run at Salonica: he was afraid that matters had been run in rather too Oriental a fashion; he was quite prepared himself to proceed to Salonica as soon as he had time and to look into matters in consultation with the Governor-General.⁶ He really did hope that he would succeed in having things rectified.

He then went on to say that another matter with which he would certainly occupy himself at the earliest possible moment was the settlement of the various outstanding claims which British nationals had against the Greek government. He realised how irritating the non-settlement of these claims must be. Private individuals were far less patient about the settlement of their claims than governments were—this must necessarily be the case because private individuals did not have the resources which governments had behind them. Anyway he gave me his personal word that he would leave no stone unturned to get these claims properly settled.

I thanked him for this assurance and for all that he had already done to expedite the liquidation of these irritating matters. I could assure him that once they were settled it would create quite a different atmosphere here.

³ See Nos. 14 and 15.

⁴ See Vol. XXIV, No. 592.

⁵ Not traced in the Foreign Office archives. See, however, No. 15.

⁶ M. J. Kanavos.

These claims engendered a feeling of irritation which was often out of all proportion to their intrinsic worth, more especially when there were a considerable number of them; they naturally had a cumulative effect which was most undesirable.

Before leaving the Minister told me that he hoped to be back before the end of March with his treaty with Serbia in his pocket.

M. W. LAMPSON

No. 27

Sir C. Barclay (Budapest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 3)

No. 34 [C 1586/1586/62]*

Confidential

BUDAPEST, January 29, 1925

Sir,

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has just returned from the Semmering, where he had been staying for some weeks for reasons of health, told me the day before yesterday that the day before he left Budapest, about a month ago, he was asked by the French Chargé d'Affaires¹ whether he had heard that the Austrian Government were about to propose at Geneva the establishment of a system of preferential treatment between Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

M. de Scitovszky went on to say that on his return through Vienna he had seen the Chancellor, M. Ramek, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Grünberger,² as well as M[onsi]g[nor] Seipel,³ and their conversations had been chiefly on economic subjects. He had taken the opportunity of enquiring whether it was true that Austria intended to bring up the question.

M[onsi]g[nor] Seipel replied that when he was in England some time ago he had heard a good deal of the matter and that he had gathered the impression that the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. Montagu Norman, and commercial (? financial) circles in the City would be in favour of such a system of preferential treatment between Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but he denied that Austria had any idea of raising the question at Geneva, and he expressed the opinion that it was possibly Czechoslovakia who wished to do so.

M. de Scitovszky here remarked that when he was at the Ministry of Commerce⁴ and the discussion of economic questions was initiated

¹ Count L. de Robien.

² He had been Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs May, 1922-November, 1924.

³ Austrian Chancellor May, 1922-November, 1924.

⁴ He had been a Secretary of State, and had retired in 1922.

between Hungary and Czechoslovakia some four years ago,⁵ M. Benes at the very first meeting mooted the question of preferential treatment between the two countries. The Hungarian Government at the time considered that the Czech offer was too one-sided and suggested certain territorial readjustments as a *quid pro quo*. Then a variety of events supervened, which led up to the formation of the Little *Entente*,⁶ and the question was dropped.

M. de Scitovszky, returning to the present, said that the Hungarian Government did not think that an agreement on the basis of preferential treatment between Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be beneficial to Hungary, as the commercial field would be too limited; but, on the other hand, they would be prepared to consider such an agreement if Yugoslavia and Roumania were included. In this case the economic unit would be even greater than the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the outlets for products and industries of the various countries would be multiplied.

M. de Scitovszky said that before adopting any definite line of conduct in the matter the Hungarian Government were anxious to know the views of His Majesty's Government on such a proposal, and he would be grateful if I could obtain some expression of opinion for their guidance. His Excellency added that the Hungarian Government were so grateful for all the support that His Majesty's Government had given them in respect to the loan⁷ that they would not like to embark on a line of economic policy which would meet with the opposition or disapproval of His Majesty's Government. He also expressed the opinion that the Czech Government were dreading the success of the Dawes plan,⁸ which would mean a great expansion of Germany's trade, and that the French Government shared this dread, fearing further the possibility of a closer rapprochement between Austria and Germany; hence France's desire to bind together economically Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary. France, he was convinced, also had some latent idea of bringing Hungary into her orbit. 'France,' he concluded, 'always thinks *politically*; England, *economically*.'

Hungary's desire for bringing Yugoslavia and Roumania into the scheme is no doubt due also to her reluctance to be under the domination of Prague.

As regards this question of preferential treatment between the countries above mentioned, it has continually been brought to my notice

⁵ For these negotiations in 1921, see Vol. XXII, Nos. 54, 189, 200, and 204.

⁶ See No. 1, n. 9.

⁷ See No. 18, n. 4.

⁸ For German Reparation. For the text of the report of the Dawes Committee of April 9, 1924, see Cmd. 2105, *Reports of the Expert Committees appointed by the Reparation Commission* (H.M.S.O., 1924) pp. 2-125. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 419, n. 2. For the texts of the treaties of August 30, 1924, for the execution of this report, see Cmd. 2259 of 1924. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 546, n. 4.

by British firms, their travellers or their local agents that any import tariff reduction which might result from such a policy to the mutual advantage of those States, and of Czechoslovakia in particular, as the most progressive manufacturing unit amongst them, would be highly detrimental to British imports, which would be handicapped by the lower dues on similar articles from the neighbouring States. Czechoslovakia, it must be remembered, is our rival in nearly every branch of industry. For instance, our relatively considerable import of textiles into Hungary would have to face the crushing competition of Czechoslovakia, which has already the advantage of close proximity to the market.

My attitude was that the Hungarian Government were probably the best judges as to the policy they should adopt, but I should be grateful for instructions as to what line I should take in future conversation on this subject with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, etc.,
COLVILLE BARCLAY

No. 28

*Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 30, 7 p.m.)*

No. 21 Telegraphic [C1496/52/90]

Confidential

ROME, January 30, 1925, 4.20 p.m.

Secretary General¹ told me that Italian government felt somewhat injured over report sent them by Italian Minister at Belgrade² that His Majesty's Minister had declared to King of Serbia that he had proof positive of a secret understanding between Italy and Yugoslavia for disposal of Albania.³ Secretary General desired me to assure you categorically that assurances given you on this subject when you were here⁴ were absolutely accurate. No secret understanding had ever existed.

¹ Senator S. Contarini.

² On January 28. See *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 695.

³ Mr. Howard Smith minuted on February 2: 'General Bodrero has misrepresented Sir A. Young as far as we know. In the first place Sir A. Young himself reported that he did not believe that there was an understanding between Italy and Serbia [Belgrade despatch No. 465 of December 21, not printed]. Secondly if he has had an interview with King Alexander he has not reported it [see No. 24]. Thirdly our evidence is that there was no understanding between Italy and Serbia, but a direct deal between Serbia and Ahmed Bey [see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 283-305, *passim*]. . . .'

⁴ Mr Chamberlain attended the Thirty-Second Session of the Council of the League of Nations at Rome December 8-13, 1924 (see Vol. XXVI, No. 282). Senator Contarini's assurances are recorded in Mr. Chamberlain's minute of December 12 (C 18900/17537/19). See Vol. XXVI, No. 285, n. 3.

One and only desire of Italian government was for a free, independent and stable Albania as they recognised that any other policy could only involve them in trouble and expense. He added that it seemed difficult to kill rumour of this secret understanding in which even opposition circles in Italy believed as Count Sforza⁵ had recently attacked him on the subject. He thought Fan Noli might have something to do with propagating it. Fan Noli had recently proceeded to Vienna in order to place himself in touch with central Bolshevik agency in that country.

Repeated to Belgrade.

⁵ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs June, 1920-June, 1921.

No. 29

Sir C. Barclay (Budapest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 3)

No. 39 [C 1591/261/21]

BUDAPEST, *January 30, 1925*

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 17 of the 17th [*sic*] instant¹ in which you express concern at the attitude of calculated obstruction which the Hungarian Government are displaying towards the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Hungary and request my views as to what possible measures of effective pressure might be taken to induce the Hungarian Government to adopt a more conciliatory attitude.

I have had the question constantly in mind since my arrival here in July last and it has been evident to me from the first that the problem is not an easy one. On the one hand there is the stubborn obstinacy of the Hungarian Government, or rather Military Authorities, who have the weight of public opinion behind them, in non-compliance with the demands of the Conference of Ambassadors, and on the other the Allied Powers are under obligation to enforce the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Trianon. The difficulty lies in the mode of enforcement of the will of the Powers. Military sanctions are out of the question, for the reason that they could only be applied by Hungary's neighbours, which would raise a storm here the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. And financial pressure, if too severe, might undo the good economic work already accomplished under the League of Nation's reconstruction scheme.²

I had hopes at one time that the Hungarian Government might be more easily persuaded than coerced, and in view of the cordial feeling towards Great Britain displayed here since the raising of the Loan,³ I thought

¹ No. 12.

² See No. 18.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 4.

myself perhaps better qualified than my two colleagues to offer friendly advice. I spoke privately on various occasions to several Ministers, pointing out the futility of continued opposition, and notably to Count Bethlen on November the 6th⁴ and on January the 12th.⁵ On the last occasion I warned him, by quoting the case of Germany and the Allied Note just published, telling him that the Hungarian Government were in the same position as that of Germany; they too had failed to comply with the demands of the Control Commission and had not fulfilled their Treaty obligation; they must not therefore be surprised if some disagreeable decision should be taken in their case likewise.

The joint Note which you propose should be addressed to the Hungarian Government would thus seem to be in line with what I warned Count Bethlen might happen if they continued to pursue their policy of obstruction. I would, however, venture respectfully to suggest that after the intimation: 'an evasion which must obviously profoundly affect the cordiality of their relations with the Hungarian Government', some such words as these might be added: 'and may have economic consequences for which the Hungarian Government will have only themselves to thank'. The Note should be presented not to Admiral Horthy, but to Count Bethlen, who is responsible for the government of the country, and would deeply resent the other procedure.

I think on the whole that such a note might prove effective, especially if it contains some hint of adverse economic consequences. The Powers, however, should be prepared to enforce the threat of withholding further financial assistance until the Hungarian Government have complied with the demands made upon them. Otherwise the Allies would merely emphasize their impotence.

An alternative which suggests itself to me is that this Note of the Allies should be held over for the present and that the Conference of Ambassadors, who so far have never adopted a minatory tone towards Hungary—their Note of December the 4th⁶ being merely a mild remonstrance—should now address a strong Note to the Hungarian Government stating that they propose to enforce their demands by all means available, and that, unless the outstanding resolutions of the Conference of Ambassadors are complied with within a certain time, and a general improvement in conditions as regards Control takes place at once, they will formally notify the Powers and disclaim any responsibility for the consequences, which may profoundly affect the economic conditions of Hungary.

This alternative of a preliminary threat on the part of the Supervisory Body seems to me perhaps a fairer course than the sudden adoption of a stern and threatening tone by the Powers themselves.

⁴ Presumably the conversation recorded in Sir C. Barclay's letter of November 7 to Mr. Lampson, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁵ See No. 8.

⁶ See No. 8, n. 9.

My suggestion that some hint of economic pressure might be added to any warning note arises from my belief that this is the most effectual way in which the Hungarian Government can be brought to face realities, as it must be remembered that Hungary is, and will be for some time, in urgent need of capital to develop her agriculture and her industries.⁷

I have, etc.,

COLVILLE BARCLAY

⁷ In a letter to Mr. Lampson of January 31, Sir C. Barclay gave an account of a meeting with Count Bethlen and Count Csaky on January 31 during which Count Bethlen replied to the points raised in No. 12 and explained Hungarian hostility to the Control Commission. He continued: '... Frankly speaking, I have myself been shocked ever since my arrival in July by the undiplomatic tone of the correspondence between the Commission and the Hungarian Authorities, which I understand did not exist before Le Bleu's [Commandant Le Bleu was the French delegate on the Allied Commission of Control in Budapest] arrival, and which is inspired by him. He always seems to get his own way, and even when Selby and the Italian are of a different opinion and send in a majority report, the Conference of Ambassadors adopts the minority report and supports Le Bleu.

'In my opinion the Conference of Ambassadors should instruct the Commission to adopt a different tone as I feel sure that no good results can be obtained until a better atmosphere is created. The best course would be obviously to remove Le Bleu, and the sooner the better; he has been here some time and there would be nothing unnatural in his transfer. ...'

Sir C. Barclay stated further, in a personal letter of February 5 to Mr. Lampson: '... I do not quite understand why His Majesty's Government should be the one of the three Allies to take a severe line. Hitherto it has been the French who have hectored and dictated with the result that they are absolutely loathed in this country, whilst we are respected and liked for our chivalrous attitude to a fallen enemy. Sympathy for England has resulted in the development of considerable trade between the two countries, which it is surely worth while to foster. If a disagreeable step is necessary, why not leave the initial suggestion of this to the French? They have nothing to lose here—we have much.

'Is it worth while to run all the risks, political, financial and commercial, which might be incurred by a policy of extreme rigour, merely to endeavour to secure the complete observance of military clauses, most of which have already been complied with, and as to the remainder of which it is really of no vital importance whether they are complied with or not? ...'

No. 30

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 2, 9 a.m.)*

No. 13 Telegraphic [C 1665/52/90]

Very confidential

BELGRADE, February 1, 1925, 9 p.m.

Rome telegram No. 21.¹

You will receive on Monday² account of my conversation with The

¹ No. 28.

² February 2.

King³ from which you will see that the truth is exactly the reverse of the declaration attributed to me. On my side I had not expressed any doubt whatever as to attitude of Italy, or Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom either, towards Albania. But as all this cannot be explained to Italians without giving the King away and his little game, . . .⁴ at our expense disagreeable Italian overtures for partition of Albania, His Majesty has placed us in a predicament for which last night at the court ball he expressed to me his contrition especially when he learnt of Italian minister's telegram.⁵ This, he declared, went beyond anything which he had said warranted.

Yesterday I obtained privately from a reliable source in Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmation of the King's revelations of such overtures; only in this case it was not Italian Ambassador at Paris,⁶ but General Bodrero himself who, coming from Rome to meet the King at Venice, where he stayed on his return journey from Paris,⁷ had announced to His Majesty to his amazement that everything was ready for agreement at Rome including partition of Albania.⁸

It may be that different authorities are following independent lines but there seems to be little regard for truthfulness, and in this obscurity I would suggest that there is no need for Sir R. Graham to recur to the matter.⁹

Repeated to Rome.

³ See No. 24.

⁴ The text is here uncertain.

⁵ See No. 28, n. 2.

⁶ See No. 24, n. 7.

⁷ See No. 5.

⁸ For General Bodrero's report of January 13 from Venice, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 672.

⁹ In Foreign Office telegram No. 23 to Rome of February 3 Mr. Chamberlain stated: 'You may inform Secretary General that I have never doubted his good faith or the loyalty of the Italian government to the assurance which he gave me. British Minister at Belgrade certainly never made statement attributed to him. He must have been misunderstood or misreported.'

No. 31

Mr. Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 5, 9 a.m.)

No. 7 Telegraphic [C 1714/1435/90]

Urgent

DURAZZO, February 4, 1925, 11.40 p.m.

My telegram No. 5¹

Secret.

I have received following from Albanian government. Italian Chargé

¹ Of January 30. This had reported that the Prime Minister, Ahmed Bey Zogu, would put the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession before the Assembly on February 2.

d'Affaires² made following communication to Minister for Foreign Affairs³ today.

'Fact of granting exclusively to Anglo-Persian Oil Company oil concession⁴ and notably hasty presentation to assembly of a project relating to this concession would be considered in Italy as a hostile act towards Royal government which in such a case would be obliged to adopt attitude of extreme reserve.'

Minister for Foreign Affairs observes that Albanian government is faced with threat to which warnings about compulsion add greater import.

He would be glad to know what diplomatic or other support he might expect from His Majesty's Government if threats materialize.

Passing of oil concession must largely depend on receipt of favourable reply as later on Italian and American pressure might prove too strong.

Italian Chargé d'Affaires appears further to have threatened that his government would block any question of active support in League of Nations and would carry on press campaign against Albania throughout Europe. He also declined to put any of these observations in writing.

I am myself laid up with illness but Ahmed Bey told Mr. Parr⁵ that he is

² Signor U. Sola.

³ Mufid Libohova was Minister of Finance, and Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim*.

⁴ A Foreign Office memorandum of February 12 on the history of the concession ran as follows: '1. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company sent a representative to Durazzo in 1920 at the invitation of the Albanian Government. As the result of his investigations, an agreement was signed in the following March with the Albanian Prime Minister and two of his colleagues which gave the company the right to prospect for three years on all lands over which the Government held mineral rights, at the end of which period they were to select such portions as they might desire. The agreement was subject to ratification, but was not, in fact, ratified by the Albanian Government.

'2. In 1922 the agreement was radically revised, chiefly in connection with the question of areas, as the company recognised the objections which might be taken to the original agreement on the ground of monopoly. To meet this objection the new agreement, which was still subject to ratification, gave the company working rights over what amounted to not more than 10 per cent. of Albanian territory; selection of the area required was to be made in four months. The agreement, moreover, was couched in terms highly favourable to the Albanian Government, who were to have 40 per cent. share of the capital and a royalty of 13½ per cent. on the output. The company had three times sent a representative to Albania and could not be regarded as remiss in attending to this business.

'3. In 1922, two years after the Anglo-Persian Company had first taken up the question, an expressed rivalry on the part of certain foreign oil companies began to be apparent. These interests were chiefly American, viz., the Sinclair group, the Standard Oil Company, and, to a very much less extent and in a great measure under American influence, French and Italian groups. The form which this competition took was the exertion of pressure on the Albanian Government to withhold ratification from the Anglo-Persian Company's agreement.

'4. In 1924 overtures were made by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the Standard Oil Company to hold a meeting of their several representatives and compare their prospective areas of exploitation in order to bring about an amicable arrangement. To these overtures, however, the American company did not find themselves in a position to respond. . . .'

For previous documentation on Albanian oil, see Vol. XXII, Nos. 605, 754, 811, and 823.

⁵ Third Secretary at Durazzo.

extremely anxious to receive a reply from His Majesty's Government which would enable him to call Italian bluff. If he were to give way it would mean the end of Albania as an independent state.⁶

It is to be noted that Anglo-Persian Oil Company agree to refrain from including in their concession that tract of oil land demanded by Italians.⁷

Repeated to Rome No. 4.

⁶ In Durazzo telegram No. 8 of February 5, Mr. Eyres added: 'President of the Republic informs me he accepted his office as President with proviso that Anglo-Persian oil concession, which he regards of supreme importance to Albania, should be immediately ratified. Knowledge of this matter is now not confined to official circles as Italians have brought pressure to bear from outside.'

⁷ Mr Nicolson commented on February 5: '... the Anglo Persian concession is in no sense a monopoly, and the blackmail now being exercised by the Italians is entirely unjustifiable. We have every right to be extremely angry and to take strong action.'

'The following objections, however, occur to me:

(1) The Italians will have in this matter the support of the Standard Oil interests and of the French.

(2) I do not think they are bluffing. Italian influence in Albania has recently been exposed to a severe defeat by the expulsion of Fan Noli [see No. 3, n. 3]. M. Mussolini can scarcely afford another defeat of a scarcely less dramatic nature. It is quite possible that he will take even stronger action than he suggests.

(3) By the Formula signed in Nov[ember] [9], 1921 [see Vol. XXII, Nos. 703 and 744] we implicitly recognise a predominant Italian interest in Albania. It is true that if the formula applies to this case, it applies only in the sense that the economic independence of Albania is threatened by these Italian menaces. But it is also true that we are pledged to give Italy herself a mandate for the restoration of the situation thus created.

(4) If we take up the Italian challenge we shall inevitably be assuming responsibilities towards Albania. It is not fair to the Albanians to promise them our diplomatic support, when we know very well that such support will be of a merely platonic nature.

(5) If we take a strong line, we shall be faced by a press campaign in Italy, France and the United States. I doubt whether an oil concession of rather doubtful value would be worth any such disturbance. ...'

Sir E. Crowe, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated on February 5: 'Certainly this attitude on the part of the Italian gov[ernment] is intolerable. It resembles that of the emperor William [II of Germany (1888-1918)] of old. It is unfortunate the case should arise just at this moment.'

No. 32

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 9)

No. 109 [C 1860/52/90]

ROME, February 5, 1925

Sir,

When I saw the Secretary General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs last night I did not fail to convey to him the message contained in your telegram No. 23 of the 3rd instant,¹ to the effect that you had never

¹ See No. 30, n. 9.

doubted his good faith or the loyalty of the Italian Government to the assurances given to you with regard to their attitude in the Albanian question. Senator Contarini desired me to thank you warmly for this message which the Italian Government would greatly appreciate. I took the opportunity of asking the Senator privately whether he felt perfectly sure that Signor Mussolini shared his feelings on the subject of Albania and might not be inclined to embark on some more adventurous policy. Senator Contarini assured me that Signor Mussolini was absolutely at one with him in considering that it would be folly for Italy to burn her fingers over Albania. Italian interests lay in the direction of a free, independent and stable Albania, and this was the unanimous view of the Italian Government on the subject. From enquiries which I have made in other directions I am convinced that a policy of adventure in Albania would not be popular here and that the declared attitude of the Italian Government meets with general approval.

I have, however, not yet received the despatch² from His Majesty's Minister in Belgrade foreshadowed in his telegram No. 13 of February 1st.³ Although I see no reason to doubt the categorical assurances received from the Italian Government on this question, I must admit that the attitude of their local agents does not necessarily inspire equal confidence. This remark applies especially to the Italian Minister at Belgrade, for General Bodrero has on previous occasions shown a disposition to take independent and unauthorised action.

I have, etc.,
R. GRAHAM

² No. 24.

³ No. 30.

No. 33

*Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 7, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 54 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1805/261/21]

PARIS, February 6, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following questions:—

...¹ 2. The Conference had before it the report of the Versailles committee enclosed in my despatch No. 319 of today² to the effect that the Hungarian government should be told to hand over all the material which they have illegally manufactured since the order was given last September by the commission of control to cease the manufacture of war material in

¹ The section(s) omitted referred to other matters.

² Not printed.

private factories (see my telegram No. 624a of November 22nd, 1924, section 4).² The Conference was prepared to agree to this proposal, but the Italian Ambassador suggested that in view of the delay which has occurred since then in reaching a definite decision with regard to the question of the Hungarian state factory,³ the Hungarian government should only be called upon to hand over such material as shall be manufactured after the date of the resolution to be taken by the Conference, that is to say that the Hungarian government should keep all that they have manufactured between September 3rd up to the present date. The general feeling of the Conference was against this concession, and it was eventually decided to refer the matter back to the Versailles committee, who will endeavour to see how far it is possible to meet the Italian point of view. . . .¹

³ See No. 8, n. 3.

No. 34

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 33 Telegraphic [C 1570/763/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 7, 1925, 3.15 p.m.*

Colonel Stirling¹ has come to London in order to secure the services of nine British retired officers for the newly created Albanian gendarmerie. He has informed me of his interview with you on the subject.² He explains that after the disbandment of the Albanian army the organisation of an efficient police force to keep order in the country is an essential requirement, a proposition with which it is impossible to disagree. The Albanian government consider that the employment of a small number of European officers to organise and command the force is an equal necessity. This, again, must be admitted. The choice of the nationality from which the officers are to be selected has been a serious problem with the Albanian government. The numbers are small, nine in all, viz. two each, working in pairs, in the four districts into which the country will be divided, and one at headquarters, the supreme command being in the hands of Colonel Stirling himself, as Adviser for Internal Affairs. With such a small force it would be hopeless to secure harmonious co-operation, if officers were of different nationalities even if this could in practice be arranged. But the chief difficulty felt by Albanian government is that no other than British officers will meet the peculiar position in which Albania finds herself placed. There is such mistrust there of France, no doubt largely arising out of her close understanding with Yugoslavia,

¹ See No. 7, n. 5.

² Reported by Sir R. Graham in his private letter of January 27, not printed, to Sir E. Crowe.

that French officers will not be accepted. For obvious reasons, neither Italian nor Serbian officers can at present be considered. There are grave objections to choosing the officers in any of the ex-enemy states, although, if it were not for fear of raising trouble with Italy, Austrian officers might well be considered. Certainly Germans cannot be allowed. There remain as possible elements Scandinavian, Dutch, and Swiss. None of these however [is] judged to possess the special combination of qualifications which are essential. Experience in Albania itself and in other countries has shown them to be unsuitable. Americans are too closely associated with the Americo-Albanians of whom Fan Noli was an unfortunate representative. By a natural process of elimination therefore, the Albanian government have reached the conclusion that they are practically restricted to British subjects. This is the case as stated to us by Colonel Stirling. The logical force of his exposition is difficult to dispute.

His Majesty's Government are now placed in a difficult position. They are bound to recognise that apart from the nationality of the officers, the plan of organising the Albanian gendarmerie on a European model is an eminently desirable one in the best interests of the country. As such, His Majesty's Government cannot oppose it. They realise that the Italian government may be disposed to look somewhat askance at the employment of British ex-officers and they propose, for this reason alone, to inform Colonel Stirling that they cannot give him any encouragement in his efforts to engage such officers. At the same time His Majesty's Government have no power to prevent him from doing so, or to forbid British subjects not actually serving their own government to take service in the police force of an independent State in friendly relations with Great Britain. All that they can do, is to warn Colonel Stirling—who himself entered the service of Albania without the previous knowledge of His Majesty's Government and contrary to their declared policy of non-intervention in Albanian affairs—that if he considers himself bound, as an official acting under the orders of the Albanian government, to proceed with his scheme, it must be clearly understood that he does so on the responsibility of himself and of the Albanian government, and that His Majesty's Government are not in any way involved.

I request Your Excellency to take a favourable opportunity to explain the position frankly to Monsieur Mussolini, with whom I desire to be quite open. As a proof of this Your Excellency may show him the draft of the letter which it is proposed to address to Colonel Stirling over the signature of Sir Eyre Crowe whom he had approached in the matter,³ but which will be held back until I receive your report of the result of your interview with M. Mussolini.

The draft, of which the text is given in my immediately following telegram,⁴ will make it clear that His Majesty's Government would

³ In a letter of January 31, not printed.

⁴ Foreign Office telegram No. 34 of February 7. The text ran as follows: 'Since you have

sincerely prefer any other arrangement than Colonel Stirling's scheme, but have to admit that they cannot deny the Albanian government the right to provide for the maintenance of order in their State by measures in themselves perfectly legitimate and of a nature which His Majesty's Government have no power to prevent. You will no doubt add such arguments as will readily occur to you to convince Monsieur Mussolini that there are no political motives or designs of any kind in our mind; that if the plan is persisted in, any British gendarmerie officers appointed can be relied upon to remain aloof from any activity not flowing from the exercise of their police duties; and that in any event His Majesty's Government for their part remain absolutely loyal to their policy of avoiding for themselves any political entanglement or claiming any special position in Albania.

In return His Majesty's Government count with confidence on the Italian government should the plans of the Albanian government be realised, not countenancing any factious opposition to the salutary activity of the gendarmerie on account of its being administered by British officers.

Repeated to Durazzo No. 4.

raised the question of the recruitment of a number of British officers for the Albanian gendarmerie, I have felt bound to refer the matter to the Secretary of State, and I now write by his direction to inform you of the view he takes of the serious issue involved. With the proposed organisation of an efficient police force in Albania, after the disbanding of the former Albanian army, His Majesty's Government have much sympathy.

'You are however well aware, and I again emphasised in our recent conversation [of January 30] that it is the deliberate policy of His Majesty's Government not to allow themselves to be drawn into any special responsibility in regard to the internal affairs of Albania. It was for this reason that they firmly declined to recommend or support the appointment of a British Financial Adviser [see Vol. XXII, No. 823, n. 6]. I need not remind you that your own appointment was made without the previous knowledge of His Majesty's Government and on the sole initiative of the Albanian government.

'Following the same line of thought His Majesty's Government feel unable to lend any support to the appointment of British officers for the Albanian gendarmerie. They would prefer that the Albanian government should adopt some other scheme.

'At the same time His Majesty's Government have, as you fully realise, no power to prevent the Albanian government from engaging the services of British subjects not in the British government service. They must leave it to your judgment, taking every aspect of the question into consideration, to take such action as you consider right in your capacity as agent of the Albanian government in whose service you are.

'But should you decide that you must proceed with your scheme, it must be clearly understood that the responsibility is yours and that of the Albanian government and that if the engagement of British subjects as officers of their gendarmerie were at any future time to involve them in difficulties with the Albanian government, they must not look to His Majesty's Government to extricate them from a position of their own choosing.'

No. 35

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Eyres (Durazzo)

No. 5 Telegraphic [C 1714/1435/90]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 7, 1925, 4 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 7 (of February 4th. Anglo-Persian Oil Concession in Albania).¹

You should advise Albanian government to reply to Italian representations in the sense that:—

1. In deference to Italian susceptibilities Albanian government have induced Anglo-Persian to exclude from scope of their concession area demanded by Italians. (See last paragraph of your telegram.)

2. That the concession is therefore not exclusive, and in no sense a monopoly.

3. That its presentation to Assembly cannot be described as 'hasty' seeing that contract was signed nearly four years ago.²

4. And that Albanian government trust that these explanations will convince Italian government that for them to persist in their written and oral menaces would be to violate sovereignty of a friendly and independent State.

You may at the same time inform Albanian government of my instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome³ in telegram of which the salient passages are being repeated to you in my immediately following telegram.⁴

We can go no further at present.

Repeated to Rome No. 36.

¹ No. 31.

² See *ibid.*, n. 4.

³ No. 36, below.

⁴ Foreign Office telegram No. 6 of February 7, not printed.

No. 36

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 35 Telegraphic [C 1714/1435/90]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 7, 1925, 4.35 p.m.*¹

Durazzo telegram No. 7 (of February 4th. Anglo-Persian Oil Concession).²

You will see from Board of Trade letter³ enclosed in my despatch No.

¹ In an unnumbered telegram of February 7, sent at 3.55 p.m., Mr. Lampson instructed Sir R. Graham as follows: 'Please await receipt of our telegrams No. 35 and No. 5 to Durazzo [No. 35] before taking action on our telegrams No. 33 [No. 34] and No. 34 [see No. 34, n. 4].'

² No. 31.

³ Of July 13 (C 12195/235/90), not printed.

918 of July 23rd 1923¹ that this concession is in no sense exclusive and is a perfectly legitimate commercial operation. Italian action, if accurately reported, will therefore necessitate strongest protest on our part.

Please see Monsieur Mussolini personally, give him substance of Durazzo telegram, and explain to him position as set out in Board of Trade letter. If he denies the accuracy of Albanian government's statement you should ask that Italian Minister at Durazzo be sent immediate instructions to dissipate the unfortunate impression which Albanian government have derived. If he confirms Albanian statement, you should express astonishment that Italian government should threaten an independent and sovereign State with dire political reprisals in the event of that State according to a British firm which is a perfectly legitimate commercial concession: and you should add that it will be most painful for you to have to confirm this rumour to His Majesty's Government who will, you feel convinced, receive such confirmation with profound indignation.

Such an attitude on the part of Monsieur Mussolini would constitute a painful contrast with the policy of perfect frankness and loyalty which inspires the friendly communication which I am requesting Your Excellency in my telegram No. 33⁵ to make to him on the subject of the Albanian gendarmerie. His Majesty's Government desire to work in perfect harmony with the Italian government in Albania and elsewhere; but this cannot be done at the expense of bona fide and altogether legitimate British interests which His Majesty's Government have the right and the duty to defend.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ No. 34.

No. 37

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 512 [C 1591/261/21]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 10, 1925*

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 227 (59/5/1925) of January [2]8th last,¹ I transmit to Your Lordship herewith copies of a despatch² and of a private letter to Mr. Lampson³ which have been received from Sir C. Barclay on the subject of military control in Hungary.

2. The proposals which you laid before the Ambassadors' Conference in accordance with the instructions contained in my despatch No. 3418 of October 31st last,⁴ were framed with the object of presenting the

¹ No. 23.

² No. 29.

³ Of January 31 (see *ibid.*, n. 7).

⁴ See Vol. XXVI, No. 251.

Hungarian Government with a clear statement of the outstanding matters arising out of the military clauses of the Treaty of Trianon, the satisfactory settlement of which would be a pre-requisite of the withdrawal of the Allied Control Commission and the substitution in its place of the supervisory powers vested in the Council of the League of Nations under article 143 of the treaty. As you are aware, there is reason to suppose that the Hungarian Government may be to some extent influenced by the desire of postponing the withdrawal of the Control Commission, which they possibly regard as less objectionable than supervision by the investigation commissions provided for by the League of Nations scheme.⁵ In the circumstances it was felt that the allies would have to employ more effective means of coercion than those hitherto used, and it was for this reason that it was originally proposed to threaten Hungary with the publication of her defaults by the League of Nations. It has, however, since been pointed out that, so long as the Allied Control Commission remains in Budapest, the League of Nations have no direct responsibility in so far as the military clauses of the treaty are concerned and that, consequently, the publication by the League of Nations of an allied report on Hungary's obstruction might present difficulties until such time as the allies had requested the League to exercise the powers conferred upon it under article 143 and the League had actually assumed those duties. In these circumstances and in order that publicity should be given to the present state of affairs without delay, an alternative method of procedure, outlined in my despatch No. 246 of January 20th last,⁶ was tentatively submitted to His Majesty's Minister at Budapest⁷ for his comments.

3. Your Lordship will now observe that Sir C. Barclay, whilst concurring generally in the procedure suggested, considers that before such joint representations are made by the allied representatives at Budapest a strong note should be addressed to the Hungarian Government by the Ambassadors' Conference. This note would state the specific points on which satisfaction is required and would intimate that the Ambassadors' Conference intend to enforce demands by all means available, and that, in the event of no improvement in conditions as regards control taking place, they would formally notify the facts to the Powers and disclaim any responsibility for the consequences which might profoundly affect the economic conditions of Hungary. This suggestion by Sir C. Barclay certainly seems worthy of full consideration: and there seems much in favour of its adoption; but the general question has since been further complicated by the fact that it may be impossible, for reasons since disclosed, for the allies to enforce their demand for the construction of the single state factory.⁸ The position in this matter is explained in a letter addressed by Mr. Lampson to Mr. Sargent on February 7th⁶ from which it

⁵ See No. 10, n. 2.

⁷ See No. 12.

⁶ Not printed.

⁸ See No. 8, n. 3.

will be observed that the Hungarian Government might be held to have committed a breach of her loan obligations,⁹ assumed under the ægis of the League, were they to meet the costs of the factory, either single state or split up, except as part of the treaty annuity laid down by the Reparation Commission. Pending a decision on this question by the Finance Committee of the League of Nations and the Reparation Commission itself, it is clearly undesirable that the demands already made on the Hungarian Government in respect to article 115 should be renewed; and, since this question is one of the most important of the outstanding defaults it is impossible to present the Hungarian Government with a definite and comprehensive statement of their outstanding obligations upon the fulfilment of which the withdrawal of the Allied Control Commission is contingent. Further reasons for the postponement of any action by the Ambassadors' Conference at the present moment are:—

(a) The fact that the Hungarian Government have prepared a detailed case purporting to justify their attitude (see Sir C. Barclay's letter to Mr. Lampson)³ which, upon receipt, will require careful examination;

(b) The fact, as shown in Colonel Selby's report dated January 23rd,¹⁰ that the Hungarian Government have now commenced to furnish the Control Commission with the nominal rolls and attestation sheets of men recruited since the last revision by the commission in 1923 (articles 103 and 135 of the treaty).

4. In these circumstances it is suggested that, when the reports of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles enclosed in your despatch under reply¹ come up for discussion at the Ambassadors' Conference, you should endeavour to postpone definite action on the questions involved until the situation has cleared. This can only be when the League of Nations Finance Committee and the Reparation Commission have given their decisions regarding the expenditure involved in the construction of the state factory and the Hungarian Government have submitted their observations on the various outstanding questions.

5. Should it result, as it well may do, (1) that the Reparation Commission will not allow even the small sum of twenty-four thousand pounds for the divided state factory to be deducted from the Reparation annuity, and (2) that the Finance Committee of the League would regard the payment of that sum by the Hungarian Government from any other source as contrary to her international loan obligation, then the inevitable conclusion appears to be that the allies may, and probably will, ultimately have to abandon entirely the attitude which they have hitherto adopted in the matter of the single state factory. Incidentally, from information lately received,¹¹ it would seem that as regards the other outstanding defaults

⁹ See No. 18.

¹⁰ A copy of this report was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Budapest despatch No. 36 of January 29, not printed.

¹¹ In a letter of February 6 from Sir C. Barclay to Mr. Lampson, not printed. This was received in the Foreign Office on February 10.

under the military clauses the Hungarian attitude has already undergone a marked change. It is thus within the bounds of possibility that before further drastic action on the part of the allies can be adopted, the whole situation may have undergone a radical modification.

I have, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

C. HOWARD SMITH

No. 38

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 16)

No. 26 [C 2208/168/7]

SOFIA, February 10, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 27th ultimo¹ I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I met last night at dinner, spoke to me again respecting the rejection² by the Greek Government of the Geneva Minorities Protocol.³ He had little to add to what he had said in our previous conversation on the subject and for the most part harped on his favourite theme of the discouragement felt in Bulgaria that her loyal execution of her treaty obligations had not received fuller recognition by the Powers, or led to their influencing her neighbours to fulfil on their side those which they had incurred towards Bulgaria. I gather that his main preoccupation was now in regard to the internal situation and to the loss of prestige which the Government would incur through what their opponents would represent as a fresh failure of their foreign policy. He said he had approached the Powers with a view to enlisting their support when the subject came up for discussion at Geneva, and appeared rather disappointed that the reply given in London⁴ had, so he said, been less encouraging than those given in Paris and Rome. From another source I learn that the Italian Government promised him their full support.

2. The Bulgarian press has devoted much space to the question and has made the most of the anxiety shown by Greece to appeal to the League of

¹ No. 19.

² See No. 19, n. 7.

³ See No. 2, n. 7.

⁴ On February 4, the Bulgarian Minister had left a memorandum at the Foreign Office suggesting that His Majesty's Government should advise the Greek Government to renounce its intention not to ratify the Minorities Protocol. Mr. Nicolson had informed him that it was too late for intervention as the Greek Assembly had refused to ratify the Protocol (see No. 19, n. 7), and, even if it had not been, he doubted whether Mr. Chamberlain would have agreed to do anything which would have lead to serious trouble between Greece and Serbia.

Nations in the matter of the expulsion of the Patriarch⁵ as contrasted with her contempt for that body shown in the question of the protocol. But on the whole the comments have been more restrained than might have been expected.

3. In connection with the question of the Patriarch the French Chargé d'Affaires told me today that he recently asked Monsieur Kaloff whether it was true, as he had heard from Paris, that the Turkish representative⁶ had informed him that, should his Government find it necessary to commence hostilities with Greece, they undertook to withdraw their troops behind their present frontiers at the close of the operations and that His Excellency had replied in the affirmative. Monsieur de Séguin added that the French Military Attaché⁷ had been informed by the Bulgarian Military Authorities that they had observed no sign of any military activity either in Greek or Turkish territory. As, according to the press telegrams, the situation has taken a pacific turn I did not think it necessary to telegraph this information.

I have, etc.,
WILLIAM ERSKINE

⁵ In a telegram to Geneva of February 11 (for the text, see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, p. 579). The Patriarch Constantin Araboglou had been expelled from Constantinople on January 30.

⁶ Server Djemal Bey.

⁷ Captain Savignoni.

No. 39

*Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 12, 9 a.m.)*

No. 29 Telegraphic [C 2069/1435/90]

Confidential

ROME, February 11, 1925, 8.40 p.m.

Your telegram No. 35.¹

As soon as it was possible to see President of the Council, which was yesterday evening, I delivered very strong protest in terms of your instructions. His Excellency was in one of his most difficult moods. Reasons for this was subsequently made clear to me by Secretary General, who said that my representation and intimation regarding gendarmerie officers had come at a singularly un-appropriate moment.

It appears that there has been acute crisis within Fa[s]cisti party over question of Albania. Critics of government policy, with president of Royal Geographical Society² at their head, had accused Ministry of Foreign Affairs of apathy and indifference regarding Albania and of having sacrificed historic Italian claims and interests, abandoning the country to foreign influences. Feeling had run so high that Secretary General had

¹ No. 36.

² The Minister of the Interior, Signor L. Federzoni.

submitted resignation which however President of the Council had refused to accept. Matters had now been patched up but incident had left an atmosphere of tense susceptibility. M. Mussolini hotly denied that there could be any idea of Italy blocking legitimate British interests but he then launched into a tirade against Ahmed Zogou saying that that statesman seemed determined to flout and ignore Italy and to prefer friendship and assistance of any other Power. Italian public opinion would not tolerate this and if Ahmed Zogou persisted he would be made to feel the force of Italian displeasure. There was no idea of direct Italian intervention in Albania but there were other methods which could be applied. I used all available arguments with His Excellency and finally left with him an aide memoire³ stating the facts of the case to which he promised me a considered reply as soon as possible.

As far as I can ascertain actual situation is as follows:—

Throughout last year Italian government have been pressing for an oil concession of 40,000 hectares for Italian state railways. This is apart from a small area of 4,000 hectares to which Anglo-Persian Oil Company probably refer as excluded from their concession. Answer of Ahmed Zogou is that Italian concession cannot be granted as area is already earmarked for concession to Anglo-Persian company. Italian chargé d'affaires at Durazzo was instructed⁴ to inform Ahmed Zogou that definite granting of latter concession and consequent final exclusion of Italian claim would be regarded as hostile act. References to loan by League of Nations⁵ and press campaign seem to have been added by chargé d'affaires on his own account. Mussolini recognised that if areas demanded by Anglo-Persian company and Italians were independent of each other and did not overlap there could be no possible objection on the part of Italian government to conclusion of Anglo-Persian concession. If however, both parties claim the same area he will ask for negotiation on the subject. Strong argument of Anglo-Persian company being the first in the field and having thereby established legitimate prior claim had little weight with him. Attitude of Italian government is, as is not unusual, inspired by considerations of face saving and window dressing. If Italian public learns of a British concession while Italy gets nothing political effect will be unfavourable for the government here. On the other hand if Italy obtains something at the same time that we do there will be general satisfaction. Should there be any idea of a negotiation it would be well that I should be placed in touch with a representative of Anglo-Persian Oil Company. If on the other hand Ahmed Zogou can be fortified into putting through company's concession regardless of Italian protest, he

³ Not printed. A copy of this *aide mémoire* was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Rome despatch No. 132 of February 13, not printed.

⁴ In a telegram of February 3. See *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 705.

⁵ In a despatch of January 31, Signor Sola had reported that Mr. Eyres, in an attempt to have the Anglo-Persian oil concession put before the Assembly, was promising British support for a League of Nations loan to Albania of £3 million (see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 701).

will undoubtedly incur Italian resentment and nothing I can do here will prevent this. I will telegraph considered reply promised by Mussolini as soon as it is received.⁶

Repeated to Durazzo.

⁶ Mr. Nicolson minuted on February 12: "... Mr. Lampson and I have seen Sir John Cadman [Technical Adviser to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and formerly Director of H.M. Petroleum Executive] on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and communicated to him the substance of Sir R. Graham's conversation with M. Mussolini.

'Sir J. Cadman made the following points:—

(1) That the Anglo-Persian were the only people who knew exactly in what areas oil was to be found. They were confident that this secret was still a secret.

(2) That it might therefore be worth the risk to say to the Italians: "Very well. We agree not to trespass on your preserves. Tell us what areas you are after, and we shall not seek to include those areas in our concession".

(3) On the other hand, the Italians were probably aware that the Anglo-Persian alone knew where the oil was to be found. They would thus hesitate to commit themselves by answering such a question, and would reply "No, you tell us first where *your* areas are situated". On eliciting this information they would then say "Oh but those are precisely the areas which we always wanted ourselves".

(4) On the whole, therefore, it would be safer to adopt more precise though less conciliatory tactics, and to say: "We originally had an option for prospecting over 200,000 acres. We reduced this, in deference to you, to 100,000 acres. We are now prepared to reduce it still further to 50,000 acres. But beyond this we cannot go". In appearance, this would put the Italians even further in the wrong. But in practice the Anglo-Persian have seen enough of the country to know that the 50,000 hectares which they wish to prospect are exactly the 50,000 which they will eventually exploit, and that their generosity is not very lavish.

(4 [*sic*]) The Anglo-Persian, though prepared to do a deal with the Standard Oil, see no reason why they should do a deal with the Italians. They are quite prepared, however, to send someone out to advise Sir R. Graham, although it is not clear what "negotiations" could possibly ensue. Their view is that they were the pioneers in this business, and that there is no reason why at the eleventh hour the Italians should come in and profit by the experience, labours and capital expenditure of a British Company. If the Italians had wanted the oil, they should have come in from the first.'

No. 40

*Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 12, 9 a.m.)*

No. 31 Telegraphic [C 2063/763/90]

ROME, February 11, 1925, 8.40 p.m.

Your telegram No. 33¹ and No. 34.²

President of the Council expressed deep appreciation of your friendly action. He begged that letter to Colonel Stirling should go forward at once. He recognized full force of Colonel Stirling's arguments but at the same time earnestly deprecated recruitment of any foreign officers for

¹ No. 34.

² See *ibid.*, n. 4.

Albanian gendarmerie at present juncture. It would excite public opinion here and confirm impression that he was abandoning Albania to foreign influences. It must be remembered that new gendarmerie force was to take the place of Albanian army and he would never be able to explain how this force came to be entrusted to foreign control. There would be explosion of feeling here and he thought the idea would be even more resented at Belgrade. He urged that proposal should be discouraged as much as possible.

Repeated to Durazzo No. 15.

No. 41

*Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 13, 9 a.m.)*

No. 32 Telegraphic [C 2118/1435/90]

Confidential

ROME, February 13, 1925, 12.15 a.m.

My telegram No. 29.¹

Secretary General gave me this evening considered reply of Italian government. It is somewhat lengthy document and text² will reach you by bag on Monday.³ After giving history of Italian explorations for oil in Albania in 1913 and 1917 it follows general lines foreshadowed in my telegram under reference.¹ It insists that Italian government had no idea or intention of opposing concessions to Anglo-Persian Company but were merely intent on safeguarding Italian interests. New points are that railways at the beginning of 1924 asked for concession of a zone of 50,000 hectares for exploration and 30,000 for exploitation. Concession now demanded by Anglo-Persian Company constitutes virtual monopoly as according to Italian expert advice it would cover all profitable oil grounds in Albania. Italian government are extremely anxious to settle the question by friendly negotiations and, in view of great susceptibility of Italian public opinion on the subject, to avoid a public discussion. They consider that it should be possible to reach an agreement which, without depriving British petroleum interest of its expected profits, would protect Italian interests to a reasonable degree. In order to avoid misunderstandings and public discussions they think it indispensable that all action at Tirana should be suspended until such an agreement has been reached and they trust that instructions in this sense will be sent to British Minister Durazzo who should recommend Ahmed Zogou that ratification of Anglo-Persian concession should be temporarily adjourned. Italian government ask to be informed as soon as possible whether an agreement

¹ No. 39.

² A translation of the Italian reply of February 12 was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Rome despatch No. 132 of February 13, not printed.

³ February 16.

should be reached by discussions between respective Ministries for Foreign Affairs or whether it would not be preferable to entrust them to delegates of Anglo-Persian Oil Company and of Italian State Railways.

Secretary-General had received news this evening that Ahmed Zogou had secretly submitted Anglo-Persian concession to Commission of Albanian Chamber and was a good deal perturbed. He gave me to understand privately that if some arrangement could be reached which would save the face of Italian government and would secure a modicum of supplies of oil to State Railway, on their part whole exploitation of oil industry in any areas conceded to either party might be left entirely to Anglo-Persian Company. If company is looking to Italy as a market for its Albanian oil, idea seems worthy of exploring.⁴

Repeated to Durazzo.

⁴ Mr. Nicolson commented on February 13: 'This is somewhat specious. I don't believe that the Italians have any idea where the Anglo-Persian area is situated, and that this offer merely means that they will consent to join the Anglo-Persian in the exploitation of the area which the latter have chosen. . . .'

No. 42

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 43 Telegraphic [C 1570/763/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 13, 1925, 10.20 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 31 (of February 12th). (Albanian gendarmerie).¹

On receipt of report of Your Excellency's interview with Monsieur Mussolini I decided to make tenour of the letter to Colonel Stirling even more categorical, as explained in detail in my immediately following telegram.² Please inform Monsieur Mussolini at once, as evidence of earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to take account in the fullest measures open to them of the difficulties by which he feels himself embarrassed.

It is hardly quite correct to say that the gendarmerie is to 'take the place' of the Albanian army. The army has disappeared because a military force

¹ No. 40.

² No. 44 of February 13. This ran as follows: 'Following are changes in letter addressed to Colonel Stirling:—

'In first sentence omit the word "rather" before "serious". In next sentence substitute "much sympathy" for "warmest sympathy". Omit concluding sentence of first paragraph, beginning with "They are disposed".

'In third paragraph substitute in first sentence "any support" for "their support"; in second sentence substitute "should adopt" for "saw their way to adopt".

'In fourth paragraph, omit the passage beginning with the words "and if they" down to "to which, I have given expression above".'

is considered by the Albanian government no longer necessary. It is only in so far as the army had to some extent been employed in helping to keep order in the country that such functions of purely internal police are now transferred to the gendarmerie. The distinction is a real one.

Repeated to Durazzo No. 9.

No. 43

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Eyres (Durazzo)

No. 11 Telegraphic [C 2063/763/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 13, 1925, 9.30 p.m.*

Sir R. Graham's telegram No. 31 of February [11]th.¹

I have authorised Colonel Stirling through this channel to send to the Albanian government the message of which the text is given in my immediately following telegram.²

In forwarding that message you may inform Albanian government of substance of what has passed on the subject of the gendarmerie scheme between us and M. Mussolini³ and explain the risks which they will be incurring if they proceed at this moment with the engagement of British officers in the face of M. Mussolini's evident hostility, and whilst concessions for oil and tobacco which should be capable of satisfactory adjustment by negotiation are also subjects of angry dispute by Italian government.⁴

Repeated to Rome No. 48.

¹ No. 40.

² No. 12 of February 13. The text ran: 'Following is message from Colonel Stirling to Albanian government.

'I had made all initial arrangements for selecting suitable officers for gendarmerie when I was informed by Foreign Office here of communications which have passed with Italian government on the subject. Mr. Eyres will be able to explain to you nature of those communications and show you the text of the letter [of February 13] addressed to me by Mr. Chamberlain's direction in consequence [see Nos. 34, n. 4 and 42, n. 2].

'In his view you will be asking for trouble—which may affect others also—if you proceed at once with your plan, and he expresses the hope that you will at least wait for a more propitious occasion.

'In these circumstances I propose to return to Tirana at once in order to discuss with you the whole situation before you are definitely committed to any contracts with officers. The matter is complicated on account of question of petroleum and tobacco concessions, both disliked by Italians, being raised in an acute form at the same time. These two questions may very likely prove capable of satisfactory arrangement if not treated in atmosphere of tension with Italy over gendarmerie.

'Repeated to Rome No. 49.'

³ See Nos. 34, 39, 40, and 42.

⁴ See Nos. 31, 35, 36, 39, and 41, and 51, below.

No. 44

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 14, 9 a.m.)

No. 34 Telegraphic [C 2153/1435/90]

Urgent

ROME, February 14, 1925, 12.35 a.m.

Confidential

My telegram No. 32.¹

I received urgent request to proceed to Ministry of Foreign Affairs this evening and Secretary-General gave me personal message from President of the Council. It was to the effect that Italian chargé d'affaires at Durazzo reported that Anglo-Persian company's oil concession would come before Albanian Assembly for ratification tomorrow afternoon. Signor Mussolini earnestly begged that you would intervene to procure postponement.

I pointed out that it might be extremely difficult for you to comply. When after four years Anglo-Persian company were about to drink the cup of success it was a strong order to expect you to dash it from their lips. Moreover if company's concession covered the whole profitable area and really constituted a monopoly, then request put forward by Italian state railways for an area of 50,000 hectares was also, I suggested, attempt to secure a monopoly. Reply was that application for latter concession was only made when news was received of Anglo-Persian claim in order to secure some area should be retained for Italy. Secretary-General insisted explosion of feeling which would be produced here when ratification of Anglo-Persian concession came to public knowledge. I said that I would not fail to convey Signor Mussolini's message to you at once. Your action regarding recruitment of officers for gendarmerie² showed that you fully appreciated difficult position in which His Excellency was placed over these questions.

Repeated to Durazzo.

¹ No. 41.

² See Nos. 42 and 43.

No. 45

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 50 Telegraphic [C 2153/1435/90]

Very Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 14, 1925, 3.45 p.m.

Confidential

Your telegram No. 34 (of February 14th.¹ Anglo-Persian oil concession in Albania).

We have not received from Mr. Eyres any confirmation of report which

¹ No. 44.

has reached Italian government and have no reason to suppose that their apprehensions are justified. In any case it would be quite impossible for His Majesty's Government at the eleventh hour to prevent the Albanian government and Assembly from exercising their rights.

None the less His Majesty's Government appreciate Italian standpoint and are anxious to meet any reasonable requests which Italian government may advance. We were indeed awaiting full text of Italian communication summarized in your telegram No. 32² in the hope that this would offer some basis for compromise such as would not infringe either the essential rights of Anglo-Persian Oil Company or the liberty of Albanian government to dispose of their resources as best suits them.

If report that concession is to be ratified today proves correct then it will be important to forestall an outburst of Italian public opinion and to furnish Monsieur Mussolini with something which may save his face. Following line suggests itself.

Concession if ratified will give Anglo-Persian the right to prospect over 100,000 hectares³ and to exploit such portions of this area as they may decide upon. It is possible however that they might be ready to surrender to the Italians prospecting rights over as much as half of the 100,000 hectares which will now be acquired. Difficulty is that the Albanian government may definitely object to any area whatsoever being handed over to Italians, all the more as the whole attitude of M. Mussolini cannot but encourage the impression that motives underlying Italian move [are] much more political than purely commercial, whilst the British company's proceedings is altogether free from any such implication. The matter will thus have to be treated with greatest discretion.

For the moment therefore your best course would be urgently to tell Italian government that if their information is correct there is obviously no time for His Majesty's Government to secure postponement of ratification. But on the other hand we have every desire to meet reasonable wishes of Italian government and would wish accordingly to be informed urgently and precisely what are exact areas in Albania which Italians desire. Should these areas be found not unduly to overlap areas required by Anglo-Persian then latter might be induced to waive their rights to prospect over a certain proportion of the 100,000 hectares now to be allotted to them, and it would then be open to Italian government to

² No. 41.

³ Foreign Office telegram No. 52 of February 17 to Rome ran as follows: 'We were informed by company in perfect good faith that original concession had been progressively modified in three stages, namely from (1) the right to prospect over whole of Albania to (2) right to prospect over 200,000 hectares, and finally to (3) right to prospect over 100,000 hectares.

'Anglo-Persian Oil Company now find that the third stage of reduction was not actually reached before concession was actually ratified, so that it gives prospecting rights over 200,000 hectares.

'Please make necessary correction with Italian government in such manner as you think best.'

negotiate with Albanian government for concession to prospect the areas thereby released. Until we know however what are the areas desired by Italian interests it is obviously impossible for us to suggest any basis of compromise.

In making this communication to the Italian government you should again draw their friendly attention to the fact that Anglo-Persian Oil Company were the first in the field; that four years ago they obtained a concession covering the whole of Albania; that they have since voluntarily modified this contract, and reduced area claimed first to 200,000 and then to 100,000 hectares;³ that they have in the interval expended considerable sums in preparation and research; and that area which will now fall to them cannot possibly be regarded as a monopoly. It represents indeed only a very small proportion of the possible oil bearing regions of Albania. Thus action of Italian government in attempting by threats of violence to restrict the economic liberty and independence of Albania and prevent the legitimate commercial activity of British subjects would be quite indefensible both in law and equity, and His Majesty's Government would be unable to reconcile such a violation of British rights with friendly sentiments so often expressed by Monsieur Mussolini and which His Majesty's Government have shown themselves so anxious to reciprocate in all their action. Subject to the maintenance of these principles His Majesty's Government are anxious to assist Monsieur Mussolini in meeting any criticisms which may be made against him by his own extremists. But Monsieur Mussolini must realise that there is a point beyond which I cannot go and that my extremely conciliatory action both in case of gendarmerie officers⁴ and of oil urgently calls for reciprocal good will on his part.

Repeated to Durazzo No. 13.

⁴ See Nos. 34, 40, 42, and 43.

No. 46

*Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 15, 9.30 a.m.)*

No. 36 Telegraphic [C 2169/1435/90]

ROME, February 14, 1925, 11.25 p.m.

My telegram No. 34.¹

News of Anglo Persian Company's concession has leaked into Italian press today in the form of quotations from 'Daily Express' and 'Daily Telegraph' without any of official statement said to have been issued by Foreign Office in London. Practically all papers refer to it this evening but in reserved terms. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is much perturbed. I am

¹ No. 44.

doing my best to calm excitement and to induce Italian government to recognise facts of situation.

I told Secretary-General that it was altogether unreasonable to expect you to hold up a concession which if delayed might never be realised and this for the probable benefit of some rival enterprise such as Standard Oil Company. I pointed out that British concession was a purely business proposition while Italian claim was a political affair; moreover I questioned whether Italians possessed capital or means to exploit any concession granted which would thus remain a paper transaction. Secretary-General admitted the force of reasoning but asked whether if concession became fait accompli I could not suggest some course which would save position of government in the eyes of public opinion. I replied that proposal must obviously come from Italian government. I would of course submit to you any such proposal and it would be sure to enjoy your sympathetic consideration. Secretary-General quoted a private letter from Mr. Lloyd George² to Senator Schanzer³ of May 17th 1922⁴ as in the nature of a pledge for a special regard for Italian interests in oil matters. I have no text of this document in my archives but it did not seem to commit us much beyond Lord Curzon's note of July 22nd 1921.⁵ On the other hand some satisfactory arrangement would be preferable in our interests and those of Anglo Persian Company to arousing a strong antagonism and press polemics.

In the meantime Mr. Barnes who appears to have acted as a pioneer for Anglo Persian Company in Albania⁶ has shown me a letter under date of January 27th 1922,⁷ from company to Mr Manzi-Fé of Anglo Italian Corporation⁸ offering Italian Corp[oration] participation in any concession obtained. Barnes say 20% was proportion verbally suggested.⁹ I do not know if this offer still holds good or whether it might be renewed but it would of course make a considerable difference if it were. In such a case it might be preferable to make suggestion ourselves to Italian government rather than awaiting their asking for it.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects a press campaign on the subject next week. But it seems to me that Mussolini would have an effective reply to his critics if he could say it was not his government which scuttled from Albania abandoning field to foreign enterprise and that he had since done

² Prime Minister of Great Britain December, 1916-October, 1922.

³ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs February-October, 1922.

⁴ See Vol. XXIV, No. 1, n. 30.

⁵ To the Italian Ambassador in London. Not printed (E 8153/382/93). See Vol. XXIV, No. 1, App. II.

⁶ See Vol. XXII, Nos. 605 and 811.

⁷ Presumably this should have read '1921'. See No. 62, n. 2, below.

⁸ In 1923, this had been renamed the British-Italian Banking Corporation. Signor G. Manzi-Fé was the Managing Director, and Chairman of its auxiliary in Italy, the Banca Italo-Britannica.

⁹ Mr. Nicolson wrote in the margin: 'We can enquire about this from the Anglo-Persian. Mr. Barnes is a well-meaning but very inaccurate person.'

all he could to safeguard Italian interests by securing a certain measure of participation in British concession as well as small area for Italian exploitation.

Repeated to Durazzo.

No. 47

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 51 Telegraphic [C 2169/1435/90]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 17, 1925, 2 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 36 (of February 14th. Anglo-Persian oil concession in Albania)¹ clearly crossed my telegram No. 50 (of February 14th)² and you should carry out instructions contained in the latter. You are correct in assuming that Mr. Lloyd George's letter³ does not commit us more than Lord Curzon's Note of July 22nd, 1921;⁴ in fact it states explicitly that His Majesty's Government would be unable to prevent British firms from competing in foreign countries and would be obliged to give such firms diplomatic support. If it applies at all to present matter its application is against and not in favour of Italian contention. It clearly refers only to 'common negotiations' initiated in concert by British and Italian commercial groups. Nothing of the sort has taken place as regards oil research in Albania.

In view, however, of conciliatory offer made in my telegram No. 50,² I see no object in arguing on these lines. If Italians will state what areas they desire, we shall then endeavour if possible to meet them. But they must first specify exactly what they want.

Meanwhile you may wish to know that statement in 'Daily Express'⁵ did not emanate from the Foreign Office, nor was it in any way inspired by us: so soon as we saw it we took immediate steps to correct the false impression conveyed and to make it clear that the dispute was being discussed in the most friendly spirit by the two governments. That was the origin of the paragraph in the 'Daily Telegraph'⁶ the day following the 'Daily Express' indiscretion.

Repeated to Durazzo No. 16.

¹ No. 46.

² No. 45.

³ See No. 46, n. 4.

⁴ See *ibid.*, n. 5.

⁵ See *Daily Express*, February 13, p. 1.

⁶ See *Daily Telegraph*, February 14, p. 11.

*Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 18, 9 a.m.)*

No. 40 Telegraphic [C 2378/1435/90]

ROME, February 17, 1925, 4.20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 50¹ and Durazzo telegram No. 6.²

President of the Council is laid up with influenza and will be confined to his room for at least a week. I saw Secretary General yesterday and made communication to him in terms of your telegram under reference. While regretting that you would not secure postponement of ratification, he expressed warm appreciation of your offer and friendly spirit with which it was inspired. He sent at once for Italian experts in order to define areas which Italian government desire to obtain. I warned him that he must not run away with the idea that he would secure any area he asked for. But there might be friendly adjustment.

Secretary General said that there was a considerable margin between 200,000 hectares as originally mentioned in your proposal in my memorandum³ and in report from Italian Chargé d'Affaires Durazzo and 100,000 hectares now indicated.

In answer to last two paragraphs of your telegram, Secretary General said that explanations contained in Italian memorandum of February 12th⁴ would show that Italian government had never had any idea of opposing our contract and had only desired to prevent a fait accompli which finally excluded Italian interests from participation in oil fields.

I am much relieved to hear that Anglo-Persian concession has been ratified as United States Ambassador⁵ has been to Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enquire for full particulars on questions in which he declared Sinclair Company was interested. His action furnished me with an excellent argument to show danger to concession which renewed delay in ratification might have involved.

Repeated to Durazzo.

¹ No. 45.

² Durazzo telegram No. 12 to the Foreign Office, repeated as No. 6 to Rome, of February 16, ran as follows: 'Rome telegram No. 32 [No. 41].

'There was no truth in statement that oil concession was sent to Parliamentary Commission last week, but today Albanian Government put concession before Chamber and it was passed practically unanimously as an urgent measure.'

³ Not printed. See No. 39.

⁴ Not printed. See Nos. 39 and 41.

⁵ Mr. H. Fletcher.

No. 49

Mr Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 18, 9 a.m.)

No. 15 Telegraphic [C 2374/1435/90]

DURAZZO, February 17, 1925, 6.30 p.m.

I have seen Ahmed Bey today and he said that he would be pleased if anything could be done to save Mussolini's face provided nothing was done which might embroil him with France or America¹ who have both sent in vehement protests against oil concession.

He also told me he was going to address a note to Mussolini to the effect that he was not animated with any unfriendly feeling towards Italy; that it was on the contrary his earnest desire to content her in any way possible and that with the exception of oil concession which Albanian government was bound in honour to put before Parliament he was ready to consider any contracts they might apply for in most friendly spirit.

Repeated to Rome No. 7.

¹ See *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, pp. 493-7.

No. 50

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 18, 9 a.m.)

No. 41 Telegraphic [C 2376/1435/90]

ROME, February 17, 1925, 9.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 40.¹

Italian government heard this morning of ratification of Anglo-Persian concession² which their chargé d'affaires reported as having taken place 'owing to strong pressure exercised by His Majesty's Minister'.³ They are annoyed but seem disposed to accept situation.

Italian government find some difficulty in defining areas which they desire without having any idea as to areas to be allotted to Anglo-Persian company. They suggest that negotiations should be opened at once either by an Italian oil expert being sent to London or a representative of Anglo-Persian company coming here. But as we asked for an immediate definition Italians would propose as a rough suggestion that river Skumbi should form dividing line and that while Anglo-Persian company should take any areas north of that river, those south of it should be left to

¹ No. 48.

² See *ibid.*, n. 2.

³ See No. 55, n. 6, below.

Italians. Secretary General emphasized that this was merely a rough suggestion subject to modification by agreement. If it can be accepted question ends so far as Italians are concerned. If not the sooner an agreement is reached the better as United States Ambassador has asked for an urgent interview on the question with Secretary General this evening, and may try to stir up trouble. Secretary General has promised me to maintain attitude of extreme reserve.

Italian government do not desire to participate in Anglo-Persian concession but to have a concession of their own. This is of course purely for political effect. My impression is that if Anglo-Persian company play their cards properly they should not in the end have much difficulty in securing practical working of Italian zone as well as their own.

Repeated to Durazzo.

No. 51

Memorandum by Mr. Nicolson on Italy, Great Britain and Albania

[C 2489/1435/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 17, 1925*

We understand that the Italian Ambassador¹ is to see the Secretary of State this afternoon.² He will doubtless raise the Albanian question. It may therefore be of some use to summarise the main questions as they stand today.

On becoming Dictator of Albania, Ahmet Bey Zoghu, who bears the Italians a grudge for having turned him out last year, offered us three important openings in Albania:—

- (1) A tobacco concession.³
- (2) The appointment of gendarmerie officers.⁴
- (3) An oil concession.⁵

1. The tobacco concession consists as far as we know in the offer to Cope Brothers, a reputable British firm, of the sole right to purchase in advance the tobacco crop of Albania. In all other respects the purchase and sale of tobacco is to remain free. The Albanian Government realise that if the Albanian peasant is allowed to sell his crop in advance to foreign speculators, he will soon be ruined. They thus want a serious British firm to have the sole right to this speculation and thereby to assure themselves that it will be carried out fairly and intelligently. Incidentally, also, the

¹ Marquis Torretta.

² See n. 10, below. For Marquis Torretta's account of this meeting, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 724.

³ Reported in Durazzo telegram No. 10 of February 9, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁴ See No. 34.

⁵ See No. 31.

establishment of a well-run tobacco industry would bring them the immediate revenue of which they stand in such dire need.

This offer has been passed on to Mess[er]s Cope Brothers who are considering it. It is quite possible that they will not think it worth their while to take up the concession. But if they do, then there will be another howl of 'monopoly' from the Italian press.

At present, so far as we know, the Italians have not heard of this concession. It is unlikely, therefore, that Marchese Torretta will mention it. Nor, I submit, are we in any sense bound to call his attention to a matter which may be still-borne.

2. The Gendarmerie.

On this matter we have been more than frank with the Italian Government, and can draw their attention to the loyalty and consideration with which we have behaved.

We have told the Italians exactly what we have said to Colonel Stirling. The latter has received our letter⁶ and has gone back with it to Albania. I have already fully informed Mar[chese] della Torretta.

The text of the more important communications on the subject will be found under flags A. B. and C. on the annexed file of telegrams.⁷

3. Anglo-Persian Oil Concession.

The main points are as follows:—

(1) Four years ago the Anglo-Persian obtained a contract giving them the right to prospect for oil over the whole surface of Albania.

(2) In view of French, Italian and American protests, the Anglo-Persian agreed to modify this contract and to reduce the area of their prospecting concession to 200,000 hectares.

(3) We were recently told by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that this area had a third time been reduced to 100,000 hectares. We now learn that this was a mistake on their part, and that their contract still provides for prospecting rights over 200,000, and not 100,000, hectares.

(4) The Italians object to this concession. They do not pretend that the Anglo-Persian are not legally in the right, or that from the commercial point of view their concession can be challenged. What they claim, apparently, is that politically Italy has a prior interest in Albania and that in friendship to Italy we must give her share in so important a concession.

(5) Their appeal is thus one *ad misericordiam*. It is true that they have mentioned the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference of Nov[ember] 1921⁸ (Flag D). But this very decision pledges Italy to respect the economic independence of Albania: if Albania is to be prevented from disposing of her oil resources as she pleases,—then her economic

⁶ See Nos. 34, n. 4 and 42, n. 2.

⁸ See No. 31, n. 6.

⁷ Presumably Nos. 34, 41, and 42.

independence is being violated. The 1921 decision tells, therefore, against, and not in favour of the Italian contention.

What we are prepared to do.

(1) The concession was ratified yesterday by the Albanian Assembly.⁹

(2) The Anglo-Persian have thus the undisputed right to prospect over 200,000 hectares and to chose 50,000 hectares out of that total for exploitation.

(3) As a matter of fact, however, the Anglo-Persian do not now want to prospect over more than 50,000 hectares, and are quite ready to abandon their rights over the remaining 150,000 hectares.

(4) Moreover, the Anglo-Persian are already committed to give the Anglo-Italian Corporation some share in the eventual exploitation of the areas which they may take up.

The Anglo-Persian are therefore ready:—

(1) To take up only a quarter of their prospecting rights.

(2) To give the Anglo-Italian Corporation a share of their exploitation rights.

We have thus many cards in our hand.

Whether or no it would be good policy to mention these eventual concessions at this stage is another matter.

Two points must be remembered:—

(1) That we have asked the Italians to state exactly what areas they require. We suspect that they do not know what are the best areas, and they would prefer to wait and see what the Anglo-Persian are taking up before stating what they themselves desire.

(2) We must not forget the Albanian Government. After all, it is *their* territory which is in question: it may well be that they would not at all relish our giving over to the Italians 150,000 of our 200,000 hectares.

I submit, therefore, that for the moment Marchese Toretta should be told:—

(1) That the Anglo-Persian have now obtained their 200,000 hectares.

(2) That we do not wish to create an incident out of this matter and are prepared to urge the Anglo-Persian to abandon a large proportion of the area thus acquired.

(3) That we must first know, however, exactly what are the areas desired by the Italians, and that we cannot keep our proposal open indefinitely.

And that he should not for the moment be told, either what proportion which the Anglo-Persian are prepared to surrender, or the fact that they may let in the Anglo-Italian Corporation to a share in the proportion they retain. Nor need he be told anything about the Tobacco concession.¹⁰

HAROLD NICOLSON

⁹ See No. 48, n. 2.

¹⁰ In Foreign Office despatch No. 216 to Rome of February 17, Mr Chamberlain stated:

'The Italian Ambassador came to see me this afternoon about Albania. He asked that I should send instructions to Mr. Eyres to advise the Albanian Government to postpone the

consideration of the Anglo-Persian Concession by the Assembly until there had been time for a further exchange of views between the Italian and British Governments and for a friendly solution to be reached. I told his Excellency that I had just received information that the concession had been passed by the Assembly yesterday, and that it gave the right to the Anglo-Persian to prospect for an area of 200,000 hectares, which had not, as I previously supposed, been already reduced to 100,000 hectares. It was therefore too late for me to take the step which he asked, but I was ready to continue the search for a solution satisfactory to both parties in the same spirit of friendship which has actuated me both in this question and in the question of the gendarmerie. But the next stage must be that the Italian Government should answer the question which I had addressed to Rome, and state precisely what was the area which they desired to see reserved for Italian exploration. It might be that the Italian State railways and the Anglo-Persian company contemplated quite different areas, and in that case no difficulty would arise.

"The Ambassador said that he was unable to give me this information, but he professed to know that the areas coveted by the two parties did at any rate overlap. He stated that oil was local, and that though the Anglo-Persian Concession was not in terms a monopoly, yet in fact it constituted one, since the company had chosen the only land in which oil existed. I replied that I did not know precisely what land the Anglo-Persian had selected, except that they had included the part which had been already exploited by the Italians. As to what he said of a practical monopoly, I had heard that the experts of the Anglo-Persian were themselves divided in opinion as to which were the best lands, and that some at any rate among them thought that the richest area was outside the district which they contemplated taking.

"The Ambassador continued to dwell on the susceptibility of Italian opinion and the difficulties created by it for the Italian Government. He assured me that Signor Mussolini desired to treat the matter as between friends and to prevent its affecting our friendship.

"I pointed out to the Ambassador that he could not expect me to do anything to annul or invalidate the concession, and that both in the matter of the gendarmerie and in this matter of the oil concession I might be exposing myself to very considerable criticism when my action became known. I would, however, continue to seek a friendly solution, but I repeated that the first essential was that the Italian Government should state exactly what area they claimed."

No. 52

Mr. Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 2)

No. 29 [C 2985/763/90]

Confidential

DURAZZO, February 17, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I read to the President the letter which you had addressed to Colonel Stirling on the subject of the enlistment of ex-officers for the Albanian Gendarmerie.¹ I also conveyed to him Colonel Stirling's own telegram.²

2. Ahmed Bey was much discouraged, not so much by the contents of your letter as by the effect on Colonel Stirling as evidenced by his

¹ See Nos. 34, n. 4 and 42, n. 2.

² See No. 43, n. 2.

expressed desire to return to Albania with his mission left unfulfilled. He said he was quite prepared for obstruction on the part of Italy whose policy it was to prevent the rehabilitation of Albania, but he had hoped better things from His Majesty's Government from whom he had not asked support but only benevolent neutrality. He was convinced that there was no rational alternative to his plan, as Albanians were kittle cattle to deal with and Englishmen alone had the requisite racial characteristics.

3. I counselled moderation and urged that it was sometimes desirable not to insist on undoubted rights when such insistence was liable to excite unduly public feeling in a neighbouring country and I suggested that he would do well to defer for at least a short period of time the execution of his plan. Though he was inclined to demur on the ground that his need for an efficient Gendarmerie was urgent, he eventually agreed to this and I accordingly despatched a reply in this sense to Colonel Stirling.

4. I may observe that the idea of bringing British officers to Albania originated solely with Ahmed Bey. He never mentioned the subject to me, and I only heard of it indirectly.

5. In conversation the Italian Minister was inclined to adopt a benevolent attitude towards this scheme, partly because he had got it into his head that Ahmed Bey meant to employ Serbian officers; he therefore rather welcomed the idea of Colonel Stirling, (with regard to whom he made some very complimentary remarks) being supported by officers of his own nationality.

6. I enquired of the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires³ whether his Government had expressed any opinion on the matter and he replied that he had done nothing but report the fact. He appeared to have taken little interest in the matter and said that he had no indication of the line his Government would take but so far as he personally was concerned he saw no reason to make any objection and he thought his Government would welcome a scheme which would make for increased security on the frontiers. He would write to his Government supporting this point of view.

7. I am sending copy of this Despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.⁴

I have, etc.,
H. C. A. EYRES

³ M. A. Cincar-Marcović.

⁴ In a minute of April 2, Mr. Smith commented: '... Since the receipt of Mr. Eyres' despatch on March 2nd we have heard no more of the matter, and we have been careful not to refer to it in any way, as it was thought better that if any question should be raised by the Italians we should be in a position to say that we had loyally carried out our undertakings and had washed our hands of the whole affair. At the same time we gather from outside sources that the nine British officers whom Colonel Stirling wished to recruit are actually already in Albania, but as no question has so far arisen, it is submitted that no good purpose would be served by raising the matter afresh in any form.'

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir C. Barclay (Budapest)

*No. 55 [C 2430/261/21]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 18, 1925*

Sir,

Baron Rubido-Zichy¹ paid me his first visit this afternoon.

He expressed his desire to do anything in his power during his mission in London to promote friendly agreement between our Governments. I responded in suitable terms, and said that there was only one matter which caused me a little trouble. This was the failure of the Hungarian Government to carry out the requirements of the Military Control Commission and the rather obstructive attitude that was at times adopted by them.² I had not intended to speak to him on this subject and did not wish to press the matter at our first meeting, but I hoped that the Hungarian Government would see that the greater the measure of disarmament they had already accomplished, the less reason was there for resisting what remained to be done and the less advantage could they find in such resistance. He would have observed that the President of the Council of the League of Nations had appointed an English officer³ as chairman of the Control Commission, which was eventually to function under the League,⁴ and, though that officer in that capacity would be the servant of the League and not of His Majesty's Government, I was anxious that his task should be as light and the occasions for his intervention as few as possible, and I should, therefore, particularly like to see the way cleared of outstanding difficulties.

The Minister responded in a similar spirit, but took occasion to dwell upon the difficulties of the Hungarian Government and the rather acrimonious character of the correspondence occasionally exchanged with them.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ The newly-appointed Hungarian Minister in London.

² See Nos. 8, 12, 13, and 29.

³ Major-General W. Kirke.

⁴ See No. 10, n. 2.

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir A. Young (Belgrade)

No. 94 [C 2451/2451/92]

Secret

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 18, 1925

Sir,

I have received from a highly confidential but reliable source¹ information to the effect that the Czechoslovak Minister in Belgrade² reported to his Government, in a despatch of the 7th January last, that during the latter part of 1924, those responsible for Yugoslav policy began to regard with scepticism the utility of the continued existence of the Little Entente, and that they had decided henceforward to concentrate entirely on the Balkans making the central European situation a secondary consideration.

2. The Czechoslovak Minister is inclined to believe that the reason for this change of policy on the part of the Yugoslav Government is the refusal of the Czechoslovak Government to enter with them into an anti-Soviet combination. Moreover, from a recent despatch sent to Rome by General Bodrero, the Italian Minister in Belgrade, it has been possible, according to the Czechoslovak Minister, to establish a policy of double dealing in the Balkans on the part of Italy. On the one hand, in anticipation of future conflicts with Greece, Italy is making every effort to force Yugoslavia to direct her attention on Salonica, while, on the other hand and with a view to complicating the Balkan situation in her own interests, she is recommending Greece to take all precautionary measures to resist Yugoslav Imperialism.

3. Quoting from the same despatch Czechoslovak Minister states that General Bodrero claimed to have succeeded in his task and declared that in the near future Yugoslavia would undoubtedly develop a 'Vardar' policy³ towards the Aegean. It is also affirmed that during General Bodrero's last conversation with M. Nincic he insistently advised him to reject the scheme for the reestablishment of an understanding with Greece and energetically supported the idea of a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. He also mentions a project for the formation of a Balkan group consisting of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Roumania, in which possibly Albania might also join. The Czechoslovak Minister is of the opinion that the advice given by General Bodrero has placed Yugoslavia in an awkward situation as M. Nincic can neither reopen negotiations with Greece nor work openly for a rapprochement with Bulgaria, a country towards which Serbian public opinion is at present not favourable.

4. As it is known that the Czechoslovak Minister at Belgrade has

¹ An S.I.S Report of February 6.

² M. J. Seba.

³ i.e. expansion to the Gulf of Salonika into which flowed the River Vardar (known in Greece as the Axiós River). See No. 15.

particularly good sources of information at his disposal, I am disposed to attach a considerable amount of importance to this despatch which has been sent to his Government, and I therefore request that you will continue to watch the situation carefully and report any developments to me.

I am, etc.,
[AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN]

No. 55

Mr. Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 2)

*No. 30 [C 2986/1435/90]**

Confidential

DURAZZO, February 18, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to state that I conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of the President, the suggestions which you sent me by telegram¹ as to the reply that they should make to the Italian verbal representations² on the subject of the oil concession. The Italian message was peril[lo]usly near to a threat of war. I also informed them of the tenor of the remonstrances which you had instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome to address to Signor Mussolini.³

2. Ahmed Bey answered that he was hardly able to appreciate the force of diplomatic phraseology and that what he really wanted was a promise that Albania would be protected from attack. I told him that it was quite impossible that he could expect anything further from His Majesty's Government at that stage of the proceedings, and that the language which has been used was as strong as any Government could possibly address to a friendly nation. He expressed his thanks and asked me to convey them to His Majesty's Government. He had already replied verbally in the sense of the suggestions above mentioned to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires and he had added various other arguments. He did not think it well to reply in writing, as Signor Sola would not put anything in writing himself.

3. He then went on to say that he could not possibly be deflected from the course he had marked out for himself with regard to the measures which he considered indispensable for the recuperation of the country. If he allowed himself to be intimidated he might as well give up all hope of success and retire from the political field. At the same time he quite saw the necessity of refraining from antagonising his neighbours, and he desired to do everything possible to soothe their *amour-propre*, subject to the proviso that he must be allowed a free hand to do what he thought right in his own country. He earnestly deprecated the idea that he had

¹ No. 35.

² See No. 31.

³ See Nos. 36 and 45.

flouted Italy; in fact, the contrary was the case. He had gone out of his way to allay any apprehensions that might have been raised in that quarter by his supposed leaning towards Jugoslavia. I myself can corroborate this statement, but I had observed that he had not succeeded in calming the unfounded suspicions of the Italian Legation.

4. Finally he remarked that the keystone of the arch of his building was the reorganisation of the gendarmerie,⁴ and the granting not only of the oil concession but of others also if capitalists would come forward. As for Italy, she would never come to the scratch; there was always some reason why their capitalists found themselves obliged to refrain from risking their money in Albania at the last moment. It was his intention to proceed with the oil concession and to expedite its passage through the Assembly at the earliest opportunity.

5. Various obstacles prevented this consummation till the 16th instant, when the concession was placed on the order of the day,⁵ and as the Parliamentary Commission of the previous Chamber had already made its report the concession was passed *en bloc* as an emergency measure with five dissentients.⁶

6. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, etc.,
H. C. A. EYRES

⁴ See No. 34.

⁵ See No. 48, n. 2.

⁶ In a letter of February 18 to Mr. Lampson Mr. Eyres reported with regard to the ratification of the oil concession: '... I was not clear in my mind at first as to what line H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] was taking in the affair. It undoubtedly lay with me whether it was to be passed or not, for Ahmed Bey had little or no support from the cowardly elements that surround him, who were thinking purely of future possibilities which might affect their own personal interests. If I encouraged him, all would go well for the concession, but how about Albania itself? Mussolini is capable of anything.

'I felt the responsibility very strongly but after a period of hesitation, I came to the conclusion that in the absence of definite instructions to the contrary, I must stick to my plain duty which is to use my best endeavours for the commercial interests of British subjects. Ahmed only wanted my support and when I told him to go ahead, he immediately put the concession into Parliament. ...'

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 59 Telegraphic [C 2376/1435/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 19, 1925, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 41 (of February 17th Anglo-Persian Oil Concession).¹

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires has been misinformed and has mislead his Government. Mr. Eyres put no pressure on the Albanian Government.²

Italian proposal is so preposterous that I can only suppose Senator Contarini is ignorant of essential facts of the case.

In the first place he has misunderstood nature of our enquiry. In note enclosed in your despatch No. 132 (of February 13th)³ Italian Government informed us that they had asked Albanian Government for exploration zone of 50,000 hectares and exploitation zone of 30,000 hectares. We replied that if they would tell us 'urgently and precisely' where this zone was situated we should see what could be done to meet them. To this enquiry they reply by seeking to exclude Anglo-Persian Oil Company from half of Albania. Senator Contarini should be made to understand that such a rejoinder to my very friendly offer does not encourage me to proceed any further, and that unless I receive shortly some clearly defined statement of what are the 50,000 hectares desired by Italians I shall reluctantly be compelled to assume that latter do not seriously desire an amicable arrangement.

In the second place Italians appear to assume that direct negotiations will be opened with them by Anglo-Persian as to the proportion of the 200,000 hectares which latter might be prepared to surrender. Clearly any such procedure is impossible. A British Company cannot in this way dispose of the territory and rights of a foreign country. All Anglo-Persian could do would be to notify Albanian Government that they did not propose to take up a certain proportion of their total concession and thus release that proportion for foreign enterprise. It is precisely because we wish to know what areas exactly Italians want us thus to surrender that our former enquiry was addressed to them.

Italian Government should realise that these 200,000 hectares are now legally allotted for exploration to a British Company, and that although I should be prepared to urge that Company to abandon a proportion of their acquired rights in order to please Monsieur Mussolini, yet I must refuse even to entertain suggestions so ill-conceived and so grasping as those disclosed in your telegram.

Repeated to Durazzo No. 21.

¹ No. 50.

² Cf. No. 55, n. 6.

³ Not printed. See, however, No. 41.

Mr. Lampson to Mr. Chilton¹ (Washington)

[C 2373/1435/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 19, 1925*

Dear Chilton,

We are sending you by this bag a despatch² on the whole question of oil in Albania. The Secretary of State wished you to know the position so that the Ambassador might be in a position to deal at once with any allegations which the State Department might make on information received by them from Grant-Smith, the American Minister at Durazzo.

In connection with that despatch, I send you herewith a private letter addressed to me by Eyres,³ in which he describes the very peculiar views and attitude of the said Grant-Smith.

So extraordinary are these, that, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, I got Atherton⁴ of the American Embassy to come and see me this morning and let him read Eyres' letter. I began by saying that Grant-Smith had been in years gone by a friend of mine when he was here in London,⁵ that I had not seen him for a very long time, but that from all we heard he must have changed considerably from the days when he was here. Atherton, before reading Eyres' letter, said—curiously enough—that it was well known in the State Department that Grant-Smith was suffering from the hallucination of persecution. I said that I was glad he had made that remark because it fitted in exactly with what Eyres told me in his letter. Atherton then read the letter and said that he was really not surprised at its contents. He would take due note of what was said and would write at once to the State Department. He suggested that I should send you a copy of the letter so that if Dulles⁶ of the State Department,

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington.

² Foreign Office despatch No. 275 of February 20 which transmitted a copy of Durazzo despatch No. 22 of February 7, not printed, which reported that Mr. Grant-Smith had been recalled.

³ Of February 8. Mr. Eyres had stated: '... He [Mr. Grant-Smith] really seems to me to have gone off his head. The final coup has been the intention of the Albanian Government to carry the oil concession through the Chamber.

'He has always been most credulous of slanderous stories brought to him by his entourage. We are black sheep of the deepest dye in his eyes and Parr particularly, for some unknown reason, is the object of his detestation. I have always outwardly maintained very friendly relations with him and have tried to chaff him out of belief in the silly fables he accepts as gospel.

'The money we have expended in Albania, the threats we have applied to the Albanian Government, the promises of support and the assistance we have given to Ahmed Bey to enable him to return—all these things purely with a view to obtaining the oil concession,—are according to him indisputable facts. ...'

⁴ First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in London.

⁵ He had been a Third Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in London 1906–8.

⁶ Mr. A. W. Dulles was Head of the Near East Section of the State Department.

who dealt with the subject, asked you to let him see it, you would be in a position to do so. I said that I would see the letter went to you by tomorrow's bag.

So there it is. I told Atherton that it seemed to me ridiculous that in out-of-the-way places like Albania the British and American Ministers should be on the terms which Eyres' letter disclosed. I knew how well he (Atherton) and our Legation at Athens had cooperated.⁷ That is the way our people in Albania ought to work also. He said he quite agreed. When we and America had to fight, London and Washington were the places to do so, not in such wild parts of the world as Albania. He left me in no doubt that Grant-Smith's failings are well known in Washington and that his reports about British intrigues and the like are not likely to be taken too seriously by the American government.

Yours ever,
MILES W. LAMPSON

⁷ Mr. Atherton had been First Secretary at Athens 1923-4.

No. 58

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 21, 9 a.m.)

No. 50 Telegraphic [C 2560/1435/90]

Confidential

ROME, February 21, 1925, 2.30 a.m.

Your telegram No. 59.¹

Italian chargé d'affaires reported that ratification which was to have been delayed till 18th was pushed through on the 16th owing to strong pressure of British minister and that Ahmed had informed him to that effect.² I have pointed out that facts were not as stated.

I am not surprised that you should consider Italian proposal preposterous nor I think was Senator Contarini but as it emanated from President of the Council it had to be accorded a certain degree of consideration in view of His Excellency's present state of mind. This is one of much excitement and irascibility which his illness³ does nothing to mitigate. He regards ratification as in the nature of a direct affront to Italy. He has

¹ No. 56.

² See No. 55, n. 6. In Durazzo telegram No. 19 of February 25, Mr. Eyres reported: 'I enquired of Ahmed Bey yesterday if he had informed Italian chargé d'affaires that he had passed oil concession owing to strong pressure supplied by myself. He indignantly denied it, saying he had not seen Italian chargé d'affaires for a fortnight and had sent him no communication. I am sure that he was speaking the truth but possibly Minister for Foreign Affairs may have said something of the sort.'

³ See No. 48.

been hesitating whether to continue negotiations when even if Anglo-Persian Company are prepared to surrender a zone there is no certainty that Italian government will obtain it or whether it would not be better, in order to disarm criticism and, from his own political point of view, to throw in his lot with Americans and contest validity of Anglo-Persian concession making a bid for popular support. If he let loose press the whole country could be worked up in a week as in Corfu affair⁴ and this might undoubtedly help him from point of view of internal situation. It is unfortunate that I am unable to see His Excellency personally as exchange of messages backwards and forwards through third person is unsatisfactory.

Secretary-General this morning urged that suggestion of Skumbi River line⁵ had been extremely indefinite and was only due to the uncertainty of Italian government's request for areas claimed by Anglo-Persian Company. He had not desired negotiations with Anglo-Persian but merely a preliminary exchange of views as to what area would be most convenient and suitable for Italian claim. It was obvious that if Italians claimed a district in centre of Anglo-Persian concession or one which Company particularly valued whole or greater part of that claim might be turned down. This, in Mussolini's present frame of mind, meant a rupture of negotiations and open antagonism. He added privately that Italian experts at their last meeting objected to . . .⁶ area they wanted on plea that Anglo-Persian Company would take advantage of knowledge thus supplied in order to retain it. He admitted that idea was ridiculous but it shows existing state of mind here.

Finally and not without difficulty I induced Senator Contarini to decide to re-summon experts to Ministry this afternoon and to prepare a map of area Italians desire to claim. This was to be submitted to Mussolini and if approved by him given to me in time for messenger this evening. It has reached me just in time.⁷

Repeated to Durazzo.

⁴ Of 1923, when the Greek island of Corfu had been bombarded and occupied in retaliation for the murder on Greek territory of the Italian President of the Albanian Boundary Commission and his staff. See Vol. XXIV, Chap. IV.

⁵ See No. 50.

⁶ The text is here uncertain.

⁷ The map was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Rome despatch No. 156 of February 20, not printed.

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 22, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 52 Telegraphic [C 2561/1435/90]

ROME, February 21, 1925, 10.20 p.m.

Secretary General sent for me urgently this afternoon and made following communication.

Italian government were much disturbed and also astonished at telegram¹ which they received from Italian Ambassador in London to the effect that you had considered a representation made by him² as offensive and had demanded its withdrawal. Marquis Della Torretta had not reported terms in which his communication had been made.³ They could not however imagine how such a situation could have arisen and thought that there must be some misunderstanding. Secretary General asked me at risk of repetition to make Italian position perfectly clear to you.

Italian government were as always animated by most friendly feeling towards His Majesty's Government and their whole action was inspired by desire to avoid any prejudice to existing relations. They had never entertained any objection whatever to a British oil concession in Albania; he would go further and say that on the contrary they would prefer to see a British rather than any other foreign enterprise there. But in view of special Italian interests in Albania for geographical and other reasons no Italian government which allowed such a concession to pass without obtaining some corresponding concession for Italy could hope to survive inevitable explosion of public feeling. Italian government had never protested either at Durazzo or in London against Anglo Persian concession but only as regards haste with which it had been ratified.⁴ They had desired to obtain some agreement with us before matter could enter field of public discussion in which case they could not avoid being forced into an attitude of strong antagonism. Their Chargé d'Affaires at Durazzo had been informed by Mufid on behalf of Ahmed Zougou that ratification was hurried through owing to pressure by British Minister. You stated this was not the case and they were therefore ready to accept such a statement although it had seemed not unnatural that Mr. Eyres would have given his support to the concession.⁵ No imputation of duplicity had ever been made against His Majesty's Government in this or in any other connection and they could not imagine how such an idea arose. But they did consider haste used in obtaining ratification showed a 'want of proper consideration for Italian interests' and Marquis Torretta had been instructed to deliver his representation in this sense. If no agreement between our two

¹ Of February 21, received in Rome at 10 a.m. For the text, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 730.

² On February 19. See *ibid.*, No. 728.

⁴ See Nos. 48, n. 2 and 55.

³ See No. 61, below.

⁵ See No. 55, n. 6.

governments could be reached Italian public feeling would compel the government to adopt attitude of strong opposition to concession which was in the opinion of all their experts a virtual monopoly and could not in spite of any contrary assurances on our part be considered by them in any other light. They thought that a clear statement of their position was a frank and friendly act calculated to avoid future misunderstandings. They might on the contrary have responded to American and other invitations to adopt an immediate attitude of antagonism but this they desired if possible to avoid and whole scope and object of their action was conceived in such a sense.

Secretary General asked me whether I could make any further suggestion calculated to remove misunderstanding in London. I replied that my personal recommendation would be that as you had requested Italian Ambassador to repeat his communication in writing he should be authorised to do so following precisely the instructions given to him. If you then considered communication offensive you would no doubt insist upon its withdrawal but if not it would be apparent that there might have been some misunderstanding in verbal terms used.

As regards Senator Contarini's communication I must say that while atmosphere here is very agitated and unreasonable all communications made to me have been in moderate and friendly terms. No insinuation of duplicity on the part of His Majesty's Government has even been hinted at. Forecast of Italian opposition failing agreement has not been made in form of menace but as a very undesirable stage of the question which should at all costs be avoided.⁶

" Mr. Chamberlain replied (Foreign Office telegram No. 70 of March 6): 'I accept Italian government's assurances tendered through you and have informed Italian Ambassador that incident may now be considered as closed.'

No. 60

*Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 23, 9 p.m.)*

No. 54 Telegraphic [C 2630/1435/90]

ROME, February 23, 1925, 4.15 p.m.

My despatch No. 156.¹

Italian map and statement of areas desired reached me so late that I could not even look at them before sending them off. But duplicates have now been sent me by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it seems probable that Italian claims for various districts in southern Albania will be

¹ Not printed. See No. 58, n. 7.

considered just as objectionable as was suggestion of Skumbi River line.² I have at my disposal no information at all on the subject of Albanian oil areas and am therefore unable to offer any recommendation to Italian government as to whether or not any particular claim on their part is open to objection. I recognise the full force of what you say in your telegram No. 59³ as to the impossibility of negotiations for disposal of Albanian territory and right of oil between Italian government and Anglo-Persian company. On the other hand to ask Italians to state their claims without any qualifications constitutes, when their oriental habit of mind in questions of bargain is taken into account, almost an encouragement to open their mouths wide. I do not therefore think Italian claims now submitted should be regarded too literally. Perhaps a firm offer to be taken or left could be made to them. It is just possible that an exchange of views between some expert who knows Anglo-Persian company's wishes and intentions and Italian oil experts might show that Italians could be satisfied without prejudice to interests of company.⁴

² See No. 50.

³ No. 56.

⁴ In an unnumbered telegram of February 21, Sir R. Graham had stated: 'I am somewhat concerned at tone of your telegram No. 59 [No. 56] and hope you will not imagine that I am not stating British point of view with necessary force and precision. But situation requires delicate handling. There is no question as to intense excitement and irritation here over this affair and Mussolini is quite capable of some foolish explosion. However unreasonably, Italians regard Albania as one of their preserves and ourselves in the light of poachers. Up to present government is sitting on the press and opposition organs are not allowed to make any comment at all but the moment this hold were relaxed there would be a violent campaign very detrimental to Anglo-Italian relations. If we cannot come to terms Italians will join with United States and will contest validity of concession on the grounds of open-door, virtual monopoly and previous verbal promises from Albania. Such action would no doubt be futile but might cause trouble and at any rate unpleasantness of mutual feeling. This seems a pity when relations since your visit have been uniformly good and there is useful co-operation in various more important fields. I am in close touch with secretary-general and see him once or twice every day but find even him unreasonable enough on this subject though he is doing what he can to keep Mussolini on the rails and is resisting invitations to co-operate from United States Ambassador.'

No. 61

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 62 Telegraphic [C 2561/1435/90]

ROME, February 23, 1925, 10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 52 (of February 21st: Anglo-Persian concession in Albania)¹ reached me at the very moment that I was about to despatch to you a full account of this extremely vexatious and entirely unnecessary

¹ No. 59.

incident. And before going further it is necessary that I should place you in full possession of the facts.

The following is a general account of what took place.

On February 19th the Italian Ambassador, with some unwillingness but obeying the instructions of M. Mussolini, reiterated in spite of his own protest against them, made to Mr. Lampson verbal representations of a most unusual nature.² In these we were accused of having practised bad faith towards the Italian government and of having forcibly constrained the Albanian government to grant us the concession. These allegations Mr. Lampson categorically denied. The following day Sir E. Crowe by my direction summoned M. Torretta:³ the latter on being asked on what M. Mussolini based such preposterous suggestions did not deny that they had been made and admitted somewhat shamefacedly that the information came from the Italian chargé d'affaires at Durazzo, a very junior official.

As regards substance of his communication M. Torretta was told to inform M. Mussolini categorically that his information in every respect was false.

As regards the form of his communication he was asked to tell his government that these allegations against the honour and the good faith of His Majesty's Government must be definitely withdrawn. As a result of my personal conversation with M. Mussolini whilst in Rome,⁴ I had formed the opinion that the Italian Prime Minister sincerely desired to promote the most amicable relations with Great Britain and favoured the policy of cordial and loyal co-operation in matters in which our two countries were both interested. It was because this attitude corresponded exactly with my own wishes and hopes that I had in all the difficult questions which had recently arisen in Albania shown a consideration for M. Mussolini's position and for Italian susceptibilities and interests, which had gone beyond anything that he had a right to ask or even to expect of the British government. I was correspondingly astonished and shocked at meeting with so little reciprocity of feeling or conduct on M. Mussolini's part. M. Mussolini must realise that it takes two parties to make a real friendship. I had done my share and had no doubt that M. Mussolini would give full weight to the serious representation which I felt impelled to address to him. At a moment when we had manifested our goodwill by urging upon Parliament the approval of the Jubaland Convention⁵ and when we were considering concessions to Italy in the matter of interallied

² A copy of Mr. Lampson's record of the conversation of February 19 was transmitted to Rome in Foreign Office despatch No. 233 of February 23, not printed. For Marquis Torretta's record of the conversation, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 728.

³ A copy of Sir E. Crowe's record of the conversation of February 20 was transmitted to Rome in Foreign Office despatch No. 234 of February 23, not printed. For Marquis Torretta's record of the conversation, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 730.

⁴ See No. 28, n. 4.

⁵ The Anglo-Italian Treaty (East African Territories) of July 15, 1924, was given its third reading in the House of Commons on February 19 (see *180H.C. Deb.* 5 s. cols. 1339-56). For the text of the treaty, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 119, pp. 433-7. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 157.

debts⁶ it appeared to be particularly inopportune for M. Mussolini to hurl offensive charges at our head.

The Ambassador, who was plainly embarrassed, tried by going once more over the whole ground of the Albanian oil concession to show that M. Mussolini had good grounds for being offended at the action ascribed to His Majesty's Government. It was explained to him that everything had been said that could be said on this subject. He should clearly realise that if anyone had cause to be offended it was His Majesty's Government and not M. Mussolini. We had treated him with the utmost consideration and goodwill. He rewarded us by undignified abuse. We were confident that he would himself come to see that his message was not merely unjustified but such as should in no case be addressed to the government of my country, and that he would therefore readily agree to withdraw what he had instructed Marchese Torretta to say, possibly under the influence of momentary irritation.

The Italian Ambassador stated that he must absolutely refuse to convey such a reply to Monsieur Mussolini and that our protest must be communicated to the latter through Your Excellency. He would be prepared, however, to record the gist of the conversation, putting it in the most friendly light. It was pointed out to him that if this were the view he took of his functions as Italian Ambassador in London there appeared little purpose in our discussing with him at the Foreign Office questions at issue between our two governments, and that although we readily acknowledged his good intentions in wishing to make our reply appear as palatable as possible to his Chief, yet in this matter it was important that the actual sentiments entertained by His Majesty's Government should be frankly and accurately stated to M. Mussolini and that the latter should not be misled by an account of our reply which did not actually reflect our sentiments.

Records of the two conversations with him, i.e. on February 19th and February 20th, go to you by bag tonight.

It now appears from your telegram¹ that Marchese della Torretta having thought better of it did in fact report the answer he received. I presume that I may take Senator Contarini's communication as the reply of the Italian government. In that case, the charges against the good faith and honour of the British Government being disavowed that particular phase of the matter is closed, and I shall be only too glad to forget the incident and to proceed with the negotiations on friendly lines. I am the more ready thus to terminate a disagreeable incident because of the

⁶ Italy owed £554 million. A Foreign Office memorandum of January 13, 1925, on the Anglo-Italian conversations held in 1923 for a settlement of reparations and inter-allied debts is filed at C 638/4/62. The Italian Ambassador, in a conversation of January 7, 1925 with Mr. Chamberlain (reported in Foreign Office despatch No. 45 to Rome of January 7, not printed) stated that the Italian Government were prepared to resume negotiations on the basis of the agreements reached between the British and Italian financial experts in April/May, 1923. A copy of these agreements is filed at C 8037/1/18 (1923), not printed.

relations which I formed with M. Mussolini in Rome as related above and because in illness⁷ he may have given instructions hastily and without due care but I cannot possibly maintain this attitude of exceptional regard for susceptibilities for Italian interests unless M. Mussolini seconds my efforts by similar loyal co-operation.

Course which I was prepared to adopt but for M. Mussolini's false step will be outlined in a further telegram,⁸ which is now being prepared. But this is, for the moment, for your own information only.

Repeated to Durazzo No. 22.

⁷ See No. 48.

⁸ No. 62, below.

No. 62

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 63 Telegraphic [C 2561/1435/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 23, 1925, 10 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram. (Anglo-Persian concession).¹

Compromise which I had been considering was on the lines that (1) Anglo-Persian should immediately abandon three-quarters of area given them for exploration under their contract. (2) That as regards remaining 50,000 odd hectares which they intend to exploit Italians should be given a share on a 20 per-cent basis on the lines of the agreement between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Anglo-Italian Corporation as recorded in exchange of letters with Manzife [*sic*: Manzi Fé] on February 1921.² Our idea would have been that these offers should be made in two stages: that in the first place Anglo-Persian should abandon their claim to 150,000 hectares for exploration and thus enable the Albanian government to meet representations not only of Italians but also of French and Americans if and when made. I realise, however, that this offer may not be really as important as it sounds, since in the first place the period granted for exploration would eventually expire automatically, and in the second place Anglo-Persian are already fairly certain regarding areas which will prove most profitable. Second and I hope final, stage would therefore be direct negotiations between Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Italian Corporation for giving them a share in the final exploiting areas.

You should not however mention above to Italian government until specifically instructed to do so.

Repeated to Durazzo No. 23.

¹ No. 61.

² Copies of a letter of the D'Arcy Exploration Company (a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company) of January 27, 1921, and the reply of the British Italian Corporation Limited of February 1 are filed at C 2362/1435/90 (1925), not printed. See No. 46.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 24, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 74 Telegraphic [C 2642/127/90]

PARIS, February 23, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being present, and considered the following questions:—

...¹ 4. It was agreed, in accordance with your telegram No. 67 of the 16th February,² that in view of the request made by the Albanian and Yugoslav governments, both the meeting of the Albanian boundary commission and the notification of the St. Naoum frontier should be postponed until the 15th March. I communicated to the conference the views set forth in your despatch No. 63³ and invited the conference to inform the two governments that if on the 15th March they have not come to an agreement between themselves, the conference will, on the advice of the boundary commission, proceed to take decisions on all outstanding points, and at the same time notify the frontier in the region of St. Naoum. This was agreed to.

...¹ 6. The two reports of the allied military committee of Versailles, regarding military control in Hungary, as enclosed in my despatch No. 227 of January 28th,⁴ were again before the conference. On the strength of the information contained in your despatch No. 512 of the 10th February,⁵ I explained to the conference the further complications which have now arisen with regard to the execution of the military clauses of the treaty of Trianon, and pointed out that there was no use the conference attempting to deal with the general question, and still less with the Single State Factory until the reparation commission and the finance committee of the League of Nations have decided how far the Hungarian government have, under the reconstruction scheme, been relieved of the obligation to meet 'treaty charges'. Copy of the statement which I made to the conference is enclosed in my despatch No. 467.⁶ Monsieur Massigli⁷ explained that neither the Reparation Commission [n]or the Finance Committee of the League of Nations had yet taken a decision in the matter, and on his suggestion the conference agreed to instruct the Versailles Committee to draw up a detailed statement showing how these decisions may affect adversely the execution of the military clauses of the treaty for communication to the League of Nations and the Reparation Commission. ...¹

¹ The section(s) omitted referred to other matters.

² Not printed.

³ Of January 6. The reference presumably should be to Foreign Office despatch No. 336 of January 28, not printed.

⁴ No. 23.

⁵ No. 37.

⁶ Of February 23, not printed.

⁷ Secretary of the Conference of Ambassadors.

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 2669/1435/90]

Private and Most Confidential FOREIGN OFFICE, February 24, 1925, 6.50 p.m.

Most Urgent

I have complete confidence in you and in your understanding of my policy and instructions. No doubt you were puzzled by Contarini's statement reported in your telegram No. 52¹ since you had not then received our account of what actually passed with Torretta here.² There was some delay in our sending it due to my desire to let it be followed, if not accompanied, by a sketch of my idea of a friendly compromise between the British and Italian oil interests. Incidents succeed each other with such rapidity that it is difficult to keep pace with them. My official telegram³ will by now have convinced you of my sincere desire to seek an accommodation with Mussolini. But no British Minister can stomach such a message as Torretta delivered, and if Mussolini proceeds upon the assumption that we can be addressed and bullied like a third rate power, he makes a fatal mistake. I do not believe however that this is his real purpose and intention and I make every allowance for the difficulties of a Minister who is at the moment unwell⁴ and gravely harassed by domestic difficulties. I am sincerely anxious to work cordially and sympathetically with him in the interest of our two countries. I thought when in Rome⁵ that this was his purpose also. I remain loyal to that friendship unless he makes it impossible, but I repeat that it takes two to make a friendship. I have gone to exceptional lengths of complaisance in trying to help him. Is he going to help me? On that everything depends. If you can get an opportunity to speak to him personally, put this to him as you think best. If, as you indicated, a personal message from me is the best form in which to appeal to him, put the substance of it as a direct message from me to him. In any case take this message as the key to the interpretation of all my more formal instructions. I am working for cordial co-operation. I am trying to find a satisfactory solution of incidental difficulties but you and I are the representatives of a great nation and it would be a mistake for anyone to forget it.

¹ No. 59.

⁴ See No. 48.

² See No. 61.

³ See No. 62.

⁵ See No. 28, n. 4.

Mr. Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 25, 9 a.m.)

Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 2734/52/90]

Urgent

DURAZZO, February 24, 1925, 11 p.m.

Following for Mr. Lampson:—

Private and Confidential

Greek, Bulgarian, German, Italian, Serbian, Hungarian, French and United States representatives here acknowledge notification of government formed by Ahmed after his entry¹ by formal notes in the usual terms.

Greek, Bulgarian, German, Italian, Serbian, Austrian, French and United States representatives have by similar communications acknowledged this formation of republic and election of Ahmed as President.² These both were decreed by constituent assembly by a unanimous vote in a house of sixty-four.

Following passage occurs in formal note addressed by United States representative to Albanian government on February 15th (No. 75)—‘the time that has elapsed since it became apparent that fortunately a legal government was again functioning which would have authority to grant concessions in Albania’.

Oil concession was granted by Albanian government in 1921.³ Formality of ratification would necessarily follow with a majority government but improper influences brought to bear on deputies by Standard Oil Company and threats of United States Ministry⁴ (see my despatch No. 18 of 1923)⁵ prevented this consummation. The matter was by common consent withdrawn from Chamber for submission to constituent assembly. The latter was elected in December 1923 with one hundred and two members. It has never been dissolved and when summoned last month sixty-five members responded. Others were voluntary fugitives. I can see no plausible reason for attacking the legality of assembly.

President of the Republic informs me that concession was passed⁶ in a house of fifty-seven members with five abstainers and eight absentees from illness.

¹ See Nos. 3, n. 3, and 7.

² See No. 20. For the recognition by the U.S. Government of Ahmed Bey, see *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, pp. 489–92.

³ See No. 31, n. 4.

⁵ Of March 5, not printed.

⁴ See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. 1, pp. 371–97.

⁶ See Nos. 48, n. 2 and 55, n. 6.

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 25, 9.45 p.m.)

No. 56 Telegraphic [C 2763/1435/90]

ROME, February 25, 1925, 8 p.m.

Your telegram No. 62.¹

As I thought it desirable to dispose of this disagreeable incident at once I saw Secretary-General immediately after receiving your telegram last night.

I first read to him in translation my telegram No. 52² and asked him whether it accurately represented point of view of Italian Government on the subject. He replied that he accepted every word of it. Then with a view to avoiding a repetition of such incidents I also read to him whole of your telegram under reference with sole exception of allusion to Mussolini's illness. As I proceeded Senator Contarini expressed increasing astonishment. He assured me that instructions sent to Italian Ambassador³ did not contemplate any official representation at all nor any message of the nature indicated. Ambassador had been told to support representations which were being addressed to me here by seeking personal interview with you, by explaining to you difficult position in which Italian Government were placed over this question and he was to endeavour to enlist your personal interest and sympathy. Was it conceivable that such a purpose could be achieved through offensive imputations against your good faith? Secretary-General could not imagine how such a representation had come to be made unless through some complete misunderstanding. When I reached penultimate paragraph of your telegram Senator said at once that Italian Government would be only too glad to disavow charges against good faith and honour of British Government which they had never thought of making. My telegram No. 52² could be taken as their reply and he would be very willing that incident should be closed in this manner.

He repeated that the one desire of Italian Government was to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in fullest confidence and friendship.⁴

¹ No. 61.

² No. 59.

³ See *D.D.I.*, vol. III, Nos. 722 and 727.

⁴ In an unnumbered telegram of February 25, Sir R. Graham stated: 'I am very grateful for your private telegram of yesterday [No. 64].

Recent incident is really extraordinary as it is hardly conceivable that Italian Ambassador should have made representation of such an offensive nature on his own account, yet this is what Senator Contarini clearly implies. Senator absolutely denied that any instructions were sent to Torretta which could have authorized such a message and private explanation that he suggests is that on hearing news of ratification of concession [see Nos. 48, n. 2 and 55, n. 6] Torretta was so frightened of effect on Mussolini that he lost his head or his temper or both. Senator was even willing to show me telegram of instructions sent to Ambassador, but

we agreed after discussion that this would create an embarrassing situation between myself and Torretta which had better be avoided.

'Italians will no doubt appreciate participation in our concession but are more anxious for a concession of their own for the purpose of political effect. . . .'

Mr. Chamberlain replied in an unnumbered telegram of February 27: 'I am entitled to take M. Contarini's declaration (your telegram No. 56 [No. 66]) confirming his statement recorded in your telegram No. 52 [No. 59] as having complete authority and as being the considered answer of the Italian government to my representations. I accept it as such and the incident is closed.

'But for your own information I must say frankly that I am as puzzled as he is: and in view of the definite and irrefutable evidence which I hold I must reckon with the probability that the explanations given to you by Contarini may have been made without the express sanction of M. Mussolini. I can only express to you the hope that those explanations will not hereafter be disavowed by him: which would risk provoking further and even more embarrassing developments.

'I am forced to the conclusion that M. Mussolini acts on occasion without the knowledge of his chief official. The original statement embodying M. Mussolini's offensive allegations was made by the Italian Ambassador in what professed to be a rough verbatim French translation of a telegram which he actually had in his hand when he spoke. It is thus pretty certain (apart from other irrefutable evidence which we hold) that such a telegram was in fact received. Again we have certain knowledge that after the interview which the Ambassador had with Sir E. Crowe on February 20th a full report was telegraphed to Rome [see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 730]. Yet this is denied categorically by M. Contarini.

'I do not wish in any way to get mixed up in the relations between Contarini and his chief: but on the evidence before me it is quite clear either that (1) Contarini is not acting in good faith with you; or (2) he is genuinely in ignorance of the facts. I regard the second as the more probable.

'I trust we shall hear no more of the alleged misunderstanding. But I think it desirable that you should be in possession of the facts as we see them, leaving it to your discretion how to meet any reopening of the question either by M. Mussolini or M. Contarini.'

No. 67

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 27, 9 a.m.)

No. 8 Telegraphic [C 2842/1142/7]

Urgent

BUCHAREST, February 26, 1925, 8.20 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just heard that Bulgarian government have arrested head of Communist Cheka¹ and have discovered in his papers proof that revolution in Bulgaria was planned for first days of March to establish republic. Mobilization of Bulgarian forces except on Roumanian frontier has been ordered. In view of coincidence of date for Soviet concentration of troops near Bessarabia reported in my telegram No. 7 today,² Minister for Foreign Affairs would be glad to learn if His

¹ i.e. the Extraordinary Commission to combat counter-revolution and sabotage (Chrezvychnaya Kommissiya).

² Not printed.

Majesty's Government have any indication from Moscow of any political unrest or plans apart from military movements.

Monsieur Duca is inclined to connect the two movements. It would obviously be highly disagreeable to Roumania to have republic established under Soviet influence in Bulgaria where present government is most friendly to Roumania and at the same time have to meet attack in Bessarabia.

He is moreover disturbed at the attitude of Serb-Croat-Slovene government who he fears would favour establishment of agrarian government in Bulgaria and do not realize that this would . . .³ly change to Communist under Soviet influence and endanger peace of the whole of the Balkans.

He would be grateful for any intimation of Russian political activity. Meanwhile Roumania will not neglect precautions.

³ The text is here uncertain.

No. 68

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the U.S. First Secretary

[C 2856/1435/90]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 26, 1925*

Mr. Atherton, of the United States Embassy, called this morning and referred to the recent conversation which I had had with him regarding the vagaries of Mr. Grant-Smith (see my letter to Mr. Chilton of the 19th February).¹

He said he hoped I would not mind his reverting to the subject, but, as I had spoken to him about Mr. Grant-Smith's activities in Durazzo, he felt it right to tell me that the Embassy had now had indications from Washington that Mr. Grant-Smith was being accused by American oil interests of having paid insufficient attention to their oil aspirations in Albania. In fact they were intimating that owing to the hubbub raised by the Italian Government over the concession given to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company the Italians were to be given a share in the British concession,² whereas America had lost her opportunity of similar participation owing to lack of corresponding agitation.

I said that as he had spoken frankly to me I would tell him, as far as I properly could, how the situation stood. Four years ago, or thereabouts, a British company had been offered an oil concession over the whole of Albania. Later this concession had been modified to 200,000 hectares for exploration and 50,000 hectares for actual exploitation, but before the concession could go through the Albanian Assembly Fan Noli had carried out his *coup d'État*³ and nothing had been done. Fan Noli had now fallen;

¹ No. 57.

² See No. 62.

³ See No. 3, n. 2.

Ahmed Zogou had returned,⁴ and one of his first acts had been to take up again the question of the Anglo-Persian Concession which had now been formally approved by the Albanian Assembly.⁵ Incidentally I might say that there could really be no accusation by America of a monopoly in its strict term as matters now stood, for the American Sinclair group had actually put in for 150,000 hectares *for exploitation* and the Standard Company for 30,000.⁶ For the rest, the grant to us of 50,000 hectares for exploitation, that is to say just one-third of what the Sinclair group had wanted to get, was obviously reasonable.

Mr. Atherton thanked me for this information, but said that what he was really getting at was how were the Americans to deal with their own oil people who were becoming restive. Could I give him any ammunition with which to counter the charge that the Italians, by making violent representations to us, had in fact secured or were about to secure a share in our oil concession in Albania? I replied that put in that form I thought I could give him satisfaction, for it so happened that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company were under a long-standing commitment to an Italian group to give them a share in any concession for oil which they might eventually obtain in Albania. That commitment dated, so far as I could recollect, from as long ago as 1921.² He could thus tell his Government that all that the Anglo-Persian Company were about to do—if indeed they did do it, which personally I thought they must in view of the existence of this commitment—was to act up to their obligations of four years ago. This in itself disproved any possible allegation that it was simply and solely the Italian blackmail which had resulted in the possibility of Italian participation in the British concession.

Finally, I asked whether he could tell me, as an old friend, whether he thought there was any likelihood of there being trouble between our two Governments over this wretched question in Albania. I devoutly hoped that there was nothing of the kind in prospect.

He said that that was the very reason he had come down to see me. He also was particularly anxious to nip in the bud any suggestion that Italy, by her tortuous methods, had forced from us something to which she had no right. From what I had told him it seemed to him that he would be able to satisfy his Government, and he certainly hoped that they would be able to check any agitation which the American oil people might endeavour to start.

He asked me if I could say what sort of percentage the Anglo-Persian were prepared to yield to their Italian opposite numbers. I said I was afraid I could not give any details. Clearly that was a matter between the Anglo-Persian and their Italian friends. All I knew was that there existed a commitment of long standing between the Anglo-Persian and a certain Italian interest; the details of what that commitment amounted to,

⁴ See Nos. 3, n. 3 and 7.

⁵ See Nos. 48, n. 2 and 55, n. 6.

⁶ See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. 1, pp. 372, 382-3, 387-8, and 396.

whether it should be on a percentage basis or what, would naturally be for discussion between the two groups.

Before the conversation ended I thought it well to tell Mr. Atherton that, under the terms of the concession, 40 per cent. of the capital was to be raised by the Albanian Government, who were also to have a royalty of 13½ per cent. on the output. From this he would realise the reasonable spirit in which the Anglo-Persian Company had dealt with the matter, and would also realise that if, as I told him, the British company were committed to give a share to the Italians, comparatively little would remain over for the original concessionaires. This point seemed to make a considerable impression on him; he said he would point it out to his Government.⁷

M. W. LAMPSON.

⁷ In a minute of February 28, Mr. Nicolson wrote: 'I asked the Petroleum Department to give me this note [of February 26, not printed] in case we have trouble with the Americans about the "open door". It will be seen that this one sided American doctrine cannot apply to Albania. If the Albanian Government had refused even to allow American companies to prospect in Albania, then the State Department might have had something to say at Tirana. But as two American Companies have been messing about there for months, and as one of them actually asked for an *exploitation* concession of 150,000 hectares, they cannot really complain.

'For if we are to admit that an independent country cannot give mineral concessions to whom it likes the argument leads to a *reductio ad absurdum*. Supposing, for instance, that these 50,000 hectares to be obtained by the Anglo-Persian do really represent all the oil resources of Albania, then, under the doctrine of the "open door", Albania would have to parcel out this tiny area among every foreign nation.

'What the Americans really mean by the "open door" is that when they get a concession themselves the door is locked and barred against all others, and when other people get a concession the door is to be opened just wide enough to admit America and no one else.

'The whole doctrine is fantastic and not to be seriously considered. One has only got to ask an American to define it in order to see him floundering in a tangle of contradictions.'

No. 69

Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 2)

No. 63 [C 2978/127/90]

BELGRADE, *February 26, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 19 of February 23rd¹ in which I reported that the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me on February 21st that the negotiations with Ahmed Zogu Bey had come to a standstill, I have the honour to report that Mr. Nincic then said that Ahmed Zogu Bey was asking for territorial concessions which were quite unacceptable: he asked for two *arrondissements* but did not explain what sort of areas he meant by that expression. I suggested that he should in the usual oriental

¹ Not printed.

way offer him half of one, but he seemed to think that that was out of reason. He inveighed a good deal against Ahmed Bey as a man who had no statesmanship. He was disappointed in him. He said that he hoped eventually an agreement might be come to.²

2. Yesterday at his private house, I again asked Mr. Nincic whether the negotiations were really off; he said 'Oh yes, but perhaps we can take them up again later, say in two or three months' time'. I then made a reference to the Ambassadors' Conference and the Commission of Delimitation. Mr. Nincic at once repeated his obstinate assertions that this country considered that St. Naoum (and this time he included the Vermosh district) had already formed part of Serbia and that no territory can be alienated without the consent of Parliament. No Government of whatever Party complexion would propose such a thing to the Parliament.

3. Moreover a document had been discovered in the Austrian Legation at Cetinje which proved that the Austrians had recognised St. Naoum as Serbian and an official map had been found in which the Vermosh district was also shown to be montenegrin.

4. The Serbs would therefore never evacuate St. Naoum except before a vast army and no one was going to send an army against them for such a small matter.

5. I did not feel qualified to say anything about an economic boycott and could only affect to treat these defiant statements as private sentiments. Moreover I understand their purport has been communicated to the Western Capitals.

I have, etc.,
ALBAN YOUNG

² Commenting on Belgrade telegram No. 19, Mr. Eyres, in Durazzo telegram No. 20 of February 25, stated: 'I think epithet "unstatesmanlike" as applied to Ahmed Bey must be due to fact that Minister for Foreign Affairs has found his match.

'Attitude of Albanian President of the Republic is as follows:

'A strategic frontier is of no moment to us. We want land we can cultivate for our mountains. If Serbs consider that two points Vermosch and St. Naoum are of paramount importance to them they must prepare to give us a quid pro quo. We ask for old 1913 line in neighbourhood of Jakova and village of Banishta in Dibra.

'I hear that Serbian chargé d'affaires appeared so pleased with this offer that Albanian Minister had an uneasy feeling that they were making a bad bargain.

'President in making this offer is seriously risking his reputation in Albania as he will give colour to accusation that he is subservient to Yugoslavia.'

*Sir M. Cheetham (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 4, 9 a.m.)*

No. 52 Telegraphic [C 3124/798/19]

Confidential

ATHENS, March 3, 1925, 8.30 p.m.

Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister informed me yesterday that first phase of negotiations for renewal of treaty with Greece¹ was nearly to an end. The negotiations would be continued early in April at Belgrade. He said that military clauses had been easily settled. Each country was bound to come to the assistance of the other if attacked. Turkey and Bulgaria were the only two powers really in view. A war in which a great power was engaged did not come within the scope of the agreement. Serbian Minister intimated position regarding Ghevgheli line² was less satisfactory. Though pressed by Monsieur Caclamanos to do so he could not define his attitude at the present stage since experts at Belgrade must first be consulted. He assured me however that Greek sovereignty of line would not be challenged and that no solution would be proposed wounding to the pride of Greece or disagreeable to her national interests. He thought that Greek officials should be retained and that satisfactory compromise ought to be found but it was essential that Serbia should be guaranteed the means of rapid transit through Salonica. Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister without being very communicative made above points clear. He added that Serbia only asked for reasonable concessions at Salonica in return for alliance vital to Greece.³

Repeated to Belgrade No. 1.

¹ See Nos. 14 and 26.

² See Nos. 14, 15, and 26.

³ In Athens telegram No. 53 of March 3, Sir M. Cheetham continued: 'I have subsequently seen Monsieur Caclamanos. He confirms information as to military treaty given by Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister and states further that it will be communicated to League of Nations. There will also be military convention I gather between general staffs which will not be so communicated but declaration will be made that it contains nothing in conflict with terms of military treaty.'

'Monsieur Caclamanos was more reticent regarding Salonica communications reason for which may be gathered from first sentences of second paragraph of my immediately preceding telegram. He appeared nevertheless to be perfectly sanguine of success of negotiations and said that Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had no objection to purchase of shares of Ghevgheli line by Greeks. He thought negotiations might even be concluded this month.'

He reported (Athens telegram No. 55 of March 5): 'Conversation with Prime Minister today tends to substantiate favourable views of progress of negotiations for renewal of Greeco-Serbian treaty communicated to me by respective delegates. Prime Minister laid stress on Serbian desire to obtain right of importing arms and munitions of war through Greek territory in case of hostilities not involving *casus foederis*. He said such provision was of the utmost importance to Serbia. He considered their demands in this respect to be reasonable and he would be ready if necessary to satisfy them even to the point of allowing their trains with Serbian personnel to come straight through to Salonica. Otherwise he had

informed Serbian negotiator at the commencement of discussion that Greece could not allow her full rights in Ghevgheli line to be questioned.'

No. 71

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Hungarian Minister

[C 3200/261/21]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 3, 1925

The new Hungarian Minister called this afternoon and referred to my conversations with the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires on January 21st¹ and 23rd last² (C 1021 and 1091) regarding the obstructive attitude adopted by the Hungarian government towards the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control. He said that since his first call at this office when he had seen the Secretary of State³ and later myself, he had telegraphed to his government saying that this obstruction had caused a very bad impression here. He had now received a telegram in reply asking for a lead as to the particular 'gesture' his government could make to show their good faith. Could I give him any indication as to what we should like them to do?

I said that the reasons for our representations were that there had been a general attitude of obstruction and defiance on the part of the Hungarian government towards the Control. I did not commit myself definitely, but I did gather that since we had made these representations there had been somewhat of an improvement. The actual points we had had to complain of were more particularly:—

- (1) A general attitude of obstruction:
- (2) The evasion of article 103 (which prohibits universal compulsory service):
- (3) Press attacks on the Commission:
- (4) Evasion of article 135 (which entails upon the Hungarian government the supply of all documents and information required by the Control Commission):
- (5) Article 115 (the single state factory).

As regards the first of these, I much hoped from what we heard from Budapest⁴ that the Hungarian government realised that such obstruction as there had been must cease. As regards point (2) and point (4), the difficulty had mainly emanated from the refusal of the Hungarian military authorities to produce the attestation papers of their recruits. This had led to a general suspicion that the Hungarian government were passing their men rapidly through the ranks and building up a reserve, which was of course contrary to the treaty. As to the last point (the single state factory) that was a question of some complexity which of course had not been disposed of yet. I might tell him what I had said before, namely, that our attitude as regards the latter point had undoubtedly been very

¹ See No. 13, n. 7.

² Not printed.

³ See No. 53.

⁴ See No. 37, n. 11.

greatly stiffened by the general obstruction of the Hungarian government and by irritation of the altogether unjustifiable attitude adopted by such people as the Minister of War in his public and other utterances.⁵ If, therefore, he wished to know what his government should do in order to eliminate the bad impression which their attitude hitherto had caused, he might suggest to them that they should come forward publicly and announce without equivocation their determination forthwith to cease any opposition to the activities of the Commission of Control and their determination to meet their treaty liabilities without reserve. Such a declaration should not be without effect. But to serve any useful purpose it must clearly be put into effect, that is to say, the outstanding demands of the Commission of Control must forthwith be met. What those demands were could only be ascertained in detail by application to the Commission of Control, but I imagined that in point of fact the Hungarian government were in no doubt as to what they were, as they were all on official record in the correspondence addressed to the Hungarian government by the Commission of Control. But I could remind him at once of the difficulties we had experienced over art[icles] 103 [and] 135.

The Minister said that he thought that some such public declaration as I had suggested could be arranged, but of course what had been at the bottom of much of the obstruction was lack of personal good feeling and contact between the officers of the Commission of Control and the Hungarian authorities. He admitted that no doubt the Hungarians had been largely to blame for this, but when you were dealing with the Hungarian military authorities you had to make allowances, and as regarded acts of obstruction, he thought that a good deal must have been due to action by subordinates. On this I made the obvious comment that in that case it was up to the Minister of War to circulate definite instructions that such action on the part of subordinates must cease, and that the demands of the Control Commission must be complied with absolutely. Continuing, he went on to say that in certain cases the Control Commission had asked for papers which really had no bearing upon the fulfilment of the treaty. For example, the personal dossiers showing the misdemeanours of regimental officers, etc., etc.

I said that, naturally if the Control Commission asked for the production of certain papers and these were refused, it at once gave rise to the suspicion that the particular papers contained something contrary to the treaty. If the papers in question were of a personal character they should nonetheless be produced when asked for, when they would show that they contained nothing illicit, and then nobody could complain of the failure to produce documents or suspect that the papers held back veiled evasions of the Treaty.

At this stage the conversation took a more general turn, and I put it to him that we must naturally suppose that the Hungarian government

⁵ See No. 10. Sir C. Barclay reported Count Csaky's speech in the National Assembly on February 25 in his despatch No. 59 of February 26, not printed.

wished to get rid of the Control Commission as soon as possible. That also was our desire, provided the terms of the treaty had been complied with. What we wished was to be able to hand Hungary over to the League of Nations with a clean sheet in the matter of treaty disarmament. That was our whole aim and object but it could not be achieved until the Control Commission told us definitely that the various disarmament clauses had been complied with and that their function was completed.

The Minister said that his government certainly wished to see control withdrawn as soon as possible. Nor did I gather that they took any exception to the proposed measures of investigation to be adopted by the League.⁶ But he did ask whether or not it was the intention to get the acceptance of his government to the League scheme?

I said that this was a point which we had gone into carefully, but that all the competent authorities were agreed that the consent of the ex-enemy countries was not legally necessary. On the other hand, every sensible person must realise that if the scheme was to work successfully it must be with the good will of the country to which it applied, and as the scheme was a reasonable one I trusted that the Hungarian government would not hinder its application in any way.

The interview then ended.

M. W. LAMPSON

⁶ See No. 10, n. 2.

No. 72

Mr. Nicolson to Sir J. Cadman

[C 2989/1435/90]

Private

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 3, 1925*

Dear Cadman,

You will remember that as a result of your conversation with the Secretary of State¹ it was agreed that the Foreign Office should inform you when, in their opinion, the moment had arrived for you to begin direct negotiations at Rome regarding this Albanian Oil Concession. We have just received a telegram from our Ambassador² which shows that the Italian government are anxious to open immediate negotiations. I therefore write to tell you that we think this moment has now come, and to ask whether you could proceed to Rome immediately in order to get into touch with Italian interests. So soon as we learn the date of your departure, we shall warn Sir R. Graham by telegraph, and I feel sure that he will keep in close touch with you throughout your negotiations. I am

¹ On February 24.

² Rome telegram No. 64 of March 1, not printed.

sending him by the messenger who leaves here on the 9th instant a copy of this letter for his information.³

Since our last meeting certain things have happened which I think you should know of.

The first is that the American Embassy here have made tentative and as yet unofficial representations on the matter.⁴ These representations took a somewhat curious form. It appears that the State Department are being criticised by the American oil interests on the grounds that whereas the energetic attitude adopted by the Italian government has forced us to make a deal with Italy, the American administration have made no similar representations and have therefore placed their companies in a weak position. To this representation we have been able to reply, still unofficially, that whatever arrangement may be come to with Italian interests is based on the commitment entered into so long ago as 1921 between your company and certain Italian financiers.⁵ This communication appears to have afforded much relief to the United States Embassy since it gives them a satisfactory answer to the particular line of criticism to which they are being exposed. On the other hand, you will remember that after your conversation with the Secretary of State I ventured to draw your personal attention to the utility of the Manzi Fé arrangement as a means of meeting possible United States criticism. The importance of this agreement is now emphasised by the particular line which these first representations on the part of the American Embassy have actually taken. We think therefore that, so far from buying Manzi Fé out of your negotiations with more important Italian interests, you should definitely use him as the first link between yourself and whatever Italian interests you negotiate with. I admit that Manzi Fé has little importance beyond the very useful fact that your agreement with him, such as it is, dates from 1921. You will realise however that in the terms of the notes then exchanged between your company and the British-Italian corporation it was expressly laid down that 'the British-Italian corporation shall be given the chance to participate either in its own name or *on behalf of its Italian friends* in the company eventually to be formed'. The Manzi Fé agreement does not therefore in any serious way hamper the extension of your negotiations while it may very materially assist you in regard to the American side of the matter. I feel sure that you will appreciate this aspect of the question. It is really important and Mr. Chamberlain is anxious that you should realise this.

The second development to which I would wish to call your attention is that the Italians, both here and in Rome, have manifested a distinct desire, not so much to participate in the profits of the Anglo-Persian concession, as to be granted a particular concession of their own. Until you come to grips with them it is difficult to foresee how far this tendency is serious. I feel myself that it would be infinitely preferable for obvious reasons that

³ Foreign Office despatch No. 297 to Rome of March 5.

⁴ See No. 68.

⁵ See No. 62, n. 2.

the Italians should co-operate in the working of your concession rather than that the oil areas in Albania should be divided into two, of which you should take one half and the Italians the other half. Apart from the desirability of getting Italian capital interested in the smooth working of your concession, there is the difficulty that if you start surrendering portions of your areas to the Italians, there is no logical reason why you should not surrender other portions to the Americans also.

This, however, as was agreed between us at our conversation with the Secretary of State must be left to your discretion when you see how the land lies. You may find that Mussolini attaches so much importance to having at least some separate area for Italy that it is worth while to pay this price for the purpose of ensuring the whole bargain. Here, again, you will doubtless keep in touch with Sir R. Graham. The great thing is to get an arrangement of some kind which secures you as far as possible in case of future political troubles in Albania, and above all, as I already said, we must be careful not to play into the hands of the American opposition by throwing over the Manzi Fé negotiations and starting afresh.

I feel sure that you would wish to know the truth about these two developments in order that you can cope with your impending negotiations with full knowledge of what has transpired since you left.

Should you desire to communicate confidentially by telegraph with your company I feel sure that the Ambassador will be willing to transmit messages through the Embassy.

I have shown this letter to the Secretary of State who approves of its terms.

HAROLD NICOLSON

No. 73

Mr. Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 5, 8.15 p.m.)

No. 21 Telegraphic [C 3201/1435/90]

Urgent

DURAZZO, March 5, 1925, 3.15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 28.¹

Although American Geologist appeared in Albania at the end of 1921 and in 1922, no application was made to Albanian government for a concession until Sinclair Consolidated Oil Company made an offer in September 1922,² one and a half years after Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Concession had been granted.³ For terms of this offer see Mr. Parr's despatches No. 91⁴ and No. 98⁵ of 1922. This was followed in October by an application from Standard Oil Company² which was modified slightly

¹ Of March 2, not printed.

² See *F.R.U.S.* 1922, vol. 1, pp. 604-9.

³ See No. 31, n. 4.

⁴ Of September 2, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁵ Of September 21, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

by another proposal in February 1923.⁶ Terms, see my despatch No. 18 1923.⁷

General attitude of Albanian government was that they were not free to entertain proposals for an oil concession until Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Concession was submitted to Parliament. At times they appeared inclined to waver but on the whole they held to this standpoint. The Minister of Public Works certainly received these proposals from other companies but they were not submitted to Council of Ministers. They were afterwards used as a lever to obtain some modifications in Anglo-Persian Agreement.

Point was that those companies only appeared in the field long after Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Concession had been [formally] accorded to and unless Albanian government were guilty of bad faith they would naturally be in an inferior position. They could only take second place. The Anglo-Persian had priority of choice.

⁶ See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. 1, pp. 372-3

⁷ Of March 5, 1923, not printed.

No. 74

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 775 [C 2716/298/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 5, 1925

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Lordship herewith for your information copy of a letter from Sir O. Niemeyer to Mr. Lampson¹ on the subject of the financial and economic situation in Austria and the various expedients which have been discussed with a view to its amelioration.

2. As regards the suggestions contained in the eighth paragraph of the enclosed letter, I am disposed to consider that, for the present at all events, any pressure on the Czechoslovak, Austrian and Hungarian Governments had best be brought to bear through the League of Nations. I propose, therefore, if a suitable occasion offers at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League when the Austrian financial situation will be considered, to impress upon the French and Czechoslovak representatives the importance which His Majesty's Government, in the interests of Austria's rehabilitation and political independence, attach to mutual tariff arrangements being concluded on the lines suggested.

3. I have already spoken to the French Ambassador² in the sense of Sir O. Niemeyer's letter and suggested to him that those Powers who have

¹ Of February 24, not printed.

² On February 13. An account of that part of Mr. Chamberlain's conversation with M. de Fleuriau which related to Austria was given in Foreign Office despatch No. 570 to Paris of February 13, not printed. For another report of the conversation, see No. 584, below.

influence at Prague would do well to encourage the Czechoslovak Government to negotiate commercial treaties with Austria and Hungary with a view to secure a substantial reduction of existing tariffs and a modification of the system of import licenses and prohibitions. The French Government have, as you are aware, been seriously perturbed by the recent revival, both in Austria and in Germany, of the Anschluss movement.³ I trust that their apprehension in this respect will enable me to obtain the active support of their delegate at the Council meeting¹ in any representations that I may be able to make to Dr. Benes.⁵

I am, etc.,

(In the absence of the Secretary of State)

HAROLD NICOLSON

³ i.e. the union of Austria and Germany.

⁴ Mr. Chamberlain was to preside at the Thirty-Third Session of the Council of the League of Nations which met at Geneva March 9-14, 1925. He left for Geneva on March 6, travelling via Paris (see Nos. 224 and 225, below).

⁵ Dr. Beneš was Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, and delegate to the Council of the League of Nations.

No. 75

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 10, 5.50 p.m.)

No. 7 Telegraphic [C 3474/3456/7]

SOFIA, March 10, 1925, 2 p.m.

My telegram No. 6.¹

I am strongly of opinion that request should be refused.

General discontent with government aroused by increasing severity of a régime based on force had undoubtedly increased since last spring, but I think there is even less danger of serious outbreak than last year when events proved that fears of government had been purposely exaggerated.² Agrarian party is divided and leaderless, feud between Macedonian

¹ Of March 6. This transmitted the following communication for the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (Major-General Sir J. Burnett-Stuart) from Major Neate, British representative on the Organ of Liquidation in Sofia (this body had replaced the Commission of Control and was liquidating outstanding points in the disarmament of Bulgaria): 'Bulgarian government inform us that they have definite information that intensive action by Agrarian and Communist Extremists is to be expected in the near future [see No. 67]. They ask permission to raise 4,000 volunteer militia to reinforce units in the country and especially on western frontier [see No. 78, n. 2, below].

'In transmitting this request to Paris we recommended that commission should be authorized to permit this enrolment without further reference if trouble envisaged by Bulgarian government should materialise [see n. 5, below].

'I am of the opinion that fears entertained by Bulgarian government are not without some justification and that some reinforcement might be in the interest of public order.'

² See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 195, 198-201, 204, 209, 219, n.2, 247, 290, and 292.

factions³ has eliminated danger of comitadji⁴ activity and has probably assured to government active support of autonomists against communists while large number of arrests of communists effected recently has presumably weakened their present offensive power.

Among dangers referred to in note of liquidation organ⁵ first place is given to that of Agrarian incursions from Serbian territory but I understand that Serb-Croat-Slovene government have undertaken to remove Agrarian refugees from neighbourhood of frontier.

In any case Bulgarian government have now had ample time to establish themselves firmly⁶ and I do not think that we are justified in furnishing them with further means of suppressing their political opponents. They have moreover recently organized system of communal guards presenting liquidation organ with a fait accompli. If this is permitted as has been recommended by latter⁷ it should amply suffice for maintenance of order.

You might possibly see fit to urge Serb-Croat-Slovene government to fulfil their undertaking to remove Agrarians from the frontier.

Copies of this and of my immediately preceding telegram are being sent by next bag to Belgrade.

³ Cf. No. 24, n. 15, and Vol. XXVI, No. 228.

⁴ The Turkish for committeemen i.e. revolutionary organisations, it had come to be applied to any member of an armed band.

⁵ A copy of this note, received in Paris on March 21, has not been traced in the Foreign Office archives.

⁶ See No. 1, n. 6.

⁷ In a telegram of February 23, an account of which was given in the *AVIS* of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles of April 4, a copy of which is filed at C 4839/3456/7, not printed.

No. 76

Mr. Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 23 Telegraphic [C 3477/2756/90]

DURAZZO, March 10, 1925, 6.10 p.m.

Italian Minister obtained Albanian government concession for oil exploration over 50,000 hectares of which 30,000 hectares are to be selected for exploitation. President of the Republic signed agreement in virtue of his new powers by which ratification of Chamber is rendered unnecessary. This concession does not affect Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession.¹ Italian Minister requested my co-operation in the matter. I replied that I would certainly accord him any support that lay in my power and I acted accordingly.²

¹ See Nos. 31, n. 4, 45, n. 3, 48, n. 2, 51 and 55, n. 6.

² Foreign Office telegram No. 33 of March 12 in reply ran: 'Your action entirely approved.'

'Please enquire and telegraph rough description of where Italian areas are situated.'

Concession[n]aires are Italian state railways
Repeated to Rome No. 11.

No. 77

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 11)

*No. 49 [C 3774/2332/7]**

SOFIA, March 11, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 37 of the 19th February,¹ I have the honour to transmit herewith translation² of a declaration published in the Bulgarian press by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation regarding its future policy. This document is of some interest as being the first statement issued by the newly-elected Central Committee.

2. It will be seen that its aim is defined as the attainment of complete autonomy for Macedonia within its geographical boundaries, either by the creation of an independent State under the auspices of the League of Nations, or as a member either of a Yugoslav or a Balkan federation; that for the achievement of this aim it relies not only on its own members, but on the assistance of all other oppressed nationalities in Greece and Serbia, especially the Croats, Slovenes and Albanians; and that it repudiates interference or dictation from the Third International³ or from any Government, including that of Bulgaria, or party which may attempt to use it for its own purposes. It states further, that the use of revolutionary methods, which is indispensable in Greek and Serbian Macedonia, is unnecessary in Bulgaria.

3. The declaration of the Bulgarian Government mentioned as a reason for this differential treatment in favour of Bulgaria, refers to a statement which I understand was made by the Bulgarian delegates on the occasion of the signature of the Treaty of Neuilly.

4. I learn from a secret source that the Central Committee have also undertaken to give active support to M. Tsankov's Government in the event of a Communist rising, and have decided to refrain from causing them embarrassment with the Serbian Government by komitaji activity, provided the latter Government abstain from aggressive action in Serbian Macedonia.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade.

I have, etc.,
WILLIAM ERSKINE,

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

² Not printed.

³ The Communist International 'Comintern', founded in Moscow in March, 1919, and dominated by the Russian Communist Party.

No. 78

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 16)

No. 50 [C 3775/3456/7]

SOFIA, March 12, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 7 of the [10]th instant¹ I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the Note² in which the Bulgarian Government submit to the Liquidation Organ their request for permission to recruit an additional 4000 men.

2. As stated in the telegram under reference, I am strongly opposed to compliance with this request. It is true that last summer I was in favour of acqu[iescing in a similar temporary increase of the Bulgarian forces³ but the circumstances were then different. The men had actually been called up and I was convinced that whatever was said to them on the subject the Bulgarian Government would find means of retaining them as long as they wanted them. This is what in fact occurred, the men not being demobilised until late in the autumn after the manœuvres in which there is reason to believe that they took part. Moreover last year, while there was good ground for suspecting that the Government were purposely exaggerating the danger, reports were so conflicting and the situation so obscure that it seemed to me that we might be taking undue responsibility by demanding the immediate disbandment of the extra men, the more so as the Bulgarian Government had found it necessary to send some 3000 men to the Petritch district in order to prevent the threatened comitadji irruptions into Serbian territory.⁴ At present there is no danger to be apprehended in that quarter, the autonomists having their hands full with the struggle with their federalists rivals.⁵ It is even probable that in view of the latter's close connection with Moscow the autonomists will give

¹ No. 75.

² Of March 5, not printed.

³ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 195 and 202.

⁴ As reported in Sofia despatch No. 142 of July 30 (C 12434/2690/7), not printed.

⁵ In his Annual Report for Bulgaria for 1925, enclosed in Sofia despatch No. 29 of February 11, 1926, Mr. Erskine commented: '... the early part of the year was chiefly remarkable for the campaign of political murders, almost amounting to civil war, carried on by the Communists and their allies, the extremist faction of the Agrarian Union and the Federalist Macedonians on the one side, and the Government, aided by the Reserve Officers' Organisation and the Autonomist Macedonians, on the other. ... The Autonomist Macedonians, who naturally concentrated their activities on the Federalists, had been particularly successful, and boasted of having accounted for over a hundred of their opponents, thus establishing a long lead over them. ... The murder of Tchaouloff, the Federalist leader [see No. 24, n. 15], was avenged early in the year by the assassination of Professor Nicholas Mileff, a prominent autonomist. ... On the whole, however, the Autonomists were the most successful in the campaign, and by dint of removing all the Federalist leaders within their reach produced at any rate a semblance of unity within the party, the rank and file of the latter faction preferring a profession of loyalty to the Autonomist cause to extermination at the hands of its supporters. ...'

effective support to Monsieur Tsankoff's Government in the event of a communist rising.

3. It cannot of course be said that there is no danger of an outbreak this season. The internal situation has undoubtedly deteriorated during the past few months and, as I have reported in recent despatches,⁶ the arbitrary and brutal methods of the Government and secret police, which include assassination and the extraction of information under torture, have aroused widespread irritation and discontent; but while these conditions have no doubt fostered the spread of communist propaganda and helped to throw the Agrarians into the arms of the Communists, the authorities have recently arrested several hundreds of communists in different parts of the country and claim, as the result, to have made important discoveries as to their plans and organisation. It is legitimate to assume that the danger of a serious rising in the near future has thereby been greatly diminished and that the ordinary forces at the disposal of the Government are sufficient to deal with any trouble which is likely to arise. This was in fact admitted by Monsieur Tsankoff himself in a speech in the Sobranje on November 21st (see Mr. Barber's despatch No. 212 of November 28th).⁷

4. But in my opinion the main objection to acceding to the request is that we should thereby be encouraging an administration, which after nearly two years of existence⁸ has been unable to establish itself firmly and turns a deaf ear to all counsels of moderation, to continue its futile policy of repression.

5. There is the further consideration that if permission is now given this will be the third year in succession⁹ in which the Government have thus increased their forces and that they no doubt hope that the principle of their inadequacy will now become firmly established.

6. Since sending the telegram referred to above I have learnt from Major Neate that in their reply to the Note from the Bulgarian Government the Organ have given their consent to the taking at once of the preparatory measures required for the enrolment of the 4000 men. I can only regret that they should thus have encouraged the Bulgarian Government to anticipate a favourable decision from the Versailles Committee.

I have, etc.,
WILLIAM ERSKINE

The series of murders had been provoked by the murder of Todor Alexandroff, one of the leaders of IMRO, in 1924 (see Vol. XXVI, No. 228) over the question of co-operation with the Communists.

⁶ See e.g. No. 19.

⁸ See No. 1, n. 6.

⁹ See Vol. XXIV, Nos. 564-5, and Vol. XXVI, No. 200.

⁷ Not printed.

No. 79

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 13, 8 p.m.)

No. 71 Telegraphic [C 3666/1435/90]

ROME, March 13, 1925, 5.25 p.m.

Your telegram No. 78.¹

I am keeping Cadman² thoroughly posted. He arrived on March 11th and I took him at once to see Secretary General. Oil expert from Italian state railways³ was present. Negotiations have been initiated in very friendly atmosphere and seem to promise well. There was difficulty in convincing Italian authorities that Anglo-Persian company cannot possibly hand over certain areas to them but can only return them to Albanian government with whom Italians must then negotiate. But situation has been made perfectly clear to them. Secretary General assures me that Italians have not obtained any specified areas but only a concession for 50,000 hectares with a reserve as to rights already conceded to Anglo-Persian company.⁴ Cadman had already instructed Watson to release certain areas but what exactly these are we shall not know until Watson arrives here on 15th.

Repeated to Durazzo.

¹ Of March 12, not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

² See No. 72.

³ Commendatore Gualdi.

⁴ In Durazzo telegram No. 25 of March 12, the following message was transmitted for Sir J. Cadman from Mr. F. Watson, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's engineer in Albania: 'Complete concession for 200,000 hectares was signed at 11 p.m. on March 11th.'

No. 80

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the U.S. First Secretary

*[C 3752/1435/90]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 13, 1925

Mr. Atherton, first secretary of the American Embassy, called this morning, and referred to a conversation which we had on the 26th February¹ regarding Italian aspirations in the matter of oil in Albania.

He said he had seen in the papers this morning that Italy had now acquired a concession; could I confirm this report?

I said that I could. We had, within the past few days, had a telegram from our Minister at Durazzo² to the effect that Italy had obtained an Albanian Government concession for oil exploitation, and I understood

¹ See No. 68.

² No. 76.

that this concession did not clash with that already conferred upon the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.³

Mr. Atherton observed that in that case it was obvious that the bottom was knocked out of any complaint by Italy that the Anglo-Persian concession constituted a monopoly.

I took the opportunity to confirm what I had said to Mr. Sterling, counsellor of the American Embassy, when he called on the 4th March, namely, that the Secretary of State had authorised me to say, in strict confidence, that the Italian interests came near to losing their share in anything which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, by their arrangement of 1921,⁴ were committed to give them owing to the blustering attitude at one moment adopted by the Italian Government, but almost at once disavowed by by them. Obviously the situation was materially affected by the Italians having now got their own concession. Whether the commitment of 1921 with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company would lead to any definite arrangement between British and Italian interests I could not say; that was a matter for direct negotiation between those interests.

M. W. LAMPSON

³ See Nos. 31, n. 4, 45, n. 3, 48, n. 2, 51, 55, n. 6, and 79, n. 4.

⁴ See Nos. 46, 62, and 72.

No. 81

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 20, 9 a.m.)

No. 9 Telegraphic [C 4010/3456/7]

SOFIA, March 19, 1925, 6 p.m.

My telegram No. 7.¹

Bulgarian Minister of War² has informed liquidation organ that enrolment of 4,000 additional men, which he subsequently reduced to 3,000, is necessary immediately, Bulgarian Minister Bucharest³ having telegraphed that Roumanian government have information that Communist rising in Bulgaria is planned for March, April or May. As Minister of War mentions, Roumanian Government had also enquired of Bulgarian government whether they had information as to Bolshevik preparations against Bessarabia. I have little doubt that information is merely echo of report referred to in Bucharest telegram No. 8 of February 26th,⁴ which originated here and was almost certainly one of many similar inventions or exaggerations published by Bulgarian government for their own purposes.

¹ No. 75.

² Colonel I. Vulkoff.

³ General I. Fitcheff.

⁴ No. 67.

I see no reason to modify opinion already expressed that permission should be refused.⁵

Repeated to Bucharest.

⁵ See Nos. 75 and 78.

No. 82

Sir C. Barclay (Budapest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 24)

No. 80 [C 4189/260/21]

Confidential

BUDAPEST, March 19, 1925

Sir,

In my despatch No. 75 of the 12th instant,¹ I reported at length the criticisms, which have appeared in the Press and which have also been ventilated in the National Assembly, of Mr. Jeremiah Smith's last report² on the progress of reconstruction work in Hungary. At the conclusion of my despatch I stated my intention of obtaining, if possible, an impartial expert opinion on the situation.

I have now had an opportunity of discussing the matter with the British adviser to the Hungarian National Bank who has been good enough to commit to paper his impressions in the Memorandum³ of which I enclose copies herein. It seems to me to be an able and interesting report and goes far to discount the pessimistic opinions reported in my previous despatch, although predicting that there may be hard times ahead for Hungary, as a result of the necessary process of stabilising the currency.

It is satisfactory to note Mr. Siepmann's observation that 'it is fairly safe to assume that nothing short of an international catastrophe can now shake the stability of the Hungarian Crown'. He goes on to state that it is the very fact that the Hungarian Budget has been balanced that is causing at present the most persistent of all prevailing complaints. These complaints he summarises under three headings and replies to each of them. They are (1) that the Budget has been balanced at too high a level and that the country is consequently over taxed (2) that the State finances are being saved – for the benefit of foreign creditors—at the cost of destroying private business and (3) that the State has huge balance at the National Bank and unexpended resources in loan money while credit and currency are being artificially restricted and that trade is stagnant for lack of funds.

Mr. Siepmann points out in reply to the first criticism that a comparison of the present figures with the original League of Nations estimates is

¹ Not printed.

² For the text of Mr. Smith's Ninth Report, for January, 1925, see *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp.

515-553.

³ Of March 15, not printed.

hardly a fair one inasmuch as the League plan⁴ was little more than guess work and was drawn up in a hurry, on insufficient evidence. It is further doubtful whether Hungary is really overtaxed, the amount collected representing on the average 50/- per head of the population. The weak spot is that, of this amount, about 30/- are required to pay for personnel.

In regard to the second criticism the writer affirms that the most important allegation which can be brought against the League of Nations scheme¹ is that it proposes only to aim at the stabilisation of the currency and the balancing of the Budget without considering the consequences. It is in fact the achievement of these aims which causes the present difficulties. They are, however, unavoidable and the only question is how far Hungary must be helped to tide over the difficult period. Mr. Siepmann explains in detail the lines on which disturbance to business and industry is likely to proceed, but considers in conclusion that the process can be accomplished without heavy loss.

As regards the third criticism, that is to say complaints about the large and unnecessary available resources of the State, the writer contends that the Hungarian Exchequer, on the contrary, is not prosperous at all. It will be hard put to it to find the necessary capital for State undertakings and the whole of the loan monies will certainly be required for this purpose apart from covering the Budget deficit.

I should perhaps point out in conclusion that the writer of the enclosed memorandum is no longer a member of the League of Nations' staff and his impartiality can only be called in question in so far as his official position as adviser to the National Bank makes him naturally inclined to place that institution on as sound a financial basis as possible.

I have, etc.,

COLVILLE BARCLAY

¹ See No. 18, n. 5.

No. 83

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Eyres (Durazzo)

No. 36 Telegraphic [C. 3942/127/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 20, 1925, 6 p.m.*

Belgrade telegram No. 24 (of March 18th. Albanian frontiers).¹

No settlement of St. Naoum question is likely to be reached unless Ahmed Bey meets Serbian requests in a reasonable spirit. I assume that Serbian suggestion regarding your attitude is entirely unfounded, and in any case your advice, if requested, should be in favour of, and not against,

¹ This ran: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs is under the impression that British representative at Durazzo is encouraging Ahmed Bey in his opposition to conditions offered by Serbia for exchange of St Naoum.'

conciliation. What we should desire is a direct and early settlement even if this entails some sacrifices for Albania. Albanian government if they are wise will not fail to realise that their best hope lies in maintaining genuinely friendly relations with their several neighbours. They should not lose sight of the wood for the trees.

Repeated to Belgrade No. 10.

No. 84

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 21, 9 a.m.)

No. 77 Telegraphic [C 4050/1435/90]

ROME, March 20, 1925, 8.35 p.m.

My telegram No. 71.¹

Confidential.

After a week of negotiations rendered difficult by grasping attitude of Italian experts, on whom however Secretary-General exercised a very useful moderating influence, a satisfactory agreement has been reached. President of the Council has not yet been out of his room² but he received Cadman and myself there this evening and agreement was signed. There was also an exchange of letters between Italian government and Anglo-Persian Oil Company whereby former promised to apply principles of mutual co-operation and to afford the board particulars in regard to distribution of company's oil products in Italy. Company has also been given option to participate up to 45% of any Italian company formed for the purpose of distributing Albanian oil in Italy. Cadman seems well satisfied with results obtained and is leaving Rome tonight.

Report and full text of agreement and of letters exchanged are being sent by bag this evening.³

Mussolini is anxious to publish something regarding agreement but agrees that it had best be in very general terms. He proposes to issue communiqué to the effect that question between Italy and Great Britain over Albanian oil has received a friendly and satisfactory solution. I asked him to issue nothing until I had ascertained whether you had any objection or suggestions on the subject.⁴

Repeated to Durazzo.

¹ No. 79.

² See No. 48.

³ Rome despatch No. 234 of March 20 (C 4090/1435/90), not printed. On March 30, Sir J. Cadman wrote to the Foreign Office (C 4477/1435/90), giving an account of his negotiations, and expressing his indebtedness to Sir R. Graham and his staff.

⁴ Mr. Chamberlain replied (Foreign Office telegram No. 89 of March 23): 'If it be really considered essential I reluctantly agree to a communiqué, but it should be in the most general terms and afford no pretext to American government to claim that through Italian government pressure Italy has been admitted to participation (see conversation with Mr. Atherton here of February 26th [see No. 66]). I suggest it had better take the form that as a

result of direct negotiations between British and Italian oil interests a satisfactory solution of a purely business character has been reached. It is important to avoid saying anything that might allow it to be inferred that the arrangements reached have a political aspect.'

No. 85

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 92¹ Telegraphic [C 4010/3456/7]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 21, 1925, 9.30 p.m.

Bulgarian government have applied to Organ of Liquidation for permission to enrol 4,000 extra volunteer militia alleging imminent danger of communist and agrarian rising. Organ of Liquidation suggest that they should be authorised to grant permission without further reference to allied governments if trouble should materialise.²

His Majesty's Minister at Sofia refuses to admit that there is any political justification for this request³ and his view is shared by British military authorities.⁴ Greek and Serb-Croat-Slovene governments have urged us to refuse permission.⁵

There is danger that Bulgarian government may act in the same way as they did last summer and [proceed] to enrol volunteers in anticipation of allied permission unless allied governments promptly show firm attitude.⁶ Such infringement of treaty of Neuilly ought clearly not be tolerated. It therefore seems important that no chance be given to Bulgarian government to present allies with fait accompli.

Please make communication to French/Italian government on above lines adding that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government there is not time to await deliberations of Ambassadors' Conference and that Bulgarian government be informed without delay that allied governments refuse this request. Joint communication should be made by allied representatives at Sofia to this effect, and it is hoped that French/Italian government will agree to send immediate instructions accordingly.

Repeated to Sofia No. 6.

¹ No. 92 to Paris and No. 87 to Rome.

² See No. 75, n. 1.

³ See Nos. 75, 78, and 81.

⁴ The matter had been referred to the War Office in a Foreign Office letter of March 16, not printed, the War Office replying in a letter of March 19, not printed.

⁵ In notes handed into the Foreign Office on March 18, not printed.

⁶ See Vol. XXVI, No. 200.

Mr. Akers-Douglas (Vienna) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 24)

*No. 81 [C 4164/298/3]**

VIENNA, March 21, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 69 of the 5th instant,¹ I find that my French colleague has spoken to the Austrian Government asking them how they would view an attempt by the French Government to concert with London and Rome as to a possible intervention by the League of Nations in order to get the neighbouring States to make more favourable commercial arrangements with Austria.²

On hearing this I went to see M. [Caron] de Beaumarchais today and asked him whether his Government expected Austria to take any initiative. He said he had only wished to sound them as to their attitude towards any plan to help Austria's economic situation and relations and to get the League to come forward as she did in 1922.³ He said the Austrian Government might possibly have felt that the idea of coming to closer terms with other States would make their position difficult with Germany and with their own pan-German party.

The Austrian Chancellor's answer naturally was that his Government would be very pleased if anything could be done for them to secure better commercial treatment and outlets for their trade.

No other answer could be expected, and I see no particular point in approaching the Austrian Government at this juncture. But I have little doubt that the French wish to show that they are the special friends and to impress Austria with their special interest in her. The French Minister said he wondered what the attitude of Italy would be to the proposal.

It seems that if any advice or pressure could be attempted the most important places are of course Prague, Belgrade and Budapest—particularly Budapest, where the League is presumably in a better position to speak. Austria already has a commercial treaty with Czechoslovakia,⁴ although of course this might be made more favourable; and she is in preliminary negotiations for commercial treaties with Jugoslavia and Hungary.⁵

I have, etc.,

A. AKERS-DOUGLAS

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 74.

³ See No. 17, n. 4.

⁴ A Commercial Agreement of May 4, 1921 (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 121, pp. 958-94), had been added to by a further Agreement of November 27, 1924 (for the text, see *ibid.*, vol. 125, pp. 21-103). See also Vol. XXVI, No. 235.

⁵ The file relating to Austria's commercial relations with Hungary (5115/3) has not been preserved in the Foreign Office archives. In Belgrade despatch No. 349 of September 4, (C 11485/11485/92), missing from the files, it was reported that a commercial treaty between Austria and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State had been signed at Vienna on September 2.

No. 87

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 108 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4069/3356/7]

PARIS, March 22, 1925

Your telegram No. 92 (of the 21st March; temporary enrolment of volunteer militia in Bulgaria).¹

I am communicating proposals of His Majesty's Government to the French government, but I would point out that the C[omit  ] M[ilitaire] A[ll   de] V[ersailles] has been considering the application of the Bulgarian government, and that General Clive wrote on the 20th March to the D[irector of] M[ilitary] O[perations] and D[irector of] M[ilitary] I[n]telligence as regards the advice that the committee should give in the matter. The Versailles committee proposed to recommend that the allied governments should allow the enrolment subject to various conditions, because, so I understand, (1) the limit up to which the liquidating organ would permit enrolment would be only equal to the deficiency in the strength of the Bulgarian army as fixed by the treaty for the purpose of maintaining order and policing the frontiers, and (2) because if permission is refused it is to be feared that enrolment may take place notwithstanding. As the French government may want to know whether His Majesty's Government have taken into account these considerations, I would suggest that immediate instructions should be sent to General Clive so that he may be able to explain matters to Versailles committee.

Another point to bear in mind is that the allied governments may have to decide on the action which they would be prepared to take should the Bulgarian government disregard the prohibition and go on with the enrolment.

¹ No. 85.

No. 88

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 1013 [C 3896/261/21]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 23, 1925

My Lord,

I have received your despatches Nos. 654¹ (59/23/1925) and 667¹ (110/6/1925) of March 16th and 18th respectively, and transmit to Your

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

Lordship herewith copy of a letter from Sir O. Niemeyer² dealing generally with the questions of treaty charges payable by the Hungarian Government, and in particular with that of the expenditure involved in the construction of the single state factory provided for in article 115.

2. As regards the latter question, it will be seen both from Sir O. Niemeyer's letter and the report of the Finance Committee of the League of Nations,³ copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 655 of February 23rd,¹ that, briefly, the position is as follows:—

The Finance Committee have reported that in drafting the Hungarian reconstruction scheme⁴ their intention was to limit definitely, during the reconstruction period of twenty years, the total of all burdens falling upon the Hungarian budget as the result of obligations arising out of the treaty, and that no distinction was contemplated between reparation and external payments on the one hand and internal disbursements deriving directly from the treaty on the other. On February 21st, 1924, the Reparation Commission fixed the total payments to be made by Hungary until the end of 1926 at the equivalent of eight hundred and eighty tons of coal per working day, the whole of which was allotted to Jugoslavia. Any other payments made with the approval of the Reparation Commission were to be credited against the annuity and the coal deliveries correspondingly reduced.⁵

3. In view of the decision of the Finance Committee of the League it seems evident that any expenditure incurred in connection with the single state factory involving, as it would, a charge on the Hungarian budget, will have to be credited against the annuities payable by Hungary and that if the expenditure is incurred before 1927 the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government would have to consent to a corresponding reduction of the deliveries due to them. In the event of the construction of the factory being postponed until after 1927, the cost would similarly have to be deducted from the total reparation payments already fixed by the Reparation Commission and due to the allies.

4. His Majesty's Government, whilst fully appreciating the force of the arguments contained in the draft letters of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles⁶ against a decision to credit the expenditure against the annuities payable by the Hungarian Government, are of the opinion that the Finance Committee of the League of Nations, if they were to keep faith with the bondholders, had no alternative but to take the decision they did. In the circumstances, the allies must be prepared to face the fact

² Possibly his letter of March 10 to Mr. Lampson, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

¹ Of February 12, 1925. For a text, see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 522–5.

³ See No. 18, n. 5.

⁴ For a text of the communications of the Reparation Commission, see *L.N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 718–21. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 53, n. 11.

⁵ Copies of these drafts to the League of Nations and the Reparation Commission, which were communicated to the Conference of Ambassadors on March 13 are to be found in F.O. 803, vol. 26. See paragraph 7 below.

that they themselves will ultimately have to bear whatever costs are entailed in the construction of the state factory, and that it is consequently in their interest that these costs should be reduced to the lowest possible limit consistent with their military requirements.

5. I request therefore that when the Reparation Commission's letter of March 12th⁷ comes before the Ambassadors' Conference Your Lordship will emphasise the above consideration, and in addition adduce the following arguments in favour of the splitting up of the factory.

(1) That both the British and Italian members of the Commission of Control at Budapest (i.e. the majority) have recorded their opinion in favour of this policy.

(2) That, whereas the cost of the construction of all sections of the factory in one locality would amount to approximately one hundred and sixty thousand pounds to one hundred and eighty thousand pounds, the factory split up into four sections is estimated only to cost approximately twenty four thousand pounds.

(3) That, whereas the former would take one and a half years to construct, the latter can be completed within six months.

(4) That the report of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles (enclosed in your despatch No. 227 of January 28th last),⁸ indicates that from a purely military point of view there is no very considerable advantage to be gained by insisting upon the construction of the factory in one locality.

(5) That in the larger interests of a final settlement and the early withdrawal of the Allied Control Commission, it is undesirable that the Hungarian Government should be presented with a demand which not only they cannot comply with without financially penalising the allies themselves but which, as experience has demonstrated, they are determined not to meet and for the enforcement of which the allies are presumably not prepared to employ any effective means either military or financial.

6. If, as I trust will be the case, you are able to obtain the assent of the Ambassadors' Conference to the course of action now proposed by His Majesty's Government you are authorised to agree to a reply being returned to the Reparation Commission's enquiries without further instructions from me. No communication on the subject should, however, be addressed to the Hungarian Government until such time as the Reparation Commission has formally notified the conference of its consent to the expenditure being incurred.

7. Whilst for the reasons stated in paragraph 4 above it is improbable that the considerations advanced by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles will influence the decisions of the League of Nations or the Reparation Commission, there is no objection to their being put forward,

⁷ Enclosed in Paris despatch No. 667 of March 18, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁸ No. 23.

and you are consequently authorised to concur in the terms of both draft letters enclosed in your despatch No. 654.¹

I am, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

HAROLD NICOLSON

No. 89

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 24, 1.15 p.m.)

No. [109] Telegraphic: by telephone [C 4219/3456/7]

PARIS, March 24, 1925

Following from [Sargent].

My telegram No. 108 March 22nd.¹ Temporary enrolment of militia in Bulgaria.

French government agree with view of His Majesty's Government² that Bulgarian government's request should be refused. They were going to telegraph instructions to their minister in Sofia³ accordingly but have delayed doing so for present as a telegram in the meantime has been received by the Versailles Committee from the liquidating organ, reporting that it has without waiting for instructions from the Versailles Committee authorized the Bulgarian government to enrol provisionally 3,000 militia-men, stress being laid on the preventative character of the measure and that it has stipulated that these militia-men shall be volunteers and that they must be disbanded not later than 31st May.⁴

The Versailles Committee is meeting to consider the situation thus created. Please let me know if you wish me to press for the liquidating organ to be told to cancel or at any rate suspend the decision which it has given. I would also suggest that you arrange for instructions to be sent to General Clive.

¹ No. 87.

² See No. 85.

³ M. E. Dard.

⁴ A copy of the reply of the Liquidation Organ of March 19 was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Sofia despatch No. 64 of March 26, not printed.

No. 90

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 94 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4069/3456/7]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 24, 1925

Your telegram No. 108 (of March 22nd).¹ Temporary enrolment of

¹ No. 87.

additional volunteer militia in Bulgaria).

Our telegram to you No. 92 (of March 21st)² was drafted in ignorance of the fact that organ of liquidation at Sofia had already given permission to Bulgarian government to enrol 3,000 volunteers.³ We have thus been presented with a fait accompli which I agree will be difficult to reverse. In all the circumstances therefore I feel that proposal of Versailles Committee should be accepted; but we must insist that the organ of liquidation should be instructed not to take any further decisions of this nature without reference to Versailles Committee and that our representative on that Committee should refer home before committing himself to decisions or recommendations having an obvious political aspect.

Repeated to Rome No. 93 and Sofia No. 8 in 'D'.

² No. 85.

³ See No. 89.

No. 91

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 26, 9 a.m.)

No. 10 Telegraphic [C 4299/3456/7]

SOFIA, March 25, 1925, 10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 94 to Paris.¹

Major Neate has kept me in ignorance of independent decision of organ of liquidation² of which I now learn for the first time from your telegram. He had previously informed me that question had been submitted to Versailles Committee for decision and I have failed to obtain from him any adequate explanation of action of organ or of his neglect to inform me of it.

He now states that final letter of authorisation has not yet been sent to Bulgarian government.

In view of receipt today of a telegram from Marshal Foch³ enquiring reasons for their action organ are informing Bulgarian government that in view of instructions just received they are obliged to submit matter to allied governments for definite decision.⁴

It is therefore still open to latter to refuse but as in a letter of March 19th organ informed Bulgarian government⁵ that they were taking responsibility of granting permission on behalf of allied governments

¹ No. 90.

² See No. 89.

³ President of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles.

⁴ This decision was notified in a letter of March 25 to the Bulgarian Government a copy of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Sofia despatch No. 64 of March 26, not printed.

⁵ A copy of their communication was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Sofia despatch No. 64 of March 26.

subject to certain conditions which Bulgarian government have since accepted,⁶ refusal will now be more difficult.⁷

⁶ In a letter of March 23, a copy of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Sofia despatch No. 64 of March 26.

⁷ In Sofia telegram No. 11 of March 31, Mr. Erskine reported: 'Bulgarian government have informed Liquidation Organ in reply to their letter of March 25th that they have ordered suspension of enrolment pending decision of allied governments but that in view of authorisation accorded in Organ's letter of March 19th they had already enlisted a certain number of volunteers whom they proposed to retain, situation being less tranquil than Organ believes.'

No. 92

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 27, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 115 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4333/3456/7]

PARIS, March 26, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning, under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present. Mr. Phipps¹ attended on my behalf.

1. In order to clear up the situation regarding the enrolment of additional militiamen in Bulgaria, Mr. Phipps communicated to the Conference the substance of your telegram No. 94.² Marshal Foch in reply read out a telegram³ which had just been received from the Liquidating Organ (copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 743),⁴ which shows that, owing to the subsequent abstention of the British member, the authorisation granted to the Bulgarian government has been suspended by the Liquidating Organ pending further instructions from the Allied Military Committee of Versailles. Marshal Foch proposes that, before taking a definite decision in the matter, the Allied Military Committee of Versailles should await the arrival of the further documents now on their way from Sofia. This was agreed to. I should be glad to know whether, in view of this further development, you still hold the view that the enrolment of the militiamen should be authorised, subject to the conditions proposed by the Versailles Committee.⁵

...⁶9. The Conference considered a letter from the Reparation

¹ Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris.

² No. 90.

³ Of March 25, not printed.

⁴ Of March 26, not printed.

⁵ Foreign Office telegram No. 98 of March 30 in reply ran: 'We do not like the authorisation and never have. We only yielded because we thought our hand had been forced. We are not sure *now* how far it is possible or desirable to refuse the application without hopelessly compromising the position and prestige of the Organ of Liquidation. But as the French apparently share our views on whole situation we are prepared to fall in with whatever solution they think best in the circumstances and we hereby leave you full discretion to settle the matter in concert with them.'

⁶ The sections omitted referred to other matters. Sections 2-12 were despatched by a later bag and were received in the Foreign Office on March 28, at 8.30 a.m.

Commission⁷ (copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 667 of the 18th March)⁸ regarding the payment of the costs of the Hungarian Commission of Control, the boundary commissions, and the single state factory, in view of the League of Nations' scheme⁹ whereby all treaty charges are to be met out of a fixed annuity payable by the Hungarian government. As regards the Commission of Control the arrangements made appear satisfactory. As regards the boundary commissions, it was decided to communicate to the Reparation Commission an estimate of the costs likely to be incurred by the allied governments, and to express the hope that in view of the small amount involved an attempt might be made to refund this expenditure forthwith. As regards the single state factory, it was decided to instruct the Allied Military Committee of Versailles to prepare an answer to the three questions put by the Reparation Commission. Mr. Phipps took this opportunity of communicating the wishes expressed in your despatch No. 1013 of the 23rd instant¹⁰ regarding the desirability of reducing the cost of the single state factory by allowing it to be split up among the already existing factories. It was accordingly agreed that the Allied Military Committee of Versailles should reconsider this question in the light of the arguments used in your despatch No. 1013.

On the recommendation of the Versailles Committee (see my despatch No. 654 of March 16th)⁸ it was decided to write to the Reparation Commission and to the League of Nations pointing out the effect of treating as treaty charges the expenditure incurred in the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty of Trianon. . . .⁶

⁷ Of March 12.

⁸ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁹ See No. 18, n. 5.

¹⁰ No. 88.

No. 93

Sir M. Cheetham (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 14)

*No. 114 [C 5061/251/62]**

ATHENS, March 31, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 89 of the 6th March last,¹ I have the honour to inform you that the date for the reopening at Belgrade of negotiations for the renewal of the treaty between Greece and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State has been again postponed. It does not now seem probable that conversations will be continued before about the end of April, and I have heard it stated that no conclusions may be expected before June.

¹ Not printed. See, however, No. 70.

2. M. Caclamanos, whom I have seen several times, does not appear to be pleased with this prospect, and he told me on one occasion that he did not quite understand the Serbian attitude with regard to certain aspects of the Salonica Railway question. He did not offer any precise explanations of his perplexity, but he is evidently suspicious that there may be some perhaps unexpected development of Serbian demands in this connection.

3. With reference to my despatch No. 101 of the 18th March,² I have recently noticed several statements in reliable Athens journals to the effect that an understanding between Roumania and Greece is once more being discussed with the object of forming with Serbia a Balkan block. I asked M. Caclamanos if he could give me any confirmation of these rumours. He said at once that they were quite true. The initiative had come from Bucharest, and M. Langa-Rascano, the Roumanian Minister here, who has been the protagonist of these ideas, was shortly returning to Athens after a long leave. The Hellenic Government had immediately referred the Roumanian suggestions to Belgrade in order to forestall any possible misunderstanding on the part of their presumptive ally. It had been arranged, M. Caclamanos asserted, that the matter should be examined as soon as the Græco-Serbian negotiations had reached a final stage. I gathered that the proposed agreement or alliance was not in any case intended to apply outside the Balkans, and would not, for instance, in the intention of its promoters, carry any obligations in case of a Russian attack on Bessarabia.

4. In the light of this more recent information it is worth while recording that, before he left Athens at the beginning of the year, the Roumanian Minister told me that the prospects of an understanding between Serbia, Roumania and Greece were increasing. He contemplated that the future co-operation of the three countries would be based on economic agreements to be concluded between them, of which the use of Greek ports by the vessels of the other two countries would be an important feature.

5. It seems to me that, if such an understanding as the above could ever mature without interference with the sovereign rights of this country, Greece would have everything to gain from an alliance which would presumably afford security against Bulgarian or Turkish aggression and strengthen her diplomatic position in other directions.

I have, etc.,

MILNE CHEETHAM

P.S.—A good deal of the information supplied in this despatch with regard to the rumours of a Græco-Roumanian alliance has, since I wrote, been confirmed by statements which have appeared in the Athens press. The 'Eleutheron Vema' adds that after the conclusion of the two treaties

² Not printed.

(with Yugoslavia and Roumania) Greece will be received in the Little Entente.

April 2, 1925

M.C.

No. 94

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 3, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 124 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4656/127/90]

PARIS, April 2, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions. Mr. Phipps attended on my behalf.

...¹ 2. Mr. Phipps reminded the Conference that in order to give more time to negotiations proceeding between the Albanian and Yugo-Slav Governments, the Conference had agreed to postpone until the 1st April² the announcement of the line which the Albanian frontier is to take in the neighbourhood of St. Naoum, as well as the meeting of the Albanian boundary commission for the purpose of settling the other outstanding questions affecting the Yugo-Slav—Albanian frontier. As the 1st April had now come and gone without the negotiations having reached any agreement, Mr. Phipps proposed that the Conference should proceed forthwith to put into force its resolution of the 21st [*sic*] February (see my telegram No. 74, of February 2[3rd], paragraph 4).³ Monsieur Cambon announced that a telegram had just been received from the Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the negotiations had been broken off and asking the Conference to settle the points at issue. This information had been confirmed unofficially by the Yugo-Slav Legation.⁴ In these circumstances the Conference decided that the St. Naoum decision should be notified forthwith and that the boundary commission should be summoned to meet in Paris on the 20th April. ...¹

¹ The section(s) omitted referred to other matters.

² Reported in Paris despatch No. 653 of March 16, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

³ No. 63.

⁴ In Durazzo telegram No. 30 of April 1, Mr. Eyres reported: 'President of the Republic sent me word yesterday that he and Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister had agreed to refer (? frontier) question back to Conference of Ambassadors with ulterior idea of possibility of coming to some mutual arrangement at some future date if Serb-Croat-Slovene government were so disposed.'

Notes on the Activities of the Soviet Government in the Balkans

[C 4916/251/62]

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 6, 1925*

At first sight the Balkans offer poor soil for Marxian seed as communist doctrines do not generally find a welcome amongst peasant proprietors. The Third International, however, hides its real object, and realising that a class war is doomed to failure in the Balkans, gets into touch with all malcontents and minorities and strives to aid the forces of disorder by exploiting economic and political grievances of which there is an abundance. The advance base of the Third International is at Vienna where a secret conference of Balkan parties was held in May 1924 under the Presidency of one Goldstein. Generally the objects of the Soviet discussed at that conference may be summarised as follows:

- (1) To render Jugoslavia politically and militarily impotent.
- (2) To set up in place of Jugoslavia and Bulgaria a series of small States nominally federated but really depending on Russia.
- (3) To weaken Roumania by internal disorder and to seize Bessarabia.
- (4) To satisfy the Macedonian autonomists by handing over to them large portions of what is now Greek territory.

Evidence of their activities is seen from the following:—

A. Roumania

- (a) The establishment at the end of 1924 of a Moldavian Republic¹ on the Russian side of the Dneister with the object of encouraging a revolutionary movement in Bessarabia.
- (b) Armed raids across the Dneister and military diversions all along the Bessarabian frontier, the object of which is to create unrest and uncertainty in Roumania. The natural result is increased vigilance on the part of the Roumanian army, an increased purchase of war material and the setting up of large munition factories.
- (c) The creation of unrest in the Dobrudja and the support of insurrectionary movements amongst the minorities in Transylvania and the Bukowina.
- (d) The spread of disaffection and sedition in the army, and the setting up of 'cells' of disloyalty in the ranks.
- (e) The secret transmission of arms to the minorities in Transylvania and Bessarabia.

B. Action in Bulgaria

- (a) Landing of arms at Varna and communist riots in the unsettled northern portion of Bulgaria.
- (b) The instigation of the blood feud between the Bulgarian commun-

¹ On October 12, 1924.

ists and the Tsankov Government resulting in a large number of political murders and the request of the Bulgarian Government to increase her armed forces in self-protection.² This results in suspicion [and] a state of tension amongst the neighbouring States of Bulgaria regarding her ultimate motives.

(c) Revolutionary propaganda amongst the discontented refugees in Bulgaria.

(d) Support given to the federalist portion of the Macedonian comitadji which results in raiding and counter-raiding on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier.

C. Yugoslavia

The quarrel between the Serbs and the Croats has been embittered by the alliance of the Croat Leader, Radic, with the Peasant International³ which is now known to be an organ of the Third International.

D. Greece

Soviet activities in Greece take the form of aiding strikes and in forming trouble amongst the refugees and ex-soldiers. Mainly thro' the agency of the Soviet Legation in Athens.

Information from Secret Sources

(1) On January 15th the Polit Bureau decided on military operations on the Roumanian frontier in order to enforce a plebiscite in Bessarabia. At the same time 15,000,000 gold roubles were voted to the Moldavian Republic for 'military purposes'. Pavlov, a Bolshevik emissary in the Balkans, recommended the discontinuance of the armed raids across the Dneister and that the Moldavian Republic should support a rising of the Hungarian minorities by sending an army into Roumania. This seems to show that the Soviet Gov[ernmen]t are directly responsible for the disturbances on the Bessarabian frontier.

(2) From the minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Third International of January 17th it appears that Bukharin⁴ and Kolarov⁵ classify the Bulgarian Communist Party as 'down and out' owing to the fact that the monthly subsidy from Moscow had not been paid regularly. Bukharin also proposed that the Bulgarian Communists should now be ordered to refrain from terrorism, thus proving that the murders in Sofia were at least in part the result of orders from Moscow. On February 17th 1925 the Polit Bureau decided to increase the credit of the Central Committee of the Balkan Communist Party by 350,000 gold roubles, and the S[erbo] C[roat] S[lovene] Communist Party by 250,000 gold roubles (for military purposes).

² See No. 75.

³ This had been negotiated during M. Radic's visit to Moscow in 1924 (see Vol. XXVI, No. 190).

⁴ Editor of *Pravda*.

⁵ Secretary of the Third International, and of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

Sir M. Cheetham (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 27)

No. 122 [C 5608/145/19]

ATHENS, April 13, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 115 of the 2nd instant,¹ I have the honour to report that the debate on the Dodecanese in the Italian Chamber on March 26th and 27th² last formed the subject of an interpellation in the Greek Chamber on the 4th instant by Doctor Zervos,³ who spoke at some length, detailing the recent political history of the Dodecanese and concluding that in spite of Monsieur Mussolini's statements the question of the islands was not a *chose jugée*, but that Greek rights to the island[s] had been especially reserved by Monsieur Venizelos when he signed the Treaty of Lausanne.⁴ Doctor Zervos went on to say that the Dodecanesians were, and intended to remain, Greeks, and that they had no intention of suffering a fate similar to that of the fourteen villages of Epirus.⁵ He warned Italy not to emulate the fate of Austria who thought to crush Serbia⁶ but found she had made a miscalculation which cost her her Empire. Let her, rather, liberate the islands and earn the undying gratitude of the inhabitants.

2. Monsieur Michalacopoulos replied that he could not, in the interests of the country, permit a debate on the interpellation of Doctor Zervos. It was well known, he added, that since 1911 the Dodecanese question had, from the point of view of international law, suffered various changes, of which the Treaty of Lausanne was the latest. All Greek Governments since 19[21?] had expressed their sincere willingness to render relations with Italy more close, not only from a point of view of commerce and finance but also from that of friendship. He had no reason to think that the same desire did not exist in Italy: as to when, however, it would be possible for a debate to take place in the Greek Chamber, that was a question of the right moment.

¹ Not printed.

² An account of a speech given by Signor Mussolini on March 27 was given in Rome despatch No. 257 of March 28, not printed.

³ A native of the Dodecanese. In 1926, he published '*La Question du Dodécanèse et Ses Documents Diplomatiques*' (Athens, 1926).

⁴ See Cmd. 1929, *Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and Other Instruments signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, together with Agreements between Greece and Turkey signed on January 30, 1923, and Subsidiary Documents forming part of the Turkish Peace Settlement . . .* (H.M.S.O., 1923). For M. Venizelos's reservation of January 29, see *D.D.I.*, vol. I, pp. 341-3.

⁵ These had been placed within the boundaries of Albania. See Vol. XXII, Chap. II, *passim*, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 148, 152, 165, 167, 184, 187, 192, 223, 226, 240, 243, and 254. See also E. Stickney, *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 1912-1923* (Stanford, 1926).

⁶ i.e. in 1914, with the presentation of an ultimatum to Serbia after the assassination by a Serb of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

3. General Gonatas (leader of the 'Revolutionary Group' to which Doctor Zervos also belongs) said that it was right for protests to be heard against Monsieur Mussolini's statement that the Dodecanese question was finished, for this would remove any idea which might exist that Doctor Zervos's voice found no echo in the hearts of the representatives of the Nation. Greece did not consider the Dodecanese question terminated by the Treaty of Lausanne, and he had reason to believe that the same view was shared in a wider international circle, and even among the more moderate statesmen of Italy herself.

4. Monsieur Papanastassiou said that, as the Premier had stated that he could not permit a debate on the Dodecanese question, he would not dispute his ruling. But he would say that Doctor Zervos's remarks expressed the feelings of the whole Greek people which considered the Dodecanese question to be a national injustice. He was sure that the greater part of the Italian people who knew the meaning of a foreign yoke shared the same view.

I have, etc.,
MILNE CHEETHAM

No. 97

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 16)

*No. 893 [C 5167/3456/7]**

PARIS, April 15, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your telegram No. 98 of the 30th ultimo¹ regarding the temporary enrolment of additional volunteer militia in Bulgaria, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the report by the Comité militaire allié de Versailles,² which takes into account the independent action taken in this matter by the Liquidating Organ, as reported in my telegrams Nos. 109³ and 115, paragraph 1.⁴

On the strength of the authority given to me by your telegram No. 98, I approved this report, and arrangements were made for effect to be given to it, by means of a resolution of the Ambassadors' Conference, without waiting for the actual meeting of the conference. Copy of this resolution⁵

¹ See No. 92, n. 5.

² Of April 4, not printed.

³ No. 89.

⁴ No. 92.

⁵ Of April 9. This ran as follows: 'Il est décidé:

'1. De faire connaître au Gouvernement bulgare que, pour tenir compte de la situation intérieure actuelle en Bulgarie, les Gouvernements alliés l'autorisent:

'(A) A enrôler provisoirement 3,000 miliciens, sous la réserve que:

(a) Les miliciens seront exclusivement des volontaires;

(b) L'enrôlement sera provisoire et tous les miliciens devront être licenciés au plus tard le 31 mai 1915;

(c) Le licenciement devra être prononcé à n'importe quel moment, dans les huit jours,

is enclosed herewith. A telegram⁶ was addressed to the Liquidating Organ on the 10th instant in the sense of the resolution, and a note is also being sent to the Bulgarian Minister in Paris on the subject.

I have, etc.,

CREWE

suivant une injonction de l'Organe de Liquidation;

'(B) A conserver provisoirement les *détachements spéciaux*, d'un effectif global de 600 hommes, qu'il a constitués sur son territoire, et qu'il devra également dissoudre dans les délais que lui fixera l'Organe de Liquidation.

L'Organe de Liquidation sera mis par le Gouvernement bulgare en mesure de contrôler le nombre, le mode de recrutement, la provenance des cadres et l'armement, l'effectif et le lieu de stationnement ainsi que la mission de ces éléments de renforts, qu'il s'agisse des miliciens volontaires ou des détachements spéciaux.

2. Faire connaître la présente décision au Gouvernement serbe-croat-slovène. . . .

3. D'inviter l'Organe de Liquidation à ne plus autoriser à l'avenir le Gouvernement bulgare à renforcer même provisoirement ses forces armées sans en avoir au préalable référé à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs.'

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ M. B. Morfov.

No. 98

Mr. Akers-Douglas (Vienna) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 21)

*No. 90 [C 5332/298/3]**

VIENNA, April 15, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 81 of the 21st March last,¹ I have the honour to report that the Austrian Government hope to be able to claim at the June meeting of the League of Nations Council that they have practically fulfilled all the requirements laid down at Geneva in so far as internal financial reforms are concerned. I think, however, that while it is true that almost all the required measures have been passed by Parliament the claim is rather optimistic unless the all-important problem of the financial relations between the State and the provinces is solved; and this question of the control of provincial expenditure is still pending, although the Chancellor recently assured me that he believed a compromise would shortly be reached in spite even of the obstinacy of the Vienna Municipality. It remains to be seen what form this compromise will take. Meanwhile, I draw attention to certain hopeful remarks made by the Finance Minister,² reported in a separate despatch,³ in the course of a speech made yesterday at Graz, in which also he not only recognised the urgent necessity of further economies, but seemed to show determination that these should be carried out however unpopular they might be.

It is indeed possible that Austria may be able to show a fairly satisfactory

¹ No. 86.

² Dr. J. Ahrer.

³ Vienna despatch No. 93 of April 17, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

equilibrium of her State budget, but it has become more and more evident to everybody that economic stability is a far more difficult and important problem for Austrian existence. I believe the intention of the Austrian Government, when they make their forthcoming appeal to the League, is to state at the same time that if a general economic as well as financial stability is to be reached as a condition of the withdrawal of control, this cannot be done unless better commercial relations can be established between Austria and her neighbours, in order to enable Austrian trade to find its outlets. With this idea the Government propose at once to ask the League to cause an expert enquiry to be made and a report furnished to the League Council upon the economic situation in Central Europe, the difficulties encountered by Austrian industry and the question of how existing restrictions on trade and communications can best be removed. For this purpose the committee (Hauptausschuss) of the National Assembly has been called together, and the Chancellor will, it is believed, make a statement to the effect that the League of Nations has let it be understood that something should be done as soon as possible with a view to improving the economic situation in this part of the world.

My French colleague informs me that his Government is very anxious to get the League to take some action; that His Majesty's Government, so he is informed, are in entire agreement; and that the present move being made by the Austrian Government is in accordance with some understanding already reached at Geneva. Both M. de Beaumarchais and I agree that a League of Nations committee, comprising, for instance, a Czech and an Italian member, could hardly be expected to put forward any concrete proposals as to tariff or other advantages to be accorded to Austria by Czechoslovakia, Italy, Hungary and Yugoslavia. This is also Dr. Zimmerman's⁴ view. Moreover, the whole question is extremely complicated on account of the most-favoured-nation treatment to which several countries would be entitled if the succession States, who already have commercial treaties with Austria, *i.e.*, Italy⁵ and Czechoslovakia,⁶ were to accord special advantages to Austria. For this and other reasons it would obviously be better that an outside independent report first be made to the League, which might possibly then be able in some way to bring Austria's neighbours to agree together, for the common good and the general economic advantage to themselves, as well as to Austria herself, to some special commercial arrangements regarding traffic, trade and Austrian exports. I understand it is already practically decided that the expert enquiry already referred to will be made at a very early date by an English and a French economic expert.

The ex-Chancellor, M[onsi]g[no]r Seipel, believes that success is only

⁴ Dr. Zimmerman was the League of Nation Commissioner-General for Austria. He was charged with the supervision of Austrian finances.

⁵ For the text of the treaty of commerce and navigation of April 28, 1923, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 629-91.

⁶ See No. 86, n. 4.

likely to be obtained if the problem is treated as one concerning all the succession States with a view to the improvement of the whole economic system of Central Europe. He is probably right, but the remembrance of the failure of the Porto Rose Conference⁷ and the existence of so much rivalry and divergence of interests among the States does not conduce to optimism in regard to any co-operation.

I attach a translation of a semi-official statement which has appeared in the press,⁸ and shows the attitude of the Austrian Government with regard to the subjects dealt with in this despatch.⁹

I have, etc.,

A. AKERS-DOUGLAS

⁷ This conference to promote freer trade and communication within the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire met October 29–November 25, 1921. For the text of the agreements signed on November 23 between the Successor States, see *Trattati e Convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli Altri Stati*, vol. 27 (Rome, 1931), pp. 359–419.

⁸ Of April 12, not printed.

⁹ In Vienna telegram No. 5 of April 16, Mr. Akers-Douglas reported: 'Austrian government have sent following telegram to their representative at Geneva.

'Begins.

'According to September agreement [*sic*: October. See No. 17, n. 4] confidence in economic situation is necessary for termination of financial control. Please request League of Nations to have situation examined as soon as possible by small body of non-political experts in order to establish effect of economic and commercial conditions on progress of Austrian reconstruction.

'Ends'.

No. 99

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 19, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 15 Telegraphic [C 5253/3456/7]

SOFIA, April 18, 1925, 10 p.m.

Following for Director of Military Intelligence from Major Neate.

Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned members of organ of liquidation yesterday afternoon.

He said that government considered recent terrorist action as part or preliminary of organized Communist campaign.¹ Evidence of plans to attack railways and communications had come to light in last two or three days. He expressed great anxiety as to government's ability to deal with

¹ A Communist Deputy, M. K. Stoyanov, had been murdered in Sofia on March 6. The murder on April 14 of the Democratic *Entente* Deputy, General K. Georgieff, was at first thought to be an act of revenge, but proved part of a plan to blow up the Bulgarian Cabinet attending General Georgieff's funeral in Sofia Cathedral on April 16. The bomb in the Cathedral killed at least 160 people, but of the Cabinet only the President of the Council and Minister of War received slight injuries. A full account of the bombing is given in Sofia despatch No. 79 of April 23, not printed.

the situation with the existing forces and also emphasized the necessity for guarding the railways and bridges throughout the country.

He asked permission to raise 10,000 men for this purpose additional to 3,000 already approved.²

The whole 13,000 to be dismissed as soon as the situation is calm.

Organ of liquidation promised to examine the question favourably and have asked for telegraphic instructions from Paris.

Though I am decidedly of the opinion that the present danger of the situation is brought about by terrorist methods of the government, it appears that the government's anxiety for public safety is for the moment genuine and extra men demanded are intended for the purpose stated and do not disguise other military objects. I therefore consider some concession should be allowed.³

Repeated to Belgrade.

² See No. 97, n. 5.

³ In Sofia telegram No. 16 of April 18, Mr. Erskine reported: 'My immediately preceding telegram.

'Minister for Foreign Affairs made similar statement to me yesterday begging me to support request and adding that government intended at once to take preparatory measures for enrolment.

'As an additional reason for requiring extra men he alleged danger from Serbia who was encouraging passage of bands and intended to follow similar policy towards Bulgaria as towards Albania in recent revolution. He went so far as to accuse Serb-Croat-Slovene government of responsibility both for the attack on the King [on April 14, an armed band fired on King Boris while driving. Two of his companions were killed] and the bomb outrage.

'The horrible character of the latter has greatly exasperated public opinion and will almost inevitably lead to sanguinary reprisals, reports of which have unofficially already reached me. It is argued by my French and Italian colleagues [Signor S. Rinella] who are strongly in favour of granting request for extra troops that such reprisals being largely inspired by fear will be extensive if government feel they have (not?) sufficient force at their disposal to overawe subversive element.

'Personally I see no reason to modify my view that there is little danger of a serious outbreak and I think Communists will restrict their activities for the present to isolated acts of terrorism which it is the task of police and gendarmerie rather than the army to prevent.

'In view however of opinion both of my French and Italian colleagues and of organ of liquidation, I find it difficult to advise rejection of Bulgarian government's request. I would suggest we should be instructed to warn Bulgarian government of deplorable impression which would be caused by taking wholesale reprisals in the event of request being granted.'

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 21, 9 a.m.)

No. 18 Telegraphic [C 5353/1142/7]

SOFIA, April 20, 1925, 10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 12.¹

I communicated your message of sympathy this morning to Minister for Foreign Affairs who asked me to transmit his sincere thanks.

I also read to him substance of your telegram No. 13² which reached me most opportunely as, feeling that warning was urgently required, I was just starting for Ministry in order to speak seriously of folly of arresting moderate agrarian leaders and to call his attention to reports circulating as to summary shooting of large numbers of Communists. In speaking to him in this sense, I warned him of deplorable impression which these reports, if verified, would produce abroad. His Excellency said that in most cases agrarians had been arrested in order to protect them. I am sceptical as to this but one or two appear now to have been released. As regards indiscriminate killing of Communists, he said that some had been shot when resisting arrest but admitted that there had no doubt been regrettable incidents which had, however, mostly been perpetrated by civil guard who had been called up to supplement the regular forces. But he said that it had been decided by the Cabinet scrupulously to avoid any indiscriminate reprisals and that strict orders to this effect had been given in order to avoid criticism incurred in connection with the suppression of the rising of September 1923.³ I omitted to mention that in conversation with His Excellency reported in my telegram No. 16,⁴ I stated my opinion that the extreme severity of that repression and harsh administrative methods of government were responsible for the present situation.

His Excellency informed me that the two authors of outrage have been captured and that chief organiser, an ex-officer, was killed this morning while resisting arrest.

House to house perquisitions [*sic*] are still being carried out, government being apprehensive of further outrages.

¹ Of April 19. This stated: 'You should inform Bulgarian government that His Majesty's Government are horrified at the occurrence [i.e. the cathedral bomb: see No. 99, n. 1] and assure them of our sympathy. . . . I leave it to your discretion to decide whether if an opportunity occurs it would be useful to add that the Bulgarian government will meet with nothing but sympathy in necessary measures for discovery and punishment of guilty *provided* it does not make this horrible outrage an excuse for persecution of mere political opponents. . . .'

² Of April 19. This was sent as an addition to Foreign Office telegram No. 12.

³ See Vol. XXIV, Nos. 536, 564, and 565.

⁴ See No. 99, n. 3.

No. 101

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 21, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 152 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5317/3456/7]

Urgent

PARIS, April 20, 1925

My telegrams Nos. 150¹ and 151² of April 19th and 20th.

At meeting of Versailles Military Committee this morning, draft telegram to Liquidation Organ³ enclosed in my despatch No. 923⁴ was approved by French and Italian delegations.

British representative withheld his consent pending receipt of your instructions.

¹ In this, Lord Crewe asked for instructions for the British representative on the Allied Military Committee of Versailles with regard to the Bulgarian Government's request for additional recruitment (see No. 99).

² Not printed.

³ This draft authorised the enrolment of an additional 10,000 militia men, under the conditions laid down for the previous request (see No. 97, n. 5).

⁴ Of April 20, not printed.

No. 102

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 106 Telegraphic [C 5258/3456/7]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 21, 1925, 3.25 p.m.

Your despatches Nos. 912¹ and 923² (of April 19th:— Bulgarian army).

From Mr. Erskine's telegrams Nos. 15,³ 16,⁴ and 17,⁵ and Sir R. Graham's telegram No. 95,⁶ it is clear that French and Italian opinion is in favour of granting request. His Majesty's Government feel that they must not be the cause of delay in dealing with very difficult position of Bulgarian government, and they appreciate fact that continental nations are apt to use military force where in this country we should look to police. If, therefore, as I suppose, French and Italian representatives are favourable to granting request, you should also agree, but please consider whether you can get them to couple the permission with a warning on the lines of the last paragraph of my telegram No. 12 to Sofia.⁷

At the same time Sir A. Young's telegram No. 33⁸ makes me

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 101, n. 3.

³ No. 99.

⁴ See *ibid.* n. 3.

⁵ Of April 18, not printed.

⁶ Of April 19. In this, Sir R. Graham reported that Signor Mussolini considered that the Bulgarian request to enrol 10,000 militiamen was reasonable and should be accorded without delay.

⁷ See No. 100, n. 1.

⁸ Of April 19, not printed.

apprehensive lest Serb–Croat–Slovene government may make some move which might lead to international complications. Your Excellency should, therefore sound your French and Italian colleagues as to a joint communication being made to Serb–Croat–Slovene government. French⁹ Italian and British ministers at Belgrade might be instructed to notify Serb–Croat–Slovene government that their governments have granted request of Bulgarian government solely in the interests of European peace and because they are convinced that extra forces are necessary for restoration of internal order in the country; that they have imposed the condition that these additional troops will be disbanded as soon as the situation permits; and that they are confident that Serb–Croat–Slovene government will not only abstain from any action which might further complicate situation, but will take all necessary steps to prevent their territory being used as base for attacking the existing Bulgarian régime.

Repeated to Rome, No. 110. Sofia No. 14. and Belgrade No. 14.

⁹ M.J. Grenard.

No. 103

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 154 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5418/3456/7]

PARIS, April 22, 1925

Your telegram No. 106 of April 21st.¹ In view of the fact that for the last two days Marshal Foch has been pressing this Embassy most strongly to agree to instructions being sent to the Organ of Liquidation to authorize the enrolment of the additional ten thousand men asked for by the Bulgarian Government, the Military Attaché² on my instructions this morning gave his consent to the despatch of the telegram, the draft of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 923 of April 20th.³

It was at the same time intimated to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that there were certain communications which you wished made to the Bulgarian and Serb–Croat–Slovene governments and at a secretaries' meeting this afternoon representatives of this Embassy submitted draft communications on the lines of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 106.¹

French and Italian representatives made little difficulty about accepting these drafts in principle, though they asked that they might be of a slightly more general character. The French representative also asked for time to inform his government. I hope, however, that the notes, which are addressed to the Bulgarian and Serbian Ministers here, may go off tonight or at latest tomorrow morning.

¹ No. 102.

² Major-General Clive.

³ See No. 101, n. 3.

The French representative said that the French Minister at Belgrade had already urged moderation on the Serb-Croat-Slovene government and Italian representative said that he was under the impression that Italian Minister at Belgrade had done the same. You may, therefore, think it well that, in addition to the communication to be made by the Conference to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister here, Sir A. Young should speak to the Serb-Croat-Slovene government independently.¹

¹ Foreign Office telegram No. 107 of April 23 in reply ran: '... What we had contemplated and still desire is that our views should go to those governments by *telegram* and we still think that procedure desirable. ...'

On April 24, Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir A. Young as follows in telegram No. 27: 'If your French and Italian colleagues have as stated urged moderation on Serb-Croat-Slovene government in connection with situation in Bulgaria, you should take similar action basing your representations on considerations in my telegram No. 106 to Paris (of April 21st) [No. 102].'

No. 104

Mr. Akers-Douglas (Vienna) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 28)

*No. 99 [C 5685/251/62]**

Confidential

VIENNA, April 22, 1925

Sir,

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to visit him today, and expressed himself as greatly perturbed and somewhat indignant about certain articles appearing in the 'Times', the 'Morning Post' and the 'Daily Telegraph', in which Vienna was alleged to be the headquarters of the 'Pan-Balkan Communist Union' and the place from which all Soviet propaganda for the Balkans was directed. He referred to the 'Times' of the 18th April, the 'Daily Telegraph' of the 18th and 20th April and the 'Morning Post' of the 21st April, and more particularly to the leading article in the 'Times' of the 20th April, in which it is said that, 'owing to the supineness of the Austrian Government, Vienna is rapidly acquiring the reputation of being the most dangerous centre of Communist or Communist-inspired intrigue outside Soviet Russia'. Such statements, he said, were quite unfounded, and must, moreover, do a great deal of harm throughout the world to Austria, who was doing her best to acquire prestige, establish her credit in the eyes of Europe and was now approaching the League of Nations to make a further effort to help her to consolidate her economic position.¹ He could not understand how the British press had got hold of this grossly exaggerated (to say the least of it) idea of Bolshevik and Communist activities in Vienna. He made some reference to a statement which (so I understood) had been made to the

¹ See No. 98.

Foreign Office by the Serbian Minister in London.²

As regards Communism in Vienna, Dr. Mataja observed that its importance and activity have fallen so much during the last two years that it is now almost negligible. And as to Soviet propaganda here, the fears felt when M. Joffé was appointed to Vienna³ (please see my despatch No. 32 of the 5th February)⁴ have not been realised.

Dr. Mataja said that the chief centres of Communism now were Berlin and Prague. While it was true that the Soviet Legation had carried on the propaganda which appeared to be their *raison d'être* in every capital, the Austrian Government knew very well it was not true that the Balkan propaganda was conducted from Vienna. This capital, because of its central position, was perhaps a meeting-place of all kinds of agents, and there was no doubt that the Russian Legation received many visits. But it was absurd to say that Soviet emissaries were fitted out and organised in Vienna and sent out hence to the Balkans, or that Vienna was the headquarters of revolutionary movements. Moreover, all Communists, Bolsheviks and Anarchists, as well as all suspicious persons, were kept under very efficient control, as I knew, by the police, by whom all their movements were known and very effectively watched.

Dr. Mataja added that, in his own opinion and according to his information, the present troubles and outrages in Bulgaria⁵ were not so much the fruit of Soviet activities as the expected revenge of the adherents of Stamboliiski and the determination of the Agrarian Communists to upset the Zankow régime. He did not think this régime could last.

Mr. Leeper⁶ had a conversation today with M. Schober (ex-Chancellor and now President of the Police), who is very friendly with this Legation and always likes to speak frankly and confidentially. M. Schober said that he felt rather hurt by the unjustifiable accusations of the English press. He doubted whether there was any capital or any country in which Communists were so efficiently shadowed and restricted in their activities as Vienna. Even the British police authorities, for whose efficiency he had the greatest admiration, could hardly effect the same control over Communist activities as he possessed, for, under Austrian law, he had power to arrest, detain for forty-eight hours and then expel summarily from Austria any foreigner whose presence he considered undesirable, without making any definite accusation against him. M. Schober instanced the promptness with which some weeks ago he had arrested and expelled four German Communists who had come on a visit to Vienna. As far as

² The Serb-Croat-Slovene Chargé d'Affaires had communicated to the Foreign Office on January 20 a list of instructions sent to representatives of the Third International in Albania, Bulgaria, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the names of Bolshevik agents in Vienna.

³ The Soviet Envoy had arrived in Vienna in December, 1924.

⁴ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives. This reported M. Joffé's transfer to Tokyo as Ambassador.

⁵ See No. 99, n. 1.

⁶ First Secretary at H.M. Legation at Vienna.

Macedonian and other Balkan revolutionaries were concerned, M. Schober refused to allow them to pursue their activities here, and it was consequently in Prague that they had made their headquarters, just as the Communist headquarters were in Berlin. Over the personnel of the Soviet Legation he possessed, of course, no jurisdiction, but he kept the strictest watch on them and all visitors to the Legation. In his opinion, the staff of the Soviet Legation, of whom there were seventy (forty of them ostensibly belonging to the 'Commercial Mission'), was unduly large, and he was again calling the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to this fact, but their opportunities of doing mischief were reduced to a minimum by the watchfulness of the police.

M. Schober is proceeding shortly to New York for the Police Congress there.⁷ Perhaps the British delegates to this congress may find occasion to discuss matters of interest with him there.

It is true that Austrian Communism is now of very little account. In fact, I believe the Soviet Government nearly two years ago gave up as a bad job their propaganda in this country itself. But, while I think the allegations of the British press as to Vienna being a revolutionary centre are greatly exaggerated, I am not prepared to go so far as to believe with M. Mataja and M. Schober that Balkan propaganda and activities are not hatched here at all. Vienna is obviously an excellent centre and meeting-place, and it is significant that, although there is little Communist work being done in Austria itself, the Soviet Legation has so large a number of persons attached to it; and I think the Austrian Government might be more firm in refusing to admit these persons. There is now, I believe, a certain amount of trade between Austria and Russia, and it may be that, in view of the unemployment here, the Government feels it important that this trade should be encouraged; and they are probably pressed by the Social Democrats in that sense, although the latter by no means see eye to eye with the Soviet régime politically. The same thing may be said of the matter of the traffic in arms and munitions from this country,⁸ for, although the Government may desire to check it, they find a natural obstacle in the Socialist working men.

Whatever may be the facts as to the real extent of Bolshevik activities here, it is a question whether it is wise that the press should publish such alarmist reports to the world which can but affect Austria's political and financial credit.

I have, etc.,
A. AKERS-DOUGLAS

⁷ This international conference of Police Chiefs met at New York May 12-16.

⁸ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 102, 116, 142, 189, 192, 212, 220, 240, 256, 259, 273 and 274.

No. 105

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 24, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 160 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5474/3456/7]

PARIS, April 23, 1925

Immediately on receipt of your telegram No. 107 of April 23rd¹ this embassy communicated with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and asked that notes to Bulgarian and Serbian governments might be telegraphed to His Majesty's representatives at Sofia and Belgrade for communication to Bulgarian and Serbian governments in the name of the conference. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, preferred that notes should still be addressed to Bulgarian and Serbian Ministers here, though they agreed to texts also being telegraphed to His Majesty's representatives at Sofia and Belgrade with instructions to present same to respective governments in concert with their French and Italian colleagues.²

As was explained to Central Department on the telephone this afternoon,³ the ministry also asked that a note on similar lines to that addressed to Serbian Minister might go to Greek and Roumanian⁴ representative here. I agreed, and in case of these communications have arranged with Secretariat of Ambassadors' Conference to adopt procedure similar to that followed in the case of Bulgarian and Serbian communications.⁵

¹ See No. 103, n. 4.

² In Paris telegram No. 157 of April 23 Lord Crewe transmitted to the Foreign Office the text of the note to the Bulgarian Government, which was repeated to Belgrade, Athens, Bucharest and Rome.

³ Mr. Lampson's minute of this telephone conversation is filed at C 5470/3456/7, not printed.

⁴ M. C. Diamandy.

⁵ In Paris telegram No. 159 of April 23 Lord Crewe transmitted to the Foreign Office the text of the note sent to Athens, Bucharest, and Belgrade explaining why the Conference of Ambassadors had allowed the Bulgarian Government to recruit a further 10,000 militiamen.

No. 106

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir M. Cheetham (Athens)

No. 38 Telegraphic [C 5470/3456/7]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 24, 1925, 3 p.m.

Greek chargé d'affaires¹ made on April 23rd an entirely unexpected and most disquieting communication in writing² protesting against the

¹ M. G. Melas.

² A copy of the communication is filed at C 5531/3456/7, not printed.

authorised increase in the Bulgarian army of ten thousand men³ and stating that Greek government 'will see themselves compelled to have recourse to similar military measures in order to meet any emergency, along with naval measures, placing the navy in a position to ensure the eventual transport of troops'.

He was warned of the gravity of the proposed step and of the danger that anything of the sort might well precipitate a crisis in the Balkans with incalculable consequences to all concerned. It was the duty of Bulgaria's neighbours to remain calm and refrain from hasty action. Conditions upon which the increase of the Bulgarian forces had been sanctioned were impressed upon him and the fact that increase was purely temporary and at longest until May 31st. Moreover it had only been agreed to after the whole matter had been gone into both by the inter-allied organ of liquidation at Sofia and by the Versailles committee: it had thus passed the scrutiny of the highest military authorities of the principle allied Powers. He was urged to telegraph at once to Athens begging his government to exercise restraint and to do nothing likely to provoke a crisis.

Please see Prime Minister at once and inform him of the grave anxiety with which I have received his communication. You should do your utmost and in the most formal language to restrain Greek government from anything so foolish as they appear to contemplate, pointing out if necessary the lamentable effect which any such move on their part is bound to exercise upon Greece's own economic position of which there were already hopeful signs of recovery.

You will already have received by now instructions from the Ambassadors' Conference regarding joint representations explaining reasons for the sanction of the increase in the Bulgarian forces.⁴ You may inform your French⁵ and Italian⁶ colleagues of the present instructions also and if possible enlist their support in your communications to the Greek government.⁷

Repeated to Rome No. 124, Sofia No. 21, Belgrade No. 25, Bucharest No. 8. Copy to Paris.

³ See Nos. 101, 103 and 105.

⁴ See No. 105, n. 5.

⁵ Count C. de Chambrun.

⁶ Signor G. Brambilla.

⁷ In Athens telegram No. 75 of April 25, Sir M. Cheetham reported: '... [The Prime Minister] promised that until May 31st, he would exercise restraint and take no measures either military or naval, but if after that date the 10,000 men were not disbanded he would consider himself free to take any action which might be necessary to ensure full safety of his country.'

He added (Athens telegram No. 76 of April 25): '... My French and Italian colleagues, who only received their instructions from Ambassadors' Conference this morning and to whom I communicated substance of your telegram No. 38, though not speaking in such categorical terms as I did both urged on Prime Minister the necessity for extreme caution and restraint and both told me that they had the impression that he would not do anything rash.'

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Erskine (Sofia)

No. 25 Telegraphic [C 5659/1142/7]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 27, 1925, 6.30 p.m.*

You will have seen from telegrams repeated to you from Belgrade¹ and Athens² that both Serb and Greek governments, whilst apparently for the moment acquiescing in temporary increase of 10,000 men, both make the point that these must be disbanded by May 31st at latest.

This attitude appears to me perfectly reasonable and it is essential that there should be no tergiversation or delay by Bulgaria over disbandment. You will have realised that it was only with considerable reluctance and in view of French and Italian pressure that I acquiesced in this temporary increase,³ and I am still not devoid of anxiety that my reluctance may prove to have been justified and that the three powers may be found to have been over hasty in agreeing to Bulgarian request. I am therefore all the more anxious that specific terms upon which it was sanctioned shall be strictly complied with. Otherwise Bulgaria's neighbours will certainly accuse us of bad faith and I have little doubt that there would be grave and immediate danger of their taking law into their own hands and in their own way.

I have every confidence in your judgment and am content to leave it largely to you what precise method to adopt to see that the conditions on which sanction was given are duly observed. I suggest however that you should keep in closest touch with Major Neate, and should concert with him effective measures for seeing (a) that disbandment is complete *at latest* by May 31st, or (b) earlier at the eight days' notice by the Organ of Liquidation postulated if you, as His Majesty's representative at Sofia, are satisfied that that is proper. You will naturally also keep in closest touch with your French and Italian colleagues and endeavour to concert action with them over this. To that end I am repeating this telegram to Paris and Rome with instructions to make necessary representations to French and Italian governments.⁴

¹ Belgrade telegram No. 43 to the Foreign Office of April 25, not printed.

² See No. 106, n. 7.

³ See No. 102.

⁴ Foreign Office telegram No. 109 to Paris and No. 131 to Rome of April 27 ran: 'My telegram No. 25 to Sofia.

'Please convey substance to government to which you are accredited and press that similar instructions should be telegraphed to French/Italian Minister at Sofia.

'I regard the situation with anxiety. I need not say that I am as anxious as anyone to prevent or punish such horrible outrages as have occurred in Bulgaria, but I have no sort of confidence in the past or present wisdom or justice of the Bulgarian government.

'Apart from this it is obvious that the decision to allow so large an increase has caused great anxiety in Greece and Yugoslavia.

'I feel strongly that we who have authorised the increase are bound to give Bulgaria's neighbours all the guarantees we can that our permission shall not be abused.'

You will of course keep me fully informed of manner in which measures of restoration of order are carried out by Bulgarian government and of use to which these extra troops are put. I am asking War Office to instruct Major Neate to help you in this.⁵ Should need arise you have full authority to protest strongly to Bulgarian government if these forces are used for other than legitimate purposes.

Meantime in your daily intercourse with Bulgarian government you should consistently keep before them specific conditions on which sanction was accorded, and the disastrous consequences to Bulgaria which any failure to comply with them would entail.

Addressed to Rome No. 130, Belgrade No. 29, Athens No. 44, Bucharest No. 13 and copied to Paris.

⁵ In a letter of April 28 (C 5659/1142/7), not printed.

No. 108

*Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received April 28, 9 a.m.)*

No. 21 Telegraphic [C 5693/3456/7]

BUCHAREST, April 27, 1925, 10 p.m.

Addressed to Paris No. 1.

Your telegram No. 3.¹

I communicated copy of note from conference contained in your telegram No. 4 of today,² to Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs. My French and Italian³ colleagues are taking similar action.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had already received text from Roumanian Minister in Paris. He agrees entirely with principle of permitting increase of militia in order to maintain internal order in Bulgaria but stated that he had felt obliged to register protest with conference on question of form, considering that Roumania and neighbouring governments should have been consulted beforehand.

Although urgently requested by Serbian and Greek governments to protest against increase he had declined because his constant policy has been to ensure peaceful conditions in this part of Europe.

He has moreover strongly urged moderation at Belgrade and Athens and pointed out importance of helping rather than hindering Bulgarian efforts to restore internal order, at the same time he has urgently advised Bulgarian government to allay Serbian indignation in regard to utterances of Bulgarian Minister of War and Minister for Foreign Affairs⁴ by

¹ Paris telegram No. 158 to the Foreign Office of April 23, not printed.

² Paris telegram No. 159 to the Foreign Office. See No. 105, n. 5.

³ Baron P. Aloisi.

⁴ See No. 99, n. 3.

retracting or explaining that statements had been misunderstood. He has since learnt from Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires⁵ that Bulgarian government are taking this step.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that he will maintain this attitude of pacification. He has pointed out to Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs who is inclined to reproach him with pro-Bulgarian sympathies that this is not the case, that his attitude has been throughout consistent in urging moderation in the interests of preserving peace so highly important in this part of the world and has reminded Monsieur Nincic that Serbian attitude towards Bulgaria has been more variable and inconsistent than that of Roumanian government.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 21, Belgrade No. 1, Athens No. 1, Sofia No. 1 and Rome No. 1.

⁵ M. C. Guerdjicov.

No. 109

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 30, 9 a.m.)

Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 5784/1142/7]

Personal and Secret

SOFIA, April 29, 1925, 9 p.m.

Your personal and secret telegram of April 27th.¹

1. I am unaware of any new grounds.

In my opinion recent outrages² were isolated acts of terrorism and not part of plot for general rising. If this is so, it seems unlikely that Third International, while they may well have advised general policy of terrorism, would have definitely ordered outrage, like that in the cathedral, of such magnitude as to render certain drastic action against Communists and strong revulsion of feeling in favour of the government both in Bulgaria and abroad, besides exciting foreign opinion against themselves.

2. While government assert that they have discovered many documents definitely proving complicity, I doubt whether, even admitting their authenticity, they will do much more than prove that money has been supplied from Moscow.

3. In its origin, it was an internal struggle and is, I think, still so in the main. Following usual policy of fomenting trouble where it already exists, Third International have, however, no doubt succeeded in gaining many converts to militant communism but also in establishing a hold over what were formerly merely elements of discontent and opposition to govern-

¹ This telegram asked Mr. Erskine to answer four questions concerning the outrages in Bulgaria (see No. 99, n. 1).

² See No. 99, n. 1.

ment. So far as this has occurred matter may be regarded as struggle between forces of law and order and Moscow.

4. Bad record of Serb-Croat-Slovene government and thoroughly Balkan mentality of M. Pasitch naturally encourage suspicion but I have no evidence whatever and have no reason to believe that Serb-Croat-Slovene government had previous knowledge of outrages or were implicated except in so far as indirect responsibility may attach to them on account of their excessively tolerant attitude towards the emigrants and their failure to exercise proper control over them. But here again there is nothing to show that emigrants had any connection with cathedral outrage at any rate.

I give above answers, especially 1, 2 and 3 with diffidence as I have nothing to go on except inferences and secret reports of very doubtful value that may prove misleading. I am told so many lies by Bulgarian government that I may sometimes err on the side of undue scepticism.

Trial of principal culprits is expected to begin in a few days. It is possible that evidence may then be produced which may enable me to form a clearer opinion.

No. 110

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 30, 9 a.m.)

No. 33 Telegraphic [C 5792/3456/7]

SOFIA, April 29, 1925, 11.55 p.m.

Your telegram No. 25.¹

Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs in conversations with Major Neate yesterday both expressed hope that latest date fixed for disbandment of ten thousand extra volunteers would be extended if necessary. Secretary-general² also observed yesterday to my United States colleague³ that it was unfortunate that definite date had been fixed as of course Communists would plan next outrage for date subsequent to May 31st but that no doubt powers would make no difficulty about postponement of disbandment.

I therefore thought it advisable that Bulgarian government should from the first be under no misapprehension on the subject and informed Minister for Foreign Affairs today that postponement would certainly lead to grave complications with neighbours and would in no circumstances be allowed. He appeared much taken back and said that he had news from abroad that next outrage would occur on May 6th or May 24th both popular festivals or still more probably on June 9th anniversary of coup d'état.⁴ I pointed out that he had always himself said that danger of

¹ No. 107.

² M. C. Mincoff.

³ Mr. C. Wilson.

⁴ See No. 1, n. 6.

rising would be over by middle of May owing to peasants being fully occupied with farm work. He finally asked whether I was expressing my personal opinion. I replied that I was acting under your instructions.

Repeated to Paris, Rome, Belgrade, Athens and Bucharest.

⁵ Mr. Chamberlain replied (telegram No. 30 of May 1): 'I approve your language which has been repeated in substance to Bulgarian Minister here by Mr. Lampson [see No. 115, below].'

No. 111

Mr. Chamberlain to the French Ambassador

[C 5488/1435/90]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 29, 1925

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 3rd April,¹ relative to the concession obtained by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to prospect for petroleum in Albania.² You state that in the view of the French Government this concession appears to constitute a virtual monopoly, first, because the Anglo-Persian Oil Company are therein accorded the right of pre-emptive choice of 50,000 hectares of oil-bearing lands for exploitation, and secondly, because the Italian Government have only succeeded in obtaining a similar concession from the Albanian Government as the result of negotiations with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.³ The French Government therefore consider that this concession is in conflict, not only with the policy of the open door, but also with the spirit, if not the letter, of the San Remo Agreement of the 25th April, 1920.⁴ Your Government accordingly desire that His Majesty's Government should intervene with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with a view to secure more equitable treatment for French interests represented in Albania by the *Crédit général des Pétroles*.

2. His Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to the views of the French Government, as expressed in your note, and I now have the honour to lay before you the following considerations which I should be glad if you would convey to your Government.

3. In the first place, the first premise of your note is clearly based upon

¹ Not printed (C 4785/1435/90).

² See Nos. 31, n. 4, 45, n. 3, 48, n. 2, 51, 55, n. 6, and 79, n. 4.

³ See Nos. 72, 76, 79, and 84.

⁴ See Cmd. 675, *Memorandum of Agreement between M. Philippe Berthelot, Directeur des Affaires politiques et commerciales au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, and Professor Sir John Cadman, K.C.M.G., Director in Charge of His Majesty's Petroleum Department* (H.M.S.O., 1920). This agreement was initialled on April 24, 1920, and confirmed on April 25 by Mr. Lloyd George, and M. A. Millerand, Prime Minister of France January–September, 1920. See also Vol. VIII, Nos. 2, minute 6 and 14, minute 2.

an entire misapprehension of the circumstances surrounding the concession by the Albanian Assembly of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In his note to your predecessor⁵ of the 19th July, 1921, Curzon explained that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company were negotiating with the Albanian Government an agreement whereby the company would be permitted to select 200,000 hectares of land for exploration on ratification of the agreement, and from this area to select 50,000 hectares for exploitation within four months after the date of ratification. This concession was first obtained in April [*sic*] 1921,⁷ subsequently ratified. Originally it gave the company the *exclusive* right to conduct geological examination in Albania and to search for petroleum deposits for five years. This provision was subsequently modified so as to give the company the rights to prospect over 200,000 hectares only, and from that area to choose 50,000 hectares for exploitation. The original concession as so modified was ratified by the Albanian Assembly in February last year. It is therefore, that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, after having obtained a promise of *exclusive* rights to prospect, subsequently asked for the reduction of these rights to cover an area of 200,000 hectares only. His Majesty's Government cannot admit that a concession of such a nature constitutes in any sense a monopoly. Moreover, if further explanation is necessary, it is sufficient to mention that the Italian Government has since obtained by direct negotiation with the Albanian Government a concession to explore over 50,000 hectares and to select 30,000 hectares for exploitation. A charge of monopoly against the Anglo-Persian Oil Company certainly cannot be substantiated.

5 [*sic*]. Nor can His Majesty's Government admit that the concession obtained by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was, though negotiated direct between the company and the Albanian Government, constitutes in any way a violation of the principle of the open door, in the letter or the spirit of the San Remo Agreement. His Majesty's Government are, indeed, somewhat surprised at the reference to this instrument in your note under reply, for an examination of the text of the agreement shows conclusively and explicitly that no violation of the principle has occurred, while the fact that the Italian Government have since obtained a concession from the Albanian Government is surely evidence which shows that the concession granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company does not operate to exclude other parties from obtaining petroleum concessions in Albania.

6. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government cannot be suggested in your note, intervene with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on behalf of the French *Crédit général des Pétroles*. As I have already mentioned, the concession obtained by the Anglo-Persian Oil

⁵ Count de Saint-Aulaire, French Ambassador in London 1921-24.

⁶ Not printed (C 12195/235/90).

⁷ See No. 31, n. 4.

⁸ See No. 48, n. 2.

was the result of direct negotiations between the company and the Albanian Government, and it is for the company itself to decide the manner in which it will work the concession which it has obtained.

I have, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 112

Sir G. Clerk¹ (Prague) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 5)

*No. 150 [C 6027/298/3]**

PRAGUE, April 30, 1925

Sir,

The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me today at some length his views on the problem of Austria, for, as he told me, he considers that the time has come when a definite solution must be provided.

According to Dr. Benes, it is generally agreed that the system at present in force, under the authority of the League of Nations,² is not proving successful. There are three other suggestions for saving Austria which are put forward from time to time, but all three of them are impossible. These three are, 'Anschluss', Danube Confederation and 'Zollverein'.³

'Anschluss' might come either from without or within. If from without, that is to say by the direct action of Germany, it is the firm conviction of Dr. Benes that it would mean war. Neither his country nor Yugoslavia nor Italy would allow it. If 'Anschluss' comes from within, it can only come as the result of a 'Putsch', whereby the regular Government would be turned out by a revolutionary movement, and the Government so installed and maintained by force would proceed to pronounce the 'Anschluss'. Such a situation would last about a week. Austria's neighbours would react by immediately closing their frontiers, stopping supplies and taking every other measure necessary to reduce Vienna to starvation. The result would be a counter-revolution and the disappearance of the 'Anschluss' and the Government that proclaimed it.

Both the Danube Confederation and the 'Zollverein' can be dismissed as possible solutions, since the succession States are resolutely determined to have nothing of the sort.

There remains therefore only one means of saving Austria, and that is, to make her economic life possible. So far as regards Czechoslovakia, Dr. Benes is prepared to do all he can to this end, but his hands are tied, and unless they are freed he is powerless to do much. In order that Austria may live she must have facilities for the export of her manufactures and produce. Dr. Benes is prepared to make the largest concessions to Austria

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Prague.

² See No. 17, n. 4.

³ i.e. Customs Union.

in this respect, but cannot do so unless those Powers with whom Czechoslovakia has commercial treaties, which include a most-favoured-nation clause, are prepared to renounce their rights in regard to special favours accorded to Austria. If, however, the Powers will do that, Czechoslovakia can and will go to the utmost limit in her share of the salvation of Austria. In fact, he asks for the prolongation and amplification of article 222 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

Czechoslovakia's aid will not, however, be sufficient by itself. Austria's other neighbours, especial[ly] Yugoslavia and Italy, must help in the same spirit, and here Dr. Benes sees his second and greatest difficulty. Both those States will only agree under strong pressure. But if Austria is to be saved they must be made to agree.

Dr. Benes has put his views frankly and clearly to my Italian colleague here,⁴ and now wishes that the question should be urgently considered by the guaranteeing Powers. If, as Dr. Benes hopes, those Powers come to the same conclusion as himself that Austria can only be saved on the lines described above, then the sooner the necessary action is taken the better.

Dr. Benes therefore hopes that he may receive the views of His Majesty's Government as soon as possible.

I made two observations to Dr. Benes when he had finished. The first was that he had not exhausted the list of possible, though it might be of probable, solutions. Fantastic though it might seem today, the Austrian problem might find itself solved by the final disappearance of Austria from the map of Europe and the division of the country among its neighbours. After all, if Austria proved incapable of independent existence, the living organisms around it could not by the laws of nature, suffer the rotting corpse in their midst, and each neighbouring country would absorb into itself the contiguous regions. While I agree that this need not, for practical purposes, be considered today, it still remains as a possibility, should Dr. Benes not succeed in putting through the plan he has outlined to me.

My second observation was, that the failure of the present attempt to save Austria was in large measure due to the incapacity of the Austrian Government to put through the necessary reforms with a sufficiently strong hand. It seemed to me, therefore, that, seeing the impossibility of tolerating a dead Austria in the centre of a living Europe, it might be held, for the strongest of motives—that of self-preservation—right and essential for the Powers to force Austria to swallow the drastic medicine which she had not the strength of mind enough to take herself so long as the Powers merely held the glass to her lips.

I did not make these observations as in any way counter-proposals to Dr. Benes's own suggestion which, indeed, seems to me to offer as much hope as anything of a working solution of the Austrian problem; but, knowing his optimistic nature, I wished to prepare him for the possibility

⁴ Count B. Pignatti Morano di Custoza.

of encountering obstacles to his ideas and to eliminate in advance the thought that he had been let down by lack of whole-hearted support on our part.

While Dr. Benes is a little inclined to consider himself as a predestined formula- and panacea-finder for any given European problem and may be raising the Austrian question at this juncture to avoid being forestalled by a rival, I think his real fear is that, as Austria's difficulties increase, more and more pressure will be put on Czechoslovakia to come to the rescue, either by way of a customs union or by early payment of the large sums due for her Austrian inheritance. Still, that is no reason why his present plan should not be examined on its merits.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Vienna.⁵

I have, etc.,

GEORGE R. CLERK

⁵ In Vienna despatch No. 111 of May 7, Mr. Akers-Douglas commented as follows on this despatch: 'In the first place, I see no reason for such pessimism as regards the near future in Austria. It is as yet too soon to judge whether she can live or not. Nor can it be said that the League of Nations' plan has failed, although it has not proved so thoroughly and rapidly successful as was hoped two years ago, this being due partly to lack of vigour and efficiency in this country itself and partly to its economic conditions and inner political circumstances.

'Presumably Dr. Benes's idea is that some preferential arrangement might be made among Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary. If such preferential reciprocity were common to all the succession States a good deal of the value of it would be lost to Austria, although of course it would still be worth much. It seems doubtful, on the other hand, whether Czechoslovakia would be prepared to give preferential tariffs to Austrian goods (Austria presumably doing the same) without this arrangement being reciprocal all round; she would hardly be content that Austrian goods should go to Hungary and Yugoslavia on more favourable terms than those countries would give to Czech goods.

'Czechoslovakia is probably more over-industrialised than Austria; the former, it is believed, has about 70 per cent of the industries of the old monarchy and only about 24 per cent. of the population. She can, of course, stand this over-industrialisation much better than Austria, having a much richer agriculture and being able to absorb some of her superfluous factory labour into this; moreover, her industrial production is, generally speaking, more efficient, and therefore better able than that of Austria to meet world competition both inside and outside the limits of the old monarchy. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak industries still feel severely the loss of so much of their old protected market. Therefore it would be interesting to know whether Dr. Benes, when speaking of Austria's hopeless economic position, is perhaps also thinking about getting easier outlets for Czech manufactures.

'As to the possible alternative solution, mentioned by Sir George Clerk, of a partition of Austria, it is difficult to say how this would work as regards Vienna. The Austrian problem is really a problem of finding means of livelihood for a considerable part of the population of Vienna. Whilst the rest of the country could probably be able to look after itself and be self-supporting, whatever its political status, I do not imagine that any of the neighbouring States would be willing to incorporate Vienna, as this city would overshadow their own capitals. Possibly Vienna might be left as a free city without any "hinterland". If it became a free-trade city, its merchants and bankers might prosper so much as to make up for the loss to its manufacturers, but the question of the excess of public employees in Vienna (of whom there are already too many) would become more acute than ever.

'It may still be possible to create a better economic life for Austria by transit facilities and preferential arrangements between her and her neighbours, and any lead which

Czechoslovakia can give in this direction is to be welcomed. Ultimately, I think, there is more improvement to be looked for in Austria's agricultural production than in her manufacturing output.

I agree that it is no good talking at present of a Danube Confederation or of a "Zollverein", and as to the "Anschluss", although it is now figuring again more largely in all the press and in political utterances of all parties, everyone is aware that it cannot be allowed. A movement from within this country for the "Anschluss" is very improbable so long as control and the demand for foreign capital lasts, and even if the Social Democrats came into power they would hardly put it forward as their declared policy.'

No. 113

Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 4)

*No. 136 [C 5974/3456/7]**

BELGRADE, April 30, 1925

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 13[5] of 30th April,¹ I have the honour to report that in my conversation with M. Nincic of the 25th April I did not say much about the authorisation of the increase of the Bulgarian armed forces, since, as I explained to M. Nincic, my French and Italian colleagues, in conjunction with myself, were shortly, under instructions from the Ambassadors' Conference to present him jointly with a copy of the note addressed to the appropriate Legations at Paris explaining the conditions under which the request of the Bulgarian Government for the additional 10,000 men was being accorded.² The subject, however, had to be touched on. M. Nincic reminded me how the Bulgarian Government was constantly finding reasons for escaping from the trammels imposed by the Treaty of Neuilly, and said that he was convinced that this latest demand was merely part of that policy and not genuinely inspired by any real need of the moment. M. Tsankov and his Government had shown great *sang-froid* in the manner in which they had dealt with the situation at Sofia,³ and with equal calm they had promptly profited by the occasion to make a demand calculated on the emotions which the sensational terrorist acts would excite in Western Europe. He felt he would be justified in insisting on a term being placed on the period during which these additional forces could be kept in being. I was easily able to answer this, and M. Nincic made notes of the conditions imposed by the conference.

2. M. Nincic used several self-evident arguments against the increase of the force; which I need not repeat, since there was nothing in them likely to be new to you. He did, however, say that the other adjoining countries, especially Greece,⁴ were much alarmed. It seems to me that the S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government may have been working on the fears of

¹ Not printed.

³ See No. 99, n. 1.

² See No. 105.

⁴ See No. 106.

Greece, not without the *arrière-pensée*, that she would be all the more amenable in the negotiations which have been resumed here for the renewal of the alliance.

3. M. Nincic appointed 6.30 that evening to receive the three representatives, and doubtless the interval served for him to consult M. Pasic with regard to this matter. The note was duly presented to him, and he read it through aloud. He was first of all unpleasantly struck by the fact that the 10,000 militiamen were over and above the 3,000 recently authorised.⁵ He was rather inclined to raise his eyebrows at the conception that the step was taken in the interest 'de la paix européenne', and he vigorously contested that the increase was necessary for the re-establishment of order in Bulgaria, repeating what he said to me as to his impression that the Conference of Ambassadors had taken this decision under the influence of emotions excited by the nature of the terrorist acts rather than by the guidance of considerations of fact. He stated, therefore, that his Government must be expected to insist on the disbandment of these forces after the 31st May. He sniffed at the assertion that the regular effectives of the Bulgarian army were below the figures authorised by the treaty.

4. With regard to the final paragraph, he assured us that his Government intended to do all in their power to support the Government of M. Tsankov, which seemed to him the only alternative to chaos and Bolshevism in Bulgaria.

5. I need not record his request to us to intervene at Sofia for the withdrawal of the reckless accusations made in regard to the complicity of Serbia in the crimes⁶ which must otherwise lead to a diplomatic conflict.

I have, etc.,

ALBAN YOUNG

⁵ See No. 97, n. 5.

⁶ See No. 99, n. 3.

No. 114

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 5, 9 a.m.)

No. 42 Telegraphic [C 6003/3456/7]

SOFIA, May 4, 1925, 11 p.m.

Rome telegram No. 98.¹

Italian minister informs me that he has now received instructions similar to those contained in your telegram No. 25² and will inform Minister for Foreign Affairs tomorrow that additional volunteers must be dismissed by May 1st (sic) at the least. He will also impress on Italian

¹ Of April 30. In this telegram, Sir R. Graham reported that he had taken action on No. 107, n. 4.

² No. 107.

representative on Organ of Liquidation³ necessity for extreme vigilance both as regards compliance with conditions on which increase was granted and use to which extra troops are put.

He will further on his own initiative advise Minister for Foreign Affairs to abandon proposed journey as useless.⁴

Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Paris and Rome.

³ Signor Scanagatta.

⁴ In Sofia telegram No. 38 of May 3, Mr. Erskine had reported: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs informed my Serb-Croat-Slovene colleague yesterday that he proposes to visit London, Paris and Rome and possibly Prague starting in a few days. He said he would like also to pay short unofficial visit to Belgrade in order to see Monsieur Pasitch and asked whether this could be arranged. Object of journey was to enlighten the respective governments as to true situation in Bulgaria, foreign propaganda organisation of Bulgarian government being very inadequate in comparison with that of Moscow and their internal enemies.'

He added (Sofia telegram No. 39 of May 3): 'My Italian colleague tells me he has been informed by Minister for Foreign Affairs of his proposed journey. Latter explained to him that his principal object was to lay before government of three powers proofs of Serbian complicity in recent outrages [see No. 99, nn. 1 and 3].

'I have little doubt that real object is to obtain concessions in regard to army and that question of alleged Serbian complicity will merely be used as main argument to prove their necessity.'

No. 115

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Erskine (Sofia)

*No. 124 [C 5854/3456/7]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 4, 1925*

Sir,

I transmit to you, herewith, a record of a conversation which Mr. Lampson held on the 30th April last with the Bulgarian Minister, relative to the recent increase of the Bulgarian armed forces by 10,000 volunteer militia.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 115

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Bulgarian Minister

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 30, 1925*

The Bulgarian Minister called by appointment this afternoon.

He began by saying he hoped we were satisfied at the way things were now going in Bulgaria. He presumed that Mr. Erskine had kept us fully informed of his various conversations with the Bulgarian Prime Minister.

I said that one tiresome incident appeared at least to have been disposed of, namely, the difficulty which had arisen between the Serb and Bulgarian Governments owing to the indiscreet utterances of the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior¹ regarding alleged Serb complicity² in the Sofia outrage.³ I might tell him—as has been already said through Mr. Erskine⁴—that we really thought that indiscretion had been extraordinarily unwise. We hoped very much no further slips of the kind would be made. As to the general question, there was a point upon the necessity of which I felt justified in calling his most serious attention, namely, a strict adherence to the letter of the conditions upon which the increase of 10,000 troops had been sanctioned. These men must be disbanded by the 31st May at latest or earlier at the discretion of the Inter-Allied Organ of Liquidation. We took it for granted that there would be no delay on the part of Bulgaria in complying with these conditions; for if there were I must warn him that not only we, but Bulgaria's neighbours, would insist upon those conditions being carried out. It was just as well that the Bulgarian Government should realise that we would stand no nonsense. The Minister protested that, of course, there could be no question of the evasion of the conditions upon which an increase of troops had been sanctioned. He personally hoped that it would be possible to disband them all even before the 31st May, for they were undoubtedly costing Bulgaria much money, which she could ill afford. He did not think we need be uneasy as regards that.

He then went on to say that really what was at the bottom of the troubles in Bulgaria was the fruitful soil existing amongst the returning emigrants for the spread of Bolshevism and general discontent. The Bulgarian Government were frankly not capable of dealing with the crowds of these people now coming back to Bulgaria; there were, he believed, about 400,000 of these people, many of them destitute, and the Bulgarian Government lacked the money to settle them upon the land and give them a start. He was anxious to know whether we could not in some way help the Bulgarian Government in their difficulties over this question. Could we not get a report from our Legation whether the conditions were or were not as he alleged? I pressed him as to what particular form of active assistance he could look for in this matter, and he answered that what he thought it must eventually come to would be some form of financial aid, such as had been given recently to Greece⁵ under the ægis of the League

¹ General I. Rousseff.

² Reported in Sofia telegram No. 22 of April 23, not printed.

³ See No. 99, n. 1.

⁴ Acting on Foreign Office instructions in telegram No. 22 of April 24, not printed, Mr. Erskine had urged the Bulgarian Government to make a public statement that General Rousseff's allusions had been misunderstood (Sofia telegram No. 30 of April 27, not printed).

⁵ In February, 1923, the Greek Government had asked the support of the League of Nations for a loan for the settlement of refugees from Asia Minor.

In December, 1924, a loan of £10 million was issued under the auspices of the League of

of Nations. To his mind, until something of the sort was done, there would always be troubles in Bulgaria. After all, prevention was better than cure; Bulgaria had an uphill struggle, and her neighbours were doing all in their power to hold her back and prevent her setting her house in order. He begged that we would not discourage the idea of some such pecuniary assistance.

I said I could not commit myself to any view on this, but I certainly agreed with him that prevention was better than cure. I was not entirely convinced that his views and mine coincided as to the cause of the present unrest. There was a general pre-occupation here at the policy of the present Bulgarian Government; indeed, that was what had prevented our agreeing at once to the request of the Bulgarian Government for the increase of 10,000 men. He would remember that we had hesitated for some time before approving it. I could not do better than call his attention to the answer⁶ given in the House of Commons yesterday by the Secretary of State to a question⁶ asked him by Colonel Wedgwood.⁷ I showed him a copy and suggested that he would do well to send it to Sofia, and invite his Government's serious attention to what Mr. Chamberlain had said, for I could assure him that that represented the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government. In short, our eyes were riveted upon the behaviour of the Bulgarian Government and upon the use to which these additional troops were being put; and if we were to find that they were being misapplied it would raise a very serious situation.

The Minister said he could assure me most emphatically that these troops would not be employed in any way for the repression of legitimate and constitutional opposition; he repeated this several times and declared that we would find that he was correct in his assurances.

I asked him whether he had any figures as to the numbers of executions which had been carried out since the outrage. He said no, but the reports published by Colonel Wedgwood and his brother M.P.'s⁸ were gross exaggerations, indeed, perversions of the truth. From this he passed on to the report just published by Colonel Wedgwood in the press on the results of his visit to Bulgaria, which he criticised as a tissue of falsehood and misstatement. I said I naturally took no responsibility for what the report

Nations to provide funds for the work of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission.

For the documentation on this loan, see *L.N.O.J.* 1923, pp. 234-5, 602-3, 903-4, 1138-48, 1356-7, 1506-10, *L.N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 508-10, 906-7, 1299-1302, 1308-9, 1718-24, 1795-1804 and *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 339-46, 437-8, and 504-14.

⁶ See 183 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s, col. 162.

⁷ Labour Member of Parliament for Newcastle-under-Lyme.

⁸ Colonel Wedgwood, Mr. W. Mackinder, Labour Member of Parliament for the Shipley Division of the West Riding, and Colonel C. Malone, formerly Member of Parliament for East Leyton 1918-22, had arrived in Sofia on April 17 to investigate on behalf of the Labour Party allegations of excesses committed by the Tsankoff Government. Colonel Wedgwood left Sofia on April 20, his colleagues on April 21. For a press report, see *The Times*, April 25, p. 11. An account of their visit was given in J. C. Wedgwood, *Report of Visit to Bulgaria by J. C. Wedgwood, W. Mackinder, and C. L. Malone* (London, 1925).

said, but I did think, if he would allow me to say so, that the Bulgarian Government had made a mistake as regards tactics when they had refused to allow Colonel Wedgwood to go over the prisons in Sofia. Obviously every Government had the right to refuse such a request if they wished to do so; but there was the consequent danger that the very fact of refusal raised suspicion that there must be something to hide. I knew that that was how Mr. Erskine felt about M. Kalfov's refusal to allow Colonel Wedgwood to go over the prisons,⁹ and I might say that I personally took the same view.

Reverting to the question of the repression of constitutional opposition, the Minister said we would doubtless have heard from Sofia that, before the Sobranje closed, the various parties of the Opposition, including the Agrarians, had voted for the measures taken by the Bulgarian Government to defend the safety of the Bulgarian realm. If constitutional opponents were, in fact, being maltreated, as was alleged, how came it that the official leaders of the Opposition parties, including the Agrarian party, should have openly voted for the Government? I said that we had duly noted from a report from Mr. Erskine¹⁰ that the facts were as he had stated, and that we had, as a matter of fact, paid special attention to the statement in that report that the leaders of the Agrarian party had voted for the Government in Bulgaria. But I was unaware of the exact chronology.

I think I made it clear to the Minister throughout our talk that the Bulgarian Government are, so to speak, on their trial, and that any offence which they commit will be marked up against them.

M.W. LAMPSON

⁹ This was reported in Mr. Erskine's letter of April 23 to Mr. Lampson, not printed.

¹⁰ Sofia despatch No. 79 of April 23, not printed.

No. 116

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Erskine (Sofia)

No. 36 Telegraphic [C 5943/3456/7]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 5, 1925, 6.30 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 38¹ and 39¹ (of May 3rd: Bulgarian crisis).

Suggested visit of Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to western capitals would be exceedingly ill timed. British, French and Italian governments are agreed that volunteers must be disbanded by May 31st and neither Serb-Croat-Slovene nor Greek government would tolerate any extension of the date. Moreover, allegations now made against Serb-Croat-Slovene government would be certain to leak out and lead to

¹ See No. 114, n. 4.

repetition of dangerous situation which has been surmounted only with difficulty during past few days.

Please therefore inform Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs that you have heard of his proposed visit and intimate that His Majesty's Government view it with great disfavour. If Bulgarian government hope that date for disbandment of volunteers will be extended or that they will secure variation in terms of treaty of Neuilly they are doomed to disappointment. Serb-Croat-Slovene government and Greek government are bound to look with suspicion on visit, and we can therefore see no justification for proposal which is an invitation to external complications for Bulgaria and not a remedy for her internal disorders.²

Repeated to Paris (by bag) No. 114, Rome No. 143, Athens No. 58, Belgrade No. 36 and Bucharest No. 25.

² In Foreign Office telegram No. 145 of May 5, Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir R. Graham to express to the Italian Government the strong hope that they would send similar instructions to the Italian Minister in Sofia. Similar instructions were sent to Lord Crewe (Foreign Office telegram No. 115 of May 5, not printed).

No. 117

War Office to Foreign Office (Received May 6)

[C. 6066/3456/7]*

Secret

WAR OFFICE, May 5, 1925

Sir,

In reply to Foreign Office letter of the 2nd May, 1925,¹ I am commanded by the Army Council to state that they are in full agreement with the views of Mr. Secretary Chamberlain as to the importance to be attached to the strict fulfilment by the Bulgarian Government of the conditions under which the recent increases of the armed forces of that country were authorised.² A copy of the instructions telegraphed to Major Neate in this respect was enclosed for the information of Mr. Chamberlain with War Office letter dated the 2nd May last.¹

2. The council had anticipated that the Bulgarian Government would have difficulty in raising by voluntary enlistment the 10,000 extra men authorised, more especially as it is apparently not intended that they should be paid, and it was to be expected that some form of pressure would be brought to bear. Major Neate, writing on the 29th April last, reports a rumour, to which he attached little importance, that all youths born in 1901 were being called up. This is, doubtless, another version of the rumour alluded to by His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.³

¹ Not printed.

² See Nos. 97, n. 5, 101, n. 3, 103, and 105.

³ In Paris telegram No. 165 of April 29, section 3, not printed.

3. As regards the possibility of such action by the Bulgarian Government, the council would point out that, although no trained and organised army reserve is allowed under the treaty, there are large numbers of war-trained men in the country who might be available. Moreover, the Compulsory Labour Law provides machinery which might be utilised for calling up young men who have not previously served with the army.

4. The council have no very recent information as to the strength of the armed forces of Bulgaria. Major Neate has been asked to furnish by telegram the latest available figures.⁴ The strength as at the 1st December, 1924, has already been communicated unofficially to the Foreign Office; it is as follows:

Army	15,530
Gendarmerie	8,003
Police, Customs, etc.	6,017
Frontier guard	2,960
Total	32,510

5. A memorandum⁵ dealing with the maximum armed force which Bulgaria is authorised to maintain, apart from any special reinforcements as at the present juncture, is attached for the information of Mr. Chamberlain.

6. The Army Council are not yet in possession of any precise information as to the strength and distribution of the recently authorised reinforcements. Major Neate, writing on the 29th April last, stated that no particulars had as yet been communicated by the Bulgarian Government

⁴ In Sofia telegram No. 41 of May 4, Mr. Erskine transmitted the following for the Director of Military Intelligence from Major Neate: 'Bulgarian War Office report that 9,625 out of total of 13,000 were enrolled by May 1st. These are distributed among units of all arms throughout the country but much the largest allotments to units in western zone. 1900 are in Sofia garrison. Evidence so far obtained indicates that they are being employed identically with men of units to which they are attached. They are nominal volunteers obtained by officers commanding regiments etc., through communal authorities from men of 31 and 42 classes—last who actually served under compulsory system. They are armed and equipped identically with the army. Government say that arms are provided from regular reserve but unauthorised stocks are undoubtedly also in use.'

Major Neate reported in Sofia telegram No. 45 of May 5: 'Budget strength for 1925-1926. Army 20,002, Frontier Guard 3,000, Gendarmerie 6,800, Police 6,798, Customs, etc. 1,730. Total: 38,330. (sic).

'Also unarmed civil functionaries as follows: Army 2,390, Frontier Guard 181, Gendarmerie 276, Police 1,182, Customs, etc. not fixed.

'Effective strength on April 1st. Army 14,169, Frontier Guard 2,824, Gendarmerie 7,530, Police 4,077, Customs, etc. 1,940. Total: 30,540.

'Civil functionaries: Army 1,300, Frontier Guard 129, Gendarmerie 425, Police about 1,000.

'Bulgarian government have repeated policy of previous years of Budgeting for more effectives than actually exist. Minister of Finance [M. P. Todoroff] states that surplus goes to railways employés benefits and other legitimate objects also we understand to paying emergency volunteers though Budget contains no reference to these.'

⁵ Of May 5, not printed.

to the Organ of Liquidation, but he believed that the total was approximately 6,000. It is not clear whether this figure of 6,000 includes the 3,000 first authorised or whether it refers exclusively to the 10,000 subsequently allowed.

I am, etc.,
H. J. CREEDY⁶

⁶ Sir H. Creedy was Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War.

No. 118

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 46 Telegraphic [C 6199/3456/7]

SOFIA, May 6, 1925, 9 p.m.

Your telegram No. 36¹ only reached me this afternoon. It was therefore too late to act upon it, Minister for Foreign Affairs being already in Belgrade² where he only stays a few hours.

I hear that much resentment is felt by Bulgarian government and their supporters, especially since your recent reply in Parliament to Colonel Wedgewood's question regarding situation,³ against His Majesty's Government for what is described as their unsympathetic attitude amounting it is alleged to encouragement of subversive forces, and even more against myself for having inspired that attitude. I do not therefore propose to speak to the President of the Council in the sense of your telegram unless specially instructed, as it would only increase that resentment with no

¹ No. 116.

² In Belgrade telegram No. 53/54 of May 6, Sir A. Young reported: 'Your telegram No. 36 to Sofia [No. 116].

'I thought it desirable to see Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and inform him of point of view of His Majesty's Government with regard to his visit to Western capitals. Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs maintained that he would ask for nothing from the Powers or do nothing to the disadvantage of neighbouring states. It was essential however that he should explain exactly to Foreign Ministers themselves how the situation really was in Bulgaria. When I said that this seemed to be superfluous he maintained that it was essential for *morale* of Bulgarian people that they should be sure that Great Powers realized danger country ran from activity of Third International so that their support and sympathy could be counted on.

'I was not at all convinced by his arguments though there was possibly some force in his saying that as his departure for Western capitals had now been announced in Bulgaria he could not return to Sofia without weakening position of his Government. Kalfov had been lunching with Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs who had shown no discontent at his proposed visits of which he had explained the object. Finally Kalfov said he was going direct to Switzerland [and] that he would make his requests to be received at three capitals through Bulgarian Minister at Berne [M. D. Mikoff] where he could receive any communication we had to make to him. He leaves Belgrade tomorrow morning. . . .'

³ See No. 115, n. 6.

compensatory advantage now that Minister for Foreign Affairs has started and might even tend to diminish moderate influence of your advice in future.

For the same reason I think that if Minister for Foreign Affairs is received in Paris it would be a mistake not to receive him in London.

Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Paris and Rome.

No. 119

Mr. Peters¹ (Moscow) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 18)

No. 276 [C 6683/1142/7]

MOSCOW, May 6, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 259 of April 24th,² I have the honour to report that, under the heading 'Against the Sofia Hangmen in defence of the Bulgarian Workers and Peasants', the 'Izvestiya' of May 1st publishes a proclamation from an organisation entitled the Balkan Communist Federation, which would appear to have its headquarters in Moscow.

The proclamation is signed for the Executive Committee of the Balkan Communist Federation by the secretary G. Dimitrov, and is dated Moscow April 23rd 1925. It declares that 'the furious terrorism and systematic political murders organised from above could not do otherwise than provoke also certain terrorist acts from below, and that the explosion in Sofia Cathedral³ is the result of the appallingly cruel government terrorism and an act of self-defence on the part of the persecuted oppositionist elements.

'The Balkan Communist Federation had of course no connection with this explosion. Denying the expediency of individual terrorist acts, the Federation has always invited the Bulgarian and Balkan workers and peasants to a mass campaign against White Terror. But the Federation at the same time has the greatest sympathy with those who are heroically defending themselves, though by the wrong method, against the persecutions of the bloody regime of the Sofia hangmen.'

Monsieur Steklov⁴ in his leading article in the 'Izvestiya' of April 26th refers to the outrage as 'a natural protest against the white terror of fascist bands,' and to the English Conservative press as 'the skirmisher in the present campaign against the Soviet Union'.

I have, etc.,

WILLIAM PETERS

¹ Mr. Peters was in charge at Moscow April 24-June 15, with the local and temporary rank of First Secretary during the absence on a tour of the Soviet Union of the Chargé d'Affaires Mr. R. Hodgson.

² Not printed.

³ See No. 99, n. 1.

⁴ Editor of *Izvestiya*.

Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 11)

No. 143 [C 6347/798/19]*

Confidential

BELGRADE, May 6, 1925

Sir,

In regard to the negotiations, now transferred to Belgrade,¹ for the renewal of the Treaty of Alliance with Greece, I have the honour to report that these were begun a week or two ago, M. Boshchovic, of the Reparation Commission, with the assistance of M. Panta Gavrilovic, S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Minister at Athens, representing this Government while M. Caclamanos, Hellenic Minister in London, is in charge of the Greek delegation.

2. I have already reported by telegraph² that, on my making a perfunctory enquiry of the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs³ as to the prospects of the negotiations, he told me, with some emphasis, that a control of the administration of the Salonica—Ghevgheli Railway was a minimum *sine quâ non* without which the benefits of an alliance with Serbia would not be accorded. 'If we do not obtain this control, our relations with Greece will remain normal,' he said, 'but there will be no alliance.' He also mentioned the recognition of Serbian minorities in Greek Macedonia.

3. Yesterday, M. Caclamanos paid me a visit. He proceeded to say that since the negotiations here had commenced the Serbs had completely changed the bases for the transaction. They had, in the first place, taken him and the Greek Government aback by the unexpected demand for the enlargement of the Salonica free zone by an area of no less than 38,000 square metres. This, he said, was quite impracticable; it would imply nearly the whole port and entail most expensive changes. The Greek Government were ready to make some rectifications, but not to the extent demanded. He then said that he had reason to believe that the demand would shortly be made for the control of the administration of the railway. During the negotiations at Athens, M. Caclamanos had, on his own initiative, made a declaration to M. Panta Gavrilovic that the Greek people would not tolerate that a foreign syndicate should have the management of such a railway, and the Greek Government must therefore continue its exploitation. M. Gavrilovic had made no observation.

4. M. Caclamanos had presented a copy of this declaration a few days previously at Belgrade, with the addition that it was expressly confirmed by the Greek Prime Minister. He had observed a reluctance on the part of the Serbian negotiators to answer this move, and foresaw that the obnoxious demand would be made. He had, moreover, a declaration from

¹ See Nos. 14, 26, 70 and 93.

² Belgrade telegram No. 34 of April 20, not printed.

³ M.Y. Marković.

the French company of the Oriental Railways, who are supposed to have sold the concession to the Serbs, to the effect that the company had no right to sell the concession without the authority of the sovereign State. He did not seem able to account for the convention enclosed in my despatch No. 15 of the 14th January,⁴ and dismissed it as being rather vague. The Greek Government were, of course, ready to buy out the shareholders and the company. M. Caclamano had hopes that the S[erba] H[ellenic] S[erbian] Government had only put forward the extravagant demand for the enlargement of the zone as a make-weight for an abstention on their part from pressing for the control. When leaving London, the Foreign Office had shown to M. Caclamano their interest in the negotiations, and had warned him that he was, perhaps, too optimistic.⁵ He was now no longer optimistic, and he hoped I would let you know how the situation was. He then hinted at, but did not actually ask for, your advice and guidance.

5. I told M. Caclamano that I had long been convinced that the Serbs were bent on obtaining the control of the railway, and they were likely to meet in this respect with the support of all the States and their political friends, who were interested in counting on absolute freedom of access to Salonica in any contingency. I thought, perhaps, that the Serbs had put forward an extreme demand for the enlargement of the zone in order to bargain with it for the control of the railway. The Greek thesis was Greek State management for the railway with ample guarantees for freedom of Serbian traffic. The Serbian thesis was Serbian control of the railway with ample guarantees for Greek sovereignty. The Serbian argument was that the value of this control was of greater measure to her and her friends than was the measure of any detriment to Greek interests caused by the control being in Serbian hands, in view of the lack of any strategical value of this railway to the Greeks. The Serbians, I believe, admitted the juridical right of the Greeks to expropriate the railway with proper compensation, but would be likely to regard the insistence on this right with the mistrust it implied as inappropriate to a nation seeking an alliance. The question, therefore, was whether Greece should maintain her point of view and imperil the alliance, or whether she should admit the principle of control and concentrate on obtaining adequate guarantees of sovereignty. I did not offer any advice, but M. Caclamano agreed that this was likely to be a correct picture of the situation. He rested his attitude as regards the management entirely on the impossibility of obtaining the consent of the Greek people to the presence of a foreign company in that capacity. He had consulted all the leaders of the different parties, including General Metaxas.⁶

⁴ Not printed. The convention was dated July 15, 1923, and was signed by the Oriental Railway Company and the National Railway Syndicate, based on Belgrade.

⁵ See Vol. XXVI, No. 309.

⁶ Chief of the Greek General Staff 1913-17. A Royalist, he had attempted a *coup d'état* in 1923.

6. I pointed out to M. Caclamanos how surprised I had always been at the apparent indifference consistently shown by the Greek Government to the importance of the status of this railway. Since 1923 I had constantly been keeping my Greek colleagues informed of the developments taking place under their noses. Not only did the Greek Government fail to take any action to protect their interests, but they seemed to make no effort to acquaint themselves or anyone else with actual historical and business facts bearing on their case. Even now M. Caclamanos was in doubt whether the Salonica-Ghevgheli Railway had passed into the hands of the French company after the Balkan war⁷ or after the Great War, and whether the often-quoted letter of M. Veniselos conditioning the transaction was written during the one period or the other.

7. M. Caclamanos admitted that this was so, and that, unfortunately, the Greek Government had let slip two occasions on which they could have bought out the French or the Serbian company.

8. It is the general opinion that the negotiations are 'sticking' and that the Serbs mean to drag the negotiations out. Whether M. Caclamanos was well-advised in throwing down the glove with this declaration I do not know. He considers that a crisis is in view. His instructions are to give way in all minor points (the Greeks are ready to restore the property of the Mount Athos Monastery), and to be generous in money offers for the railway. But he seems adamant in the matter of the control.

I have, etc.,

ALBAN YOUNG

⁷ The First Balkan War of October, 1912–May, 1913, between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, and the Ottoman Empire, which suffered defeat.

No. 121

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir A. Young (Belgrade)

No. 39 Telegraphic [C 6198/3456/7]

Most Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 7, 1925, 4.50 p.m.*

Sofia telegram No. 44¹ and Paris telegrams Nos. 168² and 169².

You will note that French government have now fallen in with my suggestion³ and are doing their best through their Ministers at Belgrade and Sofia to prevent the visit of the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the three great capitals.

My information⁴ is that M. Kalfof's ostensible object is to submit alleged proofs of Serbian complicity in recent outrage but that his real purpose is to seek permanent increase in army above treaty limits. In my view there is no justification for latter request, the acceptance of which would moreover

¹ Of May 5, not printed.

³ See No. 116.

² Of May 6, not printed.

⁴ See No. 114, n. 4.

only serve to encourage similar demands from other ex-enemy countries not to mention its reaction upon Bulgaria's neighbours who would certainly not tacitly acquiesce. Again, it would be most unwise and even dangerous to allow M. Kalfof to arraign Serb-Croat-Slovene government at the three great capitals: it would only further embitter feeling and might easily lead to serious trouble. In short, if M. Kalfof persists in his intention nothing but harm will in my opinion result to his country, suspicion will be rife, he will be regarded as engaged on an attempt to lobby the Great Powers and the situation, already sufficiently delicate, will be generally aggravated.

Please see M. Kalfof⁵ with least possible delay and speak to him in the strongest terms in hope of dissuading him. You should leave him in no doubt as to our disposition here.

You will of course keep your French and Italian colleagues informed of the action which you are taking and endeavour to enlist their support.

Repeated to Paris No. 117 (by bag) and Rome No. 146 in cypher 'for the information of the French and Italian governments'; repeated to Sofia No. 39, Athens No. 62, Bucharest No. 28 and Berne No. 7.

⁵ Cf. No. 118, n. 2.

No. 122

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 118¹ Telegraphic: by bag [C 6198/3456/7]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 7, 1925, 7 p.m.*

From Belgrade telegram No. 53² it appears that M. Kalfof has slipped through our fingers there and is proceeding to Berne there to await final decision whether our three governments will receive him or not. I have accordingly telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister at Berne³ to endeavour to prevent his proceeding further and to use the arguments embodied in my telegram No. 39 to Belgrade⁴ which has probably arrived too late to be used there.

I still hold that nothing but harm can come from proposed visit and I request that you will at once inform government to which you are accredited of the instructions which I have telegraphed to Berne and endeavour to secure similar action by their ministers there.⁵

¹ No. 118 to Paris and No. 147 to Rome.

² See No. 118, n. 2.

³ Mr. R. Sperling. Foreign Office telegram No. 9 to Berne of May 7 is not printed.

⁴ No. 121.

⁵ Paris telegram No. 172 of May 8 ran: 'French government have sent similar instructions to their Ambassador at Berne.'

Sir R. Graham reported (Rome telegram No. 107 of May 9): '... Instructions were [?] sent] last night to Italian Minister at Berne to act with his British and French colleagues in the

Repeated to Berne No. 8, Belgrade No. 40, Sofia No. 40, Athens No. 63 and Bucharest No. 29.

sense you indicated. He was further instructed to make it perfectly clear to Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs that he must on no account visit Rome only, as it is thought here he might be tempted to do, and that he would not be received if he did.'

No. 123

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 122¹ Telegraphic [C 6230/3456/7]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 8, 1925, 7.30 p.m.*

Sofia telegram No. 47 (of May 7th.² Bulgarian crisis).

Although I recognise force of Mr. Erskine's arguments, I do not consider them sufficiently strong to cause modification of instructions contained in my telegram No. 9 to Berne (of May 7th).³

Please inform government to which you are accredited, but say that if in light of recent information they consider Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs should be received I am ready to waive objection.⁴

Repeated to Sofia No. 44, Berne No. 13, Belgrade No. 43, Bucharest No. 32 and Athens No. 68.

¹ No. 122 to Paris and No. 151 to Rome.

² In this telegram of May 8 Mr. Erskine stated: '... I venture again [as in Sofia telegram No. 44 of May 5, not printed] to recommend that he [M. Kalfoff] should be received, both in order that he may be given good advice and because Bulgarian government will no longer be able to say, as they now do, that their case has not been fairly presented to the powers.'

³ Not printed. See, however, Nos. 121 and 122.

⁴ Lord Crewe replied (Paris telegram No. 173 of May 9): 'French government have always been (? inclined) to receive Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Now that you waive your objection they will inform French Ambassador at Berne [M. J. Hennessy] that Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs may continue his journey to Paris etc.'

In Rome telegram No. 108 of May 9, Sir R. Graham stated: 'In view of attitude of Italian Government as reported in my telegram No. 107 [see No. 122, n. 5] I will take no action without further instructions from you.'

No. 124

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 124 Telegraphic [C 6283/3456/7]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 10, 1925, 12 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 173¹ and Rome telegrams Nos. 107² and 108.³

¹ See No. 123, n. 4.

² See No. 122, n. 5.

³ See No. 123, n. 2.

We are most grateful for the absolute loyalty shown to us by French and Italian governments in this vexatious affair.

My own views are shown in my telegram No. 122 to Paris:⁴ we have throughout been against the visit; essentially we still are, though we recognise that there is some force in Mr. Erskine's arguments in favour of M. Kalfof being received—see more especially his telegrams Nos. 47⁵ and 48.⁶

It is now evident (see your telegram No. 173 and Rome telegrams Nos. 103⁷ and 104)⁷ that both French and Italian governments in their heart of hearts are in favour of receiving M. Kalfof; and that being so only sensible course now is to leave it to you to settle definitely with French government what final decision is, and that you should then communicate it direct on my behalf to Rome and Berne so that necessary action may be taken conjointly.

It only remains to add that it is clearly very important that the three great powers should hold identic language to M. Kalfof if received at their respective capitals. I accordingly suggest that we should agree in advance (1) to say to him if he comes that no extension of time limit for disbandment of the extra men can be accorded, (2) that we should give him general advice on the lines of Mr. Erskine's telegram No. 48⁶ but as though emanating from ourselves and not from him. Please speak accordingly to government to which you are accredited and telegraph whether they have any modifications to suggest.

Repeated to Rome No. 153 for information of Italian government,⁸ to

⁴ No. 123.

⁵ See *ibid.*, n. 2.

⁶ Of May 8. This ran: '... the only hope of pacifying the country is for the present Government, as soon as acute stage of crisis is over, to give place to a coalition comprised of Liberal *Bourgeois* parties and Moderate Agrarian, which would then hold elections. New Government, modified as the result of the elections might necessitate, would then enact wide measure of amnesty. On further consideration I think amnesty should precede elections.'

'Present Government will probably endeavour obstinately to cling to power, and it seems to me that Minister for Foreign Affairs' visit to Western capitals would afford admirable opportunity to give him authoritative advice in the above sense.'

⁷ Of May 8, not printed.

⁸ In Foreign Office telegram No. 154 to Rome of May 10, Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir R. Graham as follows: 'You will of course make it clear to Italian government that it is only to expedite matters and to put an end to this unending confusion that I have authorised His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to settle this question direct with French government. No discourtesy to Italian government is meant as I feel sure they will recognise.'

Sir R. Graham reported (Rome telegram No. 113 of May 14): 'Italian government are already in agreement that there should be no extension of time limit. Although a certain analogy between present position of Italian and Bulgarian governments tended to render President of the Council less enamoured of terms of Mr. Erskine's advice than he might otherwise have been, he agrees to this also. His Excellency considers essential factor of situation is that the three powers should act in entire accord and he is therefore prepared to tender to Monsieur Kalfoff when he comes to Rome whatever advice has been given him in Paris and London.'

Berne No. 14 for information and guidance,⁹ to Sofia No. 45, Bucharest No. 33, Belgrade No. 44 and Athens No. 69.

⁹ Foreign Office telegram No. 15 to Berne of May 10 ran: 'As soon as you receive the decision from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, you are authorised to act in concert with your French and Italian colleagues [Signor C. Garbasso].'

No. 125

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 14, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 178 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6497/3456/7]

PARIS, May 13, 1925

My telegram No. 177¹.

Monsieur Briand² told me last night that he had seen M. Kalfoff in the afternoon, and had impressed on him that the date for disbandment of the newly raised forces could not be deferred, and that he had gone on to speak in general terms of the future, urging the necessity for reconstruction of the Bulgarian government, and the inclusion in it of an Agrarian element. M. Kalfoff had replied reasonably, making no protest on either subject, and indeed agreeing that a change in the composition of the government seems to be necessary. The Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs went on to speak with satisfaction of his reception at Belgrade,³ which had been perfectly friendly.

No intimation has reached me regarding M. Kalfoff's desire to visit England, but I presume this would be arranged through the Bulgarian Minister in London.

¹ Of May 11, not printed.

² French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³ Cf. No. 118, n. 2. M. Kalfoff left Belgrade for Berne on May 7.

No. 126

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 18)

*No. 303 [C 6623/459/18]**

BERLIN, May 13, 1925

Sir,

The Secretary of State handed me on the 11th May a very confidential memorandum, a translation of which I have the honour to transmit herewith, regarding supposed negotiations between Poland and Czechoslovakia. He said that he could not guarantee the accuracy of the statements made, but he proposed to instruct the German representative

at Prague¹ to take an early opportunity of asking Dr. Benes exactly how matters stood. He thought it best to be quite frank and open in the matter with the Czech Minister.²

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 126

Translation.

Memorandum

Credible information is available to the effect that, on the occasion of the presence of Dr. Benes in Warsaw,³ not only were the three treaties concluded between Czechoslovakia and Poland which have been made public,⁴ but concurrently secret political agreements of wide political scope were reached. These secret political agreements refer to the following points:—

1. The two Governments have undertaken to reject any alteration of the territorial *status quo* and to give each other mutual support in the maintenance and execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding Poland, Czechoslovakia and Danzig.

2. The two Governments have agreed on the steps and measures to be taken in common in order to prevent the union ('Anschluss') of German-Austria with Germany.

3. The Czechoslovakian Government will support the grant to Poland of a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations so long as such a seat on the council is not granted to the Little *Entente*.⁵ Poland will, as member of the council, co-operate in representing the interests of the Little *Entente*.

4. Poland undertakes to facilitate the import of war material into Czechoslovakia via the Baltic Sea.

5. Czechoslovakia undertakes to support Poland in all questions regarding its eastern frontiers.

6. Each of the two Governments will conclude international agreements which directly or indirectly affect the interests of the other party only in agreement with that party.⁶

¹ Dr. W. Koch.

² Dr. K. Krofta.

³ See No. 119, n. 1.

⁴ These treaties were signed on April 23, 1925. For the text of the treaty of conciliation and arbitration, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 122, pp. 333–9, of the commercial treaty, see *ibid.*, pp. 304–32, of the convention liquidating the affairs of Teschen, see *L.N.T.S.*, vol. XLVIII, pp. 335–81.

⁵ The Poles had been disappointed in September, 1923, when a Council seat had gone to Czechoslovakia, and not to Poland. See Vol. XXIII, Nos. 741 and 753.

⁶ Mr. Lampson wrote as follows to Sir G. Clerk on May 27: 'I enclose herewith a copy of a despatch from Berlin enclosing a very confidential memorandum which Stresemann gave to D'Abernon to the effect that at the time of the conclusion of the recent treaties between Czechoslovakia and Poland, secret political agreements were also reached. I may add,

parenthetically, that we have had similar allegations from various other sources which I need not quote here.

'It seems to us more than curious (if true), that Benes, the arch-champion of the League, should in fact have concluded such political agreements with Poland and withheld them from the League of Nations, and for this reason we are very much inclined to doubt whether there is anything in the rumour. At the same time, as you know Benes very well, it would be distinctly useful if you could endeavour to get from him a convincing denial that there is anything in it. I make this suggestion with the authority of the Secretary of State.'

For Sir G. Clerk's enquiries, see Vol. XXV, No. 464, n. 7.

No. 127

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 139¹ Telegraphic: by bag [C 6771/3456/7]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 19, 1925, 5.30 p.m.*

I received Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs May 18th.

He spoke at great length on situation in Bulgaria complaining of machinations of Bulgarian exiles in Serbia and laxity of Serb-Croat-Slovene government regarding them and of danger from Third International and Soviet government. He stated that Bulgaria was target of Serbian territorial ambition and of revolutionary activities of Soviet government and while assuring me that neither educated classes nor peasantry had any sympathy with communism drew lurid picture of danger to Bulgarian throne and institutions. He concluded by begging that Great Powers would continue their good offices with Serb-Croat-Slovene government to keep Bulgarian exiles away from frontier, would make representations to Austrian government against toleration of Bolshevik plots in Vienna,² and would invite a report from Organ of Liquidation before insisting upon disbandment of extra troops by May 31st.³

In reply I expressed admiration of courage shown by King of Bulgaria on occasion of attack upon him⁴ and assured him of our sympathy and horror at outrages committed,⁵ but said that in view of criticism of Bulgaria's neighbours⁶ he must realise at once that extra troops must be disbanded by appointed date. His Majesty's Government had no desire but to see Bulgaria united and prosperous, but I thought that he somewhat exaggerated external dangers and the causes of disturbed conditions were rather domestic disunion and internal strife. As outrages were condemned by all but most extreme section, Bulgarian government should now make serious effort for internal unity. Once she was peaceful at home and conciliatory abroad, Bulgaria would gain such sympathy

¹ No. 139 to Paris and No. 167 to Rome.

³ See Nos. 97, n. 5, 101, n. 3, 103 and 105.

⁵ See *ibid.*, n. 1.

² Cf. No. 104.

⁴ See No. 99, n. 3.

⁶ See Nos. 106, 107 and 113.

from other nations which must be alienated so long as present fierce feud distracted the country and each successive government treated its political opponents as enemies of the country.

In thanking me for my advice His Excellency assured me of moderation of present government and professed to have followed counsels of moderation given to him by Lord Curzon in 1923 (see his despatch No. 391 of October 11th 1923 to Sofia⁷ confidential print S.E. Europe, October 11th 1923 section 1). The present government had three times passed measures of amnesty and had pursued policy of conciliation to a point at which Chamber and public opinion reproached them with weakness.

I did not contravert these observations in detail but repeated my advice that repressive measures should only be taken against men who were a real danger to the State and not against mere political opponents, and ended by saying that if a government were formed uniting all constitutional parties in Bulgaria it would command respect and be best safeguard of the country.

Please inform government to which you are accredited of above.⁸

Repeated 'for information only' to Sofia No. 47 Belgrade No. 49, Athens No. 72 and Bucharest No. 35.

⁷ See Vol. XXIV, No. 557.

⁸ In Foreign Office telegram No. 168 to Rome of May 19, Mr. Chamberlain added: '... I naturally trust that Italy, France and Great Britain may maintain complete unity in this delicate affair; and that though there may be some slight difference in the form in which we express our several views, it may be made clear to M. Kalfov that there is complete agreement in substance between the three great powers. ... In making this communication to M. Mussolini you will again make it clear that in putting up this plea for continued unity I do not for one moment doubt that that is also M. Mussolini's own view: my sole anxiety is to dispel any feeling on his part that my object is to intrude undesirably in Bulgarian internal politics.'

Sir R. Graham replied (Rome despatch No. 443 of May 22): '... I confirmed these communications in a conversation which I had with Signor Mussolini last night. His Excellency expected to receive M. Kalfov today, and declared that he would certainly speak to him in similar terms to those used in Paris and London. He was indeed prepared to go even further and tell M. Kalfov that if the present Bulgarian Government no longer represented the will of the country, it had better not attempt to cling to power. ...'

No. 128

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 21, 9 a.m.)

No. 57 Telegraphic [C 6896/3456/7]

SOFIA, May 20, 1925, 12 midnight

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

¹ This telegram, No. 55/56 of May 20, transmitted a message from Major Neate for the Director of Military Intelligence. It ran: 'Bulgarian Government have today informed us

I have not yet been able to consult my French and Italian colleagues and it is difficult to express a positive opinion in view of paucity of independent information obtainable here, but though I have confirmation that a considerable number of troops is employed in rounding up four or five bands composed of fugitive communists and agrarians, I have strong impression that government greatly exaggerate danger of further trouble and I see no sufficient reason to modify views expressed in my despatch No. 106.²

Any danger involved in disbanding volunteers by May 31st would, I think, be far smaller than that arising from hostile attitude of neighbours in the event of its postponement.³

Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Paris and Rome.

that situation in the country still gives them cause for great anxiety. . . . They ask that permission may be given for 10,000 militia to be retained until country is calmer but say that they propose to begin disbandment of 3,000 forthwith. They add that if this request is refused and entire dismissal by May 31st insisted on, they will comply but with great regret. . . .

² Of May 14. In this, Mr. Erskine stated: ' . . . While . . . reinforcements may have been of considerable assistance to the authorities in rounding up Communists and Agrarians suspected of being engaged in conspiracy, and in maintaining order during the process, especially in the particular district which Major Neate has just visited, [the Ferdinand and Berkovitz districts], I am by no means convinced that they were ever really necessary. . . . '

³ In Sofia telegram No. 58 of May 21, Mr. Erskine reported: 'My French and Italian colleagues share my views and are telegraphing in a similar sense to their governments.'

No. 129

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Clark (Prague)

No. 211 [C 5992/298/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 21, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 68 of March 5th last,¹ I transmit to you, herewith, copies of correspondence on the subject of the economic and financial situation in Austria.²

2. Whilst there would appear to be no reason to apprehend any immediate or grave economic crisis arising out of the present industrial depression in Austria, the position is generally such as to give rise to anxiety as to the ultimate stability of the country being attained through

¹ This covered a copy of a letter from Sir O. Niemeyer to Mr. Lampson of February 24, not printed.

² These comprised No. 86; record by Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, Economic Adviser to His Majesty's Government, of February 24 of a conversation of January 31 with Dr. Schueller, Director of Commercial Affairs at the Austrian Foreign Ministry; No. 98; Board of Trade letter to the Foreign Office of April 16, not printed; Vienna despatch No. 92 of April 16, not printed; letter of April 24 from Sir E. Drummond to Mr. Chamberlain, not printed.

the operation of the League of Nations Reconstruction Scheme³ unless accompanied by a marked improvement in the commercial relations between Austria and her neighbours.⁴ In this connection you will observe from Mr. Akers-Douglas's despatches enclosed herewith that the Austrian Government have recently requested the League of Nations to appoint a committee of non-political experts to enquire into economic conditions both in Austria and in the neighbouring states.⁵ His Majesty's Government welcome the opportunity thus afforded of enabling the League to bring its influence to bear in the interests of a general tariff reduction and the abolition of the system of import and export prohibitions. In their opinion this probably provides the only practical method of dealing with the Austrian situation, the alternative solutions of a more far reaching character which have been suggested, namely

- (a) 'anschluss' with Germany;
- (b) Danube Confederation;
- (c) preferential tariff arrangements,

all being beyond the realm of practical politics.

3. As regards (c), it will be seen from the enclosed correspondence that, in the opinion of the Board of Trade,⁶ any system of preferential tariffs, postulating as it would the renunciation by the powers which have concluded commercial treaties with the countries concerned, of their most-favoured-nation rights, would be highly detrimental to British interests and must be resisted. The creation of a Danube Confederation or customs union embracing the Little Entente powers, Austria and Hungary, while presumably offering no serious ground for opposition on the part of His Majesty's Government, may be regarded as impossible of attainment, at all events in the near future, the Little Entente, particularly Czechoslovakia, being resolutely opposed to any arrangement calculated to restore the former predominant position of Vienna or to jeopardise their political independence.

4. The third suggestion, namely 'anschluss' with Germany, must be regarded as definitely precluded as running contrary to the terms of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain forbidding the alienation of Austria's independence.

5. In these circumstances the path along which Austria's economic development is to be looked for and encouraged is that of a reduction of tariffs in Central Europe, the removal of import and export prohibitions and, generally, a closer economic relationship between Austria and her neighbours. Austria herself can and should exert her full influence in

³ See No. 17, n. 4.

⁴ On the condition of Austria, see Nos. 86 and 98.

⁵ On April 18. The Council of the League of Nations on June 9 approved the Austrian request for an enquiry into present economic conditions in Austria (see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 860-1). For the results of the enquiry, see *League of Nations: The Economic Situation of Austria: Report presented to the Council of the League of Nations by W.T. Layton, C.H., and Charles Rist* (Geneva, August 19, 1925).

⁶ In a letter of April 16 (C 5213/1586/62), not printed.

fostering this policy, but in order that it may become effective the active co-operation of the neighbouring States is clearly essential.

6. The object I have in mind in furnishing you with this general statement of policy is, not that you should address any formal communication to the government to which you are accredited, but that you should know the lines upon which the thoughts of His Majesty's Government are running and thus be in a position in any conversations you may have on the subject so to frame your observations and advice as to conform with their views.

7. Similar despatches have been addressed to His Majesty's representative at Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade and Bucharest.⁷

I am, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

HAROLD NICOLSON

⁷ No. 171 to Vienna; No. 161 to Budapest; No. 251 to Belgrade; No. 269 to Bucharest of May 21.

No. 130

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 144¹ Telegraphic [C 6896/3456/7]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 22, 1925, 4.30 p.m.*

Mr. Erskine's telegrams Nos. 55,² 56² and 57³ (of May 20th: Bulgarian crisis).

I fully concur with Mr. Erskine's opinion in second paragraph of his telegram No. 57, and suggest that three governments should immediately inform Bulgarian government that they cannot allow any concession in matter of disbandment of troops, and note that Bulgarian government agree to complete disbandment by May 31st (see paragraph 3 of Sofia telegram No. 55).

Please inform government to which you are accredited and invite them to send immediate instructions in this sense to their representative on Organ of Liquidation.⁴

Repeated to Sofia No. 49, Belgrade No. 53, Bucharest No. 38, and Athens No. 74.

¹ No. 144 to Paris and No. 171 to Rome.

² See No. 128, n. 1.

³ No. 128.

⁴ In Paris telegram No. 193 of May 23, Lord Crewe replied: 'French government agree and will instruct their representative [Colonel Rinck] on organ of liquidation accordingly.'

The Italian Government gave a similar answer (Rome telegram No. 126 of May 27, not printed).

Lord Crewe reported (Paris telegram No. 205 of May 30): 'Versailles committee submitted to Ambassadors' Conference at today's meeting telegram from Liquidation Organ at Sofia enclosed in my despatch No. 1234 of May 28th [not printed] proposing

gradual demobilisation of militia. Conference decided to maintain its previous decision as to complete demobilisation on May 31st and a telegram instructing Liquidation Organ to give effect to this decision is being telegraphed at once.'

In Sofia telegram No. 61 of May 31 Mr. Erskine reported: 'Organ of Liquidation having today received instructions from Marshal Foch have informed Bulgarian government that volunteers must all be disbanded within 48 hours.'

No. 131

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Keeling¹ (Athens)

*No. 310 [C 7248/798/19]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 27, 1925

Sir,

The Greek Chargé d'Affaires sought an interview with me this afternoon to submit to me an account of the critical position of the present negotiations with Serbia.²

He left me with a memorandum (A)³ which in fact resumes the whole case as explained by him, and a further memorandum (B)⁴ which he said he supposed was the reply of the Greek Government to the Serbian demand. M. Melas expressed the most anxious desire that I should treat all that had been said to me as most secret and confidential. The Greek Government had undertaken to keep the negotiations strictly confidential and this was in fact the first time they had said anything about them. He was directed to enquire whether His Majesty's Government could perhaps take some measure which might ease the situation.

I told him that the account of what had happened was not a matter of surprise to me though it was a subject for regret. We had in fact never been quite so optimistic about these negotiations as M. Caclamanos and the Greek Government. I had indeed felt some time previously that the unsatisfactory working of the Ghevgeli-Salonica line was a source of danger to the relations of Greece and Serbia, and I had therefore suggested that it might be worth the while of the Greek Government to consider whether it would not be well for them to obtain the services of a first-rate railway manager from the League of Nations or elsewhere to put the railway on a better footing.⁵ Unfortunately that suggestion did not commend itself to the Greek Government, and a situation had now been reached in which I must frankly confess that I did not, at present, see my way to any useful intervention by the British Government. I doubted very much whether an offer of advice from us would be acceptable or would help to an amicable solution of the difficulties.

The Chargé d'Affaires suggested that we might express a hope to the

¹ First Secretary at Athens and Chargé d'Affaires May 23-June 14.

² See Nos. 14, 26, 70, 93 and 120.

³ Of May 27, not printed.

⁴ This undated memorandum is not printed.

⁵ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 271 and 293.

Serbian Government that the negotiations would not be broken off, or at any rate that we might indicate that we were interested in their success. I repeated that, whilst much regretting the difficulties which had arisen, I did not think that we could usefully take action at the moment; he had himself urged upon me the extremest secrecy as to his communication and the importance of not allowing it to be supposed at Belgrade that any appeal had been made to us by Greece. I thought it was extremely unlikely that if we intervened the Greek appeal to us would remain unsuspected and our interference might well increase the difficulties of the position.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 132

Mr. Kennard¹ (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 2)

*No. 168 [C 7371/276/92]**

BELGRADE, May 27, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I had my first interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday morning. M. Nincic, after expressing his regret at the departure of Sir Alban Young,² who had always maintained such cordial relations with the S[erbia] H[ungary] S[lovenia] Government, made a lengthy summary of the problems which at the present chiefly affect Central Europe and the Balkans.

2. His Excellency commenced by examining the Austrian situation and the menace of the 'Anschluss'. He drew my attention to the danger of German penetration and the revival of the 'Drang nach Osten',³ and stated that German propaganda, more especially of a cultural nature, was again spreading its tentacles eastward. He was relieved to learn that His Majesty's Government had firmly pronounced itself against the 'Anschluss', and then examined the alternatives to this solution of the plight of Austria. He was under the impression that Italy favoured a rapprochement between herself, Yugoslavia and Austria, though he had not been approached officially on the subject. He pointed out that, though the relations between this country and Italy were excellent, it was too early to think of assuming close relations with Austria, as public opinion here was not yet prepared to approve such a policy. His Excellency personally thought that a commencement towards the re-establishment of the

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Belgrade. Formerly Counsellor at Rome, Mr. Kennard had taken charge of the Belgrade Legation on May 25.

² Sir A. Young had left Belgrade on May 16. He retired from the Diplomatic Service in September, 1925.

³ i.e. desire for expansion eastwards.

balance of power in Central Europe should be made by a closer understanding between Czechoslovakia and Austria, which might be followed in time by Hungary becoming a party thereto.

3. M. Nincic then passed to the negotiations with Greece,⁴ which, his Excellency admitted, were more or less at a standstill. After adducing the arguments in favour of the Serbian pretensions as regards the Salonica line, with which you, Sir, are familiar, he pointed out that his Government would be quite prepared to accept a unilateral management, by which Serbia alone should be obliged to support Greece in a military sense, though such a proposal would no doubt be offensive to Greece. As a matter of fact Serbia had no need of Greek military assistance as she had her alliance with Roumania,⁵ and Bulgaria was so weak and the Greek forces had so declined in strength that they were no longer the factor which they had been before the war. Incidentally Greece had never carried out her obligations under the alliance,⁶ and had indeed in 1915 assumed a hostile attitude which it was difficult for Serbia to forget. At any rate Serbia must have some tangible *quid pro quo* for the military assistance which Serbia would have to render to Greece under any new alliance, and this would be constituted by the concessions the former required as regards Salonica and the minorities. As regards the first, she was demanding a Serbian administration for the Ghevgheli–Salonica railway line which was essential for the communications with the sea, not only of Jugoslavia, but of Central Europe generally. The S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government could not rely on the friendly relations which they maintained with the present Greek Government being permanent, and at any moment they might find railway communications with their only outlet to the sea threatened, as any outlet on the Adriatic was too exposed to Italian attack to be of real value. Under these circumstances they must insist on the administration of the line from Ghevgheli to Salonica being Serbian. This was not an unprecedented request, as a portion of the line from the Greek frontier to Monastir in Serbian territory was at present under Greek administration. At Salonica itself the S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government only desired that the 90 hectares provided for the Serbian reservation under the former treaty should be fully conceded. At present they had only 50 hectares, which were inadequate for the railway sidings which they needed. As regards the minorities question, the Greek Government maintained that the Serbian demands were contrary to the spirit of the agreements concerned⁷ and the prerogative of the League of Nations, but his Excellency was of the

⁴ See Nos. 14, 26, 70, 93, 120 and 131.

⁵ For the text of the convention of defensive alliance of June 7, 1921, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 123, pp. 1046–7. See also Vol. XXII, Nos. 171, n. 5, 175 and 185.

⁶ See No. 14, n. 4.

⁷ For the texts of the treaties of September 10, 1919, and of August 10, 1920, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Serbia and Greece respectively, with regard to the rights of minorities, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 514–23, and *ibid.*, vol. 113, pp. 471–9.

opinion that this contention was not well founded. The position as regards the negotiations was that the Greek Government had refused to accept the Serbian proposals as regards the minorities question, and that they were considering the proposals respecting the Salonica line. There was at any rate no likelihood of an early conclusion of the negotiations.

4. M. Nincic then turned to the Bulgarian situation and expressed his satisfaction that M. Kalkov's endeavours to secure the maintenance of the increase in the Bulgarian forces had met with no success.⁸ As a matter of fact, the forces to be disbanded would probably be secretly kept with the colours, but it was essential that, in theory at any rate, there should be no violation of the Peace Treaty. According to the information of the Serbian military authorities, the Bulgarian army at the present moment had a strength of at least 75,000 men, and they could, in the event of necessity, raise thirteen strong divisions with 300,000 rifles and a considerable number of machine guns. They were weak only in artillery. The S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government had full sympathy with the Bulgarian Government in their efforts to combat Bolshevism, though their action in taking advantage of the present situation to ruthlessly kill their political opponents was reprehensible, but his Excellency did not believe that there was any possibility of the success of a Communist revolution in Bulgaria as the military elements could always control the situation. The S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government had no intention of taking any individual action of a drastic nature in the event of the Bulgarian Government not having fully disbanded the 13,000 additional troops by the 31st May, but they would urge that the International Commission should take energetic action to secure this disbandment.

5. His Excellency then referred to the activity of Russian propaganda in the Balkans,⁹ and stated that it was essential to lay the foundations for some effective means of resisting the pressure from Russia and Germany which must shortly threaten the existence of all the countries in Central Europe and the Balkans, and he hoped that it would be possible in the remote future to create some form of Balkan confederation, which, with a stabilised Central Europe, would prove the best weapon with which to resist the Russian and German menace.

6. M. Nincic finally discussed the internal situation and expressed the hope that the relations between Serbia, Croatia and the other component parts of the kingdom were now on the way to reaching a satisfactory solution. He, personally, was in favour of a conciliatory attitude to Croat aspirations, and he hoped that within a short period a settlement would be reached under which perhaps five portfolios in the Ministry would be given to the Radic party. The difficulty was the position of M. Pribicevic,¹⁰ who declined to collaborate with the partisans of M. Radic, but as his party represented a small fraction in the Skupshtina, an agreement with the

⁸ See Nos. 128 and 130.

⁹ See No. 95.

¹⁰ Leader of the Independent Democrat Party.

stronger groups was of far greater importance. An indication of the improvement in the relations between Serbia and Croatia had been the recent visit of the leaders of the Croatian 'sokols'¹¹ to Belgrade to pay their respects to the King. These 'sokols' would have constituted a form of military reserves in the event of serious friction with the Central Government, and some of them had even mounted organisations. His Excellency pointed out that one of the great obstacles in the unification of the new kingdom was the lack of an efficient civil service. Almost half the junior ranks of the old Serbian civil service had been killed in the war, and it was impossible at the present moment to find a sufficient number of responsible officials for the administration of the enlarged Yugoslav Kingdom. Considerable strides were, however, being made in educating an increased number of students who could later fill the present gaps in the Administration. At the Belgrade University alone there were now 6,000 students, and with those now studying at the universities at Zagrab and Ljubljana the number would be sufficiently increased to meet the present deficiencies. His Excellency alluded to the interest taken in the Montenegrin and other internal problems by certain elements in Great Britain, and said that he hoped to be able to discuss these with me at a later date.

I have, etc.,
H. W. KENNARD

¹¹ i.e. 'falcons'. These patriotic and athletic organisations had been founded in Chicago in 1908.

No. 133

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 9)

No. 290 [C 7737/3456/7]

BUCHAREST, *June 1, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 2[8]9 of yesterday's date,¹ Monsieur Duca was good enough to give me this morning an account of what had passed during the interviews which he and the Roumanian Prime Minister have had with the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs during the latter's visit to Bucharest.²

Monsieur Kalfoff had not raised at all the question of any retention of the sanctioned increased numbers of militia beyond the 31st of May.³ He

¹ Not printed.

² M. Kalfoff had arrived in Bucharest from Prague on May 28. In Prague despatch No. 192 of May 29, Sir G. Clerk had reported that Dr. Benes had told him that he had given M. Kalfoff similar advice to that given in London, Paris, and Rome (see Nos. 125, 127 and *ibid.*, n. 8).

³ See No. 128.

had stated that he was most grateful for the friendly attitude of the Roumanian Government ever since he had been in office and expressed thanks for the moderating counsels which he knew had invariably been given by Monsieur Duca to the States bordering on Bulgaria. He rejoiced to think that relations between Roumania and Bulgaria were so amicable, and assured Monsieur Duca that the intention of the Bulgarian Government was to respect the terms of the peace Treaty, and to live on friendly terms with all their neighbours. He had then given an account of the internal situation in Bulgaria which he stated had improved, though there were still turbulent elements at large of whom he expressed considerable mistrust. In this connection only he mentioned the increased militia force which had been of service in restoring order.

Monsieur Duca had, he informed me, given him the advice which the three Ministers of the Little *Entente* had decided on and which was known to me, namely to disband the increased force of militia at the date laid down. Monsieur Kalfoff assured him that this would be done, though he expressed some misgiving as to the future. Monsieur Duca told him that by taking this action loyally it would prove the good faith of the Bulgarian Government and disarm the suspicion which had been shown in certain quarters that they meant to try and retain a permanent increase of their forces for ulterior motives. Monsieur Kalfoff repeated that the Bulgarian Government intended to obey the directions of the Great Powers in this respect.

I informed Monsieur Duca that the Great Powers had already informed the Bulgarian Government on the 30th ultimo that the extra militia force had to be disbanded without fail by the 31st.⁴ He replied that he had received reports of this action from Paris, London and in particular from Rome. He gathered that no sanction for ulterior increase would be considered unless some great emergency again arose in Bulgaria. I stated that I was unaware that any such possibility had been taken into consideration by His Majesty's Government and did not believe that any mention of it had been made in the instructions to the Organ of Liquidation in Bulgaria, by whom the directions of the Allied Great Powers had been communicated to the Bulgarian Government. Monsieur Duca said he realised this also. In mentioning to Monsieur Kalfoff the suspicion entertained in certain quarters he had generalised in order not to mention Jugo-Slavia in particular, or Greece.

I asked him if he thought the Greek Government, whom Monsieur Kalfoff had not visited, would be aware of the good intentions expressed by the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs towards the neighbouring States. Monsieur Duca replied in the affirmative, adding that at any rate he had instructed the Roumanian representative at Athens to inform the Greek Government of the satisfactory assurances given by Monsieur Kalfoff.

⁴ See No. 130, n. 4.

I have forwarded copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ministers at Sofia and Belgrade.

I have, etc.,
HERBERT G. DERING

No. 134

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 3, 9 a.m.)

No. 62 Telegraphic [C 7474/3456/7]

SOFIA, June 2, 1925, 12 a.m.

My telegram No. 61.¹

Organ of liquidation has today received note from Bulgarian government in reply to their communication¹ stating that orders have been given for disbandment within time specified. Note ends however with declaration that 'if in the future situation should grow worse as result of decision of powers and if in case of absolute necessity they should be obliged again to have recourse to assistance of volunteers they will do so in the name of their duty as government responsible for maintenance of order, peace and very existence of the country'.²

I would suggest organ be instructed to protest against this obvious threat to call up volunteers without their previous permission and to warn them of grave situation which such action would produce.

Today from 4 a.m. until 6 p.m. inhabitants of the whole of Sofia have been confined to their houses while universal house to house search has been carried out by civil guards again called up for the purpose. Town has been surrounded by cordon of troops.

It is stated that object is to arrest certain conspirators still in hiding before disbandment of volunteers but I suspect that main object is to impress us with danger involved in their disbandment at the present moment if indeed it is not intended to be means of producing evidence of further conspiracies of a nature to justify their retention.

Minister for Foreign Affairs returned to Sofia³ Monday morning⁴ and was present I understand at Cabinet meeting at which note to organ was drafted.

Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Paris⁵ and Rome.⁵

¹ See No. 130, n. 4.

² Copies of the letter of the Organ of Liquidation of May 31, and of the Bulgarian reply of June 1 were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Sofia despatches Nos. 120 and 121 of June 14, not printed.

³ From his European tour. See Nos. 118, n. 2, 125, 127, *ibid.*, n. 8, and 133.

⁴ June 1.

⁵ In Foreign Office telegram No. 162 to Paris and 182 to Rome of June 4 Mr. Chamberlain referred to No. 134, and continued: 'Please inform government to which you are accredited that His Majesty's Government consider that organ of liquidation should

certainly enter a formal protest, and request that they will give appropriate instructions to their representative on military committee of Versailles.'

No. 135

Mr. Kennard (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 8)

*No. 180 [C 7665/798/19]**

BELGRADE, June 3, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, as reported in my telegram No. 86 of the 2nd June,¹ the negotiations between Greece and Jugoslavia² have been suspended, for the present at any rate. Since my arrival³ there have been indications that no satisfactory progress was being made, and on the 30th instant the head of the Greek delegation appealed to the French Minister for the support of the French Government with a view to inducing the S[erba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. On M. Grenard telling me that he thought it advisable that our two Governments should intervene, I gave him no encouragement and stated that, as I had received no instructions from my Government I could not say what action, if any, they might be prepared to take. He informs me today that he has spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject.⁴

2. On my calling on the Greek Minister⁵ he told me that M. Caclamanos, the head of the Greek delegation, was anxious to explain the situation to me. I stated that I was ready to receive M. Caclamanos, who called on me yesterday. He gave me a full history of the past and present

¹ Not printed.

² See Nos. 14, 26, 70, 93, 120, 131 and 132.

³ See No. 132, n. 1.

⁴ In Belgrade despatch No. 191 of June 9, Mr. Kennard reported: '... I enquired of the French Minister today as to the exact steps he had taken in regard to the Serbo-Greek negotiations. M. Grenard informed me that, under instructions from his Government, he had officially warned the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the serious consequences of any rupture of these negotiations and had pointed out how necessary it was that the alliance between Jugoslavia and Greece should be renewed. He had further suggested to M. Nincic that the Yugoslav pretensions as regards the Salonica line were unduly exorbitant and that it would be wise to modify them and show a generally more conciliatory attitude. M. Nincic had made an evasive reply on the lines of what he has already told me, and M. Grenard was not hopeful that his action would in any way usefully contribute to the solution of the present deadlock. He hoped, however, that it might be possible to renew these representations at a later date with greater effect.

'M. Grenard was also under the impression that the Italian Government had used their influence with a view to bringing about a rupture of these negotiations, though he had no evidence in support of this supposition. It was, however, generally the policy of Italy to prevent, if possible, any understandings between the Balkan Governments, and he had no doubt that she had acted in accordance with that policy in the present case. ...'

⁵ M. M. Tsamados.

stages of the negotiations, and the following is a summary of his version of what has occurred.

3. At the commencement various minor points were dealt with, such as the expropriation of the Serbian monastery on Mount Athos, Hilendar, and the recognition of the Serbian nationality of a number of residents at Salonica and elsewhere. On these two questions the Greek Government were prepared to meet the Serbian demands with slight modifications.

4. As regards the minorities, the Yugoslav delegation insisted on the conclusion of a separate agreement between the two Governments. The Greek delegates drew their attention to the declaration signed at Geneva on the 29th September last⁶ and the letter addressed by them to the League of Nations during the session of last March,⁷ and pointed out that they were unable to supersede the agreements at present in force as regards the minorities,⁸ and that they could not run the risk of any further difficulties with the League of Nations on this subject. They further pointed out that it would be dangerous to conclude any separate agreement, which might lead other States concerned to demand the conclusion of similar negotiations.

5. The Yugoslav delegates had further demanded an extensive enlargement of the Serbian free zone at Salonica. While unable to agree to so great an extension as was asked for, the Greek delegation agreed to the Serbian demands as regards the eastern limits of their zone, and proposed that two experts should be appointed to consider any extension towards the west, and that, in event of disagreement, the matter should be referred to arbitration by the Permanent Court of Justice at The Hague.

6. As regards the Salonica—Ghevgheli line, the Serbian delegation insisted on the grant of administrative rights for the railway, and further demanded that the line, stations and all property belonging to the railway should be handed over to the Serbian Railway Administration within a month, and that the latter should appoint all the officials of the railway, who would not be subject to Greek law or jurisdiction. They further demanded the right of supplying police and customs officials on the land traversed by the railway, which would be considered as Serbian territory, the station of Salonica thus becoming a frontier station. The Greek delegation professed their inability to consider these demands, which would violate the sovereign rights of Greece. The Greek Government, however, fully recognising the economic interests of Yugoslavia in this railway, were prepared to accord all the facilities necessary for the transit of Serbian goods from Salonica to Ghevgheli as far as these were compatible with the sovereign rights of Greece, and even to agree to the appointment of a neutral arbitrator to decide any points in dispute. M.

⁶ See No. 2, n. 7.

⁷ For the text of the Greek letter of February 11, which informed the League of Nations of the resolution of the Greek Assembly of February 3 (see No. 19, n. 7) see *L./N.O.J.* 1925, p. 577.

⁸ See No. 132, n. 7.

Caclamanos handed me a copy of a letter which had been addressed to the head of the Yugoslav delegation on the 31st May on this subject, and of which a copy is enclosed herein.¹

7. He stated that it was useless to continue these negotiations until the S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government showed a more conciliatory attitude, and then suggested that Italy was largely responsible for the exorbitant nature of the Serbian demands.⁹ He felt sure that the authorities here had received encouragement from Rome to put on the screw with a view to embittering relations between the two countries.

8. There is a general impression among my colleagues that the Yugoslav delegates have opened their mouths somewhat too wide, though it is generally recognised that the S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government were fully justified in demanding an improvement in the conditions under which Serbian goods reached Salonica. It must further be remembered that Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Poland are almost equally interested in this question, as in the event of the Dardanelles and Danzig being closed, Salonica would be the principal port of entry available for munitions in case of war. Negotiations have been proceeding, and should shortly be concluded, between Roumania and Jugoslavia regarding railway communications, and especially the transit of munitions, and I understand that similar negotiations are proceeding with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and that delegates of the four Powers are to meet in Bucharest later in the year with a view to concluding a general agreement on this subject.

9. I have reported the views of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the question in my despatch No. 168,¹⁰ and on my discussing it yesterday with the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs he endeavoured to minimise the importance of the Yugoslav demands as regards the railway, and quoted the 'Wagons-Lits' as an instance of foreign interests controlling railway communications. I have, however, avoided displaying an undue interest in the topic or committing myself to any strong views.

10. One has the impression that the S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government are not really anxious to renew the alliance unless they obtain the concessions they desire, and in certain quarters it is hinted that they may exert strong pressure to do so. It is true that, in the event of Greece not being friendly to Jugoslavia, the Greek fleet could seriously interfere with the latter's traffic in Salonica, but at the present moment this country no doubt considers itself as so greatly superior to Greece in military strength that the latter must offer some very tangible *quid pro quo* for her assistance in the event of war.

11. As to M. Caclamanos suggesting that Italy has played the rôle of 'Mephistopheles', it is of course obvious that it is in the interest of Italy to

⁹ In Athens telegram No. 97 of June 3, Mr. Keeling reported: 'Prime Minister attributes intransigent attitude of Serb-Croat-Slovene government to pressure of Italians who are anxious to prevent any union between Balkan nations.'

¹⁰ No. 132.

divert Yugoslavia away from the Adriatic towards Salonica, and that she must only regard any estrangement between Yugoslavia and Greece with satisfaction. As a matter of fact the Italian Minister here only returned from a month's absence in Italy this week. I met, however, yesterday M. Gavrilovitch, the Yugoslav Minister in Athens, who appeared to be on the best of terms with his Italian colleague, and it is suggested here that the fact that the Italo-Yugoslav negotiations at Florence¹¹ are said to be proceeding more smoothly may be connected with this question.

12. M. Caclamanos is returning to London at the end of this week, and it is hoped that by the end of the summer both Governments may have had time to seriously reconsider their attitude, and that the negotiations may be resumed in a more satisfactory atmosphere, though at present there are no signs of weakening on either side.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Rome.

I have, etc.,
H. W. KENNARD

June 4.—P.S.—On my returning M. Caclamanos's call this morning, I asked him how far the recent purchase by the S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government of the shares of the Compagnie orientale¹²—the French company which formerly controlled the Salonica–Ghevgheli line—affected the question. M. Caclamanos said that he thought that the S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] Government had been genuinely under the impression that by buying out the French company they would obtain full 'droits d'exploitation'. The French company had, however, now specifically admitted that such transfer could in no way affect the sovereign rights of the Greek Government over the line. I further asked him whether the extra-territorial rights demanded by the Serbian delegation covered the line only or a considerable zone on either side of the railway. M. Caclamanos stated that they had not specifically asked for any particular area, but that they had required a sufficient tract for a double line. He is sending me a copy of the draft convention drawn up by the Serbian delegation, which I will forward by the next bag.¹³

M. Markovitch, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was Serbian Minister in Athens until he took up his present appointment this year and who was, I believe, *persona grata* with the Greek Government, is proceeding today to Athens ostensibly to pack up his effects, but it is

¹¹ Negotiations had been begun in Venice in October, 1924, with regard to Italo-Serb-Croat-Slovene commercial relations (see Vol. XXVI, No. 276, n. 4). Further negotiations at Florence in 1925 lead to the signature at Nettuno on July 20/21, 1925, of agreements relating to the execution of the peace treaties and the Fiume settlement. For the texts, see *Trattati e Convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli Altri Stati*, vol. 34 (Rome, 1932), pp. 532–778.

¹² See No. 120, n. 4.

¹³ Belgrade despatch No. 186 of June 5 (C. 7669/798/19), not printed.

thought that he may during his visit there endeavour to influence the Greek Government to show a more yielding spirit.

H. W. K.

No. 136

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 8)

No. 117 [C 7674/3456/7]

SOFIA, June 3, 1925

Sir,

A visit paid to me this morning by Mr. Webster, who, as reported in my despatch No. 88 of the 1st May,¹ is engaged as the representative of the Save the Children Fund in carrying out a scheme for the settlement of refugees from Macedonia, enables me to furnish absolutely reliable first-hand evidence as to the methods employed by the military authorities in 'maintaining order' in the provinces.

2. Some days ago a detachment of some fifty soldiers, with machine guns and several officers, arrived at Straldja, a large village, about 40 miles from Bourgas and a few miles from the site of the refugee settlement, where Mr. Webster and most of the refugees in question are at present living. The reason given for the visit was the alleged discovery of some money which had been hidden in a railway hut in the neighbourhood, and was said to have been stolen from a bank some months ago. Twenty villagers were arrested and were interrogated in the public square by a member of the secret police, assisted by some of the soldiers. Mr. Webster, who was an eye-witness of the scene, states that the interrogation of each man began with the administration of six or seven severe blows, usually on the face, from a stout leather thong, which were followed up by many more in the course of the examination, some of the prisoners receiving at least twenty-five blows.

3. For several days no one was allowed to move a step outside his house on pain of being instantly shot—a matter of serious concern to the peasants, to whom at this time of year every hour's work on their land is of the utmost importance.

4. Mr. Webster had some difficulty in getting permission to proceed to the settlement in order to superintend the work of ploughing which was being carried on there by the refugees. Eventually the officer in command detailed a soldier to escort him there, ordering him, in Mr. Webster's presence, to unload his rifle, and giving him strict instructions not to shoot him on the way. The necessity for such an order is significant.

5. Mr. Webster said that the general attitude of the officers towards the peasants was overbearing and brutal in the extreme, mentioning, as an

¹ Not printed.

example, that opposite his inn was a small café in which the officers were in the habit of taking their meals, and that any villager who was imprudent enough to walk past it was immediately beaten over the head. One night a man was shot on this spot.

6. The inhabitants of this village are all prosperous peasants, owning their own property, and Mr. Webster has no reason for thinking that they can possibly be Communists, and I have little doubt that this is a typical example of what is being done throughout the country in villages where most of the inhabitants belong to the Agrarian Union, and where any pretext can be found for terrorising them.

I have, etc.,
WILLIAM ERSKINE

No. 137

*Mr. London¹ (Geneva) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received June 10, 8.30 p.m.)*

No. 237 Telegraphic [C 7815/251/62]

GENEVA, June 10, 1925, 5.40 p.m.

Translation of telegram to Monsieur Mussolini referred to in Geneva telegram No. 236.²

¹ H.M. Consul at Geneva.

² Of June 10. This ran: 'Following from Secretary of State [Mr. Chamberlain was the British Empire delegate to the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Council of the League of Nations which met at Geneva June 8–11]:— "M. Briand and I today handed telegram translation of which is contained in my immediately following telegram to Signor Scialoja, Italian representative on council, with request that it might be despatched to Signor Mussolini."'

This approach to Signor Mussolini had been suggested by Mr. Nicolson in a memorandum of June 4 which ran: 'Recent developments, such as the Bolshevik incidents in Bulgaria [see No. 99, n. 1] and the present tension in the relations between Greece and Jugoslavia [see No. 135], have demonstrated that the Balkans still constitute a focus of instability, and that the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] Government are inclined to profit by the disunion or indifference of the Great Powers in order to advance their own highly dangerous ambitions. The alarm which for the last six months has been felt in London is now shared at Paris: there is reason to believe that the French government would today welcome concerted action, or at least an exchange of views, in regard to the situation of South Eastern Europe.

'Anglo-French agreement will not, however, be sufficient so long as Italian diplomacy works in an opposite direction. It is very essential to secure if possible the adherence of M. Mussolini to a policy of joint action for Balkan peace. By ourselves, we can exert but little influence: joint Anglo-French representations at Belgrade would be politely disregarded: but concerted pressure on the part of Great Britain, France and Italy would have a very sedative effect.

'The occasion of M. Briand's presence at Geneva [as French delegate on the Council] might be taken to suggest the informal reconstruction of the Concert of Europe for the purpose of maintaining some sort of order and discipline in the Balkans. M. Briand might

We would seek the assurance of support of Your Excellency in a matter which we have discussed at length and in regard to which we are in agreement. We have impression that present continued mis-government and instability in South East Europe requires all the vigilance of the Great Powers and that it is incumbent upon them to cling together in order to meet any incident which might arise and which might be (? pretext for) disturbing peace in Balkans. At the moment we have not in view any clearly defined collective action but we consider solidarity of the Three Great Powers which already exists and which has recently once again been manifested, should be applied in the Balkan affairs by more frequent exchange of views and whenever opportunity presents itself by a common diplomatic action. It is evident that value of such action depends in large degree on co-operation of Italy which possesses a special authority in the Balkan affairs.

We therefore express the hope that Your Excellency will . . .³ our asking that . . .³ and that your personal support will not be lacking when the moment comes to examine measures necessary to put it into effect.

Repeated to Rome No. 2.

be asked at Geneva to join Mr. Chamberlain in some joint invitation to M. Mussolini. The difficulty is, of course, that Italy is tied to Jugo-Slavia by the "Pact of Rome" of January 1924 [see No. 24, n. 5]. The *spirit* of this Treaty certainly implies that in a matter of Serbian interest, such as Salonika, Italy could not join with France and Great Britain in bringing pressure to bear at Belgrade. The *letter* of the Treaty is, however, somewhat vaguer and obliges Italy to afford diplomatic support to the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] State only in cases where the security of the latter is menaced owing to some external aggression. It is the practice of Italian diplomacy to interpret their own obligations under a Treaty according to their own reading of the text of that Treaty: it is possible therefore that M. Mussolini would not regard his commitments to Serbia as a barrier to some less formal arrangement by which the Great Powers agreed to combine for the preservation of peace in South Eastern Europe.

'It is submitted that the idea might be broached to M. Briand and that if he is favourable, some joint invitation on the lines of the annexed draft [not printed] could be sent to M. Mussolini.'

³ The text is here uncertain. In another text this sentence ran: '. . . Your Excellency will receive our proposition favourably in principle, and that your personal support. . . .'

No. 138

Sir C. Barclay (Budapest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 16)

No. 157 [C 8050/260/21]

BUDAPEST, June 11, 1925

Sir,

The news of the Prime Minister's success at Geneva¹ was received here with much satisfaction. Greatly as the favourable decision of the Financial

¹ See No. 137, n. 2.

Committee of the League² is appreciated, however, the moral triumph of the Hungarian cause as regards the 'denunciations' of the Little Entente has been a matter of still deeper rejoicing. The entire Press point out that it was Great Britain once more who 'counteracted the intrigues of the Little Entente'. In particular, Sir, your attitude, in 'grasping the situation', and in suggesting that the decision should be made dependent upon the Commissioner-General's reply to the questions put by the Little Entente,³ is applauded by the Press as the only correct solution, and as one in harmony with the 'principle of fair play prevailing in England'.

2. As regards the financial clauses of the decision the regulation of the salaries of civil servants is regarded as a satisfactory solution, although it is anticipated that the Government will have certain difficulties in carrying out a reduction in their number. This is nevertheless an imperative necessity.

3. The 30 million gold Crowns allocated to productive purposes, though modest, is regarded as a sufficient help in present difficulties, especially if it be remembered that 22 millions have already been placed by the Government at the disposal of landowners, and that the Budget for 1925/26 provides 12 millions for similar purposes. All these sums amount to a total of 64 million gold Crowns (very nearly 3 million pounds sterling), which must, it is declared, be regarded as a considerable sum under the circumstances. With the aid of a good harvest these sums, if properly used, will certainly ease the situation, and at all events avert a serious deadlock.

4. It is interesting to note that several newspapers also point out that the grant of 90 million gold Crowns to Austria⁴ will also react favourably upon conditions here, because any improvement of the economic conditions of Austria increases her buying power, and opens her market for Hungarian agricultural produce.

I have, etc.,
COLVILLE BARCLAY

² For the section of the Report of the Financial Committee dealing with Hungary, see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 966-7. See also *ibid.*, pp. 858-60.

³ At the March meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (see No. 74, n. 4), the Little Entente representatives on the Hungarian Committee of the Council had queried certain items of the budget (see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 442). These queries were answered to their satisfaction at the meeting of June 8 of the Hungarian Committee (see *ibid.*, p. 859). The copy of the minutes of this meeting (C/S.C.H/7 Session P.V.1), communicated by the League of Nations has not been preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁴ For the section of the Report of the Financial Committee dealing with the approval of an allocation of 88 million gold crowns for the electrification of Austrian Railways, see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, p. 966. For its approval by the Council on June 9, see *ibid.*, pp. 860-1.

No. 139

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 14, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 222 Telegraphic: by bag [C 7977/3456/7]

PARIS, June 12, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following questions.

...¹ 5. The conference approved the terms of the reply to be sent to the Bulgarian government protesting against their claiming the right to increase the number of their gendarmerie, if necessity arises, without previously obtaining the consent of the allied governments² (see my telegram No. 211A section 4 of June 4th).³ Text of this note⁴ is enclosed in my despatch No. 1342.⁴ It is to be presented to the Bulgarian Minister in Paris, and a similar communication will at the same time be made by the liquidating organ to the Bulgarian government direct.⁵ ...¹

¹ The sections omitted referred to other matters.

² See No. 134.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Of June 12, not printed.

⁵ In Paris despatch No. 1442 of June 29 Lord Crewe transmitted a copy of a telegram to Marshal Foch from the Organ of Liquidation in Sofia stating that they were of the opinion that the militia had now been entirely disbanded.

No. 140

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Eyres (Durazzo)

No. 48 Telegraphic [C 7882/127/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 15, 1925, 5.50 p.m.

Your telegram No. 38 (of June 11th. Serbo-Albanian frontier).¹

In view of our firm attitude on this question and fact that reference to the International Court was entirely due to our initiative and insistence,² His Majesty's Government clearly cannot intervene in this matter at Belgrade where any action by them would be resented and might even have effect contrary to that anticipated by President. *Confidential*. But your telegram has been repeated to Belgrade where His Majesty's Minister may

¹ This ran: 'President of the Republic informed me yesterday that he had been discussing possibility of an arrangement with regard to Vermosch [see Nos. 4 and 9] and to St. Naoum [see Nos. 4, 21, 63, 69, 83 and 94] with Serb-Croat-Slovene government which he was most anxious to bring about. He has now referred matter to a committee of Senate and Chamber. ... He enquired whether His Majesty's Government would be willing to give a hint to Belgrade that a more generous offer would be politic and might strengthen President's hands.'

² See No. 4, n. 5.

have the opportunity of unobtrusively and entirely informally s[o]wing the seeds of common sense should the matter be broached to him (but not otherwise) by the Serb government.³

Repeated to Belgrade No. 65.

³ Foreign Office telegram No. 64 to Belgrade of June 15 stated: 'You will of course be scrupulously careful to take nothing savouring of initiative in this matter. Our idea is simply and solely that if the subject crops up in a casual conversation, you might take the *personal* line that a settlement of this question in a reasonable spirit would obviously be to the interest of all concerned.'

No. 141

Record by Mr. Nicolson of a conversation with the Greek Minister

[C 8336/798/19]★

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 17, 1925

M. Caclamanos came to see me this afternoon on his return from Belgrade. He gave me a full account of the course of the negotiations and confirmed the information which we had already received from Belgrade.¹ The only new points of interest, which I gathered, were the following:—

1. He told me that M. Pasic was losing his grip on the situation and falling more and more under the influence of M. Nincic. M. Caclamanos had found the latter overbearing and untrustworthy. M. Pasic and the King had themselves been not unconciliatory, but M. Nincic had endeavoured to carry out a personal policy of his own. M. Caclamanos had discovered that M. Nincic had gone so far as to give his Prime Minister and his Sovereign a completely garbled version of the negotiations. He had, for instance, informed them that the Greeks had summarily rejected all the Serb-Croat-Slovene demands. But as the contrary was the case, M. Caclamanos despaired of ever reaching an agreement with Jugoslavia so long as M. Nincic remained in power.

2. M. Caclamanos confirmed what we already suspected, that the influence of the Italian Minister at Belgrade had been directed continuously to secure a rupture. General Bodrero had left no stone unturned to envenom the relations between Greece and Serbia.

3. M. Caclamanos expressed the conviction that M. Nincic, 'such was his stupidity', had been honestly taken aback by the refusal of Greece to accept the demands put to them. M. Caclamanos happened to know that other Serbian statesmen, such as Marinkovic, had pointed out to M. Nincic that his demands were such as no independent country could ever accept. The latter, none the less, had been so obsessed by the idea that Greece was too weak to resist that he had persisted in his demands, and had made no

¹ See No. 135.

pretence of claiming for them any justification but that of superior necessity and of force. He had even abandoned the original Serbian contention that they possessed rights over the railway in their capacity as purchasers of the original French interests.² When, therefore, negotiations were suspended M. Nincic endeavoured to explain the rupture by putting about rumours to the effect that Greece had asked for an alliance against Turkey, and that Greece had been obliged to break off negotiations owing to pressure from another Power. M. Caclamanos stated that obviously these two explanations were entirely devoid of truth.

4. M. Caclamanos went on to say that he had been somewhat provoked to find that the Athens Foreign Office had interpreted his request that we in London should be kept fully informed of the progress of negotiations as a suggestion that His Majesty's Government should be asked to intervene.³ Obviously such intervention at that moment would have been fatal, and he was glad that we had immediately turned down the proposal. Now that a rupture had occurred he hoped that we would take occasion tactfully to indicate to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government that we consider their demands exorbitant, and he hinted that we might take the opportunity of a Serbian request for a loan to indicate to them that the feeling of confidence in the pacific intentions of Serbia had been somewhat shaken by the aggressive nature of their demands on Greece.

I made no comment on this suggestion, nor did I mention to M. Caclamanos the joint proposal made to M. Mussolini by the Secretary of State and M. Briand regarding a co-ordination of policy in regard to South-Eastern Europe.⁴

5. As regards the future M. Caclamanos appeared to think that the only thing to do was to wait until the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government became more reasonable. What distressed him most was the effect of the suspension of the negotiations upon the military party at Athens. The present Greek Government had with great difficulty been able to refuse the constant demands of military circles for increased expenditure on armament, but he feared that now that Greece was isolated and menaced from the north it will be difficult for the Greek Minister of Finance⁵ to repress a renewed clamour for military and naval equipment. He felt himself that it would be madness on the part of Greece to embark on any such extravagance, and that her one hope lay in consolidating her finances, in re-establishing her economic position, and in absorbing her refugees. This she could only do if given a period of ten years of absolute quiet.

My general impression was that M. Caclamanos was pessimistic but fairly calm.

HAROLD NICOLSON

² Sec No. 120, n. 4.

⁴ Sec No. 137.

³ Sec No. 131.

⁵ M. E. Tsouderos.

Sir M. Cheetham (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 6)

*No. 198 [C 9008/798/19]**

Confidential

ATHENS, June 24, 1925

Sir,

With reference to Mr. Keeling's despatch No. 177 of the 5th June¹ respecting the reception in this country of the news of the breakdown of negotiations with Serbia,² I have the honour to report that since that despatch was written I have had conversations with the Political Director of the Greek Foreign Office and with the Prime Minister, which dealt with the causes of Serbian action and with its effect on Greek policy.

2. M. Raphael, the Political Director, informed me that the attitude of the Jugoslavian Government had been principally influenced by MM. Nincic and Marcovic, the latter of whom, as Serbian Minister here, denounced the previous treaty³ and was subsequently appointed Secretary-General at Belgrade. He is regarded as an implacable enemy of Greece, and sustained that reputation, according to the Greek press, by refusing to speak to anyone here beyond the officials of the protocol when he recently visited Athens on the termination of his diplomatic mission to Greece. M. Nincic, prompted by General Bodrero, so M. Raphael affirmed, had been successful in influencing the King, and M. Pasic had been unable to resist this combination. M. Michalacopoulos practically repeated this statement to me at a later date, and no doubt would be inclined to take this view, as he several times asserted, during the course of the earlier negotiations, that he had received the most reassuring private letters from M. Pasic as to his earnest desire for an arrangement with Greece.

3. The Political Director told me that not only were the Serbian demands in the case of the railway and the port completely unacceptable, but that the pretensions put forward by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government regarding questions of nationality in Macedonia were still more objectionable. The claim in this case was that all Slav-speaking inhabitants of Greek Macedonia should be treated as a Jugoslavian minority, and thus become for all practical purposes the protected subjects of the Serbian Kingdom. Such a demand was intolerable. The Greek Government would carefully observe the Minorities Treaty,⁴ but they had a right to regard the Slavophone population as Hellenic subjects speaking an alien tongue. Even now, when the Greeks in Macedonia were in such a large majority as a result of Greek immigration, any concession to Serbia on the lines suggested would be far more dangerous and important in its consequences than Serbian claims on Salonica.

4. M. Michalacopoulos, when I saw him, spoke much in the same strain,

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 135.

³ See No. 14, n. 4.

⁴ See No. 132, n. 7.

but he appeared to be mainly preoccupied with the problem of finding an ally on whom Greece could rely. He said that Italy had undoubtedly interfered to prevent the conclusion of an alliance between Jugoslavia and Greece which might eventually lead to a Balkan combination. He thought, however, that the principal objective of Italian diplomacy was to isolate Greece, in order that she might be induced to fall in with Italian ambitions in Asia Minor. Italy could find no outlet for her surplus population except in Asia Minor, and for successful action against Turkey, when a propitious moment arrived, she would require the use of ports and islands off the coast of the mainland which Greece alone could supply. The Prime Minister referred to the strategy of the last Italian war with Turkey,⁵ of which he said Italy would once more avail herself. Italy would no doubt look forward to the acquisition of Smyrna, but there was plenty of room for Greek expansion elsewhere, a presumable reference to Constantinople. Italian overpopulation was a danger to Europe, whereas the Turks were a dwindling nation and could not possibly continue to govern the whole of Asia Minor. M. Michalacopoulos said that he was speaking to me very confidentially of what might happen at a later date, and he added that a friendly understanding with Italy might provide a solution of the Dodecanese question.⁶

5. I made no attempt to comment on these revelations. M. Michalacopoulos is no doubt suffering from an acute sense of disappointment at the loss of the Serbian alliance and from the feeling that a successful foreign policy may be a condition of his continuance in office. I do not think that it is necessary to take this outburst too seriously, though it appeared to be made with some deliberation, and many patriotic and intelligent Greeks are no doubt haunted by visions of a future empire in Asia Minor. It is, however, already rumoured that the Prime Minister is now on better terms with the Italian Legation, whose endeavours to conciliate Greek feeling have for more than a year been untiring. You will remember the secret discussions with Dr. Zervos⁷ and the recent exhumation of a Greek patriot in the case of the Italian Admiral Santarosa,⁸ who fought at Navarino.⁹ Italy has also been working very hard and with some success to obtain commercial advantages here, and it will be interesting to watch the development of her relations with Greece, and to see whether there are

⁵ Of September, 1911–October, 1912.

⁶ See Nos. 15, n. 6 and 96.

⁷ In November and December, 1924, the Italian Legation in Athens had approached Dr. Zervos. Reports of his conversations with the Head of the Press Department in the Italian Legation, Signor Ceresole, were given in Athens despatches Nos. 719, 721, and 755 of November 28, December 3, and December 30, not printed. In Athens despatch No. 127 of April 16, Sir M. Cheetham had reported that Dr. Zervos had been asked by the Greek Prime Minister to go to Rome to negotiate with Signor Mussolini respecting the Dodecanesian question. The July *coup* (see n. 11) prevented the visit.

⁸ Count di Santa Rosa, a Piedmontese Philhellene, was killed on May 8, 1825, while defending the island of Sphacteria against an attack by Egyptian forces.

⁹ On October 20, 1827, the Turco-Egyptian fleet was destroyed by the combined naval forces in the Levant of France, Great Britain and Russia.

further signs of the rapprochement to which the present Prime Minister does not at any rate seem to be altogether opposed.

6. Though the Greek public has shown restraint, both in the press and in the Chamber, in commenting on events at Belgrade, M. Michalacopoulos has probably suffered a certain loss of prestige as a result of the failure of the negotiations on which he counted so much. In the Assembly he had still, nevertheless, a large majority, and M. Papanastassiou is unable at the moment to attack the Government with any success. There have been vague rumours of meetings of officers and Royalist plots, and the resignation by General Kondylis of the Department of the Interior was unexpected, but the General is still putting the fifty votes of his party at the disposal of the Prime Minister, and careful enquiry in usually well informed quarters does not lead me to anticipate a further change of Government. M. Michalacopoulos tells me that the Chamber will rise at the end of June and meet again in October. If, however, a military movement is indeed to be apprehended, it is impossible to say what may happen. Talk of a *coup d'État*, coupled with the name of General Pangalos,¹⁰ is becoming more frequent, but the Government are extremely reticent, and the general public does not seem to know from what quarter danger is to be anticipated.¹¹

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, etc.,

MILNE CHEETHAM

¹⁰ Minister of War November–December, 1922, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army in Thrace in 1923, and Minister of Law and Order March–July, 1924, General Pangalos had played a leading part in the revolution of September, 1922, against King Constantine.

¹¹ In Athens telegram No. 107 of June 25, Sir M. Cheetham reported: 'Military movement inspired by General Pangalos secured control of main positions in Athens during the night of June 24th, while Captain Hadjikiriaos [Head of Greek navy 1922–3, and Minister of Marine March–July 1924] imposed his authority on battleship "Averoff", which was lying in Phaleron Bay. There was a certain amount of shooting in the earlier hours of today, but probably only to terrorise the population.

'During the morning Pangalos addressed ultimatum to President of the Republic [Admiral P. Koundouriotis] insisting on the resignation of Government by 4 p.m. Meeting of heads of parties was held about noon, after which government of M. Michalakopoulos resigned, resistance being hopeless. Revolutionaries published statement in press that two army corps in Northern Greece which are on a war footing were acting with them. After further discussion with President of the Republic, new Government was formed under M. Papanastasiou, in which military extremists will take prominent places.

'Town is normal again, with the exception of telephonic and telegraphic facilities. . . .'

He added (Athens telegram No. 109 of June 26): 'Military move has apparently been a success throughout Greece, and has been quietly accepted. Captain Hadjikiriaos is taking part of second chief of movement, but inferior to General Pangalos. Latter has refused co-operation of M. Papanastasiou, in spite of the fact that his appointment as President of the Council had been approved by President of the Republic. Pangalos is now to be Prime Minister himself, and is endeavouring to form Cabinet.

'He at one time thought of asking for resignation of President of the Republic, but

refrained from doing so when it was represented to him that such a course would probably lead to diplomatic difficulties, since foreign representatives, except myself, are accredited to the President of the Council. For similar reasons he has now asked Coundouriotis to remain in office.

'Press is appearing as usual, but criticises events with studied moderation "Eleutheros Typos", which represents itself as the organ of the new Government, states that latter will meet Assembly at once and that they hope to obtain majority. In contrary event Assembly will be dissolved. Summer recess from end of June should in any case place General Pangalos in the position of dictator for several months.'

No. 143

Mr. Kennard (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received June 26, 5.20 p.m.)

No. 102 Telegraphic [C 8622/798/19]

BELGRADE, June 26, 1925, 2 p.m.

While details of Greek revolution¹ are not known here it has caused considerable excitement, and establishment of a militaristic government at Athens coming on top of recent press polemics as regards Salonika may have serious repercussion here.

Efforts to hasten agreement with Croatian party and to effect settlement of internal crisis are thought in some circles to be connected with desire of this government to be free to deal with any foreign crisis, and some of my colleagues are nervous that this government may think the moment opportune to make good this claim to Salonika line.²

Repeated to Athens.

¹ See No. 142, n. 11.

² In Belgrade telegram No. 103 of June 27, Mr. Kennard reported: 'While no official communication has been issued, government press states today and Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms that Serb-Croat-Slovene government at present regards revolution as purely internal affair of Greece and general attitude is that present political instability of Greece proves how necessary it is for this country to have full control of Salonika line.'

No. 144

Mr. Lampson to Sir G. Clerk¹ (Prague)

[C 8703/251/62]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 29, 1925

Dear George,

With reference to your despatch No. 198 of June 5th,² our latest reports

¹ This letter was sent, *mutatis mutandis*, to Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow), Mr. Akers-Douglas (Vienna), Sir M. Cheetham (Athens), Mr. Kennard (Belgrade), Sir H. Dering (Bucharest), and Mr. Erskine (Sofia).

² Not printed. This despatch had been repeated to Moscow, Vienna, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia.

from secret sources regarding the Bolshevik organisation in Central Europe and the Balkans³ are not sufficiently definite to justify an official despatch on the subject. A provisional appreciation of the present arrangements, however, points to the probability that Vienna is still the principal directing centre for Central and South Eastern Europe,⁴ but that the organisation at Vienna is being decentralised. In consequence of this, it seems that a sub-centre at Salonika, under Komarov, Populos and Kosturov, is to deal with general organisation in the Balkans and that a sub-centre at Constantinople is to deal with the importation of arms into the Balkans.

The foregoing is only a summary of recent reports and our enquiries into the organisation, which is apparently in a state of flux, are still proceeding.

Yours ever,
MILES W. LAMPSON

³ See Nos. 95 and 132.

⁴ See No. 104.

No. 145

Mr. Chamberlain to the French Ambassador

[C 8495/1435/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 2, 1925

Your Excellency,

In reply to Your Excellency's note of the 22nd ultimo,¹ I have the honour to reaffirm the conclusions contained in my note of the 29th April² last and to express regret that His Majesty's Government cannot share the opinion of the French Government in regard to the nature of the concession obtained by British and Italian groups from the Albanian Government, nor are they in a position to intervene with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on behalf of the French Crédit Général des Pétroles.

2. I have ascertained however from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that, although they see little prospect of being able to reach any arrangement with the French company regarding this particular concession, yet they would be prepared to discuss the matter with representatives of the Crédit Général des Pétroles in a most friendly spirit.³

3. In these circumstances I should be grateful if Your Excellency would cause the French company to be informed accordingly in case they might

¹ Not printed. This had requested that His Majesty's Government should intervene to facilitate agreement between the French, Italian, and Anglo-Persian Oil Companies with regard to concessions in Albania.

² No. 111.

³ Mr. Nicolson minuted on July 1 that he had spoken to Sir J. Cadman on this matter.

wish to send representatives to London for the purpose of such discussion.

I have, etc.,
(For the Secretary of State)
C. HOWARD SMITH

No. 146

Sir M. Cheetham (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 21)

No. 217 [C 9618/145/19]

ATHENS, July 8, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 198 Confidential of the 24th ultimo,¹ I have the honour to report that Signor Grandi, Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, passed through Athens yesterday on his way back to Rome from Constantinople and the Dodecanese. He took advantage of his visit to call upon the Premier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.²

2. Signor Grandi informed the press that he had intended to remain three days in Athens, in order to study the affairs of Greece and to discover as many points of contact of Greco-Italian relations as possible. He was convinced that Greco-Italian relations would harmonize since the interests of the two countries in the Mediterranean were common. Unfortunately, however, he had been recalled to Rome by Signor Mussolini. The desire of Italy was, he said, to see Greece making as much progress as possible in the path of internal stabilisation and calm.

3. The indefatigable Doctor Zervos, with a deputation of Dodecanesians, submitted to Signor Grandi a protest against the continued occupation of the Dodecanese by Italy, and particularly against recent measures enforced in the islands compelling the inhabitants to adopt Italian nationality under pain of expulsion.³ A mass meeting of Dodecanesians was prohibited by the authorities.

4. The press comments on Signor Grandi's visit are more or less favourable. Eleutheros Typos (General Pangalos's organ) says that Signor Grandi allowed it to be understood that the Dodecanese question might be settled as part of a more general agreement between the two countries. But, Eleutheros Typos adds, the converse is true; the settlement of the

¹ No. 142.

² Admiral Hadjikiriaikos (see No. 142, n. 11) had become Minister of Marine, and Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* on June 28. M. C. Rentis was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 3.

³ A royal decree of October 15, 1925, stated that all inhabitants of the Dodecanese were considered Italian citizens. For the text, see *Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti del Regno d'Italia*, vol. 9 (Rome, 1925), No. 2125, pp. 8650-2.

Dodecanese question will prepare a more general entente. Eleutheros Logos says bluntly that as long as the Dodecanese remains under the Italian yoke it is impossible for Greco-Italian relations to resume their former cordiality.

5. Meanwhile, the voting of the air-service concession¹ to an Italian Company has again been held up by the persistent opposition of Doctor Zervos, who spoke for several hours in the Chamber against any concessions to Italy before the settlement of the Dodecanese question.

6. The attempts of Italian diplomacy to conciliate Greek feeling have as yet had little effect except in Royalist society and among the officials of the Foreign Office. The Hellenic people is still bitterly opposed to Italy. Signor Grandi's plea that the naval interests of the two countries are common, finds no echo at present. On the contrary it is, so far as I can discover, the settled policy of Greece to be on the same side as Great Britain in any question whatever which may arise in the Eastern Mediterranean. Many observers, my French colleague among them, believe that Italy having, for the moment at any rate, detached Greece from Yugoslavia,² is making the best of the opportunity to familiarize the Greeks with the idea of adventure in Asia Minor. The Italian Minister, who is just going on leave, has, during many months paid long and repeated visits to the Hellenic Foreign Office. Italian commercial interests, as yet little developed, can hardly account for this constant activity which seems to point to political discussion of a secret character.

7. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, etc.,
MILNE CHEETHAM

¹ For services between Athens and Rome and Athens and Constantinople.

² Cf. No. 135.

No. 147

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Eyres (Durazzo)

No. 53 Telegraphic [C. 9252/127/90]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 13, 1925, 10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 40 (of July 10th. Serbo-Albanian frontier).¹

Exact terms of latest Serbian offer were contained in my despatch No.

¹ This ran: 'After a long interview with the President of the Republic, I have hopes of approaching settlement of frontier question. But there does not seem to be any kind of accord between facts of case as I know them and those as set forth by Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister. He says his government were prepared to leave Vermosch question entirely to conference leaving open St. Naoum question for settlement between Albania and Yugoslavia. If that were so, matter could be finished at once because the President would I am sure agree to suggestion of St. Naoum compromise.'

112 (of June 24th)² which may not have reached you. They are briefly as follows:

1. Tracé of Vermosch and St. Naoum frontiers to remain as indicated.
2. Albanian government to give free passage through Vermosch valley for Serbs from Podgoritsa and Plava Goussingne and to permit Serb-Croat-Slovene government to build roads and a railway through valley if they wish.
3. Serb-Croat-Slovene and Albanian governments to draw up convention to regulate traffic in Djakova region.
4. Serb-Croat-Slovene government to allow by a protocol Albanian population to make pilgrimage to St. Naoum, but will not admit any change in tracé of frontier in this district.

Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister's statement seems therefore substantially correct.³

² This repeated Paris despatch No. 1370 of June 17, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

³ Mr. Eyres replied (Durazzo telegram No. 41 of July 14): '... Prima facie, the only difficulty I foresee is permission to build railway in Vermosch valley. Albanian delegate told me he had agreed to roads but had informed Serbian delegate that he would never agree to a railway as it would mean the sterilisation of Scutari for a generation. He said Serbian delegate had agreed not to press this point.'

No. 148

Mr. Kennard (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 18, 9 a.m.)

No. 110 Telegraphic [C 9523/251/62]

BELGRADE, July 17, 1925, 6.40 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that General Staff here have reason to believe that Italian Government are making military preparations especially in Trieste area which indicate that they may be contemplating some overseas expedition in the near future. His Excellency was unaware against whom this expedition might be directed but thought its objective would be probably Albania whose partition he felt sure Italy was determined to bring about. There was as yet no concentration of forces and nothing might come of movement as Italy had frequently made similar preparations which had subsequently been abandoned. Greece, Turkey, and even Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom might be possible objectives but His Excellency felt Albania was more likely.

I said I could hardly believe Italy could seriously intend to repeat Corfu¹ or Fiume² coups at present moment. His Excellency replied that

¹ See No. 58, n. 4.

² For the Fascist *coup* in Fiume of March 2/3, 1922, see Vol. XXIV, No. 36. Fiume had

the next few weeks would show how far his fears were justified but he was nervous as to possibility of Mussolini embarking on some rash foreign adventure within next month or two especially in view of internal situation in Italy.

Latter had recently adopted most unfriendly attitude as to Serbian claim to island of Trstenik near Krk and while Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had authorised signature of Florence agreements³ claim to this island was being maintained. D'Annunzio⁴ was in correspondence with Macedonian committee and there was evidence of pronounced activity on the part of Italian agents in the Balkans. Italian Government must also view with disfavour agreement with Croats.

He thought under these circumstances that it was essential that outstanding questions in the Balkans should be settled. He therefore proposed to take up Salonika negotiations with Greece⁵ as soon as possible. French proposal had been made under which French company which formerly owned Ghevgheli line would be re-constituted with entirely Serbian board and no extraterritorial rights. French Government have been asked to act as intermediaries at Athens for resumption of negotiations on this basis.⁶

Repeated to Rome, Athens and Durazzo.

been created a Free State by the Treaty of Rapallo of November 12, 1920 between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 1087-92). It became part of Italy by the Treaty of Rome of January 27, 1924 (see *ibid.*, vol. 120, pp. 685-706).

³ See No. 135, n. 11.

⁴ Italian poet and playwright. With a band of volunteers he had seized Fiume in September, 1919. His followers were forced to leave Fiume in December, 1920, and he himself left in January, 1921. See Vol. IV, Nos. 23-6, and ff.

⁵ See Nos. 14, 26, 70, 93, 120, 131, 135 and 141.

⁶ In Belgrade telegrams Nos. 111 and 112 of July 17, Mr. Kennard continued: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs is equally anxious to settle St. Naoum and Vermos questions [see No. 147] but fears that direct negotiations with Albanian government are useless and desires decision of council of ambassadors. He would prefer to deal with the two questions separately owing to Ahmed Bey's obstructive attitude but might agree to settle both questions simultaneously if pressed to do so.'

'His Excellency was entirely opposed to any partition of Albania and while on bad terms with present government there had taken steps to concentrate Albanian refugees near Sarajevo and to watch their movements.'

'He also proposed to give instructions for renewal of grant of visas for Bulgarian subjects shortly as Bulgarian government had now offered indemnity for parents of arrested Serbs who had been killed.'

'He hoped by these measures to clear ground of any complications which might aggravate difficulty of dealing with any move which Italy might make in the near future. I have no confirmation as to undue Italian military activity and should be glad to learn if His Majesty's Embassy Rome can in any way confirm Serbian information.'

'Curiously enough Italian minister who has just visited me stated that as France was fully occupied with Morocco and Great Britain with Far East it was natural that Italy should play major role now in the Balkans. Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs had previously suggested to me that this was present Italian view.'

No. 149

Mr. Kennard (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 18, 10 a.m.)

No. 113 Telegraphic [C 9526/251/62]

BELGRADE, July 17, 1925, 9 p.m.

My telegram No. 110.¹

French minister informs me that proposal for Salonica railway originated with French ambassador in London, and that under proposal which has been accepted in principle by Serb-Croat-Slovene government, entirely new company would be formed having a neutral chairman and a joint Serbo-Greek board. Minister for Foreign Affairs had insisted on His Majesty's Government being consulted and French minister had urged his government to do so.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had held similar language to him regarding Italian menace, but French military attaché² had not at present any further details. He has promised to keep me informed as to information he may receive on the subject.

The idea has occurred to me that Minister for Foreign Affairs may be using Italian bogey to induce us to settle St. Naoum Vermos question³ in favour of Serb-Croat-Slovene government, but French minister does not think so.

Repeated to Athens and Rome.

¹ No. 148.

² Colonel Deltel.

³ See No. 147.

No. 150

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 20, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 247 Telegraphic: by bag [C 9531/127/90]

PARIS, July 17, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following questions:

1. The Conference considered the situation with regard to the Albanian frontier as shown by the Boundary Commission's report, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 1604 of today's date.¹ No reply having been received from the Albanian government to the message² of the Ambassadors' Conference reported in the Marquess of Crewe's despatch No. 1558 of July 13th,¹ the question arose as to what measures

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

² Of July 11. This protested against the continued absence of the Albanian delegate on the Frontier Commission.

should be taken in order to bring matters to a head. General Gazzera, the President of the Commission, who attended the Conference, explained that it was no use for the Commission to attempt to demarcate the boundary in the neighbourhood of Vermosch and St. Naoum unless previously assured of the co-operation and protection of the two interested governments. If the Conference, acting on the assumption that negotiations between the two governments had failed, were to invite the latter to afford the Commission the necessary assistance to enable it to demarcate the frontier line in these districts, as laid down by the previous decisions of the conference,³ it was argued that the result would probably be that the Yugoslav government would refuse to co-operate and, thereby put themselves in the wrong, to the advantage of the Albanian government, who have been obstructing a settlement for the last three months. In these circumstances, it was suggested by the Italian Ambassador and ultimately approved, that in the event of an unsatisfactory reply being received from the Albanian government to the conference's message of the 11th instant, the latter shall inform the two governments that inasmuch as it has been found impossible to reach a settlement through the Boundary Commission, the conference will now take the matter into its own hands. With this object, it will propose to the two governments a definite compromise which is to be elaborated by the Geographical Committee in consultation with the allied members of the Boundary Commission, acting not as a commission but merely as experts. The two governments will be asked to give the necessary facilities to enable the commission this summer to demarcate the frontier, in accordance with this compromise. If they refuse, the conference will bring the facts of the case to the attention of the League of Nations, inasmuch as the whole difficulty has arisen out of the Hague's Court's decision regarding St. Naoum.⁴

If it is the fear of public opinion which prevents the Albanian government from making the necessary concessions to Yugoslavia in the course of direct negotiations, it is hoped that they may be able more easily to justify these concessions by representing them as being imposed upon them by the allied powers, although as a matter of fact, the conference, as a result of the Hague Court's decision, is unable to impose any compromise except with the consent of the two interested parties, inasmuch as the decisions which it has already taken regarding Vermosch and St. Naoum have exhausted its powers.⁵ . . .⁶

³ For the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors regarding St. Naoum of December 6, 1922, see Vol. XXII, No. 826. For Vermosch, see No. 4, n. 10.

⁴ See No. 4, n. 5.

⁵ In Foreign Office despatch No. 2526 to Paris of July 27, Mr. Chamberlain commented: '... While accepting the adoption of the above procedure I would point out that the action of the Conference in this respect, when the decision of The Hague Court regarding St. Naoum is borne in mind, can hardly be said to be strictly logical. In view of the continued presence in St. Naoum of the Serbs in defiance both of The Hague Court decision and of the Ambassadors' Conference, I fully appreciate the difficulty in which the latter body find

themselves and am unwilling to suggest the adoption of any course which might tend to aggravate the difficulty of their position. But it should not be forgotten that if the good-offices offered by the Conference to promote a much needed compromise are rejected by both parties concerned, no further step can well be taken beyond a formal reference to the League, and I should be glad if you would endeavour to see that the proposed intimation to the two governments is so worded as not to imply any disregard on the part of the Ambassadors' Conference of The Hague Court decision.

⁶ The sections omitted referred to other matters.

No. 151

Mr. Eyres (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 28)

No. 93 [C 9936/9936/90]

DURAZZO, July 18, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to state that the Standard Oil Company has obtained a concession from the Albanian Government for the exploitation of oil areas in this country and that the concession was ratified by the Chamber three days ago.¹

2. The extent of the concession for the research period is eighty thousand hectares, but within two months (so I am informed) a selection of fifty thousand hectares for permanent exploitation is to be made. I have not yet received a copy of the concession, but am informed that it is on the lines of that granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.²

3. I need hardly point out how absolutely the contention of the American and Italian Legations that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession established a monopoly, has been belied by these later developments.

4. A concession for the exploitation of oil has also been granted to a British subject, Mr. Herbert Henry Rushton. He is, I believe, a company promoter. He informed me himself that he was the original concessionaire of the Egyptian oilfields, and sold them to the Company which is now working them. He sent out an expert to survey the Valona district and is confident that he is on the track of a very promising field. But as his concession is subsequent to that of the Standard Oil Company it will depend upon their selection whether he will be able to make good his own.

5. I have the honour to transmit a printed copy of his concession³ which is the only one I have been able to lay my hands on.

6. It will be seen that his selection area is twenty thousand hectares, and his permanent area ten thousand hectares.

I have, etc.,
H. C. A. EYRES

¹ See *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, pp. 509-11.

² See Nos. 31, n. 4, 45, n. 3, 48, n. 2, 51, 55, n. 6 and 79, n. 4.

³ Not printed.

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received July 20, 11.15 a.m.)

No. 183 Telegraphic [C 9582/251/62]

ROME, July 20, 1925, 8.15 a.m.

Belgrade telegrams Nos. 110,¹ 111² and 112.²

Military Attaché³ after consulting certain of his colleagues has no confirmation of alleged military preparations and does not believe in their existence. Nor do I. My impression is that rumour emanates from their military attaché⁴ alone who has indulged in wild talk to his colleagues and has very likely reported to his general staff in a similar sense. On the other hand Yugoslav minister⁵ with whom I discussed the matter this morning shared my disbelief in any military preparations of the kind. He agreed with me that while Italian aspirations to play a leading role in the Balkans are notorious and there is a party here which has never abandoned the idea of sooner or later acquiring Valona there is no immediate prospect of Mussolini embarking on any perilous military adventure in either case.

Minister confirmed to me that Italian attitude on question of Tassenik had been intransigent and it had been omitted from forthcoming settlement.⁶ Mussolini had refused arbitration. Minister said that otherwise negotiations had proceeded satisfactorily. He had received his full power this morning and hoped to sign agreement either this afternoon or tomorrow. I asked him whether anything had happened to weaken relations of comparative confidence between Yugoslavia and Italy which had existed a year ago. He replied that less confidence was felt by Yugoslavia because Mussolini was considered to be now more in the hands of extremists and ultra nationalist wing of his followers. But he entertained no immediate apprehensions.⁷

Repeated to Belgrade.

¹ No. 148.

² See *ibid.*, n. 6.

³ Colonel W. Blaker.

⁴ General M. Yečmenić.

⁵ M.V. Antoniević.

⁶ See No. 135, n. 11.

⁷ In Durazzo telegram No. 43 of July 22, Mr. Eyres stated: 'We know nothing to support suggestion that any coup is being prepared against Albania. I have not enquired of Albanian government because they are only too prone to get scared by any rumour of this sort. If they had heard anything I should have known of it. I am convinced that Italian Minister is ignorant of any such intention on the part of his government.'

No. 153

Sir M. Cheetham (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received July 20, 6.20 p.m.)

No. 122 Telegraphic [C 9669/251/62]

Urgent

ATHENS, July 20, 1925, 3.30 p.m.

Telegrams Nos. 110,¹ 112² and 113.³

Likelihood of Italian military expedition seems difficult to reconcile with facts of situation so far as known to me unless it is in the case of Albania.

1. Jugoslavia.

Even strained relations between Jugoslavia and Italy would be likely to enlist Greek sympathies with former power in view of marked desire felt here for renewal of alliance with Serbia⁴ and formation of Balkan entente.

2. Italy has for a year or more employed every means to propitiate Greece and bring her into the orbit of Italian policy in the Near East. A sudden reversal of this policy appears improbable. According to Minister for Foreign Affairs Signor Grandi when in Athens⁵ explained that . . .⁶ was still pressing him to co-operate. . . .⁷ It is generally believed, at any rate here, that Italian schemes of aggrandisement in Asia Minor have not yet . . .⁸ stage of action.

4[*sic*]. I have no means of judging possibility of Italian attempt on Albania owing to almost complete lack of information regarding that country.

5. Is it conceivable that in spite of . . .⁹ Italian government having failed as I gather from Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs in reaching general agreement with Greece could be preparing naval demonstration for annexation of Dodecanese?

Apart from above suggestions which occur to me at first sight, Serbia's resolve to settle outstanding differences in the Balkans and to renew negotiations with Greece as stated in last paragraph of Belgrade telegram No. 110¹ appears to be if genuine at variance with the two quite recent notes addressed to Greek government by Serbian Chargé d'Affaires respecting minorities in Macedonia. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that notes are so stiff in tone that he hesitates to reply to them direct and proposes to do so through the press.

I expect to receive text of these notes at any early date.¹⁰

Repeated to Belgrade No. 9, Rome No. 5 and Durazzo No. 1.

¹ No. 148.

² See *ibid.*, n. 6.

³ No. 149.

⁴ See No. 14, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 146.

⁶ The text is here uncertain. In the Foreign Office, 'M. Pasic' was suggested.

⁷ The text is here uncertain. In the Foreign Office, 'against Greece' was suggested.

⁸ The text is here uncertain. In the Foreign Office, 'reached' was suggested.

⁹ The text is here uncertain.

¹⁰ Sir M. Cheetham transmitted a copy of one of these notes in Athens despatch No. 230 of July 21, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

Record by Mr. Nicolson of a conversation with the Greek Minister

[C 9995/798/19]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 23, 1925

Salonika Question

The Greek Minister spoke to me recently about the resumption of negotiations between Greece and the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] State.¹ He had advised his Government to avoid all panic on the one hand, or undue emprossement on the other. The best course, in his opinion, was for the Greek Government to wait calmly until Belgrade evolved a better atmosphere.

Meanwhile, however, had come a French proposal whereby the Salonika—Ghevgueli Railway was to be placed in the hands of a private French Company and administered by a mixed Board of Greeks and Serbs with a French chairman.² I said that we also had heard rumours that some such scheme was being ventilated. M. Caclamanos stated that this scheme had been born from the brain of M. de Fleuriau, who had quoted the analogy (not, I gather, a very auspicious analogy) of the Manchurian Railways. The proposal had been adopted by the Quai d'Orsay, had been mentioned at Belgrade, where it had not been discouraged, and was now being tactfully ventilated at Athens. He asked me what I thought of it.

I replied that it was difficult to express an opinion on a matter on which so few details were given. What, for instance, would be the proportionate holdings in this new Company? Would the Greek holding be less than the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] holding or only less than the Serb and French holdings together? Assuming, however, that the holdings were in the proportion of 40% Greek, 40% Serb, and 20% French, then obviously a situation would be created in which the French would hold an arbitral position between the two. Personally I thought that this would be a good thing and in the interests of Greece as well as in those of European stability.

M. Caclamanos objected that the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] State was a satellite of France and that the French would in every matter take the Serb point of view. I said that it seemed a mistake to regard the thing from so superficial an angle. It must be realised that unless the Serbs obtained a real outlet at Salonika there would be serious political friction. The Greeks must face the fact that if they are to keep Salonika they will have to be very generous as regards the Serbian outlet. The French would doubtless back the Serbs all along the line in regard to the commercial aspect of the arrangement and would insist on securing that Salonika became a line of communication in case of war in Central Europe. But this would happen

¹ See Nos. 14, 26, 70, 93, 120, 131, 132, 135, 141, 142 and 148.

² See No. 149.

anyhow, and might in the end redound to the commercial advantage of Salonika. In all political and territorial questions, however, the tendency of the French would be to restrain the Serbs and not to encourage them. The French did not in the least wish to see Serbia turning her back on Central Europe and indulging in Balkan imperialism: I thought he would find that the 'arbitral position' given to France under the Fleuriau proposal would work out as a very dependable guarantee for Greece against Serbian territorial designs in Southern Macedonia.

M. Caclamanos agreed to this, but said that the lever thereby obtained by France would be exploited in other directions and that Greece would thereby be brought within the French orbit. I said that this was possible but that it did not alarm me: our experience of the planetary systems evolved at the Quai d'Orsay was that they quickly developed a centri-fugal tendency. Meanwhile if the French were prepared to place themselves in such a position of responsibility towards Greece, the latter would be foolish not to draw profit from the necessity. He knew very well that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] were not going to intervene in the Salonika business, and that there was no chance of a British group, with the active political support of the Foreign Office, embarking upon such a venture. If British financiers, on their own account, were interested in the business they might well take up some shares of the French tronçon—but I very much doubted whether the Foreign Office would wish to assume any responsibility for the business.

I concluded by telling M. Caclamanos that I had of course expressed my personal views only and that if the Fleuriau scheme ever took more definite shape I should have to consult my superiors before making any statement whatever.³

HAROLD NICOLSON

³ Mr. Lampson minuted on July 25: 'The Minister also mentioned this matter to me at some length. But he said that he had not himself got the details of the French scheme. He understood that Belgrade viewed it with favour and he thought that Athens might do likewise. He had not heard anything definite from them lately. His own opinion was that, as mentioned in a previous interview with me [on July 16], this was essentially a question which could be better handled at Geneva during the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly than at Belgrade and Athens where local passions were so easily stirred.'

'I am not sure that the precedent of the South Manchurian railway (or of the Chinese Eastern Railway for that matter) is a particularly auspicious one. In both cases it meant the practical seizure of a belt of Chinese territory in which the acquiring Power (Japanese in the first case and Russian in the second) obtained full ext[er]ritorial rights in the heart of another country (China): also the right to establish "settlements"—the biggest of course being Harbin. I should not have thought that *prima facie* the precedent was at all a good one, but of course conditions are totally different in Greece and in China. Any way I submit that Mr. Nicolson was perfectly right in the line which he took with M. Caclamanos. If the Greeks and Serbians can compound their differences through the good offices of France, by all means let them do so. We shall have no reason to be jealous. But I remain a trifle sceptical as to whether when it comes to the point we shall find that the French scheme does prove accept[ab]le to all parties.'

Mr. Chamberlain commented (July 27): 'I would remain as non-committal as possible.'

No. 155

*Sir M. Cheetham (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received July 24, 5 p.m.)*

No. 126 Telegraphic [C 9840/798/19]

ATHENS, July 24, 1925, 2.15 p.m.

Proposals to settle by arbitration Greek differences with Yugoslavia, to which my despatch No. 230¹ refers, have already lost much of their direct interest here in view of development of French proposals for a settlement mentioned in last paragraph of Belgrade telegram No. 110.² French Minister under instructions from Paris is pressing strongly for solution on these lines and you will have been informed I suppose by Paris³ and Greek Minister.⁴ Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs approves French suggestion but desires that the new company to be formed to work Guevghele line should be international while French company is being advocated by French Minister here. Minister for Foreign Affairs would I think accept French company if necessary but is anxious that Greek and Serbian capital should be represented. There are, of course, to be no extra-territorial rights. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs believes there will be no friction concerning the port but is still uneasy regarding minorities in Macedonia. He now however considers that Serbian Chargé d'Affaires is keeping up pressure on Greece to improve Serbian position in view of fresh negotiations. Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Minister hope that these latter may be conducted secretly by ordinary diplomatic channels in order to avoid press comment.

Repeated to Belgrade No. 10.

¹ Of July 21, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives. See, however, No. 153.

² No. 148.

³ The French Ambassador in London did not raise the subject until August 6. The record of M. de Fleuriau's conversation with Mr. Lampson of August 6, is not printed.

⁴ See No. 154.

No. 156

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Greek Minister

[C 9980/798/19]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 27, 1925

The Greek Minister called this afternoon on the instructions of his Government to speak of the Salonika Railway negotiations.

He explained that the French proposals (of the exact nature of which he was in complete ignorance not having seen the text of M. de Fleuriau's

scheme) had been broached at Athens,¹ but that, as it appeared (he was doubtful how) that they amounted to the suggestion of an international Company with 40% Serb, 40% Greek, and 20% French capital, the Greek Government were definitely opposed to its acceptance. They could accept nothing which had *any* Serb participation. The scheme had been communicated to the Greek Government in the most general language—‘an international Company so framed as to meet the wishes of all concerned’ or some such words. The Government felt that any French participation, if accompanied by a large Serb holding, would in practice amount to Serb predominance. In short they were definitely against it.

It had now occurred to them that an appeal to the League of Nations might help them out of their difficulties; and he was instructed to remind us of our suggestion of November last that the Greek Government should ask the League to lend them someone from their Transport Section, who might take over the management of the line and ensure its efficient working.² He was to see us at once and ascertain what we thought of the revival of that idea.

I said that the first thought that occurred to me was the foolishness of the Greek Government in not having adopted Mr. Chamberlain’s idea when it was originally put up to them. At that time things were quite different to what they were now. I felt sure that any suggestion of now bringing in the League in the method proposed would be resented by the Serbs who would regard it almost as provocative, seeing that they on their side had agreed to accept the French scheme. The Minister said that his feeling was much the same; and that he therefore proposed to telegraph at once to Athens begging his Government not to make any such move until he had had time to receive our considered views on the proposal. Meantime he would be grateful if we would put the matter before the Secretary of State and see what his views were. This I said that I would do.

He then said that if, as he anticipated, we advised against the idea of an appeal to the League, he had a further suggestion to make to us (I gathered also on the instructions of his Government). Would it not be feasible for the railway to be taken over and run by an Anglo-French Company? The Greek Government would be quite prepared to waive all participation themselves if they could keep the Serbs out of it. And there was ample security they could give to such an Anglo-French combine. The capital required was only 10,000,000 francs, say £200,000 which at 6% would bring in £60,000 a year which could easily be provided. The Greek Government would see to it that the Company had an absolutely clean title and the existing ‘ayants-droits’ were properly expropriated.

I said that I was afraid that that idea also was not likely to be acceptable here. In the first place it was not the sort of thing which we favoured: in the second I thought it would be just as unacceptable to the Serbs as the League idea. Again quite apart from that there was the question of Italy

¹ See No. 155.

² See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 271 and 293.

who would certainly want to be included. He said that so far as that was concerned there need be no difficulty. Italy would be welcome to participation. I said that nonetheless I was afraid that it was not a scheme that we should be likely to consider. He said 'Not even if the proposal came to you from the French?' I replied that that might make it easier but that it was not the sort of thing we went in for. British capital only invested in things which were commercially attractive and which were not really political enterprises. He said that he knew that: but that the Greeks were desperate to get out of the mess in which they found themselves and that the idea of an Anglo-French Company had seemed to them a possible way out. I said that I could only promise that we would look into it and see how we felt about it on reflection. But *prima facie* the idea hardly seemed feasible so far as we were concerned.

What I did *not* say to M. Caclamanos is that the essence of the whole business is the determination of Serbia to have an effective hold upon this line. Serbia means sooner or later to get Salonika and this railway is the first means to that end. So that it is really useless to talk about getting some *genuinely* international scheme for its working. The French scheme is only a camouflage for Serb participation in the line: and the Greeks are quite right when they say that the French share (whatever it may be) will in practice be used in Serb interests, thus giving Serbia a predominance in the direction of the line.

The Department had better go into these proposals and put up a minute going into their merits and demerits. I promised M. Caclamanos that we would let him have an answer as soon as possible.

M. W. LAMSPON

No. 157

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Eyres (Durazzo)

Unnumbered Telegram¹ [C. 10290/127/90]

PARIS, August 5, 1925, 5.15 p.m.

Please communicate at once to the Albanian Government the following statement from the Ambassadors' Conference and inform your French and Italian colleagues. An identic statement is being communicated to the Yugoslav Government.

The Allied Governments, having taken note of the result of the conversations which have taken place between the delegates of the Yugoslav and Albanian Governments under the direction of the Boundary Commission of Delimitation,² observe that the negotiations thus

¹ A copy of this telegram was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1747 of August 5, not printed. This despatch was received on August 6.

² See Nos. 9, 94 and 147. A report of July 28 by the President of the Albanian Boundary

carried on have enabled the points of difference to be reduced to the utmost.

It has appeared to them that there would be serious objections to further delaying the work of delimitation, and that it is in the general interest to arrive at a definite result without further loss of time.

After having carefully studied the points on which the two interested Governments have not found it possible to reach an agreement, and after having examined in detail the claims put forward on each side, the Allied Governments have reached the conclusion that the proposals set forth below are of a kind to satisfy to the greatest possible extent the aspirations and the interests of the Yugoslav and Albanian Governments.

(a) *Region of Vermosche*. Frontier is to be modified as follows:—

(i) Western section—between the Rikavats saddle and crest 2145 of the Planinitsa—the practically straight line accepted by both delegates is to be followed, leaving the territory on the west side to Yugoslavia.

(ii) Eastern section—between the Loumbraya River and the Grntchar River—the line proposed by the Albanian delegate, which leaves to Albania the path leading from Tchafa Lipovitsa to the bottom of the valley of the Grntchar, is to be followed.

(b) *Region of St. Naoum*. The frontier is to be corrected in the manner accepted by both delegates, which leaves the Monastery of St. Naoum to Yugoslavia and the village of Pichkoupiya to Albania.

The lines indicated above are clearly defined in the declarations of the two delegates of July 28th, 1925.³

(c) In order to facilitate communications between the regions of Gousinje and Podgoritza for the Yugoslav population and between Vermosch and Liceni Hotit for the Albanian population, the right of transit shall be secured to the inhabitants of the aforementioned regions as agreed to by the two interested delegates in their declarations signed on the 28th July, 1925; the manner in which this right is to be exercised shall be defined in a protocol to be prepared by the interested Governments; the Boundary Commission shall examine this protocol and give it its final shape.

(d) A special protocol shall likewise facilitate the pilgrimage of the Albanian population to the Monastery of St. Naoum; this protocol shall be drawn up in the same manner as the protocol mentioned above.

The Allied Governments consider, on the other hand, that the question of the establishment of a transit protocol as regards the region of Djacova has already been settled (resolution of the Ambassadors' Conference No. 263 of October 9th, 1924).⁴ They are further of the opinion that it is neither possible nor opportune to contemplate fresh rectifications of the frontiers already marked out on the ground.

The Allied Governments, anxious to see the work of the delimitation of Commission, stating that no agreement had been reached but that certain points of agreement had been formulated, is filed at C 10290/127/90, not printed.

³ Copies of these declarations are filed at C 10290/127/90, not printed.

⁴ Not printed. See, however, Vol. XXVI, No. 240. See also No. 9, n. 6.

the Albanian frontiers completed during the course of the present year, most urgently invite the two interested Governments to inform them, without any reservations, before August 15th next, of their acceptance of the proposals set forth above. At the same time they require these Governments to give them the assurance that they will do everything that lies within their power to ensure that the work on the ground may be carried on without interruption, and to guarantee the security of the Commission, as laid down in the instructions of September 27th, 1923.⁵

The Yugoslav and Albanian Governments should reply to the President of the Ambassadors' Conference through their Ministers in Paris before August 15th.⁶

⁵ A copy of these instructions was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2262 of October 2, 1923 (C 17105/742/90), not printed. They had been called forth by the murder of the Italian President of the Albanian Boundary Commission, General E. Tellini, and his staff, on August 27, 1923 (see Vol. XXIV, Nos. 612, 613 and 615).

⁶ The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government accepted the proposals of the Conference of Ambassadors without reserve (a copy of their note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1816 of August 18, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives, which also transmitted a copy of the Albanian note accepting the proposals under the reserve of parliamentary approval). In a note of October 15 to the Conference of Ambassadors (copy in Paris despatch No. 2224 of October 20, not printed) the Albanian Government accepted the proposals unreservedly.

The Boundary Commissioners, together with the Albanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene delegates arrived in Cetinje on August 7, and after completing work on the ground in accordance with the instructions of the Ambassadors' Conference, left Albania on October 15 for Florence in order to compile and print the maps and draw up the necessary protocols. The Albanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene delegates refused to sign the special protocols on Djakova, Vermosh, and Saint Naoum, and on December 19, the Boundary Commission submitted the case to the Conference of Ambassadors (see the Reports of the British Delegate on the Albanian Boundary Commission, Lieut-Colonel A. Clough, filed at C 12565/13333/13884/16652/16653/127/90, not printed).

No. 158

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 6, 9 a.m.)

No. 68 Telegraphic [C 10306/168/7]

SOFIA, August 5, 1925, 6.30 p.m.

My telegram No. 67.¹

Greek Chargé d'Affaires² who reported to his government on August 3rd that Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had given him satisfactory assurances regarding enquiry into murder of Greek subject referred to and punishment of authors, has now been instructed to inform Bulgarian

¹ Of August 3. This reported the murder of a prominent Greek resident.

² The First Secretary, M. R. Bibica-Rosetti.

government that reinforcement of frontier troops³ is due not only to the murder but also to terrorisation of Greeks in general and to Comitadji activities and that measure would be revoked when satisfaction had been obtained on all three matters.

Reinforcement which would seem to be a minatory rather than a preventive measure may therefore be maintained for some time and judging from violence of Athens press as reported here there seems danger that Greek troops may find pretext to occupy Bulgarian villages as a pledge. Should this occur Bulgarian troops will almost certainly resist and serious situation will arise.

Greek Chargé d'Affaires says he has expressed similar view to his government. Could His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires⁴ also perhaps warn Greek government of danger and urge moderation?

I propose to press Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to do everything possible to satisfy Greek demands.

Repeated to Athens and Belgrade.

³ Athens telegram No. 130 of August 2 had reported: 'Press reports statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs that in consequence of system of terrorisation of Greek subjects in Bulgaria, apparently with object of compelling them to leave Bulgaria immediately and abandon their belongings. Greek Government are reinforcing their frontier posts. . . .'

⁴ Mr. Keeling acted as Chargé d'Affaires July 25–October 11.

No. 159

*Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 6, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 277 Telegraphic: by bag [C 10282/397/3]

PARIS, August 5, 1925

The Ambassadors Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires¹ being also present, and considered the following questions.

...² 4. The Conference approved the Versailles Committee's report,³ enclosed in my despatch No. 1511 of July 7th,³ regarding the measures to be carried out by the Austrian Government before the military clauses of the Treaty of St. Germain can be considered as executed and the organ of liquidation withdrawn. At my suggestion, however, the Conference adopted the two amendments proposed in your despatch No. 2504 of July 24th;³ that is to say, the expenses incurred by sending special experts to Austria will be borne by the Allied Governments, and in the note to be addressed to the Austrian Government the sentence referring to the League of Nations will be replaced by the following sentence:—

¹ Viscount A. Obert de Thieusies.

² The sections omitted referred to other matters.

³ Not printed.

'The Allied Governments feel convinced that they can rely on the goodwill and co-operation of the Austrian Government in executing the points specified in the present note, and in thus relieving the Allied Governments of the necessity of examining the consequences which would result if the defaults registered were not made good.'

I agreed to this somewhat altered wording in view of the fact that the Conference did not consider it was any use to threaten publicity, and preferred in the present note to hint at but not to divulge the measures which the Allied Governments might take in the event of Austrian obstruction. The French urged that the Conference should delay making the communication to the Austrian Government in order to give time to find out whether the League of Nations, either direct or through its Committee of Enquiry or its High Commissioner, would not veto the present demands. The French, however, did not press this proposal on its being resisted by the Italian Ambassador and myself, and the note to the Austrian Government will accordingly be despatched forthwith.⁴ . . .²

¹ A copy of this note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1787 of August 12, not printed.

No. 160

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 10)

No. 169 [C 10451/159/7]

SOFIA, August 6, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch¹ which has been addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury by the British Delegate on the Inter-Allied Commission for Bulgaria in which he puts forward his suggestion with a view to the further reduction of the Commission after the 31st of January next.

2. I am in general agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Bruce in the Memorandum enclosed in his despatch.

3. It seems clear in the first place that the maintenance of the Commission beyond that date at its present strength and cost will not be justified by the amount or importance of the work which it will probably be called on to perform—at any rate until 1933, and secondly that even if no explicit undertaking has been communicated to the Bulgarian Government to make a further reduction after January 31st a moral obligation to that effect has been assumed. Bad as is the record of the Government in other respects their behaviour towards the Commission during the present year has been exemplary and there seems therefore no

¹ Of August 4, not printed.

ground for refusing to fulfil this obligation however undesirable it may be on general grounds to make any concession to the present administration. At the same time I attach importance to Mr. Bruce's suggestion that they should be informed that the concession is conditional on their continued good behaviour and that the Powers retain the right in case of any difficulties in the future to reinforce the Commission. This reserve should neutralise such loss of prestige as the Commission might otherwise suffer by its further reduction and may prove a most valuable weapon in dealing with the serious trouble which is almost certain to arise in 1933 when the annual payments rise from 10 to 43 million gold francs.

4. It will be seen that the changes suggested would bring down the cost of the Commission from £12,000 to £6,000 a year.² I do not think that it would be possible to maintain an independent Commission adequate for the duties which it has to perform for a lesser amount. The only alternative would seem to be the transfer of its functions to the respective Legations—a solution which in my opinion is open to the gravest objections, though it was strongly advocated by the late French Minister, Monsieur Georges-Picot, who was always eager to have a finger in every pie, and is apparently to some extent favoured by the Italian Minister.

I have, etc.,

WILLIAM ERSKINE

² For previous correspondence on the reduction of costs, see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 174, 183, 192, 246, 257, 265 and 275.

No. 161

Mr. Parr¹ (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 24)

No. 99 [C 11009/9935/90]

DURAZZO, August 11, 1925

Sir,

With reference to Mr. Eyres's Despatch No. 93,² I have the honour to report that Notes have been exchanged between the Albanian Government and the French Chargé d'Affaires which secure to the French Government an option on all petroliferous lands in Albania which will not be appropriated under one or another of the four concessions already granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,³ the Italian State Railways,⁴ the Standard Oil Company⁵ and the Rushton group,⁵ and, furthermore, an option on all lands included in those four concessions and subsequently abandoned. This option is for a period of twelve months and dates from August 1st, when the Notes were exchanged.

¹ Chargé d'Affaires July 26–October 10, 1925.

² No. 151.

³ See Nos. 31, n. 4, 45, n. 3, 48, n. 2, 51, 55, n. 6 and 79, n. 4.

⁴ See No. 76.

⁵ See No. 151.

2. The Notes envisage their subsequent embodiment in a contract under which the rights at present secured to the French Government will be transferred to some French Oil company or other financial group. I understand from my French colleague that he hopes to have the name of this company or group very shortly.

I have, etc.,
ROBERT PARR

No. 162

Mr. Keeling (Athens) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 12, 4.30 p.m.)

No. 139 Telegraphic [C 10608/154/19]

ATHENS, August 12, 1925, 2 p.m.

My telegram No. 133.¹

Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to enquire views of His Majesty's Government regarding Greek proposal for internationalisation of line joining Salonika to Central Europe. He talks rather vaguely of a governing body similar to the Danube Commission on which the Great Powers would also be represented.

As far as I can see this request (? is) (? merely) an attempt to drag us into discussions. Might I perhaps tell Minister for Foreign Affairs privately while His Majesty's Government will always view with sympathy any arrangements tending to remove possibility of friction between Balkan States, it would be premature for them to offer an opinion on such a far-reaching proposal before it has been even considered by countries most nearly interested.²

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me confidentially that he was asking me to transmit this request as Greek Minister in London is not in complete agreement under present government.³

¹ Of August 6. In this, Mr. Keeling referred to No. 155, and reported that the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that if the idea of a French company was impossible, he would consider 'some form of internationalisation of Salonica Ghevghele section on condition that same principle was applied to remainder of the line joining Salonica to Central Europe especially Prague, Bucharest and Warsaw . . . '.

² In Foreign Office telegram No. 106 of August 15, Mr. Chamberlain approved the reply suggested by Mr. Keeling.

³ See No. 142, n. 11.

No. 163

Mr. Kennard (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 17)

No. 315 [C 10748/798/19]

BELGRADE, August 14, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 293 of August 6¹ I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed some apprehension in regard to the attitude of General Pangalos's Government² towards this country. The military authorities had information to the effect that trenches were being prepared on the Greek frontier and the manoeuvres of the Greek Army in the Salonica area were taking place at an ill-chosen moment. These proceedings, coupled with the continuation of the Serbophobe campaign in the Greek press, were making an unfortunate impression here especially in view of the reassuring statements which His Excellency had recently made³ and he could not understand why the Greek Government were showing so much hostility to this country. As regards the Salonica and minorities questions there was no fresh development despite the efforts of the French representatives in both capitals to find some acceptable compromise.

2. I asked the French Minister today for such information as he could give me on the subject. M. Grenard stated that, as regards the Salonica line, the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] Government insisted that the company to be formed should be purely Serbian, while the Greek Government would only agree to an international board. As regards the minorities, the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] Government complain that there is considerable divergence in the legislation of the two countries affecting the minorities and that all they require is that an agreement should be concluded whereby this legislation should be made uniform for both sides of the frontier. They are supplying M. Grenard with a more detailed statement of their case and he has promised to furnish me with a copy of any communication he may receive from them on the subject.

3. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires informs me that there is some question of transferring the Greek Minister here to Sofia. M. Tsamados is an agreeable and tactful colleague and it would be unfortunate if he were removed at the present moment. I do not at any rate see any immediate prospect of the differences between the two countries being composed in the near future and I should imagine that the French Government may find their rôle of intermediary a somewhat onerous one.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Representative at Athens.

I have, etc.,

H. W. KENNARD

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

² See No. 142, n. 11.

³ In Belgrade despatch No. 294 of August 6, Mr. Kennard had communicated to the

Foreign Office the declarations of M. Ninčić to the correspondent of a Greek newspaper as contained in the Belgrade Press on July 31.

No. 164

Mr. Akers-Douglas (Vienna) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 24)

No. 199 [C 10986/397/3]

VIENNA, August 19, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your Despatch No. 295 (C 10282/397/3) of the 8th instant¹ I have the honour to report that, having received from His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris a letter (copy of which I enclose)² with instructions to concert with my colleagues and present to the Austrian Government a joint Note concerning the decisions of the Ambassadors' Conference in regard to the disarmament control,³ I arranged with my French, Italian⁴ and Japanese⁵ colleagues to present the Note today, and we called upon the Chancellor (the Minister for Foreign Affairs being absent from Vienna) this morning and handed in the joint Note.

2. In delivering the Note and speaking for my three colleagues as well as myself, I expressed to Dr. Ramek our earnest hope that he would take serious and energetic steps to insist firmly upon the due execution of the demands contained in this Note without delay, and we pointed out that our Governments had shown a patient and generous attitude throughout and were making some large concessions in the matter of delivery of material and in that of special machines allowed to the State Factory. We expected that the Austrian Government, on their side, would see that there was no further delay in carrying out the final obligations still outstanding.

3. The Chancellor said he had no intention or wish to publish the Note; all he would do—if he found it necessary to say anything at all—would be to issue a statement merely that we had called upon him to speak about the 'termination of the Control'. To this we remarked that it would be a great mistake to use those particular words at all, as, until the obligations were duly fulfilled, it was quite premature to even speak of the end of control.

4. Dr. Ramek thanked us for the Note and for the good will of our Governments and said he would study it carefully, and he promised to use all his best endeavours to see that the demands were carried out, and he added that he realised it was in Austria's own interest that this should be done quickly.

5. I am sending a copy of this Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, etc.,

A. AKERS-DOUGLAS

¹ This covered a copy of No. 159.

² Of August 12, not printed.

³ See No. 159.

⁴ Signor A. Chiaramonte Bordonaro.

⁵ M. S. Akatsuka.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes¹ (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 31)*

No. 338 [C 11261/798/19]

BELGRADE, August 27, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to state that M. Rentis's proposal for a Balkan pact of compulsory arbitration as reported in Sir M. Cheetham's despatch No. 230 of July 21st² has been received in this country with coldness and scant attention, it having been passed over almost unnoticed by the Press.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation today expressed the view that it was a sense of general insecurity, of military weakness, of fear of Yugoslavia and even of Bulgaria that impelled M. Rentis to raise this ballon d'essai. Arbitration would be the cheapest way for Greece to overcome the difficulties in which she was involved with Serbia. His Excellency stated that he would examine with sympathy a proposal for compulsory arbitration in the Balkans provided that it were put forward side by side with and not anterior to the settlement of the Salonica Railway and Minorities questions in accordance with Yugoslavia's desires which he maintained were reasonable and moderate.

3. M. Nincić added that there was at present no question of the resumption of the negotiations for the renewal of the Alliance.³

4. My Greek colleague has informed me that his Government may raise the question of a Balkan pact of arbitration at the forthcoming meeting⁴ of the League of Nations.⁵

I have, etc.,

GEORGE OGILVIE-FORBES

¹ First Secretary at Belgrade, and Chargé d'Affaires August 25–October 4.

² Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives. See, however, No. 153.

³ See Nos. 14, 26, 70, 93, 120, 131, 132, 135, 141, 142, 148 and 154.

⁴ The Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations met September 7–26; the Thirty-Fifth Session of the Council was held September 2–28.

⁵ In Belgrade telegram No. 125 of August 31, Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes reported: 'Officially inspired statement has been circulated in the press to the effect that Serb-Croat-Slovene government do not consider M. Rentis's proposals to have been sufficiently studied. If and when they are officially submitted to government, a reply will be given in conformity with interests of country.'

'It is further stated that if it is true that M. Rentis is about to sound foreign powers, such a démarche which tends to put pressure on Serb-Croat-Slovene government would not be regarded by public opinion as a friendly act.'

Mr. Nicolson minuted (September 1): 'The Greek Government have never sounded us officially on this proposal, although I gather that the Greek Minister at Rome [M. A. Carapanos] has sounded the Italian Government.'

'This telegram means, of course, that the Serbs are afraid lest the Greeks raise their proposal in the atmosphere of the Assembly—and it is for this reason that they have

indicated in advance that this would be construed as "an unfriendly act". The Serbs know that it is force and not justice which will give them what they want at Salonika and in regard to the Minorities, and they also know that their attitude on both these questions would be impossible to defend if it ever came to open discussion by the Assembly. . . .'

No. 166

Mr. Parr (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received September 8)

*No. 110 [C 11517/2756/90]**

DURAZZO, August 29, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that during the last two months great interest has been aroused by the visits to Ahmed Bey of Signor Alessandro Lesson[a], an Italian Deputy, who is reported to be a close personal friend of Signor Mussolini's, and who had made Ahmed Bey's acquaintance when the latter was in Rome some few years ago. A gunboat is placed at Signor Lesson[a]'s disposition for his visits to Albania; he lives on board and only comes ashore in the evening for interviews with Ahmed Bey, who is at present residing in Durazzo. Signor Lesson[a] does not appear at all in local society, although the officers of his gunboat do, and his visits are surrounded by a curious atmosphere of melodrama and intrigue. They are usually of some few days' duration, at the end of which he returns to Italy, to reappear at Durazzo four or five days later. He is at present in the course of his sixth visit, but I have not hitherto made a formal report¹ as to these visits because of the practical impossibility of obtaining trustworthy information, since, so far as I can ascertain, only Ahmed Bey and Signor Lesson[a] are parties to what is going on. I had hoped that after a certain interval I might have been able to acquire some information, but these hopes have been disappointed, partly because I have judged that it would be impolitic to betray any special interest as to what may be afoot, and I can therefore do no more than report the various rumours that are prevalent as to the object of Signor Lesson[a]'s negotiations.

2. One rumour, which is that put forward by the President's immediate entourage, is that the negotiations are for a concession to construct a railroad from Valona or Durazzo to a point on the frontier, whence it could be linked with the line to Monastir. For obvious reasons I consider this story somewhat thin.

3. A second rumour was that the Italian Government was pressing Ahmed Bey to give a long lease of Valona in order that they might establish a naval base at that port. This rumour has been assiduously circulated by the refugees of Bishop Fan Noli's following who are in

¹ Mr. Parr had given the substance of this despatch in letters of July 31 and August 15 to Mr. Nicolson, not printed.

Greece. My Serbian colleague² asked Ahmed Bey directly whether there was any foundation for this report and received an absolute denial in reply. I had myself been considering the advisability of approaching Ahmed Bey and enquiring as to how far there was a substantial basis for this rumour, and as to how far any political negotiations with Italy might be on foot which might eventually lead to the establishment of a naval base on the Albanian coast, since I had in mind the Admiralty's opinion as to the effect which Corfu, in Italian hands, might have should the British navy at any time wish to operate in the Adriatic (*cf.* Confidential print, 'South-Eastern Europe', Part IX, No. 22).³ Before, however, I had decided as to whether it would be opportune or otherwise to broach this subject to the President, I heard that M. Lazarevitch had done so, and naturally concluded that it would be undesirable for me to follow him. There has been another rumour that the negotiations were for another site farther south, possibly the Bay of Palermo.

4. The third possibility which is mooted is that the Italians desire to obtain an agricultural concession for the whole of the Musekja Plain, which they could use as a dumping ground for some of their surplus population. It would not be the first time that proposals have been made for such a concession—indeed at one period a convention had been drafted, the terms of which would have proved singularly disadvantageous to Albania, and it was only the perspicacity of Meissner Pasha⁴ which led to their rejection.

5. Finally, certain people are of opinion that what is happening is simply that the Italian Government is attempting to exert general political pressure on Ahmed Bey in order to wean him from the Serbs and is attempting to take advantage of the fact of Serbian intractability over the frontiers. Colour is lent to this by the recent visit of Tseno Bey, Minister of the Interior, to Belgrade, where he has, I understand, been attempting to secure political and material assistance, which the Serbs have proved unwilling to give.

6. Personally I am inclined to suspect that the 'extraordinary activity' of the foreign policy of the Fascist Government to which Signor Mussolini referred in his speech of the 21st June⁵ is finding one of its outlets here, and that Italy is attempting to draw Ahmed Bey wholly within her own orbit by extending her economic hold over this country, and possibly by the conclusion of a secret political agreement, while Ahmed Bey himself is listening carefully to the expositions of the Italian envoy, assuring him of his complete sympathy with the objects of his mission and 'touching' him for as much money as may be available at the moment.

² M. B. Lazarević.

³ i.e. Admiralty letter of August 31, 1923, to the Foreign Office. See Vol. XXIV, No. 627, n. 9.

⁴ The German adviser to the Department of Public Works August 1923–August 1924.

⁵ In the Chamber of Deputies. Sir R. Graham gave a summary of this speech in Rome despatch No. 542 of June 22, not printed.

7. I regret that I am unable to supply you, Sir, with more definite information on this subject, but, as I have explained, the closest secrecy is observed, and the affair is all the more obscure in that it is being carried on entirely without reference to the Italian Legation at Durazzo. At the same time I judged it advisable to report according to the scanty information in my possession rather than to pass over unnoticed negotiations which may possibly have important developments.⁶

8. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, etc.,
ROBERT PARR

⁶ For the Lessona mission, see A. Lessona, *Memorie* (Florence, 1958), pp. 81 ff. See also *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, Nos. 63 and 157.

No. 167

Mr. Parr (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received September 8)

No. 115 [C 11522/52/90]

DURAZZO, August 29, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my Despatch No. 101 of August 13th,¹ I have the honour to report that I have received further information as to attempts to foment a movement in the south of Albania against the present Government. These are being carried on by certain people here who are acting in co-operation with political exiles abroad and, as will appear, there is reason to suspect that their activities are being promoted by the Bolsheviks.

2. I learn from the Albanian press that Monsignor Mjeda, the exiled Archbishop of Scutari, is preparing a memorandum for the League of Nations which asserts that the Government of Ahmed Bey is oppressing the Christian elements in this country, both Catholic and Orthodox, and asks for the intervention of the Powers and the establishment by them of a totally different form of government under a High Commissioner. This in itself is not important, but it coincides with a project for a similar memorial from the Albanian community in Bucharest. They have issued invitations to various notables of every municipality in Albania to attend a congress which they propose to hold at Bucharest within the next fortnight or so where the whole question of the government of Albania will be examined and a statement embodying their recommendations drawn up and circulated to the Powers. It is possible that there is some connection between these proposals and the action of the Roumanian Government in announcing its intention to establish schools in Albania for

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

the Kutzo-Vlachs. It is not easy to understand what the Roumanian Government can gain by creating a minority in this part of the Balkans unless it desires to have something with which to bargain in the event of Albania again going into the melting pot.

3. At the same time I learn that the Albanian exiles in Greece are busily preparing to invade the southern provinces of Albania. The ringleaders of this movement are Spiro Kolleka,² who is at present in Greece, Sotir Petzi³ at Brindisi and Moustapha Kruja⁴ in Vienna. Colonel Ismail Hakki Tatzati⁵ also is taking an active part in the movement, but I do not know his present whereabouts. These people are undoubtedly associated with the party who attempted to bring about an insurrection in Southern Albania a month ago. Their communications with some of these and their attempts to suborn officers of the Gendarmerie are known to the Albanian Government, and the President has found it necessary to forbid the departure from Albania of Mufid Bey Libohova⁶ who had announced his intention of leaving 'on a diplomatic mission to Rome and Paris'.

4. The revolutionaries have obtained at Vienna a photograph of a document which purports to be an agreement made between Ahmed Bey and Mr. Pasitch, under the terms of which the former was given help for his return to Albania last December.⁷ I should imagine that it is highly improbable that such a document as this is in existence, and that the photograph must have been taken from a specially prepared forgery. The agreement is said to contain clauses which are greatly to the disadvantage of Greece, and I understand that Ali Klissoura⁸ and another envoy have been sent to Mr. Rendis in order to lay the document before him, and to make arrangements whereby the Greek Government will assist in their enterprise on their undertaking to pursue a Grecophil policy in the event of their success. That they are not entirely sanguine of this is shown by the fact that they have prepared alternative schemes for the division of the spoils, one in the event that they are able to establish a government at Tirana, and one in the event that they will not be able to penetrate north of the Skoumbi.

5. My reasons for surmising that there is Bolshevik influence behind these activities are two. One is that at the present moment I do not see that any one of the limitrophe countries would find it worth while to supply these revolutionaries with the amount of money which they apparently possess. (As I suggested in my Despatch No. 108 of August 25th,⁹ it is

² Minister of Public Works December, 1922–March, 1924.

³ Formerly the Orthodox Christian member of the Council of Regency.

⁴ A leading member of the Kossovo Committee (see No. 24, n. 14).

⁵ Minister of War in 1922.

⁶ In Durazzo despatches Nos. 101 of August 13 and 103 of August 15, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives, Mr. Parr had reported that Mufid Bey Libohova was said to be trying to foment trouble in Southern Albania against Ahmed Bey.

⁷ See No. 3, n. 3.

⁸ A member of the 'National Union' formed of opponents to Ahmed Bey.

⁹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives. In this, Mr. Parr had reported that he

possible that the Greek Government may eventually assist these people, but I do not think it would do so until it is definitely assured that Ahmed Bey will not implement the undertaking regarding the Orthodox population of Southern Albania.) Failing any one of the three limitrophe Governments as a source of supply it is difficult to imagine that the money would come from anyone except the Russians. In the second place, the reports as to this secret document incline me to believe that the Bolsheviks have a hand in the preparations, since from what I know of the Albanians concerned in the movement I should say that they are incapable of preparing such a forgery in such a way as to give it even an appearance of genuineness.

6. I think it is possible that, alarmed by these reports, Ahmed Bey may decide to satisfy the demand of the Greek Government regarding the fair treatment of the minorities and the carrying out of the undertakings of October [sic], 1921,¹⁰ on condition that Greece puts an end to the revolutionary operations of the Albanians at present living in exile within her frontiers.

I have, etc.,
ROBERT PARR

P.S. Since writing the above I have received information from an Albanian source at Corfu to the effect that the document referred to was obtained through the Russian mission at Belgrade and the Fédération balcanique headquarters at Vienna.

R. P.
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understood that when Ahmed Bey had resumed power (see No. 3, n. 3), he had received considerable financial help from the Greek Government on the understanding that he would do everything to meet the legitimate desires of the Greek-speaking inhabitants of Southern Albania.

¹⁰ The intended reference is to Albania's undertakings to the League of Nations with regard to minorities. For that of February, 1921, see *L.N.O.J.* 1921, p. 124. The second is contained in a letter of June 21, 1921, a copy of which is filed at C 14936/580/90), not printed. For an account of an agreement with the Greek inhabitants of Chimarra of 1921, see Vol. XXII, No. 633. For this question of minorities, see *ibid.*, Nos. 655, 783, 790, 793, 805 and 807.

No. 168

Mr. Charles¹ (Bucharest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received September 8)

No. 417 [C 11513/798/19)

BUCHAREST, September 3, 1925

Sir,

The Roumanian press of all shades of opinion have shown considerable

¹ First Secretary at Bucharest, and Chargé d'Affaires July 30–October 3.

interest in the propositions made by the Greek Foreign Minister through the Greek press regarding the question of a Balkan Pact.²

2. An article published in the Paris 'Temps' is reproduced in many newspapers as well as a letter written by Professor Aulard³ advocating the conclusion of such an agreement. Opinion in general follows the French view on the subject and is almost unanimously in favour of the scheme. According to the press, if Greece and Jugo-Slavia could come to terms, Roumania would certainly join the pact and would advise the inclusion of Bulgaria also, although she realises the difficulties in the way of the latter country joining in an agreement before she can arrange the settlement of questions consequent on the war which are against her interests, racial and economic.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs does not think there is any practical hope of the realisation of such a project in view of the existing Serbo-Greek relations. The move on the part of Greece was a clever one in her present state of isolation and is an effort on her part to have the Salonica Railway difficulty solved by arbitration, by which means she thinks she would stand a fair chance of success.

I have, etc.,
NOEL CHARLES

² See No. 165.

³ Honorary Professor of the History of the French Revolution at the University of Paris.

No. 169

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received September 7)

No. 189 [C 11496/798/19]

SOFIA, September 3, 1925

Sir,

The Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me yesterday whether I had any information regarding a proposal said to have been made by Monsieur Rentis for a security pact for the Balkans based on compulsory arbitration.¹ I replied that I knew nothing of the matter beyond what I had seen in the Bulgarian press. His Excellency volunteered the opinion that in principle he was in favour of such an arrangement but that he thought it had not been put forward as a serious proposition but rather as a means of obtaining a tactical advantage in the dispute with Yougoslavia over Salonica. He added that he had not been approached in the matter by the Greek Government but he seemed to think that it might come up for discussion at the forthcoming Assembly of the League of Nations² at which he will be present as chief Bulgarian representative.

¹ See No. 165.

² See *ibid.*, n. 4.

2. There has been considerable discussion of the question in the Bulgarian press which is almost unanimous in expressing the view that such a pact would be useless unless it included Bulgaria on equal terms and that Bulgaria could not consent to participate in it until what she regards as her rights under the Treaty of Neuilly in regard to the protection of Bulgarian minorities in the neighbouring countries and the outlet to the Aegean Sea have been satisfied.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade.

I have, etc.,
WILLIAM ERSKINE

No. 170

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 11, 9 a.m.)*

No. 128 Telegraphic [C 11696/798/19]

BELGRADE, September 10, 1925, 7.30 p.m.

My French colleague has heard on reliable authority that there is good prospect of settlement of Salonica railway and minorities questions.

He says Salonica-Gjevgheli line will be controlled by French company and Greek rights of sovereignty safeguarded; and that as regards minorities Greek?? government has informed Serb-Croat-Slovene government that there will be no difficulty about coming to an arrangement and that facilities will be provided for teaching Serbian in the schools.

He understands that Serb-Croat-Slovene government will agree to above proposals subject to consent of Monsieur Pasitch who is at present abroad.

Please regard this information for the present as confidential. Centre of negotiations being now in Geneva¹ Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he has not been informed of any developments in the situation but admits possibility of some agreement being reached.

Repeated to Athens.

¹ See No. 165, n. 4.

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Keeling (Athens)

No. 498 [C 11549/798/19]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 10, 1925

Sir,

The Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs paid me a visit at Geneva¹ on the 2nd September. He began by expressing the anxieties of the Greek Government about the relations of Greece and Jugoslavia. He recited the suggestion which had been made, as he understood, in the first instance by M. de Fleuriau for the formation of an international company for the Salonica-Ghevgeli Railway with 40 per cent. Greek, 40 per cent. Serb and 20 per cent. French participation.² He said that the Greek Government were opposed to any Serbian participation, which they thought would only lead to a continuance of the demand for the employment of Serbian nationals and for special rights to be accorded to them. He would prefer a purely French company, and M. Briand had seemed to think that that might not be unacceptable to the Jugoslav Government. He wished to know my views, and he enquired whether M. Caclamanos had correctly reported what had been said to him at the Foreign Office.³ This M. Caclamanos appeared to have done. I confirmed the account he gave.

I observed that I thought that English participation was not very probable unless it was participation by some great industrial firm attracted by the *quid pro quo* of considerable orders for material.

M. Rentis remarked incidentally at this point that he had become aware, almost by accident, of the suggestion that I had made in December last,⁴ before the trouble with Jugoslavia became acute, that Greece should ask the League of Nations to appoint a first-class railway manager of neutral nationality to take charge of the line, and he expressed his regret that the late Government had not taken this excellent advice. He now enquired whether I would advise that he should apply to the League to take the railway under their control as well as the free zone immediately outside the Jugoslav concession at Salonica.

I replied that I thought there might be difficulties about this proposal from the League point of view, and I doubted whether at this stage it would be acceptable to Jugoslavia. On the whole, I should advise him to pursue his conversations with M. Briand, and see whether with M. Briand's assistance he could reach a solution on the other basis.

M. Rentis said that at present he did not think that there was any possibility of renewing the treaty of alliance with Serbia,⁵ nor of

¹ See No. 165, n. 4. Mr. Chamberlain was British Empire Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations.

² See Nos. 148, 154-56 and 162-3.

⁴ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 271 and 293.

³ See No. 156.

⁵ See No. 14, n. 4.

concluding any general arbitration treaty. I suggested that at this moment some patience was needed, that possibly if our western pact⁶ was successfully negotiated the example of the great Powers of the west might influence other countries. I could not help hoping that at some time the States of the Balkans might see their advantage in making a similar agreement, taking the form, as ours would do, not of an alliance of certain Powers directed against this or that other nation, but of a pact of mutual guarantee among all the countries concerned.

M. Rentis said that he had some idea of expressing a hope of this kind if suitable opportunity occurred during the discussions of the Assembly.

Finally, M. Rentis spoke of the trouble which had arisen between the Greek Government and the neutral members of the Refugee Commission.⁷ I advised him on this subject to give satisfaction to the League, which he said he intended to do. There was, in fact, no difficulty now about the future. The only question was how to deal with cases which had already been decided. I could only repeat my advice to him to give satisfaction to the authorities of the League.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁶ See Chap. II, below.

⁷ The U.S. Chairman, Mr. C. Howland, and the British member, Sir J. Campbell, who were appointed by the League of Nations. The other two members of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission were appointed by the Greek Government. Trouble had arisen by the arrest of Greek officials in the service of the Commission in the general colonisation department in Macedonia. See *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 1360 and 1673. On September 10 the Council of the League of Nations (see No. 165, n. 4) accepted the assurances of the Greek Government that measures would be taken to put an end to the difficulties (see *ibid.*, p. 1360).

No. 172

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received September 15, 9 a.m.)

No. 71 Telegraphic [C 11824/1142/7]

SOFIA, September 14, 1925, 8.30 p.m.

President of the Council left Sofia yesterday for Geneva¹ ostensibly for a rest but in reality to assist Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in his desperate efforts to secure something which may be represented here as a success for Bulgarian diplomacy and thus avert or at least postpone fall or reconstruction of the government which is otherwise regarded as almost inevitable when Parliament re-assembles at the end of October.

I understand from a confidential source that in addition to attempt to obtain refugee loan² Monsieur Kalfoff hopes to find opportunity to put

¹ See No. 165, n. 4.

² Mr. Smith minuted on September 15: 'In conversation with M. Kalfoff [see No. 127] the

himself forward in connection with some proposal for a Balkan security pact to be considered by Foreign Ministers of the great powers concurrently with Rhineland pact.³

It is sincerely to be hoped he will receive no encouragement whatever in either matter as no real improvement of the situation here is possible so long as present government remains in power.

I learn from a reliable source that my French colleague hears he was going to Geneva offering to recommend Monsieur Tsankoff to good offices of French representative there and that offer was gladly accepted.

Repeated to Geneva for Mr. Cadogan.⁴

S[ecretary] of S[tate] has already shown him that the loan is not likely to succeed. The British delegation at Geneva will therefore know that M. Tsankoff is not to be encouraged. I should hardly think that the French would encourage him as I do not quite see what they have to gain by it. . . .

In Foreign telegram No. 205 to Geneva, of September 16, Mr. Chamberlain instructed the British Delegation at Geneva as follows: 'See my conversation with Kalfoff. He should be given no encouragement.'

³ See Chap. II, below.

⁴ An Assistant to the British Delegate to the League of Nations.

No. 173

Mr. Ovey¹ (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received September 21)

No. 771 [C 12022/3962/90]

ROME, September 14, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 1064 of the 17th July last² (C 9298/3962/90) I have the honour to report that, according to a Communiqué of the Volta Agency, a meeting was held in Rome on the 3rd instant for the formal constitution of the National Bank of Albania.

2. As reported in Mr. Eyres's despatch to you No. 89 of June 30th last,² the Italian Financial group with Signor Mario Alberti at its head, concluded an agreement with the Government on March 15th 1925 in regard to the Statutes and Regulations required for the formation of the bank, and that agreement was duly ratified by the Albanian Parliament in the following June.

3. According to the communiqué the National Bank of Albania has been founded with a capital of Twelve million five hundred thousand gold francs, two million six hundred thousand of which have been paid up. Of the capital 51% is set apart for the promoting group, while the remainder is open to subscription by Albanian citizens.

4. The bank has been granted the exclusive right of issuing paper-

¹ Counsellor at Rome, and Chargé d'Affaires August 9–September 26.

² Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

money and metal coinage and of controlling the Treasury on behalf of the Albanian Government. In addition it may promote any banking operation or take such financial, commercial, industrial or other measures with a view to developing the productive capacity and exchange facilities of Albania.

5. The Italian Financial Group, composed of the 'Credito Italiano', 'Banca Commerciale Italiana', 'Banca Nazionale di Credito', and the 'Banco di Roma', is supported by the 'Banque Commerciale de Bâle' for Switzerland, the 'Banque Belge pour l'Etranger' for Belgium and by various Jugo-Slav banking houses.

6. After a brief speech by Signor Alberti setting forth the principles on which the bank would be managed and a reply by Signor Libohova,³ the Albanian Minister, in which he expressed satisfaction at the formation of the bank, the meeting proceeded to appoint Signor Alberti, President, with Commendatore Fritz Eugène Brunner and the Chevalier de Wouters d'Oplinter, Vice President[s].

7. A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Durazzo.

I have, etc.,
ESMOND OVEY

³ Ekrem Bey Libohova.

No. 174

Mr. Parr (Durazzo) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 5)

*No. 138 [C 12551/52/90]**

DURAZZO, September 23, 1925

Sir,

Ahmed Bey's demand for the resignation of the Cabinet is an event which has been expected for some time, and which has been immediately occasioned by the quashing of the Kortcha conspiracy, on which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 101 of the 13th August,¹ and by the subsequent discovery of a second plot infinitely more widespread and dangerous.

2. Other grounds for dissatisfaction with the Government had been gradually accumulating. The Minister of the Interior had proved a corrupt administrator. The Minister of Public Works, Kosta Kotta, has been diligent and moderately capable, but he failed to work without friction either with his subordinates or his colleagues. The Minister of Justice² has shown himself more and more as a reactionary 'Turk'. Mufid Bey's connection with the Kortcha conspiracy was not the sole cause which

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives. See, however, No. 167.

² M. P. Poga.

the President had for asking him to resign. His conduct of both public business and his private affairs, in some cases inextricably intermingled, had made it impossible that he should long continue in office. In my despatch No. 115 of the 29th August³ I reported that Ahmed Bey had refused to give Mufid permission to leave the country, but he subsequently reversed his decision—it is said because the Minister of Finance had turned informer. However that may be, details of the Kortcha conspiracy had become very widely known, and were even the subjects of press comment. Eshref Bey Frasheri, President of the Senate, asked for the suppression of a newspaper which had openly accused him of being party to the movement. Ahmed Bey refused to suppress the paper, but offered Eshref an open judicial enquiry so that he might be vindicated. Eshref thereupon resigned, which step was tantamount to a declaration of war, and two days later the President called on the Cabinet to follow this example. For some time he had been well aware of the way in which his Ministers were handling their Departments, but during the events which I have just described he received further information of a very serious nature.

3. A rising was being planned which would have covered the greater part of the country, and various prominent men were party to it, chief of whom was Tseno Bey, Minister of the Interior and Ahmed's brother-in-law. The basis of the affair was in the activities of the exiles at present in Greece, Italy and Jugoslavia; the sinews of war were coming from the last-mentioned place, and it was there that Tseno Bey had been induced to take part. Ahmed Bey was aware of the plot in time to prevent it maturing, and when, on his return from his visit to Belgrade,⁴ Tseno Bey realised how much was discovered he made no attempt to conceal his complicity. The President, from reluctance to cause scandal and for reasons of friendship and family ties, has taken no action against him otherwise than to insist on his resignation and to order him to leave the country and live privately in Paris. Ahmed Bey is very much shaken by the whole affair, and, when he recounted it to me, begged that I should allow no hint to escape which might point to what had really happened. He described himself to me as a man whose cruel destiny was that his servants must be either fools or traitors.

4. Meanwhile he is attempting to get together a Government of men who have hitherto played little part in politics. Musa Juka, a Scutarene of some ability, may go to the Public Works. Suleiman Starova is a candidate for the Finance, where he will have the extremely difficult task of co-operating with the State Bank and the Development Corporation, but he may not be the final choice. For the Ministry of the Interior, Ahmed

³ No. 167.

⁴ During his six-week stay in Belgrade Tseno Bey had sounded M. Ninčić as to Albania joining the Little Entente, and concluding a commercial treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes reported in Belgrade despatch No. 357 of September 15 that Tseno Bey had departed more or less empty handed.

Bey is trying to find an English- or French-speaking man, who would be in closer touch with Colonel Stirling than his Ministers have hitherto been; moreover, he prefers to have at this post a man who can take orders. Pandeli Evangheli will either be President of the Senate or Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is a man of little character, but well-intentioned and likely to occupy himself with his Department and stand clear from political intrigue.⁵

I have, etc.,
ROBERT PARR

⁵ In Durazzo despatch No. 143 of September 29 Mr. Parr submitted biographies of the new members of the government.

No. 175

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Keeling (Athens)

No. 115 Telegraphic [C 12172/145/19]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 29, 1925, 5.30 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 146,¹ 147² and 148² of September 24. Graeco-Italian agreement.

It is difficult for us without knowing exact scope of proposed agreement to express an opinion. On the one hand if proposal is merely for an amicable settlement of outstanding questions between Greece and Italy we should hesitate to discourage Greek Government. On the other hand, M. Rentis's language and proposal that Italian Under-Secretary should proceed to Athens indicate that something far more important is envisaged. Should the agreement be in any way directed against third parties or include even by implication the assignment to either country of zones of interest or immigration in Anatolia then His Majesty's Government (and I presume other signatories of Treaty of Lausanne)³ could not remain indifferent.

You should therefore reply to M. Rentis that His Majesty's Government cannot express an opinion without more precise information of what is proposed.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 275.)

¹ This ran as follows: 'Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that while at Geneva [see No. 165, n. 4] Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed to him desire of Italian Government for further rapprochement between the two countries with a view to eventual collaboration in Asia Minor, Conversation was only in general terms, and there was no suggestion of events in immediate future.'

² Not printed.

³ See No. 96, n. 4.

No. 176

*Record by Mr. Nicolson of a conversation with the Serb-Croat-Slovene
Chargé d'Affaires*

[C 12414/798/19]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 30, 1925

The Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires came to see me yesterday and informed me under instructions from his government that information had reached Belgrade to the effect that the Greek Government were entering into negotiations for an alliance with Bulgaria which would be directed against the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The Yugoslav Government did not conceal their suspicion that this movement was due to Italian intrigue.

I told Dr. Todorovic that I could scarcely believe that at a moment when Yugoslav-Greek relations had been sensibly improved as a result of the personal conversations between M. Rentis and M. Nincic¹ the Greek Government would contemplate any diplomatic action which might cause offence at Belgrade. I earnestly hoped that the Yugoslav Government would give no undue credence to this report and would not allow themselves to be influenced by it unless they were absolutely certain of its authenticity. Personally, I did not believe that there was a word of truth in it, and felt sure that if the Yugoslav Government made friendly enquiries at Athens their anxieties would at once be dispelled.²

HAROLD NICOLSON

¹ See No. 171.

² In a letter of October 15 to Mr. Kennard, Mr. Nicolson stated: '... We have since learnt from a secret but very reliable source that the Greek Government have no intention of entering into any direct negotiations with Bulgaria, although there is no knowing what they may not be induced to do by Italian machinations. On the whole, therefore, I think our best plan is to wait until we get something much more definite, and not to commit ourselves meanwhile to any expression of opinion in the matter. ...'

No. 177

Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Belgrade) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 5)

No. 373 [C 12583/798/19]

BELGRADE, September 30, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 435 of September 11th,¹ I have the honour to report that M. Polichroniades, the new Greek Minister, has arrived in Belgrade and called upon me this morning.

¹ This despatch had repeated No. 171.

2. M. Polichroniades enquired whether I had any information as to the attitude of the S[erbi] C[roat] S[lovene] Government towards the question of resuming the Alliance with Greece.² I informed him that as both M. Nincić and M. Pasić were still abroad no definite information as to the immediate intentions of the S[erbi] C[roat] S[lovene] Government was available until the former returned to Belgrade about October 5th. I added that he, M. Polichroniades, was doubtless better informed than I was of what had passed at Geneva between the Serbian and Greek Ministers for Foreign Affairs.³

3. He then said that he would give a description of the present position of affairs as viewed by the Greek Government.

4. First, as regards the Salonica Railway question M. Polichroniades confirmed the information contained in my telegram No. 128 of September 10th⁴ that previous to the meeting at Geneva agreement had been informally reached for the control of the Salonica—Ghevgheli line by a French company only.⁵ M. Nincić had nevertheless when the subject was broached by M. Rentis changed his mind, withdrawn from that arrangement and suggested that the question be reopened de novo through the ordinary diplomatic channels. This change of attitude was ascribed to the determined opposition of certain members of the Cabinet to any proposal from which Serbian capital and control would be excluded. It was also arranged between MM. Nincić and Rentis that negotiations for the Alliance should be quietly resumed on the return of Ministers to their respective capitals, the first step to be taken by the S[erbi] C[roat] S[lovene] Government.

5. M. Polichroniades further stated categorically that the Government of General Pangalos would never agree to the proposal for a 'mixed' company, as they were convinced that a solution on those lines with the French holding the balance between the Greeks and the Serbs would inevitably result in friction and eventually destroy the Alliance. Therefore better have no alliance at all than a settlement on that basis.

6. Moreover M. Polichroniades expressed the hope that the French Minister and myself would convey a hint to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it would be useless to reopen negotiations so long as the claim for the formation of an international company was persisted in by the S[erbi] C[roat] S[lovene] Government. Such a hint he considered, would more than counter-balance the opposition in the Belgrade Cabinet to a solely French company. M. Nincić was wavering. A word from His Majesty's Government would bring him to a favourable decision. I shall not, of course, act upon this suggestion or in any way intervene in the Serbo—Greek conversations without your instructions.

7. As regards the Minorities question M. Polichroniades stated that the Greek Government maintained their point of view and would not consent

² See No. 14, n. 4.

¹ No. 170.

³ See No. 171.

⁵ See Nos. 148, 154–6, 162–3, and 171.

to make any special agreement with Serbia, as the League of Nations were alone competent to deal with the matter. He thought however that provided all went well in the negotiations over the Railway question the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] Government would not raise much difficulty over the Minorities. Moreover the recent indiscretion of M. Radić,⁶ who in a speech at Geneva⁷ stated that Macedonia was Serbia's most vulnerable part and that the inhabitants of that country did not yet know whether they desired Bulgarian or Serb nationality, is a cause of much embarrassment to the Government and will, in M. Polichroniades's opinion, seriously hamper the Serbian case.

8. If however it is foreseen that agreement cannot be reached on the Railway question M. Polichroniades expressed the opinion that rather than acknowledge failure on that score the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] Government would stiffen their attitude on the Minorities question with a view to throwing the blame for the eventual breakdown on to the Greeks for their unreasonableness in that respect.

I have, etc.,

GEORGE OGILVIE-FORBES

⁶ See No. 24, n. 12. The proceedings against M. Radić had been dropped in July, and he himself released from prison on his party entering the governing coalition. M. Radić was a member of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation to the League of Nations (see No. 165, n. 4).

⁷ An account of this speech was given in Belgrade despatch No. 377 of October 1, not printed.

No. 178

Mr. Stevenson¹ (Sofia) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 12)

*No. 215 [C 12850/1142/7]**

SOFIA, October 8, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the President of the Council, who is at present at Nice, proposes to return to Bulgaria via Italy about the middle of this month. He will not attempt to interview any members of the French or Italian Governments. Until his return to this country the impending ministerial crisis will not take definite shape.

2. The situation at the moment is that the Democratic *entente*, though suffering from internal discord, presents a united front to the pretensions of the opposition, and is obviously determined to cling to office. While admitting the possibility of a reconstruction of the Cabinet, it is maintained that the *entente* is strong and elastic enough to produce several different Governments. I am informed, in fact, on good authority that the

¹ Second Secretary at Sofia and Chargé d'Affaires September 17–November 1.

programme of the party is already arranged for several years ahead. It is proposed that the Cabinet should now undergo a reconstruction in compliance with the desires of a strong current of opinion within the party, which is setting against certain of the present Ministers. The appointment of new Ministers would give the signal for the inauguration of a policy of reconciliation and pacification. On the expiry of the mandate of the present Sobranje in April 1927 it is expected that the party would still be strong enough to ensure a majority at the polls, and would then enter on fresh mandate, during which Tsankov himself would be succeeded by Liaptchev,² who in turn would give way to Bourov,³ one of the leaders of the Narodniaks.⁴ In each of these Governments General Volkov would continue to hold the portfolio of Minister of War. Given even a radical change of policy on the reconstruction of the Cabinet, this programme, though not impossible of fulfilment in view of the weakness of the Opposition, is very ambitious for a country where politics are so largely influenced by personal feuds and coalitions so readily and rapidly dissolve into their component parts over questions concerned with the division of the spoils of office. In the meanwhile, the parties of the Opposition, though unanimous in their desire to get rid of the present Government, are for the most part at daggers drawn with each other, a state of affairs which renders nugatory any attempt at combination.

3. It remains to be seen whether the undoubted discontent felt throughout the country with the present Government, coupled with the failure of the latter's foreign policy, will be strong enough to overcome the cohesive power of the Democratic *entente*. Any forecast as to possible successors to the Tsankov Government in such an eventuality is bound to lead into the realm of pure conjecture. It may be taken for granted, however, as pointed out in Mr. Erskine's despatch No. 197 of the 14th September,⁵ that no possible coalition would be strong enough to ignore the military element in the country. After an examination of the possibilities I have come to the conclusion that the most likely Government would be one under the leadership of Manilov,⁶ who has long been struggling to form a 'social *entente*'. Such a Government would probably comprise both fractions of the Democratic party and the Narodniaks, and would, of course, be dependent on the support of the reserve officers' organisation. Other combinations are naturally within the bounds of possibility, such as Democrats, Radicals and Moderate Agrarians or Democrats, Liberals and Moderate Agrarians; but none would be likely to include both the Liberals and the Radicals, between whom there is a bitter feud, or both parties of the Right and the Social Democrats, who now

² A Democrat. Minister of Finance 1910-11 and October-November 1918, and Minister of War 1918-19.

³ Minister of Commerce 1919-20.

⁴ i.e. Nationalist-Progressists.

⁵ Not printed. See, however, No. 172.

⁶ Leader of the dissident Democrats. President of the Council 1908-11 and June-November 1918.

regard their adhesion to Tsankov's Government in 1923 as a *mésalliance*. Moreover, the Social Democrats are now in the throes of a crisis owing to an acute difference of opinion as to future policy existing between the two wings of the party, which caused half the delegates to leave the recent party congress as a protest.

4. At the moment the country is quiet, a state of affairs to which a good harvest has largely contributed. Such small bands as are still occasionally reported as being active have, in my opinion, no political significance whatever. They are merely professional brigands, though, in order to gain assistance from the peasants, they often make themselves out to be political fugitives. There have been complaints lately, more particularly in the semi-official press, of raids carried out over the frontier by Agrarian refugees in Serbia, but this is quite possibly only a form of counterblast to the activities of the Serbians, who are, I am confidentially informed, accumulating a large volume of evidence bearing on the assistance given to the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation in this country.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

I have, etc.,
RALPH STEVENSON

No. 179

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 19)

No. 461 [C 13211/898/37]

Confidential

BUCHAREST, October 13, 1925

Sir,

I received a visit yesterday from Mr. Walter Collins, 'Times' correspondent in Sofia, who has a mission from that paper to visit neighbouring countries, especially Roumania, and to report generally whenever for one or another reason the local correspondent (in Bucharest a Roumanian subject)¹ would not be in a position to give unbiassed and consequently valuable information. Mr. Collins, whom I knew intimately as an Intelligence officer working in General Baird's military mission in Sofia on my arrival in 1919 and also in civilian capacity during subsequent residence there, informed me that he had been touring in Northern Bessarabia to study conditions in that region. As Lieutenant-Colonel Butler had given Mr. Collins advice as to route, etc. before his departure, I invited the Military Attaché to hear his observations.²

2. Mr. Collins told us that he could not report conditions in Bessarabia

¹ M. G. Boncescu.

² A copy of Lieut-Colonel Butler's despatch of September 30 on his tour in Bessarabia was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Bucharest despatch No. 447 of October 1, not printed.

to be satisfactory, although admitting that there had been no frontier disturbances of any consequence during his tour. He had however personally heard firing one night from the other side of the Dniester and learnt that the Russian guards had fired on some Roumanian peasantry who had crossed the river. On that occasion the whole of the Roumanian posts on this side of the river had turned out, but nothing further had occurred. At Kishineff he had hired a motor and driven for considerable distances to institute enquiries, putting up for the night at places indicated by Colonel Butler, where he had been hospitably entertained by Russian refugees. The financial state of these as a general rule was precarious, and some whom he had met found themselves unable to earn a living and were about to move to countries further West. Colonel Butler informed me at this juncture that he had drawn the attention of His Majesty's Consul General at Galatz to the sad case of a very old and destitute English governess in one of these Russian families who was being left behind in hospital, too ill to travel, while the family who had been supporting her had found that lack of means compelled them to leave Bessarabia, where the crops have failed and wheat is being imported to avert famine next winter. Mr. Robinson had promised to try and get the old lady repatriated, though at present she could not be moved.

3. Although Mr. Collins had heard tales of brigands and robbery on the roads, his motor trip had taken place quite undisturbed. The Roumanian gendarmerie were, as everywhere, highly unpopular. The Moldavian peasants in Be sarabia proclaimed themselves dissatisfied with conditions under Roumanian rule and many complaints were heard of corrupt tax collectors, but the Roumanian military authorities were on the other hand, he reported, popular now on all sides. He had had the utmost difficulty in obtaining access to General Rudeanu, Commanding in Chief in the province, but once that was accomplished he had received every courtesy and attention, though it became clear to him that instructions were subsequently sent out to watch and report on his proceedings and itinerary. He elicited from his chauffeur, an ex-Russian officer refugee, that he also had been told to report where he went and whom he saw. Mr. Collins had however succeeded in giving him the slip on several occasions and in interviewing whom he pleased. He had gathered that a great amount of Bolshevik propaganda was carried on and money distributed by resident Jews and that arms could be smuggled across the Dniester without much difficulty, but he did not attach much credence to the various tales of Communist plots in Bessarabia which the opposition papers have been busy printing of late in Bucharest.

4. Taking Mr. Collins's report as a whole, I gathered that, while local conditions and the outlook for the winter were very depressing, there was no particular cause to anticipate active unrest, which is, unless I mistake, the view also taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Butler after his inspection of the more Southern portions of the province in September.

5. I may add very confidentially that information has reached this

Legation tending to show that the Military Commander-in-Chief in Soviet Russia recently reported at Headquarters that his forces were not in a condition to undertake any campaign anywhere, 'even against Roumania', unless transport facilities were improved and adequate provisioning as well as supplies of ammunition were ensured. It might therefore be concluded that unless active encouragement were afforded by Soviet military aggression in Bessarabia there is not at present much likelihood of disturbances in that province, which is subject to military law, apparently rendered with good intent acceptable to the inhabitants.

I have, etc.,

HERBERT G. DERING

CHAPTER II

The Security Question January–October, 1925

No. 180

Minute by the Secretary of State

[W 362/9/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 4, 1925

It is evident that in face of the devastating criticism directed against the Geneva Protocol by both the Civil and Military departments,¹ His Majesty's Government will be obliged to refuse their signature. This is a simple and a necessary decision, but it is only the beginning of a vital chapter in the history of the British Empire and the world. Rejection of the Protocol is unavoidable, but rejection settles nothing. Indeed rejection, *pure et simple*, makes matters much worse, as every unsuccessful attempt to settle a great political problem always does. It is time, therefore, that we at the Foreign Office should attempt to develop a constructive policy.

How are we to set about it and of what character is it to be? I have refrained from raising these questions definitely so far, because I had hoped that even in their earliest consideration representatives of the Dominions might take part. It is now clear that this hope must be abandoned. The Dominions see that we can all come to a decision on the Protocol by correspondence.² What I think we have failed to convey to them is the urgency, the difficulty, the complexity and the absolutely vital character of the problem which remains for solution.

The question of Security dominates the policy of all the continental

¹ The views of the armed services with regard to the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4) are given in the Joint Memorandum by the Three Chiefs of Staff of October 29, 1924 (C.I.D. 527-B), not printed.

² See No. 183, below. See also Cmd. 2458, *Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes: Correspondence relating to the position of the Dominions* (H.M.S.O., 1925).

nations today. I am not at all sure that the same question does not affect the Far East and the Pacific, but if so the problem of the Pacific is different in many ways from that of Europe and probably easier of settlement. Taking the European problem alone I see no prospect of the continuance of cordial relations with France in Europe or elsewhere unless we can somehow give her a sense of security. Looking at Germany I see no chance of her settling down to make the best of new conditions unless she is convinced that she cannot hope to divide the Allies or to challenge them with any success for as long a time as any man can look ahead. As long as Security is absent, Germany is tempted to prepare for the Revanche. 'The Day' will still be the national toast and with far more reason, whilst French fears, goading France to every kind of irritating folly, will keep alive German hatred and lead us inevitably, sooner or later, to a new catastrophe.

And what will be our own position? We shall lose all influence over French policy. Do what we may, we shall win no gratitude from Germany. We shall be dragged along, unwilling, impotent, protesting, in the wake of France towards the new Armageddon. For we cannot afford to see France crushed, to have Germany or an eventual Russo-German combination supreme on the Continent, or to allow any great military power to dominate the Low Countries.

On the other hand it is idle even for the warmest supporter of an alliance with France to deny that such a proposal would meet with far more opposition at home and in the Dominions than would have been the case in 1919, and that such an alliance has been rendered far more difficult by the steps which France has taken to replace the former Franco-Russian alliance³ by her treaty with Poland.⁴ It is one thing to defend the channel on the eastern frontiers of the Low Countries and France. It is quite another thing to guarantee the very unstable situation in Eastern Europe which the Peace Treaties have 'Balkanised' with a vengeance.

How, then, can we at the Foreign Office best help the Governments of

³ This alliance, which began to take shape in 1891 and was completed in 1894, was until 1912 a purely defensive instrument with a very limited scope. In August, 1912, however, M. Poincaré, French Minister of Foreign Affairs 1912-13, on a visit to St. Petersburg, re-interpreted the Franco-Russian alliance in such a manner as virtually to offer to Russia French support in the event of intervention by Germany in an Austro-Russian War. See W. Langer, *The Franco-Russian Alliance 1890-1894* (Cambridge and London, 1929) and G. Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War* (Manchester University Press, 1984).

⁴ For the text of the Political Agreement of February 19, 1921, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 342-3. For a version of the text of the Military Convention of February 21, 1921, see P. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*. . . (Minneapolis, 1962), Appendix III, and for a discussion of the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 217-19.

For Franco-Polish relations, see No. 187, below.

In the margin is here added: 'Any other French engagements in Eastern or S[outh] Eastern Europe?'

the Empire to appreciate the character of the problem and to find a policy appropriate to it?

The first thing, I suggest, is to prepare a clear statement of the problem.

Chapter I. Europe today. The need for security. The effect of the absence of security. The vicious circle. The danger creates fear. Fear leads to a policy which increases the danger. The only hope for world peace is that the situation should be stabilised for long enough to allow of new generations growing up who *can* accept the *fait accompli* and *will* accept it rather than face again the horrors of war with no certain prospects of success.

Chapter II. The position of Great Britain (a) historically considered (b) these historic considerations applied to the conditions of today.

Now I conceive that Chapter I might be done by the Western and Central Departments⁵ and Chapter II by Mr. Headlam Morley.⁶ But then there remains Chapter III which should be 'The Solution, and here I am frankly at a loss. Can we propose an Anglo-Franco-Belgian pact of Guarantee to be followed by a Quadruple Pact embracing Germany? Or ought we to propose a unilateral declaration of British interests and of what we should regard as a *casus belli*? Or again is there some third course? And how in any case are we going to defend our vital interests in the West whilst safeguarding ourselves against being dragged into a quarrel over Lithuania or Latvia or Poland or Bessarabia? And what is or ought to be our policy in relation to those countries? I dare say that further questions will occur to you, but here is enough already for grave reflection and to exercise the best brains and experience of the office.

I therefore circulate to the Parliamentary Under Secretary,⁷ the Under Secretaries⁸ and the Heads of Departments⁹

1. Sir E. Crowe's minute on the protocol¹⁰

2. My statement to the C[ommittee of] I[mperial] D[efence]¹¹

3. This paper

and I will hold a conference in my room at 3.0 p.m. on Thursday, January

⁵ The outcome was the memorandum of January 23 (W 2035/9/98), not printed, drafted by Mr. Nicolson and Mr. Campbell, a senior member of the Western, General, and League of Nations Department of the Foreign Office, the final version of which is printed as No. 205, below.

⁶ Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office. His memorandum of February 12 was found to be too general for Mr. Chamberlain's purposes, and he was asked to rewrite that part of his memorandum which dealt with Great Britain's interest in the security of the Low Countries. Mr. Headlam-Morley's memoranda of February 12 (W 1252/9/98) and March 10 (W 2070/9/98) are not here printed. For a text, see J. Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London, 1930), pp. 171-92 and 156-71, respectively.

⁷ Mr. R. McNeill.

⁸ Sir W. Tyrrell and Mr. V. Wellesley.

⁹ i.e. the Heads of the Central, Western, and Northern Departments: Mr. Lampson, Mr. Villiers, and Mr. Gregory.

¹⁰ Of November 17, 1924 (W 9974/134/98), not printed.

¹¹ See No. 186, n. 7, below.

22, to discuss the matter where, as at a Court Martial, the junior should deliver his opinion first!

A.C.

No. 181

Lord D'Abernon¹ (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 10)

No. 17 [C 459/459/18]

BERLIN, January 7, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a Memorandum on the problem of Security and the present balance of military forces in Europe.

It has been written after a conversation which I recently had in Berlin with General Sir John Burnett-Stuart,² in which I expressed dissent from the assumptions usually current regarding military probabilities in Central Europe.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 181

*Memorandum respecting the Balance of Power in Europe and its effect
on the Problem of Security**

In discussions regarding the problem of security and the maintenance of European peace, it is frequently assumed that the military position today is similar to that which existed in 1914, or is likely, within a short space of time, to revert to it. This appears to me a fundamental misconception. The military position today is not only different from that of 1914, but is precisely the opposite. Germany was then the dominant military Power: today Germany is disarmed and military predominance has passed to France—not the military predominance of Germany in 1914, but one of a far more pronounced and indisputable character.

As regards the future, no positive statement can be made, but it cannot be assumed with any probability that Europe will revert to the 1914 position, for a sudden development from non-army or minor secret arming by Germany to open and undisguised arming is impossible, since it would mean an *immediate declaration of war by France*, in which Germany would have no chance. She would merely be exposing herself to destruction by hostile bombs and heavy artillery.

A gradual development is impossible without the fact being known to

¹ H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin.

² See No. 75, n. 1.

France long before the danger level is reached. It is not conceivable that France would allow that level to be attained without making an attack.

The difficulty of gradual rearming in Germany has been immensely increased by the financial controls established under the Dawes Report.³ Armament costs money. No money could be allotted to this purpose without the fact being known through financial channels years before there was any danger.

Indeed, a reversion to military predominance by Germany is highly improbable except after the convulsion of another great European war and the entire upset of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

If the object of discussion is the prevention of a European war it is unreasonable to base the whole debate on the assumption of a position which can only be reached after that which it is desired to avoid has occurred. On such lines no conclusion of practical value can be reached.

An examination of existing military facts will prove how far removed the position today is from that of 1914.

On one side is Germany with an army of 100,000 men, without reserve of guns and ammunition, with no up-to-date aerial equipment, and with no certain ally. On the other side is France with a peace army of 750,000 men, a considerable black reserve to draw upon in Africa; a more or less close military alliance with new States—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Jugoslavia and Roumania.⁴

Very inadequate attention is devoted to these military alliances. Because they are secret they are not less binding; because they are nominally defensive they are not less certain to be invoked whenever policy renders invocation convenient.

Can it be assumed—because the States of the smaller *Entente* are newly constituted—that their military power is negligible? Both in trained military forces and in potential man-power strength they represent a powerful force. Their armed strength is approximately as follows:—

			Peace.	War.
Poland	250,000	960,000
Czechoslovakia	160,000	600,000
Jugoslavia	115,000	600,000
Roumania	210,000	900,000

The population factor is often brought forward in estimating the future strength of France and Germany, and it is pointed out that the probable population in Germany will be 80 millions, while France will only have 30 millions. But the bearing of these figures is considerably modified if one brings in the population of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Roumania. The present figures are:—

³ See No. 27, n. 8.

⁴ For these alliances, see No. 187, below.

				Millions
Poland	27
Czechoslovakia	13.6
Jugoslavia	12
Roumania	17.3

As against this, Germany could only count (not very certainly) on:—

			Population.	Army.
Austria	6,500,000	30,000
Hungary	8,000,000	35,000

I do not bring the Russian population into account as (a) the present Russian Government is completely unreliable and can only be trusted to break its word; (b) any military combination between the aristocratic imperialist military leaders in Germany and the Communist forces in Soviet Russia is unthinkable.

It is sometimes contended that the next war will be dominantly chemical. This is possible. It is, however, improbable that any new development will so alter relative strength as to overcome the immense predominance in *matériel* of which France and her Allies now dispose. Some ballistic agency or some form of aerial transport is necessary for the useful employment of chemicals for war purposes.

The present position as regards guns, etc., is given in the following table:—

	Machine guns		Guns		Tanks	Aeroplanes
	Light	Heavy	Light	Heavy		
France	28,556	10,500	1,912	1,404	5,806	1,370
Poland	6,500	1,560	1,288	396	150	220
Czechoslovakia	2,500	1,500	828	456	60	500
Belgium	4,400	2,100	408	72	150	257
Approximate totals	42,000	16,000	4,500	2,300	6,200	2,400
Germany	1,134	792	288	None	None	None

⁵ Foreign Office minutes on this memorandum ran as follows: Mr. Lampson (January 13): 'It contains much truth. But it is not so much *truth* as *fear* that we have to contend with. France has twice passed through this ordeal of German aggression: her people are saturated, from the highest to the lowest, with fear of a similar experience. Perhaps they exaggerate the danger—but their feelings are at least intelligible.'

Sir E. Crowe (January 14): 'The cogency of Lord D'Abernon's argument cannot be denied. Nor the reality of the French fear to which Mr. Lampson alludes. An aspect to which it may be quite useful to call attention is that in these circumstances the offer of a British pact of security has a twofold advantage: (1) it allays or mitigates French fears; (2) it provides against a danger which is really rather remote, so that the commitment involved for this country is less serious than might appear at first sight.'

Mr. Chamberlain (January 14): 'I do not understand Lord D'Abernon's reason for thinking union between the Imperialist military leaders in Germany [and] the Communists

of Russia "unthinkable". After all who started the Russian revolutionaries on their task, [and] why not again [see W. Hahlweg (ed.), *Lenins Rückkehr nach Russland 1917: Die Deutschen Akten* (Leiden, 1957)].'

For a detailed criticism of Lord D'Abernon's memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel T. Heywood, a member of the General Staff, see No. 203, Enclosure, below.

No. 182

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 10)

*No. 18 [C 460/460/18]**

BERLIN, January 8, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you, with reference to my despatch No. 813 of the 27th November, 1924,¹ that the following further information has been obtained from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by the Commercial Secretary at this Embassy,² relative to the state of the commercial treaty negotiations between Germany and various other countries:—

France

2. The Ministry confirmed the information published in the press to the effect that, at one of the first meetings after Christmas, the French created a very strained situation by introducing into the Chamber an entirely new customs tariff with very high minimum rates, and at the same time submitting to the Germans a document of twenty-two pages and forty-three articles containing proposals for a *modus vivendi*, with the suggestion that this should be discussed and accepted before the 10th January, and should then remain in force for three months and be automatically renewed every three months. The Germans say that they cannot possibly arrive at any decision with regard to this instrument before the 10th January, as it is much too voluminous and involves too many serious issues. Moreover, they have the impression that the French mean it to be practically a final treaty. Herr Trendelenburg³ is coming to Berlin to discuss with his Government the new situation thus created. The conversations on technical and subsidiary matters are continuing in Paris in the meantime.

3. The private negotiations with regard to a Franco-German arrangement concerning iron and steel have been interrupted, as the German industrialists feel that in view of the political tension caused principally by the refusal to evacuate the Cologne zone,⁴ no useful result is likely to be reached. The Ministry regret this attitude, as they consider that economic

¹ Not printed. See, however, Vol. XXVI, No. 578.

² Mr. F. Thelwall.

³ State Secretary in the German Ministry of National Economy, and head of the German delegation to Paris.

⁴ See No. 553, below.

and political questions should not be confused. The industrialists are, however, continuing to take part in the official meetings as experts.

Belgium

4. The main difficulty is the desire of the Belgians to make a large number of exceptions to most-favoured-nation treatment. After the Christmas interval they have shown an inclination to make some concessions, but the Germans do not yet know to what extent. Considering the very great divergence of views which has so far existed between the two countries on this matter, it is still doubtful whether an agreement can be reached.

Italy

5. The negotiations were resumed in Rome on the 5th January, but it is as yet too early to say what course they will take.

Poland

6. The negotiations began on the 6th January. The Germans will propose, in the first instance, an agreement for reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment as from the 10th January, to remain in force until a commercial treaty is concluded. The date when the negotiations for the latter are to commence is not yet fixed. Both the Ministry and the German Minister in Warsaw⁵ have expressed to Mr. Thelwall the opinion that these latter negotiations will prove extremely difficult and take a very long time.

Russia

7. The German delegation will return to Moscow during January. An agreement has been reached on a large number of subsidiary matters, but serious difficulty is experienced over the important questions. In particular, the Russians refuse to make any concessions in respect of their foreign trade monopoly.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

⁵ Herr U. Rauscher.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies¹ to the Governor-General of Canada²

Unnumbered Telegraphic³ [W 425/9/98]

Confidential

January 15, 1925, 5 p.m.

Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister⁴ begins. I am sorry to say that replies from Dominion Prime Ministers to my message of 19th December⁵ indicate that there are great difficulties in arranging for special meeting of Imperial Conference at beginning of March to discuss problems arising out of Geneva Protocol.⁶

Following is summary of replies received. Mackenzie King telegraphed 29th December that Canadian Government agree that it is highly desirable that similar attitude should be adopted towards Protocol by countries of British Empire which are members of League of Nations. Suggestion, however, to hold Imperial Conference in London to be attended by Prime Ministers of Dominions as well as of Great Britain in March does not appear practicable. Canadian Parliament has been called for first week in February. It would be quite impossible for him to be absent from Canada for any length of time during the session and pressure of legislative duties would also make it difficult for any of the Ministers particularly concerned to be similarly absent. Canadian Government suggest [ex]change of opinions by cable and post with understanding that if these means found inadequate and other Dominions consider it practicable to attend Conference in London Canadian Government will be prepared to consider proposal again.

Bruce telegraphed 23rd December that Commonwealth Government agree that it is of utmost importance that on this difficult and delicate matter Empire should have single policy and speak with single voice. Before expressing opinion with regard to suggestion that Conference should be held in March Commonwealth Government feel that they must await return of Sir Littleton Groom, first Commonwealth delegate at 1924 Assembly, expected back 10th January. Whole position will be closely examined immediately on his return and Commonwealth Government will then be in a position to communicate with British Government as to

¹ Mr. L. Amery.

² This telegram was sent to the Governors-General of Canada, Lord Byng, of the Commonwealth of Australia, Lord Forster of Lepe, of New Zealand, Sir C. Fergusson, of the Union of South Africa, Lord Athlone, and to the Governor of Newfoundland, Sir W. Allardyce.

³ The text of this telegram is printed in Cmd. 2458, op. cit., No. 4.

⁴ Mr. W. Mackenzie King (Canada), Mr. S. Bruce (Australia), Mr. W. Massey (New Zealand), General J. Hertzog (South Africa), and Mr. W. Monroe (Newfoundland).

⁵ For a text, see Cmd. 2458, op. cit., No. 2.

⁶ See No. 10, n. 4.

their views upon Protocol and also as to necessity for personal consultation in order to arrive at single Empire policy. As they see position at present they believe that consultation by cable should enable such a policy to be evolved. In the event of its being demonstrated that it is impossible to deal adequately with matter by cable it will be necessary for personal consultations to take place but Bruce feels that it is practically impossible for him personally to attend and grave difficulties are in the way of another Minister being sent in his place. In view of this fact Commonwealth Government urge very strongly that every effort should be made to deal with matter by cable communications.

Massey telegraphed 23rd December that he was in communication with other Prime Ministers and would endeavour to arrange to attend in March if they were able to do so. He has now telegraphed that communications from Prime Ministers of Canada, Commonwealth of Australia and Union of South Africa indicate that each has grave difficulty in personally attending proposed Conference and that each considers consultation by cable preferable. He presumes that Conference will therefore not take place. Though his personal attendance not a certainty New Zealand Government would attend by a Minister if Conference still desired and can take place.

General Hertzog telegraphed 3rd January that it was not possible for him or any of his colleagues in Union Government to attend Conference before middle of August next.

Monroe telegraphed 24th December that he was unlikely to be able to attend himself owing to sitting of Parliament but would try to arrange to send representatives from Newfoundland.

No reply received from Irish Free State. In the circumstances it is clear that we must endeavour by correspondence to arrive at some common conclusion with regard to the Protocol itself, and the large issues of policy which arise out of its consideration.

Similar message sent to other Prime Ministers.
Baldwin. Ends.

No. 184

*The Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of
Canada*¹

*Unnumbered Telegraphic*² [W 425/9/98]

Confidential

January 15, 1925, 6.20 p.m.

Secret. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister begins:

¹ This telegram was sent to the Governors-General of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the Governor of Newfoundland.

² The text of this telegram is printed in Cmd. 2458, op. cit., No. 5.

My message of today.³ Following is summary of views so far expressed by Dominion Prime Minister with regard to provisions of Geneva Protocol.⁴

Prime Minister of Canada states that Canadian Government has given question some preliminary consideration; it is now being examined by Departmental Committee and will in immediate future be gone into in detail by Cabinet.

Prime Minister of Commonwealth of Australia entirely concurs in view that it would be most unwise to reject Protocol except for some cogent reasons or without endeavouring to formulate some positive alternative policy but Australia will not allow any abrogation of her rights with regard to immigration and is anxious that policy pursued shall if possible be acceptable to United States. He regards as most essential preliminary to any discussion as to British Empire's policy ascertaining of United States Government's real opinion on subject.

Prime Minister of New Zealand stated in his message of 23rd December that he considered whole proposal mischievous and only possible of effect in minor issues between small nations but recognised difficulty in the way of Great Britain's refusal to concur in some form of general international obligation to refer to arbitration. He stated that New Zealand Government must be largely guided by British Government in final decision but it was then his opinion that whatever is done now will be rendered nugatory under Article 21 of Protocol by inevitable failure of agreement concerning details of disarmament.

In his further message now received he states that one principal objection is to provisions in Protocol accepting Hague Council as conclusive authority to determine any questions of international law and also to determine what is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. Reference to reservations in Article 3 Protocol is so drafted as to be without effect. Another principal objection is that though defence against aggression is permitted to nation attacked Protocol prevents friendly nation coming to the aid of nation attacked without the authority of Council after tedious procedure. Article 8 Covenant of League thus reduced in practical effect. He asks to be informed as to attitude of France, Italy and Japan.

Prime Minister of Union of South Africa has no views to offer as yet as he feels that matter ought to be more fully considered after seeing what Committee of Imperial Defence have to say.

I have included in above summary and summary contained in my confidential message of today all replies so far received including your own in order that each Prime Minister may see form in which his views have been communicated to other Prime Ministers.

As regards conclusion of my confidential message of today Report of Sub-Committee mentioned in my secret message of 19th December⁵ not

³ No. 183.

⁴ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁵ Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

yet ready but Committee of Imperial Defence will consider it as soon as possible after its completion and I shall hope to be able to send you then the considered views of His Majesty's Government.

Similar message sent to other Prime Ministers. Baldwin. Ends.

AMERY

No. 185

Notes on the Advantages and Disadvantages of an Anglo-French Pact

[C 1063/459/18]*

Secret

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 15, 1925

It may be useful to summarise as far as possible the views of the three fighting services on the advantages of a pact. All three seem to agree that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, the War Office being particularly in favour of a pact, which they suggest might well be modelled on the lines of that signed in 1919.¹

Advantages of a Pact generally

1. The War Office proceed on the assumption that renewed German aggression is the greatest danger that faces us today, and French security is our security. They argue that, in the event of renewed German aggression, considerations of our own security, quite apart from our obligations under the covenant and the Treaty of Versailles, will bring us once more into the field alongside France. So a pact is no more than an official recognition of an existing commitment, and, 'from the purely military point of view, the General Staff consider that a military pact with France, provided it is kept strictly within limits, would have certain definite advantages'. It would, moreover, be of immense value to France, and would open the way to a closer liaison between the two General Staffs.

2. The Admiralty hold that our security is generally bound up with France's and 'the advantages of a pact with France outweigh the disadvantages'.

3. The Air Ministry are of the opinion that a pact would be preferable to any other method hitherto proposed of guaranteeing French security, and they suggest that all that a pact would really do would be to bind us to do what we are almost certain to do in any case when the contingency arises.

Particular Points of Advantage

1. The War Office point out that we should have the biggest army and

¹ For the text of the Anglo-French treaty of June 28, 1919, relating to assistance to France in the event of German aggression, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 213-15. This treaty was dependent on the similar agreement signed the same day between France and the United States of America (for the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 216-8). As this agreement was not ratified, the Anglo-French treaty lapsed.

The views of the armed services are given in the Joint Memorandum by the Three Chiefs of Staff of October 29, 1924 (C.I.D. 527-B), not printed.

air force enlisted on our side as a screen between the German danger and ourselves.

2. The Admiralty point out that the security of the channel ports from German occupation would be ensured as far as possible, and the possibility of their use by France to attack Great Britain would be reduced to a minimum.

3. The Air Ministry point out that air attack either by Germany or by France would be rendered more remote. The future security both of France and of Great Britain from air attack by Germany will, to a large extent, be dependent on the demilitarisation of the Rhineland being permanently maintained. A pact would be of advantage in this direction.

4. All three services point out that our commitments in the Western Mediterranean would be safeguarded, by a pact, from French attack, and the Admiralty and Air Ministry add that we should be safeguarded from difficulties in the Suez Canal in the event of a war with another foreign Power.

5. The Admiralty state that in the event of war in the Far East a large part of our naval strength could be concentrated in Far Eastern waters. Similarly, the Air Ministry state that our Home Defence Air Force could, if a pact were in force, be used as first reinforcements in any part of the world.

6. The Admiralty suggest that the friendly attitude on the part of France which the pact should engender would probably lead her to meet our views in regard to the limitation of submarine tonnage and adherence to the Washington 'Root' resolutions.²

7. The Air Ministry suggest that a pact might lead France to reduce her air forces, and the increase already approved for our own might then prove unnecessary.³

Disadvantages

Against these advantages the following disadvantages are pointed out:—

1. The Admiralty and Air Ministry fear that a pact might lead France to

² Mr. E. Root, United States Secretary of State 1905–9, was a delegate to the Washington Conference on Pacific Affairs and the Limitation of Armament (November 12, 1921–February 6, 1922: see Vol. XIV, Chap. VI). For his resolutions of December 28, 1921, relating to the use of submarines and of noxious gases in warfare, see *Conference on the Limitation of Armament: Washington November 12, 1921–February 6, 1922* (Washington, 1922), pp. 266–7. For the discussions of these resolutions, see *ibid.*, pp. 594–8 and 684–750. A treaty based on these resolutions was signed on February 6, 1922 by the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, but did not come into effect owing to non-ratification by France (for the text see *ibid.*, pp. 1605–11).

³ In a memorandum communicated to the Committee of Imperial Defence on February 9, the Secretary of State for Air, Sir S. Hoare, stated with regard to the second part of this sentence: "The words . . . are a misapprehension of the views expressed in the memoranda by the Air Staff recently circulated."

"The actual statement made by the Air Staff in paragraph 6 of C.I.D. 560B [not printed] was that "if France reduces her Air Forces, it may prove that no further increase in our Home Defence Air Force over and above the programme of development to which we are at present working, will be necessary."

adopt a provocative policy towards Germany.

2. The Admiralty state that the naval commitments involved by a pact would be out of all proportion to the strength of the German fleet.

3. The Admiralty point out that, in exercising economic pressure at sea upon Germany, friction might ensue with neutral States.

4. The Air Ministry suggest that we should be committed to sending our forces to fight for another country, and it would be impossible to limit the assistance we should have to give; also that we might hesitate to renew the pact in the future, when the danger would be far greater.

It is submitted that the first of these disadvantages is the only one of any importance.

Certain further points of importance arise:—

1. *Belgium*.—All three services agree that Belgium must be included in any pact.

2. *Period*.—The War Office and Admiralty both wish the pact to be for a considerable length of time. The War Office suggest twenty years. The Admiralty suggest that it should cover the termination of the Washington Agreement⁴ in 1936.

3. *Dominions*.—It is assumed that the dominions will be free as in 1919 to decide whether they will subscribe to the pact or not, but the Admiralty state that the dominion navies are requisite for the protection of the Empire trade.

4. *Scope*.—The War Office consider that the pact should be so worded as only to commit us to the defence of France and Belgium against German aggression, and only to be invocable for serious causes. The Admiralty say that it would be of great advantage if the pact could be extended to all wars in which the British Empire or France is involved in self-defence, *e.g.*, in the Mediterranean or the Far East.

5. *Reciprocity*.—The War Office suggest that France and Belgium might wish the pact to be binding on them too, in the event of German aggression against the United Kingdom. The Air Ministry, without touching this precise point, are against our asking any similar assistance from France and Belgium in the event of our being involved in wars elsewhere, *e.g.*, in the Far East.

6. *Amount of Assistance*.—The War Office had suggested at one time that our obligations might be limited to the assistance of one of our fighting services; they have now abandoned that idea. They maintain, however, that we could not state even approximately, in view of our Imperial commitments, the forces that we could put in the field, in so far as the army is concerned. They also advise that we should not enter into any agreement to maintain in peace greater forces than are considered sufficient for Empire security. The two General Staffs could keep in touch as regards information on the extent of our co-operation. The Air

⁴ Of February 6, 1922, limiting naval armament, between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. For the text, see *Conference on the Limitation of Armament*. . . , op. cit., pp. 1573–1604. See also Vol. XIV, No. 585.

Ministry similarly think that it would be unwise to specify the exact amount of air assistance which could be provided, though definite plans could be prepared in peace time for the distribution of such air units as are likely to be sent. The War Office and Air Ministry thus both agree on the advisability of consultation between the General Staffs.

7. *Home Defence*.—The War Office and Air Ministry both sound a note of warning that it would be the height of folly to reduce our defence on account of a pact.

8. Finally, the Air Ministry suggest that the value of the pact would be greatly increased by the inclusion of Germany, if it were ever possible.

Their view is that our security against Germany cannot be divorced from our security against France.

No. 186

*Notes by Mr. R. McNeill on Substitute for the Geneva Protocol*¹

[W 686/9/98]*

January 16, 1925

Since the prevailing atmosphere of Europe is declared to be one of fear, it is natural to ask what is the cause of the fear. Who fears what?

The answer is that the real and only source of fear is Germany. France and Belgium fear Germany's vengeance. Great Britain has more reason to fear the same thing than she admits, and it is only her habitual blind complacency that saves her from being as 'jumpy' as her neighbours. The latter have learnt their history lesson more thoroughly than we have or ever will.

2. All Prussian history, and all recent German history, proves that Germany, under Prussian leadership, is radically untrustworthy. She always has dishonoured her signature when it suited her, and there is not the slightest reason to believe she will do otherwise in the future. Not the most solemn written engagement will bind her. Security against German aggression can be obtained by no treaty or protocol, but only by making aggression too dangerous to herself.²

¹ See No. 10, n. 4.

² In a minute of February 7 to Sir E. Crowe commenting on these notes, Mr. Headlam-Morley stated: '... With much of this I should entirely agree and especially with the last sentence which is merely the application to Germany of what seems to me a sound general principle, a principle, however, which applies to every other state just as much as to Germany. Ultimately there is no security against aggression anywhere except by making aggression dangerous.'

The object of this note is, however, to call attention to the words which I have underlined [She always has ... her.] and I should venture to suggest that a statement of this nature should not be accepted and should not be made the basis of our policy without a fuller statement of the facts on which it is based. I do not of course for a moment question the fact that there have been episodes in Prussian and German history which are extremely

3. That means either (*a*) keeping Germany effectually disarmed; or (*b*) maintaining superior defensive forces ready to resist her. Of these (*a*) is probably impracticable for any prolonged period; therefore (*b*) is the only possible means of security.

4. France has endeavoured to provide this security by—

- (i) Proposal to extend her frontier to the Rhine. (Rejected by her allies at Versailles.)
- (ii) The Anglo-American Pact, promised as alternative to (i), but unratified by United States and Great Britain.³
- (iii) Military alliances with Poland, etc.,⁴
- (iv) The Geneva Protocol,¹ extending and defining the obligations of the League of Nations against an aggressor.

Of these four methods, only (iii) will remain when we shall have rejected the protocol.

5. Now assume that France obtains no further security. That security will either prove sufficient or insufficient to preserve her from aggression. Even if in fact sufficient, it will not remove the fear and all its attendant evils foreseen by Secretary of State.⁵ If insufficient, she will be invaded again by Germany.

6. In the latter event, what is our position? Is it conceivable that we should look on while France is invaded through Belgium, the Channel ports seized, Paris occupied, and a dictated and vengeful peace imposed on France? There is no point in British foreign policy so continuously insisted upon for centuries as the refusal to allow the low countries to fall into the hands of a great military Power. Should we, under any circumstances, abandon that policy in the future? Has not the introduction of submarine and aerial warfare made this policy more, and not less, necessary to us than ever?

discreditable, and periods when her policy has been most dishonourable. But such periods occur in the history of nearly every state and I doubt whether they have been more frequent in Prussia than elsewhere. Everyone will agree that it would have been most unwise to place complete reliance on any engagement made by the former, still more by the present government of Russia, and I feel sure that you, from your personal experience, would find it not difficult to adduce instances in which other countries, even those with whom we have had most intimate and friendly relations, have shown themselves most untrustworthy. It would, I think, be very difficult to support the contention that this particular charge, the violation of formal written agreements, is peculiarly characteristic of Prussia. It certainly could not be substantiated against Bismarck [Chancellor of Imperial Germany 1871–90], who always attached the highest importance to the technical fulfilment of any written agreement into which he had entered. The more subtle the intrigue in which he was engaged, the more dangerous to other states the objects which he had in view, the more careful he was not to give his opponents the opportunity of convicting him of the clear violation of any written agreement. And however low our opinion may be of German policy and diplomacy during the reign of the Emperor William II, it would be very difficult to substantiate this particular charge, apart from the one case, the violation of Belgian neutrality [in 1914].’

³ See No. 185, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 180, n. 4, and No. 187, below.

⁵ See No. 180.

7. If, then, it is as certain as anything can be that in the event of another invasion of France and Belgium we should have to take an active part in resisting it, what are the advantages in, and the objections to, proclaiming that intention in advance?

The advantages are:—

(1) It would allay the fear in France, which is the most disturbing element in Europe today.

(2) It would immensely strengthen the friendly relations between France and ourselves.

(3) As substitute for the Geneva Protocol it would be a *limitation, not an extension, of our liabilities.*

(4) It would greatly reduce the danger of German aggression and therefore of any *casus fœderis* arising. (If we had been definitely committed beforehand to support France in 1914, there would have been no war.)

Against these solid advantages the only objection to proclaiming our policy seems to be our traditional dislike of putting our signature to any document that may commit us to engage in a future war; and the opposition to which this dislike would give rise in the press and in Parliament. Also, perhaps, the difficulty of obtaining consent of dominions.

8. But this objection, if scrutinised, resolves itself into a disinclination to face facts. To say in one and the same breath that under given circumstances we should undoubtedly take such-and-such action, but that we must not commit ourselves to do so, is absurd self-contradiction. If the logic of facts and the choice of alternatives were explained to the dominions and to our own Parliament, most of the opposition (except what is politically factious) would be convinced. There could be no more favourable House of Commons in this country than the present one for acceptance of such a policy, which, if presented by a Government fresh from the country, and with years of office before them, would be supported by an overwhelming majority, which would be impressive to opinion abroad.

9. Assuming then that we are prepared to announce our determination to join in resisting any future aggression by Germany against France and Belgium, in what form should our announcement be made? It might take the form of (i) a unilateral declaration similar to our declaration in regard to Egypt and foreign Powers in 1922.⁶ As this would be a mere statement of our present intention, it might appear to have the advantage of being a less serious commitment than if it contained a promise to anyone else. But, on the other hand, if other nations (France and Belgium) were to rely upon it, our national honour would be involved; whereas, if other nations

⁶ For the text of the circular despatch addressed to H.M. Representatives on March 15, 1922, instructing them to announce to the Governments to which they were accredited, the termination of the British protectorate and British recognition of Egypt as an independent sovereign state, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 116, pp. 84–5.

felt they could *not* rely upon it, it would fail of its purpose in removing fear and gaining for us the trust and friendliness of our neighbours. The alternative is (ii) a definite defensive alliance or pact with France and Belgium.

10. The Secretary of State has made it clear that France and Belgium would value such a pact far above the Geneva Protocol,⁷ to which they have committed themselves. If, therefore, we proposed such a pact, some attenuated and innocuous form of the protocol, for face-saving purposes, might be acceptable. The pact, of course, would have to limit clearly the *casus foederis* to unmistakable aggression by Germany against her western neighbours, and the definition of aggression might be taken with or without addition or amendment from the protocol.

⁷ At the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on December 16, 1924 (a copy of which is filed at W 11158/134/98) Mr. Chamberlain gave an account of his meetings with Prime Ministers abroad while attending the Council of the League of Nations at Rome (see No. 28, n. 4). He stated: "... I will first take Belgium, if I may, because Belgium came before the others in point of time. I have circulated to this Committee a Memorandum left with me by the Belgian Ambassador [of December 3. A copy is filed at W 10544/134/98, not printed. See *D.D.B.*, vol. I, No. 244] and drawn up by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Hymans. I saw M. Hymans in Rome [see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 1], and he practically had nothing to add to his Memorandum, but only desired to emphasise it. What, then, is the position of Belgium? I conceive it to be this: that Belgium must follow in the wake of France in matters of this kind; that she is not wholly comfortable in being so much in the hands of France, and would infinitely prefer her old position of being under a guarantee by France and the British Empire instead of merely in a treaty alliance with France. But she cannot afford not to show enthusiasm for the Protocol. It would, however, be a complete mistake to suppose that if we signed the Protocol as it stands, with other Powers, we have heard the last of the question of Security so far as Belgium is concerned. She would be on our doorstep the next day asking for a supplementary pact of some kind which linked France, Belgium and ourselves. It is that to which she really attaches importance. She values it infinitely more than the Protocol, and I think that she is not without anxiety as to the obligation under which the Protocol would put her in regard to Eastern Europe.

"Then I come to France. France is pledged to the Protocol. I think not only M. Herriot's Government, but any Government that might succeed M. Herriot's Government, would equally ratify the Protocol. They feel that they cannot afford to do otherwise. They feel that by ratifying the Protocol they put themselves right with the public opinion of the world and are morally reinforced. Of course, it is of great consequence to them—they have undertaken treaties with some of the East Central Powers [see No. 187, below]—that the obligations which are now theirs should be shared by Powers which at present are not committed by them. One can see their very obvious and direct interest in securing the guarantee, especially of the great States, to the integrity of Poland, of Czecho-Slovakia, and indeed to the Eastern frontier of Europe, to the defence of which they are already committed, and which would be rendered easier for them if the British Empire came in to share their liability. But, again, in the case of France it would be, I think, a complete mistake to suppose that we should have settled the question of Security if we accepted the Protocol as it stands. I put the question directly to M. Herriot [see Vol. XXVI, No. 608], but he did not give me a direct answer: "We cannot have too many securities; France, of course, would like to get every guarantee that she could," and so forth. But this was amplified to my Private Secretary, when we passed through Paris on our way back, by M. Berger[y], the Chef de Cabinet of M. Herriot, who said in effect: "Of course we are going to sign the Protocol; it is going to establish our moral position in Europe; but of course we want as its natural concomitant a tripartite arrangement with Belgium and Great Britain." ..."

11. Under all the circumstances, and in view of the hard facts of the case, such a pact with France and Belgium seems the only policy really calculated to give the rest and security which Europe needs today. It might be limited to a period of twenty-five years, renewable thereafter for periods of five years by consent of the contracting parties. At the end of twenty-five years from now a generation will have passed since the great war. By that time the militarist spirit of Germany, if it has not disappeared, will certainly, it may be hoped, have weakened. The men who fought in the war will all have passed beyond military age, and however ineffective may be the control by the League of Nations under the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, it should be sufficient to prevent the upgrowth of a new German army comparable with the old in efficiency, discipline, or military tradition. A defensive pact for twenty-five years should at all events prevent German aggression and give us peace, and relief from fear of war, for that period; after which the further strengthening of the foundations of peace, as of the foundations of St. Paul's, may be left to the care of the next generation.

RONALD MCNEILL

No. 187

Memorandum on Political Treaties, Agreements, Alliances and Relations at present in force in Central and South-East Europe affecting the Question of Security

(The accompanying diagram¹ only includes treaties or such other instruments, etc., as are known in the Foreign Office to affect the security of the States concerned)

[C 2201/459/18]*

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 20, 1925*

I.—The Little Entente

Roumania, the S[erbi] C[roat] S[lovene] Kingdom and Czechoslovakia

This combination was built up mainly by the efforts of Dr. Benes, and the first stone was laid by the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Jugoslav Agreement of August 1920 (Annex 1).²

The terms of this agreement were, shortly, that, in case of unprovoked attack by Hungary on one of the contracting parties, the other pledged itself to afford assistance in a manner to be agreed by the competent technical authorities. Neither party was to conclude an alliance with any third party without previous notification to the other. The agreement to

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed. For a text of the convention of alliance of August 14, 1920, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, pp. 696–7. See also Vol. XII, Nos. 215 and 221.

remain in force for two years, after which time it could be denounced at six months' notice.

In April of the following year (1921) a similar agreement was made between Czechoslovakia and Roumania (Annex 2).³ This agreement was identical with the foregoing, except that it provides that the manner of affording assistance is to be defined 'in a military convention eventually to be concluded'. An additional article also provides that 'in order to co-ordinate their efforts towards peace, the two Governments agree to concert together on questions of foreign policy affecting their relations with Hungary'.

This agreement was followed in June 1921 by an agreement between Roumania and the S[rba] H[rvata i] S[lovenaca] State⁴ in terms exactly similar to those of the Czech-Roumanian Agreement.

The nucleus of the Little *Entente* was thus formed, and the next step was to pave the way for its extension to include other States. There followed the Polish-Czechoslovak (Annex 3),⁵ Polish-Roumanian (Annex 4)⁶ and Czechoslovak-Austrian (Annex 5)⁷ Agreements. These, although not on the same lines as the Little *Entente* Agreements, were more or less closely related to them, and constitute a first step towards bringing Poland and Austria within the system.

Under the Czechoslovak-Polish Agreement of November 1921 each contracting party guarantees the territory of the other as defined in the Peace Treaties. In the event of one being attacked, the other will observe a benevolent neutrality, especially by assuring the free transit of war material. Czechoslovakia disinterests herself in Eastern Galicia and undertakes to suppress propaganda against Poland conducted in or from her territory. Poland assumes a similar obligation as regards Czechoslovakia.⁸ Note is taken of the Czechoslovak-Roumanian-Yugoslav political, military and economic conventions, and of similar Polish-French-Roumanian conventions.⁹ Certain kinds of questions are to be referred to

³ Not printed. For a text of this convention of defensive alliance of April 23, 1921, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, pp. 695-6. See also Vol. XXII, Nos. 117, 127, and 169.

⁴ See No. 132, n. 5.

⁵ Not printed. For a text of the political agreement of November 6, 1921, see *Documents Diplomatiques relatifs aux Conventions d'Alliance conclues par la République Tchecoslovaque avec le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et le Royaume de Roumanie. Décembre 1919-Aôut 1921* (Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1923), pp. 181-4. See also Vol. XXII, Nos. 254 and 381.

⁶ Not printed. For a text of the convention of defensive alliance of March 3, 1921, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, pp. 916-7. See also Vol. XXII, Nos. 50 and 103.

⁷ Not printed. For a text of the political agreement of December 16, 1921, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, pp. 614-6. See also Vol. XXII, No. 578.

⁸ In a letter of February 23 to Mr. Lampson, Sir W. Max Muller, H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Warsaw, commented: '... As a matter of fact, none of the treaties negotiated between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland at that time [has] ever been ratified, so that the paragraph which describes the results of the political agreement is misleading.'

⁹ See Section II, below.

arbitration. No new agreement may be concluded with any other State which would conflict with the present agreement. The agreement to remain in force for five years, but may be denounced after two years, at six months' notice. An Annex provides for the amicable settlement of various local disputes.

The Roumanian-Polish Agreement of March 1921⁶ is of the nature of a 'defensive alliance against unprovoked attack from the East'. The agreement remains in force for five years, but may be denounced after two years at six months' notice. Military questions are to be settled by agreement between military experts, and military action is to consist of mobilisation in case of attack from the East. Poland will assist against Magyar or Bulgarian aggression. Neither side may conclude a treaty with any third Power without previously notifying the other, and neither may conclude, without the prior consent of the other, any treaty with States other than Allied and Associated States. Both parties will 'examine means for extending the alliance to other States'. The agreement not to enter into force until the Treaty of Riga¹⁰ defining frontiers has been concluded. In return for diplomatic support on the question of Eastern Galicia,¹¹ Poland promises to modify the frontiers of Bukovina and Galicia.

By the Czechoslovak-Austrian Agreement of December 1921 (Treaty of Lana) (Annex 5)⁷ both parties undertake to put into execution all provisions of the Peace Treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon. Each guarantees the territory of the other and to ensure its inviolability undertakes to afford political and diplomatic assistance. Each undertakes, in the event of the other being attacked, to observe neutrality. Both States undertake to protect each other mutually against all attempts to 'restore the former régime,' and they promise to notify to each other formally the agreements made with other States. Arbitration of certain questions is provided for. No agreement will be concluded which would conflict with the present agreement. The agreement to remain in force for five years, but may be denounced after three years at six months' notice.

A still further extension of the Little *Entente* may perhaps be said to have been effected by a somewhat vaguely worded exchange of notes between Dr. Benes and Count Sforza in February 1921 (Annex 6).¹² At the time of the signing of the Rapallo Treaty in November 1920,¹³ Italy

¹⁰ For a text of the peace treaty of Riga between Poland and Russia and the Ukraine, of March 18, 1921, see L. Shapiro (ed.), *Soviet Treaty Series*. . . , vol. 1 (Washington, 1950), pp. 105-16.

¹¹ Poland had been allowed to occupy Eastern Galicia in 1919 by the Allies in whom its sovereignty was vested (see Vol. III, Chap. III). Eastern Galicia was recognised as Polish by the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference of March 15, 1923 (see Vol. XXIII, Nos. 637, 639, 644, 654, 661, 662, and 664). For the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia, see *ibid.*, Nos. 74 and 441.

¹² For a text of these notes of February 8, 1921, see *Documents Diplomatiques*. . . op. cit., pp. 93-6. See also Vol. XXII, No. 22.

¹³ For a text of this treaty of November 12, 1920 relating to territories and frontiers, see

and the S[erba] H[ungaria] S[lovene] State had signed a special agreement directed against the restoration of the Hapsburg,¹⁴ and taking note of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Agreement² which had been framed (partly) for the same purpose. In the exchange of notes between Dr. Benes and Count Sforza, Czechoslovakia and Italy are mutually pledged to resist a Hapsburg restoration.

The treaties which form the basis of the Little *Entente* were, as has been said, to remain in force for two years as from the date of signature between the various States. In article 1 of the Protocol of the Pact of Rome (Annex 7)¹⁵ between Italy and the S[erba] C[roat] S[lovene] Republic, reference is made to treaties still in force between the S[erba] C[roat] S[lovene] Kingdom and Czechoslovakia and Roumania of the [31st] August, 1922,¹⁶ and the 7th July, 1923¹⁷ respectively. The original pacts have therefore been renewed. A recent agreement, signed on the 7th May, 1923, at Prague between Roumania and the Czechoslovak Republic¹⁸ renewed the defensive convention between these two States in its present form for a further period of three years. Presumably, therefore, the treaties binding the Little *Entente* will be in force until 1926. As the ostensible purpose of the Little *Entente* was the formation of a defensive alliance against Hungary, it may be taken that the renewal of the original treaties indicates that Hungary's neighbours do not yet consider her as 'safe'. During the last few months there has been much talk of the signature of a military convention between Roumania and the S[erba] C[roat] S[lovene] Kingdom¹⁹ aimed at Hungary (and possibly Bulgaria), and also of a Tripartite Military Convention between the three States forming the Little *Entente*.²⁰ Further information is being sought on this subject as the Foreign Office are not in possession of the actual texts of any such convention. It is certain, however, that conversations between the general staffs of the three countries have been proceeding ever since the signature of the original treaties forming the Little *Entente*, but that the actual signature of such military conventions has been hanging fire. It would now appear that efforts are being made to put on paper military *ententes* parallel with the defensive treaties between the three States, either in the form of a tripartite agreement or in the form of separate

B.F.S.P., vol. 113, pp. 1087-92.

¹⁴ For a text of the agreement of November 12, 1920, see *Documents Diplomatiques*. . . ., *op. cit.*, pp. 81-3.

¹⁵ Not printed. See No. 24, n. 5.

¹⁶ For a text of this Czech-Serb-Croat-Slovene Agreement of August 31, 1922, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol 116, pp. 708-9. See also Vol. XXIV, No. 146, n. 5.

¹⁷ For a text of this Roumanian-Serb-Croat-Slovene Protocol of July 7, 1923, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 123, p. 1047.

¹⁸ For a text, see *ibid.*, vol. 118, p. 119.

¹⁹ A military convention was signed on October 8, 1924 confirming an agreement between the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Chiefs of Staff of January 23, 1922 (see Vol. XXIV, Nos. 31, n. 11 and 574, and Vol. XXVI, No. 261).

²⁰ As reported in Bucharest despatch No. 591 of December 5, not printed.

conventions. As far as is known at present, the provisions of the rumoured S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene]-Roumanian military convention,¹⁹ which may presumably be taken as typical of all such instruments, are:—

- (a) No separate military agreements to be concluded by either of the three countries concerned.
- (b) In the case of a Russo-Roumanian conflict, the three countries will attack Hungary if she declares war.
- (c) Should Soviet Russia attack Roumania, Czechoslovakia and the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] Kingdom would each mobilise eleven divisions of infantry; such mobilisation to take place even in the event of Hungary remaining neutral.

On account of the uncertain nature of such conventions, they are marked in the accompanying diagram¹ with a dotted line. Hungary is said to be aware of these agreements and to be endeavouring to come to a military understanding with Russia. No proof whatever is forthcoming as to the truth of such rumours, and the Foreign Office places no credence in them.

II.—French connection with Little Entente

(A) The Franco-Polish Treaty, February 19, 1921²¹

During 1921 and 1922 no less than five conventions were signed between France and Poland:—

- (1) Political treaty (Annex 8).¹
- (2) An oil convention.²²
- (3) A commercial convention.²³
- (4) A convention on private property.²⁴
- (5) A military convention.²¹

Although the present notes are only concerned with 1 and 5, it may be well to summarise 2, 3 and 4.

The commercial convention assured economic advantages to Poland by facilitating the export of her products to France, but on the whole it was more advantageous to France than to Poland. The duration of this treaty ended in the summer of 1924. Another agreement was substituted in its place,²⁵ and is at present awaiting ratification.

The oil convention was concerned with the exploitation of the Galician oil-fields. While it provided for an influx of capital to Poland, it was, like the commercial convention, more profitable to France than to Poland.

The property agreement provided for the identical treatment of French property in Poland and Polish property in France.

²¹ See No. 180, n. 4.

²² For a text of the agreement on the regulation of the naphtha industry in Poland of February 6, 1922, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 356–8.

²³ For a text of this convention of February 6, 1922, see *ibid.*, pp. 343–55.

²⁴ For a text of this convention of February 6, 1922, see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. XLIII, pp. 399–413.

²⁵ For a text of the treaty of December 9, 1924, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 124, pp. 547–75.

The political agreement is couched in the language usual to such instruments, and defines in a general way the conditions under which the two countries will work together to secure the defence of their territory as delimited by the Peace Treaties, and to maintain the *status quo*. It will be seen to be directed as much against Germany as against Soviet Russia. The important clause is No. 3, whereby both countries pledge themselves to act together in the case of unprovoked aggression from a third party. The existence of a military convention amplifying clause 3 was denied at the time by Lord Hardinge,²⁶ who apparently was unable to obtain any information on the subject from the French Government. The Poles have, however, admitted its existence, but, while it is certain that such a military convention exists, it has proved impossible so far to obtain the text. From certain remarks of General Dupont (head of the French Military Mission to Poland) to Sir W. Max Muller in February 1923,²⁷ the convention appears to provide at least for—

(a) A French Military Mission to Poland.

(b) Credits for arms, munitions, etc.

In any case, the French Military Mission to Poland furnishes a sufficient guarantee that French military interests in Poland are supreme. There is close co-operation between the French and Polish military staffs, and visits have been exchanged between Marshal Foch and the Chief of the Polish General Staff.²⁸

(B) *The Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty, January 25, 1924 (Annex 9)*²⁹

This treaty consists of a preamble and eight articles. The preamble contains a reference to mutual guarantees between France and Czechoslovakia, but there is no reference to a pact of non-aggression and mutual defence. Articles 1 and 2 provide for mutual consultation over certain questions of security and concerted measures to be taken in the face of common danger. Articles 3, 4 and 5 specify these dangers, which are: any threat to Austria's independence by Anschluss or otherwise, or Hapsburg or Hohenzollern restoration. Article 6 provides for the friendly settlement of questions in dispute by ordinary diplomatic methods or by reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice, etc. Articles 7 and 8 stipulate that the two countries agree mutually to communicate their existing international obligations before entering on new ones, and to communicate the treaty to the League of Nations. During the past year there have been many rumours of a separate military treaty between the

²⁶ H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris 1920–22. He reported the denial of the French government of any military convention with Poland in Paris telegram No. 20 of January 11, 1921, not printed.

²⁷ Presumably recorded in Mr. Max Muller's letter of February 9, 1922, to Mr. Gregory, Head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

²⁸ General S. Haller. He had visited France in May, 1924.

²⁹ For a text of this treaty of alliance, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 120, pp. 181–3. See also Vol. XXIV, No. 609.

two countries, and a copy of what purported to be such an agreement was handed to His Majesty's Embassy in Berlin. The War Office and the Foreign Office did not consider that the documents³⁰ were authentic, and both France and Czechoslovakia strenuously deny the existence of a separate military convention. On the other hand, the treaty itself appears to be so complete as to render a separate military, understanding unnecessary. A French Military Mission still remains the preponderant influence in the Czech army, and M. Benes has never denied that the Czech and French staffs have elaborated plans for a conceivable contingency. While M. Benes still aims at strengthening the power and influence of the League of Nations, he finds it profitable, especially while Germany and Russia remain outside the League, to rely on France.

(C) *France and the S.C.S. Kingdom*

In spite of rumours to the effect that a treaty was about to be signed between France and the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] Kingdom similar to that between France and Czechoslovakia, no such treaty has yet been signed. The Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs has declared, however, that the friendly sentiments between the two countries render a definite treaty unnecessary.³¹ Meanwhile, France has provided the S[erb] C[roat] S[lovene] Government with military equipment.

III.—*Italy and the Little Entente*

(A) *The Italo-Yugoslav Treaty, January 27, 1924. (The Pact of Rome: Annex 7.)*¹⁵

This instrument really replaces the Treaty of Rapallo (1920),¹³ which was merely a local agreement for the settlement of the Fiume question.³² It is described as a pact of friendship and co-operation, and consists of a preamble, five articles, an additional protocol and an unimportant additional agreement. The preamble states that the object of the treaty is the maintenance of the *status quo*, and article 7 makes it clear that what is meant is that both States agree to lend each other mutual support to enforce respect of the Treaties of Trianon, Saint-Germain and Neuilly. The important articles are numbers 2 and 3. They provide for—

1. The neutrality of each State if the other becomes the subject of unprovoked aggression.
2. Reciprocal support, both political and diplomatic, should the security of either be endangered by incursions from a third party.
3. Common action in the face of international complications affecting the common interests.

The protocol provides for the presentation of the treaty to the League of Nations, and lays down that nothing therein shall contravene the alliance forming the basis of the Little *Entente*.

³⁰ The documents were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 197 of March 8, 1924, not printed.

³¹ Reported in Belgrade despatch No. 332 of September 4, 1924, not printed.

³² See No. 148, n. 2.

It is strongly suspected that the provisions of this treaty are supplemented by some secret agreement regarding 'spheres of influence' in the Adriatic and the Balkans.

(B) *Italo-Czechoslovak Treaty, July 5, 1924 (Annex 10)*³³

This treaty was the outcome of the activities of M. Benes, who was anxious to draw up an agreement with Italy which would be parallel with the Italo-S[erbo] C[roat] S[lovene] Treaty without imposing any special obligations on Czechoslovakia. It is probable for this reason that its terms were left rather vague. The great distinction between this treaty and the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty is that no special mention is made of Germany. This treaty is not considered of much importance.

IV.—*Jugoslav-Greek Treaty*

The alliance concluded in May 1913 was denounced by Yugoslavia in December of last year. It will thus terminate in December 1925, and negotiations will during the next few months take place at Belgrade for a new treaty to take its place. We have as yet no indication as to the form which the new treaty will take, although it is expected that the Yugoslavs will exact very severe terms in respect of their economic outlet at Salonica in return for any renewal of the alliance in its old form.³⁴

V.—*Poland, the Baltic States and Finland*

In 1922 a conference was held at Warsaw between Poland, the Baltic States and Finland with a view to concluding a definite alliance against Soviet Russia. An agreement was signed, but was not ratified by Finland, and it consequently lapsed.³⁵ In the event of an attack by Russia on the Baltic States, therefore, there is as yet no obligation in writing on the part of Poland to come to their aid. Conferences of the Baltic States with Finland and Poland are held periodically,³⁶ but, from the military point of view, they do not produce any concrete results, for the reason that, while the Baltic States have everything to gain from Finnish or Polish military support, they have little or nothing to offer in return.

³³ Not printed. For a text of this pact of cordial collaboration, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 120, pp. 209-10. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 136.

³⁴ See Nos. 14, 26, 70, 93, 120, 131, 132, 135, 141, 142, 148, 154, 170, and 177.

³⁵ For the Warsaw Conference of March 13-17, 1922, see Vol. XXIII, Nos. 338, 340, 341, 345, 352, and 358. For the Finnish rejection of the agreement, see *ibid.*, Nos. 350, 351, 354, 357, 384, and 389.

³⁶ See Vol. XXIII, Nos. 116, 118, 162, 437, 438, 449, 469, 481, 485, 603, 669, 728, and Vol. XXV, Nos. 353, 362, 430-4, 440, 454, 461, and 487.

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 270 [C 1001/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 20, 1925*

My Lord,

I had a long conversation with the French Ambassador this afternoon.

M. de Fleuriau began by repeating the enquiry which he had previously made of Sir William Tyrrell as to the character of my conversation with M. Rakovski.¹ I had already directed that a summary of that conversation should be supplied to him, but I gave him, in conversation, a rather fuller account than it had been necessary to put into writing.

M. de Fleuriau then touched upon the question of the proposed reply to the note of the German Government on the non-evacuation of the Cologne area.² I told M. de Fleuriau that I was sending instructions to your Lordship to accept the latest French draft.³ This led to a prolonged conversation of a very informal kind on our whole attitude towards Germany. I told M. de Fleuriau that I was well aware that in every conversation with me there was at the back of his mind the question of security; that we were busily engaged on this question,⁴ and that, though I could give him at present no hint of the direction in which our minds were working, I was not without hope that we should be able eventually to propose a solution which would be acceptable to French opinion. Much, however, would depend upon the course of policy pursued by the French Government and upon the impression which their attitude produced upon British opinion at home and in the dominions. An attitude on the part of France towards Germany at the present time which showed a sincere desire gradually to improve the relations between the two countries and to reconcile Germany to the conditions of the Peace of Versailles would do a great deal to remove one of the difficulties in our path. On the other hand, an attitude of unreasonable insistence on small points or a constant succession of irritating incidents would not only keep alive the hostility of Germany and accent the danger to French security with which France was already oppressed, but would fortify the objections of those in this country and throughout the British Empire who disliked the idea of our undertaking any fresh commitments. I told him that it was from this point of view that I thought we should determine our common attitude towards the German defaults. France could not suppose that she could count in perpetuity on a combination of Powers to hold Germany

¹ For Mr. Chamberlain's report of his conversation of January 6 with the Soviet Plenipotentiary in France, see Vol. XXV, No. 298.

² See No. 556, below.

³ See No. 568, n. 6, below.

⁴ See No. 180.

down in a position of abject inferiority and subjection. While Germany remained in her present mind, no doubt precautions were necessary, but our object must surely be to make it possible for a new generation to grow up who would not share the passions engendered by the war, who would have become accustomed to the new situation, and would accept it rather than face the dangers of a new appeal to force.

M. de Fleuriau took his full share in this conversation, though what he said was of no great importance, except for one observation. He warmly agreed with me that it was very desirable that the Allied Ministers should meet before we addressed a note to the German Government on the final report of the Military Commission of Versailles.⁵

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ See No. 559, n. 4, below.

No. 189

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 22)

No. 49 [C 980/459/18]

Strictly Confidential

BERLIN, January 20, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I had an interview this morning with the Secretary of State,¹ at which he handed me a Memorandum—translation of which is enclosed—on the question of security.

The Secretary of State requested me to transmit this to you with minimum delay as the German Government were anxious to have the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject, and to obtain your advice as to the best method of bringing the German attitude on the question of Security to the knowledge of the Allied Powers.

The Memorandum, in its present form, must be considered as strictly confidential. Outside Dr. Stresemann² and the German Foreign Office, it has only been seen by the Chancellor, Dr. Luther:³ it has not been discussed by the Cabinet.

The intention is to avoid, at present, discussion of the question of Security in the Reichstag, unless the Government are compelled to make declarations regarding it by the attacks of Breitscheid⁴ and Dr. Wirth.⁵

The object which the German Government have in view is pacification of a permanent character. In their Memorandum they have indicated

¹ Herr C. von Schubert.

² German Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³ Dr. Luther had formed a coalition government on January 15.

⁴ A prominent Socialist member of the Reichstag.

⁵ German Chancellor May, 1921–November, 1922, and a member of the Centre Party.

several alternatives, and they are prepared to discuss and negotiate upon any combination of proposals which would bring about a real feeling of security and pacification.

The Secretary of State urged me to impress upon His Majesty's Government that the responsible German Ministers were anxious to move forward rapidly in the direction indicated, and await with anxiety the views and advice of His Majesty's Government.

In the view of the Secretary of State, the proposals are momentous ones of lasting importance for the future of European civilisation. They must not be confounded or confused with the controversies respecting disarmament and the evacuation of the Cologne area.⁶ From these they are distinguished by being of a different order of magnitude.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 189

Memorandum★

Translation

Strictly Confidential

The present acute questions of disarmament and evacuation are frequently considered in France from the standpoint of security against possible aggressive intentions on the part of Germany. For that reason it would probably be easier to find a solution for them if they were combined with an agreement of a general nature, the object of which would be to secure peace between Germany and France. Germany is perfectly ready to take this point of view into consideration. She is anxious to see the problems arising between her and France dealt with by no other method than that of friendly understanding and is accordingly interested, for her part, in the establishment of a special treaty foundation for such a peaceful understanding.

In considering the various forms which a pact of security might at present take, one could proceed from an idea cognate to that from which the proposal made in December 1922⁷ by Dr. Cuno⁸ sprang. Germany could, for example, declare her acceptance of a pact by virtue of which the Powers interested in the Rhine, above all, England, France, Italy and Germany, entered into a solemn obligation for a lengthy period (to be eventually defined more specifically), *vis-à-vis* the Government of the United States of America, as trustee, not to wage war against a contracting State. A comprehensive arbitration treaty, such as has been concluded in recent years between different European countries, could be amalgamated with such a pact. Germany is also prepared to conclude analogous

⁶ See Chap. III, below.

⁷ In a speech at Hamburg on December 31. See Vol. XX, No. 163. See also Vol. XXI, No. 2.

⁸ German Chancellor November, 1922–August, 1923.

arbitration treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts with all other States as well.

Furthermore, a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status ('gegenwärtiger Besitzstand') on the Rhine would also be acceptable to Germany. The purport of such a pact could be, for instance, that the interested States bound themselves reciprocally to observe the inviolability of the present territorial status on the Rhine, that they, furthermore, both conjointly and individually ('conjointement et séparément') guaranteed the fulfilment of this obligation, and, finally, that they would regard any action running counter to the said obligation as affecting them jointly and individually. In the same sense the treaty States could guarantee in this pact the fulfilment of the obligation to demilitarise the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken in articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. Again, arbitration agreements of the kind defined above between Germany and all those States which were ready on their side to accept such agreements could be combined with such a pact.

To the examples set out above still other possibilities of solution could be linked. Furthermore, the ideas on which these examples are based could be combined in different ways. Anyhow, these examples should suffice to show that, if there be question of a desire for guarantees for peaceful evolution in all the States concerned, a secure treaty foundation for them cannot be difficult to find.

No. 190

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 24, 9 a.m.)

No. 39 Telegraphic [C 1143/459/18]

BERLIN, January 23, 1925, 9.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 34¹

I have had further conversation with Secretary of State regarding German memorandum of January 20th² in which he set forth the ideas of German government and cleared up several obscure points.

The treaties of arbitration which Germany is prepared to enter upon with all the powers would be based upon treaty with Switzerland signed at Berne December 3rd 1921³ and forwarded in my despatch No. 1450 of 1921.⁴ A similar treaty has been signed with Sweden⁵ but has not yet been ratified.

¹ Of January 20, not printed. See, however, No. 189.

² See No. 189, Enclosure.

³ For a text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, pp. 820-27.

⁴ Berlin despatch No. 1450 of December 29, 1921, not printed.

⁵ On August 29, 1924. For a text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 125, pp. 741-50.

Under these treaties all disputes of whatsoever nature which are impossible of settlement within a reasonable time through diplomatic channels are submitted either to tribunals of arbitration or of conciliation. Legal questions are submitted to arbitral tribunal which makes an award definitely binding upon parties. Political questions are submitted to conciliation board which does not make a definitive binding award but parties are obliged to declare within a limited period of time whether they accept the conciliation proposal. In practice it is considered that there is little chance of either party declining a conciliation proposal and proceeding to measures of violence.

Readiness of Germany to sign treaties of arbitration extends to all powers. It would include notably powers whose frontiers touch Germany on the East. This point appears to have great importance.

In protocol attached to Swiss treaty it is stated 'disputes immediately connected with events in the world war are outside its purview'. German government do not propose to insert a similar phrase in protocols attached to new treaties.

Secretary of State informs me that Switzerland has recently concluded a treaty of arbitration with Italy⁶ which goes further than German-Swiss treaty and submits all state conflicts without distinction to an arbitral tribunal with a definitive binding award. In his opinion elimination of conciliation procedure in political conflicts is not expedient. German government however consider this a matter of detail and would discuss both sides if need arises.

Words 'Gegenwärtigen Besitzstand am Rhein' mean territorial status under treaty of Versailles.

Great importance is attached here to German proposal being framed in such a form as to be acceptable to present French government. It is thought that acceptability will depend largely upon:

1. Differentiation from policy on Cuno basis.⁷
2. Guarantees regarding Rhineland, and
3. Application of arbitration treaty to countries touching Germany on the East.

Secretary of State made it clear that while Cuno basis is mentioned in German memorandum in the first instance, it is only one of several alternatives. If it appeared unsuitable owing to America's unwillingness or for any other reason it could be modified or dropped.⁸

⁶ For a text of the treaty of September 20, 1924, see *L.N.T.S.*, vol. XXXIII, pp. 91-101.

⁷ See No. 189, n. 7.

⁸ Sir E. Crowe minuted on January 27: '... The Prime Minister spoke to me about the matter this morning and I expressed to him the ... opinion ... that the first thing to do is to get clear about the Anglo-French pact before we proceed with the problem how to bring Germany into a wider combination. The Prime Minister seemed disposed to share this view.'

No. 191

Sir M. Hankey¹ to Mr. Lampson

[C 1218/459/18]

Secret and Personal

January 26, 1925

My dear Lampson,

Many thanks for your letter C 1063/459/18, of January 24th,² enclosing a summary of the views of the three Fighting Services on the advantages of a pact with France and Belgium.³

Troutbeck's⁴ summary is so accurate that I think it would be very useful to the Committee of Imperial Defence. When the Report⁵ of the C.I.D. Sub-Committee on the Geneva Protocol⁶ comes before the Committee of Imperial Defence I presume we shall take simultaneously the question of Franco-Belgian security, and I should rather like to include Troutbeck's summary with the Papers circulated. Would you kindly let me know if this is permissible?⁷

Meanwhile I enclose, for your information, a copy of a Note of my own, which I have sent to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon,⁸ and privately to Lord Balfour,⁹ on the subject of a Pact.

Yours sincerely,
M. P. A. HANKEY

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 191

Secret

2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S.W 1, *January 23, 1925*

Since, in the past (both in 1919,¹⁰ and in 1922)¹⁰ my general sentiment towards the idea of a Guarantee Pact to France and Belgium has been decidedly adverse, I wish to put on record the reasons why I have been able to sign the Report of the Sub-Committee on the Geneva Protocol, which tends to favour such a development.

¹ Secretary to the Cabinet, and to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

² Not printed.

³ No. 185.

⁴ Mr. Troutbeck was a member of the Central Department of the Foreign Office.

⁵ On December 16, 1924, it had been decided to set up a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to be chaired by Sir M. Hankey, to consider the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4.) A copy of the Report of January 23, 1925 is in Cab. 16/56: C.I.D. 559-B. G.P. (24) 9. See S. Crowe, *Sir Eyre Crowe and the Locarno Pact* (English Historical Review, vol. LXXXVII, No. 342, pp. 49-74).

⁶ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁷ Mr. Lampson here wrote in the margin: 'I have said yes.'

⁸ Lord Privy Seal. He had been Foreign Secretary 1919-1924.

⁹ Lord President of the Council. He had been Prime Minister 1902-5, and Foreign Secretary 1916-19.

¹⁰ See Cmd. 2169, *Papers respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact* (H.M.S.O., 1924).

I have never doubted that if France were again menaced by Germany as in 1914 we should be bound, in our own interests, to go to her assistance, Pact or no Pact. What I have apprehended was that the existence of a Pact might involve us in quarrels, when the security of France was not really threatened, and that, by removing the restraint of fear, a pact might encourage France to maintain an overbearing and unaccommodating attitude towards Germany, thereby sowing the seeds of future wars, into which we should be drawn by the terms of our agreement. Though recognising that France would probably become more friendly towards us if her security was assured by a pact, I have never believed that she would adopt generally a more accommodating attitude, either in her European or world policy. There would always be a danger either that we might be involved by the technicalities of a pact into a dispute arising out of the continuously provocative attitude of an over-confident France towards Germany, or else that, when the occasion arose, by claiming that the circumstances of a dispute were not such as to justify our intervention under the terms of the pact, we should be stigmatised by France as perfidious, and create an irreparable breach between the two nations.

Yet another objection, which has made a strong appeal to me, is that the existence of a pact would, in the long run, involve us in great military commitments and armaments on an otherwise unnecessary and undesirable scale.

Finally, I have always felt that the utmost difficulty would be encountered in overcoming the average Britisher's instinctive dislike of any Continental commitment (which I share), and in persuading public opinion in this country, and more particularly in the Dominions and India, to accept a pact.

There are three reasons which have brought me, though very reluctantly, to change my view.

The first is the realisation of the very difficult position in which we should be placed if at any time we came to loggerheads with France. The studies which have been made by the Committee of Imperial Defence during the last five years have brought out conclusively how seriously, under modern conditions, our imperial communications would be jeopardised owing to the geographical position of France, if that country were hostile. Not only would London, the great terminus of our Imperial communications and the capital city of the Empire, be exposed to extreme danger from air attack—a danger which may be diminished but cannot by any means be averted—but also our Imperial communications through the Channel and Mediterranean would be seriously menaced. Although the dangers to which we are exposed are not insuperable, and can and will be provided against to some extent by proper forethought in time of peace, we should nevertheless suffer grave inconvenience and grievous loss in the early stages of a war with France. Hence it appears to be an almost essential Imperial interest that we should orient our policy so as to remain, so far as possible, on such close and cordial terms with France that

there is no risk whatever of hostilities with that country.

It is even more important to us that the French (and Belgian) coasts on the Channel and North Sea, and on both sides of the Mediterranean, should not come under the control or influence of some aggressive and efficient country, like Germany, with which friendly relations might be impossible to maintain, and which would not hesitate to make use of the geographical advantages, which are now available to France, to attack us. If the danger is one that cannot be disregarded in the case of France, it would be infinitely greater if Germany held the Channel coasts.

Hence, with all its objections, a pact appears to be the easiest way to secure ourselves, whether from France or Germany.

The second reason is the Geneva Protocol,⁶ which seems to have changed the whole situation. Had there been no Protocol we might conceivably have carried on without a pact until the League of Nations had so far developed as an organ of co-ordination and pacification as to create an adequate sense of security among nations. The Protocol, however, whose only merit (as pointed out in Mr. Campbell's Memorandum—(*C.I.D. Paper No. 540-B*)¹¹) is that it provides for French security, seems to have rendered this course difficult to pursue. If deprived of the Protocol and not given some compensating guarantee of security, there would appear to be a danger of a real reaction against us on the part of France. It may be that the astute French politicians have throughout had in mind the idea of using the Protocol as a lever wherewith to force us into a pact. However this may be, it is clear that the consequences of rejecting both Protocol and pact would have to be very seriously weighed by any British Government.

On the assumption that one or other is unavoidable, the pact appears by far the less objectionable as a choice of evils. The commitments of a pact are definite, limited geographically, and their application is within our own control. Those of the Protocol⁶ are vague, unlimited geographically, and not within our own control, since they are liable to be brought into operation either automatically or in circumstances in which the British representatives may be over-ruled by a majority of the Council. The Protocol also involves hampering restrictions and the surrender of rights of national sovereignty, which would have no place in a pact.

The third reason is that Sir Eyre Crowe's draft pact,¹² which the

¹¹ A copy of this memorandum of November 20, 1924 is filed at W 10151/134/98, not printed.

¹² Sir E. Crowe's draft, a copy of which was communicated to Sir M. Hankey on January 2 (Cab. 16/56: G.P. (24) 8), ran as follows: "The British, French and Belgian governments etc., etc., etc., declare that the maintenance of the independence and integrity of their territories bordering on the North Sea and the English Channel constitute a vital interest of their respective countries.

'2. Consequently, the three Powers, having especial regard to the close propinquity of their respective coasts and harbours to each other, and recognising that any infringement of the territorial status quo in their respective countries cannot but gravely affect their national safety have resolved to notify, and hereby undertake to notify, the Council of the League of

Sub-Committee has adopted,⁵ removes some of the objections to previous drafts and could be presented in a more favourable light to public opinion. It brings out prominently the importance of the French and Belgian coast to our position. Though we cannot well explain publicly how seriously we should be menaced by a hostile France and how important it is to retain the friendship of that country, we can at least explain how important it is to exclude Germany from the southern shores of the Channel. People have not forgotten the air raids.

For the above reasons, namely, in order to provide for the safety of our Imperial communications and the heart of the Empire, on the assumption that the Protocol (wholly unacceptable in itself) has compelled us to do something for French security; and because the draft pact, as devised by Sir Eyre Crowe, is infinitely preferable to the Protocol—the objections to a pact appear to be outweighed by its advantages. This conclusion is subject, however, to the following:—

(a) That the decision whether an unprovoked aggression involving the use of British forces in fulfilment of the Pact has taken place, remains entirely within the discretion of the British Government. (b) That no increased expenditure in armaments is involved. (c) That, as in the case of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance¹³ and the abortive Pact of June 28, 1919,¹⁴ some kind of provision is made for periodical reconsideration.

M.P.A. HANKEY

Nations, in pursuance of the provisions of article 13 of the revised Protocol of that any unprovoked aggression against Great Britain, France or Belgium will be regarded by them as one of the contingencies in which they are determined to make their maximum effort by sea, by land, and by air, to oppose and defeat the aggressor.'

¹³ For a text of the alliance of January 30, 1902, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 95, pp. 83–4. See also Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. II (London, 1927), chap. XI.

¹⁴ See No. 185, n. 1. See also n. 10, above.

No. 192

Memorandum¹ by Mr. Chamberlain on the United States and the Geneva Protocol²

[W 745/9/98]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, Jan[uary] 27, 1925

I have recently informed the Committee of Imperial Defence that I intended to try to find out what was the real attitude of the United States Government towards the Geneva Protocol,² as to which our information had hitherto been sharply conflicting. I could not, as my colleagues will

¹ This was printed for the Cabinet.

² See No. 10, n. 4.

appreciate, address a formal official enquiry to the United States Government, but from unofficial and confidential enquiries which I have made³ I think it is safe to assert that the attitude of the present administration is broadly as follows:—

In their eyes the Protocol contains numerous sources of trouble, and they had hoped that it would die a natural death. The United States have hitherto regarded the League of Nations with no more than a certain mistrust; if the Protocol went through as it stands, it is no exaggeration to say that they could hardly help considering that body as a potential enemy. It is, of course, the compulsory arbitration and the sanctions provisions which inspire this feeling. It is not difficult to imagine that the League, at the instance of some Central or South American member, might be brought into conflict with the Monroe doctrine.⁴ If, for instance, the United States Government were at any time compelled to take measures for the protection of the Panama Canal and were on that account to be arraigned before the League by one of the Central States, there would undoubtedly be an explosion of public opinion throughout the country. Similar difficulties would arise if the neutral rights of the United States in matters of trade and commerce were interfered with in the event of an economic or an armed blockade of an aggressor State by the League, and of course it would be practically impossible to institute an effective blockade without such interference. In short, if H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] ratify the Protocol, they will be running a serious risk of grave trouble with the U[nited] S[tates] in the future.

A.C.

³ See *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, pp. 16–20. See also *F.R.U.S.* 1924, vol. 1, pp. 79–83.

⁴ For the text of those passages in President Monroe's Message to Congress of December 2, 1823 which came to be known as the Monroe doctrine, to the effect that politically, the Americas and Europe were two separate spheres, see D. Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (London, 1960), pp. 394–96.

No. 193

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 29, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 40 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1319/459/18]

PARIS, January 28, 1925

The culminating point in the debate in the Chamber was reached this afternoon when M. Herriot rose at 3.30 to make his statement on (1) the renewal of relations with the Soviets,¹ (2) on inter-allied debts, which M. Herriot disclaimed any idea of repudiating, but which must, he declared,

¹ In Paris despatch No. 2371 of October 29, 1924, Lord Crewe had transmitted to the Foreign Office a copy of a French note of October 28 to the Soviet Government, as printed in the French press, granting *de jure* recognition. See also Vol. XXV, No. 260.

be settled 'on a moral basis', account being taken of France's financial straits, and (3) the question of security and the non-evacuation of the Cologne zone.² M. Herriot's statement lasted from 3.30 till 6.45, and it is impossible for me at this late hour adequately to summarise so vital a pronouncement.

M. Herriot began his remarks on the security question by recalling at some length Marshal Foch's desire at the peace conference permanently to occupy the Left Bank of the Rhine, the British and American objections thereto and the final compromise arrived at owing to the offer of an Anglo-American pact with France.³ That offer had induced France to part with all that she considered most essential to ensure her security, and Great Britain and America must remember and endeavour to understand her feelings when France showed fear at the dagger which was suspended within an inch of her heart. M. Herriot then proceeded to cite at considerable length the numerous instances in which Germany has failed to carry out the disarmament, police, military and other clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. He quoted in support of his statements extracts from various German newspapers of the left. He drew attention to the truculent speeches of German ex-ministers and other public men. He reproached Germany with not having met his government anything like half-way in the efforts made to establish a really lasting peace, and concluded his speech by declaring that it was impossible for French democracy, inspired by the passionate ideal of peace, to continue alone to make all possible efforts towards that goal unless it met with a proper response on the part of Germany.

Mr. Phipps, who was present, informs me that M. Herriot's speech was acclaimed by the entire Chamber, most of the deputies rising to their feet. He was throughout listened to in almost religious silence, save for occasional outbursts of spontaneous and unanimous applause in which the right took a prominent part.

M. Herriot prefaced his remarks on security by stating that never, he thought, in history had relations between Great Britain and France been so entirely cordial and friendly. He quoted the instructions sent by you and by him to British and French representatives abroad.⁴ At intervals

² See Chap. III, below.

³ See No. 185, n. 1. See also No. 191, n. 10.

⁴ Mr. Chamberlain's circular despatch of January 19 to His Majesty's Representatives (W 11368/631/17) ran as follows: '... In my conversation with the French Prime Minister on the 5th December [see Vol. XXVI, No. 608] I took the opportunity to impress on him the importance attached by His Majesty's Government to loyal co-operation between British and French agents in all parts of the world, observing that national friendship could not be confined only to the relations existing between the Governments in London and Paris. M. Herriot cordially agreed, and, as you will see from the enclosed despatch (No. 2850 [of December 30, not printed]) from His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, French representatives in various parts of the world have been instructed to maintain close and continuous collaboration with their British colleagues.'

'2. I attach particular importance to this declaration, and desire that our response should

throughout his speech M. Herriot addressed himself with great emotion to his British friends across the Channel, and at rarer intervals to his American ones across the Ocean.

M. Herriot's speech, which might in so far as many passages thereof are concerned, have been made by M. Poincaré⁵ himself, may, I fear, postpone the French consent to the evacuation of the Cologne zone to the Greek kalends or, at any rate, until such time as His Majesty's Government may see their way to making what the French consider some adequate proposal in regard to security.

Text by bag tomorrow.⁶

be cordial and complete. Genuine and world-wide Anglo-French co-operation would be of incalculable benefit to the world at large as well as to France and England. I am well aware that the realisation of this ideal may be more difficult in fields where in the past there has been a rivalry, sometimes an acute rivalry, between the nationals of the two Powers, and that time may be needed to give full effect to the new spirit. But I do not doubt the sincerity of M. Herriot's declaration, and, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, they are resolved to encourage this new spirit in every possible manner, and to meet it more than half-way. I rely on you to bear this constantly in mind and shape your action accordingly.'

⁵ French President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs January, 1922–June, 1924.

⁶ Paris despatch No. 238 of January 29, not printed.

No. 194

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 30, 9 a.m.)

No. 49 Telegraphic [C 1416/459/18]

BERLIN, January 29, 1925, 7.55 p.m.

I had a conversation with Stresemann this morning, and discussed several questions of current interest. Regarding proposed pact of non-aggression,¹ he adverted to article which appeared this morning in 'Die Zeit' (see my telegram No. 48)² saying that it represented what he thought best line for German government at the present moment. He had gathered from the press and from private sources of information that any initiative at the present moment by Germany on this matter might be interpreted in Paris as a trick to evade discussion on military disarmament. Nothing was further from the German mind than such an evasion. German government wanted a full statement of alleged defaults³ and were ready to discuss them in detail.

In Stresemann's view, it was most undesirable that a proposal of high importance for the peace of Europe like the present pact of non-

¹ See No. 189, Enclosure.

³ See No. 553, n. 2, below.

² Of January 29, not printed.

aggression should not be viewed in the proper focus or should be confounded with less important and certainly much less permanent difficulty, namely, that regarding disarmament.

It was essential for her dignity that Germany should not put forward fundamental proposals for general pacification except at a moment when such proposals would be welcomed and properly appreciated. This did not appear to be the case at present. He was therefore, speaking for himself, inclined to postpone the idea or to recede from it altogether.

I replied that I had no indication from London as to views of His Majesty's Government. If I received instructions I would make a communication.⁴

⁴ In Berlin telegram No. 50 of January 29, Lord D'Abernon added: 'The reasons given by Stresemann for retarding or withdrawing German offers are probably genuine, but it is by no means impossible that idea of a pact of non-aggression has met with unexpected resistance in Cabinet.

'Whatever the real reason for his attitude may be, it would be a vast pity to allow German government to recede from their intended proposal or to let opportunity pass of obtaining from them an offer of such indisputable importance.'

No. 195

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 175 [C 1454/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 30, 1925

My Lord,

The German Ambassador¹ called upon me this morning at my request, as I wished to speak to him about the memorandum which Dr. Stresemann handed to your Lordship on the 20th January.²

I explained to his Excellency that I had been unable to receive him earlier owing to my recent slight indisposition, but that the delay was not altogether without its advantages, as I had just received your Lordship's telegram No. 49³ with Dr. Stresemann's later views. Before entering on the substance of the proposal, I said that I must make it clear that I could not receive confidential communications from the German Government on the footing that I was not at liberty to mention them to our French allies. Any appearance of negotiations between Germany and this country behind the back of France would arouse suspicion and destroy any influence which the British Government might have with the Government of France. In the next place, I venture to observe that, if the German Government really wished to consult me confidentially, it was inexpedient that the substance of their communication should be made public as had been done in this case by the 'Germania' article.⁴

¹ Herr F. Sthamer.

² See No. 189, Enclosure.

³ No. 194.

⁴ A translation of this article of January 25 was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin

Turning to the merits of the proposal, I told his Excellency that I gathered from your telegram,³ which had just been placed in my hands, that Dr. Stresemann himself was now of opinion that the moment was not opportune for raising a discussion of this character, and I myself thought that any such attempt would be premature. I assured him that I welcomed the evidence afforded by this communication that the German Government appreciated the reality of French fears and were spontaneously considering what Germany could do to allay them, but in my opinion it would be found that such proposals for a German pact or treaty of guarantee could not be usefully discussed until the British attitude towards the Geneva Protocol⁵ and, in particular, to the question of French security, had been defined. When that had been done, it might be a very useful thing to take up again Dr. Stresemann's proposal.

In reply, his Excellency said, in the first place, that the German Government had never had any intention of carrying on secret negotiations with us behind the backs of the French. They had always intended to make the same proposal to the French Government and had had no thought of attempting to divide Great Britain and France. As to publication, he entirely agreed. He had not understood, however, that the 'Germania' article was in any respect official. He had not seen the article in the 'Zeit' to which you drew my attention⁶ as indicating the present views of the German Government, and had not, as I gathered, received any parallel communication to that contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 49.³ He accepted, however, the view that the present moment was not opportune for making such a proposal, but he was afraid that my suggestion that the fate of the Geneva Protocol must be first settled, indefinitely postponed any progress. I told him that I did not think that it involved such delay as he foreshadowed; I did not say that all arrangements must be completed, but only that the attitude of the British Government towards the question of French security must be first defined in order to make discussion of the German suggestions fruitful.

His Excellency then asked if he might understand that I favoured the principle of the proposal. I told him that I hesitated to use those words, as I was not sure what he intended to include in them, but that I certainly did not exclude the idea at the proper time of an agreement between Germany and France or Germany and the Allies, giving a mutual guarantee to the situation established by the peace treaties on their common frontiers, and that the British Government would at all times be glad if it could help to promote a better state of feeling between Germany and France.

Herr Sthamer expressed the pleasure with which he had heard this statement, and I went on to ask why Germany did not at once join the League of Nations. They were assured of a seat on the council⁷ and the

despatch No. 71 of January 27, not printed.

³ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁶ In Berlin telegram No. 48 of January 29, not printed.

⁷ See Vol. XXVI, No. 590.

influence that such a position would give to them, and by joining they would not only cover automatically a part of the ground included in Dr. Stresemann's memorandum,² but would also give a significant indication of their desire for peace and of their readiness to accept the existing constitution of Europe. Their entry into the League would, in my opinion, mark a real advance upon the present situation.

Herr Sthamer, as I anticipated, replied that they could not overcome their objections to article 16. I told him that it was for Germany to decide whether she would or could not apply for membership of the League, but that she could not make conditions. It seemed to me impossible to admit that the League should consist of two categories of members, one with unlimited and the other with limited liabilities. The League comprised great Powers and small, countries with large military forces and countries with very little military force, and it was to be assumed that the council would take account of the particular situation of a Power in any demands which it might make upon that Power; but it would be fatal to the whole idea of the League to constitute different categories of membership. The position of Switzerland, historically and actually, was so different from that of other countries that it could not be made a precedent.⁸

As Herr Sthamer continued to develop the dangers of article 16, I observed that I had no desire to press the matter further, but I confessed my inability to understand the German mind. Cavour⁹ had thought it worth while to send two Italian divisions to the Crimea to fight in a quarrel in which Italy had no interest in order to win for Italy the right to a seat at the Peace Conference in Paris.¹⁰ Germany was offered a seat at the Council of the League of Nations and refused to take it. Which showed most statesmanship?

Herr Sthamer then referred to M. Herriot's speech,¹¹ which he said had not made things easier. I observed that M. Herriot's speech was the natural reply to the second German note.¹² Again, I said that I could not understand the attitude of the German Government. I would tell him frankly that I had been anxious to give no details of German defaults until the British Government had received the final report of the Inter-Allied Commission,¹³ and had been able to judge it as a whole and to appreciate the character and gravity of the unfulfilled obligations, but the German

⁸ Switzerland had informed the League of Nations that although she was willing to collaborate in commercial and financial sanctions against any nation, no military action was possible. The Council of the League of Nations had recognised that although Swiss neutrality clashed with her obligations under the Pact of the League of Nations, Switzerland was in a unique position and her neutrality justified in the interests of a general peace. (See *League of Nations: Verbatim Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Second Session of the Council of the League of Nations* . . . 13th February, 1920, pp. 21–25.)

⁹ Prime Minister of Piedmont-Sardinia 1852–9 and 1860–1.

¹⁰ Of 1856. This conference ended the war between Russia and France, Great Britain, Piedmont-Sardinia, and Turkey.

¹¹ See No. 193.

¹² See No. 570, n. 3, below.

¹³ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592, below.

Government had at every stage demanded that a formal and detailed indictment should be publicly preferred against themselves. Given the position of the Allies, no notes could have been more moderate than those which they had presented in Berlin.¹⁴ The German Government appeared to be wholly unappreciative of this moderation. Even in the second note the Allies had informed Germany of their determination to make a full communication at the earliest possible date, and had concluded by volunteering an expression of their determination scrupulously to observe the dispositions of the treaty. This statement, which I should have thought was the one of most consequence to the German Government, was apparently the only one to which they attached no importance, and of which they took no notice. I learned from the press that Dr. Luther was going to make a speech in Berlin tonight. I did not think that an exchange of speeches was more likely to be helpful than an exchange of notes, and I could only hope that he would show more restraint and wisdom than had characterised the German attitude hitherto.

I should add that your Lordship's telegram No. 50¹⁵ did not reach me till after the conclusion of this interview. I do not think, however, that its earlier receipt would have materially affected the tenor of my observations.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹⁴ See Nos. 553 and 570, below.

¹⁵ See No. 194, n. 4.

No. 196

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 385 [C 1455/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 30, 1925*

My Lord,

I received the French Ambassador this morning immediately after my interview with Herr Sthamer.¹

I told M. de Fleuriau that I had asked him to call in the first place because the Swedish Minister² had left a memorandum³ at this Office a week ago in which he called attention to the last communication from the German Government to the League of Nations (dated the [12th] December)⁴ on the question of Germany's admission to the League. The Swedish Government, it was stated, thought that it would be highly regrettable if the German request were not placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the council,⁵ and the Minister was directed to ask whether

¹ See No. 195.

² Baron Palmstierna.

³ Of January 22, not printed.

⁴ See *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 323-6.

⁵ See No. 74, n. 4.

the British Government proposed to take any initiative in the matter, and what their attitude towards it would be. I told M. de Fle[ur]iau that I proposed to reply⁶ that it was of course open to the Swedish Government to ask that the German communication should be placed on the agenda of the council, but that His Majesty's Government certainly did not intend to take the initiative in the matter. I intended to add that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the case of Switzerland⁷ must remain exceptional and could not be made a precedent; that it was impossible that there should be two categories of members of the League—one with unlimited liability and the other with limited liability—and that Germany must make up her mind to enter on the same terms as other nations or to remain outside. I added that, in speaking to the German Ambassador, I had said that I could not understand the attitude of the German Government on this question, and was astonished that they should voluntarily deprive themselves of the influence which would naturally come to them from taking a seat in the Council of the Nations. M. de Fleuriau replied that my declaration exactly corresponded with the attitude of the French Government as explained by M. Herriot in his speech the other day,⁸ of which the Ambassador had seen a fuller report than had yet reached me.

I then informed M. de Fleuriau of the substance of my conversation with Herr Sthamer.¹ M. de Fleuriau thanked me for the loyalty of my attitude towards France, which he would report to M. Herriot, to whom he was sure it would give great satisfaction. His Excellency agreed that such advances from Germany could not be usefully discussed until the attitude of Great Britain to the question of French security was defined. He enquired, however, whether the suggestions which had been made to Lord D'Abernon by Dr. Stresemann⁹ revived or were connected with Dr. Cuno's proposals of two years ago.¹⁰ I said that Dr. Cuno's proposals were referred to in the conversation, but rather for the purpose of differentiating the new suggestions from them. It had been indicated, for instance, that such an objectionable feature as the provision for war if approved by a plebiscite might now be dropped and, what was of more consequence, that arrangements similar to those suggested for the western frontier of Germany might be discussed in regard to the States on her eastern boundary.

This M. de Fleuriau thought very interesting and important. He found it difficult to understand exactly the position and attitude of the German Government, but he thought that they were becoming somewhat anxious about their relations with the Soviet Government and were perhaps beginning to think that Poland was a useful barrier between themselves and Russia. In any case, he believed that the great industrialists, who at the

⁶ The reply, not printed, was sent to Baron Palmstierna on February 9.

⁷ See No. 195, n. 8.

⁹ See No. 189, Enclosure.

⁸ See No. 193.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, n. 7.

time of the Spa Conference¹¹ and later had been a very injurious influence, now carried less weight in German politics. I added that I was as much at a loss as M. de Fleuriau in attempting to reach a true appreciation of the situation in Berlin, but I thought it possible that, just because the present German Government belonged more to the Right, it might be in a position to give some satisfactions which Governments of the Left had not had sufficient authority to do.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ Of July 5-16, 1920. See Vol. VIII, Chap. VIII.

No. 197

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 60 Telegraphic [C 2021/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, February 10, 1925, 8.15 p.m.

Secretary of State informs me that a secretary of German embassy in Paris yesterday handed to Monsieur Herriot a memorandum¹ substantially identical with that enclosed in my despatch No. 49 of January 20th.² The German ambassador is laid up but thought it expedient not to delay until his recovery, communication of Germany's views regarding non-aggression.

Monsieur Herriot is reported to have received memorandum rather favourably.³ He promised to keep it absolutely private not communicating it to his officials and saying nothing to you. It was agreed that visit of German secretary should be stated to be in connection with current affairs and treaty of commerce.

Monsieur Herriot said he was not hostile to Luther and that he would not be mixed up in internal German politics. There were certain elements in Germany that he feared.

¹ A translation of this memorandum of February 9 is printed in Cmd. 2435, *Papers respecting the Proposals for a Pact of Security made by the German Government on February 9, 1925* (H.M.S.O., 1925), p. 4.

² No. 189. In a minute of February 16, Mr. Bennett, a member of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, stated: '... It differs from that memorandum in two particulars only:

'1. The first paragraph of the memorandum communicated to His Majesty's Government, pointing out the connection between the question of French security and the questions of German disarmament and the evacuation of the Cologne zone, is omitted from the memorandum handed to M. Herriot.

'2. The memorandum handed to M. Herriot contains an entirely new final sentence suggesting that any pact for guaranteeing French security on the lines proposed by the German government should be so drafted as to be capable of embodiment subsequently in a world convention on the lines of the Geneva protocol [see No. 10, n. 4].'

German government ask for utmost discretion as to above information which is given privately.

No. 198

*Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 13, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 61 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2085/459/18]

Secret

PARIS, February 12, 1925

I had some conversation this morning with the President of the Council on the subject of M. de Fleuriau's letter to Sir Eyre Crowe of February 10th.¹ On the point made in that letter that he considered the evacuation of the Cologne zone to be a question that must be decided between the military authorities and not one suited to consideration by a conference of international ministers, M. Herriot said that he is absolutely determined to respect the provisions of the treaty, so that evacuation must take place when the terms of Article 429 are complied with. He showed some signs of reverting to his contention that the last paragraph of that Article has a bearing on the present situation, so that it would be advantageous to re-state the legal construction to be placed on this, as indicated in your telegram No. 50 of February 5th.²

The President of the Council went on to say that the one thought in his mind is that of the security of France. The word '*obsédé*' was the only one he could use of his own feelings regarding it. He fully recognized your determination that the security of France must not be neglected during the present discussions, and he was even encouraged by the attitude now taken by the German government.

He then proceeded to tell me in absolute confidence of the communication described in Lord d'Abernon's secret telegram No. 60,³ adding that he had not yet disclosed it to anybody, even the political director.⁴ He spoke in appreciative terms of the German chancellor, whom he believes to be well-intentioned and honourable, and he added that he did not believe that there is any serious obstacle to the conclusion of a pact to ensure security in which Germany would be included. He recognized completely that, if France is guaranteed against German aggression, Germany has an equal right to be similarly guaranteed against any attack by France. He said this as a pacifist by conviction, and with no sort of *arrière pensée*. He also recognized that you have to keep in view British public opinion which may be liable to misunderstand the intentions of the French government, but he has also to consider the public opinion of

¹ Not printed (C 2030/2/18). See, however, No. 584, below.

² No. 580, below.

⁴ Of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. J. Laroche.

³ No. 197.

France with reference to these two questions of the evacuation of the first zone⁵ and that of security. He knew that you wish to keep these two matters entirely distinct, and though there might be no *rapport juridique* between them, yet he maintained that there is a *rapport de causalité*.

I observed that I took this to mean that, assuming that according to his view the allied military authorities concerted with those of Germany that the infractions of the treaty which prevented immediate evacuation could be rectified within a certain time, three, four, or five months, or whatever it might be, French public opinion would not permit part of the eastern frontier to be left defenceless, and yet he had announced his intention of faithfully observing the obligations of the treaty. From his point of view, therefore, it seems imperative that he should secure the moral assurance which he hoped to obtain for France before the date contemplated for the complete evacuation of the zone. M. Herriot implied that this is his position, and he thought that by Easter⁶ it would be possible to hold the proposed conference of ministers⁷ which would take in hand the wider questions. He also stands to his pledge to clear out of the Ruhr in August.⁸ He repeated that though he would have much liked a preliminary conversation with yourself, yet he realised that the susceptibilities of both Italy and Belgium might be wounded if it was thought that conversations were going on behind their backs.

My general impression is that the President of the Council is genuinely desirous of fulfilling the terms of the treaty, and that his repeated assertions of his intense anxiety about security equally represent the truth. He feels that, unless he can allay popular feeling on the latter subject, he may be swept away and replaced by an administration of more Nationalist temper. This is why he is afraid to treat the Cologne question as isolated, while determined not to lay himself open to the reproach of playing tricks with the treaty of Versailles. I hope that His Majesty's Government may find it possible to help him over this difficult piece of ground without departing from the line indicated in your recent telegrams and despatches.⁹

⁵ i.e. the Cologne zone.

⁶ Easter Sunday fell on April 12.

⁷ See Nos. 562 and 580, n. 6, below.

⁸ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 537, 540, 542, 544, n. 3, 545, and 546.

⁹ See Nos. 188 and 196, and 577, 580, and 581, n. 3, below.

No. 199

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 18)

No. 122 [C 2390/459/18]

BERLIN, *February 14, 1925*

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's

Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit a Memorandum regarding future relations between Germany and Poland, and the German attitude towards Alsace-Lorraine, with special reference to the bearing of these two questions on discussions regarding a Pact of Non-Aggression.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 199

Memorandum respecting Future Relations between Germany and Poland^{*}

BERLIN, February 12, 1925

In any discussion regarding a Pact of Non-Aggression to be signed by Germany, the questions of Alsace-Lorraine and of the Danzig corridor will necessarily take a prominent place. Although no formal declaration on the subject has been made, the general opinion prevails here that Germany is prepared finally to abandon any claim to a revision of the settlement regarding Alsace-Lorraine embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. German opinion appears reconciled to the permanent incorporation of those provinces with France.

With regard to the Danzig corridor, it is far otherwise. No one here considers the Danzig corridor solution¹ as permanently acceptable or regards it otherwise than certain to be modified at some future date. Indeed, one might almost say it is accepted temporarily *quia absurdum*. But even with this reason for temporary acquiescence, feeling regarding it is stronger than that regarding the Upper Silesian question²—certainly stronger than that regarding Posen.³

The two latter are considered unjust—the former unjust and unnatural.

To the German official mind there appears no insuperable difficulty in obtaining a revision of this question without a break with Poland.

It seems probable that the difficulties in the way of this development are underrated, but it is thought—

(1) That the Poles themselves are not satisfied with the present solution, and do not fail to recognise its unnatural character.

(2) That it might be possible to give Poland compensations which would reconcile her to abandonment of the corridor. Germany would certainly be willing to grant very extensive commercial advantages to Poland in exchange for a solution. It is also thought advantages to Poland in the direction of Kovno would facilitate a settlement regarding Danzig.

On the general question of relations between Germany and Poland, a

¹ See Vol. XXIII, Appendix. See also No. 205, below.

² See Vol. XI, Chap. I and Vol. XVI, Part I.

³ Posnania. See H. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. VI (London, 1924), pp. 250–6.

certain modification of feeling has occurred during the last few months. It is now generally recognised in circles where the political horizon is scanned that improved relations between Germany and Poland will probably result from the anticipated rapprochement between Paris and Moscow.⁴ If Paris makes friends with Moscow, her intimacy with Warsaw inevitably diminishes. Whether Paris will or will not persist in her policy of a rapprochement with Russia may be doubtful, but the Germans consider that there will be no turning back now that France has entered upon this path. Berlin is therefore much more inclined than it was three years ago to regard friendly relations with Warsaw as desirable and within the range of possibility.

⁴ See No. 193, n. 1.

No. 200

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

[C 2450/459/18]

Private

February 16,¹ 1925

My dear Crewe,

The pressure of work here has again been very severe during the last few days, and though I have worked very long hours I have not had time for as close a correspondence with you as I should have liked. I am glad that I sent you my correspondence with D'Abernon² since it has helped to fill the gap. A three-handed game, such as is now going on between Paris, Berlin, and London, is not an easy one to play, but I do my best to keep both you and D'Abernon fully informed.

I am still wondering what exactly is to be inferred from my conversation with Fleuriau on Friday afternoon.³ My impression was at the time, and is still, that Herriot's instructions were that the meeting of Allied Ministers was not to take place till after our demands had been presented to the German Government in Berlin, and that the two stages to which he alluded—but which he never defined—were the stage up to and including the presentation of a Note in Berlin, and the subsequent stage in the course of which such a meeting might become possible. I suspect that Fleuriau felt that to state this definitely might provoke some explosion on my part and that he therefore made his exposition purposely vague. I

¹ This letter was dictated on February 14.

² Copies of Mr. Chamberlain's letter of February 3 to Lord D'Abernon, Lord D'Abernon's letter of February 7, and Mr. Chamberlain's letter of February 11 were transmitted to Lord Crewe under cover of Mr. Chamberlain's letter of February 11 (see F.O. 800 (Chamberlain Private Papers), vol. 257 (Jan. 1–May 11, 1925), ff. 227–29, 258–59, 282–84, and 285).

³ See No. 584, below.

took advantage of his vagueness to state the various stages of our progress in my own order, categorically and explicitly, counting them off on my fingers as I did so, and then asked if I had rightly interpreted Herriot's proposal. In face of this clear question, Fleuriau replied in the affirmative. I do not doubt that he was of my opinion that without a meeting we should never reach agreement. But I wonder whether Herriot will accept his Ambassador's view. In any case, in any communications between yourself or any member of the Embassy and Herriot or the Quai d'Orsay, please proceed throughout upon the basis that it is already agreed between us that the meeting of Ministers in London shall precede the presentation of our demands to the Germans.

What amusing people these same Germans are! First they hand a copy of their secret memorandum on a pact to D'Abernon⁴ and ask my advice about it, whilst attempting to enforce the condition that I shall say nothing to the French. I repudiated the condition,⁵ as you know, and one would have thought that they might have learned the lesson; but they next sent the same memorandum to Herriot—as I learned in the first instance from D'Abernon with the addition that they have told Herriot that he must not communicate with me.⁶ Herriot very properly responds to my confidence by giving me his confidence.⁷ But what earthly object do they think that all this tortuous duplicity would serve?

As to the memorandum itself and the spirit which it discloses, I think that they are the most hopeful sign that I have yet seen. I am absolutely precluded from saying a word to any Ambassador which would indicate what the ultimate attitude of the British Government to the question of French security will be. Public opinion in this country is intensely suspicious of any particular undertaking, and both the Liberal and Labour Parties in their present mood are ready to start on the warpath at the first indication that I could be contemplating a regional pact. The League of Nations Union is equally on the alert and equally predisposed against partial and particular arrangements. Yet I am firmly convinced that the true line of progress is to proceed from the particular to the general, and not, as has hitherto been embodied in covenant⁸ and protocol,⁹ to reverse the process and attempt to eliminate the particular by the general. A form of guarantee which is so general that we undertake exactly the same obligations in defence, shall I say of the Polish corridor¹⁰ (for which no British Government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a British grenadier) as we extend to those international arrangements or conditions on which, as our history shows, our national existence depends, is a guarantee so wide and general that it carries no conviction whatever

⁴ See No. 189, Enclosure.

⁵ See No. 195.

⁶ See No. 197.

⁷ See No. 198.

⁸ The Covenant of the League of Nations, which formed Part I of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919.

⁹ See No. 10, n. 4.

¹⁰ See Vol. XXIII, Appendix.

and gives no sense of security to those who are concerned in our action. If, then, we are to relieve the tension of Europe in the only way in which it can be done, namely, by relieving French fear, a more particular and specific guarantee is in my opinion necessary. I am not sure that in 1919, or even a little later, public opinion would have been prepared to admit the signature of Germany, so lately and so flagrantly dishonoured, to any pact of that character, but I am disposed to think that in the circumstances of today a guarantee of the eastern frontiers of France and Belgium by Great Britain would be rendered a much more practical policy if Germany was associated with it. For this reason I attach immense importance to this new move on the part of the Luther Government—more particularly because Stresemann intimated to D'Abernon that a similar local arrangement might be possible with the Powers on the eastern frontier of Germany,¹¹ and because, as I have ascertained through private correspondence with D'Abernon,¹² the German Government did not make their proposal conditional on the shortening of the 15 years' period of the Allied occupation of German territory.

As Fleuriau said nothing to me about the German memorandum, and as I did not know whether Herriot had thought it right to inform him of its existence, I did not mention the subject to him, nor could I at the present stage of our deliberations even hint to him much of what I have here written to you. I know exactly what I would do if I were an autocrat, but I cannot yet forecast what the Cabinet's decision will be.

I shall send a copy of this letter to D'Abernon, but both of you must please treat it as very confidential and as dictated by my desire that a perfect understanding and the most intimate confidence shall prevail between the three of us, since on the completeness of our understanding the success of any policy must depend. As far as any immediate use of this sketch of the position is concerned, there is nothing to be done except if occasion arises to let both Governments know, if they again refer to the matter, that I attach great importance to the German *démarche* and that I consider it would be a great mistake for the Germans to withdraw it or for the French not to consider it with all the serious and even appreciative attention which it demands.

I should like to say more and to show you how I think that it can be used, but I have no right to do that until I am better assured that the Government share my view or am in a position to give you instructions based upon their decisions.

Yours sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ See No. 190.

¹² Mr. Chamberlain's letter of February 3, and Lord D'Abernon's reply of February 7 (see n. 2).

*Mr. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard*¹ (Washington)

No. 268 [A 885/49/45]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 17, 1925*

Sir,

I have made no formal report of the long farewell conversation,² lasting, I suppose, some two hours, which I had with Mr. Kellogg before his departure.³ He also said that he had made no record, but he subsequently informed me that he had telegraphed one part of it to the President⁴ and asked me for further information in regard to it. It will perhaps therefore be convenient that you should know the principal topics discussed between us.

One of the first questions raised by Mr. Kellogg was that of disarmament. He expressed the view that there was no chance of the successful summoning of a disarmament conference at Washington; he asked if I agreed with him. I replied that I thought that there was very little likelihood that an invitation to consider land disarmament at a new Washington Conference⁵ would have any success, but that I believed naval disarmament to stand on a different footing, and that the British Government, at any rate, would welcome the summoning of such a conference and would be glad to associate with the other great naval Powers in taking part in it. Mr. Kellogg enquired a couple of days later⁶ what grounds I had for thinking that France might be willing to take part in a naval conference, to which I replied that it was only the fact that M. Herriot had specifically referred to the difficulty which he would have in considering land disarmament in Washington, from which I had inferred that he placed further naval restrictions in a different category, but I added that I assumed that the American Government would feel their way before making any public pronouncement on the subject.

Mr. Kellogg and I discussed at considerable length the general European situation, which both of us feel to be very insecure—fear seeming to dominate the policy of almost every country. Mr. Kellogg summed up the situation in the phrase ‘that French security is the hub of the whole situation, and the question is whether you can do anything to reassure them’.

¹ H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington.

² On February 10. An account of it is given in Mr. Chamberlain's memorandum of February 10 (W 1151/9/98), not printed.

³ The United States Ambassador sailed for America on February 18. He was appointed Secretary of State on March 4.

⁴ Mr. C. Coolidge. For Mr. Kellogg's communications on this conversation, see *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, pp. 3-4.

⁵ For the Washington Conference of 1921-2, see No. 185, n. 2.

⁶ See *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, p. 5.

Before parting with the Ambassador I spoke to him of the difficulties which had arisen in connection with seizures of boot-legging vessels in doubtful or, as we contended, illegal circumstances. I was confident that he would appreciate the strength of our desire to assist the American Government in enforcing their law, and would understand how great was the concession we had made in agreeing to the time-limit extension of the right of search.⁷ Like my predecessors, I was very reluctant to stand out as a champion of men with whose activities I had no sympathy. I would beg him to use his influence to prevent seizures being made in circumstances in which I must protest or allow a precedent to remain on record that might be cited in quite different circumstances by other countries in some future controversy with us.

Mr. Kellogg said that he fully appreciated the action of the British Government, that he had always recommended moderation and caution to the Administration in Washington, and that he would speak again to the Secretary of the Treasury in this sense as soon as he returned.

I have, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁷ Under the British-U.S. Convention of January 23, 1924, respecting the regulation of the liquor traffic (for a text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 119, pp. 467-9), Great Britain agreed that U.S. authorities could search vessels within one hour's sailing distance from the coast. See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. 1, pp. 133-255 and *F.R.U.S.* 1924, vol. 1, pp. 157-61.

No. 202

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 585 [C 1802/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 17, 1925*

My Lord,

I have received Your Lordship's despatch No. 324 of February 6th,¹ enclosing leading articles by Monsieur Paul-Boncour² and Monsieur Jacques Bardoux,³ on the subject of the evacuation of Cologne and French security.

2. I am profoundly disquieted by the agitation for the connection of these two questions which you have disclosed in several recent despatches,⁴ and of which the above despatch provides fresh proof. I desire to draw your attention particularly to my conversation with the Belgian Ambassador on February 12th, (recorded in the enclosure in my despatch No. 578 of February 16th),¹ in which I expressed my great

¹ Not printed.

² Deputy for the Seine.

³ A professor at the Paris School of Political Sciences.

⁴ E.g. Paris despatches Nos. 238 of January 29 and 248 of January 29, not printed. See, however, No. 579, below.

anxiety on this matter. You will observe that I told Baron Moncheur that while I was unable to say whether the members of the British Government would be in a position to discuss the question of security when the allied ministers meet, as I hope they will meet in the near future, to discuss the report of the Military Control Commission⁵ and the evacuation of Cologne, in no case would His Majesty's Government consent to make the decision on Cologne dependent on the general question of security. I added that any attempt to subject the British Government to duress in this way would make impossible between the allies a continuation of that cordial co-operation and very friendly spirit which now prevails.⁶

I am, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

⁵ See Nos. 559, n. 4, 586, n. 1, and 592, below.

⁶ For Baron Moncheur's record of the conversation, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 17.

No. 203

Mr. Sargent¹ (Paris) to Mr. Lampson (Received February 19)

[C 2464/459/18]

PARIS, February, 18, 1925

Dear Lampson,

I enclose herewith a memorandum which has been drawn up by Heywood in answer to Lord d'Abernon's memorandum respecting the balance of power in Europe contained in his despatch No. 17 of the 7th January.² Lord Crewe has asked me to send you this privately as it hardly appears to be the business of the military attaché's office here to answer Lord d'Abernon officially. If there is to be an official answer it ought to be made, I suppose, by General Burnett-Stuart himself. Lord Crewe thinks, however, that it may be useful that the Office should be in possession of the views expressed by his military advisers, and hopes that Heywood's memorandum may be shown to the Secretary of State.

Yours ever,

ORME SARGENT

¹ A First Secretary, he was attached to the Paris Embassy for the work of the Conference of Ambassadors.

² No. 181.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 203

Notes on Lord D'Abernon's Memorandum of January 7, 1925

No. 12/G/10/(1746)

PARIS, February 16, 1925

The military appreciation of the situation in Europe by Lord D'Abernon forwarded under his Despatch No. 17 dated 7th January, 1925,² appears to be based on certain military factors, the accuracy of which seems open to serious doubt when closely examined.

(1) It seems very improbable that any French Government could, even if it would, make an immediate declaration of war on Germany, solely on the ground that rearmament by Germany had reached a dangerous level. French public opinion would not allow it until too late, and world opinion would be against France unless she had previously had recourse to the League of Nations machinery. This would make any declaration of war by France single handed too late to be certain of success.

(2) As regards the development in arming by Germany, everything tends to show that Germany, particularly with respect to her industries, is being so organised as to render such development possible with the least possible risk of detection.

Financial control is evidently one of our best safeguards, but the statement that 'no money could be allotted to this purpose without the fact being known *years* before there was any danger', seems somewhat sweeping. A certain amount of money could surely be found by means of industrial subsidies, educational and other grants to Universities, Societies, etc. We also know that the re-arming of Germany is a matter of *months*, not of *years* (see War Office memorandum on 'The present and future military situation in Germany'—forwarded to British Military Representative under No. 0154/6557 (M.I.3) dated 19th January, 1925).³

(3) The existing military facts to which attention is called do not appear to be set out with strict accuracy, or to be complete.

(a) On the one hand, German, Austrian and Hungarian armies are given *as they should be* if the military clauses of the treaties were fully executed, which is not the case; whereas the position of the French and other Allied armies is given as it is with none of the Treaties fully carried out, and not as it would be if the Treaties were completely executed.

(b) The memorandum omits to mention that a considerable proportion of the French Peace Army of 720,000 men (not 750,000) is not available for operations against Germany, as about 240,000 are dispersed over the African and Asiatic continents from where they cannot be spared, whilst practically two-thirds of that army are raw recruits of less than one year's service. It further omits to mention that the Reichswehr and Schupo⁴

³ A copy of this general staff memorandum of December, 1924, was transmitted to the Foreign Office in War Office letter of January 6 (C 248/30/18), not printed.

⁴ i.e. Schutz Polizei—the armed state police.

form a striking, or covering force, of over 200,000 highly trained and efficient long service men with, for many years to come, large reserves of war trained men behind them.

(4) The military power of the Little Entente is not to be undervalued, but at the same time it is difficult to agree that this force would be available in a conflict between France and Germany, (see paragraphs 6 and 7 below).

(5) It seems likely that in any further conflict, Austria would avoid becoming involved; on the other hand it is very probable that Hungary would become involved. Here again the strength of the Hungarian Army is given as 35,000, whereas the Hungarian Minister for National Defence himself has recently stated that Hungary had 600,000 trained men available.⁵

(6) It is difficult to agree with the statement that 'any military combination between the aristocratic imperialist military leaders in Germany and the Communist forces in Soviet Russia is unthinkable'. We know by experience that the contrary is the case, as the German forces in the latter part of the war, and in 1919 got on well with the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, South Russia and the Caucasus. Such an agreement, however, is unnecessary, as there is no doubt that should France become involved in a conflict with Germany, and thereby become unable to assist Poland and Roumania, Russia could not, and would not, miss such an opportunity to attack Poland and Roumania. These two countries would not dare send a man to their eastern and northern frontiers.

(7) The Yugo-Slav Army would be neutralised by the task of watching her Bulgarian, Albanian and Hungarian neighbours, and possible assistance to Roumania. A similar task, as well as possible assistance to Poland, would leave only a portion of the Czechoslovak army available to assist France in her conflict against Germany. Italy would probably not move a finger, as her interests are now concentrated in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. The assistance of Belgium, should France decide to make a sudden attack on Germany, is not a certain factor.

(8) France could, therefore, only really count on her own efforts, and at the present moment she would undoubtedly be equal to the task, but her superiority is bound to decrease steadily in the course of the next few years.

(9) The table of armaments given at the end of Lord D'Abernon's memorandum is equally misleading, as the figures for Germany indicate what she is allowed to possess by the Treaty, and not what she has. The latest discoveries made in Germany, and in particular the discovery in one place alone of 17,000 heavy machine gun barrel forgings,⁶ show what

⁵ In a speech of January 14 to the Finance Committee of the National Assembly, a summary of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Budapest despatch No. 20 (No. 10).

⁶ This discovery at Wittenau had been reported to the War Office by the Head of the

these figures are really worth. These figures, it should be noted, are those given recently by various German sources (see Despatch No. 860 dated 29.12.24⁷ by H[is] M[ajesty's] Representative Berlin) when endeavouring to prove that Germany is in a state of hopeless military inferiority with regard to her neighbours. How quickly this state of things could be altered is clearly shown by a recent War Office memorandum,³ which demonstrates how Germany could, in certain circumstances, put forward a covering force, mobilise 22 Divisions in a week, or at most 10 days, increase this force to 50 Divisions in a few weeks, and then go on securely to full national mobilisation.

T. G. G. HEYWOOD
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

British Section of the Military Control Commission at Berlin, General Wauchope, in a telegram of January 5 (C 324/21/18), not printed.

⁷ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 204

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 19, 8.45 p.m.)

No. 67 Telegraphic [C 2501/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, February 19, 1925, 7.50 p.m.

Paris telegram No. 61¹

I am informed most confidentially that in conversation on Tuesday² with German Ambassador,³ Monsieur Herriot said he welcomed German note of February 9th.⁴ He produced document from a pocket book where he said it had been kept secure since its receipt. He appears not to have mentioned note to his usual advisers and certainly not to the press.

In subsequent conversation Monsieur Herriot took no objection to any point in German note and in particular did not criticise those passages which refer to Germany's eastern frontier. He did not indicate what action he proposed to take but it was evident that he considered communication one of extreme importance regarding which utmost secrecy must be observed.

It was agreed to state in the press that German Ambassador had called in connection with mine disaster.⁵

German government apparently intend to take no further immediate steps in this matter. They will await next move from Herriot.

¹ No. 198.

² February 17.

³ Dr. L. von Hoesch.

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁵ Over 120 men were killed in an explosion at the Minister Stein coalmine near Dortmund on February 11.

Memorandum by Mr. Nicolson on British Policy considered in relation to the European Situation; prepared in pursuance of directions from the Secretary of State¹

[C 2201/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 20, 1925

I.—General Conditions of Insecurity in Europe

(1) *Russia*

Europe today is divided into three main elements, namely, the victors, the vanquished and Russia. The Russian problem, that incessant, though shapeless menace, can be stated only as a problem; it is impossible as yet to forecast what effect the development of Russia will have on the future stability of Europe. It is true, on the one hand, that the feeling of uncertainty which is sapping the health of Western Europe is caused to no small extent by the disappearance of Russia as a Power accountable in the European concert. On the other hand, the Russian problem is for the moment Asiatic rather than European; tomorrow Russia may again figure decisively in the balance of continental power; but today she hangs as a storm-cloud upon the Eastern horizon of Europe—impending, imponderable, but, for the present, detached. Russia is not therefore in any sense a factor of stability; she is indeed the most menacing of all our uncertainties; and it must thus be in spite of Russia, perhaps even because of Russia, that a policy of security must be framed.

¹ See No. 180. This memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet by Mr. Chamberlain under cover of the following note of February 19: 'A successful British foreign policy depends, first, on a clear appreciation of the facts of the situation with which we have to deal, and, secondly, on an equally clear conception of British interests and of their relation to the facts.'

'I have, therefore, set myself to work to examine the European situation from this point of view and to deduce from this examination the principles which should guide the foreign policy of the Empire in the European sphere.'

'Mr. Harold Nicolson's memorandum, prepared by my directions under the supervision of Sir Eyre Crowe, gives the result. It presents clearly and succinctly both the basis and outline of the policy which I urgently recommend. But it is much more than my individual opinion. In order to be certain that all points of view were adequately considered, I took the unusual course of holding a conference of all the senior officers of the Department [see No. 180]. This paper was prepared after and as a result of that discussion. I do not pretend that everyone concerned would give exactly the same value to each of the facts set forth or each argument deduced from them, but I am entitled to say that it represents not only the personal opinion of the Secretary of State, but the considered view of the Foreign Office as a whole and of the very able and experienced body of officials who advise me.'

'I commend it to the most careful consideration of my colleagues. No Minister can conduct foreign affairs successfully without a policy. It is my duty to suggest one, and it is urgently necessary that I should know whether what I propose is approved by the competent authorities.'

See also No. 521, below.

(2) *The Minor ex-Enemies*

The condition of Central and Western Europe, though scarcely less uncertain, is at least more definable. The main psychological factors in every case are almost the same. All our late enemies continue full of resentment at what they have lost; all our late Allies are fearful of losing what they have won. One-half of Europe is dangerously angry; the other half is dangerously afraid. The friction between these inflamed emotions is incessant, and acts as some septic irritant, poisoning the wounds which are yet unhealed. Fear begets provocation, armaments, secret alliances, ill-treatment of minorities; these in their turn beget a greater hatred and stimulate a desire for revenge, whereby fear is intensified, and its consequences are enhanced. The vicious circle is thus established.

This action and counter-action of revenge and fear are visible today in every continental country, though their political, as distinct from their psychological, effect varies in essential proportions. The smaller ex-enemies, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, are so completely surrounded and overpowered by their neighbours that, for them, revenge has become a sullen subjective emotion rather than an objective political hope. In Austria, this feeling takes the form of a desire to fuse with Germany. Hungary and Bulgaria are recalcitrant, but for the moment overawed. If Turkey were again to have a European policy, her attitude might not be dissimilar. While, therefore, our minor ex-enemies are not strong enough to create a disturbance by themselves, yet they are ready to foment the causes of insecurity and to profit by any disturbance which may elsewhere ensue.

(3) *The Attitude of Germany*

Although Germany is at present quite incapable of undertaking aggressive action, it is certain that with her great military and chemical potentialities she will sooner or later again become a powerful military factor. For the moment, it may well be true that the more intelligent German desires peace; he feels that Germany must first re-establish her economic and financial position; he realises that she can only do so in circumstances of comparative stability, and that such stability implies, in a broad sense, the execution of the Dawes scheme² and even of the Treaty of Versailles.

On the other hand, he is aware that one day Germany will again be strong. There are but few Germans who seriously hope to exert this strength, when reacquired, against the British Empire; it may be doubted, even whether the majority of Germans desire today a war of revenge against France; but it may be confidently asserted that so soon as Germany recovers, there will be a steady movement towards the righting of what are, for a German, the two most objectionable provisions of the Peace Settlement, namely, the Polish corridor³ and the partition of Silesia.⁴

² See No. 27, n. 8.

³ See Vol. XXIII, Appendix.

⁴ See Vol. XI, Chap. I and Vol. XVI, Part I.

These two questions are of such importance that they merit more substantial treatment:—

(1) *The Polish Corridor*³

By the Treaty of Versailles, not only was Poland restored to independence, but she was also, at the expense of Germany, given access to the sea and the use of the port of Danzig. The consequent readjustment of Germany's frontiers necessitated the complete severance of East Prussia from the rest of the German Empire by a narrow strip of territory known as the Polish corridor. A special régime was established in Danzig, which was declared a free city under the protection of the League of Nations. In this city, originally a German town-colony planted on conquered Polish soil, and even now having a population 94 per cent. Germans, special rights were secured to Poland, including control of foreign affairs, customs and external railway communications, and the port was placed under separate administration ensuring facilities for Polish trade and shipping.

(2) *Upper Silesia*⁴

In Upper Silesia, after a plebiscite held amid turmoil and uproar, Poland, who polled 40 per cent. of the total votes, eventually received by a decision of the League of Nations a considerable tract of territory containing at least 80 per cent. of the developed and 95 per cent. of the undeveloped mineral wealth of Silesia and large enclaves inhabited by clear German majorities.

There is obviously a danger that a nation of over 60 millions will not permanently acquiesce in being thus sundered from the province which was the cradle of the Prussian State, or in being deprived of those mineral resources on which the national prosperity was largely based.

(4) *The Attitude of France*

France is afraid of Germany because—

(1) She is Germany's neighbour.

(2) She has within living memory been twice invaded by Germany.⁵

(3) The birth-rate in France is declining. At present the population numbers 39½ millions. It is estimated that by 1940 it will have declined to 35 millions; by 1950 to 31 millions; by 1965 to 25 millions.

(4) The birth-rate in Germany is increasing. In 1922 the German population numbered 61½ millions. In 1965 it may well number 80 millions.

These circumstances have inevitably and justifiably led the French to place their own security above all other considerations. It may be well at this stage to summarise the history of the security question as dealt with since the armistice:—

(1) Marshal Foch, having defeated Germany, insisted that if there was to be any security for France or peace for Europe, the German frontier must cease at the Rhine. That, he stated, was the only effective guarantee of

⁵ In 1870 (see No. 22, n. 5) and 1914.

French security. France did not want to annex the territory between herself and the Rhine: all she wished was that this territory should be detached from Germany proper, and that the Rhine should thus serve as an abiding barrier between France and her hereditary enemy.⁶

(2) This, the only safeguard which would have really allayed French apprehensions, was refused them by their Western Allies. In return, the French were given the following compensations:—

(a) A Treaty of Guarantee,⁷ under which Great Britain and America pledged themselves, in the event of any unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany, to come immediately to France's assistance.

(b) The occupation, for an extended period, of the Rhineland.

(c) The assurance, under articles 42 and 43, that any violation of the provisions for the demilitarisation of the Rhineland would be considered an act of war.

(d) The disarmament of Germany under the supervision of an Allied Commission.

(3) As Marshal Foch pointed out at the time, safeguards (b) and (d) above were but provisional in duration, whereas safeguard (c) was uncertain in effect. The Anglo-American guarantee, on the other hand, might well have given France a sense of security had it even been put into effect. As is well known, however, it was rejected by the United States and, therefore, lapsed altogether.

(4) The French were thus left under the impression that not only had they been refused the Rhine barrier, but that they had also been deprived of the only serious compensation offered to them in return for the abandonment of this main desideratum. They determined, therefore, to create subsidiary safeguards to take the place of those refused them by their Western Allies.

(5) The first of these expedients was to supplement the deficiency of French man-power by enlisting large numbers of coloured troops. At present 25 per cent. of the French army is composed of natives of North Africa and the French colonies, of whom some 60,000 are in France and on the Rhine today.

(6) The second expedient was the policy known as the 'policy of the Little Entente,' under which the new States to the east of Germany were to be welded into a compact block, united to each other, and connected to France by a complicated system of alliances, subsidies and military missions. The complexity of this artificial connexus is best shown by the memorandum⁸ and diagram attached to this paper.⁹

(7) The policy of the Little Entente, while securing the encirclement of Germany, and while redressing to some extent the balance of man-power, was none the less a policy of desperation. The solidarity of the Little Entente was not in itself very dependable; the exigencies of these satellites

⁶ For translations of Marshal Foch's memoranda of January 10 and March 31, 1919, see Cmd. 2169, op. cit., pp. 18–24 and 85–8.

⁷ See No. 185, n. 1.

⁸ No. 187.

⁹ Not printed.

were liable to constitute a serious and increasing drain on French resources; and the precarious position of Poland and Roumania in relation not to Germany only, but also to Russia, constituted an element not of security but of added apprehension.

(8) It may well be that the realisation of this inherent instability of the Little *Entente* was what inspired the French Government to press upon the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations¹⁰ the acceptance of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.¹¹ They hoped by this means to fuse their specific responsibilities into more general responsibilities assumed under the ægis of the League of Nations. They now realise that it is most unlikely that the Geneva Protocol will, in its present form, be accepted either by His Majesty's Government or by the Governments of the Dominions.¹²

(9) There are indications, therefore, that French public opinion is now reverting to the original thesis of Marshal Foch, and that it will be increasingly difficult for any French Government to evacuate the Rhineland unless and until they receive some compensating guarantee for the future security of France.

(5) *The League of Nations*

How far can the League be counted on to control a situation of such uncertainty? As a clearing-house for international disputes, the League of Nations is a wholly admirable institution. In many minor questions it has already played a most useful part, but at present, and probably for many years, it will be unsafe to count upon its authority being sufficient to restrain a Great Power in any case in which that Power considers its vital interests to be at stake. The time may come when the League will be able to deal not merely with incidental disputes, but even with more permanent and deep-seated rivalries. It is vain to deny, however, that this stage has not yet been reached, or to hide the fact that a sense of security cannot, in such vital matters, today emanate from Geneva.

II.—*Conclusions regarding European Insecurity*

The following conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis:—

(1) The future development of Russia is still incalculable; Europe must work out her own security in spite of Russia.

(2) The minor ex-enemies are not likely by themselves to cause serious trouble, since the lesser treaties are guaranteed by a superiority of force. The Treaty of Versailles possesses no such safeguard, since the preponderance of whatever man-power would be certainly and unhesitatingly available tells against, and not in favour of, the *status quo*.

(3) Germany will sooner or later recover. She will certainly desire to revise

¹⁰ This met September 1–October 2, 1924. For the attitude of the French Government at the Assembly, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1924), pp. 51–4 and 78–9.

¹¹ See No. 10, n. 4.

¹² See No. 180.

the Polish clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. If France were isolated, and British neutrality to be assured, she might also endeavour to attack France.

(4) Unless France can be secured against this menace, she will be driven to expedients which in the end will only provoke the German revenge of which she stands in terror.

III.—*British Interests*

In a situation of such incertitude, the only sound line of British policy is the path of British interests. The road is too dark for any altruism or digression; it is our own security which must remain the sole consideration. What, then, are the essential conditions of the security of the British Empire?

Before answering such a question, it will be well to limit the scope of enquiry by the establishment of three axioms, namely:—

(1) That the policy known as 'splendid isolation' is not today a practicable policy. For America, powerful and aloof, such a course is still, perhaps, a possibility. For the British Empire no such escape is feasible. History and economics show that isolation in present conditions spells danger, vulnerability and impotence. Geography and aeronautics show that isolation is not in our case a scientific fact.

(2) That, conversely, it would be unsound for the Governments of the Empire to commit Great Britain and the Dominions to responsibilities which are not direct necessities of Imperial defence, and of which the people of the Empire would not approve. No promise must be given which public opinion in Great Britain and the Dominions would not, in the last resort, be prepared to execute.

(3) If we are to contribute to general security, we must first establish certainty and conviction. It is far better to give restricted promises which Europe realises will inevitably be executed, than to enter into wide commitments, the ultimate execution of which would always allow of doubt. In order to carry such conviction we must base our policy, not on possible tendencies, but on generally recognisable facts. We must be direct, simple and explicit.

What, therefore, in their simplest expression, are the needs of Imperial Defence? They may perhaps be summarised under three heads, namely:—

(1) The defence of the individual Dominions.

(2) The defence of the sea communications between Great Britain and the individual Dominions.

(3) The defence of Great Britain itself, being the heart of the Empire.

Nos. (1) and (2) are generally realised and are not for the present directly menaced. No. (3) is not perhaps so fully realised as an Imperial necessity, and is a matter which requires immediate consideration.

IV.—*The Defence of Great Britain*

The defence of Great Britain necessitates:—

- (a) That no single Power shall be in a position to occupy or to dominate all the Channel and the North Sea Ports.
- (b) That the hostility of France, Belgium, and, more incidentally, Holland, Germany and Denmark, who now possess these ports, or of any of these countries, and particularly the hostility of any combination of them, is to be avoided.
- (c) That no third Power at war with France or Belgium should be allowed to invade those countries so as to threaten the *status quo* of the Channel Ports, or of such French and Belgian territory as would expose Great Britain to aerial invasion.
- (d) That it is consequently a necessity of British and therefore of Imperial defence to reach some understanding with France and Belgium which may entail a guarantee on our part that these territories shall not fall into other hands.

V.—*British interests as affecting European Security*

So soon, therefore, as we realise that it is a necessity of Imperial defence to guarantee to France and Belgium the possession of their present territory, it becomes possible to show how this necessity, inevitable in any case, can constitute a very important contribution to European security. We have only to define publicly what we recognise privately as an essential condition of the future existence of the Empire, in order to secure the following very definite political advantages:—

- (1) Europe will then know where she stands. It is doubtful whether even in 1914 Germany would have risked the Great War had she known for certain that the British Empire would come to France's assistance. If she is now assured that by invading France she will inevitably incur the hostility of the British Empire, it is most unlikely that she will make any such endeavour.
- (2) France will know that her ultimate security is regarded as of direct interest to the British Empire. The provocative policy inspired by her present uncertainty will tend to diminish; she will contemplate with less alarm the impending evacuation of the Rhineland; she will be less inclined to constitute the Little *Entente* as an armed camp to the east of Germany; she will be able to settle down to financial stabilisation and to a policy of debt-repayment.
- (3) The smaller countries in Europe will learn that they must make peace with their neighbours, and that it is unnecessary to wait in uneasy expectancy for a second European conflagration.
- (4) A nucleus of certainty, of stability, and of security will thereby be created. Such a nucleus can gradually be enlarged in expanding circles. There is nothing to prevent the eventual inclusion of Germany within the guarantees of security thus established.

(5) Although in the present mood of Europe it would be useless even to mention the revision of the peace treaties, yet if the concert of Europe can thus gradually be recreated, saner councils will prevail. It is conceivable, especially if Germany, with French goodwill, becomes a member of the League of Nations and obtains a permanent seat in the Council, that it may become possible eventually to revise by European agreement the dangerous conditions involved in the Silesian settlement and the Polish corridor.

(6) But until we can quieten France, no concert of Europe is possible, and we can only quieten France if we are in the position to speak to her with the authority of an Ally.

The essential interests of Imperial Defence are thus closely related to a policy of European security. The first hope of stability in Europe lies in a new *entente* between the British Empire and France.

The form which such an *entente* might take is beyond the scope of the present memorandum.

HAROLD NICOLSON

No. 206

Sir E. Howard (Washington) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 2)

*No. 280 [A 1124/49/45]**

WASHINGTON, *February 20, 1925*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the publication in the press here yesterday of your statement in the House of Commons¹ about American diplomatic 'feelers'² as to the convocation of a new Disarmament Conference by the President at Washington has already given rise to comment, all of which, so far, is favourable to the idea of another conference³ for the limitation of naval armaments and aircraft.

The initiative of the President is considered opportune now that the Geneva Protocol⁴ seems likely to fall to the ground or be amended out of all recognition, and more especially as the League of Nations is to postpone consideration of the protocol till the September meeting.⁵ That the President should call another Naval Conference is also thought a useful and obvious corollary to the Washington Conference of 1921-22.³ Responsible papers like the New York 'Times' and 'World' point out that such action by the United States at the present time does not clash with the efforts for disarmament being made by the League,⁶ but will rather help

¹ On February 18. See 180 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s, col. 1060. ² See *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, pp. 3-7.

³ See No. 185, n. 2.

⁴ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁶ On September 6, 1924, the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations (see No. 205, n. 10) had passed a resolution requesting the First (Constitutional and Legal Questions) and Third (Reduction of Armaments) Committees to consider the articles in the Covenant

these, more especially as the new Washington Conference will not consider land armaments. This is considered a wise restriction of the agenda, since land armaments are essentially a matter closely allied with European political problems of security and thus primarily for European settlement. Moreover, the United States has nothing in the way of possible military reductions to bargain with, her army being already at an irreducible minimum strength.

The Philadelphia 'Public Ledger' thinks a League of Nations disarmament conference with fifty-four nations participating would be so unwieldy and so productive of widely divergent views that in any case it would have little chance of success. On the other hand, American leadership of a conference of a few important Powers would, with the prestige already acquired by the United States from the last Washington Conference,³ have far more useful and practical results, and His Majesty's Government have been quick to see this.

Both the New York 'Times' and 'Journal of Commerce' refer to the difficult position of France in the face of the proposals for a new conference. The former publishes reports from Paris that her attitude will be 'frigid'; the latter thinks she will continue her naval programme and will not participate in such a conference unless she can extort from Great Britain concessions on the question of French security, whether by means of pact or protocol.

The Hearst press reports Senator Borah⁷ and other Senators as favouring the participation of Russia in the conference, and publishes a despatch from Tokyo to the effect that Japan will oppose any limitations on submarines, destroyers and aircraft.

I have, etc.,
(For the Ambassador),
H. G. CHILTON

relating to the settlement of disputes, and obligations contained in the Covenant in relation to possible guarantees of security if required by arbitration and a reduction of armaments, with a view to the summoning of an international conference upon armaments. See *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1924), pp. 77 and 79.

⁷ U.S. Senator from Idaho, and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

No. 207

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 76 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2558/459/18]

Secret

PARIS, February 22, 1925

Berlin secret telegram No. 67 of February 19th.¹

¹ No. 204.

The President of the Council yesterday showed me in confidence a French version of the German note.² It is suggested that France, Great Britain, Italy and Germany should enter into a pact against war, separate arbitration [treaties] being concluded with France and with the other powers.

A second agreement to be made ensuring the *status quo* in the Rhineland, and a third dealing with the arrangements to be made in the demilitarised zones.

Nothing is expressly stated concerning the eastern frontiers of Germany, but the last paragraph expresses, in rather involved terms, the hope that these agreements will lead to the conclusion of other similar pacts which would tend to ensure the peace of the world. I suggested that this obscure allusion might be intended to refer to the countries eastward of Germany, and Monsieur Herriot said that the German Ambassador here had confirmed this impression in speaking to him.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

No. 208

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 24, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 78 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2627/459/18]

Secret

PARIS, February 23, 1925

My telegram (secret) No. 76 of February 22nd.¹

The President of the Council informed me that he sent a polite reply to the German note,² stating that his Government had received it with interest, but that it will be impossible to proceed to further consideration of the suggestions it contained except in concert with the Allies.³

¹ No. 207.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

³ A translation of the French reply of February 20 is printed in Cmd. 2435, op. cit., p. 5.

No. 209

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 25, 9 p.m.)

No. 69 Telegraphic [C 2747/459/18]

BERLIN, February 24, 1925, 9 p.m.

I have received following from very confidential but reliable source.

Laroche on Saturday¹ handed to German Ambassador in Paris written note² stating that French government had received German memorandum of February 9th³ with interest but could not discuss it without the allies and without agreement with them as to security of France in accordance with treaty of Versailles. Laroche added: 'notably we must consult England'.

In subsequent conversation German Ambassador said 'the evacuation of Cologne cannot depend upon settlement of security'. To this he reports that Laroche specifically agreed to adding 'it depends only on article 429'.

German Ambassador considers that written word of note is considerably colder than spoken word of M. Herriot but he attributes this to different temperament of permanent official and politician.

German government on Saturday communicated to Rome and Brussels memorandum similar to that of February 9th. From Rome they have as yet had no answer—a fact attributed to Signor Mussolini's illness.⁴

In Brussels German Chargé d'Affaires⁵ had conversation⁶ with Monsieur Hymans⁷ who welcomed co-operation of Germany in assuring security. He did not adopt any positive attitude on problem and appeared not to have been informed previously by Paris. Monsieur Hymans was slightly annoyed because Belgium was not specifically included among Powers who would take part in future pact. It was explained that no offence was intended. Monsieur Hymans declared that the utmost secrecy and discretion were necessary. Any premature discussion in the press would undoubtedly wreck the whole scheme.

¹ February 21.

² See No. 208, n. 3.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 48.

⁵ Baron W. von Ow-Wachendorf.

⁶ An account of this conversation of February 23 is given in *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 24.

⁷ Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 210

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir C. Eliot¹ (Tokyo)

*No. 82 [A 1048/49/15]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 25, 1925*

Sir,

The Japanese Ambassador² called this afternoon to ask what was taking place in regard to the possibility of holding a Disarmament Conference at Washington.

I told his Excellency that the matter had been mentioned by Mr. Kellogg in a very informal conversation³ which I had with him before he sailed, and in which I had expressed the view that it would be useless to

¹ H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Tokyo.

² Baron G. Hayashi.

³ See No. 201.

attempt to deal with land armaments, including aircraft, at Washington. There might be better prospects of success for another conference on naval limitations. No further communications had at present passed between us on the subject. The Ambassador enquired how such a conference would be affected by the proposed conference on disarmament under the auspices of the League.⁴ I replied that that would be a matter for the convening Power to consider. I had told Mr. Kellogg that I presumed that the President would sound other naval Powers if he thought of issuing an invitation. I had, however, indicated to Mr. Kellogg that, if the great naval Powers were willing to join in conference, we should very gladly participate.

The Ambassador then enquired what progress was being made in the question of Cologne. I briefly told him how the matter stood. For the moment we were all waiting for the observations of the Versailles Committee on the report of the Control Commission.⁵ When those had been received and considered by the Governments, correspondence would naturally take place, but, in any opinion, a meeting of Allied Ministers would be necessary to settle the final terms of the communication to Germany.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ See No. 206, n. 6.

⁵ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592, below.

No. 211

*Lord D'Abernon(Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 28)*

*No. 150 [C 2881/109/18]**

BERLIN, *February 25, 1925*

Sir,

It may be of interest at the present juncture if I endeavour to give a sketch of the views held here regarding the entry of Germany into the League of Nations.

I have had an opportunity of discussing the question lately with one or two persons in a position to know what the real mind of the Government is on this subject. Broadly, they agree that the reason alleged last year,¹ namely, Germany's objection to article 16 of the Covenant of the League, while it was undoubtedly genuine, was not the sole or the major reason for hesitation or refusal. Were there no other causes for resistance, Germany's apprehensions regarding article 16 could probably be overcome.

Now that Germany's position on the council is assured¹—the essential

¹ See Vol. XXVI, No. 590.

cause of hesitation—in the opinion of my informants—is the fear that if Germany entered the League of Nations she would have to break with Russia, and thus lose all hope of support from that quarter. It is thought here that the Soviet Government will never enter the League. Being so violently opposed to it, Russia will not remain a support for Germany if the latter country neglects her advice and becomes a member. I imagine that the Soviet Government have not hesitated to put the dilemma clearly before the authorities in Berlin (see my despatches No. 315 of the 25th April, 1924,² and No. 337 of the 29th April, 1924).²

I do not gather that any secret engagement to consult Russia was entered into by Germany at the time of Rapallo,³ but Russian representations had great weight in the past owing to the general diplomatic position. Their weight in the future will probably diminish. In the first place, M. Herbet's mission to Moscow⁴ has somewhat chilled enthusiasm in Berlin for the Russo-German understanding. While the situation between France and Russia has not yet sufficiently developed to enable Germany to resettle her diplomatic course, [she] is not now inclined to put all her eggs in the Russian basket. It is thought probable that Russia will be lured by the supposed possibility of financial assistance from the Paris market—in default of better supplies—and will do her best by promises to cultivate the friendship and support of France. It is indifferent how serious these promises are—they will have served their purpose in life if they achieve the illusion of an alliance which increases momentarily Russia's prestige and if they bring a modicum of cash to the till. And in any case they will d[i]minish Germany's confidence in Russian support.

Assuming that the view above stated is correct, namely, that Germany's main hesitation in entering the League is apprehension that entry will cost her Russian support, it should be noted that the influence[s] in favour of Germany's Russian orientation have not only been weakened by the Paris-Moscow rapprochement, but also by Baron Maltzan's appointment as Ambassador to Washington.⁵ As long as he was Secretary of State, it was hardly possible for Germany to recede from the Rapallo policy. It was certainly not possible for Baron Maltzan to assent to the destruction of an agreement which he had done so much to promote. As soon as he leaves Berlin this tendency will be less strongly represented. Indeed, I believe that Baron Maltzan himself, while he could not personally approve so great a change in the line of policy he had previously advocated, would

² Not printed.

³ For a text of the German-Russian treaty of April 16, 1922, regarding solutions of general problems, see Shapiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 168–9. See also Vol. XIX, No. 75, and Vol. XX, Nos. 492, 495, and 497. For Lord D'Abernon's views on the nature of the treaty, see Vol. XX, No. 537. A text of an alleged military agreement of April 3, 1922 is given in Shapiro, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

⁴ M. J. Herbet, formerly editor of the Political Bulletin of *Le Temps*, had been appointed French Ambassador at Moscow in 1924. See Vol. XXV, No. 262.

⁵ The appointment had been made in December, 1924.

himself agree that the Russian connection has given Germany more disappointment than satisfaction. Of late he never defended Rapallo in conversation except on the *Acheronta movebo*⁶ principle. Germany must have a friend somewhere. That is the essential necessity of her diplomatic position.

While everyone realises that improved relations with Poland are almost a necessary corollary [*sic*] of deteriorated relations with Russia, no one here is in favour of intimacy with Poland *per se*. Germans regard, and still continue to regard, the Poles as light-headed and unreliable. In addition to their mental and moral disqualifications they are disliked as possessors of what Germans consider stolen goods. However, facts are stronger than prejudices, and a German-Polish 'Pact of Toleration,' I will not say of 'Friendship,' is one of the possibilities of the remoter future.

Leaving this part of the question for the moment and reverting to the question of Germany's entry into the League of Nations, my information is that, in view of diminished confidence in Russia, it would today not be impossible to obtain a German demand, on acceptable terms, to enter the League of Nations provided this question was treated together with certain other major problems now under discussion, and if Germany had not to fear diplomatic isolation. These are the exterior reasons for Germany's attitude. There are also considerations of internal policy.

Luther and his Government are strongly in favour of a general settlement. They are probably, in their hearts, not unwilling to signify Germany's assent to entry at Geneva, but they fear to put the decision before the Reichstag unless at the same time they obtain something of the nature of a political success. No one here would regard Germany's entry into the League as a German success. It would be thought rather a concession and a forced abandonment of previous attitude. If, however, it coincided with a cessation of the present military control and the evacuation of the Cologne area, the popularity of the latter settlements might enable the German Government to carry the League of Nations issue.

I have just read M. von Hemel's⁷ [*sic*] important memorandum of the 5th January, 1925,⁸ but do not propose, in the present despatch, to comment upon his suggestions. The essential question he asks is to some extent answered by what I have written.

My main purpose has been to inform you as to the influence of Russia in this matter and to set forth the silent haunting fear of Germany that action by her in joining the League will turn what she considers her principal

⁶ This is a quotation from Virgil's *Aeneid*—'Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.'—If I am unable to bend the Gods, I will stir up Hell.

⁷ Dr. J. van Hamel was Head of the Legal Section of the League of Nations Secretariat.

⁸ A copy of this memorandum suggesting the terms of the Council's reply to the German note of December 12, 1924, on admission to the League of Nations (see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 323-6) is filed at C 1670/109/18, not printed.

supporter today into an indifferent or an unfriendly neutral.

I have, etc.,

D'ABERNON

No. 212

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

*No. 260 [C 2854/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 26, 1925*

Sir,

Baron Moncheur called this afternoon to inform me of the reply¹ which M. Hymans had made to the German Ambassador when he handed to the Belgian Government a similar memorandum to that which had been previously communicated to the British² and French Governments.³ M. Hymans's reply expressed appreciation of the communication, but stated that he could express no opinion until he had conferred with his Allies. M. Hymans now desired to learn what I thought of the German proposal.

I said that this German *démarche* appeared to me an incident of the utmost importance, which might be of vital consequence to the Allies and have a determining influence upon the whole question of our future security. As I understood the German proposal, it was in the first place a voluntary acceptance of the present western frontiers of Germany. These frontiers Germany had accepted under compulsion at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. Now they not only for the first time accepted them voluntarily, but they offered their guarantee. In the second place, in this memorandum Germany for the first time voluntarily accepted the existing boundary of Germany upon the east. It was true that Germany made a distinction between the finality of the arrangement on the west and that on the east, but this very distinction was an additional guarantee of the French and Belgian frontiers. Even in relation to her eastern frontiers, Germany in this memorandum definitely offered to abandon all recourse to war for the redress of any grievances under which she might conceive herself to lie, and to look only to a peaceful settlement of her claims by some eventual friendly diplomatic arrangement.

Baron Moncheur confirmed my interpretation of the document by a reference to the copy which he had in his hands. He expressed his agreement with the importance which I attached to it, and especially with my comments on the particular points which I had enumerated.

He then drew my attention to the fact that there was a discrepancy between the copies given to the French and Belgian Governments. In the copy handed to M. Herriot there had apparently been no reference to the United States of America, whilst in the copy handed in at Brussels it had

¹ See No. 209, n. 6.

² See No. 189, Enclosure.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

been suggested as one alternative that the countries interested in the western frontiers, including Italy, should pledge themselves to the United States for their observance. I informed the Ambassador that this proposal had been mentioned to me.² It was, of course, not an essential item in the German plan, and I did not myself suppose that it could be rendered effective, for it seemed to me useless to make the United States the recipient of our pledges unless the United States were willing to become also their guarantor, a condition which, as Baron Moncheur remarked, did not seem likely to be fulfilled.

Baron Moncheur further drew attention to the fact that in the Belgian copy of the memorandum there was no reference to the Belgian frontier. I had not my copy at hand for reference, but I said I assumed that the offer of Germany applied as fully to Belgium as to France.

I then observed to Baron Moncheur that for the moment I did not think that we could proceed further in negotiations with Germany. I had ascertained from Lord D'Abernon that it was no part of the German plan that it should have been preceded by the total evacuation of the occupied area,⁴ but I conceived that it would be no good discussing it until we had dealt with the immediate problem of Cologne.⁵ It rendered all the more urgent an early and a satisfactory settlement of that particular question.

Baron Moncheur enquired how matters stood in relation to our procedure in considering this question. I repeated to him the method which I have consistently pressed upon the attention of the French and Belgian Governments. I reminded him of an observation which he had made to me at our last meeting⁶—that '*la politesse est la monnaie qui coûte le moins et rapporte le plus*'. I conceived that the object of the Allies must be to obtain satisfaction for their just demands and to bring the evacuation of the Cologne area to an end as soon as those demands were satisfied. That, at any rate, was the policy of His Majesty's Government. Its success, and in particular the execution of the measures necessary for our security, might well depend upon the form in which our demand was presented to Germany. Upon this question M. Herriot and I had not yet reached an agreement, but I was ready to go a long way to meet M. Herriot as to the time at which the interview with the Germans should take place, provided only that it was clearly stated to them at the moment when our demands were presented that they would be heard in person if that was their desire. I repeated to Baron Moncheur what I had said to M. de Fleuriau⁷ as to the unimportance, as it seemed to me, of the particular formula in which this intimation was embodied. We might well use Dr. Luther's statement of his determination to make good the faults which were shown to exist as the peg on which to hang our invitation. In any case, it was always in our power (and as far as I was concerned I should not hesitate) to bring the German representatives at once to book if they attempted to use the

⁴ See No. 200.

⁶ See No. 202.

⁵ See Chap. III, below.

⁷ See No. 584, below.

interview to rewrite the Treaty of Versailles instead of for the purposes for which it was offered. I added that, if it was agreed among the Allies that the Germans should be heard and their reasonable representations taken into account, it might be easier for the British Government to agree with the French Government on the drafting of those terms. It might even, in such a case, be wise to include in our note some demands upon which we might be ready to concede something to German representation, whereas if no such interview were to be held the British Government would be unable to sign any note which contained demands upon the execution of which it was not prepared finally to insist.

Our interview lasted for a considerable time. It was mainly occupied by my statement and enforcement by every argument which occurred to me of the point of view which I have here stated. Baron Moncheur repeatedly indicated his assent. Incidentally he showed some apprehension lest the French should jeopardise their chance of gaining such guarantees of their own and the Belgian frontiers as seemed now to be within their grasp by seeking to obtain an exactly similar guarantee for Poland or the Polish corridor. I could only ask whether the young Frenchmen of another generation, who would no doubt give the last drop of their blood to defend Alsace-Lorraine, would really make the same sacrifices, not to prevent war on the eastern frontiers of Germany—for war was expressly excluded by the German memorandum—but to prevent some modification being achieved by peaceful methods of diplomacy and perhaps by the League of Nations. If Baron Moncheur knows the mind of his Government, it was clear that, on such an issue, the whole weight of its influence would be thrown on our side.

One other observation which I made appeared forcibly to strike the Ambassador. I said that Russia was at present outside Europe. Some day, under some form of Government—not necessarily the old Tsardom—Russia would be restored and reappear in Europe, not, as now, merely as a fomenter of discontent and revolutionary disturbance, but as a great Power. Before that time came let us link Germany with the system of the west. Do not let us hold her perpetually at arm's length until she turned her back upon the west, and, turning east, threw herself into the arms of Russia so that together they made an anti-western block.⁸

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁸ Baron Moncheur's account of this conversation is given in *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 28.

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Italian Counsellor

[C 3026/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 27, 1925*

M. Preziosi asked me today if we had been informed of the German proposals respecting general security which had been made at Paris¹ and at Rome,² and if so what action we were proposing to take upon them.

I told him that we were aware of these proposals, but that I was under the impression that no immediate action upon them was contemplated. Generally speaking, we here were very sympathetic to any effort on the part of Germany to show her peaceful intentions and her desire to contribute to any general settlement of the security problem.

We had a general discussion on the whole subject which was of no material importance, with the exception of his allusion to the reference made in the German communication to France¹ to article 19 of the Covenant in connection with the eastern frontier of Germany. How did we interpret that allusion?

It will be remembered that that article provides that the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of internal conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. Did it not seem, he asked, that this was a plain indication that Germany meant to work for a modification of the existing territorial Polish frontier?

I said that that seemed the most obvious interpretation to place upon it, but frankly it was not a matter to which we had given any very deep thought so far. I then repeated to him what I had said on a previous occasion,³ namely that it seemed to us here possibly premature to consider these German suggestions until we knew where we were more definitely on the main lines of the security problem; at the moment everything was in an inchoate and indefinite state. No one knew what might evolve out of the various trains of thought now stirring in men's minds. We always had felt, and we still felt, that in the general settlement which would doubtless result, Germany would have ultimately to be included. There was a strong party in this country, which favoured her inclusion, not only amongst the general public but also in political circles; and clearly that was right; a settlement excluding Germany would be no true settlement in the long run, so that I felt pretty sure that sooner or later Germany's overtures would be seriously taken up and studied with a view to their application.

M. Preziosi then asked whether there was not to be a second step in the more or less near future. The position, as he understood it, was that each country had informed the Germans that they were unable to reply to their

¹ See No. 197, n. 1.

² See No. 209.

³ The record of this conversation has not been traced in the Foreign Office archives.

proposals until they had consulted their allies.⁴ When and how were these consultations to take place?

I said I was afraid I could not tell him. I imagined that the proposals would be noted and that if and when the general lines of a solution of the problem of security defined themselves, the question of some response to the German overtures would be taken in hand. For the moment, so far as I knew, no further reply to Germany was under consideration.⁵

⁴ See Nos. 195, 209, and 212.

⁵ Sir E. Crowe minuted (February 28): 'I should not be sorry to see this persistent inquisitor discouraged a little.'

Mr. Chamberlain added (March 1): 'If they [the Italians] want to know any more the *Ambassador* should see Sir Eyre Crowe or me when he might be talked to pretty frankly on the lines of my conversations with Baron Moncheur [see No. 212].'

No. 214

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 7)

*No. 106 [C 3288/433/18]**

WARSAW, February 28, 1925

Sir,

His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin was so good as to furnish me with a copy of his memorandum on the future relations between Germany and Poland and the German attitude towards Alsace-Lorraine, which formed the enclosure to his despatch No. 122 of the 14th February to the Foreign Office.¹

Not unnaturally my attention was attracted by his statement that no one in Berlin considered the Danzig corridor as a permanent arrangement, as I was interested to learn that his Excellency shared the opinion which I have held ever since my arrival here four years ago, and which, I believe, is also entertained by the majority of my colleagues and by a growing number of the more intelligent Poles.

In my annual report for 1921² I wrote: 'It remains one of the great political problems of the future how far Germany will submit permanently to the mutilation of Prussia, and to the separation of East and West Prussia by the corridor.' Again, in my annual report for 1922,³ I wrote: 'Both sides appear to be making the best of an impossible situation, but the separation of East and West Prussia by the Polish corridor presents a problem full of danger for the future.'

¹ No. 199.

² This was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Warsaw despatch No. 582 of December 23, 1922 (N 30/30/55 (1923)), not printed.

³ This was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Warsaw despatch No. 417 of September 29, 1923 (N 8023/8023/55), not printed.

Only yesterday I was discussing the general question of Polish-German relations with M. Rauscher, the German Minister, who left last night for Berlin to assist in the negotiations for a commercial treaty,⁴ and he declared that no one in Germany except a few extreme Nationalists thought of retaking Posnania, which had become a purely Polish province, and he even went so far as to say that in a few years' time Germany might grow reconciled to the loss of the Polish part of Upper Silesia.⁵ In regard to the Danzig corridor,⁶ however, he stated emphatically that no German would accept as permanent an arrangement which divided Prussia into two parts, and that, if no peaceful means could be discovered for rectifying this intolerable injustice, sooner or later it must lead to war.

In my opinion, M. Rauscher was stating an incontestable, though unpalatable, truth, for the longer I remain here the stronger grows my conviction that the corridor, as settled by the Treaty of Versailles, cannot be maintained permanently. Even if the Poles go to the utmost limit of concession in regard to privileges of transit, etc., petty annoyances are unavoidable, and the German sense of national dignity is subjected to constant humiliation. It is too much to expect that Germany can ever acquiesce in such an arrangement. On the other hand, with a nation so intensely patriotic as the Poles, it passes the wit of man to devise a peaceful solution of the problem, in spite of the fact that many of the more sensible Poles admit in conversation that some way out of the difficulty must be discovered if war is to be avoided.

I am interested to note that Lord D'Abernon suggests that a settlement might be facilitated on a basis of concessions to Poland in the direction of Kovno. Curiously enough the German Minister made exactly the same suggestion to me yesterday. My own view, however, is that it is too late to seek in Lithuania compensation for the abandonment by Poland of her rights in the corridor. I have always felt that the problem of providing access to the sea for Poland, which confronted the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles, should have been solved by giving Poland possession of the port of Memel⁷ either by a corridor or by the incorporation of Lithuania as an autonomous province of Poland. Such an arrangement would have presented many advantages; it would have obviated the constant bickerings with Lithuania which have endangered the peace of Eastern Europe during the past four years and it would not have created a permanent grievance for Germany, who would certainly have been willing to grant to Polish commerce free access to, and use of, the port at Danzig.

⁴ A provisional commercial agreement had been signed on January 13, 1925, which would expire on April 1 (a copy of the text was enclosed in Berlin despatch No. 56 of January 22, 1925, not printed). When the agreement lapsed, it was informally prolonged until June 15, but the commercial negotiations made no progress.

⁵ See Vol. XI, Chap. I and Vol. XVI, Part I.

⁶ See No. 205.

⁷ For previous documentation, see Vol. XXIII, Nos. 31, 289, 308, 405, 479, 495, 509, and Chap. III, *passim* (e.g. Nos. 518-24, 671, 677, and 750) and Vol. XXV, Nos. 355-65, *passim*, 385-91, *passim*, 401, 406, 410-11, 445, 477, n. 7, and 488.

Now it is too late for this. It is easy to be wise after the event, but I fear that the negotiators of the Treaty of Versailles committed an irremediable blunder in giving the Danzig corridor to Poland and thus creating a geographical situation which can never be accepted by Germany, and for which it is difficult to imagine anything but a violent solution.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, etc.,
W.G. MAX MULLER

No. 215

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 2, 9 a.m.)

No. 80 Telegraphic [C 2969/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, March 1, 1925, 8.50 p.m.

My telegram No. 69.¹

Following report has been received from Rome.

Contarini declared to German Ambassador² that Italian government were extremely satisfied with German initiative³ and would be ready to take part in negotiations.

As far as Contarini knew English attitude, he believed Italy to be in full agreement with it.

¹ No. 209.

² Baron C. von Neurath.

³ See No. 209.

No. 216

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 2, 9 a.m.)

No. 81 Telegraphic [C 3009/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, March 1, 1925, 8.50 p.m.

My telegram No. 69.¹

Following information reaches me from a confidential source.

French Ambassador² has had several conversations with German government regarding pact of non-aggression³ and communications have also passed through third parties. Stresemann's position is that Germany recognises utility of Poland as a buffer state. Poland can render service and it is a mistake to believe that Germany is in principle hostile to Polish

¹ No. 209. ² M. B. Jacquin de Margerie. ³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

autonomy. Germany is ready to undertake a solemn engagement not to endeavour to alter the present . . .⁴ by force of arms. It would be quite a different matter, however, to conclude that Germany regarded Polish frontier as satisfactory or as a permanent solution.

Regarding negotiations for security on eastern frontier of France, French Ambassador is reported to have expressed personal view that hostility shown by certain sections of Paris press to any agreement with Germany regarding non-aggression was foolish and not practical politics. Provided that England took part, some arrangement of this kind might be of great value. He considered, however, that without intervention of England the sentimental distrust of any German promise would be such that even a most favourable arrangement would be refused by French public opinion.

I gather that same view respecting necessity of English participation has been expressed privately by the Belgian Minister.⁵

⁴ The text is here uncertain.

⁵ Count G. della Faille de Leverghem.

No. 217

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 2, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 87 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2931/459/18]

PARIS, March 1, 1925

On February 27th before the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, Monsieur Herriot dealt at length with the question of security and evidently went far in divulging the German proposals for a peace pact.¹ Press has consequently now begun to discuss these proposals and the 'Quotidien' is evidently in possession of authoritative information. Monsieur Pierre Bertrand in that newspaper has been writing most sympathetically towards the German offer urging that it should receive fair and unprejudiced treatment. Owing to Monsieur Bertrand's intimacy with Monsieur Herriot I am inclined to think that he is being employed to test public opinion here.

Generally speaking the Press has fastened on the question of a guarantee for Poland and Czechoslovakia, without which any such pact is pronounced as useless. This point and the situation created by the death of President Ebert,² which is held to necessitate caution, are the two considerations emphasized by the Press. As to the second of these it is pointed out that no settlement can be reached until the Presidential election³ has shown the direction in which German public opinion is moving.

¹ See No. 197, n. 1.

² The German President had died on February 28 after an operation for appendicitis.

³ In Berlin telegram No. 89 of March 3, Lord D'Abernon reported: 'Presidential election

Certain old-school writers condemn the German offer out of hand, but they are not very numerous at present and if the Polish difficulty can be overcome I think their voices may be weakened.

I have dealt with the matter fully in my despatch No. 520.⁴

fixed for 29th March, with second date of voting 26th April in case of no absolute majority on first vote.'

⁴ Of March 1, not printed.

No. 218

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 3, 9 a.m.)*

No. 86 Telegraphic [C 3097/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, March 2, 1925, 8.25 p.m.

Your despatch to Paris No. 6(?86),¹ page 2, line 9.

I notice that French Ambassador considers that it would be far easier to come to an arrangement with Germany regarding pact of non-aggression if a previous settlement . . .² made between France, Belgium and England.

I advise some reserve in adopting this view if it means a formal allied defensive pact antecedent to a second pact including Germany.

The German government memorandum of February 9th³ appears to be meant as a broad gesture of reconciliation and appeasement.

If it is treated as subordinate and ancillary to an agreement perpetuating war grouping there is little hope of initiative of German government being endorsed by public opinion here.

The public in Germany is at present unaware of far-reaching character of German communication. Strict secrecy has been observed. When text of this communication becomes public there will be general surprise at boldness of policy indicated—a surprise which in many circles will be accompanied by resentment. The government will be in for heavy weather.

The only line on which they can fight the question is broad basis of a regeneration of Europe through obliteration of war animosities and allaying of war alarms.

This line will be impossible if new pact against German danger has just been signed by allies.

I should anticipate no insuperable difficulty in obtaining such a modification of German proposal as would bring it into full consonance with Herriot's formula—arbitration, disarmament, security.

¹ No. 590, below.

² The text is here uncertain. In another text, this sentence read: '... if a previous arrangement had been made. ...'

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

Memorandum for the British Representative at Geneva¹ on the subject of the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the question of the Entry of Germany into the League of Nations, and of the Reply to be sent by the Council of the League to the German Note of December 12, 1924²

[C 3234/109/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 3, 1925

The 18th item on the agenda of the next council meeting³ is—
'Memorandum of the German Government of the 12th December, 1924'²

This item has no *rapporteur*, and will, therefore, presumably have to be introduced by the president, in this case the Secretary of State.

2. The previous history of Germany's desire to enter the League of Nations is given in the Foreign Office memorandum of the 29th January (Annex A).⁴ The recent history is briefly as follows: On the 2[9]th September the German Government addressed identic memoranda to all the States represented on the council, informing them of Germany's desire to enter the League without further delay, but adding that she must first be clear on certain points of decisive importance.⁵ The chief of these were—

(1) Her desire for a permanent seat on the council, and

(2) The bearing of article 16 on a State disarmed to the extent Germany was disarmed;

as to these she was bound to make reservations.

3. All the ten States replied to this memorandum on more or less similar lines to the effect that, while they would welcome Germany as a member of the council, they could not agree to her receiving any special privileges.⁶ Thereupon, on the 12th December,² the German Government addressed a communication on the matter to the competent authorities of the League of Nations. The object was not to apply for admission to that body, but to draw attention to the difficulties that would, in German opinion, arise from article 16 of the covenant were Germany unconditionally to accept the obligations of League membership; the hope was expressed that the League would discover some means of allaying the German Government's misgivings. This memorandum was duly circulated by the League secretariat to all members of the League of Nations, and it is this memorandum which will come up for discussion at the forthcoming council meeting.

¹ Mr. Chamberlain.

² For a text, see *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 323–6.

³ See No. 74, n. 4.

⁴ Not printed (C 1422/109/18).

⁵ A copy of the German note to His Majesty's Government is filed at C 15217/2072/18, not printed. See Vol. XXVI, No. 590.

⁶ A copy of His Majesty's Government's note of October 8 in reply is filed at C 15532/2072/18, not printed.

4. The policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to this memorandum has been defined in a note sent to the Swedish Minister on the 9th February (Annex B),⁷ in reply to his enquiry⁸ as to the attitude they proposed to adopt. Two points were brought out in this note:—

(1) That while they remained in favour of the early entrance of Germany into the League, His Majesty's Government did not propose themselves to take the initiative in placing the German communication upon the agenda at the forthcoming meeting of the council;

(2) That they did not consider Germany's claim to receive assurances as to special treatment in regard to the obligations imposed on members of the League by article 16 of the covenant could be conceded. The establishment of two categories of League membership, one with full and the other with limited liability, was not to be contemplated, and the case of Switzerland could in no way be invoked as a precedent.

5. Early the same month (February 1925) the secretary-general circulated an exhaustive exposition on the German memorandum by Dr. van Hamel, head of the legal section of the League secretariat (Annex C):⁹ Dr. van Hamel, in the first place, confirmed at considerable length the legal case against giving Germany any special privileges in respect of article 16. Secondly, he discussed the point whether the council was competent to send a reply, his conclusion being that, while the assembly would appear to be the proper organ to give a reply, there would be no objection to the council doing so as long as it gave no promise or undertakings in the name of the other members of the League; a reply containing suggestions which might help the German Government to overcome its difficulties would certainly be within the council's powers. Finally, he suggested the terms of a draft reply (paragraph 15 of Annex C).⁹ This was briefly to the effect that—

(1) It was impossible to give any State member of the League special rights in respect of its obligations. This would be contrary to one of the basic principles of the League.

(2) No member of the League would have to contribute more to the common action than was within its powers—a position that Germany could safeguard all the more were she herself a member of the council; though even without this safeguard other States with equal disabilities had joined the League without hesitation.

(3) If Germany wished to lessen the possibility of conflicts she would do so better by openly accepting all the principles connected with League membership than by endeavouring to obtain an exceptional position.

6. This draft and Dr. van Hamel's memorandum were duly considered by the Foreign Office, and it was generally decided—

(1) That a reply to the German memorandum of the 12th December² was desirable; and

⁷ Not printed. See, however, No. 196.

⁸ See No. 196, n. 3

⁹ Not printed. See No. 211, n. 8.

(2) That Dr. van Hamel's draft, being not effectively different from our own attitude to the question, would serve as a basis for discussion with the only reservation that all reference to the Geneva Protocol¹⁰ should be omitted as being obviously premature.

7. Since then a second draft has been drawn up by the League secretariat (Annex D),¹¹ apparently without knowledge of Dr. van Hamel's draft. A copy has been sent privately to the Department. The new draft contains the following differences in substance from Dr. van Hamel's: While including the first two points of the latter's draft (viz., that a privileged position is impossible, and no member would have to contribute more than within its powers), it begins by emphasising the point that the entry of a non-member State into the League is ultimately for the decision of the assembly. Later it includes a paragraph inviting the German Government to send representatives to discuss the question at Geneva when the members of the council are again assembled in June. Finally, it concludes by saying that all the members of the council would cordially welcome Germany as a member, especially in view of the discussions regarding security that will take place at the next assembly meeting.

As this second draft reply has not been circulated to the members of the council, and as we are told specifically¹² that it has not been seen by even Sir [E.] Drummond,¹³ it seems better to ignore it and to deal with the van Hamel draft as originally agreed.

¹⁰ See No. 10, n. 4.

¹¹ Not printed. A copy of this draft by Sir A. Salter, Director of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations, is filed at C 2970/109/18, not printed.

¹² In the covering letter of February 27 to Mr. Cadogan from Mr. F. Walters, a member of the Office of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, not printed.

¹³ Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

No. 220

Memorandum on the Application to Germany's Eastern Frontier of the recent German Proposals for a Solution of the Security Problem

[C 3172/459/18]

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 3, 1925*

The German proposals for a security pact put forward at various times since December 1922¹ and renewed in a more elaborate form in a memorandum to His Majesty's Government of January 20th 1925,² were

¹ See No. 189, n. 7. For German proposals of May and September, 1923, see Vol. XXI, Nos. 201, n. 2, 346, 348-9, 355, Enclosure, and 358, Enclosure. A memorandum was communicated to His Majesty's Government on February 11, 1924 (C 2602/2408/18), not printed, which dealt with French security.

² See No. 189, Enclosure.

concerned with finding a solution of the Rhineland problem. In addition to a mutual undertaking not to go to war, but to submit all disputes, whether legal or political, to arbitration, there was to be a special pact guaranteeing the existing territorial status of the Rhineland and its demilitarisation.

2. The idea of a pact in which Germany would join has been from time to time the subject of discussion in the press of the countries concerned, and it is evident that in some quarters at all events in France the suggestion of a Rhineland pact is looked upon as a mere manœuvre to erect a barrier which France would be prevented from crossing in the event of an attack by Germany on her eastern neighbours, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The French people are recalling how Sedan³ was preceded by Sadowa⁴ and it is a fixed belief in France that as soon as Germany recovers her military strength she will attempt to paralyse the countries on her eastern border, prior to a war of revenge against France.

3. The German government are now making an effort to remove this suspicion concerning their intentions in the east.

4. The German memorandum of January 20th to His Majesty's Government was followed by *verbal* explanations to Lord D'Abernon by Herr von Schubert,⁵ the permanent Head of the German Foreign Office, who said that Germany was ready to sign *arbitration* treaties not only with the Powers interested in the Rhine, but with those Powers whose frontiers touched Germany on the east.

5. On February 9th a memorandum was handed to the French government by the German government,⁶ substantially the same as that communicated to His Majesty's Government on January 20th, but with the addition of a sentence suggesting that the proposed pact might be so drafted as to prepare the way for a world convention to include all states. In discussing this memorandum with M. Herriot, the German Ambassador intimated that Germany was prepared to consider the conclusion of a treaty of arbitration with Poland and Czechoslovakia.⁷ Further, Herr von Hoesch stated *verbally* that while the eastern frontier of Germany would not be guaranteed in the same manner as that of the west, a way out might be found by reference to article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, thus obviating all idea of solution by force.⁸ Article 19 of the Covenant reads:—

'The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.'

6. Germany's unwillingness to guarantee the existing territorial status

³ The decisive French defeat of September 1, 1870, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1.

⁴ This battle of July 3, 1866, between Prussia and Austria and their respective German allies destroyed Austrian influence in Germany and established Prussia's hegemony.

⁵ See No. 190.

⁶ See No. 197.

⁷ See No. 207.

⁸ See No. 590, below.

on her eastern frontier in the same way as she is prepared to guarantee that on her western frontier, is said to have been explained by Dr. Stresemann to the French Ambassador at Berlin in the following manner. Germany recognises the utility of Poland as a buffer state and is not in principle hostile to Polish autonomy. She cannot regard the Polish frontier as satisfactory or as a permanent solution. She is, however, ready to undertake a solemn engagement not to endeavour to alter the present frontier by force of arms.

No. 221

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 5)

*No. 158 [C 3163/460/18]**

BERLIN, March 3, 1925

His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum based on information supplied by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, regarding the commercial negotiations between Germany and other countries.

The details regarding the Franco-German commercial negotiations foreshadowed in Lord D'Abernon's telegram No. 82 of the 1st March¹ have not yet been furnished by the Ministry.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 221

Note on Commercial Negotiations between Germany and other Countries

BERLIN, February 27, 1925

1. Belgium

The Belgian delegation returned to Berlin on the 17th instant, and the negotiations are proceeding favourably, as the Belgian Government has agreed to grant Germany *de jure* most-favoured-nation treatment for the final treaty, provided the Germans are prepared to meet the Belgian wishes in respect of the duties on a number of items in which they are particularly interested. Amongst these are heavy draught horses, the sale of which in Germany is of considerable importance to the Belgians.

¹ This ran: 'French Ambassador informs me that agreement has practically been reached in Paris as to a provisorium for ten months. It is agreed that future treaty will constitute in effect reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment with slight exceptions.

'Certain special advantages will be granted to produce of Alsace-Lorraine.

'The Ambassador could not say anything definite regarding contingents.

'Ministry for Foreign Affairs promise me for tomorrow precise statement.'

A provisional arrangement between Germany and Belgium is to be concluded for one year. During this period both countries will discriminate against each other, and they have agreed that such discrimination shall be exercised against forty-two items of the German customs tariff for the first six months and against twenty-five for the whole period. Negotiations are taking place this afternoon concerning the Belgian articles against which the Germans will discriminate for the duration of the provisional agreement.

2. *United States of America*

The German Government have not yet received formal notice of the reservations which the Americans propose to make in respect of their treaty with Germany, but it is the intention of the Germans to accept these reservations, as they will in any case not operate for one year, and the Germans feel confident that when the matter is again brought up before the Senate at the end of that time, the proposed changes will not be agreed to.

3. *Spain*

As already reported,² the acceptance or rejection of this treaty depends upon the question of wine duties. The discussions have been suspended until the Reichstag meets again next week. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs still entertain doubts as to whether it will be possible to secure a majority in favour of the treaty as it stands. It would be easy to do so under normal political conditions, as the Socialists and Democrats are in favour of it, but the Nationalists and the Centrum, although in a minority, are sure to vote against the treaty, and the Opposition parties will in that case also reject it on the ground that they do not wish to support Government measures and thus make matters easy for their political opponents.

4. *Poland*

Negotiations will begin in Berlin on the 1st March, the leader of the German side being Staatssekretär Lewald. He was a member of the German delegation which concluded the Geneva agreement in respect of Upper Silesia,³ and was also German representative when the questions of nationality were discussed between Germany and Poland. As already stated in previous reports, the chief subjects for negotiation will be the commercial and industrial relations between the ceded portion of Upper Silesia and Germany and the liquidation of German properties in that area and other former German territories.⁴

5. *Russia*

The German delegation returned to Moscow on the 24th February, and there is nothing to report yet. While not objecting to the Russian foreign trade monopoly as such, the Germans will insist that they be given such

² Berlin despatch No. 635 of August 31, 1924, not printed.

³ For the text of the convention for the establishment of a conventional regime in Upper Silesia, of May 15, 1922, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 365-585.

⁴ See No. 214, n. 4.

facilities as will in practice enable them to carry on trade, otherwise no treaty will be concluded, or, if it is, it will remain a dead letter.

6. *Austria*

The supplementary agreement to the Anglo [*sic*: Austro] -German Treaty,⁵ which has already been fully reported upon, was passed by the Reichstag on the 20th February; as a matter of fact, it had already been in operation since the 1st January.

7. *Portugal*

The provisional arrangement with Portugal, which was signed on the 31st December, 1924,⁶ and which has already been reported upon in detail, was also passed by the Reichstag on the 20th February. This has also been in operation since the 1st January last, inasmuch as importers of Portuguese goods and products were informed by the German Government that, in respect of any imports since the 1st January, they would be refunded the difference between the autonomous tariff and the conventional tariff laid down in the German-Portuguese Agreement, as soon as the latter was ratified.

F. THELWALL

Commercial Secretary

⁵ Of September 1, 1920 (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 121, pp. 994-1013). For the supplementary agreement of July 12, 1924, see *ibid.*, vol. 125, pp. 121-49.

⁶ An Exchange of Notes providing for the Provisional Regulation of Commercial Relations had been signed on April 28, 1923 (see *ibid.*, vol. 120, pp. 569-74). This was prolonged by further exchanges of notes on March 14, 1924 and December 31, 1924.

No. 222

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 776 [C 3170/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 4, 1925*

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Lordship herewith a record of a conversation which took place today between the French Ambassador and Sir Eyre Crowe on the subject of security.

I am, etc.,

(In the absence of the Secretary of State)

HAROLD NICOLSON

*Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French Ambassador*FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 4, 1925*

The French Ambassador called today, when I expressed to him the regret of Mr. Chamberlain on his inability to receive His Excellency because, owing to the sudden departure from London of the Prime Minister,¹ he had to act as Leader in the House of Commons.

The Ambassador said he particularly regretted not to see the Secretary of State because he had been most anxious to talk over with him a number of important questions. Four of these had reference to matters which were to come up for discussion at the meeting of the Council of the League.² I record his observations on these in a separate note.³

The Ambassador's chief object had been an unofficial exchange of views with the Secretary of State on the all-important question of an Anglo-French pact of security. He had desired to continue the conversation which he had already had with Mr. Chamberlain on the subject of the overtures made by the German Government.⁴ He laid stress on the fact that he had had no definite instructions from Paris on this point, but wished to place his own personal views before the Secretary of State. He had made a short note himself which, at my request, he agreed to leave with me. I attach it to the present memorandum. He has come to the conclusion that the negotiation of a pact to be signed by the German, and possibly even the Italian, governments would present great practical difficulties to the French mind. A pact signed by four or five powers would be felt to be little more than a repetition, even if a confirmation, of what was already provided for in the Treaty of Versailles. This fact would tend to deprive it of all special value. It was for this reason that already considerable opposition to the idea was being expressed in France. It would be a totally different thing if a pact with Germany were to form the accompaniment, or the immediate consequence of, a separate pact between Great Britain, France and Belgium. In fact, he considered that the Anglo-Franco-Belgian pact should be the nucleus around which other pacts with Germany, with Italy, possibly with Poland, might be grouped. It might quite possibly be arranged that all these pacts should be signed simultaneously, but the fact that the pact with England constituted a separate and different instrument would make all the difference and

¹ Mr. Baldwin had left London on March 3 to visit his mother who was seriously ill. Mrs. Baldwin died on May 16.

² See No. 74, n. 4.

³ Sir E. Crowe's record of these observations, divided into extracts and filed according to the subject, have not been preserved in the Foreign Office archives. M. de Fleuriau's note of the matters—the economic restoration of Austria, Hungary's evasion of the Treaty charges, the municipal loan for Danzig, and the League of Nations control scheme (see No. 10, n. 2) is filed at C 3170/459/18, not printed.

⁴ See No. 196.

would give the whole aggregate of arrangements the form of something entirely outside of, and additional to, the Treaty of Versailles.

M. de Fleuriau thought that we would no doubt realise the special importance which France must attach to satisfactory stipulations appearing in the pact with Germany concerning her Eastern frontiers. In accordance with the suggestion thrown out by the German Government themselves, they would have to renounce all idea of trying to bring about a modification of these frontiers by any but peaceful means. An engagement to that effect ought to be connected in some way with the League of Nations; it ought to be an essential condition, in any case, that Germany joined the League.

A further point which might be specially dealt with was the question of Austria's federation with Germany, which should remain prohibited except on the conditions consigned in Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles. The Ambassador realised that so comprehensive a settlement would necessarily require some time to negotiate, but he thought it was very desirable that the British and French Governments should clear their minds on the subject and come to some understanding on a general line of policy, as soon as possible.

I promised to lay this communication at once before the Secretary of State. The Ambassador repeated his earnest desire to have a brief talk with him before his departure for Paris on the 6th.⁵ He said that, although he had an engagement tomorrow afternoon, he would gladly put it off and hold himself at Mr. Chamberlain's disposal at any time tomorrow, though he would prefer the morning. He added that if Mr. Chamberlain would do him the honour to lunch with him tomorrow it would give him great pleasure. He would there meet Mr. and Mrs. Churchill,⁶ who had accepted his invitation.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 222

Note by M. de Fleuriau

Non officiel

Pacte franco-anglo-belge-allemand ne constituerait pas une augmentation, mais un affaiblissement, des garanties non réalisées du Traité de Versailles. Mais un pacte f[ranco]-a[nгло]-b[elge] ou deux pactes f[ranco]-a[nglais] et a[nгло]-b[elge] précédant le pacte général proposé par l'Allemagne aurait beaucoup de force s'il était complété par un engagement réciproque de ne pas recourir à la force et par un traité d'arbitrage obligatoire à condition:

1. de n'affaiblir en rien les stipulations du Traité de Versailles (art[icles] 430, 44, 213), ni celles du statut de la Société des Nations;

⁵ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227, below.

⁶ Mr. W. Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer.

2. que l'Allemagne fût entrée dans la Société des Nations.

Précautions à prendre en ce qui concerne les frontières orientales de l'Allemagne, les Traités entre l'Allemagne et ses voisins de l'Est devant être conclus en même temps que les pactes.

Précautions à prendre du côté de l'Autriche. Maintien de l'article 80 du T[raité] de Versailles.

Il faudra donc du temps pour mettre au point ces questions.

No. 223

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 92 Telegraphic [C 3287/459/18]

BERLIN, March 6, 1925, 8.10 p.m.

Addressed to Paris No. 3.

Following for Secretary of State.¹

Your speech of yesterday² indicating attitude of His Majesty's Government is widely quoted in all papers and has produced excellent impression.

The main result should be to confirm German government in policy of pacification and to diminish danger of opposition from the Right.

The latter remains real menace to successful prosecution of policy adopted.

In my opinion maximum reasonable rapidity of action is desirable so as to create new atmosphere before opposition can form.

¹ Mr. Chamberlain arrived in Paris on March 6 *en route* to Geneva (see No. 74, n. 4).

² For that portion of Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the debate in the House of Commons on foreign affairs which related to security, see 181 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 707-10 and 713-15.

No. 224

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 9)

*[C 3367/459/18]**

Secret

[PARIS], March 7, 1925

My dear Crowe,

I had a long conversation alone with M. Herriot¹ after dinner last night. I told him that I had come with no idea of carrying on negotiations or making any proposals to him, but I was glad to have an opportunity of reviewing the situation in the light of what had passed since I last met him.

¹ See No. 223, n. 1.

I told him, in the first place, of our decision *not* to sign the protocol,² giving two or three broad reasons and explaining that neither His Majesty's Government nor the dominions thought it wise or possible to extend so greatly the powers and the sanctions of the covenant. I added that we had considered whether we could propose amendments, but we had found that the changes which would be necessary were so great that this was not a practical course. Accordingly, I proposed to make an announcement to the League of our decision, in the form that I might find most convenient to my colleagues at Geneva, that the attitude which His Majesty's Government would take up would not be entirely negative; we should point to the possibility of other arrangements.

This brought me directly to the question of security. I said that I must talk to him with absolute frankness. I had to tell him, to my great personal regret, that neither the state of public opinion at home nor of public opinion in the dominions would allow us to enter into an Anglo-French or Anglo-Franco-Belgian pact. Any such proposal would be opposed by the whole strength of the Liberal and Labour party and by a considerable section of our own party. If we could carry it at all, it would thus be carried by a greatly diminished majority and as a purely party measure, and the other parties would certainly repudiate from the first any obligation to observe it. It would therefore at best be a purely party pact, certain to be terminated whenever there was a reversal of party fortunes. On the other hand, the German proposals³ seemed to us to offer a hope of a solution in which we might co-operate. I developed at some length the reasons for which we attach so much importance to this German step, and I said that if, as it seemed to us, it might lead to some mutual pact, including Germany, which would really increase the security of France and secure the peace of Europe, His Majesty's Government would do their utmost not to let it fail for want of British goodwill and help. I concluded by saying that I thought it best thus to define our attitude with complete frankness and with as much precision as was possible. I did not ask M. Herriot to give me any reply that evening or even today, but I would beg him most seriously to consider what I had said and to study the German proposals from the point of view of formulating the conditions which would render them acceptable to France and make them a real guarantee for European peace. Perhaps at some later time after such consideration he could authorise M. de Fleuriau to give me an *aide-mémoire* of his views on this subject, which I could submit for the consideration of the British Cabinet. In the meantime, I should, of course, be interested to hear his first impressions, but I had no desire to commit him in any way at this stage.

M. Herriot, who had listened in complete silence and with a face that

² On March 4, the Cabinet had decided that Mr. Chamberlain should be authorised to announce to the Council of the League the decision of the British Government not to adhere to the Geneva Protocol (see No. 10, n. 4). An extract of the Cabinet Minutes (Cab. 14 (25)) is filed at C 3458/459/18, not printed.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

became increasingly drawn as I proceeded, said that he must thank me for my frankness, but that he could not conceal that the decisions of the Government were a great disappointment and a great blow to him. In pursuance of his policy of appeasement he had associated himself very directly with the protocol, and undoubtedly its rejection was a serious thing for him. As regards the German proposals, he viewed them obviously with the gravest suspicion. He mentioned four points which at once struck him: First, did the Germans contemplate that it should be a condition of their offer that the fifteen years' occupation of German territory should be shortened? To such a condition no French Government could possibly accede. Next, he turned to the eastern frontiers and to the distinction drawn in the German proposals between the frontiers of the east and west. He was obliged to restrain the impetuosity of young States which might otherwise embroil France by their indiscretion, but Poland was an ally, and France must be very solicitous for her safety. The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁴ who arrived in Paris a day or two ago, had been with him that afternoon. For some reason which M. Herriot did not understand, whether distrust of himself or any other cause, he said nothing on this question, though he had given a long interview to the press, but the Ambassador⁵ had already been to him in great anxiety protesting that Poland could not consent to expose her boundaries to uncertainty. M. Herriot's third point was that the German proposals made no mention of the southern frontier. That certainly was a matter of immense importance to Italy. If we came to an agreement with Germany about the western and eastern boundaries and left the southern boundary unmentioned, Germany and Austria would unite in six months. Lastly, M. Herriot, observing that he knew Dr. Luther, thought him up to a point an honest man, recognised the truth of what I had said that these German proposals were more advantageous than anything which had yet been proposed to the Allies and were specially important as coming from Luther and his Cabinet, yet asked himself whether the whole thing were not really a manœuvre by Luther for the purposes of his domestic policy. He had a majority of the Right in the background, but he was anxious, perhaps, to show certain liberal tendencies so as not to antagonise the Socialist majority. Then M. Herriot, becoming much more rhetorical, as Lord Crewe had warned me he often is, made me a speech of much feeling and evident emotion on the dangers which France ran. A propaganda of revenge was already being preached in every university and school. France, unable to restore her devastated regions, obliged to refuse money to rebuild schools and hospitals, had yet been forced—he might truly say forced—by the United States to subscribe to the German loan.⁶ He must admit that it was humiliating to him to find into what

⁴ Count A. Skrzynski.

⁵ Dr. A. Chlapowski.

⁶ On October 10, 1924, in accordance with the Dawes Plan (see No. 27, n. 8), British, Belgian, French, and United States bankers signed an agreement with German delegates

dependence France had been brought by her misfortunes. France, struggling with her financial and economic situation, determined—for he *was* determined—to make a settlement of her debts whenever she could, saw Germany rapidly recovering, Luther able to make huge payments to the industrialists of the Ruhr and spend large sums on development. Germany was rapidly recovering her position. ‘From my heart,’ he said, ‘I tell you I look forward with terror to her making war upon us again in ten years.’

These are the general lines of the conversation. To these apprehensions and to the expression of his disappointment and difficulties he returned again and again, and I felt it would be unwise to argue too strongly at that moment on the other side. I told him, however, that Stresemann had informed Lord D’Abernon, in reply to an enquiry from me, that he had no idea of making the evacuation of the whole occupied territory a condition of his proposal.⁷ I added that it was curious that no mention was made of Belgium in any of the memoranda, not even in the one which had been handed in at Brussels,⁸ but I assumed that the guarantee of the frontiers of France would extend to those of Belgium, whilst if Germany was not going to war either on the east or the west, I could not believe that she intended to provoke trouble for the sake of restoring the Tyrol to Austria. M. Herriot sat silent for some time, and then asked what became of the League of Nations and of the covenant. I replied that our obligations under the covenant and to the League remained exactly what they were, but he himself had admitted that neither the covenant nor the protocol would give France the security that she needed. It was for this reason that he had sought the separate pact which it had been my duty to tell him it was out of the power of any British Government to accord, and it was for this reason that we desired him to consider most seriously whether that security might not be gained as a result of negotiations on the German proposals. What I did endeavour to do was to mark the framework within which His Majesty’s Government thought that it would be possible for them to co-operate in this work. M. Herriot finally asked me to come and see him again today, after lunch, and said that he should say nothing of our interview. We must proceed in any case with the greatest caution. Time must be given for French provincial opinion to seize the problem and make itself felt, and Paris must not be allowed to explode before provincial opinion could make itself heard. More than that, M. Herriot expressed the strong hope that I would stop in Paris on the way back, not, as it appeared, because he had in mind anything in particular that he would wish then to discuss with me, but because he was afraid that the differences which must arise between us at Geneva might give public opinion the impression of a rupture between France and

for a loan of £40 million to Germany (see Vol. XXVI, No. 570). France was responsible for £3 million of the loan.

⁷ See No. 200, n. 12.

⁸ See No. 209.

ourselves, and that it was most important to do anything we could to prevent this impression getting abroad. He did not ask me for an immediate engagement, though he showed additional anxiety when he expressed a little doubt, as to whether my parliamentary engagements would make it possible, and I then said I would make a point of doing it.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 225

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 9)

[C 3368/459/18]*

Secret

[PARIS], March 7, 1925

My dear Crowe,

My conversation with M. Herriot¹ was renewed after lunch today, and lasted nearly two hours. He began by thanking me for the frankness with which I had explained to him the position of the British Government, for which he was grateful, however painful it might have been. He had been reflecting upon what I had said, and he had jotted down some points which had at once occurred to him as being vital. First, as I had observed, the Germans had made no mention of the Belgian frontier, but he thought that this omission could not have been intentional, and he assumed that they meant to include the frontier of Belgium in their guarantee. This, I said, appeared to me essential. He then raised the question of Holland, the guarantee of whose territory was equally important to France and Great Britain. It might be worth while to consider whether Holland could not be included in any agreement that we contemplated. He had been somewhat surprised to read in a Dutch paper a statement by a prominent Dutch statesman that Holland would in no circumstances take any part in a pact of mutual defence. In reply to his mention of Holland, I summarised the relevant part of my conversation with Baron van Swinderen,² as recorded in my despatch No. 73 to The Hague.³

M. Herriot's second point referred to the Rhine. He repeated, with even greater insistence than last night, that *no* French Government could contemplate as a condition of any pact that the fifteen years' period of occupation should be shortened. On this subject, he said, some anxiety had been caused to him by the 'Balfour note'. At first I could not understand to what he referred, and he himself did not seem very certain, but I came to the conclusion that it was obviously some journalistic

¹ See No. 224.

² Mr. Chamberlain's conversation with the Netherlands Ambassador to London was held on February 19.

³ Of February 19, not printed.

reference to the draft despatch on the Geneva Protocol which Lord Balfour submitted to the Cabinet,⁴ and I was able to reassure him. I again repeated that Dr. Stresemann had informed Lord D'Abernon that this was *not* a condition which the German Government proposed.⁵

More important was his third point. He was, he explained, seeking tentatively a means of reconciling the British and the French point of view. I had explained to him that we could not make a separate pact with France and Belgium directed against Germany, but could we not begin by agreeing among ourselves on the terms which we might propose to Germany for a quadrilateral pact. Obviously, if the Germans were brought into the negotiations from the first, there would be great embarrassment in their presence. He could say things to me as an ally that he could not say in the presence of the Germans. He could tell me the grounds for his fears and particularise his fears in a way which would be impossible if German auditors were present. As he developed this thesis at some length, he seemed to me to be edging round tentatively to the proposal that we should conclude, as part of one negotiation, two separate pacts, one Anglo-Franco-Belgian and the other of the three Powers and Germany, but he never expressly stated this, and, when I came to reply, I said that, if his proposal was for conference and agreement among the Allies before we put forward any proposals to the Germans, I was in entire accord with him, but that, if his proposal was for separate pacts, that was not, in my opinion, possible.

His fourth point was Poland. He dwelt again on the obligations of France to Poland. On this occasion he went so far as to say that he could believe that the Germans did not mean to renounce all hope of winning back Alsace-Lorraine, but that the more they renounced their hopes in the west, the more certain it was that they would cultivate their hopes in the east, and France could not purchase her own security at the expense of her ally. This is very much what President Doumergue had said to me in the conversation which I had with him this morning. He had said that if the Anglo-American pact⁶ had materialised, there would very probably have been no Polish alliance,⁷ but France could not remain isolated. She had been forced to make this alliance, and she could not dishonour her word. I said to both the President of the Republic and to M. Herriot that the undertaking to avoid recourse to war for the realisation of any hopes which Germany might cherish, even in regard to the eastern frontier, was in itself a new security for Poland, whilst the general appeasement that would follow an accord between ourselves and Germany would tend to render more secure the situation everywhere.

M. Herriot's fifth point was that of the southern boundaries of Germany. He repeated that if an arrangement were come to in regard to

⁴ This draft despatch (C.I.D. Paper 589-B) was revised in the Cabinet on March 4. The revised memorandum as finally approved was attached as Appendix II to Cab. 14 (25) (copy at C 3458/459/18, not printed).

⁵ See No. 200, n. 12.

⁶ See No. 185, n. 1.

⁷ See No. 187.

both east and west which made no reference to the south, Austria would be rapidly absorbed. This would not only be a new danger to France, but in particular a great menace to Italy. Germany would be inclined to press forward to Trieste, and he did not suppose that the British Government would wish her to become a Mediterranean Power.

The sixth point which M. Herriot had noted was the question whether Germany should be called upon to enter the League before or after the examination of her proposals for a pact. He did not do more than ask the question and, I think, had not himself reached any fixed conclusion on the subject, nor was it necessary for me to express an opinion, but my own view is that it ought to be a condition of the conclusion of the pact that Germany should enter the League. It would no doubt, from many points of view, be desirable that she should take that step in advance of negotiations for the pact.

Lastly, M. Herriot asked me whether I had observed that Germany was at this moment refusing to conclude a treaty of arbitration with Switzerland. The refusal gave occasion for thought: What was in Germany's mind; what motive had she in her refusal? I was able to throw no light on these subjects, for indeed, I was unaware of the fact; and if we do not already possess information, I should be glad if you would have enquiry made.⁸ This concluded all that M. Herriot wished to say for the moment on that subject. He emphasised the fact that there had been no time for consultation with other Ministers; that the views which he expressed were purely personal, and that they might not be shared by all his colleagues; and, indeed, he evidently expected strong resistance from some of them to any idea of including Germany in a pact under any conditions whatever.

I asked M. Herriot if he had anything to say to me on the subject of Danzig⁹ (about which we had exchanged a few sentences before dinner last night) and the patriarchate.¹⁰ He evidently was not prepared to discuss these questions in any detail; he professed agreement with the view I had expressed last night that we should preach as occasion arose moderation on both sides in each of the disputes; in the case of Danzig, proceed as quickly as possible to the delimitation of the port and see whether any means could be found to limit the number of appeals which were made to the Council of the League. But he was evidently content to leave this matter to be treated with me by M. Briand¹¹ at Geneva. In regard to the patriarchate, he doubted whether the Turks would consent to treat it as anything but an internal question. He was inclined to think that the best thing for Greece would to be remove the patriarchate to Athens, for, after all, even if the present difficulty at Constantinople were

⁸ See No. 235, below.

⁹ See Nos. 199, 205, and 214.

¹⁰ See No. 38, n. 5.

¹¹ M. Briand was to be French delegate to the Council of the League of Nations (see No. 74, n. 4). He had been French President of the Council July, 1909–February, 1911, and January–March, 1913, and President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs October, 1915–March, 1917, and January, 1921–January, 1922.

tided over, the position of the patriarchate, which, in the eyes of the Turk was a Turkish institution, and in the eyes of the Greeks a racial headship, would be certain to involve further difficulties at a later time. From conversations that he had had with Politis¹² and other indications of the views of the Greek Government, he thought that they were not unfavourably inclined towards this solution.

M. Herriot then invited me to speak of the question of Cologne. I impressed upon him with the utmost earnestness our view that the Germans should be admitted to a meeting with the Allies. I told him that, in deference to him, I was willing to waive my great wish that the demands should be handed to the Germans across the table, provided that, in return for this concession, he would meet me by consenting that, when the note¹³ was presented in Berlin, it should be accompanied by a statement that we were ready to receive them. On this point I found him very difficult. He dwelt upon the great difference which exists between the circumstances of the demands which we are now making and of the negotiations that were necessary to secure the adoption of the Dawes Report.¹⁴ In the latter case, of course, new conditions not contemplated by the treaty were accepted by Germany. That could only be done by negotiation and agreement, but, in this case, there was no question of Germany undertaking new obligations, but only of the fulfilment of old ones. He did not desire 'un dictat,' of which the Germans were always talking. What he wished was 'un constat'. All we had to do was to establish that here were certain obligations which were unfulfilled, the fulfilment of which was necessary before Cologne could be evacuated. He repeated that he did not exclude the idea that the Germans might be admitted to make observations at some time, but he obviously felt that my proposal would place him in a position of great difficulty with French public opinion. I could push him no further for the time being, but I left him under no doubt as to the importance which I attached to this procedure. M. Herriot then developed a long argument upon the inter-connection between security and evacuation. He dealt with the Anglo-American guarantee pact,⁶ and the framing of articles 428 and 429 of the Treaty of Versailles, and of the concluding words of that section. It was not, to me, very logical or very clear, all the more so as he accepted the British thesis that, legally, the two questions were distinct and that the question of evacuation must be decided in the terms of the treaty. But what was significant was that, even while admitting this, he could not separate the two questions for a moment in his mind, that he said to me plainly what I have always suspected was at the bottom of his mind, that he would have juridical justification for remaining in Cologne to all eternity because the terms of the treaty never would be fulfilled and never could be enforced. He asked me, therefore, whether our discussion as to security and the German

¹² Greek Minister in Paris.

¹³ See Nos. 586–95, below, *passim*.

¹⁴ See No. 27, n. 8.

memorandum¹⁵ could not proceed simultaneously with our discussions about Cologne. I said that I should report to my colleagues the points to which he had already drawn my attention, and we would proceed at once with their study; that I hoped on his side he would enter into a careful examination of the possibilities with his colleagues and would let me know, for the consideration of the British Cabinet, the conclusions at which they might arrive. I was quite prepared to press the urgency of the question, and to do my best to deal with it as rapidly as possible, for I said that what I feared was that if France insisted upon maintaining the occupation of Cologne on grounds which appeared to British public opinion frivolous or unimportant, that opinion might make it impossible for us to remain alongside of them. Should that happen, it would be indeed a disaster for both of the countries, from which their relations might not recover, and it would be no less disastrous for the peace of Europe. I pointed out that if we continued to act together in regard to Cologne, our troops would still stand alongside the French and Belgians in the rest of the occupied area, no blow could be struck by Germany against the French where the British troops would not be in the forefront of the battle, and, so long as we were together on the Rhine, France could never be isolated. I called his attention also to the terms of article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides that if Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions for the demilitarised area, it should be regarded as committing a hostile act against all the Powers signatory of the treaty; and I observed that he had there a most formidable guarantee for the security of France. I frankly could not share his apprehensions for any immediate or early date, but we could not hold Germany down for ever, and our object ought to be to bring about such a change in the situation that by the time that Germany might really have become dangerous again she should enjoy sufficient well-being and have travelled too far away from the bitter thoughts of today to care to risk what she then possessed on the chance that she might recover what she had lost in 1914. This argument was in reply to M. Herriot's repetition of his profound mistrust of the German and his insistence on that factor of their psychology which leads them always to speak like masters or servants, and which he alleged rendered a conciliatory attitude with them perhaps less wise and less likely to be fruitful of good results than with other nations. I asked M. Herriot to consider whither any other course would lead to. I observed that France could, of course, hold Germany under the yoke for many years, and could place her foot on Germany's neck. M. Herriot at once interrupted to say that nothing could be further from his thoughts. He had shown his peaceful disposition in consenting to evacuate the Ruhr;¹⁶ he had risked a great deal, when a young Minister just arrived in power, to carry through

¹⁵ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

¹⁶ In his conversation with the German delegation to the London Conference (see n. 17, below). See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 528, 537, 540, 542, and 544-6.

the London Conference;¹⁷ and he had never contemplated such a policy as I was sketching, and could not let those phrases pass.

Upon the whole he was calmer this morning than last night, but he looked tired and ill, and was indeed suffering acute pain from a sudden attack of rheumatism in the knee of his good leg. Finally, we agreed on the terms of the communiqué¹⁸ which you will have already seen. He may perhaps have more to say to me on my return, and we must set to work through ambassadorial channels to see how and in what way we can arrive at agreement among the Allies. He knows now the limits within which we think it is possible for us to co-operate, and in the course of my conversation with the President of the Republic this morning I explained them equally clearly to him. M. Doumergue seemed to me not unhopeful. He was particularly anxious to impress upon me the peaceful disposition of the French. He himself was the first to allude to the conversation with Lord Grey¹⁹ of which Tyrrell had spoken to me, and this gave me the opening for explaining the Cabinet decision.²⁰ There was nothing really of consequence in what he said to me which is not covered by this letter.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹⁷ The London Conference for the execution of the Dawes Plan met July 16–August 16, 1924. See Cmd. 2270, *Proceedings of the London Reparation Conference July and August 1924* (H.M.S.O., 1924). See also Vol. XXVI, Nos. 517–51, *passim*.

¹⁸ This was issued on March 8 by the Quai d'Orsay. See *The Times*, March 9, p. 14.

¹⁹ Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1905–16.

²⁰ See No. 224.

No. 226

*Mr. London (Geneva via Marconi) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 8, 6 p.m.)*

No. 52 Telegraphic [C 3327/459/18]

GENEVA, March 8, 1925, 4.25 p.m.

Following for Sir E. Crowe from Mr. Austen Chamberlain:¹

I authorized French Minister for Foreign Affairs at his request to inform Allied Ambassadors in Paris of nature of my communication to him. Please take similar step in London. You should receive my full reports² by Paris bag Monday morning.³ I must leave you to decide whether an interview with Polish Minister⁴ is necessary and, if so, how much to tell him but Herriot will certainly see Polish Ambassador in Paris. I shall repeat substance of conversation to Hymans here.⁵

¹ Mr. Chamberlain left Paris on March 7 and arrived in Geneva on the morning of March 8. See No. 74, n. 4.

² See Nos. 224 and 225.

³ March 9.

⁴ M. C. Skirmunt.

⁵ The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was to be delegate at the Council meeting.

Mr. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 11)

[C 3569/459/18]

HOTEL DES BERGUES, GENEVA, March 8, 1925

My dear Crowe,

My interviews with Monsieur Herriot were, as you will have seen from my previous letters,¹ difficult and distressing. I do not think that he can have supposed that there was any chance of our ratifying the protocol,² nor am I disposed to think that Frenchmen at large care as much about the protocol as they will pretend to do. No doubt, it would have involved us in additional guarantees and additional risks in case of possible breaches of the peace in parts of Europe in which they are more directly interested than we, and on this account our adhesion to it would have been all to the good from their point of view; but Monsieur Herriot did not for one moment dispute my statement that if we had signed and ratified it as it stands, we should not have given France the security of which she feels herself in need. The rejection of the Protocol³ is therefore rather a blow to his personal policy than a loss to France, but what completely upset him was my announcement that no separate Anglo-Franco-Belgian pact was possible in view of public opinion both at home and in the Dominions.

For this statement he seemed wholly unprepared. His face turned very white and he looked suddenly a sick man. When I saw him again next day at luncheon he still looked very ill. He was suffering considerable pain from rheumatism in one knee, which had attacked him suddenly during the night. I expect that my communication had so upset him that he did not sleep. He was, I think, trying to adjust himself to the new situation and would like to do something within the frame-work which I sketched to him as being possible for His Majesty's Government; but he was terrified of the effect of this announcement upon French opinion and indeed, to judge by the conversations reported by Crewe and Phipps and by the Paris Press, there must be a complete change in French opinion before anything can result from it. Of the reality, if not of the reasonableness, of their fear of Germany there can be no doubt.

The President of the Republic, who talked quietly and sensibly, opened our conversation⁴ by developing for nearly a quarter of an hour the pacific disposition of the mass of the French people and the mass of French politicians, and their terror, in view of their past history, of seeing the German attack renewed. All sections of French opinion hold the same view. All of them distrust Germany to the point of regarding it as almost an insult to suggest that they should make a pact with her, as if her word

¹ See Nos. 224 and 225.

² See No. 10, n. 4.

³ See No. 224, n. 2.

⁴ See No. 225.

ever had been or ever would be anything more than a scrap of paper. On these points Poincaré and Herriot, Briand and Boncourt,⁵ even Caillaux,⁶ hold the same view. How far Herriot will have been able to bring himself and his Cabinet to a fair consideration of what we offer by the time I pass through Paris again I do not know, but I expect that my chief task on my return may be to repeat what I said on my way out, and to destroy finally any vestige of hope of a separate agreement; but I cannot conceal from myself, and ought not to conceal from you or from the Cabinet, that I view with grave anxiety the effect which the communication of the views of the British Government will have upon the immediate consideration of German disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne.⁷

As you will see, it drove M. Herriot to say frankly⁴ that the Treaty would always afford good juridical ground for the indefinite continuation of the occupation; and this statement impressed me the more because it was not said threateningly, but was obviously the expression of the way his mind was working under the shock of my communication. For the first time, too, as far as my relations with him are concerned, he pointed, as Grigg⁸ had done in the House of Commons,⁹ to the final words of Section V, with their vague assertion of the right to continue or to reimpose occupation after the close of the fifteen years as the real security of France if the safety of her frontiers was not by that time otherwise assured.

All this points to the conclusion that, whilst he is ready, and even wishes, to see what can be made of the idea of the mutual pact embracing Germany, his mind at the same time is at work on the alternative of considering that France can do, with the aid of Belgium and Poland (and possibly of Italy), in the absence of Great Britain.

The comment from the Chancery of the Embassy, which Selby¹⁰ reported to me after they had seen my first letter to you, was that the Ambassadors' Conference would now make no progress with the question of disarmament.

You will have seen that I thought it well to put plainly to Monsieur Herriot the dangers of the breach over Cologne, and to beg him to think of the security which is given to France by the continued presence of our troops along with the French and Belgian armies of occupation, and of all that would be implied by our complete withdrawal. Can you get me, through the Prime Minister, any indication of the views of the Cabinet on this subject? I am really oppressed by the danger that the French will insist

⁵ Mr. Chamberlain presumably referred to M. Paul-Boncour (see No. 202, n. 2).

⁶ A member of the Socialist-Radical Party who had been President of the Council and Minister of the Interior June, 1911–January, 1912, and Minister of Finance 1899–1902, 1906–9, and 1913–14. He had been arrested for treason in 1918 and had suffered imprisonment and civil disabilities. He had been amnestied in January, 1925.

⁷ See Chap. III, below.

⁸ Sir E. Grigg was National Liberal M.P. for Oldham.

⁹ In the foreign affairs debate on March 5. For his speech, see 181 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 715–26. For his reference to the Treaty of Versailles, see *ibid.*, cols. 717–8.

¹⁰ Mr. W. Selby, a Counsellor in the Foreign Office, was Private Secretary to Mr. Chamberlain.

upon remaining in Cologne, *for reasons which are within the terms of the Treaty*, but which will be held as insufficient to justify a prolongation of the occupation by all those sections of British opinion which are opposed to a Pact.

On the other hand, our withdrawal, leaving the French to march in, would mean of course the end of any real understanding between the Allies. It would be patent to all the world that the days not merely of alliance but of an understanding are over, and it would be impossible to keep British and French policy in harmony in any part of the world. The question thus raises the gravest issues on the one side and on the other. Am I justified in pressing upon Monsieur Herriot the possibility of our having to take this course, or would the consequences of it be so grave in other respects that, in the last resort, the Cabinet would decide to retain our troops just as we maintained them through all the difficulties brought about by the occupation of the Ruhr?¹¹

If the Prime Minister can send me some guidance on this matter, and generally give me any indication of how the conversations, which I have reported, are viewed by the Cabinet before I see Herriot again, I shall be very grateful for this help. I hope that he and my colleagues will feel that I properly represented our decision and spoke with sufficient firmness and clearness on the subject. I hope that they will also realise what great issues hang in the balance.

I thought the immediate reactions of my statement on M. Herriot's mind ominous of future trouble.

Yours sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ For the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January, 1923, see Vol. XXI, Chap. I.

No. 228

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 9, 1.40 p.m.)

No. 54 Telegraphic [C 3376/459/18]

Very Urgent

GENEVA, March 9, 1925, 12.30 p.m.

Following from Mr. Chamberlain for Sir E. Crowe.

Please consider following appreciation of situation.

1. Decision of His Majesty's Government¹ is an immense shock to French opinion. We have risked our influence with them and even endangered our (?future) relations not only in Europe but also in (?Eastern) and Far Eastern questions, in our endeavour to persuade them to treat German overtures² seriously and to make them starting point for

¹ See No. 224.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

better relations between allies and Germany.

2. I observe that whilst my speech,³ cautious as it was, has seriously disturbed France and her allies, it has given satisfaction in Germany but I see no signs of its having produced better atmosphere for negotiation in Germany. Lord d'Abernon's telegrams⁴ seem to indicate that he thinks that Germany has offered everything that could be asked and that it would be fatal to demand more.

[3.] If this is real attitude of German government nothing can come of their memorandum.² French never cease to insist that Germans do not understand a friendly word or language and take it only as a sign that they can safely defy and bully the allies.

4. Is there not a danger that Lord d'Abernon misunderstands real position, which is that there is just a chance that starting from their memorandum we may by all our influence, and not without some risks to ourselves, persuade our reluctant allies to accept settlement very distasteful to their public opinion if and only if German government and public at once respond to our advances?

5. *If Germany does not advance with every step we take*, still more if she retreats as we advance, our effort is doomed to failure and must be abandoned at once; does Lord d'Abernon see this and does he hold suitable language to German government? Unless we press Germany at least as much as France our whole effort will fail. Does not Lord d'Abernon need full confidential instructions for his guidance, lest in atmosphere of Berlin he should wholly misconceive situation?

6. Please consider above in light of Lord d'Abernon's telegrams⁴ and of my Paris conversations.⁵ If situation appears to you in London in the same light as to me here, please draft instructions accordingly and submit them for Prime Minister's verdict.⁶

³ See No. 223, n. 2.

⁵ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

⁴ See Nos. 216, 218, and 223.

⁶ See Nos. 230 and 231, below.

No. 229

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 9, 4 p.m.)

No. 56 Telegraphic [C 3375/459/18]

GENEVA, March 9, 1925, 3.40 p.m.

Following from Mr. Chamberlain for Sir Eyre Crowe.

My telegram No. 54.¹

Attitude of Germany.

I give an example. Sir E. Drummond has shown me in confidence reports of his recent conversations with Schubert, Stresemann and Lord

¹ No. 228.

d'Abernon.² Germans make immense difficulty about joining the League of Nations on account of Article 16. Does Lord d'Abernon realise that unless they join League on the same footing as other Great Powers nothing can come of their proposals? Without unconditional entry into the League there can be no possibility of any pact. If they are not prepared to express their willingness to do this we shall make no progress.

² Sir E. Drummond visited Berlin on March 2. See *An Ambassador of Peace: Lord D'Abernon's Diary*, vol. III (London, 1930), pp. 146-7.

No. 230

Sir E. Crowe to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 53 Telegraphic [C 3376/459/18]

Most Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 9, 1925, 9 p.m.

Confidential.

Following are salient points of confidential report received from the Secretary of State of his conversations with M. Herriot in Paris.¹ Copies of records of those conversations will reach you Wednesday² morning by bag leaving tonight.

In accordance with the decision of the Cabinet³ Mr. Chamberlain informed M. Herriot of the reasons which made it impossible for His Majesty's Government to agree to a purely Anglo-Franco-Belgian pact of guarantee and that the most they could offer was to profit by the present German proposals to take part in a quadruple arrangement including Germany.

This decision was evidently a great blow to M. Herriot, who after dwelling at some length on want of good-faith on Germany's part which stood in the way of French confidence, raised a number of points presenting difficulties in the way of any arrangement with Germany. Chief of these were:—

- (1) The problem of the eastern frontiers and particularly the danger to Poland.
- (2) The question of the southern frontiers, particularly southern Tyrol now forming part of Italy, and the position of Austria which neither France nor Italy wish to see united to Germany.
- (3) The impossibility of evacuating the Rhineland before the fifteen years had expired, and the necessity of Germany giving definite assurances that she accepts the occupation for the full period laid down in the treaty.

Other points which emerged from the conversation were the omission of any reference to the Belgian frontier and the desirability of including Holland in any arrangement come to. M. Herriot tentatively suggested

¹ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

² March 11.

³ See No. 224, n. 3.

possibility of concluding, as part of one negotiation, two separate pacts, one an Anglo-Franco-Belgian and the other an Anglo-Franco-Belgo-German, but Mr. Chamberlain had to point out that this would not meet British view.

M. Herriot also enquired how the question of Germany's entry into the League stood. Should she be called upon to enter before or after the examination of her proposals.

It also emerged from the conversations that France shows every intention of somehow linking together the question of the evacuation of Cologne with that of security. Mr. Chamberlain made clear the British objections to such a course and the dangers inherent in it.

No. 231

Sir E. Crowe to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 54 Telegraphic [C 3376/459/18]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 9, 1925, 10 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Following is sent with approval of Prime Minister.

The prevailing note, even in Pacifist circles in Paris, is that the recent German proposals² are not considered sufficiently explicit or far-reaching or trustworthy. I will take the question of German credit first and suggest that the best way to remove French distrust would be for Germany to decide at once to join the League unconditionally on the same footing as other great powers. The hesitation on this subject shown by Stresemann and Schubert in their conversation with Sir Eric Drummond³ must be overcome. Without unconditioned entry into the League, it is certain that there is no possibility of any pact. This cannot be too strongly impressed on the German Government.

With regard to the frontiers which are to be included in a new pact, Germany should agree to meet the French complaint as regards the absence of any provision for the southern frontier between Austria and Italy and to make her pledges respecting the Polish frontier as binding as those relating to the Rhine frontier. There is, of course, nothing to prevent Germany taking full advantage of the declaration made by M. Clemenceau⁴ on behalf of the allies in the letter of June 16th, 1919,⁵ in which he communicated the draft treaty of Versailles to Germany. The following were his words: 'At the same time it (the treaty) creates the machinery (the covenant) for the peaceful adjustment of all international problems by discussion and consent, whereby the settlement of 1919 itself

¹ No. 230.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See No. 229, n. 2.

⁴ French President of the Council November, 1917-January, 1920.

⁵ For a text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 244-53.

can be modified from time to time to suit new facts, new conditions, as they arise.'

The above are the immediate and concrete contributions which the German government must be prepared to make if they desire the success of our present negotiations. It is only with German assistance that we can persuade France to treat German overtures seriously and to make the starting-point for better relations between the allies and Germany. Germany must realise both the necessity and desirability of contributing in every way she can to make our advice to our allies more palatable.

German memorandum² is a good starting-point for reaching agreement with allies, but it ought not to be regarded as a complete statement of the case, but open to further precision and development as discussions advance. I cannot, therefore, over-emphasise how vital it is that Germany should be ready to advance with every step we take, and that the best way to ensure the failure of our attempt to bring the allies and Germany together would be for Germany to retreat as we advance. Unless, therefore, you press Germany at least as much as we are pressing France, we must fail.

To sum up, unless the German government is sincerely prepared to make full use of the situation which we have helped to secure for them in Paris we risk missing a unique opportunity of achieving settlement of utmost importance and promise for Europe and the world.

Your Excellency will appreciate the necessity of avoiding any procedure which should give French government cause to feel that we are behind steps which German government may think fit to take in response to these hints. It is essential that their action should be taken and should clearly appear to be taken spontaneously and on their own responsibility.

I leave it to Your Excellency's discretion to find the best way of conveying to them message in the sense of this telegram.

Repeated to Geneva, No. 45.

No. 232

Memorandum to the Cabinet by Mr. Chamberlain

[C 3538/471/18]*

GENEVA, March 9, 1925

I have just had a very interesting conversation with M. Briand, who had expressed the desire that we should find an opportunity for an early exchange of views.

He began by referring to the Protocol,¹ and I sketched to him briefly the principal reasons which had decided His Majesty's Government to refuse their signature.² M. Briand said that he fully appreciated the force of our

¹ See No. 10, n. 4.

² See No. 224, n. 2.

reasons for a Government situated as we are. On the other hand, France must of course again express her complete approval of that document. He was only anxious, however, that its rejection by us should not weaken the authority of the League itself, in which, after all, must rest much of our hope for the future peace of the world.

I replied that we fully shared his views on this point, and had for that reason decided to refrain from stating fully some of our objections to the Protocol lest they should seem in any way to animadvert upon the Covenant itself.

M. Briand then asked if my statement³ was going to be a simple negative, or whether it would suggest in any way fresh steps.

I enquired whether M. Herriot had told him the purport of our conversations in Paris,⁴ and learning that M. Briand was generally informed of them, I stated them in my own language, and then said that the concluding passage of my declaration would indicate our idea that for the present further security for the peace of the world was to be found rather in mutual agreements between the States interested in particular boundaries than in any general change in or addition to the Covenant.

I found M. Briand, who in conversation always shows a spirit of sweet reasonableness, much more favourable to this idea than I had expected. He at any rate would appear to have realised that the decision of the British Government definitely excludes their participation in any other form of settlement, and to be anxious to make the best of what, from his point of view, may be a bad business, instead of rejecting our assistance in the only form in which we can offer it. He was equally reasonable in his views upon the eastern frontiers. Our object, he said, must be, on the one hand, to prevent the Poles from prejudicing the future by immediate declarations that there can never be any modification whatever in the existing conditions; and, on the other hand, to prevent the Germans from talking as if they meant to force an immediate change. He said that, undoubtedly, if Germany could be brought into the League of Nations, and if satisfactory arrangements could be made about the western frontier, it must be admitted that there was much in the present arrangement of the map in the east which lent itself to serious criticism, and if the two parties would take time and show patience, their mutual interests, especially their economic and financial interests, would very probably lead them to an agreement. After all, the Germans were already back in the management of the Silesian mines. Their skill, their organisation, and the need the Poles had of their services, had brought this about, and the same forces, given time, might easily lead to a solution of other difficulties.

It would obviously be unwise to attach too great importance to an informal conversation of this kind with a man who, however distinguished and influential,⁵ has not at the moment the responsibilities of a Minister;

³ To the Council of the League.

⁴ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

⁵ See No. 225, n. 11.

but I am encouraged to hope that his influence with M. Herriot and with French public opinion will be directed towards trying to find a solution which will be acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

He passed from these greater questions to two or three matters which are preoccupying the minds of the members of the Council and promise to create some difficulties for us. First he raised the question of the Saar.⁶ I said that he might have observed that I had been severely criticised for the decision which I had taken at the request of the French Government,⁷ but of course I adhered to that decision, and should support the renomination of M. Rault.⁸ M. Briand interjected: 'That would be for one year,' and I said 'Yes.' I then added that of the original members of the commission only two remained, M. Rault and the Belgian.⁹ I thought that it was desirable that we should introduce some new blood, and I enquired whether M. Briand thought that we could persuade the Belgians to acquiesce in the appointment of another representative in place of the Belgian. M. Briand suggested that we should discuss this with M. Hymans, who arrives tomorrow. He was afraid, however, that the suggestion would meet with considerable difficulties, especially as Belgium was on the eve of a general election,¹⁰ which was always a bad moment for making any concession.

Then I raised the question of the police and of the troops, and learnt that M. Rault would announce that he had already invited the French Government to withdraw one battalion of the troops, and would propose to proceed with the further recruitment of policemen so as to enable him to dispense with more troops.

I proceeded to call M. Briand's attention to the distribution of portfolios, and invited him to consider whether some of those which M. Rault now held might not well be distributed among his colleagues. M. Briand said that we might discuss that matter, but that in any case it had the less importance, as M. Rault would only be there for one year more.

I then raised the delicate questions which are to come before us in regard to the Port of Danzig. We shall discuss them tomorrow in secret session,¹¹ where we may have a sharp divergence of opinion; but I hope that M. Briand will use his influence on the side of moderation. I am

⁶ For previous documentation on the reference of this question to the League, see Vol. XXI, Appendix.

⁷ See Vol. XXVI, No. 608, for the record of Mr. Chamberlain's conversation of December 5, 1924, with M. Herriot. See also 181 *H.C. Deb.* 5s, cols. 701-3. For parliamentary criticism, see *ibid.*, cols. 689-9.

⁸ Chairman of the Governing Commission of the Saar.

⁹ Major J. Lambert.

¹⁰ A General Election was held on April 5.

¹¹ Mr. Cadogan's record of the secret session of the Council on March 10 on the extension of the Polish postal service in Danzig has not been preserved in the Foreign Office archives. For this question, see Vol. XXV, No. 429, n. 1. Mr. Cadogan's record of the secret session of March 11 concerning the procedure in connection with appeals against the High Commissioner's decision is printed in Vol. XXV, No. 448.

myself advised that it is impossible to give unqualified support to the decisions of the High Commissioner.¹²

Next I alluded to the difference of opinion which had been disclosed in the Organisation Committee on the question of the right of the Council to establish a permanent control in the demilitarised zone when the League takes over the supervision of that area.¹³ M. Briand surprised me by saying that he thought the best thing would be to temporise and not to take any immediate decision. We might perhaps refer the matter back to the Organisation Committee for further study, with the suggestion that they should see what other means for avoiding dangerous delay could be devised. Speaking for himself, M. Briand said that he attached little importance to the matter. It was only important because at this moment it excited public opinion, and if we could adjourn it till the next Council meeting and had in the meantime made progress with our security negotiations, and if the Germans were ready to join the League, it was probable that the question would settle itself so that it could be discussed in quite different circumstances and an arrangement made by agreement.

Finally, M. Briand enquired what were my ideas about the reply of the Council to the German note¹⁴ respecting the conditions on which Germany would enter the League. I replied that upon the substance of the reply I conceived there would be no difference of opinion between us. Both the French and British Governments were agreed that there could not be two categories of membership, and the only question which might give us a little trouble was the form of our reply. I was inclined to think that it should be as short as was compatible with politeness, and that the best thing would be, after a little discussion among members of the Council in a secret session, to ask one of our members to sketch a draft for our consideration. It would be better that this dish should be prepared in the kitchen and not brought into the dining room until the cooks had done their work.

M. Briand said that he entirely agreed, but changed my metaphor, and suggested that the patient should be put to sleep in the ante-chamber before he was brought into the operating theatre.

A.C.

¹² Mr. M. MacDonnell.

¹³ See No. 596, below.

¹⁴ Of December 12, 1924. See No. 219, n. 2.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 10)

No. 604 [C 3380/459/18]*

PARIS, March 9, 1925

Sir,

I have read with great interest the speech which Viscount Grey of Fallodon made to the Liberal Parliamentary party on the 4th March on the question of European security,¹ and those parts of your speech in the House of Commons on the 5th March² dealing with the same subject.

Lord Grey observed that security was the master-key of the difficult problems of Western Europe; that we might worry about French or British occupation of German territory, but that no progress would be made until the question of security was dealt with. No French Government would dare to give up the pledges that it held until it felt that there was some security for France greater than those pledges. A great responsibility rested with the British Government to make some proposal for European security. It could not go on turning down all proposals for security and make none itself. Lord Grey then proceeded to state that there would be no security for France except a security which was equally good for Germany, and *vice versâ*. Out of any arrangement to which France, Great Britain and Germany were parties, or round it, might develop real security, and eventually cover Europe. Meanwhile, it was for British public opinion to recognise that the one thing it could do to help the European situation was to make some firm offer to promote European security in which the British Empire could join. Until we had that we should do nothing but waste time in discussions about the Rhineland occupation, German disarmament and international debts.

In commenting on the above remarks, you observed in the House of Commons that sometimes isolation may have been splendid and sometimes not, but that no nation could live as we live, within 20 miles of the continent and remain indifferent to its peace and security. You added that if our history showed, as it does show, that this is the case, then it is more important today than ever before that we should not regard ourselves as so protected and so separated from the rest of Europe and its misfortunes by the narrow strip of sea that divides us as to be able to remain indifferent to what happens, and to be callous and deaf to any appeal for help. It was not in that spirit that we have exercised, when it rested with us alone in the United Kingdom, nor was it in that spirit of selfishness, and at the same time, short-sighted isolation, that we shall exercise now when we speak, in consultation with the free self-governing dominions of a great

¹ A report is given in *The Times*, March 5, p. 11. Lord Grey had been Leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Lords until his resignation in August, 1924.

² See No. 223, n. 2.

Empire, our mission and our influence in the world.

I consider it to be my duty to place officially on record my entire agreement with the above observations of yourself and Lord Grey. Although the reception accorded by the President of the Council to the views of His Majesty's Government on the security question, as set forth by you last week,³ may have, at first sight, appeared to be disappointing, and although the attitude of the French press is, generally speaking, inclined to be suspicious, I am strongly of opinion that His Majesty's Government would be well advised to show the utmost patience in the matter. As M. Herriot himself told you, time must be allowed for public opinion in the provinces to develop and to make its influence felt,⁴ if possible, upon the Paris press, and I am hopeful that a more reasonable frame of mind will prevail when time has been given for the inevitable disappointment which has been felt here on learning definitely that His Majesty's Government could not enter upon a separate pact with France or with France and Belgium.

Whilst allowing reasonable time for French opinion to become reconciled to the fact that Germany must be included on terms of reciprocity in any future pact, it would, I consider, be a fatal error to imagine that by pursuing a policy of isolation for the next few years His Majesty's Government will be able to induce France to accept any solution that they may desire in the belief that by that time she will be weakened to the point of impotence. It must be borne in mind that France is now, and will be for the next few years at any rate, in a position, both on land and in the air, of overwhelming military preponderance over Germany. She is at the same time obsessed by fear. Now that feeling of fear is only held within reasonable limits so long as France feels that we are at her side. The day we show that we intend to 'plough our lonely furrow' and to evade any kind of continental commitments, that fear will assume panic proportions, and, coupled with the military preponderance above referred to, together with the realisation that that preponderance is necessarily and steadily dwindling, may well, indeed is bound, I fear, to lead to some supreme act of folly which may have disastrous consequences for the peace and for the economic stability of Europe.

For these reasons, therefore, I earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government will continue to show patience in dealing with the sometimes exasperating attitude assumed by this country, and will adhere to the lines of policy set forth by Lord Grey and by yourself, in spite of any momentary discouragement which they may quite naturally feel at the unreasonable tone taken by the French press, people or Government. That tone is inspired rather by fear than by any imperialist spirit. Fear may, however, if unrelieved, lead to the same sinister result as imperialism. The proper remedy for each of these two diseases is naturally different. If my diagnosis be correct in the present case, continued

³ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

⁴ See No. 224.

co-operation with France, and not isolation from her, is the remedy now required.

I have, etc.,
CREWE

No. 234

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received March 12, 9 a.m.)*

No. 95 Telegraphic [C 3553/459/18]

BERLIN, March 11, 1925, 8.15 p.m.

Addressed to Geneva No. 2.

Following for Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Confidential.

I hear that discussion of proposed pact¹ in Reichsrath² yesterday passed off smoothly, representatives of different states being favourable.

The discussion today in committee of Foreign Affairs of Reichstag was lively; considerable opposition to government policy was expressed by German nationals and by communists.

There will be a public debate on subject in Reichstag next week.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Russia will make a desperate endeavour to prevent Germany taking part in any western European combine.

¹ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

² The Upper House of the National Assembly which was composed of representatives of the various lands which made up the federal republic.

No. 235

*Mr. Lampson to Mr. Selby (Geneva)*¹

[C 3368/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 11, 1925

Dear Selby,

You will remember that in the conversation of March 7th² M. Herriot asked the Secretary of State whether he had observed that Germany was at that moment refusing to conclude a treaty of arbitration with Switzerland. The Secretary of State in his letter to Crowe recording this conversation,² asked that M. Herriot's statement might be verified.

¹ Mr. Selby was a member of the British Delegation to Geneva.

² See No. 225.

Herriot is misinformed. A general treaty of arbitration between Germany and Switzerland has not only been signed but ratified. Signature took place at Berne on December 3, 1921,³ and ratifications were exchanged on April 25, 1922. You may remember that it was this very treaty that Schubert quoted to D'Abernon⁴ as an example of the kind of arbitration treaty which the German government had in mind when the German memorandum of January 20 last⁵ was drawn up (see paragraph 20 in Central Department's memorandum on the German proposals⁶ which is in your dossier on the subject).

I can't think of any other treaty with Switzerland to which Herriot can have been referring. We at least know of none.

In case it should be of use for reference I enclose a copy.⁷

Yours ever,

MILES W. LAMPSON

³ See No. 190, n. 3.

⁴ See No. 190.

⁵ See No. 189, Enclosure.

⁶ Mr. Lampson's reference was presumably to the Central Department memorandum of January 21 (C 1000/459/18), not printed.

⁷ Missing from the file.

No. 236

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the French Ambassador

[C 3656/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 11, 1925*

The French Ambassador, during the course of a conversation which I had with him on general subjects on March 9th, alluded to the current discussions regarding the problem of security. He asked whether we had had any account from Mr. Chamberlain of the course of his talks with M. Herriot.¹ Feeling that it was undesirable to go into detail on so delicate a question, I answered his enquiry by saying that we had had news that the discussions ranged over all the subjects of mutual interest at the moment, but that I was not in a position to give him any detailed information.

From this the conversation passed to the question of what form of arrangement between this country and France relating to security was now possible. The Ambassador admitted that he had got the impression from what he had read and heard, that opinion in this country seemed to be crystallising in the direction of a quadruple arrangement, including Germany, rather than a purely Anglo-Franco-Belgian agreement. Discussing this, I gathered his general view to be that he saw no absolute objection. He personally favoured the inclusion of Germany, but on the understanding that any arrangement made with her should not be purely

¹ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

and simply a repetition of what the Treaty of Versailles already contained. He was distinctly vague when I pressed him as to what lines any arrangement comprising Germany and dealing with security could in practice cover; but he dwelt insistently on the idea that the form which these agreements should take should be a series of two-Power pacts each employing a formula to suit special requirements—such formulas not necessarily to be identified.

The conversation was of so general and non-committal a kind that I had hesitated to record it; but as it is just possible that it may later on be referred to perhaps it is better to do so.²

M. W. LAMPSON

² Sir E. Crowe minuted (March 12): 'I since spoke to M. de Fleuriau explaining fully Mr. Chamberlain's views and proposals. See my letter to Mr. Chamberlain of yesterday [No. 237, below].'

No. 237

Sir E. Crowe to Mr. Chamberlain (Geneva)

[C 3569/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 11, 1925*

My dear Mr. Chamberlain,

I must thank you for having kept me so fully informed of what passed between you and Herriot.¹ I have, of course, communicated everything to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

Your letter of the 8th from Geneva² reached me this morning. Unfortunately I could not get at the Prime Minister before a meeting of the Cabinet, which sat till nearly two o'clock. I sent him over a copy of your letter, but begged him not to discuss it at the Cabinet without my being present. He explained to me afterwards that the Cabinet was so busy with other matters that he did not like to trouble them with this important foreign question at the moment. I saw him for a short time after lunching with him and I will write more fully presently of the result of our talk.

For the moment I want to let you know that I have seen all the allied Ambassadors in turn and informed them in detail of the substance of your Paris conversations.³ I thought it right to dwell strongly on the reasonableness of our suggestions for the quadruple pact, and whilst I explained the difficulties raised by M. Herriot, I added in each case reasons why I thought we ought not to despair of surmounting them all.

¹ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

² No. 227.

³ An account of Sir E. Crowe's conversation with the Italian Ambassador on March 11 is given in *D.D.J.*, vol. III, No. 757.

The Belgian, Italian and Japanese Ambassadors were unanimous in expressing concurrence in this view, and seemed to be hopeful of something tangible resulting from the further discussions which have to take place with the view of concluding some pact of security. They were all inclined to criticise the timidity and hesitations of M. Herriot as something which would in due course be overcome, but they said very little of substance beyond asking me to thank you for having taken them into your confidence so freely.

The Italian Ambassador raised one point which perhaps should be mentioned with reference to M. Herriot's remark about the absence from the German proposals of any mention of the southern frontier of Germany. He informed me that the wording of the German memorandum as communicated to the Italian Government¹—which he suggested was perhaps not quite identical with the text received by us or by France—contained an allusion to the Rhine frontier so peculiarly worded as in practice to include a pledge not to disturb the Italian frontier. So far as I could gather, the phrase referred to was something to the effect that the German Government, recognising the interest which the allied powers, specifically including Italy had, in the Rhine frontier, were ready to give an undertaking not to disturb *the* frontiers of those countries.

I am not myself convinced that there is much in this Italian view of the wording of the German memorandum. There is nothing in our version⁵ to bear it out, but I expressed the opinion, in which Marquess della Torretta fully concurred, that if the German government declared that they would not seek to alter their Eastern frontier except by peaceful means, they would not hesitate to give the same assurance concerning their southern frontier if the Allies asked for it.

My conversation with M. de Fleuriau assumed a different character from the fact that he expressed some apprehension that the difficulties felt by M. Herriot as standing in the way of any pact including Germany might prove very substantial. He again reverted to his former argument that a general agreement including Germany, and perhaps also Italy and Poland, would be too difficult to negotiate, and that the more hopeful procedure would undoubtedly be to negotiate a series of separate pacts or declarations with the several states, laying stress upon the fact that the nucleus of such a bundle (*faisceau*) of pacts ought to be that between England, France and Belgium.

In all other respects he took what I thought was a reasonable view of the situation, and thought that with patience and tact we ought not to despair of arriving at a satisfactory settlement.

I break off here because the Prime Minister has summoned me to come to his room at the House of Commons, there to meet 'a number of his colleagues', therefore not the whole Cabinet, in order to discuss the situation as so forcibly described in your letter of the 8th.² I hope to find

¹ See No. 209.

⁵ See No. 189, Enclosure.

time before the bag goes tonight to write further on this subject, or, failing that, to send you a telegram.

Yours sincerely,
EYRE A. CROWE

No. 238

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 12)

No. 616 [C 3531/459/18]

Confidential

PARIS, March 11, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatches Nos. 569¹ and 584¹ of the 5th and 6th instant respectively, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a memorandum by Mr. Phipps giving an account of a conversation which he had yesterday with Marshal Foch respecting the recent proposals made by Germany for a guarantee pact.

I have, etc.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 238

*Record by Mr. Phipps of a conversation with Marshal Foch**

PARIS, March 11, 1925

When I saw Marshal Foch at the Quai d'Orsay luncheon last Saturday² he expressed a wish to have a long conversation with me. He begged me to come to see him yesterday evening, and kept me with him an hour and a half.

Marshal Foch began his conversation by remarking that the Germans had obtained a contract for the construction of an enlarged port at Suez; he referred also to the fact, which had been published in the press, that a British shipping company had just placed orders for three motor-ships with a German firm. Marshal Foch expressed the greatest fear in regard to the surprisingly rapid recovery of Germany, which, he said, could not in the end fail to injure the best interests of Great Britain. He pointed out that the time-clauses of the treaty, which should have been carried out within three months, were still not executed, and he then proceeded to declare how dangerous it would be to allow the Germans to participate in a pact of security. He aired his views exhaustively on this subject and on the general question of Germany, but as the latter are so well known it is

¹ Not printed.

² March 7. Mr. Chamberlain attended (see No. 225) together with the members of the Conference of Ambassadors, M. Briand, and French officials.

not necessary for me to deal with them at length. Many times in the course of our conversation he started up from his chair and led me to a large-sized map of Europe hanging on the wall, pointing fearfully to the German monster, which, indeed, is always a somewhat terrifying spectacle on the map, and to the strangely-shaped countries which flank it on the east and south. The German proposals,³ the marshal declared, were but the thin end of the wedge, which, if admitted, would burst asunder all the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles one after the other. First, the Polish corridor would disappear, and then Czechoslovakia and Austria would rapidly follow, and instead of an already sufficiently powerful Germany of some 65 million inhabitants, we should be faced with a Germany of well over 100 millions, and then it would be too late for us to endeavour to check her ever-growing land-hunger or power. We were now watching her anxiously through the Cologne-Mayence window; so long as we watched her from there we were safe, but the day we left the Rhine or even the Cologne section thereof we should open the gates through which she would little by little creep and finally overflow. The marshal then pointed to Turkey, to Egypt, and, with a gesture of his hand, waved in the direction of Persia, India, etc., enquiring at the same time whether I thought the future action of Germany in those regions would be calculated to further the interests of the British Empire.

I told the marshal that I had listened to him with interest, but that he was evidently in favour of the policy of sitting on the safety-valve. That was a policy in which no British Government would be able, even if it were willing, to join. The marshal denied any such intention, but declared that the boiler must be well wrapped up and blanketed to prevent its bursting. Anything that issued through the safety-valve would only be destructive and injurious both to France and Great Britain. By opening it the pressure would only become intensified, and the one hope for the future lay in the absolutely strict adherence to the Treaty of Versailles and the close and continued co-operation of all the Allies to maintain the treaty intact, no conversations being entered upon with Germany of any kind. I remarked that that policy precluded any real pacification in the future, and that it was a policy of continued war and not of peace; moreover, adherence to the treaty meant leaving the Rhine in due course, but Marshal Foch affirmed with renewed vigour that the only chance of peace was to pursue the policy he had always advocated. He declared, in regard to the control question, that practically all the machines for the manufacture of heavy guns are still working in German factories at producing other and, it was true, more peaceful articles, but they could in a remarkably short space of time be reconverted, and could, he was convinced, within a few months turn out again some fifty heavy and other guns a day.

Marshal Foch is impervious to arguments of any kind, and, were it not for his great personal charm, a protracted conversation with him on the

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

above lines would be highly exasperating. He certainly represents one of those solid breakwaters of obstinacy on which the waves of M. Herriot's eloquence and good intentions must dash themselves in vain. M. Herriot may enter the marshal's presence an *homme de gauche* and a man of peace; he must always leave it so transformed as to be indistinguishable, even for his own 'chef de cabinet,' from M. Poincaré.

Marshal Foch, when I took leave of him, begged that I would not let any members of the French Government know of our conversation, for, were they to hear of it, they would probably ask him to mind his own business.

ERIC PHIPPS

No. 239

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 12, 8.35 p.m.)

No. 69 Telegraphic [C 3624/459/18]

ROME, March 12, 1925, 5.15 p.m.

Following for Mr. Chamberlain.

Secretary General read to me last night telegram from Italian Ambassador reporting interview with Sir E. Crowe¹ at which latter had confidentially informed him account of your conversation with French President of the Council in Paris.² Senator Contarini said that Italian government shared your point of view and would give it full support. He added that idea of an Anglo-French-Belgian pact was particularly distasteful to Italian government. They would dislike being omitted from such a combination but would be equally reluctant to join it. Their first impression was that German proposal constituted a useful basis for further discussion and that to reject it without consideration would be a grave mistake.

Repeated to Geneva.

¹ See No. 237, n. 3.

² See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

No. 240

Mr. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 16)

*[C 3726/459/18]**

BRITISH DELEGATION, GENEVA, March 12, 1925

My dear Crowe,

I made an opportunity yesterday for conversations, first with M. Benes,¹

¹ See No. 74, n. 5.

and subsequently with M. Hymans. They were not very informative, but of course I took the opportunity to repeat to M. Hymans in substance all that I had said to M. Herriot in Paris.²

M. Hymans told me that on receiving the memorandum, he had at once called the attention of the German Ambassador [*sic*: Chargé d'Affaires] in Brussels³ to the absence of any mention of Belgium. The Ambassador⁴ had returned a day or two later to assure him that it was the intention of the Germans to include Belgium and the Belgian frontier in their proposals, and that the omission was only due to their having worked on the phraseology of an earlier draft, the terms of which they had changed without observing that the new form excluded Belgium.⁵ M. Hymans said that the interest of Belgium was, of course, primarily on the west, and it did not wish to be entangled with the affairs of Poland. At the same time, the Belgian Government must take account of the sympathy felt for Poland, partly because it was another Catholic country, and partly because Poland, like Belgium, was a small nation which had suffered great hardships. As far as he is concerned, he is obviously prepared to treat the German proposals and our suggestions seriously, and he had told M. Herriot that neither France nor Belgium could afford to reject our ideas without the most careful consideration.

I made it quite clear to him, as I had done to M. Herriot, that it was only within the *cadre* that I had traced that our co-operation was possible.

To M. Benes I spoke much less fully or perhaps I should more truly say that he left me very little time to say anything. He, of course, knew that we had decided not to sign the protocol,⁶ and he spent most of his time in elaborating his views on the subject. From his long statement I gathered that he did not attach great importance to the protocol, that he was quite prepared to consider mutual treaties of guarantee and arbitration with his neighbours, and that, *au fond*, he felt that it was Poland which was menaced and not Czechoslovakia. He repeated what he had said at Rome,⁷ that, after all, if peace were secure in the west, that would do more than anything else to stabilise Europe and to render an outbreak of war in the east unlikely. Incidentally he told me that Czechoslovakia had no obligations for the defence of Bessarabia. The treaty with Roumania excluded all obligations in respect of that territory.⁸

The council⁹ is working smoothly and with a real spirit of goodwill and conciliation. We have settled, partly by adjournment, our differences with the French in regard to control in the Rhineland, Briand himself

² See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

³ See No. 209, n. 6.

⁴ The German Minister in Brussels was Dr. A. von Keller.

⁵ For an account of this conversation of February 26, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 26.

⁶ See No. 224, n. 2.

⁷ A record of Mr. Chamberlain's conversation with Dr. Benes at Rome on December 11, 1924 at the meeting of the League Council (see No. 28, n. 4) is filed at C 19104/909/12, not printed.

⁸ See No. 187, n. 3.

⁹ See No. 74, n. 4.

observing that perhaps by the time there was a demilitarised area and we had finally to take a decision, Germany might be a member of the League of Nations, and the question might perhaps be discussed in much more favourable circumstances. The Swede¹⁰ had got Poincaré's letter¹¹ up his sleeve, and as I saw him approaching the subject I thought it friendly to warn M. Briand of what was coming, so I passed him my copy of the letter. He turned to his neighbour on the other side exclaiming: 'Quelle guigne! Faut-il que je le trouve toujours sur ma route?' He handled a difficult situation with admirable skill and *bonhomie*, and we all enjoyed ourselves as if we had been at the play. This was in private session.¹²

I have just made our declaration on the subject of the protocol.¹³ I am told by spectators that it sounded as impressive when read aloud as we had found it admirable when we discussed it in council.

Please show this letter to the Prime Minister, and, if he wishes, communicate it to the Cabinet.

Yours sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹⁰ Professor O. Undén, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹¹ A translation of this letter of April 28, 1919, from M. Poincaré, who was then President of the French Republic, to M. G. Clemenceau, then President of the French Council of Ministers, on the occupation of the Rhineland, is printed in Cmd. 2169, op. cit., pp. 100-02. The Swedish Minister in London had communicated a copy of this letter to the Foreign Office on March 5.

¹² An account of the secret session of the Council on March 11 is given in Geneva telegram No. 70 of March 12, not printed.

¹³ See *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 446-50. See No. 248, n. 3, below.

No. 241

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 13, 9 a.m.)

No. 97 Telegraphic [C 3664/459/18]

BERLIN, March 13, 1925, 12.58 a.m.

Addressed to Geneva, No. 3.

Following for Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Your telegrams Nos. 53¹ and 54.²

I have had preliminary discussion with leading members of German Government on general lines indicated by you and find a satisfactory readiness to co-operate in measures for general pacification and security together with a full recognition of the services rendered to this object by His Majesty's Government.

German Government are ready to give desired precision to their proposal.³

¹ No. 230.

² No. 231.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

On individual questions there will of course be more or less arduous discussion. Following are principal points requiring negotiation.

Germany's entry into League of Nations. Russian influence is still being exercised almost violently against Germany entering League. Their effort is essentially directed against Germany forming part of any Western European combination. Notwithstanding this, effect of your speech in House of Commons⁴ and of English attitude regarding German memorandum³ has been to modify favourably German attitude since Drummond's visit of November (? 1924). I understand that if Council of League of Nations answers German memorandum⁵ on basis similar to draft clauses which follow, entry of Germany into League will be faced. These clauses are stated to be inspired by page 16 of general report of October 1st 1924⁶ made to Assembly by Monsieur Benés⁷ and Monsieur Politis.⁸

(Beginning of clauses).

1. League has examined and understands considerations contained in German memorandum of December [sic] 12th 1924.⁵

2. A formal exemption of Germany from stipulations of Article 16 is incompatible with constitution of League.

3. It is understood that in applying different clauses of Article 16 the economic and geographical situation of Germany will be taken into account together with special situation of Germany as regards disarmament so long as general disarmament has not been effectively accomplished.

(End of clauses).

Germany's entry into League might be obtained on this basis without (? signature) of pact but it would be easier to negotiate (? simultaneously with the) pact. (See my despatch No. 150 of February 25th⁹ for underlying causes.)

Regarding Polish Frontier see my immediately following telegram.¹⁰

Regarding Southern Frontier, I should be glad to receive indication as to kind of assurance desired as Monsieur Herriot in second conversation (page 2, paragraph 1)¹¹ is rather obscure. Discussion of this question here is difficult as danger would arise only after Anschluss is accomplished and it might be unwise to discuss an assumption that Anschluss is probable. While there is no present idea of any political agreement with Austria it

⁴ See No. 223, n. 2.

⁵ Of December 12, 1924. See No. 219, n. 2.

⁶ For the text of the General Report, which was drafted in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of September 6, 1924 (see No. 206, n. 6), see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Meeting of the Committees: Minutes of the First Committee (Constitutional Questions)* (Geneva, 1924), pp. 117-135. The draft Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes formed part of this Report (see No. 10, n. 4).

⁷ Czech delegate to the League of Nations, and Rapporteur to the Third Committee.

⁸ Greek delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations, and Rapporteur to the First Committee.

⁹ No. 211.

¹⁰ No. 242, below.

¹¹ See No. 225.

will be difficult to obtain from German Government assurances going beyond Treaty of Versailles.

Regarding Rhineland occupation, German Government will not demand modification of Articles 428 to 432. On the other hand they will not abandon any right conferred by these Articles.

Regarding Belgium, frontier would be assured in the same way as French territory.

Regarding Holland, there is no objection from German side to Dutch participation in pact.

Regarding alleged refusal of Germany to sign arbitration Treaty with Switzerland, I am informed that this Treaty was signed three years ago and was ratified immediately.¹² Monsieur Herriot must have been mis-informed.

I gather from conversations which I have held with German Government that essential basis of their proposal is twofold

(1) Final acceptance of French and Belgian Frontiers as laid down in Treaty of Versailles; this tacitly accepts settlement reached.

(2) Arbitration in all cases of conflict on basis similar to arbitration treaties already negotiated e.g. German—Swiss, German—Swedish.¹³ If necessary scope of these treaties could be extended so as to embrace all possible causes of conflict.

¹² See No. 235.

¹³ See No. 190, n. 5.

No. 242

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received March 13, 9 a.m.)*

No. 98 Telegraphic [C 3655/459/18]

BERLIN, March 13, 1925, 12.58 a.m.

Addressed to Geneva No. 4.

Following for Secretary of State. . . .¹

With regard to Polish frontier I have had private conversation with Chancellor.

He said that German government were above all anxious to create stability in European position. This could only be created by complete frankness and by German government remaining in their engagements strictly within what they were able to carry out.

His general view was following.

A primary basis for pacification must be established through a settlement of German-French frontier danger. This had proved . . .¹ est source of peril in the past and would remain a menace to the future unless

¹ The text is here uncertain.

an agreement was reached. A lasting agreement regarding it would constitute a sure basis for European peace in the future. He was therefore anxious not to impair that foundation by linking up with this settlement another settlement of a less essential character regarding which similar permanence could not now be reached. In his view German-French frontier was ripe for final and permanent settlement. German-Polish frontier was not ripe. He submitted argument that if exactly identical conditions were adopted for Polish frontier as for French frontier this would dim value of French agreement and diminish its authority. No thinking man could assert that present conditions regarding Danzig corridor and separation of East Prussia from Germany were a permanent foundation for pacification.

In German memorandum² it had been proposed that disputes with Poland should be submitted to arbitration. Poland was included in negotiation proposal the object of which was to avoid settlement by force of international conflicts and to introduce peaceful methods.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

No. 243

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 13, 9 a.m.)

No. 99 [C 3626/459/18]

BERLIN, March 13, 1925, 12.58 a.m.

Addressed to Geneva No. 5.

Following for Secretary of State.

In my telegrams 3¹ and 4² I have endeavoured to give information on all points raised by Herriot in conversations of March 6th and March 7th³ except one viz. that Luther's offer⁴ was a manœuvre devised for internal political ends.

This supposition can be dismissed as groundless. From standpoint of internal politics present offer of German government is a bold initiative which Right will only endorse under pressure and which arouses violent opposition from Extreme Left. The Moderate Left supports the offer but not to the extent of assisting Luther if they had an opportunity to unseat him.

If Luther wanted a quiet time and a safe majority he would have chosen any policy rather than pact of non aggression.

¹ No. 241.

³ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

² No. 242.

⁴ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 13, 4.30 p.m.)

No. 78 Telegraphic [C 3665/459/18]

Urgent

GENEVA, March 13, 1925, 4 p.m.

Following from Mr. Cadogan.

At Public Session of Council this morning Czechoslovak delegate summarised declarations made yesterday:¹ he himself admitted that perfection could not be claimed for protocol.² He emphasized pressing need for security in Central Europe. While admitting that British statement³ offered hope of approaching problem from a different angle, he expressed conviction that ultimately the world must come back to something in the nature of the protocol. He then submitted resolution

(A) referring to next Assembly⁴ declarations made on behalf of governments and instructing Secretary General to put question at once on Assembly agenda.

(B) adjourning preparatory work until decision reached by 6th Assembly.⁴ Mr. Chamberlain then made following statement: 'In expressing my concurrence in the resolution proposed by M. Benes, I desire only to repeat in a sentence what I said yesterday³—that the British Government remains firmly attached to the principles of arbitration and disarmament, and is anxious to do its part in giving peace and security to the world. If we find ourselves obliged to reject the protocol, it is because we think that in present circumstances the covenant itself better serves those great objects to which all the countries represented at this Council have in the discussions of yesterday and today again pledged their support.'

Resolution submitted by Monsieur Benes was then adopted.⁵ The Council then passed resolutions regarding appointment of chairman and members of Saar Governing Commission,⁶ Greek minority in Constantinople and Turkish minority in Western Thrace,⁷ representation of certain women's international organisations among assessors to Advisory Committee for traffic in women and protection of children⁸ and request of Swiss government for representation on this committee.⁹

Full report follows by bag tonight.¹⁰

¹ For the minutes of the sixth and seventh meetings of the Council of the League of Nations on arbitration, security, and the reduction of armaments on March 12, see *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 445-58.

² See No. 10, n. 4.

³ See No. 240, n. 13.

⁴ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁵ See *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 458-61.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 461-2.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 462-3.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 463.

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 463-4.

¹⁰ The League of Nations minutes of these meetings of March 13, received in the Foreign Office on March 17, have not been preserved with the exception of those relating to the Geneva Protocol (W 2304/9/98), not printed.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 14, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 101 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3669/459/18]

PARIS, March 13, 1925

Press reports this morning that at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber yesterday a resolution was unanimously passed to the effect that none of the districts at present under occupation, and in particular Cologne, should be evacuated so long as no pact had been arranged between allies ('entre alliés') which would provide an absolute guarantee of French security.

According to the press, M. Herriot was immediately informed of the attitude of the commission.

The proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Commission are of course secret, and as a rule no account of them is issued. The report cannot therefore be regarded as authoritative. It is nevertheless substantially accurate. Other accounts are perhaps less explicit, but they state that it was agreed that the evacuation of Cologne could not be considered so long as the problem of French security had not been solved.

The above vote of the commission does not, of course, bind the government, but it is calculated to make M. Herriot's position more difficult.

Now that the question of security has been raised in a concrete form, we must I think face the fact that the French government will be unwilling to commit themselves on the question of Cologne until they know how the present discussions are going to develop. If they are to negotiate a pact with the German government, they will certainly want the negotiations to take place before and not after Cologne has been evacuated. It will not be surprising therefore if they try to protract as long as possible the proceedings leading up to the notifications to the German government on the conditions on which Cologne can be evacuated. The manner in which the resolution instructing the C[omit  ] M[ilitaire] A[lli  ] de V[ersailles] to analyse the facts revealed by the general inspection¹ has been delayed,² seems to confirm this view. If in these circumstances we press for an early and reasonable decision on the Cologne question, we may I am afraid, drive M. Herriot into taking up an uncompromising attitude and therefore bring matters prematurely to a head, with perhaps disastrous results. It would on the whole be better to go slow for the present, and acquiesce in a certain amount of circumlocution if necessary in order not to make M. Herriot's position more difficult than it already is. But I realise that public opinion in England and Germany may make this difficult. I

¹ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592, below.

² See Nos. 593, 595, and 597, below.

gather from General Wauchope³ that the latter is so far showing patience, but this cannot be expected to continue indefinitely.⁴

Copy sent to Geneva.

³ President of the British Section of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Berlin.

⁴ Sir E. Crowe minuted on March 16: '... [France] must be persuaded to follow a reasonable policy. That will be a matter of friendly and patient negotiation, in which the question of a security pact of some sort must play an important part. If only for this reason alone the Department must now lay aside all idea of a threatening or bullying attitude towards France over the question of Cologne. There are enough elements of friction already between us. ...'

No. 246

Mr. Dodd¹ (Prague) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 17)

*No. 76 [C 3851/459/18]**

PRAGUE, March 13, 1925

Sir,

It has been very noticeable that whereas public opinion in other countries has been greatly interested by the recent offer of a pact of security by the German Government,² and in Poland the greatest excitement has been caused by it,³ in Czechoslovakia the subject seems to have raised no interest at all. The press has concentrated on such questions as the regulation of holidays, and the alleged interference of the Papal Nuncio⁴ in the internal affairs of the country, and has passed over this question of European and even world interest practically in silence. So noticeable has it been that I had wondered whether the Government had given to the press a *mot d'ordre* to that effect, and I took an opportunity this morning of mentioning the point to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Dr. Girska had noticed the contrast, but denied that any suggestion had been given by the Government to the press. Other countries who owed their existence or present form to the Treaties of Peace appeared either to fear that the present situation was not permanent or to hope that it might not be so, but Czechoslovakia had no fear whatever that her present frontiers would ever be changed; she would never consent to a change, and any attempt to effect one by violence would lead to war *à outrance*. Czechoslovakia was not at all nervous on the subject. Poland, however, felt very uncertain about the maintenance of the Danzig corridor, and feeling uncertain became excited when it was mentioned. Poland felt that the corridor did not really belong to her. Dr. Girska touched the lapel of his coat and said: 'If this coat

¹ First Secretary at Prague and Chargé d'Affaires March 2–April 7.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See Vol. XXV, No. 449.

⁴ Monsignor F. Marmaggi.

were only borrowed and someone came up to me and mentioned it, I should fly into a passion and suspect that he was going to take it away from me. But Czechoslovakia has no borrowed coat and consequently is not nervous.'

Dr. Girsá admitted that there were in the country certain elements, especially the German Nationalist party, who did desire a revision of the frontiers, but the Czechoslovak Government did not take them very seriously. There had been, moreover, certain movements in Germany, notably in Bavaria and Saxony, which might be called irredentist in regard to Czechoslovaks of German race, movements in which Czechoslovak citizens did play a part, and the Government were taking appropriate steps to check this.

The Czechoslovak Government welcomed the German offer.² They looked upon it as a step forward, which might be made the basis for a more complete arrangement. They regarded it, however, as merely a beginning. It was useless to accept as definitely settled the frontiers of the west while leaving the eastern frontiers open to revision. Any attempt by warlike measures to alter the eastern frontiers would lead as surely to a European and a world war as an attempt to do the same in the west. The mere offer on the part of Germany to decide any questions so dangerous by arbitration and to exclude the possibility of war in connection with them was a welcome advance.

I have, etc.,
CHARLES DODD

No. 247

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 16)

[C 3753/459/18]*

BRITISH DELEGATION, GENEVA, *March 14, 1925*

My dear Crowe,

I asked the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs to call upon me yesterday evening after the long sitting of the council, which had been almost entirely occupied by the disputes between Poland and Danzig.¹

I must admit that M. Skrzynski, who is said to pride himself on being both the handsomest and youngest Minister for Foreign Affairs, had not made an agreeable impression on me when I met him in society, and had seemed to me perfectly disagreeable in his attitude during our council meeting. He presented, indeed, a curious contrast to the President of the Senate of Danzig. M. Skrzynski, who spoke excellent French, was all smiles and irony, but seemed to me to wear that air of uneasy assumption which those who are uncertain of their own position are apt to assume.

¹ See *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 468-77. See also Vol. XXV, Nos. 448 and 450.

M. Sahn, on the other hand, reminded me of the late [*sic*] Mr. Flavin, M.P.,² whom some of my colleagues will remember. He is a man of great stature, with a strong brutal face, which was grimly set during the whole of the proceedings. He spoke German, and, whether from necessity or calculation, appeared to depend upon the English translation for the sense of M. Skrzynski's French.

M. Briand observed to me that merely to look at the two men was to appreciate the whole question. The President of the Danzig Senate refused to look at the Polish Minister, and did not attempt to conceal either his dislike or contempt. M. Briand added later that if they met in a dark lane he knew which of them would return.

Having formed this unfavourable impression of M. Skrzynski, I was very agreeably surprised when, opening our conversation in good English, he spoke simply and directly, with none of the swagger or conceit which had seemed to me a constant part of his public form. A few words upon the position in Danzig, with which city M. Skrzynski said that Poland would get along very well if it were not for the opposition and ill-will organised by Berlin, brought me at once to the question of security. I sketched very rapidly—for our time was limited—the reasons which led His Majesty's Government to attach so much importance to the German proposals,³ and to the opening which they might be found to afford for reconstituting the society of European nations. I told M. Skrzynski that, if there was a chance of increasing the guarantees for peace, and of removing those brooding fears of which I had spoken in my declaration at the council, it seemed to me that Poland had an even greater interest in seizing this chance than any other of the Allies. Poland stood between two great nations in a position of danger which her tragic history must make only too plain. Surely it was in the interest of Poland to come to terms if possible with at least one of those Great Powers. Did he not think that it would be easier to cultivate good, and even friendly, relations with the German Reich than with the Soviet Union? I had tried to put myself in the position of a Pole, and to think what was the true interest of Poland. I begged him to consider whether there was not some force in what I had said to him.

M. Skrzynski listened with close attention and, I thought, with growing interest as the conversation proceeded. He began by arguing that, on the one hand, Germany gave nothing to which she was not already pledged by the Treaty of Versailles; on the other hand, that she gained nothing; and it was therefore legitimate to suspect the good faith of her proposals. But he observed that what he most feared and disliked was the idea that the three Western Powers and Italy should enter into a general pact with Germany, which would appear to 'legitimise' her aspirations for changes in her eastern frontier. He had, as I have mentioned, been speaking

² Mr. M. J. Flavin (1861–1944) had been Nationalist M.P. for North Kerry 1896–1918.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

English, but he formulated this phrase in French, and repeated it more than once.

I replied that I had, of course, no cut-and-dried plan in my mind and no propositions to lay before him. All that I wished him to do was think very seriously over the arguments that I had addressed to him, to consider whether Poland's real interest did not lie in following up these overtures, and at any rate not to close his mind or to attempt to prejudice French opinion against a serious study of them. I observed that the very fact that Germany would not make exactly the same declaration with regard to the east as to the west was a proof of her good faith, for, if she had no serious intention of keeping her engagements, it would be a matter of indifference to her what pledges she gave. Further, I observed that, in refusing to renounce for ever the hope of securing some modification in the arrangements on her eastern border, Germany was after all only following the example of France. France had in fact abandoned all hope of regaining Alsace-Lorraine, and would never have declared war for the purpose of reversing the verdict of 1870,⁴ but France had, nevertheless, always (and notably at the time of the German negotiations for an anti-English union during the South African war)⁵ refused publicly to renounce all hope that Alsace-Lorraine might some day be restored to her. Was it unreasonable in Germany to refuse in respect of her eastern frontiers what France had always refused to her in respect of her western ones?

M. Skrzynski again emphasised his fear of any pact including both the west and the east, which by a difference of language might seem to 'legitimise' the German claims in the east. After all, if Germany joined the League of Nations, article 19 was always open to her. I hastened to say: 'Then if Germany joined the League and, publicly renouncing any idea of war, accepted article 19 as the method for solving her problems, you would not object.' He would not absolutely pin himself to this view. Indeed, he said that in such grave matters he must necessarily consult his colleagues, and could not make any declaration of policy except after careful consideration, but he assured me that he would most carefully consider what I had said. He regretted that words like mine were not heard by the Polish people, who were made anxious by certain articles in the English journals. He was grateful to me for the way in which I had spoken to him. It was not his policy to be a *trouble-fête* in Europe, and he would be only too glad to find a way to better relations between the adjoining nations. He offered to come to London at any time if I desired

⁴ See No. 22, n. 5.

⁵ Also known as the Boer War, between Great Britain and the Transvaal (South African Republic) and the Orange Free State October, 1899–May, 1902. For the anti-English union, see Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. I (London, 1927), chap. VII and vol. III (London, 1928), pp. 432–3. See also W. L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890–1902* (2nd. ed., New York, 1951), chap. XX, which concludes that Russia, not Germany, attempted such a union.

to pursue the conversation, for though he had every confidence in M. Skirmunt,⁶ he thought that questions of this high importance were better treated personally by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

I have omitted to say that I told him I had no idea of signing any pact which included a reference to the eastern frontiers of Germany. He would recognise that Great Britain was in a different position from France, inasmuch as our obligations to Poland were only those of one member of the League of Nations to another whereas France had, in addition, the obligations of her alliance⁷ which she intended to observe loyally, as M. Herriot had declared in his conversation with me.⁸ Any pact into which we might enter, if our co-operation could facilitate the great work of pacification, would necessarily be confined to those frontiers in which we had an immediate interest. I would venture, however, to suggest that the elimination of the risk of war in the west would itself be an additional security for peace in the east, and that I earnestly trusted that Poland would consider her responsibility to her ally and not prevent France from obtaining additional security if such were within her reach.

M. Skrzynski assured me that he had no desire to stand in the way of France.

Altogether, the interview seemed to me satisfactory. I believe that it went far to remove from M. Skrzynski's mind the feelings which had influenced his conversations and published statements in Paris,⁹ and that he will at least regard the attitude of England and the proposals which we have supported in a different light from that in which he had previously seen them. My impression is confirmed by the fact that later in the evening he told M. Quiñones de León¹⁰ that he had been 'much touched' by my words. He repeated the same words to Sir Eric Drummond this morning, and he used similar language to M. Briand. M. Briand himself is under no illusions as to the impossibility of permanently maintaining the present arrangements in Eastern Europe. He observed to me this morning, when I spoke of this conversation, that M. Skrzynski would leave Geneva wiser than he came, and that if Germany would only join the League and trust to time and article 19 of the covenant, the council itself, after a series of such sittings as we had yesterday, would become convinced that some changes must be made. M. Briand informed me that he had had a telephone message from Paris that the effect produced by the British declaration on the protocol¹¹ was not bad. Unless I am wholly mistaken, and indeed, unless his whole language and attitude are deliberately adopted to conceal his thoughts, he is ardently desirous to find some method of working within the *cadre* which I have traced, and I count upon his influence with M. Herriot and with French opinion to

⁶ See No. 226, n. 4.

⁷ See No. 187.

⁸ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

⁹ Count Skrzynski visited Paris March 5-6, and saw M. Herriot, M. Briand, and M. Paul-Boncour on March 6 before leaving for Geneva. See No. 224.

¹⁰ Spanish Ambassador to Paris, and delegate to the Council of the League of Nations.

¹¹ See No. 240, n. 13.

produce by degrees a better attitude in Paris, provided we stand firmly by our policy and make good the expectations that my speech in the House of Commons¹² and my conversations with M. Herriot⁸ and the other statesmen I have seen here, have raised. M. Briand told me that M. Benes, who, as he remarked, was the more intelligent of the two, 'travaillerait' M. Skrzynski and he believed that we should presently find him more moderate and reasonable. Provided, therefore, our policy is consistently maintained and steadily pressed forward, I am not unhopeful that we may work a great and beneficent change in the European situation; but it may be taken as certain that no improvement can take place without our active co-operation, and that to withdraw now would not merely be to raise a universal outcry against the perfidy of Great Britain, but to plunge Europe into disaster.

Yours sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹² See No. 223, n. 2.

No. 248

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 15, 5 p.m.)

No. 81 Telegraphic [C 3756/459/18]

GENEVA, March 15, 1925, 2.30 p.m.

Following for Sir E. Crowe from Mr. A. Chamberlain.

Very confidential.

I summarise my impression of Geneva discussion of protocol¹ and of my conversations. Decisive character of British declaration,² its ruthless exposition of our objections, its sternly practical character, absence of any expression of those vague hopes, loose ideas and sentimental phrases which are customary in League oratory, undoubtedly gave considerable shock to most of those present. Omission of detailed examination of effect of American solution on economic sanctions³ was undoubtedly right. Its

¹ See No. 10, n. 4.

² See No. 240, n. 13.

³ Mr. Chamberlain had stated: '... As all the world is aware, the League of Nations, in its present shape, is not the League designed by the framers of the Covenant. They no doubt contemplated, and, as far as they could, provided against, the difficulties that might arise from the non-inclusion of a certain number of States within the circle of League membership. But they never supposed that, among these States, would be found so many of the most powerful nations in the world; least of all did they foresee that one of them would be the United States of America. ... surely it is most unwise to add to the liabilities already incurred without taking stock of the degree to which the machinery of the Covenant has been already weakened by the non-membership of certain great States. For in truth the change, especially as regards the "economic sanctions", amounts to a transformation. The "economic sanction", if simultaneously directed by all the world against a State which is not itself economically self-sufficing, would be a weapon of incalculable power. This, or

inclusion would have had a disastrous effect on the foreign mind always inclined to push every thought (? to its) logical conclusion and almost incapable of understanding British habit of disregarding logical (? in favour of) practical but illogical middle course. Even more disastrous would have been omission of 5th section. This section did much to restore confidence to an assembly whose nerves were shaken by definite rejection of protocol by Great Britain, Dominions and India and was increasingly valued the more it was considered. It is on execution of policy therein foreshadowed that all hopes are now concentrated and in its fulfillment that threatened powers see their hope of safety and Germany chance of a tolerable life and of re-entry into the comity of nations. M. Benes says in effect that if you will make France secure I shall be safe. Skrzynski said to me: 'after all you hold the peace of Europe in your hand; it will not be broken if Great Britain makes it clear she will range herself against the aggressor'. Hymans and Briand are both hopeful and you will have seen Briand has asked Herriot to make no further declaration until he has seen Briand.

Herriot has of course most difficult task and public opinion in France is far from favourable to our plans. I dare not underrate immense difficulties of my task nor how easy it would be to dash the cup from our lips. Influence of Great Britain has been hypothetically weakened by uncertainties of our policy or I might say by absence of any policy and there are very disagreeable expressions of doubt of our good faith. But given time and (? moderation) and provided we always act consistently and resolutely I am convinced we can play part befitting our traditions and greatness of Empire and lead Europe in work of reconstruction and peace.

Repeated to Paris and Berlin.

something not very different from this, was the weapon originally devised by the authors of the Covenant. To them it appeared to be not only bloodless, but cheap, effective and easy to use, in the most improbable event of its use being necessary. But all this is changed by the mere existence of powerful economic communities outside the limits of the League. It might force trade into unaccustomed channels, but it could hardly stop it; and, though the offending State would no doubt suffer, there is no presumption that it would be crushed or even that it would suffer most. . . .'

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir E. Crowe (Received March 15, 7.05 p.m.)

No. 82 Telegraphic [C 3725/459/18]

GENEVA, March 15, 1925, 5.10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 4.¹

Addressed to (? Berlin,) No. 2. Repeated to Foreign Office, repeated to Paris.

Secret.

Following from Mr. Chamberlain.

I do not wish to move too fast with Germany; I must have time to allow my conversations to bear fruit in Paris. Following is therefore for your personal information and guidance in your conversations but not for use as coming from me.

Polish frontier: it would be quite impossible for any French government to make mutual pact for west without a simultaneous though not necessarily same provision for east. Unless Germany realises this clearly I cannot bring to a successful conclusion any attempt to restore her to comity of nations. I recognise clearly she cannot renounce all desire for change in the east as she is ready to do in the west and I have not failed to use this declaration of different attitude towards the east and west as a proof of her good faith in all my conversations including that with Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs² and argument has not been without effect. But Germany will spoil her case if she is in a hurry to press it.

Obviously her right course is to work on following lines:

1. Simultaneous signature of pact with Poland offering mutual guarantees not to have recourse to force etc.
2. Entry into League of Nations.
3. Reasonable attitude about Danzig and abstention from provocative acts including continued choice of free city for seat of German congress and the like.
4. Give time for League Council and Assembly to draw their own conclusions from nature and multiplicity of Danzig questions brought before Council of League of Nations.³ Effect of these disputes is already beginning to appear in men's minds but is lessened by obvious effort of Germany to make the worst of a difficult situation.
5. Paramount (? importance of) establishing her position in League and joining cordially and sympathetically in friendly co-operation and conciliatory spirit which are outstanding features of proceedings of Council.
...⁴
6. Use of article (? 19 of) covenant and M. Clemenceau's explanatory letter⁵ if she has not already been able to come to terms by direct

¹ No. 242.

² See No. 247.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 1.

⁴ The text is here uncertain. In another text, this read 'then'.

⁵ See No. 231, n. 5.

negotiations with Poland which some of my colleagues on Council think she will be able to do.

In my opinion success would attend such a policy if carried out with prudence and (? unity) but any attempt to precipitate conclusion of what must be work of some years would be fatal to German hopes.

I need not point out to you that Poland must desire to be on good terms with either Russia or Germany. If German policy is wisely directed this fact will be of immense consequence in eventual solution of existing difficulties.

No. 250

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received in the Foreign Office, March 24)*

[C 4171/459/18]

Personal and Confidential

BERLIN, March 15, 1925

Dear Secretary of State,

I think that we have made solid progress during the last fortnight.

In the first place, the difficulties about the 26 per cent¹ appear practically settled. There are still details to elaborate, but a fundamental basis, acceptable to both parties, has been reached. The Agent General, Mr. Gilbert, has shown a very accommodating spirit and has done his best to facilitate an arrangement within the limits allowed by his legal adviser. I hope, therefore, that the necessary measures for ratification of the Commercial Treaty² will be carried through rapidly in both Parliaments.³

Secondly, the German Government have practically made up their minds that they must come into the League of Nations. The reserves which they made, and which I communicated in my telegrams to Geneva,⁴ appear to be adequately taken into account in the reply of the League⁵ which is published in the German papers this morning. Provided Luther has the desire to come into the League, he can agree to the conditions formulated.

I regard this question as nearly settled.

Thirdly, as regards the reciprocal Pact, I am anxious to know what you thought of the information given in my telegrams this week.⁶ The German Government are anxious to push on with the preparation of an instrument which will give them security. They are prepared to be quite precise in their own engagements regarding the Western frontier.

¹ i.e. the levy under the German Reparation (Recovery) Act of 1921. See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 417, n. 2, 484, 534, 548, 589, and 596.

² For the text of the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty of December 2, 1924, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 119, pp. 369-89. See also Vol. XXVI, Nos. 589, 604, and 606.

³ Ratifications were exchanged on September 8, 1925.

⁴ No. 241; Berlin telegram No. 102 of March 13, not printed.

⁵ Of March 14. See No. 261, below.

⁶ Nos. 234, 241, 242, and 243.

As concerns extension of their proposal, I do not think they will go much beyond what they offered in their original memorandum to Paris of February 9.⁷ I should regard that level as the high-water mark of what the Ministry could get through the Reichstag. But details could be filled in and guarantees specified.

I have been looking up the Treaty of 1839⁸ regarding the neutrality of Belgium and am surprised to find how simple the phraseology is which was considered adequate at that time. There is no talk of military commitments or of sanctions or of economic reprisals. If we accept today what was then considered adequate, the drafting of the necessary clauses should not be a matter of great difficulty.

The Presidential Election⁹ occupies men's minds here almost exclusively. It is probably rather fortunate that it has diverted public attention from the reciprocal Pact discussion. But for Public interest being centred on home politics, there would have been more opposition to the Luther initiative. I cannot tell you anything useful about the probable result of the Presidential election—the whole thing is confused and obscure.

I am much obliged for your sanction of my leave this month, but I shall defer taking it until rather a later date—probably after the Presidential election on March 29—as there is so much of importance going on here, and I want particularly to get the Commercial Treaty through. I hope this will meet with your approval.

Yours sincerely,
D'ABERNON

⁷ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁸ See No. 22, n. 3.

⁹ See No. 217, n. 3.

No. 251

Memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with M. Herriot

[C 3921/459/18]*

[PARIS], March 16, 1925

In pursuance of the promise which I made on my way to Geneva,¹ I called upon the President of the Council this afternoon. He told me that he had been thinking seriously over our conversations,² and had informed the Council of Ministers of what had passed between us. The points which seemed to him, after further consideration, to merit particular attention were those which he had already indicated: the absence of any reference to the Belgian frontier or to the southern frontier; the necessity for France to act loyally towards Poland and not to purchase her own security at the expense of Polish safety; the position of Holland in relation to this

¹ See No. 224. Mr. Chamberlain arrived in Paris from Geneva on March 16.

² See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

question, and the refusal of Germany to ratify a treaty of arbitration with Switzerland.³ All these required careful examination, but the points of greatest and most immediate importance from the French point of view were that Germany should enter the League of Nations, and that we should proceed by the method which he had indicated of consultation and agreement between the Allies before we entered into negotiations with Germany.

M. Herriot said that the rejection of the protocol⁴ and the simultaneous rejection of any idea of a separate pact with France and Belgium¹ had come as a great shock to his colleagues and to the French public as well as to himself; that public opinion was very difficult to deal with, and that even among his colleagues he had difficulties to overcome. He did not know whether it would be possible, out of such proposals as I had sketched, to arrive at an eventual success, but he had said to his colleagues and was prepared to maintain before the Chambers and before French opinion that it was the duty of France not to repel, without the most serious examination, the German propositions,⁵ and to study seriously the British suggestions with a view to seeing whether a guarantee for French security and for peace could not be obtained from them. He had already taken the first step; his instructions to M. de Fleuriau were already in London,⁶ and he had caused similar instructions to be sent to the other Allied capitals and a short note to be sent to Berlin to show the German Government that he was seriously examining the possibilities of their memorandum.⁷ The last matter which he had mentioned was perhaps only a matter of procedure, but it was extremely important in consequence of the very sensitive state of French opinion.

I took up his points in turn; I told him the substance of what had passed between the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself,⁸ and that just at the moment of leaving for my interview with him I had received from M. Skrzynski a report of the speech which he had delivered at last night's Franco-Polish banquet.⁹ I had only been able to glance at it in a great hurry, but I thought that it indicated that M. Skrzynski had been somewhat reassured by what I had said to him, and was not at all inclined to take up a *non possumus* attitude. In my view, as in that of M. Benes,¹⁰ if peace was firmly established in the west, that fact by itself would be an additional guarantee for the Powers of Eastern Europe. I had no desire, in considering the possibility of new agreements, to weaken the force of old treaties, but the covenant itself contained an article 19, to which, at the proper time, Germany might appeal if meanwhile she had been unable to come to any amicable arrangement direct with Poland, a contingency

³ See, however, No. 235.

⁵ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁷ See No. 209.

⁹ A copy of this speech is filed at C 4075/459/18, not printed. For a report, see *The Times*, March 16, p. 14.

¹⁰ See No. 240.

⁴ See No. 240, n. 13.

⁶ Cf. Nos. 236 and 237.

⁸ See No. 247.

which, as M. Briand had indicated to me, was by no means impossible.¹¹ As to the southern frontiers, I assumed that what he really had in mind was that nothing should be done to weaken the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade the union of Austria and Germany. He assented to this interpretation of his meaning, and I then asked him whether he had had any indication of Italian opinion, because I had heard from Rome that the Italian Government agreed generally with the views which I had expressed.¹² M. Herriot replied that he also had received the same message—or, rather, that he also had heard from the Italian Government that they agreed with him. I said that to my message they had added, however, something of greater interest, namely, that they would have very much disliked a Franco—Anglo—Belgian pact, to which they would not have wished to adhere and from which they would have disliked to be excluded. M. Herriot said that that part of the message had not been delivered to him. I added that we ought certainly not to do anything that cast any doubt upon the provision of the Treaty of Versailles forbidding the union of Germany and Austria. As to Belgium, I told M. Herriot that there would appear to be no difficulty, for M. Hymans had informed me that he had already been assured by the German Government that the omission to mention the Belgian frontier was due to an accident of draughtsmanship.¹³ About Holland, in regard to which M. Herriot had said he felt some anxiety, for he could not exactly ascertain what was happening there, I said I could add nothing to the account I had given him of my conversation with the Dutch Minister in London.¹⁴ As to the Swiss Treaty, he must be speaking under some entire misconception, for, after his mention of the subject at our last interview, I had enquired both in London and in Berlin, and I found that the treaty had been ratified three years ago.¹⁵ It was, indeed, as I understood, the provisions of this treaty and those of the German—Swedish Treaty of Arbitration¹⁶ that the German Government had in mind as a model, though not necessarily a model to be exactly copied, when they drew up their note.

I now came to his two principal points. I was in complete agreement with him that the entry of Germany into the League of Nations was an essential though not a *preliminary* condition of any negotiations with Germany, on the lines which we had discussed. I did not wish to make it a condition preliminary to all discussions with the Germans, because just as I was anxious, wherever I could, to take account of his great difficulties with French opinion and to facilitate his difficult task, so I thought that we must also take some account of the difficulties of the German Government and ease their path where it was possible for us to do so. But I had already told Lord D'Abernon that unless the Germans were prepared to enter the League of Nations on the same footing as other Powers, it would be idle to suppose that anything could come of their *démarche*.¹⁷ As to his second

¹¹ See No. 232.

¹² See No. 239.

¹³ See No. 240.

¹⁴ See No. 225, n. 3.

¹⁵ See No. 235.

¹⁶ See No. 190, n. 5.

¹⁷ See No. 231.

principal point—procedure—I was happy to say I was equally in agreement with him. I did not mean that he on his side or I on mine might not ask a question of Berlin or make observation to the German Government before we were all agreed, but I thought it was indispensable that we should examine the possibilities of the German proposals,⁵ and reach some agreement among ourselves before we undertook to negotiate with Germany.

By a train of thought which I failed to follow, M. Herriot had linked with this question of procedure the problem of disarmament. He had received a telegram from Washington that morning, indicating that it had been announced to the press by the White House the day before that, in view of the failure of the protocol,⁴ the President was considering the summoning of a new disarmament conference at Washington, and that the French Government must be prepared to receive proposals for such a conference embracing all questions, both of military and naval defence.¹⁸ He must tell me confidentially, and using the freedom which he hoped I would permit, that such a proposal would be very unacceptable to the French. France was devoted to the League of Nations; but that America, which had induced her to enter it and had then withdrawn from it, which had refused her aspirations and offered her a guarantee treaty instead and then declined to ratify it;¹⁹ America, which was so aloof from all the suffering and the fears of France, and from all the dangers to which she was exposed; America, which touched sometimes with a rough hand the wounds which the war had left in the body and mind of France, and used the position of dependence in which France unfortunately found herself, to try and impose decisions and dictate policy; that this America, which refused to take part in the League deliberations, should summon her own conference in Washington. No! such a thing at this moment, immediately after the rejection of the protocol and in the first disappointment of finding out that no purely mutual pact with England was possible,¹ would be painful to French opinion and to himself—pacifist though he was—painful to the point of being humiliating.

M. Herriot had spoken with much emotion. I replied that I had, from the first, told Mr. Kellogg that I thought a conference in Washington on land armaments was an impossibility, but naval disarmament stood on a different footing, and that the British Government would be favourably disposed to any effort to carry further the work of the last Washington Conference in that field.²⁰ We did not suppose that it was possible to lay down a proportion for cruisers in the same way as had been done to the battleships, but we thought that a limitation of the size of individual cruisers and questions of a similar character might be very usefully and fruitfully examined, and we should be glad to join in the work if the other great naval Powers would do so. I had gathered from what he said to me

¹⁸ Reported in Washington telegram No. 90 of March 14, not printed.

¹⁹ See No. 185, n. 1.

²⁰ See No. 201.

in December²¹ that his great objection to a Washington Conference rested upon the supposition that it would extend to land armaments and I had so informed Mr. Kellogg. I hoped that he would not reject the idea of a naval conference. My Government had already approved a despatch for communication to our Ambassador in Washington instructing him to inform the Administration of our views.²² M. Herriot, who told me that he had difficulties even with his own Government and with military and naval officers, who did not always take the same views as civilians, said that he was determined to propose the reduction of the period of service in France, and his Minister of War²³ had agreed to bring the subject before the Chamber, but he repeated with great earnestness that it would be painful—and again he said painful to the point of humiliation—to be dragged to Washington, where they had felt, even at the last conference,²⁴ that the atmosphere was not very friendly to them. If some kind of pact giving security to France resulted from the proposals which we had been discussing, then it might be an entirely different thing; then, indeed, he would go to his own French public and say that they must reduce their military strength. After all, France was now scarcely a naval Power; that question was of very little consequence compared with the much larger question of the land forces. What he wanted above all was delay. In reply, I said that I could understand his point of view, but I would beg him to see how different was our position. After all, the biggest factor in the world today was fear, and this fear was not confined to Europe, but affected other nations as well. The Americans were afraid of the Japanese; the Japanese were afraid of the Americans; if no further restrictions were agreed upon, they might very likely begin a new race in naval construction, and Great Britain, which had no desire to take such a course, would inevitably be compelled to follow in their wake. For us naval disarmament was, from every point of view, and particularly, perhaps, from the financial point of view, much more important than for France, and he would see, therefore, that it was not possible for me to adopt exactly his attitude. I would, however, reflect upon what he had said, and I would consult with my colleagues; I could make him no sort of promise, but if our instructions had not yet reached Washington or had not yet been acted upon, we would consider whether we could avoid taking any initiative. But if the American Government approached us, neither public opinion nor, I must add, our own opinions—for I did not wish to put all the burden of any difference between him and me on that vague entity, public opinion—would permit us to do otherwise than say that if other great naval Powers would co-operate, we should most gladly accept the American invitation.

M. Herriot then reverted to the question of security. Was he right in understanding from my first conversation¹ that the British Government

²¹ See Vol. XXVI, No. 608.

²³ General C. Nollet.

²² See No. 256, below.

²⁴ See No. 185, n. 2.

had no idea of allowing it to be made a condition of a pact with Germany that the period of the occupation of the second and third zones should be shortened? I said he was perfectly right in so understanding, and I repeated that I had indicated this to Lord D'Abernon in my first communication upon the German memorandum as being a matter which could not be brought into question if negotiations resulted,²⁵ and had received through Lord D'Abernon Dr. Stresemann's assurances that no such condition formed any part of the German plan.²⁵ This concluded our discussion on security, and I then enquired of M. Herriot whether he had any views about the publication of the report of the Inter-Allied Military Committee in Berlin,²⁶ briefly indicating to him the reasons why I had been opposed to it, but saying that the Opposition parties in England demanded it, the German Government represented to me that it was unfair to withhold it from them, and that though I could perfectly well maintain my own position if he thought it inexpedient to publish the document, I could not resist a wish on his part to publish, which would be supported both by the Germans and by the Liberal and Labour Oppositions. He replied that his own Government were divided on the subject; some of them and General Walch²⁷ were opposed to publication, as they said it would betray the source of their information and lead to reprisals against those who had supplied it, but he himself did not take that view. He thought that the German request was a fair one; that they were entitled to know what was alleged against them, and that the objection which he had mentioned might be met by publishing the substance of the report whilst omitting the annexes and anything of a nature to betray individuals to the vengeance of the German Government or of their neighbours. He was not yet in a position to answer my question definitely, because, as he had told me, his colleagues were not all agreed, but if they did come to some such conclusion, he suggested our soldiers might well get together to examine the report from that point of view, and to indicate what must be omitted in order to avoid that particular danger.

A. C.

²⁵ See No. 200, n. 12.

²⁶ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 596, below.

²⁷ French President of the Inter-Allied Military Committee of Control in Berlin.

No. 252

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 19)

*No. 660 [C 3966/459/18]**

PARIS, March 16, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 616 of the 11th March,¹ I have the

¹ No. 238.

honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum by Mr. Phipps giving an account of the conversation which he had yesterday with M. Léon Blum² respecting the German proposals for a security pact³ and other subjects.

I have, etc.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 252

Memorandum

PARIS, March 15, 1925

I had a long talk with M. Léon Blum this afternoon.

I began by telling him that I had been greatly disturbed to read in the press of the reported unanimous voting by the Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee of a resolution to the effect that Cologne should not be evacuated until the security of France was assured.⁴ My anxiety had been increased by reading the leader in yesterday's 'Ere nouvelle' entirely endorsing this resolution. I feared that views such as these, expressed as they were by a Government organ, would create a deplorable effect in England, where public opinion would strongly object to any attempt at linking up the question of evacuation to one of the general security of France, which latter point was entirely outside the treaty. As for the effect in Germany, it would doubtless be disastrous. Moreover, would it not be a fatal error to place ourselves on marshy soil in the matter, when, in regard to our justifiable insistence on the execution of the treaty, we were on perfectly solid ground?

M. Blum entirely agreed with all I said and remarked that directly he saw the press account of the resolution of the Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee he tried to ascertain whether it was accurate or not, for there were seven Socialist Deputies on that committee. So many Deputies had gone away for the week-end that he had not yet received a trustworthy and final report on the subject; but from what he had been able to gather, the press account had been greatly exaggerated. He thinks the resolution must have been to the effect that Cologne should not be evacuated until Germany has disarmed entirely. In any case, he assured me that his party as a whole would never approve any such resolution as had been reported by the press. M. Blum admitted, however, that M. Paul-Boncour was an exception to the above rule. M. Paul-Boncour was practically the only member of the Socialist party to hold intractable views on the subject, and he (M. Blum) knew for a fact that M. Herriot was determined not to let himself be 'rushed' by M. Paul-Boncour in the matter.

M. Blum then said that he would speak to me with the usual frankness

² Deputy for the Seine, and a member of the Socialist Party.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 245.

which we show to one another. He assured me that the definitive renunciation by Great Britain of the protocol⁵ had made a most deplorable effect in France in spite of the fact that it had not been unexpected. (In this connection I may remark that I met this morning in the Bois M. Jacques Bardoux, who is, of course, an out-and-out reactionary and Poincaréist, and he used similar language to me.) I replied to M. Blum that, even if the Labour party had been in power, it was highly improbable that Mr. MacDonald⁶ himself would have been able to accept the protocol owing to the opposition of the dominions, not to mention that in Great Britain itself. M. Blum here observed that it was most unfortunate that Great Britain should become, as she rapidly was becoming, a sort of colony to her dominions, some of which were, in their turn, being drawn more and more into the orbit of America, thus erecting the latter Power into a species of super-State. To have pursued this argument would have taken us too far, and I therefore confined myself to enquiring whether, pending some ideal solution of the security question by means of some future protocol, M. Blum did not think that the best solution for the immediate question at issue lay in the acceptance of some such pact as that proposed by Germany.³ M. Blum replied in the affirmative, but declared that it was most important that it should be clearly understood that Germany must first of all join the League, and that such a pact was not a final solution of the question, but should only fit into the framework of an eventual general pact under the League of Nations. If that were made clear from the outset, he thought a settlement could be reached on those lines.

M. Blum saw Bertrand Russell⁷ today, who told him that the feelings of the Labour party in England had very much altered towards the protocol since the International Socialist Conference in January,⁸ and that had they been in power now they would undoubtedly have ratified it. The Labour party were, on the other hand, as a whole, opposed to the pact even as proposed by Germany. I pointed out that it would be a thousand pities if the Labour party in England adopted such an attitude, and M. Blum assured me that he would put all possible pressure upon them to abandon it. He is even going to propose that an international Socialist conference should be held in the near future with a view to inducing all the Socialist parties concerned to accept the idea of a pact on the lines proposed by Germany, but always stipulating that it must be within the framework of the League and only a step towards a larger measure of general security.

M. Blum told me that the German Socialists had urged their French comrades to support Herr Luther's pact proposals to the best of their ability, as they felt them to be the only present solution of the security

⁵ See No. 240, n. 13.

⁶ Leader of the Labour Party (see No. 5, n. 10).

⁷ English philosopher and mathematician.

⁸ The Joint Executive of the Socialist International and Trades Union International met at Brussels January 3-6.

question. In doing this, M. Blum remarked, the German Socialists were showing the same abnegation that the French Socialists had shown when they urged M. Poincaré to enter into negotiations with Germany on her abandonment of passive resistance in the Ruhr,⁹ and when they had declared their readiness to support him in such negotiations.

At the end of our conversation we touched upon French internal politics, and here I found M. Blum in a much less optimistic frame of mind than he was when I saw him on the 1st February (see my telegram No. 44, Confidential, of that date).¹⁰ He now feels that M. Herriot may possibly be defeated in the Senate over the question of the Vatican Embassy, and in this connection, when I asked M. Blum whether he did not consider that the French archbishops' recent violent manifesto¹¹ would on the whole strengthen M. Herriot's hand, he remarked that at first sight this had seemed to him probable. On second thoughts, however, he was not altogether convinced that this would be the case, for the manifesto in question had enabled the opponents in the Senate of the suppression of the Vatican Embassy to show that their opposition to that particular measure did not necessarily imply that they had clerical tendencies, for they had quickly passed a resolution condemning the manifesto. This would render it all the easier for them to maintain their opposition to the suppression of the Embassy. I cannot help thinking that M. Blum takes too subtle a view of this question, and I hear that M. de Jouvenel,¹² who originally intended to oppose the Government in the Senate over the suppression of the Vatican Embassy, has, in view of the archbishops' manifesto, now declared that he will support them. M. Blum, I can see, also feels serious misgivings in regard to the budget question in the Senate. Of course, if his misgivings prove correct, the combination succeeding M. Herriot will almost certainly include M. Briand, owing to his outspoken opposition to the suppression of the Vatican Embassy.

ERIC PHIPPS

⁹ In September, 1923. See Vol. XXI, Nos. 370, 373, 377, 380 and 389.

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ A copy of this manifesto of March 10 protesting against the system of 'Lois Laiques' was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 645 of March 16, not printed. Church hostility had been aroused by the French Government's intention to suppress the French Embassy at the Vatican.

¹² Editor-in-Chief of *Le Matin*.

No. 253

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 18, 9 a.m.)

No. 107 Telegraphic [C 3904/459/18]

BERLIN, March 17, 1925, 7.55 p.m.

Geneva telegram No. 2¹ (sic) Confidential.

I have had a long conversation with Secretary of State on general lines of your instructions.

He informs me that French Ambassador yesterday made an official communication from Monsieur Herriot saying that French government would require further and more precise details regarding German note of February 9th.² Before formulating their questions, however, French government desired to discuss the subject with their allies.

This démarche is taken here to mean that French government agree to treat German memorandum as basis of future discussion.

Only point of detail which His Excellency discussed was position of Poland. This I report upon in my immediately following telegram.³

¹ No. 249.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

³ No. 254, below.

No. 254

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 18, 9 a.m.)

No. 108 Telegraphic [C 3922/459/18]

BERLIN, March 17, 1925, 8.15 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Confidential.

Secretary of State said regarding Poland that from line adopted by French Ambassador and from information from Warsaw it was clear that apprehension was felt that Germany designed to obtain a modification of Polish frontier by means of arbitration courts which she proposes should be established. Secretary of State declared that to attribute this intention to German government was 'complete nonsense'. Under arbitration treaties already negotiated with Switzerland,² Sweden³ and Finland⁴ two kinds of arbitration are foreseen (see my telegram No. 39).⁵

¹ No. 253.

² See No. 190, n. 3. See also No. 235.

³ See No. 190, n. 5.

⁴ A convention of arbitration and conciliation was signed on March 14, 1925. For a text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 122, pp. 491-99.

⁵ No. 190.

1. Arbitration on legal question with binding force.
2. Conciliatory award on political question without binding force.

Frontier questions in all the treaties are placed in second category so that no arbitration court could give an award compulsory on either party. Moreover if Poland so desire it frontier questions could be specifically excluded from proposed arbitration treaty. A negative clause could be introduced excluding frontier problems from whole procedure. Germany would not advise this method but would be ready to accept it.

Secretary of State further pointed out that exclusive of frontier problems there are many subjects which might cause difficulty between Germany and Poland. All these could be brought within the scope of arbitration clauses so as to eliminate all danger to peace.

I put to him very strongly the urgency of taking steps to tranquillize Polish opinion and to avoid embitterment of conflict, pointing out how disastrous it would be if apprehension—justified or unjustified—on the part of Poland were allowed to interfere with major problem of western frontier. Secretary of State recognized real force of this view. He stated that Germans had no desire whatever to precipitate Polish question. They were content to let it rest and only to discuss it at a later date. Supposing western frontier problem was settled amicably on lines ensuring real pacification he had no doubt that an agreement on eastern frontier question could be found to mutual satisfaction. It was a profound mistake to suppose that present solution of corridor⁶ was agreeable to anybody. It was galling to Germany; it could not really be satisfactory to Poland. There were alternative solutions which would be better for both parties. If a general atmosphere of pacification in Europe was created a solution of this problem acceptable to Poles would unquestionably be discovered before long.

⁶ See No. 205, and Vol. XXIII, Appendix.

No. 255

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

[C 4171/459/18]

Private and Personal

[FOREIGN OFFICE], March 18, 1925

My dear D'Abernon,

I am well content with what we have achieved so far since the German proposals were first made¹—little though it seems to my critics—and I am not unhopeful of ultimate success. You know my general lines which may perhaps be briefly summarised as follows:—

(1) Great Britain is not prepared to accept a universal extension of her

¹ See No. 189, Enclosure.

covenanted liabilities under the Covenant such as was embodied in the Geneva Protocol.²

(2) On the other side, she is equally unprepared to enter into a pact with France and Belgium specifically directed against Germany.

(3) The Germans propose that there should be separate pacts by which the Powers interested in particular frontiers should mutually renounce recourse to war and give a common guarantee of those frontiers.

(4) As regards the frontiers on the West, I understand that Germany would renounce all desire to change them; whilst in regard to the frontiers of the East, she would preserve her rights under Article 19 of the Covenant on becoming a member of the League of Nations.

It seems to me that this affords a basis on which Great Britain can cooperate and that the cooperation of Great Britain is essential to any chance of success. We should take no fresh obligations in respect of any boundaries except those between Germany on the one side and France and Belgium on the other; but by giving our guarantee to this Western frontier we should remove the acute fears which distort French policy and which prevent any improvement in Franco-German relations and threaten, unless removed, to make those relations steadily worse.

In obtaining additional security in the West, I think we do not in fact lessen the danger of war in the East; but undoubtedly the eastern powers, and particularly Poland to which France is bound by her alliance,³ are very suspicious lest in taking fresh guarantees for the West we should seem to weaken the existing guarantees for the East. The solution of this difficulty must be sought, first, in the entry of Germany into the League with full acceptance by her of the obligations of Article 16 which is the correlative of her enjoyment of rights under Article 19; and, secondly, by renunciation, as she has suggested, of recourse to anything but the peaceful methods [under] Article 19 for a solution of the difficulties which the present territorial situation involves. If Germany will accept this position, she can, I feel confident, make treaties of arbitration, and so forth, with her eastern neighbours. These, of course, must be on the basis of the existing frontiers. But if she comes into the League and plays her part there in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, I myself believe that within a reasonable number of years she will find herself in a position where her economic and commercial support is so necessary and her political friendship so desirable to Poland that, without having recourse to the League machinery, she will be able to make a friendly arrangement on her own account directly with the Poles. This is what Briand said to me⁴ and what other members of the Council repeated. For the success of such a policy good-will, patience, and tact are necessary. If the German public and press could be restrained from talking so much about the eastern frontiers, they might get more quickly to a solution.

Of course I recognise the immense difficulty of bringing France and

² See No. 10, n. 4.

³ See No. 187.

⁴ See No. 232.

Germany together. If Germany digs in its toes and says that it has spoken its last word, the negotiations will break down. Equally, if the spirit of France becomes again the spirit of Poincaré, the negotiations will break down. But the result of my visits to Paris and Geneva⁵ and of my speech in the House of Commons⁶ is that the Allies know exactly the *cadre* within which the British Government believe their cooperation to be possible, and that French statesmen, though profoundly disappointed, are setting themselves seriously to consider what can be done within the framework thus traced. As I say, I come back not unhopeful that in spite of all the press campaign and of all the unreason, whether in Berlin or in Paris, we have made some progress and have a fair chance of doing a great work.

Yours sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ See Nos. 224–51, *passim*.

⁶ See No. 223, n. 2.

No. 256

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard (Washington)

[A 1478/49/45]

Private and Personal

[FOREIGN OFFICE], March 18, 1925

Dear Howard,

Very many thanks for sending me the 'Life' of the President¹ from which I hope to get a better idea of the man whenever I am able to read it; but the Foreign Office does not give one much time to study anything but its own papers.

I returned last night² from a very interesting Council meeting at Geneva,³ where, quite apart from the discussion on the Protocol,⁴ we did some very useful work in minor but difficult and important questions.⁵ It is a fearful task to try and get all those whose cooperation is required to move together, but I am not without hope that the influence of Great Britain may still be made the decisive factor in restoring the comity of nations. With America withdrawn, or taking part only where her interests are directly concerned in the collection of money, Great Britain is the one possible influence for peace and stabilisation. Without our help things will go from bad to worse. With our help there is at least a fair possibility that a great advance will be made by relieving the fears of France and removing the boycott[t] of Germany.

Since I wrote to you about a Naval Despatch⁶ I have been waiting for the

¹ Presumably the reference is to H. Green, *The Life of Calvin Coolidge* (New York, 1924).

² Mr. Chamberlain left Paris (see No. 251) on the morning of March 17.

³ See Nos. 227–49, *passim*.

⁴ See No. 244.

⁵ See Nos. 244, nn. 6–9 and 247, n. 1.

⁶ In a private letter of February 14, not printed. See, however, No. 201.

replies of the Dominions, and meanwhile the President appears to have made an unofficial announcement to the press that he is thinking of taking up the matter.⁷ In these circumstances I am rather doubtful whether I shall now send the Despatch at all, for on the one hand I have no desire to appear to be jogging his elbows or hurrying his steps, and, on the other, I find the French in a state of such general susceptibility that such action on my part might add to my difficulties with them.

You will get the account of my conversation with Herriot on my way back from Geneva,⁸ and you will see how strongly he spoke against the possibility of France taking part in a new Washington Conference. I do not think that this is decisive as far as Naval matters are concerned, and I assume that it is only with naval disarmament that any Washington Conference would deal; but his attitude was not promising and he himself had evidently been informed that if disarmament was raised at all at Washington it would include land as well as sea forces. In any case I assume that the American administration will feel their way before actually issuing invitations. If approached, we shall certainly express our readiness to take part in a Naval Conference provided the other great naval Powers will do the same.⁹

Yours sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁷ See No. 251, n. 18.

⁸ See No. 251.

⁹ Foreign Office despatch No. 623 to Washington of April 21 transmitted a copy of a telegram of April 4 from the Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland stating that it had been concluded that it was undesirable to send the proposed despatch on a naval conference.

No. 257

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 24)

*No. 171 [C 4204/459/18]**

BUCHAREST, *March 18, 1925*

Sir,

The Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw this morning, referred to the recent meeting of the League of Nations at Geneva¹ and to the Geneva Protocol,² which he said appeared likely to be abandoned, seeing that His Majesty's Government were unable to accept it.³ As I knew, the Roumanian Government had likewise not viewed it favourably, and had decided to wait and follow the lead of Great Britain in the matter. He was still of opinion that Poland and Czechoslovakia had been premature in their hasty acceptance of the protocol.

¹ See No. 74, n. 4, and Nos. 227-49, *passim*,

² See No. 10, n. 4.

³ See No. 240, n. 13.

M. Duca observed, however, with anxiety, the tendency shown by the proposed pact of guarantee,⁴ the idea of which he was inclined to attribute to France rather than to Germany, to divide Europe into two parts—the guaranteed and the unguaranteed. Even if Poland and Czechoslovakia were eventually brought into the guaranteed area, Roumania would still be excluded and thrown on her own resources, a situation which he could not but contemplate with serious apprehension. The danger point for Europe was undoubtedly Russia rather than Germany, and if half Europe only were guaranteed against Russian designs, Roumania, in the other half, would become a specially vulnerable point, which did not augur well for the future peace of Europe.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs begged that I would communicate his anxiety in regard to the incompleteness of the proposed pact to you, adding that he was also instructing M. Titulesco to explain to you the dangerous position in which Roumania would be placed in the future by any partial guarantee from which she was excluded.

He mentioned that recent intelligence had reached him that Trotski,⁵ exiled to the Caucasus, had endeavoured to escape to Angora, but had been recaptured on the point of departure. This showed that the internal situation in the Soviet Union was far from tranquil.

I have, etc.,

HERBERT G. DERING

⁴ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁵ Soviet Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs March, 1918–January 1925.

No. 258

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 983 [C 4007/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 19, 1925*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador paid me a long visit this afternoon, but in truth he seemed to have very little to say to me. The only definite proposition which he enunciated was that, speaking without instructions and without any certain knowledge of M. Herriot's views, he personally was opposed to any pact which was a pure repetition of provisions of treaties already in existence, but that he thought that it might be wise to take a part or parts of the Treaty of Versailles and to complete and confirm and explain them. As far as I could ascertain, this rather obscure phrase was really intended to convey a warning against weakening some provisions of the Treaty of Versailles by the mere fact of repeating others. For the rest M. de Fleuriau repeatedly expressed his regret that we could not make a separate agreement with France and Belgium even though it

were to be simultaneous with an agreement with Germany, and he dwelt a good deal upon the position of Poland and the obligation of doing nothing to weaken it.

On my side, I explained my views on Poland very much as I had done in my conversation with the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Geneva.¹ I told him that I also was anxious that nothing which we did to strengthen the position in one part of the world should serve to weaken it in another, but that in my conversation with M. Herriot² I had indicated the *cadre* within which the British Government could co-operate; that within that framework I believed that our co-operation might be of importance, and that the security of France and Belgium might be made absolute. I knew that it was not the policy which the French Government would have preferred; I was well aware that in trying to work it out they would meet with great difficulties from the state of French public opinion; but he must clearly understand that it was within those limits alone that we could be of any help; and again I repeated that within those limits I believed that we could give France absolute security.

The Ambassador's call on me was a preliminary to a visit of a few days to Paris. I therefore added that I was agreed with M. Herriot on the points which he had laid down as essential:³ first, that, as a concomitant of any agreement with Germany, she must enter the League without conditions; second, that it could not be a condition of any agreement with her that the fifteen years' right of occupation of the left bank of the Rhine should be shortened, though it was, of course, essential that we should come to an amicable arrangement about the Cologne area; third, that the Allies must agree in principle among themselves before they entered upon formal negotiations with Germany; fourth, that whilst Great Britain would undertake no new obligations in respect of other frontiers than those of France and Germany, we had no desire to weaken the provisions of existing treaties with regard to them.

This being our position, what I now begged M. de Fleuriau to do was to secure from M. Herriot a definition of what he would desire within these limits. I myself believed that it would not be very difficult, if the limits themselves were accepted, to find terms upon which we could easily unite. We must take Baron Moncheur very early into our confidence, and we must get into touch with Italy; but the urgent thing now was that I should know what France wanted, so that I might see in what form and in what measure we could meet her wishes.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ See No. 247.

² See No. 251.

³ See No. 225.

*Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)**No. 514 [C 4008/459/18]**FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 19, 1925*

My Lord,

The German Ambassador called upon me this afternoon immediately after M. de Fleuriau.¹

He explained that he had sought the interview in order to ascertain what progress was being made. Germany had made her proposals² for security and arbitration in the hope that thereby she might facilitate the solution of the more immediately urgent questions, which, for her, were disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne,³ but these questions seemed to make no progress. Germany was not told wherein her defaults existed or what it remained for her to do. She thought that she was entitled to the publication of the report of the Military Control Commission⁴ and to be given the opportunity to make good any defaults, and thus to secure evacuation; but it seemed to his Excellency that the whole movement had become stagnant.

I observed that to me, on the other hand, it seemed that very remarkable progress had been made since the German proposals were first put forward. I would even venture to say that part of the progress was due to the emphasis which I had laid, in my speech in the House of Commons⁵ on the eve of my departure for Geneva,⁶ on the high importance attached by His Majesty's Government to the new step taken by Germany. It had, in my opinion, opened up new and better possibilities, and, provided that there were patience and goodwill, I was not unhopeful of their resulting in a real success; but if this result was to be achieved, the German Government must have confidence in the good faith of the British Government and in their desire to make these new proposals succeed, and they must have patience in dealing with immediate difficulties so that the larger hopes which seemed to be within our reach might not be shipwrecked on some smaller point before we could bring them into port.

Round and about the two positions thus stated the conversation continued for a considerable time. I find that Herr Sthamer habitually comes to me with a particular idea, and that whatever may be the turn of our conversation, he reverts to this idea again and again. So it was on this occasion, and I could only insist again and again on the need of patience and goodwill lest their contraries should wreck a great scheme of durable peace and goodwill upon temporary and comparatively minor difficulties.

¹ See No. 258.³ See Chap. III, below.⁵ See No. 223, n. 2.² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.⁴ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592, below.⁶ See No. 74, n. 4.

Herr Sthamer expressed his confidence in the good faith of the British Government, but accompanied it with profound suspicions of the French. I observed that I, who stood a little further away from the danger point than either of them, could perhaps appreciate the genuineness of the fears and suspicions of each, even though I did not fully share them, and that my part was to be a moderator and a reconciler. I did not underrate the difficulties of such a rôle. Any change of success might easily be destroyed by unwisdom either in Paris or Berlin, but I would beg Herr Sthamer to believe that I was working heart and soul to found upon the German proposals a restoration of the concert of the Great Powers in Europe and a lasting peace for our countries. I believed that this might be achieved if there were sufficient wisdom in our respective Governments.

Herr Sthamer enquired whether he might consider that I interpreted my rôle as that of 'the honest broker', and I accepted the description, though I said I preferred my own word 'moderator', and that I was making it my business, with perfect loyalty to my allies, as I wished him clearly to understand, to work for an arrangement which would close the war chapter and start Europe afresh as a society in which Germany would take her place as an equal with the other great nations. Herr Sthamer said that he should report what I had said to his Government, that he appreciated my attitude and had perfect confidence in me, but, as so often throughout the interview, he reverted to the point which he had first mentioned, and his parting words were of fear lest German public opinion, failing to obtain any satisfaction in regard to Cologne and disarmament, might force the German Government to withdraw its overtures and reject the policy of concession and goodwill.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 260

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1009 [C 4067/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 20, 1925*

My Lord,

I transmit to your Lordship herewith a record of a conversation which took place today between the French Ambassador and Sir Eyre Crowe on the subject of the German proposals regarding security.¹

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French Ambassador

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 20, 1925

The French Ambassador asked to see me today before he left for Paris.

He informed me of the conversations which he had had last night with the Secretary of State² and with the Prime Minister this morning touching the question of a quadruple pact.

Whilst he expressed himself as gratified with the information given to him as indicating that progress in the desired direction was confidently believed to be assured, his observations to me were in the most pessimistic mood. He still harped on the difficulty created by our refusal to let the pact take the form of separate declarations, of which an Anglo-Franco-Belgian one would have been the nucleus. But what he chiefly wished to speak to me about was the question of procedure and the next step now to be taken. He said very emphatically that in his opinion the first thing was for the Allies to agree among themselves exactly what they should ask Germany to do, and he added that an understanding on this basis ought to be in the form of a written document.

I asked him how he proposed to arrive at such an understanding. It was on this point that M. de Fleuriau pretended he saw the greatest difficulty. He asked me whether I could suggest the form and substance of an agreement. I replied that I did not think we had yet reached this stage. I quite admitted that the Allies must agree among themselves as to the kind of agreement or declaration which Germany should be asked to sign. But it seemed to me obvious that, as Germany's signature was essential, it would be futile for the Allies to sit down and, without reference to Germany, draw up a text for Germany's signature. No negotiation could be carried on in this way. Surely the first thing was to find out what the two chief protagonists, France and Germany, had in their minds. We, on our part, had made it plain that whilst we could not enter into a separate pact with France and Belgium, we were ready to subscribe to a pact of security for the eastern frontiers of France and Belgium, to which Germany was a signatory. It was therefore now for France and Germany to seek the basis of a general outline of what they could agree upon.

M. de Fleuriau again repeated that it was not France who had proposed the quadruple pact, and it was not for her to take any further initiative in the matter.

I said that I thought it had been made plain to him in his conversations with the Secretary of State that we now looked forward to hearing what M. Herriot might have to suggest on this subject. I could well imagine that M. Herriot might have difficulties in making any suggestion without knowing a little more of what Germany had in her mind. I understood that the German Ambassador in Paris afforded a most suitable channel of

² See No. 258.

confidential communication between the French and German Governments, and I thought it would be only natural if M. Herriot had some conversations with M. de Hoesch.

M. de Fleuriau thought that his Government could never initiate a discussion with the German Ambassador. But I continued to impress upon him how reasonable it would be to take this very step. It was not a question of the French Government taking any initiative; the German Government had taken the initiative by submitting their offer in a memorandum, but this memorandum, not unnaturally, was in somewhat vague form and rather in the nature of a feeler than of a definite proposal. What more natural than that M. Herriot should inform the German Ambassador that his memorandum had been received with sympathy and had formed the subject of discussion with his Allies, that it opened a way on which the French Government would gladly proceed, but that it was essential in the first instance to know with rather greater precision how the German Government proposed to give practical effect to the suggestion they had vaguely put forward. Surely this was a business-like proceeding and in no way affected the dignity of the French Government. It might be expected to lead to something more definite from the German Government, on which M. Herriot might formulate counter-suggestions of his own, which he might then discuss with his Allies, if he wished.

In the end I think M. de Fleuriau recognised that there was nothing derogatory or objectionable in such procedure, and I believe he will recommend it to M. Herriot. He agreed, at any rate, that this would be a better starting-point than to embark at once on an exchange of views between all the Allies, such as M. Herriot appeared at one time to have thought necessary.

M. de Fleuriau observed that to get all the Allies directly into one pact would not only make the negotiation difficult, but would tend more and more to narrow down the contents of a possible pact. If not only France, Great Britain, Belgium and Germany, but also Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy, Japan and Holland were asked to come in, it would be necessary, in order to satisfy the special interests of each, to make the clauses of the pact more and more general, with the result that it would eventually assume the form of a general formula without any precise meaning at all.

I pointed out that for this very reason it would be an inestimable advantage that France and Germany should, in the first instance, come to some kind of understanding as to what they were ready to put into a pact. All the rest would then follow more easily.

I asked him whether M. Herriot still insisted on the inclusion of Holland, as he had mentioned that country. He said that he was not quite sure, but mentioned that Mr. Baldwin, in his conversation with him this morning, had himself expressed himself strongly in favour of including that country if possible.

E. A. C.

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 515 [C 3874/109/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 20, 1925*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 15 of the 3rd January,¹ I transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the English text of the note sent by the Council of the League of Nations on the 14th March² in reply to the German Government's note of 12th December last,³ on the subject of Germany's entry into the League of Nations.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 261

*Reply by the Council to the German Government's Letter of December 12, 1924*³

The Council of the League of Nations have given careful consideration to the communication of the German Government dated the 12th December, 1924, regarding Germany's entry into the League.

The council note with satisfaction its opening statement that the German Government is of the opinion that the 'political developments during the past year have rendered it possible for Germany to join the League', together with the statement in the enclosed memorandum that the German Government has 'decided to seek the early admission of Germany'.

The German Government has already consulted the ten Governments who are represented on the council and has received authoritative replies from all of them.⁴ Any observations which can now be made by the council, composed as it is of representatives of the same Governments, will obviously not be at variance with those replies. The council are glad, therefore, to learn that, with one exception, which is dealt with later, the replies are satisfactory to the German Government.

The council would observe that the German Government state, with reference to the circumstances in which Germany desires to enter the League, that they have no intention of 'claiming special privileges for Germany', but that they expect she shall enter on a footing of equality.

The council note that all the ten Governments are in complete agreement with this condition.

The council, indeed, regard this principle of equality, involving as it

¹ Not printed.

² This is printed in *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 490-1. See also No. 241.

³ For a text, see *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 323-6.

⁴ Cf. No. 219, n. 6.

does both equal rights and equal obligations, as being of the essence of the League's constitution.

At the same time they feel bound to point out that this principle has an important bearing on the special question which the German Government raise with regard to article 16 of the covenant. Though it is only in relation to this one article that Germany asks for an exceptional position, this article is of capital importance for the whole structure of the League, comprising, as it does, an important part both of the safeguards enjoyed and the responsibilities accepted by all the members.

The German Government, in stating its position on this article, calls attention to the military position of Germany resulting from the Treaty of Versailles and expresses the fear that if the measures provided for in the article lead to hostilities, she would be incapable of protecting her territory against military invasion. The Government adds that, in its view, there is only one way out of the difficulties: 'Should international conflicts arise, Germany ought to be at liberty to determine how far she will take an active part in them'. Later in the communication, the Government expresses Germany's objection to being compelled, by virtue of entry into the League, 'to waive the right to neutrality'.

The council consider that the following observations on this point may serve a useful purpose: The character and extent of a member's active co-operation in military measures undertaken by the League in pursuance of the covenant must vary with the military situation of the member in question. Under the existing provisions of the covenant, it is the duty of the council to recommend what effective military, naval or air forces the members of the League shall contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenant of the League, and it would be for Germany herself to say to what extent she could comply with the recommendations of the council.

The council would further remind the German Government that a member of the League and of the council would always have a voice in deciding the application of the principles of the covenant.

As regards economic measures, the States members of the League themselves decide, either separately or by prior agreement, the practical steps to be taken for the execution of the general obligation which they have undertaken. But the provisions of the covenant do not permit that, when action is undertaken in pursuance of article 16, each member of the League should decide separately whether it shall take any part in that action. The council feels bound to express its clear opinion that any reservation of this kind would undermine the basis of the League of Nations and would be incompatible with membership of the League. It seems to the council impossible that a member of the League and of the council should, in the event of operations undertaken against a covenant-breaking State, retain a status which would leave its nationals exempt from the general obligations imposed by the covenant. The council need hardly point out that other countries whose military forces have also been limited

by the provisions of the existing treaties have, on entering the League, accepted the obligations of the covenant without reservation.

The council trust that these observations may be of use in elucidating the attitude of their members with regard to the questions raised by the German Government.

The general conditions of entry of new members are contained in article 1 of the covenant, which leaves the decision to the Assembly, which has on repeated occasions declared itself in favour of the universality of the League. Only by active co-operation as a member can a country have its due influence in the decisions of the League—decisions which cannot fail to be of far-reaching importance.

In conclusion, the council wish to express to Germany their sincere wish to see her associated in their labours and thus play, in the organisation of peace, a part corresponding to her position in the world.

No. 262

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 23)

*No. 235 [C 4091/459/18]**

ROME, March 20, 1925

Sir,

When I saw the President of the Council this afternoon in order to conclude the agreement between the Italian Government and the Anglo-Persian Company regarding Albanian oil,¹ I found him in good spirits, but evidently much pulled down by his illness.² This illness seems to have necessitated a milk diet. I was therefore reluctant to tire his Excellency by any lengthy discussion of other questions with him. But he kept me for a short private conversation after the agreement was concluded, and said that he had been reading your speeches at Geneva.³ He desired to congratulate you warmly on the manner in which you had delivered the *coup de grâce* to the protocol,⁴ which had always appeared in his eyes a bit idealistic and an unworkable instrument. He was, further, in entire agreement with what he understood to be your ideas on the subject of security and international pacts. Your policy would receive his whole-hearted support, and he would be glad that you should know this. I thanked his Excellency, and said that his message would certainly give you satisfaction.

I have, etc.,
R. GRAHAM

¹ See No. 84.

³ See No. 74, n. 4.

² See No. 48.

⁴ See No. 240, n. 13.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received in the Foreign Office, March 30)

[C 4491/459/18]

Private and Personal

BERLIN, March 20, 1925

Dear Secretary of State,

I am greatly indebted for your letter of March 18¹ which sets forth very clearly the general lines of your policy. I am confident that along those lines there is more than a fair chance of success.

The German Government are quite ready to discuss any modification of their attitude which may be found necessary in order to achieve agreement. Schubert—who is really the principal author of the German memorandum,² or, at any rate, the principal thinker behind it—quite realises that breadth of treatment is essential.

Since you wrote he has made a statement regarding the willingness of Germany to exclude frontier modifications from the scope of any compulsory arbitration,³ which showed that he appreciates the necessity of tranquillising Poland.

I am pressing the German Government, unofficially, to conduct their negotiations for a commercial treaty with Poland⁴ on genuinely broad lines. I have also advised them to turn over in their minds what advantages they could offer Poland in order to obtain some modification of the Corridor.⁵ If they find the Corridor unbearable, they must be prepared to give Poland good terms which will enable a Polish Government to defend a deal before their own generally unreasonable Polish opinion.

Outside the German declaration regarding the Polish frontiers, little has occurred here affecting the Pact negotiation.

The German Government are waiting for an indication from you or from Herriot as to what further precision or extension is required to their February 9 offer.⁶ As I said before, precision appears to me more possible than extension.

As regards the ever present danger of the Right breaking away from Luther on the Pact—particularly on renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine—there is an increased tendency to criticise. It is clear that, under the surface, the Right dislike the whole negotiation, but they cannot revolt against it without losing their places in the present Government, and forfeiting both office and influence.

The Luther Ministry is not really very sure or very permanent, so that it is expedient to make the most of it while it lasts. Up to now the Right have played far above their form in the direction of good sense. This is a rare

¹ No. 255.

³ See No. 254.

⁵ See No. 205, and Vol. XXIII, Appendix.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 214, n. 4.

⁶ See No. 197, n. 1.

opportunity which must be seized by the forelock. A Pact endorsed by a Government supported by the Right, is worth ten Pacts carried in the Reichstag against the votes of the Right.

I have not heard any details lately regarding Herriot's communications with the German Government,⁷ but Stresemann has the impression that personally Herriot is friendly to the Reciprocal Pact idea, being restrained only by the necessity of reconciling French opinion to it.

On secondary matters—The 26 per cent arrangement is proceeding towards settlement.⁸ It is a maze of financial complication.

As regards the entry of Germany into the League of Nations—there is nothing to add to my telegram of March 15.⁹ Essentially the German Government realise that they must come in before progress can be achieved regarding the Pact, but they are inclined to bring the two negotiations to a simultaneous conclusion. What they have in their minds, although they do not say it, is that the four questions, namely—the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, The Pact, Military Disarmament,¹⁰ and the Evacuation of Cologne¹⁰—will, in practice, all be settled together. They do not say it because they realise the importance of keeping evacuation separate from Security.

You must have had a very hard time in Paris¹¹ and Geneva,¹² but I fully endorse your view that progress has been achieved: so far as can be judged from here I should say very great progress.

Shall you be within reach of London during Easter?¹³ There will be a period of quiescence here then and I shall hope to come over. But I want to get the 26 per cent finished first, and, if possible, to see definite progress regarding the Pact.

Yours very sincerely,
D'ABERNON

⁷ See Nos. 208, n. 3, 209 and 253.

⁸ See No. 250, n. 1.

⁹ Berlin telegram No. 105, not printed. See, however, No. 250.

¹⁰ See Chap. III, below.

¹¹ See Nos. 224, 225, 227 and 251.

¹² See Nos. 74, n. 4 and 227–249, *passim*.

¹³ Easter fell on April 12.

No. 264

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 23, 9 a.m.)*

No. 113A Telegraphic [C 4108/459/18]

BERLIN, March 22, 1925. 7.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 108.¹

Secretary of State today confirmed in most definite manner that

¹ No. 254.

German government were ready to exclude all frontier questions from scope of arbitration treaties to be signed and particularly from arbitration treaty with Poland. While Germany would be ready to record incident of exclusion she does not desire it.

Secretary of State further declared that in point of time Germany had no desire to raise question of Polish frontier now. When a new atmosphere had been created through conclusion of a pact stabilizing western frontier the matter of eastern frontier could be discussed in a friendly way with Poland. This might occur at a much later date.

His Excellency added that there were of course people in Germany who attach importance to raising question of Polish frontier at once, but this was view of irresponsible individuals. Deliberate opinion of German government was that which he had stated to me.

No. 265

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 22, 8.15 p.m.)*

No. 114 Telegraphic [C 4109/459/18]

BERLIN, March 22, 1925, 7.15 p.m.

Nationalist hostility to policy of pact which has been simmering for some time burst into open revolt yesterday. I learn that party meeting decided to send Minister for Foreign Affairs a letter expressing doubt as to the wisdom of policy he was pursuing and reserving to party the right to vote against the pact agreements when they came before Reichstag. The attack was directed in particular against Minister for Foreign Affairs and demand was made that all future negotiations should be conducted under immediate guidance of the Chancellor and in permanent contact with Nationalist representatives in the Cabinet.

I have seen Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject and learn from him that he is working in absolute harmony with the Chancellor. Both ministers are determined to carry the pact policy through either with the support of the Nationalists or if necessary against them.

They regard it as intolerable that a policy which has been approved by Nationalist members of the Ministry and supported by their representatives in foreign affairs committee should be rejected by Nationalist followers. The ministers are to have a meeting with Nationalist leaders this evening and will demand either Nationalist party's promise of faithful support or that of Nationalist members.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 107 Telegraphic: by bag [W 2481/9/98]

PARIS, March 22, 1925

I had to see the President of the Council yesterday on two matters which will be reported separately,¹ when he took the opportunity of saying something about the general situation, in view of M. de Fleuriau's approaching visit.² He thought it a misfortune that statesmen had been in such a hurry to define their opinions, some asserting that the Protocol³ must be upheld as it stands, some denouncing it *in toto*, others convinced that a Pact of three, or of five, or of seven powers, offers the only solution.

The danger was that these views announced by individuals might become stereotyped in the minds of a majority in some particular country, thereby making an ultimate settlement more difficult. I took this to imply that M. Herriot is anxious to go on discussing, without committing himself very definitely at present. He proceeded to say that the main difficulty at the present moment lies in the fact that if too cool a reception is given to the Berlin advances, the Nationalist Party in Germany is at once strengthened and encouraged; whereas too warm a welcome given to German proposals here would similarly stimulate the Opposition Party, and might even put the Bloc National⁴ in power. M. Poincaré had been maintaining an ominous silence all through the winter, in marked contrast to his former oratorical activities, and the President of the Council thought it not unlikely that a direct frontal attack might be made on the government from that quarter, if a tempting opportunity were given. M. Herriot also said something about his general difficulties with the Senate, but I do not think too much importance ought to be attached to his utterance mentioned in my telegram No. 106 of yesterday.⁵ I am inclined to think that this was one of those hesitating judgments of *le for intérieur* which M. Herriot, like some other statesmen, is fond of sharing with his audience from time to time.

He spoke with great satisfaction of your last visit and the conversation you had had with him.⁶ I said that you had also welcomed the opportunity

¹ (i) the report of the Control Commission on German Armaments (see No. 599, below) (Paris telegram No. 111 of March 24, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives); (ii) the Turkish request for the transfer of diplomatic missions to Angora (Paris telegram No. 110 of March 24 and Paris despatch No. 721 of March 24, not printed).

² See Nos. 258 and 260. M. de Fleuriau visited Paris March 20–25.

³ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁴ The coalition of the *Action républicaine et sociale*, *Entente républicaine démocratique*, and *Républicains de Gauche*.

⁵ This ran: 'A passage in M. Herriot's speech last night hinting that it might be the last time he addressed Parliament as head of Government is much commented on in political circles, but a vote of confidence was finally passed by 325 to 251.'

⁶ See No. 251.

of having a personal conversation with the Foreign Secretary of Poland,⁷ and I was interested to find that he seemed disposed to set aside any special Polish pretensions, saying that the question with that country would have to be settled, and that he had little doubt it could be.

⁷ See No. 247.

No. 267

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 24, 9 a.m.)

No. 115 Telegraphic [C 4174/459/18]

BERLIN, March 23, 1925, 9.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 114.¹

Meeting between ministers and recalcitrant German national leaders took place last night and after lively discussion resulted in official declaration that German national party would continue to support Luther Government. Luther declared that he endorsed in every way Stresemann's action.

The attitude of German national leaders left it to be inferred that they themselves were not hostile to policy of pact but they had great difficulty with their electors particularly in more remote districts. The public there only saw that no solution of Cologne evacuation was in sight² and they did not understand advantage of giving for nothing a pact of security to France or of confirming abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine. They are also suspicious about Government's intention to enter League of Nations.³ The ministers seem satisfied with result of the meeting but only fairly confident as to future. They anticipate difficulty in retaining German national support for long unless there is palpable evidence soon of progress achieved towards a general settlement or some definite result. At present while authorities in Berlin fully recognize real and even remarkable progress achieved there is nothing much to satisfy the public.

¹ No. 265.

² See Chap. III, below.

³ See No. 250.

No. 268

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 26)

No. 206 [C 4289/459/18]*

BERLIN, March 23, 1925

Sir,

In supplement to my telegram No. 114 of yesterday,¹ reporting hostility

¹ No. 265.

of the Nationalist party to the policy of the reciprocal pact, I have the honour to report that this incident has caused considerable excitement in political circles here. There is no doubt that the extreme wing of the German Nationalist party feels an extreme dislike to any policy involving final renunciation of claims to Alsace-Lorraine. They are also unwilling to see Germany add a signature to any document which either specifically or implicitly endorses the peace of Versailles.

2. I understand that in conversations which have taken place recently between National representatives and the Government, the former have been rather weak in argument and have not been able to propose any alternative policy to that of the reciprocal pact which seemed to hold out superior practical advantages for Germany. They relied rather upon sentimental objections to a policy of reconciliation and upon the statement that their own supporters throughout the country viewed Stresemann's policy with serious alarm.

3. It would seem that apart from this somewhat vague ground for opposition, Nationalist politicians have been disappointed with two recent events. First, with their failure to obtain in the Prussian Landtag an adequate majority to support a Prussian Ministry. They had set great store on the political influence they would obtain through the constitution of a Ministry in Prussia to their liking. They have also been disappointed by the collapse of the Gessler candidature for the presidency.² If they had been able to maintain Gessler as candidate, the post of Minister of War would have become free. They would have pressed for the appointment of a strong Nationalist as War Minister, and would then have been able to bring the organisation and the direction of the Reichswehr into more complete harmony with their own political views. They regard Stresemann as the principal cause of the failure of the Gessler candidature, and are consequently incensed against him.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

² In Berlin despatch No. 185 of March 13, Lord D'Abernon had reported that the candidature of the Minister of War for the presidency (see No. 217, n. 3), which had been supported by the Right, Centre and Democratic Parties, had been withdrawn owing to the opposition shown by Dr. Stresemann.

No. 269

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 64 Telegraphic [C 4302/459/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 25, 1925, 11.55 p.m.*

An important debate took place in House of Commons last night¹

¹ See 182*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 291-408.

regarding the Geneva Protocol² and general question of security. Summary has no doubt already been published in German press.

Meantime there is one point of special importance arising out of it in regard to Poland which requires immediate elucidation.

In final survey of German proposals³ I used the following words in my speech:⁴

'If I understand them rightly, they amount to this: that Germany is prepared to guarantee voluntarily what hitherto she has accepted under the compulsion of the treaty, that is, the status quo in the West; that she is prepared to eliminate, not merely from the West *but from the East*, war as an engine by which any alteration in the treaty provisions is to be obtained—this not only in the West but in the East. She is prepared absolutely to abandon any idea of recourse to war for the purposes of changing the treaty boundaries of Europe. She may be unwilling, or she may be unable, to make the same resignation of the hopes and aspirations that some day, by friendly arrangement or mutual agreement, a modification may be introduced *into the East*, which she is prepared to make in regard to any modification in the West.'

In reply to specific question by Mr. Lloyd George I made further additional statement:

'In regard to the West she (Germany) is prepared to renounce all desire to change, and to enter into a mutual Pact to guarantee the existing situation. In suggesting arbitration in the East, she does not propose or suggest that her Eastern frontiers should become subject to such treaties of *arbitration*. She is prepared to say that she renounces the idea of recourse to war to change the frontiers in the East. She is not prepared to say, in regard to the frontiers in the East, that she renounces the hope some day to modify some of their provisions by friendly negotiation, by diplomatic procedure, or it may be, for aught I know, by recourse to the good offices of the League of Nations.'⁵

In an interval in the debate the German Ambassador came to see me and said that he thought my statement had in one important point gone beyond position of German government insofar as *Eastern* frontiers are concerned. I found it impossible to extract from his words any precise meaning for as soon as I challenged him he withdrew and then restated more vaguely his original position, but so far as I could gather his point was that German government had not in fact renounced all possibility of resort to force over Polish frontier.

I told His Excellency that if I was to understand that the German government did in fact intend to reserve a right to resort to war to change their Eastern frontier, I could only say that the bottom at once fell out of

² See No. 10, n. 4.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁴ For Mr. Chamberlain's speech, see 182*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 307–22. For the passage quoted, see *ibid.*, col. 318.

⁵ See *ibid.*, cols. 318–19.

the whole scheme and that I must at once return to the House of Commons and inform them of what His Excellency had just said. Faced with this demand for a categorical statement of the German position the Ambassador denied that this was his meaning. I then restated what I had said in the House. He said that this was correct but he still argued that something was wrong though what it was I could not understand.

In order that there might be no possibility of doubt as to meaning placed by His Majesty's Government on the German proposals, the Prime Minister stated in closing the debate that 'in Eastern Europe she (Germany) has taken a great step forward towards peace, because she is prepared to declare that she renounces any prospect of changing the frontier by military force. That, of course, leaves it perfectly clear that in years to come she may try by diplomacy, by offering to arbitrate, in any one of half-a-dozen peaceful ways to effect changes in the Eastern frontier. *She renounces—this is the important thing—any attempt to change the frontier by military force.*'⁶

You will appreciate the vital importance of at once clearing up this point beyond all possibility of doubt. It is the test of German good faith; and if German government are not sincere His Majesty's Government must at once reconsider their whole policy and inform Parliament and British Public. I request that you will see German Chancellor at the earliest moment and put the position squarely to him. It is not too much to hope that he will be able to still without more ado the fears which the observations of Herr Sthamer have roused in my mind. Does Germany or does she not renounce an ultimate resort to war to rectify existing territorial settlement with Poland?

You will recollect that in the version of the German proposals made to the French government⁷ (see final enclosure in my despatch to Paris No. 686 of February 24th.⁸ Confidential Print 'Germany' February 24th section 1) the following passage occurs in regard to the Eastern frontier: 'According to the verbal explanations of M. Hoesch, the Eastern frontier would not be guaranteed in the same way as that of the West. A way out might however be found by reference to article 19 of the Covenant, *and all idea of solution by force would be obviated.*' I am frankly at a loss to understand apparent attitude of German Ambassador here and can only hope that he has been insufficiently informed by his government of exact scope of their proposals.

⁶ See *ibid.*, col. 404.

⁷ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁸ No. 590, below.

No. 270

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 26, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 113 Telegraphic: by bag [W 2665/9/98]

PARIS, March 25, 1925

Monsieur Paul-Boncour read today to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber his report on the Bill for the ratification of the Geneva Protocol.¹ He said that the only object of the protocol was to make applicable the dispositions of the Covenant, notably those of Article 16 regarding sanctions against an aggressor state, to define more closely the procedure of arbitration and security, to dispel all uncertainty as to the assistance to be expected by any victim, a member of the League, from the other members, and to allow all states to draw up a programme of disarmament. After recapitulating the attempts made since the foundation of the League of Nations to define the scope of the Covenant, M. Paul-Boncour described the mandate of the French delegation at the 1924 Assembly.² He then gave a very detailed juridical analysis of the protocol itself showing how it forms the most complete and precise effort ever made for peace. M. Paul-Boncour concluded that the protocol should be ratified by the French Parliament. He considered that it should either be adopted in its entirety or should constitute the frame-work of particular regional accords, defining the measures of entente and security to be taken at any points. He urged that the protocol should be examined in its general principles.³

¹ See No. 10, n. 4.

² See No. 205, n. 10.

³ Mr. Orde, a senior member of the Western, General, and League of Nations Department of the Foreign Office, minuted on March 26: 'The French Gov[ernmen]t know quite well that the protocol will never come into force. They can hardly think of getting it put into force, so far as applicable, as between those countries to which it is acceptable. It is difficult to understand their object in pressing the bill for ratification, unless it is to make an empty gesture. Possibly parliamentary procedure prevents abandonment of the bill.'

Sir W. Tyrrell commented on March 26: 'Is it the French Gov[ernmen]t who are doing this? I think it is M[onsieur] P[aul]-B[oncour] by himself.'

No. 271

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 28)

*No. 144 [C 4403/459/18]**

WARSAW, March 25, 1925

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 128 of the 17th instant,¹ I have the

¹ Not printed. This commented on the Polish attitude to the German proposals and summarised press articles.

honour to report that the indignation and anxiety aroused here by the publication of the German proposals² have not yet died away, and not a day passes without the appearance of more or less violent articles on the subject in papers of all shades of political opinion.

It would serve no useful purpose to prepare for your information translations of all these articles, as there is seldom anything new or original in the sentiments they express, but I beg to enclose a short summary of a few of the principal articles³ that have been brought to my notice.

It is undoubtedly true, as Herr von Schubert said to Lord D'Abernon (see Berlin telegram No. 108 of the 17th March),⁴ that the average Pole is convinced that Germany intends to obtain a modification of her eastern frontiers by means of the arbitration courts which she proposes to establish, and such is the universal and, as I said last week, not wholly unjustified distrust of the Germans felt by all Poles that it will be difficult to persuade the latter that their apprehensions are not well grounded, though, so far as the Polish Government are concerned, it may be of some use if the German Minister is able to explain to Count Skrzynski, as he intimated to me yesterday that he wished to do, the views of the German Government, as stated by Herr von Schubert to Lord D'Abernon, that frontier questions are not to be made the subject of compulsory arbitration, but only of conciliation awards without binding force, and that, if Poland so desires, they could be specifically excluded from any arbitration treaty concluded between the two Governments.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, etc.,
W. G. MAX MULLER

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ Not printed.

⁴ No. 254.

No. 272

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1078 [C 4349/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 26, 1925*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 983 of the 19th March,¹ I transmit to your Lordship herewith a record of a conversation which took place today between the French Ambassador and Sir William Tyrrell on the subject of security.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ No. 258.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 272

Record by Sir W. Tyrrell of a conversation with the French Ambassador

March 26, 1925

The French Ambassador came to see me today in order to tell me that he had communicated to M. Herriot² the points which the Secretary of State had raised with him last week.³

M. Herriot had asked the Ambassador to furnish him with a memorandum containing a report of his conversation with Mr. Chamberlain which he proposed to discuss with his Cabinet either today or tomorrow. It is his intention to authorise M. de Fleuriau to enter into a discussion of those points here with a view to arrive at the answer which M. Herriot thinks should be returned to the German proposals. M. de Fleuriau hopes to be able to begin his conversations at the beginning of next week.

The Ambassador seemed to me more optimistic as regards the future than he has been hitherto as he thinks that French public opinion is gradually getting used to the idea of including Germany in the proposed pact, and he also feels confident that if the present Ministry in France remain in office they will carry the negotiation through to a successful conclusion. He thinks that the trump card to play is a reminder to France how this country honoured its signature of the Belgian Neutrality Treaty.⁴ It is the best answer he thinks that can be given to dispel French distrust of Germany; in other words, it is the backing of the Bill by Great Britain which should enable the French Government to inspire confidence in the Quadruple Pact with their own countrymen.

W. TYRRELL

² See No. 266, n. 2.

³ See No. 258.

⁴ See No. 201, n. 3. Germany's invasion of Belgium in 1914 had resulted in Great Britain's declaration of war.

No. 273

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

[C 4491/459/18]

Private [and] Personal

[FOREIGN OFFICE], *March 26, 1925*

My dear D'Abernon,

I have been encouraged by your letter of the 20th¹ and by the news that you have sent me as to the intentions of the German Government.² You will have seen that I thought the time had come to deal frankly with the House of Commons³ and to risk the possible consequences both in France

¹ No. 263.

² See Nos. 250, 264 and 265.

³ See No. 269, n. 1.

and Germany of defining with greater precision than I had hitherto used in public the attitude of the British Government. On the whole, I think the reception of my speech⁴ in those countries and at home has been as good as I could have expected, but, heaven knows!, it will be difficult enough to carry the negotiations through to a successful conclusion.

I telegraphed to you last night about Sthamer's conversation.⁴ What exactly he was driving at, I do not know, and I suspect he scarcely knew himself. I could attach no other meaning to his words than that Germany did not propose to repudiate war as a means of readjusting her eastern boundaries. But the moment I challenged this sentiment, he repudiated it. He is not a clever man, and I do not think that I should ever be able to negotiate effectively through him, for he seems to come to me with one idea and, whatever passes in our interview, his mind always circles around and finally settles upon his starting point, so that I do not know whether he ever conveys to his own Government a reasonable account of our conversation. Be this as it may, I advised him to send my speech to his Government, and if they wished to repudiate the intentions which I had attributed to them, he could come to me again with clear instructions. But I need not tell you that if we have misunderstood them and they do intend to use the establishment of peace in the west only to make it more possible for them to make war in the east, there will be an end of the negotiations. This is entirely contrary to what the German Ambassador in Paris said to Monsieur Herriot⁵ as well as to what Luther [*sic*] said in his speech to the effect that the German Government had neither the power *nor the will* to attempt to challenge the eastern boundaries by force.⁶

As to France, I feel confident that both Herriot and Briand would like to make something of the British offer to join in a mutual pact, but they too have an immensely difficult public opinion to deal with. I shall know more about their attitude when Fleuriau returns,⁷ but I am going out of London today to recover from the slight attack of laryngitis which is the tribute I pay to what is called 'the atmosphere of Geneva'.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

P.S. I shall almost certainly be within reach of London during the Easter recess.⁸

⁴ See No. 269.

⁵ See No. 207.

⁶ Dr. Stresemann gave an exposé of his policy on March 10 and 11 to the Reichsrat and the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Reichstag, in which this reference was made. A copy of an extract from the German press respecting his speech was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 186 of March 14, not printed. See Nos. 234 and 392, below.

⁷ He had already returned from Paris (see No. 272, Enclosure).

⁸ The House of Commons adjourned on April 9 until April 28.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received March 28, 9.35 p.m.)

No. 129 *Telegraphic* [C 4419/459/18]

BERLIN, March 28, 1925, 8.35 p.m.

Your telegram No. 64.¹

Confidential.

Chancellor is still away and will only return on Wednesday² but I have discussed subject of your telegram with Secretary of State and have put the matter squarely before him. I have communicated to His Excellency the extracts from your speech and from that of Prime Minister which were contained in your telegram. He has also seen the Times report of the debate.³

After consulting Minister for Foreign Affairs and being in telephonic communication with Chancellor the Secretary of State answers as follows:—

During conversation which took place on March 24th between His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and German Ambassador a misunderstanding must have arisen. Telegraphic report of German Ambassador confirms this. It is of the greatest importance that this misunderstanding should be cleared up.

The German Government renounce any idea of bringing about by warlike measures an alteration in present German Polish frontier. They are of opinion that the right means to exclude the possibility of war between Germany and Poland would be a far-reaching treaty of arbitration, the technical details of which should be fixed by verbal negotiations.

If therefore Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Baldwin in their speeches in the House of Commons on March 24th gave expression to the view that German government had no intention of obtaining an alteration of German Polish frontier by warlike measures, but that they had definite hope of seeing this frontier altered at a given time in some other way, the ideas of German government have been correctly interpreted.

Therefore there is not the slightest reason for British Government to modify in any way whatsoever their views as expressed in the said speeches which are most cordially welcomed by German government. Answer ends.

German government would be glad if your telegram under reference and their reply could be considered confidential. They regard the present report as clearing up of an incident and removal of a misunderstanding. Publication is particularly undesirable.

The press continues to assert that German government has sent or is

¹ No. 269.

² April 1.

³ See *The Times*, March 25, pp. 8–9.

sending a new memorandum regarding proposed pact. German government have denied this and are anxious not to give any colour to report.

No. 275

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 6)

*No. 155 [C 4766/459/18]**

WARSAW, March 28, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that Count Skrzynski, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, returned to Warsaw from Geneva¹ and Paris² on the 21st instant. He has undoubtedly enhanced his reputation here as a Foreign Minister by the attitude which he adopted in Geneva and Paris regarding the questions connected with Danzig³ and the recent German proposals,⁴ and his speeches and interviews have been extolled in the press practically without distinction of party. The 'Kurjer Polski' spoke of the paramount influence exercised by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the discussions of the proposed pact and of the success which had crowned his efforts at Geneva as evidenced by the declaration of the British Foreign Secretary that the eastern frontiers equally with the western were guaranteed by the Treaty of Versailles.⁵ The 'Kurjer Poranny' and other papers declared that he had by his action raised the prestige of Poland in the councils of Europe and had successfully repulsed the German attack directed towards the revision of the frontiers prescribed by the Treaty of Versailles.

On the 24th March Count Skrzynski delivered a speech in the Diet Commission for Foreign Affairs, in which he gave an account of his attitude towards the German proposals and of the conversations which he had had with you⁴ and with M. Herriot.⁶ In the course of this speech, of which I have the honour to enclose a French translation,⁷ Count Skrzynski stated that the proposals for a guarantee pact recently put forward by the German Government⁸ had aroused such widespread interest in Poland that it was incumbent on him to expose in detail the true significance of the recent developments connected with them. The German proposals, he declared, amounted on the one hand to a guarantee of the inviolability of Germany's western frontier coupled with a renunciation of all claims to Alsace-Lorraine; as regards the east, on the other hand, the German Government, while reserving the right to negotiate by peaceful means for the revision of the present frontiers, denied any intention of obtaining this

¹ See No. 74, n. 4.

² Count Skrzynski visited Paris March 15-19. Cf. No. 251, n. 9, and n. 6, below.

³ See No. 247, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 247.

⁵ See No. 269.

⁶ See No. 247, n. 9. Count Skrzynski had had a conversation with M. Herriot on March 16.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

revision by other than pacific negotiation.

The British Government were unwilling either to accept the obligations imposed on them by the protocol⁹ or to conclude a separate pact with France and Belgium,¹⁰ but being nevertheless anxious to make a positive contribution to the problem, had proposed that Germany should be brought into the pact of guarantee which would thus, according to the British view, offer greater security for peace as including both victors and vanquished of the Great War.

Meanwhile, certain English newspapers had gone far beyond the declarations of the Government and had created a false impression by hinting that guarantees on the west could be obtained at the price of concessions to Germany in the east.

Poland on her side desired nothing better than to see France protected by such powerful guarantees. At the same time these proposals might prove a real source of danger to Poland. The appeal to article 19 of the covenant by a State which was not a member of the League would have the appearance of connecting the guarantees given to France with the demand for a revision of the Polish frontiers and of recognising legally the German claims to such a revision, to which Poland could never agree.

As regards Franco-Polish relations, Count Skrzynski explained that his conversations with M. Herriot had only served to confirm his belief in France's loyalty towards her allies. His conversations with Mr. Chamberlain had also convinced him that Great Britain did not entertain any idea of permitting a revision of the Treaty of Versailles and that she fully appreciated the successful efforts of Poland to restore her finances¹¹ as evidence of the great organising capacity of the nation. The British Government had no idea of throwing doubt on the existing frontiers and fully appreciated the fact that no democracy could voluntarily surrender a single yard of its territory and that to raise the question of frontiers now would be playing with fire.

As for Poland, she took her stand on the treaties of peace. Her security was backed by her own military resources and by those of her allies,¹² who in their turn could rely on Poland if these treaties were violated.

He reaffirmed his belief in some general plan for international solidarity, which, in his opinion, could alone guarantee the security of Europe. If, however, the British Government came forward with other proposals for the preservation of peace, the Polish Government would give most careful and unprejudiced consideration to any alternative suggestions, provided that they were based on the Treaty of Versailles and were in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Anxiety such as had recently been shown by certain sections of the Polish press¹³ was quite uncalled for and was liable to be interpreted abroad as a sign of weakness.

⁹ See No. 240, n. 13.

¹¹ See Vol. XXV, Nos. 412 and 486, n. 6.

¹² See No. 187.

¹⁰ See No. 224.

¹³ See No. 271.

Poland did not lack confidence in the strength of her rights, in the loyalty of her ally France, or in the unshakable determination of her people to defend her cause.

The debate which followed Count Skrzynski's speech is worth reporting briefly as showing the unanimity of all parties towards the German proposals.

M. Kozicki, the leader of the National Populist Union, spoke of the patience and determination with which Germany was working for the destruction of the Treaty of Versailles. 'Anybody who has studied the history of German-Polish relations,' said M. Kozicki, 'must realise that the Treaty of Versailles will not form the last episode in the struggle between the two nations, but one would have expected that this clear attempt to change the frontiers would not have been made barely six years after the signature of the treaty.'

M. Stronski, National Democrat, spoke in much the same sense. 'A pact of guarantee', he said, 'certainly has its importance, but such an instrument exists already in the German signature attached to the Treaty of Versailles; and what is the good therefore, of discussing further guarantees? Even if these concessions are made to Germany, who can guarantee that the new arrangement will not soon prove equally irksome to Germany, and that after a short time she will not begin to put forward fresh demands, threatening to disavow her obligations in case she is refused?'

M. Stronski further declared that the entry of Germany into the Council of the League of Nations would change the political *status quo* in Europe, which was founded on the basic idea that Germany was responsible for the war; the situation created at the price of such sacrifices by the Allies would be undermined if Germany obtained a seat on the council without the same privilege being accorded to Poland.'

M. Daszynski, the Socialist leader, declared that Poland had done well in co-operating actively at Geneva to secure the peace of Europe, but it was to be regretted that the work of peace advanced so slowly and met with so many obstacles, not only from military reaction, but also from the dominions of the British Empire, who refused to take any interest in the disputes that divided Europe. He made a strong protest against the principle of the balance of power and declared that the principle of international solidarity was the sole means of assuring the peace of the world and of each individual State. Poland, an essentially democratic country, should be the first to set an example and prove her pacific intentions. He urged the need for better propaganda in England to convince English opinion of the true nature of Polish policy.

To this last speech Count Skrzynski replied that, as regards propaganda in Great Britain, he had noticed that the great work of financial reform accomplished by Poland had made a stronger impression on the Anglo-Saxon mind than any indirect methods, such as M. Daszynski advocated, could ever produce.

I have the honour to enclose a summary⁷ of some of the press comments on Count Skrzynski's speech.

I have, etc.,
W. G. MAX MULLER

No. 276

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 6)

*No. 156 [C 4767/459/18]**

WARSAW, March 28, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 155 of today's date,¹ I have the honour to report that I had a short conversation yesterday morning with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which his Excellency referred briefly to his conversations with you at Geneva² and with M. Herriot in Paris.³ He spoke with genuine gratitude of the kind and sympathetic reception with which he had met at your hands, but was otherwise in one of his most uncommunicative and vague moods. Generally speaking, however, he appeared to me to have returned from his visit to Paris inspired with more marked anti-German feelings than he had shown before. Every word he uttered proved that he was filled at present with a rooted distrust of the word of the German Government. He declared that the whole idea of the German proposals⁴ had been to drive a wedge between France and Poland, and to lull to sleep the suspicions of the Allies, while they, the Germans, made ready to recapture Upper Silesia⁵ and the corridor, including Danzig.⁶ As to the proposed new pact and treaties of arbitration, Germany, he said, had already affixed her signature to a treaty guaranteeing the frontiers both west and east, and he failed to see how a new signature could strengthen her first signature. He declared that the only basis on which a pact of guarantee was possible was a basis of absolute equality of treatment for the frontiers on the west and on the east. His own predilection had been for the Geneva Protocol,⁷ but that was now dead. He hoped, however, that His Majesty's Government would soon put forward some alternative proposals, and he threw out a suggestion of a pact of non-aggression to be signed by Germany and all the States bordering on Germany and to be open to the signature of any other Powers that might wish to join.

I ventured to express the opinion that negotiations entered into in such a spirit of absolute distrust were almost bound to prove abortive, and I

¹ No. 275.

² See No. 247.

³ See Nos. 247, n. 9 and 275, n. 6.

⁴ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁵ See Vol. XI, Chap I, and Vol. XVI, Part I. ⁶ See No. 205, and Vol. XXIII, Appendix.

⁷ See No. 10, n. 4.

enquired whether the German Government had made any kind of approach to the Polish Government regarding their proposal of a treaty of arbitration. Count Skrzynski replied that all that had happened hitherto was that the German Minister called at the Ministry four days before and left with one of the officials, who had nothing to do with the political work of the office, a copy of the German-Finnish Arbitration Convention signed on the 14th March,⁸ but had apparently made no comments, so that he, Count Skrzynski, was rather at a loss to know how to proceed. I said that, speaking quite privately, it seemed to me that he would lose nothing by hearing what the Germans had to say.

Count Skrzynski also referred to the virtual promise made to Germany of a seat on the council in the event of her joining the League,⁹ saying that in such an event Poland's position in the League would become impossible unless she was simultaneously given permanent representation on the council.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, etc.,
W. G. MAX MULLER

⁸ See No. 254, n. 4.

⁹ See Vol. XXVI, No. 590.

No. 277

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 30, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 117 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4417/459/18]

PARIS, March 29, 1925

Monsieur Poincaré, in a speech at Bar-le-Duc today, in the course of which he criticised those people who 'think it their right to indulge unfair spite and exercise miserable reprisals against Frenchmen who are conscious of having loyally done their duty', reminded his audience that at the present moment the Control Commission had taken note of the fact that Germany has not fulfilled her disarmament obligations¹ and is undertaking a new offensive against the treaty which she has signed. The 'mot d'ordre' of all German parties today was to claim on the east a portion of the territory attributed to Poland, and in fact inhabited by Poles. If France and her allies did not resist these claims they would only excite further German ambitions, and encourage her, by their own action, to reconstitute that great Germany which Herr Stresemann had recognised as representing a dream which had not vanished. The people of Lorraine at least would recognise that their future fate would be settled on the Vistula as much as on the Rhine, and that an attack on Poland would be

¹ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592, below.

the prelude to an attack on France, just as Sadowa was the forerunner of Sedan.²

Monsieur Poincaré asked what purpose there would be in the renewal by Germany of an engagement which she had entered into under the treaty, i.e. an engagement not to attack France. That signature would add nothing to the first signature, and might even amount to a disavowal of other of the peace conditions if it were made applicable only to part of the treaty. If it happened one day that after having apparently guaranteed the French frontiers Germany with or without Soviet Russia were to renew the partition of Poland, and were thereupon to incorporate Austria with Germany, Germany would quickly recover the hegemony in Central Europe, and it would only remain for her to turn against France in order to achieve a second time the evolution which brought about the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and the foundation of the German Empire.³ The allies must stop this movement at its beginning if they did not wish to prepare for Europe a future as tragic as the past.

France would certainly participate with her traditional generosity in the common effort for the maintenance of peace, but let her not be called upon, in the face of a Germany which has not disarmed, to abandon or reduce her own means of protection; let her not be asked to exchange those means of protection for the semblance of guarantees or the mirage of security. In the diplomatic negotiations now going on France must not sacrifice the substance for the shadow. Her life was at stake. In order to preserve it she must maintain all the influence to which she had a right, and must not allow herself to be enfeebled by internal dissensions. Never had it been more necessary to make a truce to internal disputes in order to allow the country to follow a methodical and healthy foreign policy, to strengthen the credit of the State and to triumph finally over the serious economic and financial difficulties, which Germany's prolonged failure to pay had caused to France.

² See No. 220, nn. 3 and 4.

³ King William of Prussia had been proclaimed German Emperor in the Palace of Versailles on January 18, 1871, after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. Under the Preliminary Treaty of Peace of February 26, 1871, Alsace-Lorraine was ceded to the German Empire (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 62, pp. 59-64).

No. 278

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 31, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 119 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4497/459/18]

PARIS, March 30, 1925

My despatch No. 762 of March 29th.¹

¹ Not printed. This transmitted a press extract of March 29 summarising a statement by M. Herriot before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate on March 28.

A delegation of the Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission interviewed Monsieur Herriot this morning on the subject of security. According to the press they expressed the unanimous wish of the commission that negotiations should not take place with Germany before she had entered the League of Nations unconditionally. Monsieur Herriot is stated to have informed the delegation of the German memorandum² and to have made a statement similar to that made to the Senate Commission.¹ Press states that Monsieur Herriot made it clear that he would not sign any pact before Germany had unconditionally joined the League of Nations, but that he disagreed with the delegation in so far as he had agreed with Great Britain to undertake negotiations before Germany had joined the League.³ Monsieur Herriot stated that without entering into any engagement for making any promise, the French government intended to study all possible solutions which seemed to it to afford a chance of establishing lasting peace in Europe consistently with the complete observance of the treaties and that France found on the part of her allies similar views and assurances of collaboration in the future.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

³ Cf. Nos. 225 and 251.

No. 279

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Sir E. Crowe (Received April 2)

[C 4630/459/18]

PARIS, March 30, 1925

My dear Crowe,

I lunched at Sauerwein's¹ today. Henry de Jouvenel, who was there, told me that at the meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission the day before yesterday² Poincaré expressed himself as violently opposed to the German pact proposals. Jouvenel thereupon pointed out that Germany's eastern frontier and notably the Polish corridor could not be considered an ideal solution. Poincaré retorted that all other possible solutions of the question had been considered, and that the corridor was the only one left, to which Jouvenel says that he replied that he was convinced that *all* solutions had not been considered, for instance, that whereby the corridor would have been placed under international control.

If Jouvenel did not go so far as Poincaré, he likewise did not see eye to eye with Herriot, for he declared that the latter showed at the meeting of the Commission that he was full of illusions and that he was unaware of the practical difficulties in the way of a settlement. For instance, Jouvenel

¹ M. J.-A. Sauerwein was Foreign Editor of *Le Matin*.

² See No. 278, n. 1.

asked Herriot what would happen supposing Germany, after the signature of the pact, were, at some later date and after fruitless recourse to arbitration, to attack Poland, and France then went to the assistance of her ally. Would not Great Britain in that event be compelled under the pact to resort to arms against France? Herriot had been unable to answer that question. I said that so far as I could see nothing would in such a case compel Great Britain to take up arms in favour of Germany, who would be the aggressor.

The fact is that Jouvenel, like most Frenchmen, is intensely suspicious of Germany's proposals, which, he is convinced, contain some trap. In the days of the Poincaré régime he seemed to be a moderating influence: now that the cartel des gauches are in power his influence is much less healthy.

Massigli³ was also at the luncheon and held forth in a highly Nationalist manner, which is ominous, for Sauerwein declares that he is now the chief Quai d'Orsay adviser on security. He will, however, I feel convinced, be careful to jump with or even in front of the cat. He keeps in with all political circles and frequents Blum [and] Co[mpany], as well as the reactionaries.

Yours sincerely,
ERIC PHIPPS

³ See No. 63, n. 7.

No. 280

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir A. Grant Duff¹ (Stockholm)

*No. 80 [C 4579/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 31, 1925*

Sir,

The Swedish Minister called this afternoon to enquire what progress was being made with the discussion of the German proposals.² I gave him a brief account of the position reached in the communications which had passed between M. Herriot and myself.³ I found Baron Palmstierna very sanguine of a successful result. He observed that Polish opinion had been much more moderate and that M. Benes was exerting his influence with the Polish Government. Czechoslovakia had already made her terms with Germany,⁴ and in the circumstances was much less interested in the protocol⁵ than she had previously been, and much less inclined to countenance any disturbing elements. The Minister said that he had known Dr. Luther for many years, that he thought him a man of courage

¹ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Stockholm.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See Nos. 224, 225, 227 and 251.

⁴ Cf. No. 240.

⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

and honesty and a good man of business. He had been in communication also with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and the chairman of the Labour Party Foreign Affairs Committee,⁶ and from what they had said he drew the inference that they would support my policy. He had brought with him the German-Swedish Arbitration Treaty⁷ with an explanatory memorandum,⁸ to which he desired to direct my attention as a possible model for our arrangements with Germany. He was not aware that the German Government had already suggested this treaty as a possible model.⁹ He said that he had drawn Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's attention to it last year,¹⁰ but that Mr. MacDonald had then been unwilling to work on that basis, as he was engaged in larger schemes for the protocol. If, however, any development for arbitration on these lines were introduced into the western pact, it would now have Mr. MacDonald's support. Altogether, he repeated, things were going very well both here and abroad, and he was sure that my policy would succeed. Sweden could not intervene, but if she could give any help her good offices would not be found wanting. As he asked me whether I thought that Germany would join the League, I told him that that was a *sine qua non* of any sort of agreement with her. If she were not prepared to do that, nothing could come of the suggestions which he had made.

Baron Palmstierna told me, as I had also learnt at Geneva,¹¹ that the Swedish Government had appointed a committee to consider the protocol. Their report would probably contain a good deal of criticism, and would be adverse to its adoption as a whole, but there were good things in it which could perhaps be picked out either for separate adoption or for inclusion by amendment in the covenant, and he enquired whether I thought it was desirable that Sweden should at the assembly merely make her criticisms or present such alternative proposals. I replied that, in our view, the time had not come for any general amendment of the covenant. The League was performing very useful functions, and if too great a strain were not put upon it in its early years, it would grow in strength and authority, but what was required at the present time was, as I had said in the House of Commons, not an addition to the superstructure but a strengthening of the foundations,¹² and this, I thought, could best be achieved by regional arrangements among nations interested in particular spheres to guarantee the peace of their own frontiers. It was, for instance, quite impossible that the British Government should accept universal compulsory arbitration, but it by no means followed that as

⁶ i.e. Mr. A. Henderson and Mr. G. Lansbury.

⁷ See No. 190, n. 5.

⁸ A copy of this memorandum of March 30 is filed at C 4580/459/18, not printed.

⁹ See No. 190.

¹⁰ No record of Baron Palmstierna's action has been traced in the Foreign Office archives.

¹¹ See No. 74, n. 4.

¹² See 182*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, col. 313 for this part of Mr. Chamberlain's speech of March 24. See also No. 269.

between particular countries and for particular purposes such obligations might not be undertaken. It would be wiser thus to proceed from the particular to the general than, as proposed in the protocol, from the general to the particular.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 281

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 446 [C 4638/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 1, 1925

Sir,

The Italian Ambassador called today to ask for information as to the present position of the German proposals for a mutual pact.¹

He said that his Government was, if he rightly understood our position, in complete sympathy with it. They had welcomed the German proposals,² and thought that they offered a serious basis for negotiation. They should, at any rate, be most carefully considered, with a view to extracting from them, if possible, a solution of our present difficulties, and establishing peace and security on a firm basis. The Ambassador asked, in particular, whether any mention had been made of Austria in any communications I had had with either the German or the French Government, and whether any arrangement had been made for a conference with the Germans.

I sketched to him the present position, saying that I understood the French Government were drafting a reply to the German proposals, the terms of which they intended to communicate to the Allies before transmitting them to Berlin. As to Austria, the Germans had made no mention of it, and I had not thought it either necessary or desirable to raise the question with them. I felt quite confident that it was not part of their intention to challenge the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles on that point, and, in any case, I had made it clear in my declaration in the House of Commons³ that His Majesty's Government had no intention of encouraging or permitting an attack on other provisions of the treaty under cover of their effort to place the position in the West on a better and more secure foundation. M. Herriot had mentioned Austria to me,⁴ and he might desire to receive from Germany an assurance that they intended to observe the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade the union of Austria and Germany.

¹ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See No. 269.

² See Nos. 239 and 262.

⁴ See No. 251.

As to a conference with the Germans, I said that nothing was as yet decided except that M. Herriot and I were both of opinion⁴ that it was desirable that the Allies should reach agreement among themselves on all large matters of principle before they opened any formal negotiations with the Germans, but I had no doubt that, if things went well, it would be necessary at the proper time that the Allied Ministers should confer with the representatives of the Government of the Reich.

The Ambassador expressed his satisfaction with all that I had said, which showed that, as he had anticipated, our Governments were in agreement. The Italian Government was glad to be rid of the protocol,⁵ which they had not approved, and agreed with His Majesty's Government that the moment had not come to undertake any universal or general increase of our engagements, but they would gladly join in such a pact as was suggested for the western frontiers of France, considering their adherence as their contribution to the peace of the world, even though they received no direct or reciprocal advantage in respect of their own frontier, provided only that it was made clear that the general provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and, in particular, that relating to the union of Austria with the Reich, were not impaired by any agreement to which we came in regard to the West.

The Ambassador added that it was the desire of M. Mussolini that any such pact should be registered with the League of Nations, and, if possible, be placed under the safeguard of the League. I said that I entirely shared this wish. Obviously, such a pact must be registered with the League, and, if means could be found to associate the League more directly with it and to place it in some special way under the protection of the League, that would be a great advantage. I made it quite clear to his Excellency that we could undertake no fresh obligations in respect of the Italian frontier, but that we intended loyally to observe our existing obligations, and not to allow them to be brought into doubt by any new agreement that might be entered into.

Finally, I expressed to the Ambassador my anxiety about the prolongation of the discussions about German disarmament, and the delay in taking effective steps to formulate our demands with a view to the completion by Germany of what still remained for her to do, and the consequent evacuation of Cologne.⁶ On this point also, the Ambassador said that M. Mussolini entirely shared the views of the British Government, and that the Italian Ambassador in Paris had been directed to do whatever he could at the Ambassadors' Conference to hasten a decision.⁷

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁶ See Chap. III, below.

⁷ For Marquis Torretta's account of this conversation, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, Nos. 787 and 788.

*Sir G. Grahame¹ (Brussels) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received April 2)*

*No. 248 [C 4616/459/18]**

BRUSSELS, April 1, 1925

Sir,

The following communiqué respecting Franco-Belgian conversations on the subject of a pact of security has appeared in all the Belgian newspapers:—

‘The Belgian Government consider that the German proposals² should be taken into serious consideration, and this for three reasons:—

1. Because the violation by Germany of such a pact as that proposed by her would raise the whole world against her.
2. Because Belgium attaches the greatest importance to the adherence of England to such a pact.
3. Belgium considers that this pact must come within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, and that Germany must accordingly be asked what guarantees she will give as to the control of the demilitarised zone.’

The current number of the review the ‘*Flambeau*’ contains an article written by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to the question of security.

He deals first with the Geneva Protocol,³ of which he says that whatever its final fate may be, the principles embodied in it will not disappear from the conscience of mankind. The question of security was raised at Geneva⁴ and must now be faced by all. Though the protocol has not been ratified, the covenant stands untouched and constitutes the foundation of the peace of the world. The speech of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, while rejecting the protocol, affirmed British support for the covenant.⁵ Great Britain also recognises the necessity for separate agreements of a defensive character between certain nations within the framework of the League of Nations. This fruitful idea of ‘regional agreements’ was embodied in the proposed pact of mutual assistance elaborated by the Assembly in 1923,⁶ and it was revived in the protocol voted in 1924.³ The British declaration showed that England would be ready to join in a pact of security. Her participation would be one of the surest guarantees of Western peace and would constitute an important

¹ H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Brussels.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 244.

³ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 240, n. 13.

⁶ See *League of Nations: Records of the Fourth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1923), pp. 143–55 and 397–417.

element in the peace of the world. But guarantees must also be found for peace in other parts of Europe; Poland was an essential element of Europe equilibrium. For this purpose, one could imagine the elaboration of a succession of pacific conventions, which, added to and connected with one another, would combine to make a vast general pact resembling the system set up by the Geneva Protocol.

M. Hymans went on to say that Germany's suggestions were worthy of the most serious consideration. The entry of Germany into the League of Nations was desirable; but she must adhere to the covenant without claiming any exceptional treatment. All true progress must be slow; but he hoped that the first steps were being taken in the right direction and that, by adding to the Covenant of the League of Nations the support of regional understandings, the foundations of peace would be surely laid.

I have, etc.,

GEORGE GRAHAME

No. 283

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

[F.O. 800/127]

Private [and] Personal

April 2, 1925

My dear D'Abernon,

I have your letter of the 29th March.¹ There will be no difficulty here about the settlement of the 26% problem.²

As to the larger question of the mutual pact, I am satisfied with the progress that we have made up to date and hopeful of the future, though there are moments when I am a little discouraged by the thought of the many difficulties we have yet to overcome. As factors making for success I put first the whole-hearted adoption by my colleagues of the policy for which we are now working, and the growing body of public opinion which supports us. There is, for instance, in today's 'Times' the report of a brief speech³ made by Lord Grey at a League of Nations Union party at Lady Salisbury's⁴ two nights ago, in which he defines my policy and my hopes in terms which I can unreservedly accept, and on that basis expresses his full concurrence. So too Ramsay MacDonald, while necessarily critical of our attitude towards the Protocol,⁵ was careful to indicate in his speech in the House of Commons⁶ that he did not exclude any other method of

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 250, n. 1.

³ See *The Times*, April 2, p. 19. Mr. Chamberlain also made a speech at the meeting. See *ibid.*

⁴ Lady Salisbury was the wife of the fourth Marquess, the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords.

⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁶ On March 24. See 182*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 338-47.

reaching the objects at which he himself had aimed, and added that if we could achieve that end by the plans which we were pursuing he would not be opposed to them.

On the other side is the constant risk that either France or Germany may upset the apple-cart. If I had not spoken as I did in the House of Commons before I went to Paris,⁷ in Paris⁸ on my way to Geneva and on my way back, and whilst at Geneva in the several conversations which I held there,⁹ it is clear that the new German overture¹⁰ would have fallen still-born as did the Cuno proposition.¹¹ Nothing but the insistence of the British Government that it should be seriously treated, coupled with the plain intimation that it was on these lines and none other that we could offer any additional guarantes for French security, obtained for the German proposals serious consideration. I felt when I returned from Geneva that the position was sensibly better than when I set out for Paris, and all that has happened since confirms me in this belief; but that does not relieve me of anxiety lest some clumsy word spoken in Paris should lead to a more clumsy reply in Berlin, or vice versa, and thus shatter all our hopes. Much as I like Sthamer as a man, I feel that he is quite useless as a medium of communication with the German Government, and I do not suppose that his opinions have the slightest weight with them. It is, therefore, upon your influence and your discretion that I rely for keeping things straight at the German end.

At this moment I understand from Fleuriau¹² that the French Government are considering the terms of a reply to be made by them to the German offer.¹⁰ I see talk in the newspapers of a questionnaire. This seems to me a most unhappy phrase, likely to misrepresent the real intentions of Herriot and his government, and to arouse the suspicions or offend the pride of the German Government. As far as I am informed, the intention of the French Government is to show that they are giving a serious and, I would say even a friendly attention to the German suggestions, and that they are sincerely desirous of finding in them the basis for an improved relationship between Germany and the Allies. As a first stage, therefore, they propose to ask the German Government to elucidate some of the suggestions rather vaguely presented in their memorandum. If the German Government accept their note in this spirit, which is I believe the spirit in which it will be framed, I do not think that Berlin will find it difficult to answer their questions simply and directly and thus carry us a stage further on our road. I have had so far no indication of the contents of this French note except those which I can derive from Fleuriau's account of the advice he had tendered to Monsieur Herriot,¹² but neither in the questions which Monsieur Herriot put to me,⁸ nor in the suggestions made by Monsieur de Fleuriau, do I find anything which should occasion difficulty to the German Government,

⁷ See No. 223, n. 2.

⁹ See Nos. 232, 240 and 247.

¹¹ See No. 189, n. 7.

⁸ See Nos. 224, 225, 227, and 251.

¹⁰ See No. 197, n. 1.

¹² See No. 272, Enclosure.

still less anything which should give them umbrage; but I hope that you will get an opportunity of learning the nature of the contemplated German reply, and of offering observations upon it should it seem to you that it is less friendly or less helpful than it ought to be. I think that we have a right to expect the German Government to have regard to our position, and to take account of what we have done for them, and to treat us with confidence in this matter, and to attach importance to any advice which we may tender.

As to the eastern frontier, I am not at this moment quite clear what the countries immediately concerned or the French Government would wish. I take it that the German Government mentioned the eastern frontiers in order to meet in advance any possible objection from France, that they were only attempting to stabilise the situation in the west in order to be free to work for the destruction of the treaty position in the east, and I took their reference to the eastern boundaries as a fact of great importance and as an earnest of their good faith and their pacific intentions. At first sight it appeared to me that the proper policy would be to carry on simultaneous though separate negotiations as to both the west and the east, but I am now led to infer that the French Government would prefer to deal in the first instance with the west alone, only making it perfectly clear that because we added an additional security to the west we were not destroying any of the existing treaty stipulations in regard either to the eastern frontiers or to the inclusion of Austria in the German Reich. I believe that this is the view now held by the French Government, and probably by the Polish Government. If so, I see no difficulty in working upon that line. I do not expect Germany in any circumstances to renounce formally all hope that time and diplomacy may lead to some modification of the arrangements in the east, but for the moment I think the less that is said about the east the better it will be, and that at any rate on this subject Germany should confine her reply to answering such enquiries as may be addressed to Berlin. The one thing about which I hope there will be no bargaining and no hesitation in any reply that is sent is the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. You will have seen that Herriot, and still more the French opinion with which he has to reckon, would have liked to make this a preliminary condition of any negotiations. Against such an attitude I have protested strongly, but the adhesion of Germany to the League, if not a necessary preliminary, is an absolutely essential condition of the conclusion of any pact, and I hope that the German reply will make it clear beyond a shadow of doubt or contention that, if these negotiations are conducted to a successful conclusion, Germany will seek admittance to the League without any other condition than that which has already been accepted, namely that we shall all support her application and the attribution to her of a permanent seat on the Council.

This is a long screed, perhaps unnecessarily lengthy. What I want above all to impress upon you is that the French note, when it comes, is to be treated as a not unfriendly response to the German advance, that its

phrases and questions should be interpreted in that spirit and that the answers should be framed to make as easy as possible the course of a French Government which, in face of much prejudice and many difficulties, is trying to open a new chapter.

Yours sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 284

Sir E. Howard (Washington) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 15)

*No. 549 [A 1920/49/45]**

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1925

Sir,

The Secretary of State, speaking to me today of the Disarmament Conference,¹ said that there appeared to be a good deal of agitation in France over the matter and that various reports seemed to have emanated from the Quai d'Orsay. He went on to say that M. Daeschner, the French Ambassador, had recently spoken to him 'personally and unofficially' on the subject, stating that, in his opinion, France wished to see the question of security settled before any attempt was made to deal with disarmament by France.² Mr. Kellogg informed him that the United States Government had no intention of issuing invitations at once for any conference of this kind, and that they would first sound all the Governments interested before issuing such invitations.

The Italian Ambassador³ called on me this morning and showed me a cutting from some American newspaper, stating that His Majesty's Government had actually informed the United States Government officially and in writing that they were prepared to join in such a conference. He asked me whether any notes had passed between the British and American Governments on the subject. I said that, so far as I was aware, nothing had passed between us except the conversations which you had had with Mr. Kellogg before his departure from England,⁴ the purport of which was already generally known, and that beyond this the American Government had not attempted to sound His Majesty's Government as to their willingness to take part in any Disarmament Conference at Washington. I then went on to tell him what Mr. Kellogg had told me a short time before about the intention of the American Government, which I have reported in the preceding paragraph.

There seems, I think, to be a certain nervousness abroad as to an

¹ See Nos. 201, 206, 210, 251 and 256.

² For a memorandum of this conversation of March 26, see *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, pp. 10-11.

³ Signor G. de Martino.

⁴ See No. 201.

Anglo-American plan to force other nations willy-nilly into a Naval Disarmament Conference at Washington, and the action of the Italian Ambassador struck me as indicating something of this kind.

Mr. Willmott Lewis, the 'Times' correspondent, who has just returned from Europe, tells me that suspicions of collusion in this matter between Great Britain and America have been aroused in France, and it seems to me not unlikely that they may have been communicated to other Powers; but of this, Sir, you will be able to judge better than I, and I only report the Italian Ambassador's action as possibly indicating a certain nervousness with regard to this subject.

I have, etc.,
ESME HOWARD

No. 285

Record by Mr. Cadogan of a conversation with Sir A. Salter

[W 2964/9/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 3, 1925

Sir A. Salter called on me yesterday and in the course of an interview gave me his impression of the manner in which the next Assembly¹ might approach the subject of the Protocol,² and the direction in which its deliberations might develop.

He said that although it was now quite clear that His Majesty's Government would not sign a general pact based on compulsory arbitration,³ yet there were various other countries which still professed attachment to the principle of compulsory arbitration and which might desire to embody it in partial and local agreements forming groups of States, even if it were impossible at present to devise a general system of mutual guarantee. From what had transpired of the German pact proposals, these appeared to include some form of agreement for arbitration.⁴ Sir A. Salter thought that other States, in Central and Eastern Europe, might wish to conclude similar 'pacts', and in his view (and he thought this view would be shared by others) there might be advantage in evolving, through the League, a uniform model for these pacts. His idea seemed to be that it might be possible thus eventually to build up a solid structure of peace, brick by brick, avoiding the mistake which the last Assembly⁵ made of building castles in the air, and the structure would be easier to build if the bricks were made in one mould.

Incidentally, he thought that the League might be able to assist in rendering more workable and effective the proposed guarantee of the Western frontier of Germany. Any such guarantee might always be

¹ See No. 165, n. 4.

² See No. 10, n. 4.

³ See No. 240, n. 13.

⁴ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁵ See No. 205, n. 10.

compromised by the difficulty, for instance, of determining in certain cases, which side has violated a frontier first. He thought the League might be able to work out some general system of rules regarding frontiers: he suggested that this might, for instance, possibly take the form of regulations for the demilitarisation of strips of territory on either side of the frontier line. Any general principles of the kind which the League might be able to enunciate would assist in the working of any 'regional' guarantee pacts.

Sir A. Salter thought that the discussion by the League, and their encouragement of regional arbitration agreements might possibly remove some of the difficulties which have hitherto stood in the way of American participation in League activities. He did not find any impossibility in imagining an arbitration 'pact', on the League model, between the United States of America and this country. He evidently hoped that a growing number of such regional 'pacts', of strong family likeness, might one day be united under the parental authority of the League.

In any case, the establishment of regional agreements with provisions for arbitration would accustom the world to the idea of arbitral procedure, and would afford further facilities, even to States who were not parties to any such agreement, to avail themselves, should they so desire, of arbitral machinery on the model of that provided in those agreements.

It is therefore possible that the Assembly may be moved by certain Delegations to discuss a model draft regional arbitration agreement and guarantee pact, and may also embark on an attempt to evolve a system of rules, e.g. regarding frontiers, for the more exact and effective working of such instruments.⁶

A. CADOGAN

⁶ Mr. Chamberlain minuted (April 8): 'I have great hope that we may see in the course of a year or two a considerable development of arbitration pacts, placed under the protection of the League, if, *but only if* the League will allow these to grow up naturally among the states concerned. If however "the League" sets out to tell everyone how to do his business, I shall despair of any result but a fresh fiasco.

'I sincerely trust that the bureaucrats of Geneva will leave these matters to those who have the greatest interests in success [and] bear all the blame of failure. If Sir A. Salter [and] Co[mpany] are going "to get busy" over the Western Pact, they may do infinite mischief [and] can do no good at this stage. I sincerely wish that I had the chance of telling him [and] Sir E. Drummond with what dismay these restless [and] most dangerous activities fill me.'

*Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)**No. 424 [C 4760/459/18]★*FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 3, 1925*

Sir,

The Belgian Ambassador left with me this morning a copy of the memorandum¹ which M. Hymans had prepared in answer to a request from M. Herriot² for the views of the Belgian Government upon the German memorandum.³ I attach a copy of this memorandum,⁴ which I read hastily in Baron Moncheur's presence. Without committing myself to details as a result of this hurried perusal, I said that I found myself in general agreement with the views expressed by M. Hymans.

On re-reading it more carefully I am confirmed in my first expression, except that I think it would probably be unwise to raise at this early stage the question of the form of control to be exercised by the League over the demilitarised area (see paragraph 5).

Baron Moncheur then asked me if I knew exactly what course the French Government proposed to take. Did they intend the note which they were drafting to be signed by all the allied Governments, or was it to be only the reply of the French Government? I said that as far as I understood it was to be the latter, but that M. Herriot intended to communicate its contents to the Allies and to seek their general concurrence in its terms before it was presented. I had, however, no definite information at present as to what the note would contain or as to M. Herriot's final intentions in regard to this consultation. M. de Fleuriau had pointed out⁵ to me that whilst the interest of Great Britain and Belgium in the French reply was direct and immediate, the interest of the Italian government was less direct and that of the Japanese Government even more remote, and this might affect, as I understood, the extent of the consultation or of the concurrence which the French Government were contemplating. In this connection, I told Baron Moncheur of the statement made to me by Marquis Torretta the other day that, provided it was made clear that in seeking to give further stability to the western frontiers we were not weakening the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles in other respects, Italy would view with pleasure the conclusion of a mutual pact with Germany, and, though obtaining no direct advantage for herself or for her own frontiers, would gladly join in such a pact as her contribution to the general peace of Europe.⁶ Baron Moncheur observed that this declaration was important and very satisfactory.

¹ For the text of this memorandum of March 31, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 49, Annexe.

² For the text of the French memorandum of March 19, see *ibid.* No. 40.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁵ See No. 260, Enclosure.

⁴ Not printed.

⁶ See No. 281.

I also took occasion in the course of our conversation to refer to the interview which Herr Sthamer had with me during the discussion which followed my statement in the House of Commons on Tuesday, the 24th March.⁷ I said that altogether undue prominence was being given to this conversation in the newspapers. Though Herr Sthamer was a very pleasant gentleman, he was not, I thought, very clear-headed and perhaps not kept very fully informed by his own Government. In any case, I had been unable to make out from his conversation what it was in my speech which had disturbed him, but to prevent any possibility of a misapprehension, I had caused enquiry to be made at once in Berlin. I had received confirmation of my interpretation of the intentions of the German Government.⁸ As far, therefore, as the matter had any importance at all, it lay only in the confirmation which had come to me of the good faith of the German Government. I observed that they also had their difficulties with the parties of the Right, but all my information showed that they had stood their ground and were firmly decided to adhere to the policy on which they had embarked,⁹ and I could add that in so far as I had had occasion to ask for any explanations, the answers which I had received had always been satisfactory.

Incidentally, I told Baron Moncheur that I disliked speaking of a questionnaire to be addressed to the German Government. This seemed to me an unnecessarily cold and even menacing word. I would rather speak, as M. Hymans did in his memorandum, of asking for explanations of a greater precision of the suggestions which the German Government had put forward.

Baron Moncheur then raised the question of procedure after the delivery of the proposed French note. To this I replied that it seemed to me useless to try and look too far ahead. We could settle such points as they arose. For the moment I could only say: 'One step enough for me,' to which the Ambassador replied that he agreed, and that, as they said in French, 'sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof'. He would, however, like to know whether I agreed with what he understood to be the French view, that no pact could be signed until Germany had entered the League of Nations. I said that M. Herriot had summed up the view which I had pressed upon him in the phrase that the entry of Germany into the League was a 'condition essentielle mais non préalable'.¹⁰ Clearly Germany must enter the League, and unless she were willing to do so on the terms accepted by all other members there could be no pact at all, but the exact moment at which she should enter seemed to me a matter to be arranged with a view to making a successful issue of the negotiations as easy as possible. It occurred to me that if there were any difficulties about a special meeting of the assembly, such as M. Hymans had suggested in his memorandum, or if, for any reason, such a course were undesirable, it

⁷ See No. 269.

⁹ See No. 263-68, *passim*.

⁸ See No. 274.

¹⁰ See No. 251.

would be quite possible to provide in the pact itself that it should not come into operation until Germany had become a member of the League. This suggestion also approved itself to the Ambassador.¹¹

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ For Baron Moncheur's record of this conversation, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 51.

No. 287

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

No. 277 [C. 4689/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 3, 1925

Sir,

I have read with interest your despatch No. 107 of February 28th reporting a debate in the Diet Commission of Foreign Affairs on Polish foreign policy.¹ I note in particular the pessimism expressed in the course of the debate with regard to future Polish-German relations.

2. These relations have been brought into special prominence by the recent discussions arising out of the German security offer.

3. The original memorandum regarding security communicated to me by the German Ambassador on January 20th² contained, as you are aware, no direct reference to Germany's eastern frontier and was apparently concerned solely with the guaranteeing of the existing situation on the Rhine. It did, however, contain a suggestion that, as one of several possible solutions, a comprehensive arbitration treaty, providing for the peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts, should be concluded, and Germany declared her readiness to sign such treaties, not only with the powers interested in the Rhine but with all other states as well. Stress was subsequently laid on this part of the German offer by the Permanent Head of the German Foreign Office, who, in conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, explained that it was intended to cover the powers whose frontiers touched Germany in the east (see Berlin telegram No. 39 of January 23rd).³

4. The memorandum handed to the French Government on February 9th⁴ was no more explicit on the subject of Germany's eastern frontier than the version communicated to His Majesty's Government, but from the account of what passed that was given to His Majesty's Government in writing by the French Government, the German Ambassador at Paris subsequently informed the French President of the Council verbally that

¹ Not printed.

² The memorandum was communicated by the German Government to Lord D'Abernon (see No. 189).

³ No. 190.

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

Germany was prepared to consider the conclusion of arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and that while the eastern frontier of Germany could not be guaranteed in the same manner as that of the west, a way out might be found by reference to article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, thus obviating all idea of a solution by force.⁵ In a conversation with Lord D'Abernon on March 17th (see Berlin telegram No. 108),⁶ Herr von Schubert disclaimed any design of obtaining a modification of the Polish frontier by means of arbitration. The arbitration treaties which Germany had in mind would, he said, provide for two kinds of arbitration, namely arbitration with binding force on legal questions and conciliatory awards without binding force on political questions. Frontier questions would in any case not be placed in the first category and Herr von Schubert even went so far as to suggest that, if Poland so desired, frontier problems could be specifically excluded from the operation of the proposed arbitration treaty. Germany would not advise this method, but would be ready to accept it.

5. In short, it appears from the above that the attitude of the German Government is that they cannot accept their eastern frontier as final and irrevocable, and cannot therefore give concerning it the same absolute guarantee as they are prepared to give concerning the western frontier. Nevertheless they have declared—although their assurances are as yet purely verbal—that they are ready to renounce all appeal to force to alter the eastern frontier and to rely on peaceful methods, such as arbitration or, if even arbitration is repugnant to Poland, then on eventual appeal to the League of Nations. This attitude was publicly proclaimed by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in his statement to the press on March 13th⁷ (see Berlin despatch No. 186 of March 14th):¹ 'There is no party in Germany,' he said, 'from the Deutschvölkische to the Communists, which could conscientiously admit that the eastern frontier was drawn in accordance with the right of self-determination. Germany has not got the strength to force an alteration of the frontier, and she has not got the will to do it. But when article 19 of the Covenant of the League makes express mention of the fact that treaties which have become impracticable can be altered, nobody can expect Germany to renounce once and for all any claim to have recourse to this refugium. In the sincere desire to live in peace with all her neighbours, Germany can only wish that the general development will be towards a solution of the differences existing here by peaceful methods.' Further, in reply to enquiries which I caused to be made on this particular point,⁸ Herr von Schubert, after consultation with the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, categorically informed Lord D'Abernon on March 28th that 'the German Government renounce any idea of bringing about by war-like means an alteration in the German-Polish frontier'.⁹

⁵ See No. 220.

⁶ See No. 269.

⁶ No. 254.

⁷ See No. 273, n. 6.

⁹ See No. 274.

6. From the various records of my conversations which have reached you, you will be aware that I have lost no opportunity of emphasising to Monsieur Herriot,¹⁰ to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs¹¹ and to the allied representatives in London,¹² the importance of this renunciation by Germany of war as a method of settling disputes on her eastern frontier, the significance of her willingness to come to a settlement in the east in addition to her voluntary guarantee of the *status quo* on her western frontier, and the proof of good faith which is inherent in her refusal to make the same declaration with regard to the east as to the west. I deprecate, in fact—as I informed the Polish Minister in London on March 31st (see my despatch No. 268 of that date)¹³—the suspicion with which the German offer has been greeted, both in Poland and in France.

7. On the other hand, I have not hesitated to impress the German Government with the impossibility of succeeding in the present effort to bring Germany back into the comity of nations unless they are prepared to make, not only a mutual pact for the west but also a simultaneous, though not necessarily similar, provision for the east, and with the necessity of making their pledges respecting the Polish frontier as binding as those relating to the Rhine frontier.¹⁴ This, as it seemed to me, was a not unlikely or unreasonable demand for France to put forward on behalf of her ally, but I ought to add that later developments leave me uncertain whether either France or Poland would desire to do more at this moment than guard against the possibility that, in endeavouring to give additional stability to the treaty position in the west, we might be in any way waiving or laying open to question the other provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

8. You will have learnt from my statement in the House of Commons on March 24th⁸ that any pact which His Majesty's Government may enter into will necessarily be confined to the frontiers in which they have an immediate interest, and I have made it clear to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs¹¹ and to the French Government¹⁵ that His Majesty's Government have no intention of undertaking any *new* obligation in respect of frontiers other than those on the west of Germany—in regard to which special obligations already devolve upon us in consequence of articles 42–44 of the Treaty of Versailles which establish the demilitarisation of the Rhineland and constitute any infraction thereof an act of hostility towards all the signatories of the treaty. At the same time I have endeavoured to make it equally clear that His Majesty's Government have no desire by strengthening security in the west, to weaken the provisions of existing treaties in the east or elsewhere. The views of His Majesty's Government are, in short, summed up in the following extract from my speech in the House of Commons on March 24th:⁸

'It is equally obvious that, in the view of His Majesty's Government,

¹⁰ See No. 225.

¹² See Nos. 212, 226, 258 and 281.

¹⁴ See Nos. 231, 249, 255, and 269.

¹¹ See No. 247.

¹³ See Vol. XXV, No. 453.

¹⁵ See No. 251.

our obligations could not be extended in respect of every frontier. That is one reason, the main reason, why we rejected the protocol.¹⁶ It was because it was a universal extension of our obligations of the most serious kind. But we thought that what we could not do in every sphere we might properly undertake, and advise our people to undertake, in that sphere with which we were most closely connected. but it must be made quite clear that in trying to underpin the Covenant and to stabilise peace in the west, we were not licensing or legitimising war elsewhere; that to enter into fresh engagements of a mutual character turning into a friendly agreement, voluntarily made on both sides, what is now a peace imposed by the victors on the vanquished that that must not be held to be an encouragement to those who were defeated yesterday to try and reopen conclusions in other spheres. On the contrary, we held that by the mere fact of stabilising peace in the west you would give an additional guarantee to the frontiers of the east.'

I trust that this declaration will have sufficed to remove any suspicion that may have been entertained in Poland regarding the good faith and loyalty of His Majesty's Government, and to prove that Great Britain has no desire to see a revision of the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles except in so far as it may come about by friendly and direct negotiation between the parties concerned or by the application of article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

9. My view is that Germany, on her side, would be most ill-advised to attempt, even by peaceful means, to precipitate a solution in the east for which the time is not yet ripe. This appears, in fact, to be realised by the German Government and I have received assurances through Lord D'Abernon that Germany has no desire whatever to precipitate the consideration of the Polish question and is prepared to postpone it until it can be discussed in a friendly way in the new atmosphere which it is hoped may be created by the conclusion of a western security pact. In this respect, I would direct your special attention to my telegram No. 2 from Geneva to Berlin of March 15th¹⁷ and to Lord D'Abernon's telegrams Nos. 108 of March 17th¹⁸ and 113 of March 22nd.¹⁹

10. On the other hand, Poland's responsibility would be heavy indeed were the present offer to promote peace to break down through her intransigence, exaggerated fears or inability to realise where her advantage lies. As I pointed out to Count Skrzynski at Geneva,¹¹ it is to Poland's interest, situated as she is in a position of danger between two great nations, to come to terms with at least one of them, and good sense suggests that it will be more profitable and easier to cultivate good and even friendly relations with the German Reich than with the Soviet Union. For this purpose Poland would be well advised, as I have intimated to

¹⁶ See No. 240, n. 13.

¹⁸ No. 254.

¹⁶ No. 249.

¹⁹ No. 264.

Monsieur Skirmunt in my conversation of March 31st,¹³ to begin by showing more goodwill and patience over such troublesome questions as that of Danzig and by avoiding action which would unnecessarily irritate or offend German susceptibilities.

11. The counsel of His Majesty's Government to both countries will continue to be, as and when opportunity arises, that they should make an effort in their own interests to close the chapter of mutual hostility which has so unfortunately lasted ever since the signature of peace, and to endeavour to establish closer and more normal relations. It is not too much to hope that friendly discussion and negotiation may result in smoothing away outstanding difficulties and possible causes of dispute. You will observe from my despatch No. 268 of March 31st¹³ that I have already expressed this view to Monsieur Skirmunt, and you should continue, as opportunity occurs, to urge it upon the Polish Government, whose attention you may find it useful to draw to the following extract from my speech in the House of Commons on March 24th⁸ as an embodiment of the views of His Majesty's Government:

'No country has a greater, a profounder interest in stabilising peace, or in promoting good relations with her great neighbour, than Poland; and no one, no impartial person, who can judge Germany's interest with a clear mind, unclouded by prejudice or passion, can fail to see that Germany can gain no real advantage, and no additional security by attacking her Eastern neighbour. Time and friendly adjustment, the force of economic ties and obligations, the freedom of commercial interests, should lead those great nations to cultivate an ever growing, an ever closer friendship, once they can get away from the atmosphere of yesterday and turn to what should be the attitude of the future.'

I am, etc.,

(In the absence of the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

No. 288

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 6)

No. 279 [C 4803/459/18]

ROME, April 3, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on April 1st the Agenzia di Roma issued a communiqué saying there was reason to believe that the Italian point of view in regard to the German proposal for a Security Pact¹ might be summed up as follows:

¹ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

- 1) Italy was favourable to a Guarantee Pact to be concluded between five powers—Italy, England, France, Belgium and Germany;
- 2) Italy did not believe in the practical efficacy of the Geneva Protocol² or in the possibility of its resurrection;
- 3) Italy thought it necessary to reach a general previous agreement between the Governments of Rome, London, Paris and Brussels.

The Agenzia di Roma is not openly official, but its director is in the closest touch with Palazzo Chigi,³ and it may be taken that the above communiqué was directly inspired.

I have, etc.,
R. GRAHAM.

² See No. 10, n. 4.

³ The seat of the Italian Foreign Ministry.

No. 289

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 14)

*No. 173 [C 5040/459/18]**

WARSAW, April 3, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 164 of the 1st instant,¹ I have the honour to report that an interesting leading article appeared in the semi-official 'Messager polonais' of yesterday, which shows the insurmountable distrust with which every fresh move of the German Government is received in this country.

The writer begins by referring to the news received from London to the effect that M. Sthamer had informed you that Germany did not wish to make the Western Pact dependent on the question of her eastern frontiers, and was ready to conform her action to articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the demilitarisation of the zone of the Rhine, and then proceeds to examine critically the conclusions to be drawn from M. Sthamer's declaration. He points out that it costs Germany nothing to give guarantees in regard to her western frontiers, for it will be many years before she can hope to be in a position to attack France again. The promise, however, to respect articles 42 to 44 seems at first sight to be a more substantial offer, as hitherto the German Government have been strongly opposed to the idea of the demilitarisation of the zone of the Rhine. Quite recently the inter-Allied authorities are reported to have discovered large clandestine stocks of arms in the Rhine district.² Is Germany promising to renounce such breaches of the treaty for the future? The probable object of her thus professed willingness to comply piously with the stipulations of articles 42 to 44 is to accelerate the

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 592, below.

evacuation of Cologne and of the Rhine district. Once the Rhine is evacuated her hands will be freer to organise the attack on the eastern frontiers, so that in reality Poland is as much interested that no concession should be made to Germany on the Rhine as France is that no concession should be made to her on the Vistula.

There are, however, other motives underlying Germany's new proposals. She wishes to ascertain the precise limits of England's disinterestedness in the course of events on the continent.

Many people in Germany and elsewhere believe that if Germany had known for certain in 1914 that she would have had England to reckon with she would not have moved; in any case, it is probable that if Germany had been better informed of England's real intentions she would have taken the necessary precautions and would have limited herself to a defensive action in the west and aimed her decisive blow at Russia. After a lapse of eleven years the situation is much the same, and for that reason the greatest importance must be attached, says the 'Messenger', to the news from London, according to which you, Sir, in the course of conversation with the French Ambassador, declared that His Majesty's Government in no way shared Mr. Lloyd George's hostile views regarding Poland. Such a statement is eminently satisfactory, for a firm attitude on the part of His Majesty's Government is in itself worth more than all the guarantees offered by pacts in which Germany is willing to make promises which she is no more bound to observe than her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. The facts, continues the writer, are obvious and cannot be too often repeated. So long as Germany looks upon herself as an oppressed party she will feel no obligation to respect her undertakings; whereas, as soon as she is able to speak on a footing of equality she will believe that she has not only the right, but even the duty, to trample her undertakings under foot. The British Foreign Secretary, in stating that England is not entirely disinterested in the question of Germany's eastern frontiers, has probably by that statement alone guaranteed the peace of Europe at least for the period during which his Government remain in power.

The same invincible distrust of Germany and all her works was evident in a short conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs last night. According to him it was folly to believe one word of what the German Government said; their proposals were not genuine and were only meant to tide over the time until they were ready to pounce on their credulous neighbours. This feeling of suspicion and fear towards Germany is practically universal in this country, and even so level-headed a person as General Sikorski, the Minister of War, when discussing the possibility of placing some orders for tanks and guns in England the night before last, said to me that all parties in the Diet were agreed as to the necessity of making large financial sacrifices to perfect the equipment of the army as they knew that Germany was already preparing for a war of revenge against Poland and they must rely on their own resources to defend their country. To a certain extent General Sikorski is probably

right, as he no doubt realises that there would be no question for many a long year to come of an English army fighting to defend the frontiers of Poland, and he may well also feel some doubt as to the efficacy of the armed help to be expected from France. I do not know how far the French Ambassador here³ and General Dupont, the head of the French Military Mission, are in the secrets of their Government, but they must anyhow know something of public opinion in their own country, and they have both told me in the course of the last month that it is very doubtful how far it would be possible to get French soldiers to fight for Poland, with the horrors of the Great War still fresh in their memories.

I have, etc.,

W. G. MAX MULLER

³ M.A. de Panafieu.

No. 290

Memorandum on Soviet Influence on Germany in connection with the question of Germany's entry into the League and of a Western Security Pact

[C 4844/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 6, 1925

It was reported in the Daily Herald of April 3rd 1924 that a Russo-German Agreement had been come to whereby Germany undertook not to accept any invitation to enter the League until the League itself had been so reorganised as to permit of the Soviet Government accepting a similar invitation.

Lord D'Abernon made enquiries at the German Foreign Office and was informed that no formal agreement to this effect existed between Germany and Russia. Lord D'Abernon reported, however, that the discussions which he had had on this subject with the German Foreign Office had left the impression on his mind that there was a good deal in the Daily Herald rumour. If no formal agreement had been come to it was certain that a close interchange of views on the subject had taken place between the two governments.¹

Later Baron Maltzan, then head of the Russian section of the German Foreign Office, admitted that while there was no definite agreement between the two countries Germany would not take any final step regarding the League without discussing the matter in a friendly way with Soviet representatives.²

On February 25th 1925 Herr von Schubert gave Lord D'Abernon a *very*

¹ Reported in Berlin despatch No. 315 of April 25, 1924, not printed.

² Reported in Berlin despatch No. 337 of April 29, 1924, not printed.

confidential memorandum on the subject of Germany's entry into the League.³ From this it was evident that while Germany's scruples arose partly from distrust of the League and partly from a reluctance to accept the obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant, the real difficulty was the effect which would be produced on Russo-German relations by Germany's entry into the League. The memorandum contained the following passage:—

'The Soviet Government would in all probability regard the acceptance of the obligation arising out of article 16 without reserve as a proof that Germany in an eventual conflict would take the side of the Western Powers against Russia. They would adjust their whole policy, including their economic policy vis-à-vis Germany, accordingly. Germany is of course just as little bound in the question of the League of Nations vis-à-vis the Soviet Government as she is in any other political question. This freedom of decision does not at the same time absolve German policy from the obligation of investigating carefully if and how far an interruption of German-Russian relations would be in accordance with Germany's interests, all the more as such an interruption would inevitably follow the abandonment of neutrality.'

Russian influence has also clearly been exercised in connection with the recent German security offer. Lord D'Abernon reported on March 11th 1925 that 'It is becoming increasingly clear that Russia will make a desperate endeavour to prevent Germany taking part in any Western European combine'.⁴

Two days later Lord D'Abernon reported that 'Russian influence is still being exercised, almost violently, against Germany entering the League. Their effort is essentially directly against Germany forming part of any Western European combination'.⁵

³ In Berlin despatch No. 156 of February 27, Lord D'Abernon transmitted a translation of a letter of February 25 from Herr von Schubert enclosing two memoranda (one of which was written by Herr von Schubert) dealing with Germany's attitude to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

⁴ See No. 234.

⁵ See No. 241.

No. 291

Minute by Mr. Sterndale Bennett

[C 4853/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 7, 1925

In a letter dated April 3rd¹ to Sir William Tyrrell, Sir C. Mendl² said that while French opinion was gradually becoming reconciled to the idea

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

² Paris representative of the Foreign Office News Department.

of a pact with Germany and was beginning to realise that it would not be in Germany's interest to employ force against Poland, yet 'there seems to be a lurking fear that if France were to send troops to the assistance of Poland attacked by Germany, she would expose herself to a "casus belli" with ourselves for having broken the neutrality of the Rhineland. This was brought out in the "Temps" leader of last night, and the point was apparently raised by M. Henri de Jouvenel in the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission.'

The Secretary of State wrote the following minute concerning this passage: 'This point has been exercising my mind also. I should like the advice of the Department as to how it is to be handled.'¹

Stated baldly, the difficulty is that the new pact faces us with the possibility that in certain circumstances we might have to join Germany in fighting France, and the prospect is naturally distasteful.

The position is that we are at present really only prepared to envisage the possibility of joining France in fighting Germany. We realise, however, that it is impossible for us to join in an alliance specifically directed against Germany. Such an alliance would be a false step which would naturally accelerate the approach of the next war. So we have decided that a mutual guarantee pact, in which Germany is included, is the only possible solution.

(The Secretary of State has already publicly emphasised the reciprocal nature of the proposed settlement. In the House of Commons on March 24th³ he said 'The agreement is not a pact of one set of Powers directed against another set of Powers, but is a pact of Powers interested in particular directions out of which trouble has arisen in the past, or might arise in the future, mutually guaranteeing one another in the possession of their present territory and against the danger of war.')

Having decided upon a mutual pact we cannot shrink from its consequences. The possibility that if France breaks the pact we may have to join Germany against her, just as if Germany broke the pact we should have to support France against Germany, is inherent in the type of settlement we have chosen, and the possibility will have to be faced and accepted. Our efforts should be directed simply to making it as remote a possibility as human foresight can.

But to avoid exaggerating the danger, let us first examine the position and consider what 'breaking the pact' really means. No pact yet exists; its outlines are still of the vaguest; it remains for us to mould it with our eyes open to the danger.

To begin with, the fear which Sir C. Mendl interprets assumes the existence of a neutral Rhineland. Now it is very likely that this is what the Germans mean to set up in effect, provided that German sovereignty over the Rhineland is preserved. Probably their object is to set up a strip of territory which neither the armed forces of Germany nor those of France

³ See No. 269.

may enter. But it is by no means certain that they mean this. All they have said is that the powers interested in the Rhine might 'guarantee the fulfilment of the obligation to demilitarise the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken in articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles'.⁴ The exact meaning of this is one of the points that must be elucidated.

If the German proposal is that a demilitarised and neutralised band of territory shall be set up, it is to be hoped that we shall accept it and not hesitate to give it our guarantee—without which its inviolability will not be worth much. The Rhineland problem dates from the abolition of the old middle kingdom of Lotharingia⁵ and the proposed demilitarised zone between France and Germany is the nearest possible approach to a return to the old middle kingdom which is consistent with modern conditions and the maintenance of German sovereignty.

The French fear seems to be not that Germany will violate any such demilitarised zone if set up, but that the French themselves will be unable to cross it without committing a hostile act against us in case of a war on Germany's eastern frontier. If Poland attacked Germany and France were to cross the demilitarised Rhineland to help Poland, we should clearly be bound to take up arms against France. If, however, Germany attacked Poland and France went to the defence of Poland through the Rhineland, the case would not be so clear. At all events, this is the case that we have to provide for. Now surely it would be met to some extent by Germany's assurance that she renounces war with Poland as a method of changing her eastern frontier, and that she is prepared to submit all disputes with Poland other than frontier questions to arbitration. The object to aim at seems to be to have that assurance embodied in a formal treaty. The German offer suggested as part of the general settlement an undertaking between the powers interested in the Rhineland not to go to war with each other. I[t] is for consideration whether

- (a) this part of the settlement could not be embodied in a treaty which Germany would sign, not only with the powers interested in the Rhine, but with all her neighbours including Poland;
- (b) a similar, but separate, treaty as that signed between the powers interested in the Rhine could not be signed by Germany and her eastern neighbours;
- (c) the contingency is not covered by the obligations of the Covenant of the League of Nations (assuming Germany to be a member of the League which we insist on as an essential condition before any pact can become effective).

⁴ See No. 189, Enclosure.

⁵ Lotharingia comprised the northern area of Francia Media, the kingdom between the Western and Eastern Kingdoms of the Carolingian Empire, and took its name from Lothair, on whom it was bestowed as a kingdom in 855. On his death without heirs in 869, it was divided between the French and German rulers, and although a part of the territory retained the name of Lotharingia, this name was lost in 959 when this part was divided into Upper and Lower Lorraine.

There is one other possible suggestion. The German offer seems to contemplate a settlement consisting of several different instruments. These instruments might be so drafted that they will be dependent one on the other. For example, if Germany broke her undertaking about going to war by attacking Poland, the signatories of the pact concerning the demilitarisation of the Rhineland could either automatically, or by a special decision which the Council of the League might be authorised to take, be absolved from the obligation to respect that demilitarisation in the measures which they would be called upon to take against Germany.

Of course the same procedure would have to apply *mutatis mutandis* if France and not Germany broke the pact; but this seems perfectly fair. The object to aim at is not to leave France with her hands free in all circumstances. The object is to avoid giving the transgressor of the pact an advantage and penalising those who observe their obligations in any war which might be necessary for the up-holding of the pact.

J. C. STERNDALÉ BENNETT

No. 292

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Addison¹ (Berlin)

*No. 757 [C 5482/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 22, 1925*

Sir,

I transmit to you herewith a record of a conversation which took place today between the German Ambassador and Mr. Lampson on the subject of the German security proposals² and the evacuation of Cologne.³

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 292

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the German Ambassador

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 22, 1925*

The German Ambassador called this afternoon and enquired when he would be able to see the Secretary of State. He understood that he was in London today,⁴ but did not know how long he was staying.

I told him that Mr. Chamberlain had only come up for the Cabinet and was leaving at once. He was not receiving any foreign representatives

¹ Counsellor at H.M. Embassy at Berlin, and Chargé d'Affaires April 5–May 1.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See Chap. III, below.

⁴ Cf. No. 273, n. 8. Mr. Chamberlain attended a Cabinet meeting on April 22 (Cab. 21 (25)).

before he left. Was there anything I could do for his Excellency?

The Ambassador said that he had instructions from his Government to discuss certain points connected with the German security proposals with Mr. Chamberlain, but as he was with me could I tell him whether there had been any development in the situation?

I replied in the negative, saying that obviously until the new French Cabinet⁵ got into the saddle no progress in this matter could reasonably be looked for. The same remark applied to the Belgian Government.⁶ Had the French Government not fallen when it did it was probable that by now the discussions would have made considerable progress. I imagined that the German Government would have been asked to clear up certain doubtful points in their proposals with a view to getting to grips. But with the fall of the French Government obviously nothing had eventuated.

The Ambassador said that his Government were anxious to simplify the matter as far as possible, and what he had to say to Mr. Chamberlain on behalf of his Government was made with that object. Possibly he would be able to see Mr. Chamberlain next week and go into the question?

His Excellency said that so far as he could gather the inclusion of M. Briand⁷ in the French Cabinet was rather a hopeful sign. I said that personally I agreed with him; I had always been an optimist and continued to be so. It seemed to me that the prospects of a settlement remained exceedingly good, but I did hope that nothing would be done in Germany to prejudice the issue.

This led to a general discussion of the election prospects in Germany.⁸ I took the line that I could hardly believe the German people were unaware of the adverse reaction which the election of Field-Marshal Hindenburg⁹ as President of the Reich would be bound to have on foreign public opinion; it really would be tragic if through such a cause the prospects of settlement of the security question should be prejudiced.

The Ambassador said that even if Hindenburg were elected (and personally he thought he would not) the election would have no effect upon the policy of the German Government. After all, the present Government included representatives of the Nationalist party; that was to say, the Nationalists were backing the German security proposals. That being so, the election to the presidency of the Nationalist candidate, Field-Marshal Hindenburg, certainly would not affect the security proposals already put up by the German Government.

⁵ M. Herriot had been defeated in the Senate on April 10 and had resigned the same day. A Cabinet under M. P. Painlevé took office on April 17.

⁶ A General Election was held in Belgium on April 5, and M. Theunis resigned the same day. A government under M.A. van de Vyvere was formed on May 13.

⁷ See No. 125, n. 2.

⁸ See Nos. 217, n. 3 and 268. No candidate had gained an absolute majority in the first ballot and a second one was to be held on April 26.

⁹ Field-Marshal P. von Hindenburg had accepted his nomination as candidate of the Right-Wing Parties on April 8. He had been named commander of all the German forces in the East in 1914, and was Chief of the General Staff 1916-19.

His Excellency then turned to his favourite topic, namely, the delay in presenting to the German Government a list of the military defaults to be made good before Cologne could be evacuated.¹⁰ He said nothing of any particular importance, and I confined my observations to a general statement that the Allies had a perfectly clear conscience regarding non-evacuation, and that we had ample evidence that our continued presence there was justified under the treaty. I hoped that before much longer a specific list of defaults would be presented to the German Government.

M. W. LAMPSON

¹⁰ See Nos. 586, 592, 593, 597, 599, 600 and 608.

No. 293

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received April 24, 9 a.m.)

No. 51 Telegraphic [C 5518/459/18]

WARSAW, April 23, 1925, 8.43 p.m.

I had conversation last night with Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs¹ regarding feeling aroused in Poland by attitude of His Majesty's Government towards German proposals.² His Excellency said that he had found Prime Minister³ and Minister for Foreign Affairs fully convinced of absolute loyalty of your intentions though they regretted raising in any form question of Eastern frontier and considered that we showed a certain naiveté in our trust of Germany. Polish public however being incapable of appreciating political nuances misunderstood your speech⁴ and resented what they considered to be British attitude in a question concerning Polish treaty rights.

In regard to his own attitude he spoke much in terms of his speech of April 1st⁵ and said that he accepted western pact and thought it might re-act favourably on situation in the east but if Germany raised question of frontier he would reply giving a categorical . . .⁶ He had spoken in this sense both to Polish Minister⁷ and to journalists and hoped that his words might produce good effect.

I afterwards spoke to two Polish journalists who will, I hope, try to instil reason into minds of public. Recent growth of anti-English feeling (? said to have been) sensibly less is having unfortunate effect in commercial matters.

¹ For Dr. Beneš's visit to Warsaw April 20-23, see Vol. XXV, No. 464.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ M.W. Grabski.

⁴ See No. 269.

⁵ A copy of Dr. Beneš's statement to the Czech Senate Committee was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Prague despatch No. 113 of April 2, not printed.

⁶ The text is here uncertain.

⁷ Dr. S. Lasocki.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 24)

No. 941 [C 5523/459/18]*

PARIS, April 23, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 934 of the 21st April,¹ I have the honour to inform you that in the debate which took place in the Chamber of Deputies on the 21st April on the ministerial declaration, the Government obtained a vote of confidence by 304 votes against 217. The Extreme Right and the four Opposition groups of the Right and Right Centre (*Union républicaine des Démocrates*, *Gauche républicaine démocratique* and *Républicains de Gauche*) voted solidly against the Government, and the Communist group abstained from voting. The Socialist-Radicals, Socialist-Republicans and Socialists voted almost equally solidly with the Government, and the great majority of the most rightward group of the *Cartel* (*Gauche radicale*, the group of M. Loucheur),² whose attitude is naturally of importance, also voted with the Government.

Apart from a number of noisy attacks on M. Caillaux's past,³ the debate, which had been awaited with such interest, was really only remarkable for M. Blum's announcement that the Socialist party would extend support to the Government and for the speech of M. Briand.

As regards M. Blum's declaration, the promise of Socialist support for the Government was qualified by the statement that 'the party remained in the position where it had been and abandoned none of the projects which it defended in agreement with the groups of the majority'.

M. Briand's speech was in the main a reply to a Deputy of the Right, who had questioned him on the subject of security. The full text of the speech, extracted from the 'Journal officiel' of the 22nd April, is enclosed herein,⁴ but it may be useful that I should summarise the more important passages.

Speaking of the publication of the Control Commission's report and of the reports of the Versailles Committee on German Disarmament,⁵ M. Briand saw no objection in principle, but 'our policy is dictated by the consideration that the best security for France is to remain always in close contact with all her allies and to do nothing save in agreement with them. . . . It is no part of our intention to separate ourselves from our allies, and I consider that they are the greatest element of security which France can have.'

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives. In this Lord Crewe had transmitted a copy of the declaration of the new ministry (see No. 292, n. 5) outlining their political and financial policy.

² Deputy for Nord.

³ See No. 227, n. 6. M. Caillaux had been appointed Minister of Finance.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ See Nos. 586, n. 1, 592 and 608, below.

Turning, then, to the Treaty of Versailles itself, M. Briand said that it contained important guarantees, and he drew attention in particular to articles 42, 43 and 44, which were of the greatest value to France. 'When in a demilitarised zone an act of hostility within the meaning of article 44 has been committed, France is mistress of her action. She is in a state of legitimate defence and can act immediately. As soon as note is taken of this act *ipso facto* all the nations signatory to the covenant are bound to come to the assistance of France.' The importance of these articles must not be underestimated, for M. Briand could not suppose that any of the nations which had signed this undertaking would endeavour to escape its consequences. 'In 1914 we had only one binding alliance,⁶ but there were unwritten undertakings.⁷ Did any one of those undertakings fail us? How can we doubt that when nations have signed a pact with us they would, should the need arise, dishonour their signature?'

After reference to the entry of Germany into the League, which he stated must be unconditional, M. Briand then spoke again of German disarmament. He said: 'The state of Germany has been mentioned. Undoubtedly grave defaults have been noted, defaults which as a whole are most disturbing from the point of view of what they may become, but, if it is said that Germany, after her defeat and the extent of disarmament which she has undergone, is in a condition which gives her strength comparable to ours and which would be capable of overcoming it tomorrow, the question will be asked of what good is a military organisation as rigorous as that which is advocated for France. Are not our French officers capable, after the proofs which they gave in the war after the defeat of Germany and the condition into which she has been thrown, of organising an army which can put the country in safety. Certainly, we must give thought to the future. We must take all precautions, but we must also take precautions in order that we do not uselessly disturb people's minds. Our country has need also of feeling that she has a large measure of security in order that she may work in peace. In the present state of Europe, the situation of France is certainly disquieting. Clearly, she cannot close her eyes, but all the same she has every reason to regard the future with confidence.'

I have, etc.,

CREWE

⁶ i.e. the Franco-Russian alliance (see No. 180, n. 3).

⁷ i.e. on the part of Great Britain. See Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. II (London, 1927), chap. XV, and vol. X, part II (London, 1938), chaps. XCVI(I) and XCVII for the Anglo-French *entente*.

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 2)

No. 205 [C 5938/459/18]*

WARSAW, April 24, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 277 of the 3rd April,¹ and I venture to express my thanks for the detailed explanation contained therein of the course of the negotiations regarding the German proposals² for a pact of guarantee of the western frontiers and for the conclusion of arbitration treaties with the countries whose frontiers touch Germany on the east.

At the end of that despatch you expressed the wish that I should take any opportunity that might offer to speak to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense in which you had already spoken to M. Skirmunt³ and urge the Polish Government to abandon their attitude of distrust towards Germany and towards every offer emanating from her Government, to close the chapter of mutual hostility which has lasted not only since the signature of peace, as you state, but from time immemorial, and to endeavour to establish closer and more normal relations with their neighbours.

I thought it more prudent not to seek an official interview for this purpose, the more so as I learnt that Count Skrzynski had received direct from you through M. Skirmunt a copy of your speech of the 24th March,⁴ and had studied it carefully, but I took the opportunity of having both Count Skrzynski and the Prime Minister to dinner alone one evening with Lord Peel⁵ to talk to them about the German proposals. I soon found that the suspicion excited by those proposals still existed in their minds, and, as I have said before, a study of Polish history fully explains its existence, however deplorable its effects may be in the present instance. Under these circumstances I think it wiser not to return to the subject, just at present, until Count Skrzynski raises it of himself.

There can be no doubt that Count Skrzynski and also M. Grabski acknowledge the absolute loyalty of your intentions towards Poland as explained in your speech in the House of Commons⁴ and in your conversation with M. Skirmunt,³ but they deplore the raising of a discussion which appears to cast doubt on the sanctity of the Polish frontiers and consider that we have given proof of a certain *naïveté* in accepting the German promises at their face value. This, as you will have seen from my telegram No. 51 of today's date,⁶ is the impression which

¹ No. 287.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ On March 31. See Vol. XXV, No. 453.

⁴ See No. 269.

⁵ The First Commissioner of Works. He was visiting Warsaw in connection with the purchase of a building for the British Legation.

⁶ No. 293.

the Polish Ministers also conveyed to M. Benes.

Far different, however, is the impression regarding our attitude in this question among the less well-informed circles of Polish society, where, in spite of all that you have said to the contrary, it is commonly believed that we are prepared to purchase our security in the west by sacrificing Polish interests in the east, and, as I said in my above-mentioned telegram, the existence of this belief probably accounts for certain difficulties which I have encountered lately in commercial matters. It is, however, not surprising, in view of what has been published in the newspapers here, that public opinion should hold such a view. The counterpart, I find, exists in neighbouring countries hostile to Poland. For instance, when I was in Danzig at Easter⁷ I heard from English sources that the Germans in Danzig and also the German landed proprietors residing in the corridor were overjoyed at what they regarded as the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the question of the eastern frontier and looked on the return to Germany of the Free City and the corridor as only a matter of time, while from the last paragraph of Mr. Vaughan's telegram No. 7 of the 18th April⁸ I gather that the Lithuanian Government regard such a development as imminent. No doubt this is due to German propaganda.

It is therefore not to be wondered at that the Poles should be correspondingly apprehensive of German designs, and their fears have recently been intensified by the selection of Marshal Hindenburg as candidate of the Nationalist parties for the Presidency of the Reich.⁹ The German Minister, who is generally well informed, told me last night that he looks for the election of Herr Marx,¹⁰ and if he turns out to be right, this may have a slight calming effect on Polish public opinion. He mentioned that the negotiations for the German-Polish Commercial Treaty¹¹ were hanging fire and had met with considerable difficulties mainly owing to what he described as the unreasonable attitude of the Poles regarding the residential rights to be granted to Germans in Poland.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin.

I have, etc.,
W. G. MAX MULLER

⁷ See No. 263, n. 13.

⁸ Not printed. Mr Vaughan was H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Riga, Reval and Kovno.

⁹ See No. 292, n. 9.

¹⁰ German Chancellor November, 1923-January, 1925. He was the candidate of the Weimar Constitutional Parties.

¹¹ See No. 214, n. 4.

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Mr. Lampson (Received April 30)

[C 5771/35/18]

[BERLIN], April 25, 1925

My dear Miles,

The following may not be without interest to you.

The Russians, both at Moscow and here, have been working very hard to dissuade the German Government both from concluding the Security Pact and from entering the League of Nations. So strenuous have been their efforts in Moscow that Brockdorff-Rantzau¹ has come here and has spent considerable time in urging the Russian point of view or, at any rate, in reporting the urgent representations made to him in Moscow on this twin subject. At a dinner given by Stresemann to the Russian Ambassador a couple of days ago, Krestinski also spent two hours pointing out to Luther how fatal it would be for Germany to enter the League of Nations and how, under Article 16, Germany might be compelled to take up an anti-Russian attitude, with bad results to herself.

I am glad to be able to tell you, however, that, according to my informant who was at the dinner, after the Russian Ambassador had left, Luther and Stresemann categorically declared that neither his arguments nor Brockdorff-Rantzau's had had any influence on them whatsoever and that they firmly adhered to their policy of joining the League of Nations and of concluding a Security Pact, if possible. The second man to Kühlmann² on the League has even been selected, Levitsky, formerly Counsellor at Washington.

Incidentally, as I dare say you know, the real moving spirit of the Russian Embassy and the head of the Soviet agitation in this country is not Krestinski, who is a mediocrity, but the Councillor of the Embassy, a certain Brodowski. I have it on the best authority that Brodowski has had a lot to do with the organisation of the agitation in Bulgaria and in particular of the recent bomb outrage in Sofia.³

Another point which is not without interest, although largely academic by the time this letter reaches you, is that the report in the newspaper that Moscow has advised the communist party here to vote for Hindenburg is perfectly correct. This advice was transmitted to the leaders of the communist party here through Brodowski. It is not, however, anticipated

¹ German Ambassador at Moscow.

² Herr R. von Kühlmann had been German Minister for Foreign Affairs August 1917–July 1918. In a letter of April 14 to Mr. Lampson, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives, Mr. Addison had reported that Dr. Stresemann was searching for a suitable representative at the League of Nations, and that Herr von Kühlmann was likely to be appointed.

³ See No. 99, n. 1.

that it will have any effect since in any case time is too short for the communist electors to be properly instructed. That Marx will be elected by a majority of probably at least one million remains my firm opinion. By the time you read this, however, the question will have been settled.⁴

Yours ever,
JOSEPH ADDISON

⁴ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

No. 297

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 29, 6.50 p.m.)

No. 176 Telegraphic [C 5759/459/18]

BERLIN, April 29, 1925, 3.50 p.m.

Chancellor has just delivered speech to representatives of German trade and industry. Following is free rendering of salient portions of speech relating to German government's attitude in foreign affairs.

'Keynote to general international situation is that nations desire that present obscurity and uncertainty be removed. A policy with this aim must be continuous and cannot alter its direction arbitrarily.'

After referring at length and in strong terms to delay in evacuation of Cologne zone¹ and stressing the fact that Germany is entitled to expect allied governments will not delay any longer communicating to Germany in what respects she is in default² and after pointing out that any further delay was only retarding solution of other European problems and positive cooperation of Germany in such solution Chancellor said 'the well known efforts of Germany on security question are directed to this end. Germany in her disarmed condition is also entitled to ask for security. She has all the more interest in obtaining protection by treaty against future attacks in that she, as I would like to repeat again imperatively, will not wage any war and as every expert knows cannot wage any war. German government, in full recognition of necessities which no German statesman can ignore and on the other hand in frank statement of legitimate aims which no German statesmen can surrender, desire to co-operate in finding means to do away with existing international tension. Our attitude in this question is so clear and obvious that no doubt regarding our intentions should be possible. It is obvious that standpoint adopted by government remains unaltered. Security question is such a difficult problem that it would not be advisable to complicate it by introduction of other problems which either have nothing at all to do with it or would best be treated separately.'

¹ See No. 553, below.

² See Nos. 586, n. 1, 592, 593, 597, 599, 600, and 608, below.

Chancellor went on to say 'although evacuation of Cologne was a separate question nevertheless if allies so hastened treatment of security question as to make a conclusion coincide with an early settlement of evacuation question and if in that way a general understanding were facilitated Germany would welcome such a solution'.

Chancellor concluded with following words:—

'The public utterances of allied statesmen³ have indicated their readiness to solve security question in common with Germany.

Consequently although at the present moment we are still waiting for allies to adopt a definite attitude, prospect of reaching a positive solution is still open. As soon as these two most urgent problems shall have been settled, way to a general reconstruction of Europe seems to me to be open.'

Full text by bag.⁴

³ See e.g. No. 269.

⁴ Berlin despatch No. 280 of April 29, not printed.

No. 298

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received May 5)

[C 6047/459/18]

PARIS, April 29, 1925

My dear Tyrrell,

I had a short conversation with Seydoux today. He told me that Winston, the American Treasury official, whom he saw today and who has just returned from Berlin, seemed to be absolutely in despair over Hindenburg's election.¹ Winston asked Seydoux what could be done to give France the security she requires, and Seydoux replied that the only thing possible was a close understanding between France, the United States and Great Britain.

I told Seydoux that I very much hoped that the conversations with Germany would not be allowed to drop as a result of the election. Seydoux replied that he did not yet know what had been decided in this respect by Briand, but so far as he himself was concerned he was strongly of opinion that the conversations with Germany should continue, though they must go slow and not be hurried in any way. Time must be given to see what was really at the back of the Germans' minds, and whether, after due reflection, there was a chance of their showing a real desire for peace. The fact, however, that fourteen millions of German electors had voted for Hindenburg was terribly disquieting. Seydoux feared, so far as he was concerned, that the great desire for peace which existed in Great Britain and France had not yet awakened any real echo in Germany. Russia, he observed bitterly, instead of serving as a counterpoise to Germany had

¹ See Nos. 292, n. 8, and 611, n. 1, below.

only one desire, and that was to stir up trouble everywhere. Seydoux seemed very frightened, but only too anxious—as indeed he always is—to find some peaceful issue to all our terrible problems.

I have reason to believe that Berthelot² is, so far as he personally is concerned, opposed to the resumption of any conversations with Germany at present, but it is very much to be hoped that he will not be able to impress his views on Briand.

Yours sincerely,
ERIC PHIPPS

² Appointed Secretary-General at the French Foreign Ministry in 1920, he had been suspended in 1922 after involvement in a financial scandal. He benefitted from the amnesty laws passed by the Herriot ministry (see No. 227, n. 6) and in April, 1925, regained his former position as Secretary-General.

No. 299

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1502 [C 5804/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 30, 1925*

My Lord,

M. de Fleuriau came to see me today for the first time since the Easter holidays.¹ He had been to Paris and seen the new Ministers.² He had enquired of M. Briand whether he contemplated visiting London. M. Briand replied that he recognised that a return visit was due to us, but that he thought it would be wiser not to make it until we had arrived at an agreement on some one of the matters now under consideration and could, as it were, seal our agreement by a personal interview. For the moment he did not think that such an interview would be useful. I agreed.

M. de Fleuriau went on to say that he had also asked M. Briand about the proposed German pact.³ M. Briand had been very much occupied and fatigued by the sittings of the Chambers (where, in truth, the existence of the Government had depended on his skill), and wanted a few days' holiday before turning to other work, but M. de Fleuriau believed that he would receive a draft of his proposed reply⁴ within a day or two. The Ambassador said that he had seen the draft on which M. Herriot had been working. There were, his Excellency observed, two forms which such a draft could take. It might either ask a series of questions or embody our conditions. Personally, he would prefer the latter course, but M. Herriot's draft was a mixture of the two, and had not recommended itself to M. de

¹ See No. 273, n. 8.

² See No. 292, n. 5. M. de Fleuriau had a meeting with M. Briand on April 25.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁴ To the German memorandum of February 9 (see No. 197, n. 1).

Fleuriau nor, as I understood, to M. Briand. M. Briand had mentioned the principal conditions which must be observed in any negotiation: first, that nothing which we did to strengthen one portion of the Treaty of Versailles should in any way weaken the other stipulations of that treaty, and, secondly, and more important, that Germany should join the League of Nations without conditions. I reminded M. de Fleuriau that I had from the first assented to both these propositions, and had always spoken in this sense both in Paris and in Berlin.⁵

M. de Fleuriau then said that the French Government were on the point of signing, or had perhaps actually signed, a treaty of compulsory arbitration with Switzerland,⁶ and that it was his personal impression, from conversations with M. Fromageot⁷ (though M. Briand himself had not mentioned the subject), that the French Government would be ready to go very far in the same direction in their treaty with Germany, and even to recommend similar treaties to the other States bordering on the Reich. He wished me to consider this question, as he was aware that, in my statement on the protocol,⁸ I had taken a rather different line on behalf of His Majesty's Government. He added that M. Briand was fondly attached to the protocol,⁹ and hoped to save something from it. It might be possible, for instance, to build up a partial system of arbitration in the countries bordering on Germany which might eventually be the basis for some wider agreement. M. Briand had mentioned that he had it in mind to attend the Assembly of the League in September,¹⁰ and that he hoped very much that he might come to some agreement with me as to the line which we could take before that time came. His Excellency thought that M. Briand had not himself at this moment any very clear conception of policy, but he had a parental interest in the protocol, and was desirous of saving something from it. It would, however, perhaps be premature to enter upon such a discussion at this moment.

I replied to the last point that I should be very glad to come to some agreement with M. Briand about our attitude at the assembly before we went there, and I hoped that our first interchange of views would not be too long delayed. We were endeavouring to obtain the presence of the dominion representatives in London some little time before the assembly met,¹¹ so that we might come to a complete agreement with them, and I should like to be in possession of the views of the French Government when I met the dominion representatives. As to what he had said about arbitration, I had already given some thought to the subject, and I had, I

⁵ See Nos. 224, 225, 228-32, 249, 251, 255, 258-9 and 269.

⁶ For the text of this treaty of conciliation and arbitration of April 6, 1925, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 133, pp. 490-94.

⁷ A Legal Adviser to the French Foreign Ministry.

⁸ See No. 240, n. 13.

⁹ See No. 10, n. 4.

¹⁰ See No. 165, n. 4.

¹¹ A Dominions Office telegram of July 30, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives, transmitted a copy of a telegram to the five dominions pointing out that the suggestion of a preliminary meeting in London no longer appeared necessary.

believed indicated that it might be possible, as between particular nations and in particular zones, to admit an extension of obligatory arbitration, even though it could not be accepted as universally applicable. I could not, however, arrive at any definite conclusions even in my own mind until I knew more exactly what the French Government had in view. M. de Fleuriau repeated that, in his opinion, they would go very far—as far, indeed, as compulsory arbitration on all disputed questions.

M. de Fleuriau then turned to the question of inter-Allied debts. Both M. Painlevé and M. Caillaux were determined to proceed to a settlement of this question, but M. Caillaux did not wholly adopt the point of view taken by M. Clémentel.¹² He wanted a little time to consider the French internal position, and could scarcely carry the English negotiations¹³ further until his domestic policy was settled. To this I replied that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would necessarily be very much occupied with budget discussions during the next few weeks, and I thought that it would not be disagreeable to him to be allowed a little time before he resumed the negotiations. M. de Fleuriau thereupon remarked that he might have to trouble me with some questions arising out of the budget, and, in obscure language and a tone of voice even a degree less audible than is usual with him, seemed to suggest that M. Caillaux might presently be prepared for a more liberal tariff policy than any yet pursued by France, especially if French goods were exposed to sufficient risk of duties on entry into our ports and we were in a position to offer France a bargain. But I do not pretend to have clearly understood the Ambassador's *sotto voce* reference to what M. Caillaux said to him some twenty-two or twenty-three years ago when M. Caillaux was last in England in the midst of my father's Tariff Reform campaign,¹⁴ nor did I think that I could usefully press for explanations at this moment.

The Ambassador left with me a note¹⁵ of the instructions given by the French Government to their representative in Sofia to keep in close touch with his British and Italian colleagues and with the Inter-Allied Organ of Liquidation, in order to watch over the execution of the conditions laid

¹² French Minister of Finance June 1924–April 1925.

¹³ M. Clémentel had raised the question of the French debt to Great Britain (which stood at £638 million gross at January 1, 1925) with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Churchill, at the meeting of the Allied Finance Ministers in Paris January 7–14, 1925 on the allocation of the proceeds of the Dawes Scheme (see Vol. XXVI, No. 616, n. 4), and Mr. Churchill had promised to discuss the matter with his colleagues. (A group of documents concerning the settlement of the inter-allied war debts were printed for the Cabinet and are filed at C 1364/4/62.) On February 6, Mr. Churchill communicated to M. Clémentel a note of His Majesty's Government's views on the repayment of the French debt (C 1786/4/62), not printed. For a text, see *The Times*, February 9, p. 12. A Treasury record of April 3 of informal discussions with French Treasury Officials is filed at C 5155/4/62, not printed.

¹⁴ Mr. Chamberlain's father Joseph Chamberlain (1836–1914) had been Secretary of State for the Colonies 1895–1903. For his Tariff Reform campaign 1903–6, see J. Amery, *Joseph Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform Campaign: the Life of Joseph Chamberlain*, vol. 5 (1901–1903) (London, 1969) and vol. 6 (1903–1968) (London, 1969).

¹⁵ Of April 29 (C 5839/3456/7), not printed.

down for the provisional increase in the Bulgarian troops.¹⁶ The French representative was instructed to make it clear to the Bulgarian Government that the Allied Governments would insist upon the strict observation of these conditions. His Excellency left with me a second note¹⁷ enquiring what were the views of the British Government on the differences which have arisen between the Allied and the Turkish delegates on the Commission of the Straits in regard to the demilitarised zone, to which I promised to send him a written reply.¹⁸

What the Ambassador said was interesting. The fact that he did not say other things was even more interesting and far more important. Your Lordship will observe that the name of Marshal Hindenburg was never mentioned by the Ambassador, and that he continued our previous conversations on the German proposals almost as if there had been no change of Government in France² and without any reference whatever to the result of the presidential election in Germany.¹⁹ This is hopeful, and confirms the information as to the attitude of the new French Government which your Lordship has transmitted.²⁰ My own impression of the effect on German policy of that election finds confirmation in Mr. Addison's very interesting telegram No. 175 of the 28th instant,²¹ which Lord D'Abernon on his way back to Berlin²² confirmed to me today.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹⁶ See Nos. 97, n. 5 and 101.

¹⁷ Of April 29 (E 2575/67/44), not printed.

¹⁸ His Majesty's Government's policy was given in a note of June 11 to M. de Fleuriau (E 3264/67/44), not printed.

¹⁹ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

²¹ No. 612, below.

²⁰ See No. 294.

²² Cf. No. 292, n. 1.

No. 300

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Addison (Berlin)

*No. 797 [C 5852/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 30, 1925*

Sir,

I received the German Ambassador this afternoon. His Excellency first expressed on behalf of the German Government and for himself personally their deep regret at the death of Sir Eyre Crowe,¹ of whom the Ambassador spoke in terms of high honour and regard. I expressed my thanks to him and begged him to convey to his Government my appreciation of their sympathetic message.

¹ Sir E. Crowe had died on April 28. He was succeeded as Permanent Under-Secretary by Sir W. Tyrrell.

His Excellency then turned to public affairs. He said that he had for some time had instructions to seek an interview with me for the purpose of putting before me informally some anxieties felt by the German Government. First, in regard to disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne. He had no doubt that I should have seen the Chancellor's speech.² Public opinion in Germany was growing a little restless under the delays. The Chancellor was not impatient, but he was anxious that progress should be made. When might they expect the promised communication³ and what form would it take? After all, there was no objection on the part of Germany in principle. It was only a question of detail and of adjustment. His Excellency deprecated an exchange of notes, which was apt to make rigid a demand on the one side or an objection on the other, and to render difficult an ultimate accord. Might not this matter be treated in confidence?

Next, as to the pact. He trusted that the election of Marshal Hindenburg⁴ was not going to put an end to those negotiations the thread of which the German Government hoped might be again taken up quickly. Herr Sthamer thought that English opinion, judging by the press, was becoming reassured. What about French opinion and the French Government? It would be a great mistake to regard the election of the Marshal as throwing any doubt upon the policy or the good faith of the German Government. Again he referred to the Chancellor's speech and to the Marshal's declarations.⁵ The Marshal was an honest man, a soldier who had seen too much of the horrors of war to desire a repetition of them, and who knew too well Germany's incapacity to wage a war to think of provoking it. He was a man who would keep his oath, and his assumption of the Presidency threatened no monarchical restoration. He would observe and defend the Constitution, and behind him were gathered all the sober and strong elements of the German people. He would remind me of what he had already said on some previous occasion,⁶ that the fact that Dr. Luther's Government was so largely composed of the elements of the Right gave a greater value to the offer of a guarantee coming from them and a greater security both for their power to carry it out and to fulfil its obligations than would have attached to an offer from a Government of the Left, who might not unlikely have been unable to secure support for the same plan. Just as the composition of the Government should thus be considered as an additional security to the Allies, so the association of the Marshal with the Government's policy gave

² See No. 297.

³ See No. 570, below.

⁴ See Nos. 292, n. 8, and 611, n. 2, below.

⁵ For Marshal von Hindenburg's Easter message of April 11, and his conference with American Press representatives on April 21, see W. Hubatsch, *Hindenburg und der Staat: aus den Papieren des Generalfeldmarschalls und Reichspräsidenten von 1878 bis 1934* (Göttingen, 1966), Nos. 26 and 27. For reports of his declarations, see *The Times*, April 13, p. 10 and April 22, p. 13.

⁶ Cf. No 292.

additional strength to that Government and an additional guarantee to us.

The Ambassador next referred to Lord D'Abernon's conversation with Herr Schubert.⁷ He said that he might be repeating what was already known to me, but the German Government had some anxiety as to the suggested *questionnaire*. The German proposal⁸ was a simple one. It was a voluntary declaration which the Allies could not have expected from Germany, the offer of something more than the Treaty of Versailles, a new addition to that treaty, leaving the treaty itself intact and not affecting any of its provisions. Why then should we complicate the negotiations by the introduction of other and wholly unnecessary questions? Why, for instance, speak of Austria? What had that got to do with the proposed guarantee pact? Why again introduce the question of Germany's entry into the League of Nations? The German Government recognised that it had received a friendly and conciliatory reply from the Council of the League,⁹ but it was still not satisfied in regard to article 16. Germany was not hostile to the League, but in her disarmed state, and before any disarmament at all had taken place in Europe, she was afraid of the obligations and the dangers to which article 16 would expose her. Why then introduce this disturbing element into the discussion of a proposal which came—he would repeat the phrase—as a voluntary declaration by Germany, as an addition to the Peace Treaty leaving the provisions of the treaty itself unaffected?

In reply, I told the Ambassador that I regretted as much as he did the delay which had unavoidably taken place in the presentation of our demands in respect of disarmament. I hoped that I should be in a position to instruct Lord Crewe in the course of the next day or two, and I was encouraged by the character of the reports made both by the Inter-Allied Military Commission and by the Versailles Committee¹⁰ to hope that the Allies might be agreed upon the presentation to Germany only of such demands as I was advised by my military experts here were indispensable for our security. If this was so, there would, as he had observed, be no difference in principle between us. There would remain only details to be adjusted, and in that case I thought a meeting of Ministers would be unnecessary. Even if we met, we should at once have to refer the consideration of these details to our experts on both sides, while the Ministers themselves would have nothing to do. If, then, I were right in my forecast, it would be best that the military experts should meet (possibly in Berlin) as soon as possible after the demands were presented. Incidentally I observed that I understood that it was now the opinion of the French Government, to which I had rallied, that we should comply with the German request for publication¹¹ of the report upon which our demands were founded, and that it should be communicated to them at the same time as our demands.

⁷ See No. 253.

⁹ See No. 261, Enclosure.

¹¹ See No. 594, below.

⁸ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

¹⁰ See Nos. 586, n. 1, 592 and 608, below.

The Ambassador interrupted me to enquire whether I meant that the evacuation should take place as soon as these demands were complied with. I said that upon this point all British Governments in succession, and I myself on more than one occasion, had spoken publicly and quite definitely, and His Majesty's Government had in no way changed their attitude.

Then as to the security negotiations. It would be idle to pretend that the election of Marshal Hindenburg⁴ had not produced a very unfavourable impression upon public opinion in this country as well as in France, and that sometimes in quite unexpected quarters. For instance, a prominent member of the Labour party who had been till recently very friendly to Germany and not a little hostile to France had observed to me a couple of days ago that the Marshal's election put an end to my policy of a guarantee pact. I myself did not take this view. I had, of course, read with close attention the report which I had received of the Chancellor's speech.² I had assumed, as the Ambassador has since told me, that that speech, made after the Marshal's election and after the Chancellor's visit to him,¹² carried the approval of the President-elect, and that he would support his Ministers. In these circumstances, I saw no reason to change my policy. I intended to proceed on the basis which I had hitherto adopted—that the German proposal⁸ was put forward in good faith and the German Government meant to carry it to a successful conclusion and to adhere scrupulously to it. No doubt the Marshal's election had produced an even worse effect on public opinion in France than on opinion here, and had greatly added to the difficulties of the French Government, but, as far as my knowledge went, it had not changed their policy, and I understood that they were considering, and hoped shortly to send to Berlin, their reply to the German memorandum.¹³ He had spoken of this as a *questionnaire*, and I knew that it had been so referred to in the papers. I had not seen it or even a draft of it, but I would not be too ready to assume that it necessarily took such a form. I disliked the term *questionnaire*, which seemed to me to sound a little forbidding. Quite possibly the reply might not take the form of questions but of a statement of the conditions upon which the Allies could proceed. In any case, I thought I could assure him that, whether it took the form of questions or not, it would be drawn up with a real desire that it might advance the negotiations, and not with any intention or wish of creating unnecessary difficulties either of form or of substance.

Then he had asked me, why introduce extraneous questions, such for instance as the position of Austria? Upon this I observed that, after what he had said, I thought there was no difference of principle between us, and the only question was to find the form which was easiest to us all. He had observed that the proposed pact was an addition to the treaty, not a variation of it. All that was necessary was to find some form of words

¹² At Hanover on April 28.

¹³ See No. 299.

which made it clear that Germany and the Allies were agreed that, in removing the danger of war from the west, they were not inviting or encouraging any revision of the treaties in other quarters. This ought not to be difficult, but his last observation had raised a real difficulty. I must tell him quite plainly that for His Majesty's Government, no less than for their allies, it had from the first been an essential condition of the conclusion of any mutual pact of guarantee that Germany should be willing to enter the League of Nations. I did not suggest, and I hoped that the French would not suggest, though I had no authority to speak for them, that Germany should enter the League as a condition preliminary to discussions; but it would be useless to carry on the pact discussions unless Germany was willing to enter the League if a pact were concluded. She need not be bound to enter the League unless the pact were concluded, but it would be idle to face all the difficulties and to thrash all the conditions of a pact if at the end of it all we were to be told that article 16 was an invincible obstacle, and that Germany must remain outside the League of Nations.

Upon this point the Ambassador and I argued backwards and forwards for some time without making any progress. I finally said that I thought it was useless to discuss that matter further. We could go on repeating our arguments on the one side or the other, but it seemed to me in the highest degree unlikely that the Council of the League would vary the answer which it had made, and I must repeat to him quite clearly that, as I have told Lord D'Abernon from the first,¹¹ it was a condition *sine quâ non* of the pact, for us no less than for France, that Germany should be ready if the pact was successfully negotiated to become a member of the League. It may be well that you should repeat this in any conversations which you may be having with the Chancellor or Foreign Minister, for unless the German Government clearly realise that on this point we can make no concession, our whole effort will be brought to naught.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ See Nos. 229 and 231.

No. 301

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

*No. 506 [C 5812/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 30, 1925*

Sir,

The Belgian Ambassador called this afternoon to express on his own behalf and, in the absence of M. Merry del Val,¹ on behalf of his

¹ The Spanish Ambassador, who was Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in London. He had

colleagues in the Diplomatic Corps, their profound regret at the death of Sir Eyre Crowe² and their sympathy with us. He spoke of his personal relations with Sir Eyre with a warmth of feeling which I find common to all those who were brought into close contact with him.

The Ambassador enquired what effect I anticipated that Marshal Hindenburg's election³ would have upon the proposals for a security pact. I read to him the summary just received from Mr. Addison of the Chancellor's speech to the representatives of German trade and industry, and of the newspaper comment upon it.⁴ Baron Moncheur seemed relieved, and observed that there would appear to be no reason to despair. I told him that for my part, whilst recognising that the choice of the German people had increased our difficulties with French and English public opinion, and no doubt with Belgian public opinion also, I was by no means certain that on merits it did not strengthen our position, for if the marshal loyally supported his Government as the Chancellor's speech indicated, he brought support to it from the quarter which was most valuable, and he spiked the guns of the Nationalist opponents to agreement. I myself thought that probably the majority of those who voted for the marshal were thinking of the internal rather than the external position of Germany, and that in making their choice they had voted for the man who seemed to give them the best guarantee for law and order at home. I understood from information I had received from Paris,⁵ as well as from my conversation yesterday with M. de Fleuriau,⁶ that the French Government intended to proceed with the drafting of their reply just as M. Herriot's Government had done before the presidential election. They might, perhaps, move with greater caution, but I did not understand that they contemplated any change of policy.

I then enquired of the Ambassador when his own country was again going to possess a Government.⁷ He observed that a distinguished Belgian Senator had recently remarked to him that the three parties in Belgium were like three goats on a narrow plank. None of them would give way, and unless they were careful all of them would fall into the water together. He did not anticipate that the crisis would be solved for another ten days, or perhaps even longer.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

been called to Spain by the illness of his mother.

² See No. 300, n. 1.

³ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

⁴ See No. 297.

⁵ In a letter from Lord Crewe, an undated copy of which, not printed, is to be found in F.O. 800, vol. 257, ff. 528-9.

⁶ See No. 299.

⁷ See No. 292, n. 6.

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 1533 [C 5904/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 2, 1925

My Lord,

[With reference to my despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin No. 797 of the 30th April¹ (copy of which is being sent to you in my despatch No. 1532 of today's date)² regarding a conversation with the German Ambassador, I transmit to you herewith a record of a conversation which I had last night with the French Ambassador concerning the policies of the German and the Polish Governments.]

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 302

Record by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the French Ambassador

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 2, 1925

After the dinner of the Anglo-French Association last night, I gave M. de Fleuriau an account of Herr Sthamer's conversation with me, particularly that part which referred to the meaning [and] effect of Marshal Hindenburg's election³ [and] the phrases in which Herr Sthamer set forth with emphasis that the German pact proposals were put forward as an addition to the Treaty of Versailles—not as a variation or amendment of it. I also told M. de Fleuriau of what had been said by Herr Sthamer [and] myself on the subject of Germany's entry into the League.

I took the opportunity of asking the French Ambassador whether he had had any recent news of the attitude of Poland. I had got an impression, which I could not trace to any definite facts or information, that Poland was endeavouring to seek support against Germany in Soviet Russia. If that were so, it seemed to me a suicidal policy for Poland [and] very much opposed to the interests of France [and] this country.

M. de F[leuriau] said he had not received any information to this effect, but he should not be surprised if it were so, for M. Benes had just been at Warsaw⁴ [and] M. Benes had always tried to get an anchor out to windward on the Russian side. But it would come to nothing—no negotiations with the Soviet ever did succeed.

A. C.

¹ No. 300.

³ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

² Not printed.

⁴ See No. 293, n. 1.

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 595 [C 5905/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 2, 1925

Sir,

Yesterday I exchanged ratifications of the Jubaland convention¹ with the Italian Ambassador.

I have recorded in a telegram to Lord Allenby² (repeated to Y[our] E[xcellency]) the Marquis Torretta's account of the present position of the negotiations with the Egyptian Gov[ernmen]t about the frontier of Cyrenaica [and] my reply.³

Passing from this subject after noting my advice [and] definitely ascertaining that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] felt themselves bound by the Milner-Scialoja agreement,⁴ H[is] E[xcellency] went on to describe the impression produced on the Italian Gov[ernmen]t by the election of Marshal Hindenburg.⁵ Certainly this election had some disagreeable aspects, but in the opinion of his gov[ernmen]t there was no reason why it should change our policy or interrupt the Pact negotiations.

I said that this was also our view [and], as I believed, the opinion of the French Gov[ernmen]t. I briefly indicated to him the character of the statement made to me by Herr Sthamer (my despatch No. [797] to [Berlin])⁶ [and] my reply, particularly those parts dealing with Germany's entry into the League of Nations [and] with the German Ambassador's reference to Austria [and] description of the Pact as an addition to, not a variation of, the Treaty of Versailles.

Before leaving, Marquis Torretta spoke feelingly of the loss which not we only but all who had been brought into relations with Sir Eyre Crowe, had suffered by his death.⁷

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ See No. 61, n. 5.

² High Commissioner for Egypt.

³ Foreign Office telegram No. 105 to Cairo of May 2 was repeated to Rome as No. 136, not printed. For Marquis Torretta's account of this part of the conversation, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 834.

⁴ Copies of the letters of April 10 and 13, 1920 between Signor V. Scialoja, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs November, 1919-June, 1920, and Lord Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies January, 1919-February, 1921, on the boundary between the British Kenya Colony and Italian Somaliland are filed at A 2123/1379/60 (1920), not printed. See *Survey of International Affairs 1924* (British Institute of International Affairs, London, 1928), pp. 464-5.

⁵ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

⁶ No. 300.

⁷ See No. 300, n. 2.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 4, 9 a.m.)

No. 185 Telegraphic [C 5969/459/18]

BERLIN, May 3, 1925, 8 p.m.

Stresemann has been laid up with influenza but was well enough to see me yesterday.

I found him rather troubled about political outlook. It is not so much that he fears difficulties from Hindenburg personally but that extreme right who have always been hostile to Stresemann will take advantage of Hindenburg's success¹ to challenge whole policy of conciliation. Their principal ground of attack will be security pact. The accusation will be made against Stresemann that by memorandum of February 9th² concessions dangerous to Germany were made while nothing has been obtained in exchange for these concessions. What is the use of renouncing all title to Alsace Lorraine if in return nothing is received? It is now three months since German offer was made and no official reply has come notwithstanding the fact that French Ambassador has twice promised an answer in a few days.

Stresemann is evidently nervous about Reichstag debate on security pact which will take place directly after installation of new president, i.e. about May 13th or 14th. In his view unless some more or less favourable response to German initiative is received before that date the debate will be difficult for German ministry.

I pointed out to Stresemann that delay in French reply was largely explained by the long crisis in France³ while the German election last Sunday⁴ was not at first sight conducive to expedite negotiations or reassure foreign opinion. He rejoined that while he had been opposed in the first instance to Hindenburg's candidature he now realised that a pact signed under authority of Hindenburg would be a far greater security for peace than a pact signed by Marx or by a socialist president.

Stresemann does not anticipate any opposition to security pact from Hindenburg himself. He says that the Field Marshal is disinterested in political questions and that he will certainly refuse to let himself become tool of extreme nationalists. When latter attempted a few days ago to foist upon him a pronounced anti-democrat as president's secretary he turned them neck and crop out of his house saying that he intended to appoint Meissner who must be a most faithful servant of the State since he had contrived to work during five years with Ebert.

Hindenburg's friends say that his main desire is not to hear long speeches or full explanations. He prefers a friendly cup to argumentative discussion and above all wants not to be troubled and to get to bed at 9.

¹ See No. 611, n. 1, below.

³ See No. 292, n. 5.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ See *ibid.*, n. 8 and 611, n. 2, below.

My general conclusion from conversation with Stresemann is that he is apprehensive about debates on security which will take place about mid-May unless before then German initiative has elicited a reply from the allies of which favourable use can be made in Reichstag discussion.

I gather that—contrary to current rumour—the co-operation between Luther and Stresemann is cordial.

No. 305

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 8)

[C 6250/35/18]

Personal and confidential

BERLIN, May 3, 1925

Dear Secretary of State,

Since my return here on Friday¹ I have made it my business to get in touch with as many sources of information as possible. The impression both in government and in diplomatic circles is that the election of Hindenburg² will not make any great immediate difference to the course of ministerial policy. The constitutional rights of the president are not considerable and both individual ministers and special departments, such as the Foreign Office, are extremely jealous of their respective prerogatives. Except when a ministry has been upset by a vote in the Reichstag, the president does not normally come much into the conduct of affairs.

Schubert, who is quite a cool judge of events, seems fairly confident and optimistic. Stresemann less so; he is undoubtedly alarmed at the hostility of the right, who accuse him of having done his best to prevent the Hindenburg candidature and having thus gone against what turned out a successful coup. Stresemann says that, if the election had taken place a week earlier, Hindenburg would not have been elected. According to him the actual result was due to excessive zeal on the part of the Jewish Marxites. He also told me that Hindenburg's original decision not to stand had been overcome by Tirpitz,³ who slipped off secretly to Hanover to talk the Marshal over, after his own party had acquiesced in foregoing the H[i]ndenburg. Stresemann rates the slyness and duplicity of Tirpitz extremely high.⁴

Public opinion here has followed more or less the same curve as public opinion in Europe. It began by thinking the Hindenburg election a great political change. It is now apathetic—perhaps unduly so.

As regards the Security Pact, there is unquestionably a certain silent majority in favour of it, and the Ministry are absolutely loyal to the

¹ May 1.

² See No. 611, n. 2, below.

³ Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy Department 1897–1916, he was a National People's Party member of the Reichstag.

⁴ Sir W. Tyrrell commented in the margin: 'With every good reason.'

proposal. But its supporters are mute and its opponents vocal. Stresemann, as protagonist of the pact, is the object of violent abuse from the extreme nationalists and, as I telegraphed today,⁵ he is himself evidently apprehensive about the coming debates. The security pact is, indeed, not a strong indigenous plant which will survive rough treatment. It is rather an exotic, of great value and beauty, which can be nursed by skill but which will perish if left out long in the cold.

Therefore the attitude of the Allies is of dominant importance, not only for the conclusion of an international agreement but for the survival of the policy in Germany.

While it may be impossible to obtain anything final from Paris of a definitely encouraging nature, I hope some response will be elicited which will give Stresemann a good case in debate: something in the spirit of your House of Commons speech of March 5.⁶

Regarding minor negotiations, everything appears likely to proceed smoothly. I find Schubert more confident regarding the passage of the commercial treaty⁷ than he was a month ago. He is also satisfactory regarding the import of coal and the reduction of the list of prohibited articles.

The representatives of the Air Ministry appear fully satisfied with what they obtained here.⁸

Regarding the League of Nations: I will not fail to make it quite clear that Germany's entry into the League is a *sine qua non* of the pact. I have, indeed, always held this line in conversation.

The Russians continue to make the most desperate efforts to prevent Germany joining the League. The German Ambassador at Moscow recently came to Berlin.⁹ It is asserted that his journey was undertaken at the special request of the Soviet in order to bring their views regarding Geneva before the Berlin Government.

Yours very sincerely,
D'ABERNON

⁵ See No. 304.

⁶ See No. 223, n. 2.

⁷ See No. 250, n. 3.

⁸ See No. 625, n. 4. below.

⁹ See No. 296.

No. 306

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 113 Telegraphic [C 5969/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 5, 1925, 1.15 p.m.

Lord D'Abernon's telegram No. 185.¹

I do not attach great importance to this picture of the situation which though less hopeful than I had hitherto been led to suppose may I think

¹ No. 304.

be no more than a natural desire on Stresemann's part to strengthen his hand for purposes of parliamentary debate. Nevertheless it is true that a good deal of time has elapsed without anything definite being said except by me and we ought not to let the pot cool. Please consider whether you might not usefully say a word to M. Briand, based upon the *substance* (but not the text) of Lord D'Abernon's telegram, to the effect that further delay may increase the internal difficulties of the German government and conceivably even prejudice the chances of success in the 'security' negotiations. I leave it to your discretion to decide whether such a démarche in Paris is likely to do more harm than good.

Repeated to Berlin No. 96.

No. 307

*Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received May 6, 9 a.m.)*

No. 57 Telegraphic [C 6093/459/18]

WARSAW, May 5, 1925, 8.49 p.m.

Following for Lampson:—

Your private letter of May 1st.¹

My despatches Nos. 205² and 218³ which have crossed your letter explain matter raised by Secretary of State.

It must be remembered that Polish public were much disturbed at raising in any form frontier question and their apprehensions were not allayed by speech of Secretary of State⁴ because its reassuring tendency was not made clear to them by press.

I doubt whether I can throw further light on the origin of the feeling which undoubtedly existed in the minds of Polish public but not of government, but please inform me if anything further is required.

¹ This ran as follows: 'The Secretary of State is somewhat puzzled by the remark made to you by Benes and reported in your telegram No. 51 of April 23rd [No. 293] that the Polish public had misunderstood his (Mr. Chamberlain's) speech of March 24th [see No. 269], and resented what they considered to be the British attitude in a question concerning Polish treaty rights.

'Now it is quite understandable that the Poles should be disturbed at His Majesty's Government having any truck with Germany, but granted that, the speech itself ought to have been, and was certainly meant to be, reassuring. In fact Mr. Chamberlain purposely used language taken almost verbally from Count Skrzynski's talk with him at Geneva [see No. 247], in the hope that by so doing he might allay Polish fears.

'I have accordingly been commissioned to ask you privately whether you can say what exactly it was in the speech that proved disturbing. Naturally Mr. Chamberlain does not want you to make a formal enquiry on the subject, but he would like your personal opinion for his confidential guidance.'

² No. 295.

³ Of April 29, not printed.

⁴ See No. 269.

No. 308

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 6, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 167 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6056/459/18]

PARIS, May 5, 1925

Lord D'Abernon's telegram No. 185.¹

Monsieur Sauerwein of the 'Matin' has been in Berlin during the presidential election,² and has now returned to Paris. For one whose anti-German sentiments are so strong, his impressions are not without interest. He testifies to President Hindenburg's great honesty, and seems inclined to think that he is not likely to take a very close interest in politics or diplomacy. Monsieur Sauerwein records a distinct feeling in Germany in the direction of a 'rapprochement' towards France. He urges the immediate necessity of replying to the German offer of a pact,³ and states that he knows that Herr Stresemann cannot wait much longer for the French answer. Herr Stresemann had told him that if there was no reply within the next week he would be obliged to make a speech to the effect that Germany had made an offer, but that nothing had come of it owing to the allies' suspicion of Germany and disagreement among themselves. Such a speech would have a serious effect upon the orientation of German policy. Monsieur Sauerwein intends to inform Monsieur Briand of his views, and seems completely convinced of the harm which would result if no early reply were sent to the German offer.

¹ No. 304.

² See Nos. 292, n. 8, and 611, n. 2, below.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

No. 309

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 9)

*No. 290 [C 6273/109/18]**

BERLIN, May 5, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I had a conversation this morning with the Secretary of State, in which I adverted to your statement to Herr Sthamer, in the conversation recorded in your despatch No. 797 of the 30th April,¹ that Germany's entry into the League is a *sine quâ non* of the pact.

2. Herr von Schubert fully recognised that this condition was absolute both on the part of England and on the part of France. He repeated what he has often said, namely, that it was very difficult for Germany altogether

¹ No. 300.

to abandon her reserves about article 16, but he felt convinced that, if the security pact went through, agreement would be come to regarding the entry of Germany into the League.

3. Two things are clear from the German attitude: First, that their suspicions are aroused because, from having opposed the entry of Germany into the League two years ago,² the French now make an absolute condition that Germany should enter. To the German mind this suggests some trap. They cannot understand how France has come round so completely, unless there is a hidden scheme which they cannot penetrate; they suspect that they are being led to Geneva to be massacred or maltreated. The argument is perhaps a childish one, but it has a certain effect even on the Socialists here, who have always been advocates of the League. Outside this there is grave preoccupation about flying in the face of Russia. As I have frequently reported,³ the Russians are fighting tooth and nail against Germany entering the League of Nations. They state that they would regard this as a definite alliance of Germany with forces and organisation which are fundamentally hostile to the present Russian Government. The Germans reply that no such intention is present in their minds; it suits their general policy to enter the League, and no hostility to Russia is intended.

4. One can understand that Germany does not wish to break altogether with Moscow, even if the results of Rapallo⁴ have been so disappointing. Preoccupation on this score has become somewhat more acute since the recent agreement between Poland and Czechoslovakia.⁵ The German view is that in all matters Czechoslovakia does not act except in fundamental unity with Moscow. If Czechoslovakia, notwithstanding antipathy to Poland, makes an agreement between Poland, this means that Polish relations with Russia are less inimical than usual, and that a combination of Russia with Poland in an anti-German sense is not so impossible as is usually believed.

5. Information received here by the Wilhelmstrasse⁶ is that the other members of the *petite Entente*, namely, Roumania and Jugoslavia, are by no means delighted with the new intimacy between Czechoslovakia and Poland. They fear that the traditional irresponsibility of the Poles may eventually lead the *petite Entente* into undesirable adventures.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

² See Vol. XXI, Nos. 319, 333 and 339.

³ Cf. Nos. 290 and 296.

⁴ See No. 211, n. 3.

⁵ See No. 126.

⁶ The Berlin street in which stood the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 7)

[C 6154/459/18]

Private

PARIS, May 5, 1925

My dear Austen,

I had been thinking of writing to you in any case today, and now that I have received your telegram No. 113¹ on the subject of Berlin Telegram No. 185 of May 3rd,² I must not delay doing so. I have been somewhat concerned myself at the silence of the French regarding the German offer,³ but I am afraid we are not in a very strong position to make representations to the Quai d'Orsay until we are able to concur in their reply on the subject of Military Control.⁴

As you know, the French have refused to disconnect the three topics of Disarmament under the Treaty, Evacuation of the Cologne Zone, and General Security, and they are able to point out that Berlin has at least an equal grievance in the silence of the Allies on these two overdue questions, while, if they were in process of being dealt with, the Germans would be less impatient for the French reply to their offer. Partly for this reason, and partly because the French are only now making a good recovery from the shock of Hindenburg's election,⁵ I do not think it would be wise for me to ask for an appointment with Briand simply to urge him to despatch his answer forthwith. If I see him in the course of a day or two, as I possibly may, I can lay some stress on the point in the course of conversation; and my view that to ask him for a special interview would be unwise is strengthened by what you will see in my telegram No. 167 of today,⁶ describing M. Sauerwein's intention of visiting the Quai d'Orsay. That gentleman's recent articles in the *Matin* have been interesting and encouraging reading, since, in spite of his name, he is by no means teutonic in ideas, and must, I think, have gone to Berlin with the imprecatory intentions of Balaam,⁷ and have sustained a similar conversion. I think it is very possible that his observations may have real effect on Briand's receptive mind. If it had been Poincaré, the impulse would have been in the contrary direction.

A propos of what I have said above, I hope we may get your final opinion on the Report of the Versailles Committee⁸ quite soon. Jules Cambon, who is never hurried or nervous, told me an evening or two ago that he thought it really important for us to get on with our job.

Yours sincerely,

CREWE

¹ No. 306.

² No. 304.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ See Nos. 604, 608-9, 613-4 and 620, below.

⁵ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

⁶ No. 308.

⁷ An Old Testament prophet who was asked to curse the Israelites, but who blessed them instead: see *Numbers*, chaps. XXII-IV.

⁸ See No. 608, below.

No. 311

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 7, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 170 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6112/459/18]

PARIS, May 6, 1925

My telegram No. 167 of May 5th.¹

This morning's 'Matin' publishes a statement to the effect that M. Briand is engaged upon drawing up a reply to the German proposals for a security pact.² This reply will not be the same as that drafted by M. Herriot.³ According to the 'Matin' the note will be signed in the course of this week.

¹ No. 308.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

³ No. 299.

No. 312

Sir E. Drummond (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received May 9)

[C 6279/459/18]

LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GENEVA, May 6, 1925

My dear Willie,

When Salter was in London a month ago he saw several people at the Foreign Office, including Cadogan¹ and Selby, and talked over the League aspects of the negotiations now proceeding on the Western Pact and the general security problem. He understood that it might be convenient for the Foreign Office to have any ideas we have at Geneva as to the way in which the negotiations on the Pact could be best adjusted to League interests and action, and as to what the League itself might usefully do this year. We have since talked over the questions involved here, and I think it may be useful to have the enclosed notes. As you will see, it is rather a list of various things we think might usefully be examined than a reasoned memorandum.

I presume that among the preoccupations of the British Government will be a desire:—

- (a) to arrange for the provisions of the Western Pact so that they shall be adjusted to League obligations and machinery, and operate as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, League engagements;
- (b) to give as much satisfaction to the Continental point of view as to arbitration and the principles of the Protocol² as is compatible with the fundamental principles of the British Government's policy as stated by Mr. Chamberlain;³
- (c) to avoid any risk of the same situation again arising this September⁴ as

¹ See No. 285.

³ See No. 240, n. 13.

² See No. 10, n. 4.

⁴ See No. 165, n. 4.

we have seen in the case of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance⁵ and the Protocol—i.e., the preparation and circulation of a detailed scheme which the British Government are afterwards obliged to reject.³ This means, in effect, I suppose, a careful consideration beforehand, doubtless with consultation of the Dominions, of the line to be taken by British Delegates in September, so that there will be no danger of them assenting to proposed engagements which the Government will be unable to accept. To some extent this can perhaps be secured by reference from the Delegation to London in the course of September, but can this be satisfactory unless the main lines of policy have been laid down beforehand?

The enclosed notes⁶ may be of some service in bringing to your attention a League point of view which will doubtless form a factor in the development of the British Government's policy. They were drafted before the Hindenburg election,⁷ but we have not thought that any change need be made because of that. I imagine the chief importance of that election on the negotiations is its effect upon French opinion and upon the rapidity with which it will be possible to conclude the arrangements. There are, of course, a number of vital questions, outside the provisions of the Pact itself, which may retard agreement—in particular the evacuation of Cologne and questions as to the Rhineland generally⁸—and if the reactions of the Hindenburg election further retard the time-table, there is obviously a very narrow margin of time if Germany is to enter the League in September. The notes are on the assumption that this is still possible—as it is obviously of the utmost importance.

I leave it entirely to you whether to shew the notes to the Secretary of State or not.

Yours ever,
ERIC DRUMMOND

⁵ See No. 282, n. 6.

⁷ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

⁶ Missing from the file.

⁸ See Chap. III, below.

No. 313

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

[C 6250/35/18]

Private and Personal

[FOREIGN OFFICE], May 7, 1925

My dear D'Abernon,

Many thanks for your letter of May 3rd,¹ which perhaps requires no comment from me at this stage except this. All my indications point to the

¹ No. 305.

fact that Briand means to negotiate seriously for a mutual guarantee, but that, as becomes his situation and is natural to the man, he will walk cautiously in view of French public opinion, and he must be allowed whatever time he requires. The only indications which I have had as to the possible nature of his reply when drafted were given me by Fleuriau,² and amounted only to this: first, that it was probable that Briand's reply would not take the form of a questionnaire but more probably of a positive statement of the French point of view, and, secondly, that Briand, who was very much attached to the Protocol³ and anxious to save whatever he could from its wreck, would be likely to go very far in the direction of compulsory arbitration. Clearly if Fleuriau is right, the second of these statements shows that Briand means business, whilst the first seems to me satisfactory, and certainly should be satisfactory to the Germans, since Sthamer took exception the other day to the idea of a questionnaire.⁴

As to Cologne and disarmament, I have at last sent off full instructions to Crewe.⁵ Don't allow the Germans to suppose that there has been any malice in the delay. As I said yesterday in the House of Commons,⁶ the last part of it at any rate and the most avoidable was due to me and not to them, since the Ambassadors' Conference had to adjourn owing to Crewe being without instructions.⁷

Yours sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

² See No. 299.

⁴ See No. 300.

⁶ See 183*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 915-6.

³ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 620, n. 5, below.

⁷ See No. 608, n. 13, below.

No. 314

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 11)

*No. 293 [C 6407/2690/18]**

BERLIN, May 7, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, on receipt of your despatch No. 504 of the 19th March,¹ I did not fail to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government could not see their way to accept any arrangement between the French and German Governments which would place British goods generally in a disadvantageous position on the German market as compared with similar goods from Alsace and Lorraine.²

¹ This covered a copy of a Board of Trade letter of March 12 to the Foreign Office, not printed.

² See No. 221, n. 1.

2. I have now received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a reply, which gives the assurance desired by His Majesty's Government. I have the honour to transmit a translation of this note herewith.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 314

Translation

M. [von] Schubert to Lord D'Abernon

BERLIN, April 30, 1925

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you, with reference to your note of the 25th March³ regarding the preferential treatment of certain products of Alsace-Lorraine, that the German Government has no intention of making proposals to His Britannic Majesty's Government for a limitation of the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment.

I avail, etc.,
SCHUBERT

³ Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 315

Note by Sir C. Hurst on Compulsory Arbitration and a Security Pact with France

[C 7182/459/18]

May 9, 1925

There is one aspect of the question of compulsory arbitration to which I should like to draw attention in connection with any pact for the security of France.

One of the risks to be faced by any democratic government which gives a pledge to bring its forces to the support of another state is that when the moment comes the people may not respond and the government may not be able to fulfil its contract.

A democracy does not fight unless it is moved. I admit that Great Britain will probably always redeem its pledges, but a five Power Pact should be so framed as to ensure that all the contracting parties, and not one only, will fulfil their obligations.

If at the moment when a pledge to come to the support of another state has to be fulfilled the people refuse to move, it will almost certainly be due to one or other or both of two causes, a feeling on the part of the public that: (a) they have no interest in the quarrel which has led to the attack on

the Power guaranteed (b) the Power to which the guarantee has been given is not in the right in the quarrel which has broken out.

The first is a matter which can only be considered at the moment when the guarantee is given. For Great Britain it is not a difficulty which would be likely to arise in connection with such a security pact as is now proposed, as a guarantee for the security of the countries bordering on the western frontiers of Germany covers the low countries and the channel ports, and I understand that it has always been a principle of British policy that these shall not pass under the domination of a great military power.

It is in connection with (b), the second reason given above, that arbitration in its wider sense—the submission of the dispute to independent and impartial examination—may play a useful part. If the dispute has been subjected to such examination and the party calling for British support is shown to be in the right, there is much less chance of the British public not standing loyally behind the government. The converse is equally true. In a case where Great Britain has been found after such impartial examination of the dispute to be in the right, the other contracting parties would have no excuse for backing out of their engagements.

The incidents of 1922 and 1923 afford a good illustration. M. Poincaré pursued a policy against Germany in the latter year¹ of which H[is] M[ajesty's] Government disapproved and which they believed to be inconsistent with the Treaty of Versailles. They asked for the legal point to be referred to the Permanent Court at The Hague.² M. Poincaré refused.³ If the Cannes proposals for a pact⁴ had materialised and H[is] M[ajesty's] Government had been bound in 1923 to support France in the event of hostilities supervening, it would have gone hard with the government to induce the British public to fulfil its guarantee.

It might be well to include in the draft security pact a provision binding the parties to submit to arbitration any dispute which might bring the obligations of the pact into operation, and relieving any party from its obligation to come to the support of another party unless that other party had referred the dispute to arbitration or had offered to do so; arbitration being taken to mean reference to the Permanent Court, if the issue was a justiciable one, and reference to an impartial commission of enquiry if it was not justiciable.

C. J. B. H.

¹ i.e. the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (see Vol. XXI, Chap. I).

² In a note of August 11, 1923, to the French and Belgian Governments (see *ibid.*, No. 330).

³ In a note of August 20, not printed. See *ibid.*, No. 337.

⁴ For the proposed British guarantee to France against German aggression, see Vol. XIX, Nos. 1, 10 and 11. It was discussed by M. Briand and Mr. Lloyd George at the Conference of Cannes which met January 6–13, 1922 (see Vol. XIX, Chap. I). See also *Cmd. 2169*, *op. cit.*, Part II.

Draft Security Pact suggested by Sir C. Hurst

[C 6579/459/18]*

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 12, 1925

Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany,

Realising the need of satisfying the desire for security of the peoples upon whom fell the brunt of the fighting in the war of 1914–18,

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium¹ and conscious of the necessity of stabilising the territorial *status quo* in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts,

Determined so far as possible to render resort to war unnecessary by promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes between them which may affect the tranquillity of their territories in Western Europe,

Have agreed as follows:—

1. The high contracting parties solemnly affirm the obligation which is incumbent upon each of them to abstain from any hostile measures or attack directed against any one or more of the other contracting States.

2. The high contracting parties severally undertake that, in the event of a contracting State directing a hostile attack against the territory in Europe of another contracting State, they will each of them to the utmost of their power assist by force of arms in repelling the attack. They also severally undertake that they will not tolerate any modification by force of the existing frontiers of the contracting States in Western Europe.

3. The high contracting parties declare their intention of respecting and faithfully observing the provisions of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles.

In the event of any violation of those articles being established, the high contracting parties severally undertake that they will each of them take such measures, including if necessary, the use of naval, military and air forces, as the Council of the League of Nations may consider necessary.

4. If any question should arise as to whether any action taken by one of the contracting States constitutes a hostile measure or attack within the meaning of article 1, or a hostile attack within the meaning of article 2, or a violation of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Council of the League shall forthwith, at the request of any contracting State, take the question under consideration, and shall be entitled to make such enquiries as may be necessary to establish the facts.

5. Disputes between any two or more of the high contracting parties which cannot be settled by negotiation, and which, if they led to a rupture,

¹ These treaties of April 19, 1839 (see No. 22, n. 3 and *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 27, pp. 1000–02, for the treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia and Belgium) had been abrogated by Article 31 of the Treaty of Versailles.

might bring into operation the provisions of article 2, shall be referred to arbitration or to judicial settlement.

No high contracting party shall be entitled to call upon another high contracting party for assistance or support in pursuance of article 2 unless it has referred, or has offered to refer, to arbitration or judicial settlement the dispute which led to the hostile attack.

6. Nothing in this treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of the contracting States as members of the League of Nations, nor shall it prejudice the power and the duty of the League to take, in accordance with the provisions of the covenant, any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

7. No State shall be entitled to claim the benefits of this treaty unless it is a member of the League of Nations.

8. This treaty shall not come into force unless and until it has been approved by the Parliaments of the contracting States.

9. If any of the British Dominions or India gives notice within a period of _____ from the ratification of this treaty that it is unable to accept articles 2 and 3 of this treaty, the provisions of those articles shall not be binding on that Dominion, or on India as the case may be.

No. 317

Notes by Sir C. Hurst on his suggested Draft of May 12, 1925, for a Security Pact¹

[C 6579/459/18]*

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 13, 1925

Preamble

1. The Netherlands have been omitted as a party. It would be easy to add Holland as a party if and when she consents to participate.

2. The point made in Mr. Headlam-Morley's memorandum² has been borne in mind in the first two paragraphs of the preamble. His point was that the guarantee limited to the frontiers on the west ought not to be allowed to diminish the moral value of the peace treaty settlement on the eastern side of Germany. The first paragraph, therefore, lays stress on the fact that the western people have suffered most. The second paragraph brings in Mr. Headlam-Morley's idea that the abrogation of the 1839 treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium³ should be made the occasion of the guarantee treaty now concluded. The last part of paragraph 2 is a veiled reference to the British policy that the *status quo* must be maintained in the low countries.

¹ No. 316.

² Of March 10, 1925, not printed. See No. 180, n. 6.

³ See No. 316, n. 1.

Article 1

3. The obligation not to resort to aggressive war is already embodied in the covenant, but war is allowed by the covenant in certain circumstances, *e.g.*, self-defence. To be satisfactory article 1 must steer a middle course. It must not appear merely to repeat what is already binding on members of the League or it weakens the authority of the covenant. On the other hand, if it went further than the covenant and prohibited war altogether, a saving clause would have to be introduced. The language in its present form is justified by the fact that Germany is not yet a member. The words 'measures or' are probably superfluous, and it might be better that the sentence should read 'abstain from any hostile attack upon'.

Article 2

4. As drafted, this article applies reciprocally between each of the contracting parties and not merely between the Allies on one side and Germany on the other. It guarantees Belgium against France as much as against Germany.

Article 3

5. This article replaces in effect the Defence of France Treaties of 1919,⁴ which never came into force by reason of America's failure to ratify the treaty with her, but the article is so phrased as to eliminate the doubt which now arises as to the correct interpretation of article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles.⁵ Article 44 has been interpreted in France and in Italy as

⁴ See No. 185, n. 1.

⁵ In a note of May 5, Sir C. Hurst had stated '... article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles ... says that Germany, by violating the provisions of article 43, shall be regarded as committing a "hostile act" against the signatories of the treaty. ...

'War necessarily involves a state of belligerency between two parties. Suppose Germany violates article 43 and assembles an armed force in the demilitarised zone, thereby committing a "hostile act", with whom is she at war? Who is the other party? According to article 44, it must be the whole body of Allies, if anyone—Panamá just as much as France. ... The violation by Germany of article 43 consists of an act taking place wholly within her own territory and involving no application of force against another State. ... The application of force against another State is of the essence of war.

'Suppose the Allied Powers reply to Germany's violation of article 43 by hostilities. Which of the two parties—Germany or the Allies—is the one which went to war, *i.e.*, which established the state of belligerency? My fear is that an arbitration tribunal would hold that it was the Allies, because Germany's act, though hostile (*i.e.*, one which the Allies may legitimately reply to by hostilities), does not of itself create the state of war. The arbitration tribunal might, therefore, hold that it was the Allies which had resorted to war.

'Now, the Allies, as members of the League, are all under covenant not to resort to war except after pursuing certain methods prescribed by the covenant for securing a peaceful solution of the difficulty. If the Allies replied to a violation of article 43 by Germany by immediate hostilities, I fear that an arbitration tribunal might hold that they, not Germany, had resorted to war. If so, the Allies must, before they reply to Germany by hostilities, pursue the methods prescribed by the covenant for securing a peaceful solution of the difficulty. This is what I meant when I wrote ... that I doubted whether article 44 did more than bring into play the provisions of the covenant. In the case under consideration, it must be either Germany, by her violation of article 43, or the Allies, which have resorted to war.

meaning that a violation of article 42 or 43 automatically creates a state of war and thereby justifies immediate action by France and obliges the rest of the Allies to march with France. If that is the correct interpretation, the Council of the League has little or no scope left for action which may avert the catastrophe of a general conflagration. Any such interpretation lays a heavier burden upon Great Britain than the Defence of France of 1919 laid upon her, for under that treaty Great Britain was only pledged to come to France's support in the event of 'an unprovoked movement of aggression' against her by Germany. This article as drafted makes the right of the Council of the League to interfere plain and obliges the contracting parties to take only such action as the council may recommend.

Article 4

6. The advantage of laying stress upon the right of the Council of the League to intervene in case of any alleged violation of article 43 is that that article is so wide in its terms as to make it very likely that cases will occur in which it is difficult to say whether or not the article has been violated. Somebody must decide the point. It would not be safe to leave the decision wholly in the hands of a Power which wishes to resort to extreme measures.

Article 5

7. This article introduces compulsory arbitration for disputes which might bring the guarantee clauses into operation. The second paragraph is intended to eliminate any risk of one country being called upon under the guarantee to support another in respect of a dispute as to which it has doubts whether the party to be supported is in the right.

Article 6

8. This article is intended to meet any criticism to the effect that the new arrangement will undermine the position of the League.

Article 7

9. Article 7 is an attempt to meet the difficulty caused by Germany's hesitation to enter the League. The effect of the clause as drafted is that German delay in entering the League need not hinder the conclusion of the new pact nor hinder its coming into force, but would prevent Germany getting any benefit under it until she entered the League.

Article 8

10. Article 8 is on the lines of article 4 of the Defence of France Treaty of 1919.⁴ That treaty was to be submitted to Parliament for approval before ratification.

If it is Germany, the state of belligerency must have been in existence from the date of the violation. The wording of article 44 does not support this view. Germany's act is to be regarded as "calculated to disturb the peace of the world", not as having already broken it. . . .'

Article 9

11. Article 9 is an attempt to meet the Dominion difficulty. The Dominion problem in this case is intricate. In the matter of peace and war the Empire is a unit. Great Britain cannot go to war without involving the whole Empire. If Great Britain rallies to the support of France and resorts to war for the purpose, the whole Empire becomes a belligerent. His Majesty's Government are pledged by the treaty resolutions of 1923⁶ not to sign a treaty affecting the whole Empire without the participation of the Dominions. The problem of French security presses, and to obtain Dominion concurrence in a guarantee treaty may take a deal of time. In 1919 the Defence of France Treaty was to impose no obligation upon the Dominions until it had been approved by the Parliament of the Dominion concerned. It is most unlikely that the Dominion Parliament at Dublin, not to mention Ottawa and Cape Town, would join in the new pact. The best way out of the difficulty seems to be a clause which shall impose on the dominion concerned the obligation of coming forward and declining to bear any part of the burdens of this new treaty. It is only articles 2 and 3 which impose any burden upon the Dominion Governments which are not already imposed upon all members of the League, except perhaps the arbitration clause, but in this case that is only a diminution of the burdens imposed by articles 2 and 3.

12. No time limit is embodied in the treaty. It would be difficult to fix any period of time which would be satisfactory. Articles 42-44 of the Treaty of Versailles are permanent clauses, and it would be an advantage that the new treaty should last as long as those articles, particularly article 44, are in force.

13. No accession clause is provided. If other States were to be allowed to become parties, it would increase the burdens imposed on His Majesty's Government. If Holland is willing to come in at all, she should be added as a party.

C. J. B. H.

⁶ These had been passed at the Imperial Conference held in London October 1-November 8, 1923. See Cmd. 1987, *Imperial Conference 1923: Summary of Proceedings*. . . (H.M.S.O., 1923), pp. 13-15.

No. 318

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 14)

No. 1126¹ [C 6493/459/18]

Immediate

PARIS, May 13, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a copy of the draft note

¹ The text of this despatch and its enclosure is to be found in Cmd. 2435, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-8.

proposed to be sent by the French Government to the German Government in reply to the latter's memorandum of February 9th.²

In forwarding this document to me, the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that Monsieur de Fleuriau had been instructed to hand a copy of it to you.³

I have, etc.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 318

Projet de réponse au Mémorandum allemand

12 Mai 1925

Ainsi qu'il en a informé le Gouvernement allemand par sa note du 20 Février dernier,⁴ le Gouvernement français a étudié, en commun avec ses alliés, les suggestions contenues dans le mémorandum qui lui a été remis le 9 février par Son Excellence M. von Hoesch.

Le Gouvernement français et ses alliés ont vu dans la démarche du Gouvernement allemand la manifestation de préoccupations pacifiques qui s'accordent avec les leurs.

Désireux de donner à tous les Etats intéressés, dans le cadre du Traité de Versailles, des garanties supplémentaires de sécurité, ils ont examiné les propositions allemandes avec toute l'attention qu'elles comportent, en vue d'apprécier les éléments qu'elles peuvent fournir pour consolider la paix.

Il est apparu toutefois qu'avant d'aborder l'examen de fond de la note allemande, il convenait de mettre en pleine lumière les questions qu'elle soulève ou peut soulever et sur lesquelles il importe de connaître les vues du Gouvernement allemand, un accord préalable à leur égard apparaissant comme la base nécessaire de toute négociation ultérieure.

I

Le mémorandum ne fait mention qu'incidemment de la Société des Nations.

Or, les Etats alliés sont membres de la Société des Nations et liés par le Pacte de la Société qui comporte pour eux des droits et des obligations nettement définis, en vue du maintien de la paix générale.

Les propositions allemandes se réclament sans doute du même idéal, mais un accord ne pourrait être réalisé sans que l'Allemagne, de son côté, assume les obligations et jouisse des droits prévus par le Pacte de la Société.

Cet accord ne peut donc se concevoir que si l'Allemagne entrait (translation pp. 8-10). The text of the enclosure is also printed in *Pacte de Sécurité* . . . , op. cit., pp. 5-6.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

³ See No. 322, below.

⁴ See Nos. 208, n. 3 and 209.

elle-même dans la Société des Nations dans les conditions spécifiées par la lettre du Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 13 [sic] mars 1925.⁵

II

La recherche des garanties de sécurité que le monde réclame ne saurait comporter de novation aux Traités de Paix.

Les accords à conclure ne devraient donc ni impliquer une révision de ces Traités, ni aboutir dans la pratique à la modification des conditions spécifiées pour l'application de certaines de leurs clauses.

C'est a[insi] que, en tout état de cause, les alliés ne sauraient renoncer au droit de s'opposer à toute inobservation des stipulations de ces Traités, même si ces stipulations ne les concernent pas directement.

III

Le mémorandum du 9 février envisage d'abord la conclusion entre les 'Puissances intéressées au Rhin' d'un pacte qui pourrait s'inspirer des principes suivants:

1. Répudiation de toute idée de guerre entre les Etats contractants.
2. Respect rigoureux du statu quo territorial des régions rhénanes avec garantie conjointe et séparée des Etats contractants.
3. Garantie par les Etats contractants de l'exécution des obligations relatives à la démilitarisation des territoires rhénans résultant pour l'Allemagne des Articles 42 et 43 du Traité de Versailles.

Le Gouvernement français ne méconnaît pas l'intérêt que présenterait pour la cause de la paix, à côté de l'affirmation renouvelée des principes inscrits dans le Traité, la répudiation solennelle de toute idée de guerre (engagement qui ne devrait d'ailleurs comporter aucune limite de temps) entre les Etats contractants.

Parmi ceux-ci doit évidemment figurer la Belgique, qui n'est pas expressément nommée dans le mémorandum allemand, et qui devrait être partie au Pacte au titre d'Etat intéressé directement.

Il va de soi également, et il résulte d'ailleurs du silence observé à cet égard par le mémorandum allemand, que le Pacte qui serait conclu sur ces bases ne saurait affecter les clauses du Traité relatives à l'occupation des territoires rhénans, ni l'exécution des conditions stipulées à cet égard dans l'Arrangement rhénan.

IV

Le Gouvernement allemand se déclare ensuite disposé à conclure avec la France, ainsi qu'avec les autres Etats partie au Pacte rhénan, des traités d'arbitrage garantissant 'une décision paisible des conflits juridiques et politiques'.

La France considère que de tels traités d'arbitrage formeraient le complément naturel du Pacte rhénan. Mais il doit être bien entendu qu'ils s'appliqueraient à tous les conflits de quelque nature qu'ils soient, et ne laisseraient place à une action coercitive qu'en cas d'inobservation des

⁵ See No. 261, Enclosure.

stipulations des divers traités et accords envisagés dans la présente note. Pour donner à ces traités une pleine efficacité, leur observation devrait être assurée par la garantie conjointe et individuelle des Puissances participant d'autre part à la garantie territoriale inscrite dans le Pacte rhénan.

V

Le Gouvernement allemand a ajouté dans son mémorandum qu'il était prêt à conclure, avec tous les Etats qui s'y montreraient disposés, des traités d'arbitrage du même genre.

Les Gouvernements alliés prennent acte avec satisfaction de cette assurance. Ils estiment même qu'à défaut de semblables accords entre l'Allemagne et ceux de ses voisins qui, sans être partie au Pacte rhénan projeté, sont signataires du Traité de Versailles, le but visé par ce Pacte rhénan ne pourrait être atteint ni la paix de l'Europe complètement garantie.

Les Etats alliés ont, en effet, de par la Pacte de la Société des Nations et les Traités de Paix, des droits auxquels ils ne sauraient renoncer et des obligations dont ils ne sauraient s'affranchir.

Ces traités d'arbitrage ainsi conçus auraient la même portée que ceux envisagés au paragraphe IV et seraient avalisés par les mêmes garanties conjointes et individuelles.

VI

Dans l'esprit du Gouvernement français, la garantie générale de sécurité nécessaire au maintien de la paix ne saurait être efficacement assurée que si les accords envisagés dans la présente note forment un ensemble indivisible.

Il estime donc que tous les accords, dont la signature des mêmes Puissances sanctionnerait l'observation, devraient être coordonnés dans une convention générale enregistrée par la Société des Nations et placés sous ses auspices, et qui pourrait être du reste, comme l'indique le mémorandum allemand, le noyau d'un entente pacifique plus générale encore.

Il va de soi enfin que si les Etats-Unis croyaient pouvoir s'associer aux accords qui seraient ainsi réalisés, la France ne pourrait qu'être heureuse de voir la grande nation américaine participer à cette œuvre de paix générale et de sécurité.

Tels sont les principaux points sur lesquels il a paru nécessaire de connaître avec précision les vues du Gouvernement allemand.

Les Gouvernements alliés seraient heureux de recevoir à ce sujet une réponse qui permette d'engager une négociation ayant pour but la conclusion d'accords constituant pour la paix une garantie nouvelle et efficace.

Draft suggested by Central Department as basis for a Security Pact

[C 6580/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 13, 1925

Belgium, the British Empire, France, Germany (? Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland),

Realising the need of satisfying the desire for security of the peoples upon whom fell the brunt of the fighting in the war of 1914-18,

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium¹ and conscious of the necessity of stabilising the territorial *status quo* in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts,

Determined so far as possible to render resort to war unnecessary by promoting the peaceful settlement of dispute between them which may affect the tranquillity of their territories in Western Europe,

Have agreed as follows:—

I

The high contracting parties hereby enter into a solemn obligation not to wage war against each other.

II

The high contracting parties severally and collectively guarantee the maintenance and inviolability (save as affected by Part XIV, section 1, of the Treaty of Versailles) of the national frontiers between France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other (Q[uer]y., add Luxemburg and Holland) as they exist at the date of the signature of the present agreement.

III

The high contracting parties hereby declare their intention of respecting and faithfully observing the provisions of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles.

IV

Any act which shall be held by any signatory Power to be contrary to articles 2 or 3 of this agreement shall at once be brought by that Power to the notice of the Council of the League of Nations, which shall forthwith take the question under consideration and shall be entitled to make such enquiry as may be necessary in order to establish the facts.

V

In the event of any violation of articles 2 or 3 being established by or to the satisfaction of the Council of the League of Nations, the council shall

¹ See No. 316, n. 1.

have power to absolve the high contracting parties from their obligation under article 1.

VI

The high contracting parties severally undertake that they will each of them take all means in their power to uphold articles 2 and 3; including resort to force, subject to the authorisation of the Council of the League as provided in article 5.

VII

Save for defensive measures within its own territory, no high contracting party shall be entitled to resort to force against any other high contracting party, for the purpose of upholding articles 2 or 3 of this agreement unless authorised by the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with article 5; and no high contracting party shall be entitled to assistance or support from any other high contracting party unless it shall have appealed to the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with article 5.²

VIII

Nothing in this treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties as members of the League of Nations, nor shall it prejudice the power and the duty of the League to take, in accordance with the provisions of the covenant, any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

IX

This treaty shall not come into force unless and until it has been approved by the Parliaments of the high contracting parties.

X

If any of the British Dominions or India gives notice within a period of from the ratification of this treaty that it is unable to accept article 2 of this treaty, the provisions of that article shall not be binding on the Dominion, or on India, giving such notice.³

² A marginal note (see n. 3 below) has not been preserved in the Confidential Print.

³ In a note of May 13 on this draft, Sir C. Hurst commented: '1. *Article 1*. If the guarantee is to be limited to the frontiers between Germany on the one side and France and Belgium on the other as proposed in article 2 of the departmental draft, article 1 is unnecessary.

'2. Though article 1 looks imposing, it adds nothing to the obligations which are already binding on a Member of the League, and Germany, I understand, is to join the League [see Nos. 195, 211, 219, 229, 232, 241, 250, 261, 290, 296 and 309]. The article must be read in conjunction with articles 5 and 8. Presumably article 8 saves the rights of any state which is a party to the new pact to wage war when the Covenant allows it, i.e. defensive war, sanctions and, perhaps—the disputed point—as to matters of domestic jurisdiction. Article 5 gives the League a dispensing power, absolving a state from observing article 1 where there is a breach of article 2 or 3.

'3. *Article 2*. This article which guarantees the inviolability of the frontiers between Germany and the west will give rise to difficulty with the French in connection with §18 of Annex 2 to the Reparation Section [of the Treaty of Versailles]. It would put an end to any

right which France alleges that she now possesses under that paragraph to occupy German territory for a reparation default. This right disappeared in fact under the Dawes arrangements of 1924 [see No. 27, n. 8], but I am not sure that France would be willing to sign an instrument which pledged her not to repeat the Ruhr occupation [of 1923: see Vol. XXI, Chap. 1]. The language employed leaves it a little uncertain whether what is being guaranteed is the territory or the frontier.

'4. *Article 7.* Opposite the last part of the article there is a marginal note that it embodies the same idea as article 5 of my draft, but this is a mistake. The purpose of my article 5 was to ensure that there should be some impartial examination of the dispute out of which the quarrel arose. This is not achieved by an enquiry under article 5 of the departmental draft as to whether or not a violation of articles 2 and 3 has been committed.

'5. Cutting out the arbitration clause necessitates the cutting out also of the third paragraph of the preamble.'

No. 320

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 18)

*No. 304 [C 6624/459/18]**

BERLIN, May 13, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the 11th May in which he discussed the present position of current negotiations.

2. His first point was to express great apprehension about the debate in the Reichstag on the budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He thought that Stresemann's pact initiative¹ had not yet met with a sufficiently favourable response, and that Stresemann might meet with considerable opposition and criticism.

3. I replied that I had already set forth the Reichstag position to the Secretary of State,² who had taken action in the matter.³ I did not consider anything further would be expedient at the present moment.

4. Herr von Schubert went on to say that he had received reports from German representatives, both at Warsaw and at Prague, regarding recent negotiations between Poland and Czechoslovakia. He was informed that three conventions had been arrived at, one concerning arbitration, the second concerning commercial and industrial matters, and the third on certain technical points. It was further reported to him that outside these three agreements some further secret understanding had been arrived at. Regarding this, he has given me a confidential memorandum, which forms the enclosure to my despatch No. 303 of today's date.⁴

5. There were many objections to these secret agreements between Germany's neighbours. The first was that, essentially, they were directed against Germany. The second was that they aggravated the apprehensions

¹ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See Nos. 306 and 308.

² See No. 304.

⁴ No. 126.

of those who feared that when Germany came to Geneva she would find several Powers secretly in league against her. The most absurd and exaggerated rumours regarding this were now in circulation in Berlin, involving not only the minor Powers, but the Great Powers.

6. It was also unfortunate that such frequent reference was made to the 'Anschluss' with Austria. This proceeded apparently from Dr. Benes. As a matter of fact, no one in a responsible position at Berlin had any idea of raising the 'Anschluss' problem now. It may have been mentioned in some election speeches—in fact, Marx did mention it—but that was very different from the Government taking it up. In Germany there was considerable hostility to the idea, and this hostility was particularly marked among the parties of the Right. These parties feared that the addition of Austria to the voting forces of Germany would give a clear majority to the Centre and the Left, and would unduly increase the Catholic vote. The unpopularity of the 'Anschluss' in Protestant Prussia had not been adequately realised in England or France.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

No. 321

Memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain for the Cabinet

C.P.245(25) [C 6654/459/18]

Secret Most Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 14, 1925

It will be noticed that while the French draft¹ is in the form of a note to the German Government from the French Government alone and not from the Allies jointly, it is written as though the French Government were replying not on their own account alone but on behalf of their Allies also. We can of course only allow this to pass if we are fully in agreement with the contents of the draft.

The general spirit of the document seems to me eminently satisfactory, but some passages in it raise questions of principle of great importance upon which I must ask for a Cabinet decision.

1. It will be observed that Sections 5 and 6 propose that the arbitration treaties to be concluded between Germany and her eastern neighbours should receive the same joint and several guarantee as the treaty relating to the western frontier; that both the treaties of the west and of the east should be co-ordinated in one general Convention placed under the auspices of the League of Nations, and it is suggested that they might serve as the nucleus of a still more general pacific understanding.

This seems to me open to two objections. It would appear to involve us in new guarantees of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and this I take to be

¹ See No. 318, Enclosure.

clearly contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government. Further, the suggestion that this would be only a nucleus of a still wider Entente carries us back to the Protocol² and would seem to imply a readiness to undertake in the future obligations that we have hitherto refused to assume.³ I circulate another copy of the French Note showing how these paragraphs could be amended⁴ to meet what I conceive to be the British view, namely, that we should welcome the conclusion of such agreements between Germany and her eastern neighbours, but that we are not ourselves prepared to take in respect of those countries any obligations additional to those which are incumbent on us as members of the League of Nations and signatories of the Covenant. There is here a difference of policy between the French and British Governments, but it will be seen that, if the French are willing to concede our point, there is no difficulty in adjusting their note to our point of view.

2. Paragraph 4 of the French draft raises much more difficult questions. In the first place, it would seem, as I pointed out to the French Ambassador,⁵ to say that every question arising between the signatories of the pact is to be referred to arbitration except failures to observe the stipulations of the different treaties and agreements contemplated in the Note. This is an obscure phrase which the French Ambassador was unable to interpret. It is, I think, a reasonable and a necessary condition of the

² See No. 10, n. 4.

³ See No. 240, n. 13.

⁴ The text as amended read as follows: 'V

'Le Gouvernement allemand a ajouté dans son mémorandum qu'il était prêt à conclure, avec tous les États qui s'y montreraient disposés, des traités d'arbitrage du même genre.

'Les Gouvernements alliés prennent acte avec satisfaction de cette assurance. Ils estiment même qu'à défaut de semblables accords entre l'Allemagne et ceux de ses voisins qui, sans être partie au Pacte rhénan projeté, sont signataires du Traité de Versailles, le but visé par ce Pacte rhénan ne pourrait être atteint ni la paix de l'Europe complètement garantie.

'Les États alliés ont, en effet, de par le Pacte de la Société des Nations et les Traités de Paix, des droits auxquels ils ne sauraient renoncer et des obligations dont ils ne sauraient s'affranchir.

'Ces traités d'arbitrage ainsi conçus auraient le même portée que ceux envisagés au paragraphe IV *and would be backed by corresponding guarantees by the States concerned who are not parties to the Rhineland Pact. It would also be open to any of the States parties to the Rhineland Pact to join in these guarantees should they so desire.*

'VI

'Dans l'esprit du Gouvernement français, la garantie générale de sécurité nécessaire au maintien de la paix ne saurait être *complètement* assurée que si les accords envisagés dans la présente note *are signed and come into force all together, are enregistrés* par la Société des Nations et *placés* sous ses auspices.

'Il va de soi, enfin, que si les États-Unis croyaient pouvoir s'associer aux accords qui seraient ainsi réalisés, la France ne pourrait qu'être heureuse de voir la grande nation américaine participer à cette œuvre de paix générale et de sécurité.

'Tels sont les principaux points sur lesquels il a paru nécessaire de connaître avec précision les vues du Gouvernement allemand.

'Les Gouvernements alliés seraient heureux de recevoir à ce sujet une réponse qui permette d'engager une négociation ayant pour but la conclusion d'accords constituant pour la paix une garantie nouvelle et efficace.'

⁵ See No. 322, below.

pact that it should be founded upon the present treaty position and that it should not be open to Germany to claim arbitration on a demand for an alteration of the Treaty of Versailles. But if we are to have a pact with so wide an arbitration clause, can we simultaneously exclude from arbitration a question of fact as to whether an infraction of that treaty has or has not taken place.

But this section involves an even larger question. Subject to what I have just said, it proposes arbitration on all disputes arising between the countries signatories of the pact, and the problem immediately arises whether we are prepared to agree to universal arbitration as between ourselves and these countries, and, if not, what limitations we are to propose.

It will be seen that this is not only a question of first-class importance, but one of very considerable delicacy. We have hitherto resisted any proposal for an arbitration which was to be both compulsory on all points and with all nations. Can we consent to compulsory arbitration on all points in this restricted sphere? If not, what are the limitations which we must propose, and what effect will they have upon our own public opinion? If France is willing to refer all matters which might occasion a quarrel between herself and Germany to arbitration, can we risk bringing such a project to naught, and would public opinion in this country or the Dominions justify our attitude?

We must be prepared with a general answer on these questions as soon as possible, and I must, therefore, ask my colleagues to take them into consideration at our next meeting.

A. C.

No. 322

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1709 [C 6558/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 14, 1925

My Lord,

The French Ambassador handed to me this afternoon the draft reply to the German pact proposals¹ prepared by the French Government.² I had had the advantage of receiving a copy from your Lordship this morning³ and of reading it carefully before the Ambassador's visit. His Excellency informed me that, in a covering letter, M. Briand had explained the ideas which had actuated him in the composition of the draft. In the first place, he had to consider French opinion. He must not have the appearance of being caught in a trap. He must not rouse French Nationalist opinion by appearing to yield too much or too readily, nor, on the other hand, must

¹ See No. 197, n. 1.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

³ See No. 318.

he antagonise Socialist opinion by an unsympathetic or harsh reply. His object had been to show that he accepted the German overtures¹ as made in good faith. It was not his intention to make exactly formal conditions, not even, for example, in connection with the entry of Germany into the League. He had no intention of dictating the sense of the Germany reply. He wished to give them full freedom as to the character of their answer, and not in any way to appear to force upon them a Yes or a No. He had also to be careful of the feelings of Poland and Czechoslovakia. He was anxious to calm the anxieties which the pact proposals had aroused in those countries by showing that we were always free to help them in the measure of our obligations and our interests. The draft was to be regarded merely as a preliminary which would put us in the right position, so that, if unhappily the German Government refused, we should stand well, not only with the world at large, but with pacific public opinion in Germany, which would see that it was not our fault that the negotiations had fallen through.

I told his Excellency that anything that I could say to him this afternoon must be of a very preliminary and tentative character, for this draft was obviously of great importance and a matter on which I could not speak to him with any finality until I had consulted my colleagues; but I might say in general terms that the intentions which he indicated as having inspired the draft were entirely shared by me. His Excellency interrupted me to ask whether, when I had read the draft, and before he had spoken, it had produced upon me the impression which, as he had explained to me, it was intended to convey. I replied in the affirmative.

I then asked for one or two explanations. In the first place, I said that I hoped I was right in understanding that the paragraph referring to Germany's entry into the League indicated that M. Briand adhered to M. Herriot's opinion that though this was a necessary condition of a pact, it was not a necessary preliminary to negotiations.⁴ M. de Fleuriau confirmed my interpretation.

I next turned to the second paragraph of section 4. I said that I had been prepared by what the Ambassador had told me on his last return from Paris⁵ to expect that the French draft would contain a very wide application of the principle of compulsory arbitration. But what, I asked, was the exact meaning of the sentence which said that these treaties of arbitration 'would leave no room for coercive action except in the case of failure to observe the stipulations of the different treaties and agreements contemplated in the present note'? Was this paragraph intended only to provide that arbitration should take as its basis existing treaties and should not go behind their terms, or did it mean that if differences arose between us as to whether those treaties were in fact being observed, those differences were to be excluded from arbitration? It would seem to me

⁴ See No. 251.

⁵ See No. 299.

difficult to maintain that all other matters should be referred compulsorily to arbitration, and at the same time to exempt from arbitration allegations of a breach of these treaties, and to reserve the right to use force immediately in case of such an alleged infraction. On this point the Ambassador said that he was not in a position to answer my question; he could only make enquiries.

I accordingly passed to section 5, and enquired in the first place whether the French Government were satisfied that Poland and Czechoslovakia would like a reference to the eastern frontiers and to arbitration pacts to which they would be parties inserted in this document. What I had read of the public pronouncements of those Governments and of discussions in their press had given me the impression that they might prefer not to have the eastern frontiers mentioned at all in connection with our western pact.⁶ The Ambassador thought that M. Briand must have satisfied himself on this point. M. de Fleuriau himself had certainly gathered the impression that some such phraseology as this would meet the wishes of the Italian Government in regard to Austria. In any case, as the draft was being communicated to Rome we should hear their views.

Finally, I turned to the last line of section 5, which proposes that the treaties of arbitration with the eastern Powers should receive the same joint and several guarantee as the western pact. I again said to the Ambassador that I could make no definite statement at the moment, but this sentence and the text of section 6 certainly raised some serious difficulties in my mind. I was heartily in favour of treaties of general arbitration between the States bordering on Germany's eastern frontiers and Germany, but I had not contemplated that Great Britain or the British Empire could become parties to and guarantors of those treaties. We had our obligations as members of the League of Nations and signatories of the covenant, but in respect of those eastern boundaries I did not think that we should be prepared to take on any new obligations; yet the wording of the passages upon which I was commenting seemed to place those boundaries on exactly the same footing as the boundary between France and Germany. I should be met at once with the question: 'Are our obligations in the two cases the same?' And if, as these passages would seem to imply, the answer must be in the affirmative, I should be placed in the dilemma of either exalting our obligations to the eastern neighbours to the level of those which I thought we ought to undertake in regard to the western frontiers, or of whittling down our obligations on the west to those which public opinion might be ready to accept in regard to the east. Indeed, it seemed to me that this wording could scarcely escape the charge that we were either doing more than public opinion would tolerate in regard to the eastern frontiers, or we were giving very inadequate security to France and Belgium in regard to the western frontiers.

⁶ See Nos. 246, 289, 293 and 295.

The Ambassador said that he would report these observations to his Government, but he did not altogether share my view of the effect of these passages of the draft. He did not regard the words as binding us to the same exertions in defence of the eastern frontiers or the eastern countries as in respect of the west. Although he expressed on this point only a personal opinion, I think it is not unlikely that his interpretation is also the interpretation which would be placed upon the language of the note by M. Briand. It is obvious, however, that His Majesty's Government must most carefully consider both the meaning and the phraseology of this portion of the note before they could allow themselves to be made parties to it as is done by the French text.

Section IV of the draft requires equally careful examination. On the one hand it appears, as I pointed out to the Ambassador, to exclude from arbitration any question of fact or interpretation arising out of the Treaty of Versailles, such, for example, as whether Germany had or had not observed her obligations in the Rhineland; on the other, it would appear to include every question of possible dispute in whatever part of the world and on whatever point they may occur, provided only that they are not concerned with the execution of the 'divers traités et accords envisagés dans la présente note'. I confess that, at the moment of writing, I can form to myself no clear picture of what is included and what excluded, or of what would be our position in the conditions contemplated by the French draft.

I should add that as he was leaving I told his Excellency that in what I had said about sections V and VI, I had, as he well knew, no desire to cast doubt on the treaty settlement of Eastern Europe. To whatever criticisms it might be open, it had been adopted by those who drew up the treaty, not because they thought it perfect, but because they could devise no better arrangement nor any other as good. I hoped it would last—indeed, I regarded those who talked constantly of the necessity of changing it as very ill friends of peace—but I should be unwilling to stake as confidently on its durability as on that of the Western settlement. His Excellency remarked: 'No, it has not the same starting price!'

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 323

Mr. Lampson to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

[C 6093/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 14, 1925

Many thanks for your telegram No. 57¹ in answer to my private letter of May 1st.²

¹ No. 307.

² See *ibid.*, n. 1.

We fully realise the difficulty of talking to the Poles about Polish-German relations in view of the intransigent attitude they are prone to take up. But it is really a little odd that they should attempt to put on others the blame for raising the German-Polish frontier question. After all, the German offer was put forward as an attempt to settle one question, and one only—the Rhine frontier. As the Secretary of State wrote in a minute³ on your telegram No. 57: 'Nothing would have been said about the Polish frontier if it had not been certain that silence on that point would have been met with the cry: The Germans offer a pact in the West in order to be free to make war in the East.'

The Poles can't have it both ways. And in any case I do not see that they have much cause to complain; indeed, rather the contrary, for we have extracted from the German Government a disavowal of any intention to use force to modify the eastern frontier.⁴ It remains to see how (if at all!) a *formal* assurance to that effect by Germany can best be embodied in the general settlement to which we hope the German proposals are going to lead.

My personal belief is that this is one of those questions which will settle itself if left alone long enough. I put it to Skirmunt the other day that Poland was twixt the hammer and the anvil: it seemed to me her policy to make friends with the hammer rather than the anvil more especially as the hammer was a far more controllable instrument besides, in this case, being more civilised.

Yours ever,
MILES W. LAMPSON

³ Of May 8.

⁴ See Nos. 190, 216, 242, 254, 264, 274 and 297.

No. 324

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 19)

*No. 306 [C 6765/459/18]**

BERLIN, May 14, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to state that I have received information from a confidential source regarding recent conversations in Paris between leading French statesmen and representatives of the German Kontinental Politik group.

2. As is well known, the latter consist largely of men mainly of Semetic antecedents with pseudo-pacifist or anti-military aspirations, whose main thesis in the past has been the desirability of close agreement between Germany and France, either without the co-operation of England or against England.

3. The first object of their recent visit to Paris was to convince M.

Briand and his colleagues that the danger apprehended from the election of Hindenburg¹ had been exaggerated, and to prove to them that, if properly managed, Hindenburg might become a valuable factor in the development of a pacific atmosphere in Europe. The old—though probably true—argument was put forward that an agreement signed by Hindenburg would prove more binding than one signed by a Socialist President.

4. The German delegates were surprised to find that very little genuine alarm was felt in Paris regarding the personality of Hindenburg, as it was recognised that the field-marshal was too old to be a very dangerous firebrand.

5. Regarding the attitude of France towards England, both M. Briand and M. Loucheur declared there could be no question of any co-operation with Germany without the direct participation of England. The old idea of a continental block must be entirely abandoned. Such a policy was no less out of date than the policy of balance of power and the policy of dynastic rivalry.

6. M. Briand is reported to have said that it was a mistake to regard the French army as having won the great war or as being now dominant in Europe. Weight of money had won the war—capitalism had been triumphant—and the present force which dominates Europe was the power of the City of London and of Wall Street. France could embark upon no policy which did not dispose these elements in her favour.

7. It had long since been said that the basis of international policy today was economic development. People had repeated this for the last twenty years, but they had not yet succeeded in freeing diplomatic action from the taint of political bias. This he would endeavour to achieve, and he hoped thus to bring about economic and industrial co-operation in the place of rivalry.

8. M. Briand appears to have insisted upon the necessity for Germany to become, without delay or restriction, a member of the League of Nations. He said it would be possible for Germany to co-operate at Geneva both with France and with England. He knew well that the real reason for Germany's hesitation about Geneva was fear of displeasing Russia, but there could be no pact without entry into the League of Nations.

9. The German representatives then discussed the intended French reply² to the German proposal, and urged that it was indispensable to give the Luther-Stresemann Government a good case for defending their policy before the Reichstag. M. Briand said he would bear this observation in mind, and would endeavour to adopt a supply [*sic*] tone in the notes to Germany which would not render further negotiation too difficult. He drew attention to the fact that he had already achieved a good deal in preventing the Paris press from adopting a harsh and alarmist line regarding the Hindenburg election.

¹ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

10. The German Kontinental Politiker returned to Berlin generally satisfied with what they had heard, and confident that it would be possible with the French Government now in power to enter upon a period of better relations and of reciprocal understanding.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

No. 325

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 902 [C 6652/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 15, 1925

My Lord,

The German Ambassador sought an interview with me this morning for the purpose, as he expressed it, of explaining to me the anxieties and apprehensions excited in Germany by the reports of what had passed between Poland and Czechoslovakia.¹ The German Government had what they believed to be trustworthy information that, in addition to the public treaties, secret engagements had been entered into for a defensive alliance between Poland and Czechoslovakia directed against any attempt on the part of Germany at any time to secure an alteration in her eastern boundaries, and that Czechoslovakia had further pledged herself to support the claim of Poland to a permanent seat upon the Council of the League, where the Polish representative would be also a representative of the Little *Entente*. Germany might thus find herself isolated in the League if she joined it. A new encirclement had begun on the east, and the reports seemed to indicate that France was trying to secure a similar block in the west, so that Germany would sit circumscribed and bound without hope for all time. He did not come to say that this made Germany's entry into the League impossible, but it made it more difficult. It seemed to him that these agreements encroached upon the authority of the League, if, indeed, they did not put it out of the League's power to act upon article 19. He understood, too, that the agreement between Czechoslovakia and Poland dealt with the possible union of Austria and Germany. There was no question of this at the present time. Germany did not desire to stir in the matter, but the ultimate decision was confided to the League by article 80 of the treaty, and Germany was apprehensive that the discretion and freedom of action of the League was, in fact, being taken away by these agreements. All this appeared to be a result of the German proposals for a pact in the west. It was the very opposite of what Germany had expected from her proposals, and it filled his Government with doubt and apprehension.

¹ See No. 126.

In reply, I told his Excellency that I was unable to confirm the news which his Government had received, but for the purpose of our conversation I would proceed on what, from his point of view, was the worst assumption—that all that he had said of these secret agreements was true. Was that any reason for changing our policy? In my opinion it was not. Undoubtedly the distinction drawn by the German Government between the western and eastern frontiers had alarmed their eastern neighbours and had produced the rapprochement between Poland and Czechoslovakia of which he complained. The talk indulged in by the Nationalist parties in Germany naturally fed the fears of her eastern neighbours and as naturally caused them to seek fresh protection for themselves. I had said—and it was the basis of my present policy—that mutual fear was at the root of all the evils from which Europe was now suffering.² I believed this to be profoundly true. Unless we could relieve these fears, there would be no relaxation of the international tension. If we carried through the pact on the west, we should have made a great advance towards a better state of mind, and it was only from a change of mind that an improvement in material and political conditions could proceed. If we secured a mutual pact—which I was encouraged to think we might do in regard to the western sphere—it would have an ever-widening effect on conditions elsewhere and itself might, and, I believed, would, help to relieve the tension in the east. I wished him, however, to be under no misapprehension as to my views about the eastern frontier. Article 19 of the covenant existed, and if the Germans joined the League they had a right to appeal to it when they thought fit like any other member of that society, but he must not suppose that I intended to encourage Germany in the expectation of a change in the treaty settlement, nor did I think that those who continually stirred up this question served the interests of peace. The men who framed the treaty were well aware of all the criticisms to which the eastern settlement was open. They had not chosen it carelessly or without the most careful consideration. They had been driven to it because they could find no better settlement nor any other as good. I did not profess to be able to see into the distant future, but it would be folly for Germany to enter the League only to raise this question at once. To stir up the question now would only stiffen opinion on both sides. It would create in the public mind everywhere a sense of insecurity and range against Germany every Power which had anything to lose by a reversal of the settlement of 1919. If a peaceful change were ever possible—and neither his Government nor ourselves could contemplate a change by any other means—it could only come when the passions of the war had been appeased and as a result of new conditions which would have altered the whole outlook of the world. The wise man would let this question sleep for a generation before he even considered whether it was opportune to discuss it.

² In his speech in the House of Commons on March 5 (see No. 223, n. 2).

Herr Sthamer asked if he might make some observations on what I had said. In the first place he disclaimed the suggestion that this question had been raised by the German Government. Before they had spoken about it there had been, for example, Mr. Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons.³ I interjected: 'A very unwise speech from a friend of peace.' 'That might be', his Excellency replied, 'but at any rate Mr. Lloyd George had raised the question; it was not the fault of the German Government that this had been done.' Then he went on to speak of Russia and of the danger to which Germany was exposed if she quarrelled with Russia. This argument was, I gathered, intended to bear upon the possible entry of Germany into the League, though, knowing my strong feeling upon that subject, the Ambassador spoke a little hesitatingly and not very clearly. I replied that I had no doubt that Russia would do her utmost to prevent Germany from entering the League. Soviet policy was unfortunately directed to maintaining everywhere internal unrest and international animosities, which were the proper breeding-ground for the social revolution which was its ultimate object. Did it not occur to Herr Sthamer that, in the circumstances, Germany might find some compensation for her loss of territory in the fact that the Reich no longer bordered upon Russia? Of course, Russia desired to prevent a mutual pact and improved relations between Germany and ourselves. It was for Germany to consider whether she would be made the cat's-paw of Soviet aims. I had no doubt what her true interest was, but German statesmen must take their own decision.

As the Ambassador still continued to dwell upon the Russian danger, I reminded him of the earlier negotiations for a pact between Great Britain and Germany at the close of last century and the beginning of this.⁴ I had then told my father,⁵ who was at that time engaged with negotiations with Baron Eckhardstein,⁶ that, though Germany would encourage the negotiations up to the point where they would have done the greatest injury to Franco-British relations, they would never conclude a treaty, for their fear of Russia was too strong. Had the decision of the German Government been wise on that occasion, and were they going to repeat the same policy today? As to entry into the League, I did not wish to repeat all my arguments. To me it seemed so plainly in the interests of Germany, and, indeed, the reluctance of some of her late enemies to admit her so evidently confirmed this view, that I was unable to understand the German hesitation. He talked about the anti-German block in the League. I ventured to commend to him Professor Webster's book on Castlereagh's policy after 1815.⁷ That policy was in principle the same as I was pursuing

³ On March 24. See 182*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 328-38.

⁴ For these negotiations of 1901, see Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. II (London, 1927), chap. X.

⁵ See No. 299, n. 14.

⁶ Baron Eckardstein was German Chargé d'Affaires in London 1899-1902.

⁷ C. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-22*, published in London in January,

today: first to secure the Allies against a possible attempt by France to reverse the settlement of 1815, and, having thus secured their own safety, to bring France into the comity of nations and make her a member of the concert of Europe. Lord Castlereagh had achieved this object,⁸ with the result that, the fears of the Allies being removed, the Powers almost at once regrouped themselves on new lines as new problems required their attention. I observed that I did not attempt to prophesy the future, but that it was sometimes useful to recall the past. In any case I must once again say to him that it would be far better to stop the pact negotiations at the beginning than to have them brought to naught at the end by the refusal of Germany to join the League on the basis of the reply sent by the council to the German enquiry.⁹ The bitterness created by such a refusal at the last moment would be even worse than the effect produced by a refusal now. If Germany were not prepared to enter the League she would lose all sympathy in this country, would have united against her the Governments of France, Italy and Belgium, as well as ourselves, and would have put herself entirely wrong with the world. A few further observations by the Ambassador, in which he stated that he was only expressing the anxieties and troubles of the German Government, and not in any way hinting at such a refusal, brought this part of our conversation to a close.

I then said that, as he had brought his apprehensions and anxieties to me, I would take the opportunity of speaking to him about a matter which had caused me the very gravest anxiety. I then spoke of Lord Kilmarnock's¹⁰ despatch¹¹ and of the letter from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior about which I addressed your Lordship in my telegram No. 101 of the 13th May.¹² I expressed with earnestness and even vehemence my view of the folly of the whole proceeding, and in particular of the encouragement which the Prussian Ministry of the Interior had given to it, not, as it appeared, without the support of the Finance Minister of the Reich.¹³ It was perfectly clear that the whole object of this demonstration was to heighten German nationalist feeling and to excite it against the Allies and the occupying forces. Above all to run excursions from unoccupied territory, which were certain to be composed in large measure of persons of strong nationalist views, was asking for trouble. The British authorities would exercise their discretion in prohibiting any demonstration which they thought fit, but it would not be thanks to the German Government if grave incidents were avoided. And all this was done at a

1925. Lord Castlereagh (1769–1822), second Marquis of Londonderry, was Foreign Secretary 1812–22.

⁸ France was a participating member of the Congress which met at Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) October 1–November 15, 1818, and decided on the evacuation of the allied troops from France.

⁹ See No. 261, Enclosure.

¹⁰ Lord Kilmarnock was British High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

¹¹ No. 616, below.

¹² No. 617, below.

¹³ Herr O. von Schlieben.

moment when the success of the negotiations for the completion of disarmament and the consequent evacuation of Cologne and for the larger agreement on which our future relations depended was hanging in the balance. I spoke in terms to impress him as strongly as possible with the view I took of the criminal folly, and perhaps even bad faith, of the Government authorities who were concerned in this business.

His Excellency said that he had no information about the matter, but he would of course communicate to his Government the views which I had expressed so strongly. I remarked that I had spoken strongly because I felt strongly about the folly and danger of the actions of the German Government which were being pursued, and, as his Excellency said that I had certainly spoken extremely strongly and that he would not report the exact language which I had used, I added that I hoped he would make my opinion perfectly plain. In any case I had already instructed your Lordship to speak with equal frankness, and I read to him the text of my telegram,¹² calling his attention to the fact that the draft from which I read was largely in my own handwriting, I having felt that the language suggested by the officials of my Department was inadequate to convey the strength of my opinion and the extent of my anxiety.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 326

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 19, 9 a.m.)

No. 195 Telegraphic [C 6711/459/18]

BERLIN, May 18, 1925, 8.30 p.m.

Paris despatch No. 1126.¹

My first impression of French draft² is that it will be well received here and will strengthen position of Luther-Stresemann government by justifying initiative taken on February 10th [*sic*].³

While there will be minor objections on several points I am optimistic regarding ultimate success of negotiations on basis established.

It is perhaps worth considering whether there would not be advantage in sending to German government the security note some days before disarmament demands.⁴ The favourable atmosphere created by former might facilitate acceptance of disarmament requisitions which however justified cannot fail to appear more voluminous than luminous to non-technical opinion while to military circles here they will necessarily be repugnant.

So far as I can judge position and subject to observations in your despatch No. 1709⁵ the sooner Monsieur Briand's note comes the better.

¹ No. 318.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 620, below.

² See *ibid.*, Enclosure.

⁵ No. 322.

No. 327

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 19, 9 a.m.)

No. 196 Telegraphic [C 6734/459/18]

BERLIN, May 18, 1925, 9 p.m.

Dr. Stresemann addressed rather a listless and dejected House in his speech on Foreign Office estimates this afternoon. The major portion of his remarks were devoted to commercial treaty negotiations.¹

Coming to question of disarmament and evacuation he emphasized German standpoint strongly. Although allied statesmen were able to state before January 10th that German defaults amply justified non-evacuation of Cologne² nearly four months had now elapsed and none of these defaults had been communicated.

His references to security offer were mainly by way of reply to internal criticism regarding its genesis and import. He said that designs of France in Rhineland were mainly due to fears for her security. Hence the necessity for German initiative.³

¹ See Nos. 221 and 250.

² See No. 553, below.

³ A translation of the press report of this speech was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 318 of May 19, not printed.

No. 328

Memorandum communicated informally by the French Embassy on May 18¹ in reply to certain Enquiries which Mr. Austen Chamberlain made of the French Ambassador on May 14² when the latter handed to him the French Draft Note to Germany on the Subject of Security³

[C 6708/459/18]

[(Paragraphs numbered I, II, etc., in Foreign Office for convenience of reference.)]

Projet de réponse à la note allemande

Observations de M. Austen Chamberlain Réponses

I. Paragraphe 1, dernière phrase:

¹ In Foreign Office despatch No. 1748 to Paris of May 18, Mr. Chamberlain reported: 'The French Ambassador called upon me this morning to answer verbally the questions which I had put to him on a first perusal of the suggested draft of the French reply to the German pact proposals. As his Excellency was good enough to promise to put these answers in writing in the course of the day it is unnecessary that I should record them here as detailed by him. They appeared upon the whole favourable to our point of view.'

² See No. 322.

³ See No. 318, Enclosure.

Est-il bien entendu que l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations est une condition essentielle mais non préalable des accords envisagés?

II. Paragraphe 4, phrase: 'les traités d'arbitrage ... ne laisseraient place à une action coercitive qu'au cas d'inobservation des stipulations des divers traités et accords envisagés dans la présente note.'

Cette phrase pourrait être interprétée comme l'exclusion des Traités de Paix de l'arbitrage prévu, ce qui serait excessif. L'arbitrage ne doit pas être utilisé pour la revision des Traités, mais peut être employé pour la solution des conflits soulevés par l'exécution desdits traités.

III. Paragraphe 5. Autriche.

IV. Paragraphe 5: Pologne.

V. Paragraphe 5, dernière phrase, et Paragraphe 6: L'ensemble paraît accorder aux frontières occidentales et orientales de l'Allemagne la même garantie.

Oui. Il faudra peut-être prévoir que le pacte deviendra caduc dans le cas où l'Allemagne différerait son entrée dans la Société des Nations après la signature dudit pacte.

L'arbitrage s'applique aux traités de paix, sous réserve expresse de leurs stipulations spéciales en vue de l'application de certaines clauses. Exemples: Articles du Traité de Versailles confiant aux Puissances alliées le contrôle direct de l'exécution de certaines clauses (ainsi le contrôle militaire): Articles du Traité (42 à 44) qualifiant d'actes hostiles la violation de certaines de ses dispositions ou attribuant (429) aux Puissances alliées le droit de prendre certaines décisions.

M. Briand pense que le texte de sa note comprend la question autrichienne. Il ne peut répondre au nom de l'Autriche, parce qu'il ne répond que d'accord avec ses Alliés, dont l'Autriche n'est pas.

Le texte du projet n'a pas été concerté avec le Gouvernement Polonais qui en aura ultérieurement connaissance.

M. Briand ne désire pas conférer les mêmes garanties aux frontières occidentales et orientales de l'Allemagne.

Les frontières occidentales de l'Allemagne comporteraient à la fois (1) une garantie territoriale spéciale et (2) une garantie générale constituée par l'engagement réciproque de ne pas faire la guerre et par les traités d'arbitrage.

Les frontières orientales ne comporteraient que cette seconde garantie.

En ce qui concerne les frontières

occidentales et le statut territorial rhénan, la garantie spéciale que donnerait la Grande-Bretagne résulterait du caractère territorial de ce statut comme de la qualification d'acte hostile inscrite dans le Traité de Versailles pour la violation dudit statut.

En ce qui concerne les frontières orientales, la garantie que donnerait la Grande Bretagne serait surtout d'ordre moral, puisqu'elle s'appliquerait à des traités d'arbitrage.

No. 329

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

*No. 563 [C 6787/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 18, 1925*

Sir,

Baron Moncheur came to see me this afternoon. He wished to know what impression I had formed of the draft reply to the German proposal prepared by the French Government.¹ He had no indication of the views of his own Government, but had himself marked the same passages upon which I had questioned the French Ambassador when I received the note at his hands.²

I told him that M. de Fleuriau had been with me this morning to give me verbally the answers of the French Government.³ They appeared to me to indicate a closer approximation of view than I had at first supposed from the language of the note; but as M. de Fleuriau had offered to put these answers in writing, I preferred not to comment on them until I had had an opportunity of studying his note, which I hoped to receive in the course of today or tomorrow.⁴ I added that I had as yet had no opportunity of discussing the French draft with my colleagues, and that such comments as I had made must, therefore, be considered merely as my own first thoughts on reading M. Briand's draft.¹ I should, of course, be glad to have as early as possible any indication that the Belgian Government might be willing to give me of their views, as it was important that we should all be agreed. Baron Moncheur was personally a good deal concerned at the idea that the same obligations were to be undertaken in regard to Germany's eastern frontier as in regard to the west, and that the

¹ See No. 318, Enclosure.

³ See No. 328, n. 1.

² See No. 322.

⁴ See No. 328.

whole of the agreements and treaties contemplated in the note were to be embodied in a single document signed by all the Powers concerned. He did not seem very sanguine about obtaining any early expression of the views of the Belgian Government as the new Minister for Foreign Affairs⁵ was only appointed *ad interim* and had had no previous familiarity with the subject.⁶

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ Baron A. Ruzette took office on May 13. See No. 333, below.

⁶ For Baron Moncheur's record of this conversation, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 55.

No. 330

Memorandum communicated informally by Mr. Chamberlain to the French Ambassador on May 19, 1925, regarding certain points in the French Draft Note of May 12, 1925,¹ on the subject of Security

[C 6708/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 19, 1925

Mr. Chamberlain is indebted to M. de Fleuriau for the supplementary explanations of the French draft of the 12th May¹ which he was so good as to communicate to the Foreign Office on the 18th May.² These explanations answer the various points which Mr. Chamberlain raised verbally with M. de Fleuriau on the 14th May on his first cursory perusal of the French draft.³

Whilst these supplementary explanations go far to clear up the particular points mentioned by Mr. Chamberlain, there are certain others suggested by a further study of the draft regarding which he is uncertain what exactly is in the mind of the French Government. In order, therefore, that the British Cabinet may be in a position to accord to the French draft that prompt and careful study which so important a document demands, Mr. Chamberlain takes advantage of M. de Fleuriau's offer to supply any further explanations that might be needed in order to elucidate these further points which are set forth briefly below.

Before passing to an enumeration of these points Mr. Chamberlain would like to emphasise, and M. de Fleuriau will naturally appreciate, that the present informal communication is made solely with the object of securing supplementary information for his use in explaining the project to the British Cabinet. It must of course not be taken as in any sense a reply to, or final comment upon, the French draft of the 12th May;¹ it does not pretend to deal with the questions of principle embodied in that draft, as to which the British Cabinet can naturally express no reasoned

¹ See No. 318, Enclosure.

² See No. 328.

³ See No. 322.

opinion until they have fully grasped the exact purport of the French proposals.

The further specific points on which some additional elucidation would be of assistance are, then, the following:—

1. The present draft, though in the form of a note from the French Government to the German Government, is so couched as to commit the Allied Governments concerned as a whole to the proposals which it contains. Is it the intention of the French Government that the note shall be an expression of the views of the French Government alone? Or, as the present text infers, a communication to the German Government from the French Government, acting in concert with and in the name of the interested Allies? The answer to the above question must largely determine the angle from which His Majesty's Government approach and eventually comment on the document.

2. The third paragraph of the preamble refers to the desire of the Allies to give to the interested States supplementary guarantees of security 'within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles'. It is doubtful what exactly this phrase means; is it not, for example, perhaps a little misleading when applied to a proposal which, as His Majesty's Government understand it, is to be put forward as supplementary to and outside the existing framework of the Treaty of Versailles? It is presumably the intention of the French Government that the proposed pact shall not in any way weaken or infringe the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. But the phrase is not free from ambiguity, and Mr. Chamberlain would be grateful for such explanations as can be given him.

3. The meaning of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section II is distinctly obscure. For example, it is expressly stipulated in Section III that the pact shall not affect the clauses of the treaty concerning the Rhineland occupation⁴ or the execution of the provisions of the Rhineland Agreement;⁵ it is not understood what other provisions of the Treaty of Versailles the French Government can have in mind under Section II. It would be of assistance to learn what precise object the wording of Section II has in view, and what danger it is designed to avoid.

4. Mr. Chamberlain notes that the French Government welcome the suggestion of treaties of arbitration guaranteeing the peaceful settlement of juridical and political disputes. But what exactly do the French Government understand by the term 'arbitration' in this respect? Is it contemplated that there shall be a settlement of a *judicial* nature in every case to the exclusion, for instance, of the procedure of settlement by the council laid down by the Covenant of the League of Nations? Or

⁴ i.e. Articles 42 and 43 which demilitarised the Rhineland, and Articles 428–32 which laid down the terms of the Allied occupation of the Rhineland.

⁵ For the text of the agreement of June 28, 1919, between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 219–24.

do the French Government include 'conciliation' in the general term 'arbitration' used in their draft?

5. The French draft contains the phrase that the arbitration treaties 'should leave no room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated' in their note of the 12th May. But even in the latter case the French Government can hardly contemplate actual coercive action without a preliminary reference to some procedure for peaceful settlement, such, for example, as the Council of the League of Nations, in accordance with the general provisions of the covenant? This is an important point, and one on which Mr. Chamberlain would be more particularly grateful for further information.

6. What exactly is meant by the phrase 'the joint and several guarantee' which, under the French draft, is to be given to the contemplated arbitration treaties? What actual obligation would devolve upon the guarantor? This is a point on which His Majesty's Government are in great doubt as to what is intended. Does such a guarantee involve an obligation on the guarantors to resort to force, and, if so, in what circumstances?

7. Again, the exact import of the reference in paragraph 3 of Section V to the existing rights and obligations of the Allied Powers under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties of peace is not clear, and a more precise indication of the objects of this passage would be welcomed.

8. What exactly does the French Government mean in Section VI by the phrase 'placed under the auspices' of the League of Nations? Is any procedure thereby contemplated which would entail an obligation on the part of an individual member of the League who was not an actual signatory of the agreements reached?

Mr. Chamberlain feels sure that M. de Fleuriau will forgive his raising the various points set forth in the preceding paragraphs. His doing so does not necessarily mean that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is desirable to amplify or modify the actual wording of the French draft. That can only be decided at a later stage. His present object is merely to learn for the confidential information of his colleagues and himself the precise import of the French proposals in order to remove any danger of a misunderstanding of the French draft of the 12th May before attempting to formulate the views of His Majesty's Government upon it.⁶

⁶ The text of this memorandum is printed in Cmd. 2435, op. cit., pp. 11-13.

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

No. 394 [C 6850/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 19, 1925

Sir,

The Polish Minister called this afternoon to express M. Skrzynski's appreciation of my invitation to him to visit London on his way to the June meeting of the Council of the League of Nations,¹ and his regret that he was so pressed by business at the present time that he would probably not be able to attend even the council. He hoped, however, that he might visit London before the meeting of the assembly in September.² I expressed my regret that we were not likely to meet either in London or Geneva till then, but assured the Minister that M. Skrzynski would be very welcome when he found it possible to come.

M. Skirmunt then enquired what were my first impressions of the proposed French reply³ to the German note,⁴ of which, he informed me, he had a copy. I said that I had not yet been able to discuss it with my colleagues, but my impression of its general tone and purpose was very favourable. There were, however, some passages in it which I did not clearly understand, and of which I was seeking further explanations from M. de Fleuriau.⁵ M. Skirmunt said that he desired to repeat what M. Skrzynski and he himself had already told me that his Government had no desire to stand in the way of a western pact.⁶ They did not propose to ask for an explicit acceptance by Germany of the eastern frontier and, as I gathered, were content with the references to that subject contained in the French draft, but M. Skirmunt also found some difficulty in understanding the exact intentions of the French Government on certain points.

M. Skirmunt then referred with considerable satisfaction to the results of the reference of the question of the Danzig postal boxes to The Hague court⁷ and of the enquiry by the appropriate international tribunal, comprising a German and a Pole with a Danish chairman, into the recent railway accident in the Danzig corridor.⁸ The decision in each case had been wholly favourable to Poland. I congratulated him on the result in each case, and took occasion to observe that the fact that the decision in

¹ Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.² See No. 165, n. 4.³ See No. 318, Enclosure.⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.⁵ See No. 330.⁶ See No. 247 and Vol. XXV, No. 453.⁷ For the Danzig post box question, see Vol. XXV, Nos. 429, n. 1, 438, 448 and 450 and *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 469-72, 564-5 and 882-7. For the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice of May 16, 1925, see *ibid.*, pp. 883-4.⁸ On May 1, the Berlin-Königsberg express was derailed in the Polish Corridor near Stargard, and 29 people were killed. Poland was accused by Germany of having failed to maintain the track, and the matter was referred to the Polish-German Railway Arbitral Tribunal at Danzig, which in a decision of May 15 exculpated the Polish Government of any responsibility for the accident.

the case of the letter boxes had been taken by the Hague Tribunal gave it a special authority and significance. I thought that the council had been wisely inspired in referring the question to it. It appeared from M. Skirmunt's remarks that the Poles had thought that The Hague Tribunal had shown prejudice against them in some previous questions, and they were, therefore, the more gratified with the decision in their favour on this occasion.

M. Skirmunt further invited my attention to proposals partly suggested by the Polish Government, but emanating, as he said, from the secretariat of the League of Nations and the *rapporteur* of the council on Polish affairs in favour of some modified arrangements for the working of the minority treaties.⁹ He explained that the interest and purpose of the Polish Government in the matter was to establish, before Germany entered the League, a machinery which would as far as possible eliminate political controversy on these questions and place them on a practical and judicial basis so that, when Germany took her place in the League—as she might be expected to do in September²—there would not be a constant conflict between Germany and her neighbours on this subject. M. Skirmunt did not seek to explain the nature of the proposals of which he spoke and I made no comment on the matter, but this subject led us back to the treaty situation as affecting Germany's eastern neighbours, and I took the opportunity to tell him of the warning I had addressed to the German Ambassador on this subject in my last conversation with him (see my despatch to Lord D'Abernon, No. 902, of the 15th May).¹⁰ I thought it just as well to remove from his mind any suspicions of British policy which might have been aroused by some rather rash utterances in the House of Commons and equally unwise articles in some organs of the press. The Minister was evidently gratified, and I do not doubt that he will convey the sense of what I said to his Government.

M. Skirmunt then asked me whether I had heard anything of propaganda in certain quarters suggesting that Germany might be willing to abandon all hope of any change in her eastern frontiers in return for the union of Austria and Germany. I said that I had heard nothing of such a suggestion, which would, of course, arouse vehement opposition in other quarters, and the Minister hastily added that it would be equally ill-received by Poland, but he said that propaganda on these subjects took place in Germany and had a disturbing effect. I called his attention to the

⁹ These treaties formed part of the peace settlement and comprised treaties between the Allied and Associated Powers and Poland (of June 28, 1919; for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 232–43); Czechoslovakia (of September 10, 1919; for the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 502–13); Serb–Croat–Slovene State (of September 10, 1919; for the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 514–23); Roumania (of December 9, 1919; for the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 538–46); Greece (of August 10, 1920; for the text, see *ibid.*, vol. 113, pp. 471–79). A convention on minorities was signed on November 27, 1919 by Bulgaria and Greece (for the text, see *ibid.*, vol. 112, pp. 997–1000).

¹⁰ No. 325.

fact that German propaganda affected the particular interests of this country no less than those of continental nations. I had observed an agitation beginning for the return of some portion of the German colonies.¹¹ These were symptoms which it was well to watch, but they ought not, in my opinion, to alter the policy on which we had embarked. We must think of the future. For Europe to continue ranged in two hostile camps was to court inevitable disaster at some future time. The task of statesmanship was to create conditions now which in course of time might allow a new generation of Germans to grow up who would be unwilling to risk the prosperity that they enjoyed on the chance of a new war, and who would abandon tacitly, if not openly, any thought of endeavouring to regain by force what the evil policy of this generation of Germans had lost. It was on this change of mind that the peace of the world depended, and the possibilities of such a change depended upon the attitude which the victors of the Great War now adopted towards their beaten foes.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ Frankfort despatch No. 20 of February 28 had reported a meeting on February 27 to commemorate Germany's pre-war colonial expansion, and Munich despatch No. 56 of March 12 had reported that the Bavarian Prime Minister, Dr. Held, had said at a lecture in Munich that Germany's colonies could only be recovered by 'deeds'.

See A. Crozier, 'The Colonial Question in Stresemann's Locarno Policy', *The International History Review*, IV, 1 February, 1982, pp. 37-54.

No. 332

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 20, 9 p.m.)

No. 199 Telegraphic [C 6852/459/18]

BERLIN, May 20, 1925, 6.40 p.m.

Security pact.

I found French Ambassador this morning in agreement with view (see my telegram No. 195)¹ that security note should be presented before disarmament requirements.² He has already reported to his government urging either this or simultaneous presentation. He holds with me that to present disarmament demand first might injure chances of successful negotiation on security. French Ambassador shares my view that present moment is abnormally favourable for pressing forward security negotiations. It is clear from current debate in Reichstag that Stresemann can for the moment command Nationalist support for this policy while Hindenburg is—for immediate present at least—certain to endorse government's action and will not be influenced by any Camarilla. One cannot be sure how long this suspicious [*sic*: auspicious] conjunction will continue.

¹ No. 326.

² See Nos. 620 and 624, below.

No. 333

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received May 21, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 43 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6866/459/18]

Confidential

BRUSSELS, May 20, 1925

I paid this morning my first official visit to Baron Ruzette, Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim*.

Baron Ruzette continues to hold the portfolios of Public Works and Agriculture which he has held for nearly five years uninterruptedly.

The Minister began by saying that he felt sure that he was a very evanescent figure. It might even be that the Ministry would be overthrown this afternoon. However, as he was temporarily Minister for Foreign Affairs, he wished to say how strongly the President of the Council and he felt on the subject of maintaining ever closer relations with England. His words and manner were unmistakably genuine. He then went on to say that he was examining the draft of the French note to the German government on the subject of the security pact.¹ As soon as he and his department had studied it thoroughly, he intended to consult his colleagues at a Cabinet Council, which would be summoned specially for the purpose, if necessary. After that, he was desirous of communicating the Belgian views to His Majesty's Government. I thanked him warmly and said that they would be of the highest interest.

I gathered that certain things in the French draft note had caused some astonishment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I doubt whether the Belgian government will endorse it as a whole. Baron Ruzette made some remarks about Poland which showed strong disinclination to commit Belgium in any conceivable circumstances to military action on her behalf.

Even if the Cabinet falls, it is likely that the present Ministers will be in charge for some little time longer and that Baron Ruzette will be in a position to communicate to His Majesty's Government their considered views on the above-mentioned matter.

¹ See No. 318, Enclosure.

No. 334

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

No. 579 [C 6910/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 20, 1925

Sir,

I transmit to Your Excellency herewith a record of a conversation which

took place today between the Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Lampson on the subject of the French draft reply¹ to the German security proposals.²

I am, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

HAROLD NICOLSON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 334

*Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Belgian Ambassador**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 20, 1925

The Belgian Ambassador, who came down this morning on another matter, alluded to the question of the French draft reply to the German security proposals.

He said that he had spoken to Mr. Chamberlain the other day,³ who had explained the position to him briefly, and had told him that he was awaiting certain explanatory observations from the French Ambassador in reply to certain verbal points which he had raised with the latter. Baron Moncheur asked me whether we had yet received these observations and, if so, what we felt about them.

I replied that we had got these supplementary explanations⁴ which, on the whole, seemed pretty satisfactory; but of course there were many other points of detail as to the exact meaning of which we were not quite clear. We were now endeavouring to ascertain exactly what was meant by these passages.⁵ The general position was that until we were absolutely certain of what each paragraph in the French draft meant, clearly the British Government could not return any definite comment upon the French note. But I had no doubt that an answer would be sent to the French Government at the earliest possible moment.

Baron Moncheur told me that the Belgian Government had also been struck by the fact that the French note was so phrased as apparently to constitute an inter-Allied document. The Belgian government agreed with us that if it was to go forward as an inter-Allied expression of opinion, it would be necessary to go through its every word; in short, to consider the document very much more carefully than if it were merely an expression of French views. He imagined it would be useful to us to know what the Belgian Government thought in general of the French note, and he would endeavour to get the Belgian Government's views for us. I thanked him and said that I had no doubt they would be most helpful.

Reverting to the short explanatory notes handed in here by M. Cambon⁶ two days ago,⁴ Baron Moncheur said he presumed we would have no objection to his asking the French Embassy for a copy. I said that

¹ See No. 318, Enclosure.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

³ See No. 329.

⁴ See No. 328.

⁵ See No. 330.

⁶ M. R. Cambon was Counsellor at the French Embassy in London.

certainly there was no objection whatever. Clearly the Belgian Government were deeply interested in this question, and the more fully informed they were of developments the better for all concerned.

M. W. LAMPSON

No. 335

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Lampson (Received May 25)

[C 6984/459/18]

Private

WARSAW, May 20, 1925

My dear Lampson,

Many thanks for your letter of May 14th (C 6093/459/18).¹ I fear, however, that we do not quite see eye to eye in the matter of the German proposals,² which my knowledge of the German national character and national aims leads me to regard with considerable suspicion. Even granting that the present authors of the proposals really mean what they say and that we do succeed in obtaining a formal disavowal from the German Government of any intention to use force to modify the eastern frontier, do you really maintain that, after our experience in 1914, we are justified in considering that future generations in Germany would hold themselves bound by any such declaration? Surely the very fact that the Germans themselves draw a distinction between the Western and Eastern frontiers indicates a sneaking doubt in their minds as to the binding force of their promises with regard to the latter.

For centuries the whole trend of German policy has been towards the unification of the German race and this was accomplished in 1871³ with the exception of Austria. During the war many people used to talk glibly about the advantage of dividing up the German Empire into its component parts and I used always to say: 'You can do that just so long as you have sufficient military force to prevent the component parts from coming together again.' My realisation of the strength of the secular centripetal force in Germany has ever since my arrival here prevented my regarding the Danzig corridor⁴ as a permanent arrangement unless some means could be devised to induce or to force the Germans to respect it. I explained this in my despatch No. 106 of February 28th⁵ and in that same despatch I reported how the German Minister here had declared to me, that even if they accepted every other provision of the Treaties, his countrymen would never accept the corridor. I must confess that I find it difficult not to regard this attitude of the Germans as natural and indeed inevitable.

Curiously enough a few nights ago Snow⁶ was at a farewell dinner given

¹ No. 323.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See No. 277, n. 3.

⁴ See No. 205.

⁵ No. 214.

⁶ First Secretary at H.M. Legation in Warsaw.

for one of the German secretaries, at which, as is usual in those surroundings, much too much wine was drunk and tongues wagged freely. Three of the Germans accompanied Snow to his flat and they began to talk politics. The three Germans all took the view that the corridor was insufferable and must be abolished. Graf du Moulin,⁷ a son-in-law of Kapp,⁸ waxed loud in praise of Hindenburg whom he described as a practical man who knew that war was out of the question for the moment and would therefore pursue by other means the aim which he had in view. Snow objected that after all the corridor did Germany no practical harm, but his guests replied that that was not the question and that he would understand this if he could feel like a German, and as for Poland's access to the sea, she ought to be able to get that at Memel.⁹

I can see no use in shutting our eyes to disagreeable facts, and to ignore the natural desire of the Germans to abolish, by fair means or foul, the barrier separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany is in my opinion to do so. Under these circumstances, though strongly in favour of the Pact with proper safeguards, I cannot honestly share your views on the attitude of the Poles towards the German proposals. They realise well enough how precarious is their hold on the corridor unless they are prepared to defend it by force, and they naturally look with extreme suspicion on any arrangement which may possibly be regarded as throwing the slightest doubt on the validity of their Treaty right to it.

To my mind the whole question is whether the German word is to be trusted or not, and I can only express my devout hope that the Secretary of State will prove to have been right in accepting the German proposal² as being put forward in good faith and with the honest intention of carrying it to a successful conclusion and adhering scrupulously to it. I cannot, however, forget former instances of German perfidy, and the Poles have even more reason for remembering them.

Do you recollect how we closed our eyes to the real significance of the German pre-war fleet because it was easier to believe the explanations offered by the German Government than to call their bluff in time? I could quote other instances, but they will doubtless occur to you. The result is that though I personally am inclined to share the belief in the sincerity of the German proposals so far as their authors are concerned, I cannot blame those who refuse to take the German assurances at their face value and believe that the real object of the proposals is to pave the way for a revision of the Eastern frontiers. We should certainly do what we can to allay those suspicions and fears, but we cannot do this by pooh-poohing them but rather by attempting to understand their reality and remove their causes.

To my mind the best and most convincing proof that Germany can give

⁷ A Secretary at the German Legation in Warsaw.

⁸ Dr. W. Kapp, a founder of the German Patriotic Party, had attempted a *putsch* in Germany March 13-17, 1920 (see Vol. IX, Chap. II). He had died in prison in 1922.

⁹ See No. 214, n. 7.

us of her good faith is her prompt and unconditional entry into the League of Nations.

Yours ever,
W. G. MAX MULLER

No. 336

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 935 [C 6145/2994/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 21, 1925

My Lord,

I have received your despatch No. 288 of the 3rd May,¹ dealing with the possibility of arriving at some compromise with Germany with regard to her former colonial possessions, with a view to satisfy her aspirations in favour of overseas trade and colonial emigration.

2. I do not know whether it was your Lordship's intention to raise one of the most controversial questions which existed in the past between this country and Germany, but, the question having been raised in your despatch under reply, I think it necessary to acquaint you with the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject for fear of any misapprehension arising in the mind of the German Government. His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate for a moment the possibility of returning to Germany now or at any time her former colonial possessions, or any part of them. The first practical difficulty that would arise in connection with

¹ This ran as follows: 'I am indebted for your communication (in your despatch No. 589 of the 30th March [not printed]) of a memorandum [of July 28, 1924, not printed. The memorandum has been misdated in Confidential Print] from the Colonial Office regarding the trade and emigration figures of German colonies before the war. The facts as stated will be of great value in conversation with the German authorities. The latter are inclined vastly to exaggerate the detriment to this country resulting from the loss of colonial possessions, and to attribute to it both the absence of overseas trade and the presence of turbulent elements in Germany.

'2. It is, of course, possible to invert the argument, set forth in the memorandum, and to hold that the paltriness of the commercial value of the German colonies before the war goes far to prove their insignificant actual value today. It may, therefore, be asked: "Is it worth while to create a sentimental grievance to obtain an asset of such relatively small value?"

'3. From the point of view of relations with Germany, increased facilities at some future date or the grant of extended rights to Germany in her former colonies would be regarded as a concession of great importance. Moreover, as long as Germany has no strong fleet, and England's naval strength, compared with that of Germany, remains supreme, every increase of Germany's interests in oversea colonial territories is a pledge to England of good behaviour. The greater Germany's stake in oversea interests, the more indispensable is it for her to remain on friendly terms with the dominant naval Power in European waters.

'4. These considerations are not intended to suggest any immediate action, but they might be borne in mind during some future negotiation—since the possibility appears to exist of obtaining a great deal in exchange for what is of insignificant value to us.'

any such policy would be the fact that they are mainly owned by the self-governing dominions, who would be strongly opposed to any retrocession. Another objection would be due to the record of the German colonial administration, which, with the possible exception of Kiaochau, is hardly one that would justify us in handing back to her the custody of native populations. A more general and not less powerful objection is to be found in the experience which we have had of the use made by Germany of her colonial possessions as a reason and justification for the immense and menacing development of her naval forces, which was one of the most direct causes of the late war.

3. I observe that an agitation is now being provoked in Germany with a view to the revival of German colonial ambitions and hopes.² Such an agitation is a bad accompaniment of the pact discussions, and your Lordship should not hesitate to let the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject be known in unequivocal language to those whom they may concern.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

² See No. 331, n. 11.

No. 337

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 107 Telegraphic [C 6852/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 22, 1925, 3 p.m.

Your telegram Nos. 195¹ and 199.²

I am rather sorry that you should have had this exchange of views—however informal—with French Ambassador. However speedy the 'security' negotiations may be, they are bound to take some considerable time; and I am apprehensive that one result of your observations may be that they may be used by French government as an excuse for further delay in presenting the inter-allied note on Cologne.³

Moreover your argument surely applies both ways. If 'security proposals' went in first, subsequent receipt of Cologne note would have an inevitable reaction. If the order is reversed, the reaction may be just the other way round and the 'security proposals' might well react favourably on the other question.

In any event, please refrain from making more of the point as I am anxious to keep an absolutely open field for both communications as and when ready. There are of necessity so many unavoidable delays that our only safe course is to get on as and where we can.

¹ No. 326.

² No. 332.

³ See Nos. 620 and 624, below.

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received May 26, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 47 Telegraphic: by bag [C 7065/459/18]

BRUSSELS, May 25, 1925

My telegram No. 43 of May 20th.¹

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. He told me that his department had furnished him with a memorandum regarding the French draft reply² to the German security proposals³ and that he had had a long consultation with the Prime Minister on the subject.

The following is a resumé of what His Excellency said to me:—

1. Belgium attached great importance to taking part in the Pact on the same footing as the other powers.

2. The Belgian government would wish an explicit guarantee of the new Belgian frontiers. This question had hitherto been rather equivocally treated by the Germans.

3. The Belgian government did not wish to insist upon the preliminary entry of Germany into the League of Nations. They were even in favour of *signing* the Pact before the question of Germany's entry into the League was decided. The Pact should, however, not be brought into operation until this happened.

4. The Belgian government regarded the question of the treaties of arbitration with sympathy but had misgivings about guaranteeing them. They felt, generally speaking, that Belgium should receive rather than give guarantees. However, if they were pressed they might do so, but could not go further than partake in a guarantee for what directly affected Belgium. It was not in practical politics for them to guarantee distant territorial arrangements about which there might be dangerous disputes.

5. Belgium would follow attentively the discussion between her bigger allies of matters which did not concern her directly; but she would only intervene in such discussion if invited to do so and in order to help to bring about a compromise.

¹ No. 333.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

No. 339

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received May 26, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 48 Telegraphic: by bag [C 7066/459/18]

BRUSSELS, May 25, 1925

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

The Minister for Foreign Affairs made some interesting observations this morning to me, which were evidently the result of his conference with the Prime Minister, on the subject of the inadvisability of setting up the intangibility of the treaty of Versailles as a kind of dogma. His Excellency said that, in this matter, the Prime Minister and himself did not see quite eye to eye with M. Hymans who would never consider the question of a jot or tittle of that treaty being altered.

The view of the Prime Minister and of himself was that, if anything better or of a more reciprocal nature could be devised instead of any part of the treaty, it was highly desirable to examine it attentively. In the course of his observations, he spoke of the impossibility of the Danzig corridor² being a permanent arrangement.

Baron Ruzette said that he would like to have the British views on this matter of the intangibility of the Versailles treaty. As he had just told me that Baron Moncheur would be instructed to speak to you about all these questions, I suggested that he would no doubt soon have an opportunity of hearing your views in your own words.

¹ No. 338.

² See No. 205.

No. 340

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 1841 [C 7064/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 25, 1925

My Lord,

The French Ambassador left with me this afternoon the reply of the French Government to the questions which I had very informally addressed to his Excellency¹ for the elucidation of their draft reply² to the German note.³ M. de Fleuriau accompanied the presentation of the document with a running commentary on its terms, which showed, I think, that he appreciated the difficulties which the draft presented to an English mind and that his own mind was working on possible solutions of

¹ No. 330.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

them. He felt in particular that the proposal for a guarantee of treaties of arbitration required very careful study because there was no precedent to guide us in the matter, and he suggested that it might be reserved for examination during the subsequent negotiations. Returning to the same point at a later moment, he asked whether I thought that it would be useful to introduce some such words as 'La garantie dont la définition sera ultérieurement déterminée'. I took a note of the words and said that I should like to examine them at my leisure.

On the general subject, I thanked him for the explanations, which I thought would both assist our understanding of the draft and facilitate an agreement between our two Governments. I noted particularly the passage in paragraph 4 in which express reservation was made of the prerogatives of the Council of the League of Nations. To this I said that I attached importance, pointing out that, if Germany joined the League—which was the basis of our whole conception of the pact—she would automatically undertake obligations not to go to war without submitting the matter in dispute either to judicial arbitration or to the consideration of the Council of the League. I further observed that I could understand the special position of France to the countries with which she had contracted alliances on the eastern frontier of Germany, but I felt sure that M. Briand would equally appreciate the position of the British Government, which was that we could undertake no fresh duties in that part of the world and that it was important to distinguish clearly between the further guarantees that we might be willing to give for the stability of the treaty position in the west and any additional obligations which other nations might undertake in respect of other parts of the world.

His Excellency concluded by saying that his Government hoped it would be possible to hasten this reply, as it appeared to them from the information which they received that the situation at this moment was favourable both in Germany and in France—more favourable in France than it had been a little time ago.

I attach a copy of the note which his Excellency left with me.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 340

French reply to Mr. Chamberlain's informal Memorandum of May 29, 1925,¹ regarding certain Points in French Draft Note of May 12, 1925,² on the subject of Security (Communicated by French Ambassador May 25)

[C 7063/459/18]

22 mai, 1925

Avant d'entrer dans le détail des réponses aux différentes demandes d'éclaircissement formulées par le Gouvernement britannique, il convient de faire la remarque suivante:

Le projet de note français est conçu d'après le plan ci-après: tout d'abord des observations et réserves générales contenues dans les deux premières sections; puis des observations particulières aux diverses questions et propositions envisagées par le mémorandum allemand, ces dernières faisant l'objet des sections 3 et suivantes:

1. L'intention du Gouvernement français n'a pas été de répondre au nom de ses alliés, mais en son nom propre, d'accord avec ses alliés.

Un tel accord est nécessaire, puisque la proposition allemande du 9 février 1925³ est de conclure un pacte auquel participeraient l'Angleterre et d'autres alliés. C'est la raison pour laquelle, en accusant réception du mémorandum allemand le 20 février,⁴ le Gouvernement français avait fait connaître à l'Allemagne qu'il en saisissait ses alliés.

De cette situation de fait est né le présent échange de vues qui, comme l'espère le Gouvernement français, aboutira à constater la communauté de vues des Gouvernements alliés.

Aussi bien le Gouvernement français est-il prêt à rédiger son texte de manière à ne laisser aucun doute à cet égard. Il remplacera donc les termes 'le Gouvernement français et ses alliés' ou le terme 'les alliés' par 'le Gouvernement français, d'accord avec ses alliés'.

2. Par les mots 'dans le cadre du Traité de Versailles,' le Gouvernement français a entendu spécifier que le pacte proposé par l'Allemagne ne saurait en rien contredire, enfreindre ou affaiblir le Traité de Versailles, et représente une offre de garanties complémentaires. Les points qui sont précisés par la réponse française sont en germe dans le Traité ou dans le Pacte de la Société des Nations.

3. La section 2 a pour objet de formuler une réserve d'une portée générale concernant l'ensemble des clauses du Pacte de la Société des Nations et du Traité de Paix, de manière à bien préciser que les accords envisagés dans le mémorandum allemand doivent ne leur porter aucune atteinte d'aucune espèce. Il en est ainsi notamment des clauses concernant les frontières et des dispositions spéciales destinées à assurer l'observation du traité.

La réserve, ainsi formulée au paragraphe 2, est précisée au paragraphe 3 par rapport aux clauses qui ne concern[e]nt pas directement les Puissances alliées, et vise par là spécialement l'Autriche et le Slesvig.

C'est pour répondre à la demande instante faite tant officieusement que publiquement par l'Allemagne que la réponse française n'a pas mentionné expressément le nom de l'Autriche, de la Pologne, etc., ce qui, selon les hommes politiques et les diplomates allemands, aurait rendu impossible pour l'Allemagne la poursuite de la négociation.

Le projet de note français entre ensuite dans la discussion de chacun des accords envisagés dans le mémorandum allemand.

C'est pour ce motif que la section 3, qui est relative au projet de pacte rhénan, contient un passage visant expressément les conditions d'occupa-

⁴ See Nos. 208, n. 3 and 209.

tion du territoire rhénan et l'exécution de l'Arrangement rhénan.

4. Le Gouvernement français a pris le mot 'arbitrage' dans le sens le plus général, entendant par là qu'il s'agit d'exclure les solutions par la force. Quant aux moyens d'atteindre ce but, c'est seulement au cours des négociations des accords éventuels qu'on pourra les préciser.

Dans tous les cas, le caractère obligatoire du règlement pacifique doit être particulièrement affirmé et consacré.

Il n'est pas question d'ailleurs de porter atteinte aux prérogatives du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

La seule condition qui paraît essentielle au Gouvernement français, c'est que la solution pacifique obtenue ait un caractère de décision obligatoire.

5. Il convient de distinguer deux cas:

(1) Inobservation des stipulations des traités ou accords, autres que les traités d'arbitrage, existant entre les parties. Dans ce cas l'inobservation des stipulations de ces traités ou accords ne peut donner lieu *ipso facto* à une action coercitive qu'en vertu d'une disposition spéciale desdits traités et accords, prévoyant une telle action.

(2) Inobservation des traités d'arbitrage: ceux-ci ont, comme il a été dit plus haut, assurément pour objet d'exclure les solutions de force; mais, si ces traités ne sont pas observés, il est nécessaire de prévoir que leur violation apparaît comme pouvant justifier une action coercitive appropriée à la nature de cette violation.

6. —(a) Par 'garantie conjointe et individuelle' on entend que la garantie est donnée par tous les signataires, qui doivent en principe agir ensemble, mais que chacun des signataires, pris isolément, est néanmoins tenu d'agir dans le cas même où l'un ou plusieurs de ses cosignataires seraient défaillants: ainsi, lors de la violation de la neutralité belge par l'Allemagne en 1914, l'Autriche a été défaillante, mais les autres garants étaient tenus d'agir et n'ont pas hésité à faire honneur à leur signature.

(b) Il faut distinguer la garantie territoriale et la garantie donnée à un traité d'arbitrage. La première s'applique en cas de violation d'un territoire et comporte nécessairement le recours à la force pour la défense de ce territoire.

Au contraire, la garantie d'un traité d'arbitrage ne prend pas nécessairement cette forme. Elle suppose tous moyens diplomatiques ou autres appropriés à la nature de la violation. C'est intentionnellement que nous avons évité d'en préciser la nature ou l'étendue. Il va de soi que chacun des garants, en pareil cas, agit dans la mesure de ses possibilités.

Au cas, par exemple, où l'Allemagne violerait le traité d'arbitrage avec la Pologne, la Grande-Bretagne ne pourrait être engagée automatiquement au delà de ce que comportent, d'une part, la garantie donnée par elle au traité d'arbitrage dans les conditions au-dessus définies et, d'autre part, sa qualité de membre de la Société des Nations. En revanche, la France ne pourrait pas se voir opposer le Pacte rhénan par le fait qu'elle pourrait être appelée à assister la Pologne.

Cet exemple même démontre la nécessité de faire coïncider la

conclusion éventuelle d'un pacte rhénan avec la conclusion de traités d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et les Etats alliés voisins, comme d'ailleurs l'Allemagne le propose elle-même.

7. Le paragraphe qui précède donne l'explication demandée concernant le sens et la portée du troisième paragraphe de la section 5.

En effet, si des traités d'arbitrage n'étaient pas conclus entre l'Allemagne et les alliés autres que ceux participant au pacte rhénan, ce dernier pacte pourrait être invoqué par l'Allemagne pour empêcher toute assistance donnée, en conformité avec le pacte de la Société des Nations, à ces États alliés.

8. En plaçant l'ensemble de ces pactes et accords de garantie sous les auspices de la Société des Nations, nous n'avons pas en vue de créer pour les autres membres de la Société des Nations les mêmes obligations que pour les signataires de ces accords. Notre intention a été seulement de placer les accords à intervenir sous la haute autorité morale de la Société des Nations pour pouvoir au besoin lui faire constater la légitimité d'une action entreprise aux termes de ces accords, ainsi que la conformité de cette action avec le pacte et les principes mêmes sur lesquels il repose.⁵

⁵ The text of this reply, together with a translation, is printed in Cmd. 2435, op. cit., pp. 13-18.

No. 341

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 1)

No. 284 [C 7279/459/18]*

WARSAW, May 25, 1925

Sir,

One of the topics which Count Skrzynski touched on in the course of the conversation which I had with him in the country yesterday afternoon¹ was the speech delivered by M. Stresemann in the Reichstag on the 18th instant.² He deplored the tone of M. Stresemann's utterances regarding the Eastern frontiers and the relations between Poland and Germany. I replied that not having seen any account of the speech except a very brief telegraphic summary in the 'Times',³ I was not in a position to judge how far his criticisms were justified.

Count Skrzynski went on to say that his one object at present was to give time to allow the excitement that had been aroused in Poland by the German proposals to die away, and that he might claim that considerable progress had been made in this direction already, as I would judge from the calmer tone of the Polish press. It is certainly a fact that not only the

¹ For an account of another part of this conversation, see Vol. XXV, No. 469.

² See No. 327.

³ See *The Times*, May 19, p. 16.

successes obtained by Poland in the two affairs of the Danzig pillar-boxes⁴ and the Starograd [*sic*] railway accident,⁵ but also the provocative speech of M. Stresemann have called forth very little comment in the Polish newspapers, and such comment as has appeared has been surprisingly moderate in tone. As regards M. Stresemann's speech, the only criticism that has been brought to my notice, besides the article in the 'Messenger polonais' which formed the subject of my despatch No. 271 of the 22nd May,⁶ is one published in the 'Robotnik', the organ of the Socialist party. This article is distinctly chauvinistic in tone and declares that a pact of security on the lines of the German proposals would only prove a source of dispute and perhaps even of war in the east of Europe, and that there can be no question of arbitration concerning the frontiers of Poland when Poland is absolutely determined to resist any modification of those frontiers. Count Skrzynski told me further that he felt that he ought to reply to M. Stresemann's speech as he was already accused of being too weak towards Germany, but, on the other hand, he realised that M. Stresemann had very likely spoken as he had for internal political motives; moreover, he was opposed on principle to this kind of wordy warfare, and as he had said before, he was most anxious that the whole incident should be allowed to die down, so that the relations between the two countries might become more normal again.

I replied that I hoped that he would act on his good impulse and not start a wordy warfare with the German Foreign Minister. 'The less said, the sooner mended.'

I have, etc.,
W. G. MAX MULLER

⁴ See No. 331, n. 7.

⁵ See *ibid.*, n. 8.

⁶ Not printed.

No. 342

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received May 26, 10.20 p.m.)

No. 204 *Telegraphic* [C 7142/459/18]

BERLIN, May 26, 1925

Secretary of State today asked me to convey to you that he was apprehensive about the effect on German opinion of long delay in a reply to German memorandum of February 9th.¹ Three and a half months had now elapsed since German memorandum was sent and France had not yet responded. If no final reply was possible it was most desirable that German Government should receive some preliminary communication showing that their initiative had been accepted as a sincere endeavour to

¹ See No. 197, n. 1.

improve present conditions and arrive at a basis for pacification. If press reports were correct a further long delay might occur before unanimity was reached between the allies on a joint text. It would be dangerous to allow German proposal to remain for this extended period without direct reply.

No. 343

Notes¹ on Meeting of Committee of the Cabinet held in Prime Minister's room at the House of Commons on Tuesday, May 26, 1925

[C 7204/459/18]

MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN first explained the situation. In his view the general spirit and tone of the French draft reply² was all that could be desired and more than could have been expected. He reminded his colleagues that M. Briand was anxious for an early reply as he regarded the present moment as particularly favourable for addressing such a note to Germany. M. Briand's underlying principles were two.

1. That nothing should be done in contravention to, or in derogation from, the Treaty of Versailles. M. Briand's idea was that any pact should be an addition to the Treaty of Versailles. Mr. Chamberlain thought this the right line and he further deprecated raising the question of the European boundaries fixed by the peace treaties.

2. To avoid all possibility of war by providing for a peaceful solution of all conflicts. The French proposals were much influenced by the fact of the existence of a Franco-Polish alliance.³ It was possible that a security pact in the west might result in the loosening of the existing bonds between France and Poland. In the meantime France would naturally try to get His Majesty's Government to extend their obligations as far as possible. Thus, although the French proposals were a little uncertain, they sought to link up the western with the eastern settlement. On this point it was necessary for His Majesty's Government to guard themselves.

LORD CECIL⁴ expressed the view that for His Majesty's Government and the French government to attempt to come to an agreement on a form of words would take a long time. The procedure he would favour would be to say that His Majesty's Government were broadly in agreement with the French reply but that they thought the only way to arrive at a clear understanding was to attempt to draw up an agreement, otherwise he feared (a) long delay or (b) that the French would be left with the impression that His Majesty's Government had agreed to something more than was actually the case.

¹ These were communicated to the Foreign Office by the Cabinet Offices on May 28.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

³ See No. 187.

⁴ Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

LORD BALFOUR said that he thought the first thing was to be clear as to what His Majesty's Government really wanted. There appeared to be three territorial questions concerned

- (1) the western frontier;
- (2) the German-Polish frontier;
- (3) the eastern frontier of Poland.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN stated that the attitude of His Majesty's Government as publicly declared was that they could undertake no new obligation except on the western frontier.⁵ As to the German-Polish frontier, they admitted only the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles. At the same time they would welcome the widest kind of arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland which was acceptable to those two powers.

LORD BALFOUR expressed satisfaction with the territorial restriction of His Majesty's Government's new obligations. He enquired whether this would meet with the approval of Italy.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he believed the line which we had adopted commended itself both to Italy and Belgium. The Italian ambassador had told him that while the western pact did not directly affect Italy, Italy would like to be associated and thus to contribute to the general solution of the problem. The only point with which Italy was specially concerned was the contingency of Austro-German union.

Replying to Lord Cecil, Mr. Chamberlain explained that the first response to the German offer was contained in his speeches in Parliament on March 5⁶ and March 24.⁷ These speeches were not well received in France at first, but French [*sic*] was becoming more favourable towards the idea of the pact. The practicability of a pact depended on the French attitude and the first step had to come from France. It was difficult to ask the French to send the draft note on their own behalf alone as this would be interpreted as disagreement between His Majesty's Government and the French government. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government could not allow themselves to be committed by the French note to obligations which they would be unable to undertake. He then proposed that the French draft should be discussed paragraph by paragraph.

Preamble. The first point was how far His Majesty's Government could allow the document to appear as an inter-allied document. This was a point which would have to be reserved for decision until it was known how far the French government would meet His Majesty's Government on points of detail. Apart from this, Mr. Chamberlain considered the preamble acceptable.

Paragraph 1. This paragraph concerning Germany's entry into the League was in accordance with the British attitude.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE⁸ asked whether the wording of the paragraph might

⁵ See Mr. Chamberlain's speech to the House of Commons of March 24 (182 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s. cols. 307-22). See also No. 269.

⁶ See No. 223, n. 2.

⁷ See No. 269.

⁸ Secretary for Air.

not be altered to show that Germany's entry was an essential but not a prior condition, the French wording not being quite clear on this point.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN did not think this necessary, though our interpretation of the paragraph might be recorded in the instructions which would be sent to H[is] M[ajesty's] Ambassador at Paris.

Paragraph II. This was acceptable in principle. Mr. Chamberlain particularly thought it right to inform his colleagues that it possibly concealed a claim to resort to force under paragraph 18 of annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. At the same time the London Agreements of August 1924⁹ had set up so elaborate a machinery before such action could be taken that the claim even if it existed was not of great importance.

LORD BALFOUR enquired whether the phrase 'result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the conclusion of certain of their clauses' referred to the Dawes Scheme.⁹

SIR C. HURST was invited to consider this point.

Paragraph III was acceptable. The reference to Belgium was clearly right. Belgium might possibly wish to have the guarantee of the Rhineland pact extended to Luxembourg and it was for H[is] M[ajesty's] Government to consider whether they were prepared to agree to this extension. Mr. Chamberlain did not consider the question of very vital importance.

Paragraph IV. This was unacceptable as it stood. Mr. Chamberlain read the following statement:

'Here we are on very debateable ground. In the first place, I do not see that we need or could assume obligations beyond those already entailed on us by the Covenant of the League. In the second place, I do not see how we can reasonably agree to *guarantee* arbitration treaties between Germany and other Powers. What we are ready to do is to guarantee the Rhineland frontier—that and no more; and as to that we are prepared—and indeed anxious—to include a proviso that the guarantee is subject to our existing commitments under the Covenant. That is quite sufficient. It is accordingly suggested that we cut out the whole of the section after the first sentence of paragraph 2.'

MR. AMERY enquired whether even as amended the paragraph would not commit H[is] M[ajesty's] Government to *universal* arbitration treaties with France and Germany.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought that this was not the case and referred to the French memorandum of May 22¹⁰ which in the answer to question 4 contained a definition of what the French government understood by arbitration.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the answer to question 6 in the French memorandum of May 22¹⁰ appeared to be a reservation by France of the

⁹ For the texts of the Agreements of August 30, 1924, for the execution of the Dawes Plan (see No. 27, n. 8), see Cmd. 2270, *Proceedings of the London Reparation Conference July and August 1924* (H.M.S.O., 1924), Nos. 50–53.

¹⁰ See No. 340, Enclosure.

right, in spite of the Rhineland pact, to march into Germany to help Poland. He enquired what would be the position of H[is] M[ajesty's] Government if Poland were in the wrong. Would H[is] M[ajesty's] Government be bound to help Germany against France, or if H[is] M[ajesty's] Government decided not to act in such a case and Germany then counter-attacked France, would H[is] M[ajesty's] Government be bound to help France although we thought the cause which France was supporting to be wrong?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought that the answer lay in the fact that it is proposed that the German-Polish treaty of arbitration should apply to all disputes. If arbitration went in favour of Germany, France could have no right to march against Germany. If, on the other hand, Germany refused to accept an adverse award she would be in the wrong and if she then attacked Poland France would come to her help. Mr. Chamberlain did not see how so restricted a right could be disputed.

SIR C. HURST drew attention to the case where, even under the terms of the Covenant, Germany might lawfully go to war with Poland. What would be the position of France in such a case? Would she be prevented from attacking Germany by the Rhineland pact?

LORD CECIL said that he felt more strongly than ever that it was impossible to discuss details of this sort until a draft agreement had been drawn up. On certain points the French government and H[is] M[ajesty's] Government were evidently not in agreement. One or other would have to give up their point of view and discussion would only lead to delay.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he was able to produce draft treaties if required, but he had not thought it worth while at that stage. His idea was to draft a memorandum to the French government defining the obligations which H[is] M[ajesty's] Government were prepared to undertake and those which they were not prepared to undertake. The French draft would be examined in the light of the principles this established and the French government asked to amend their draft where it was not in accordance with those principles.

LORD BALFOUR enquired whether it was expedient to agree to universal arbitration.

MR. AMERY recalled that New Zealand had already protested against the acceptance of universal arbitration and cited a number of questions which were not suitable for arbitration.¹¹

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the difficulty was that it was quite possible for H[is] M[ajesty's] Government to regard the Rhine frontier as a water-tight compartment, but for the French this was not possible, since any dispute with Germany would involve a Franco-German frontier.

MR. AMERY suggested that the settlement to be come to should be in two parts

¹¹ In a memorandum of January 6, 1925, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (W993/9/98), not printed. For a text, see Cmd 2458, op. cit., pp. 13-16.

(1) There should be a Rhineland guarantee pact in which H[is] M[ajesty's] Government would participate.

(2) H[is] M[ajesty's] Government would give their blessing to any arbitration treaty which France and Germany might conclude. He thought it impossible for H[is] M[ajesty's] Government themselves to enter into universal arbitration treaties.

LORD CECIL doubted the possibility of dividing international disputes into water-tight compartments as any dispute between France and Germany might affect their common frontier. The only thing to do was to provide for peace.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN agreed with Mr. Amery that the part of the French answer which dealt with arbitration could not be accepted and that H[is] M[ajesty's] Government must limit the sphere in which they were ready to submit to compulsory arbitration. At the same time it must be borne in mind that H[is] M[ajesty's] Government could not go to war in any dispute before the Council of the League had exhausted its conciliatory procedure. He would like the French draft to be considered from the point that H[is] M[ajesty's] Government were prepared to give only a territorial guarantee. It was not necessary to define the British position in detail in replying to the French government. It was only necessary to take out from the French draft those portions which were unacceptable.

LORD BIRKENHEAD¹² said that France and Great Britain evidently contemplated different things. France wanted compulsory arbitration which would not be accepted in this country. It was no use glossing over the difference and he recommended that a draft be prepared accepting as much as possible of the French draft, saying how far H[is] M[ajesty's] Government were themselves prepared to go, and welcoming any arrangement between France and Germany into which those Powers chose to enter.

The discussion then turned on whether H[is] M[ajesty's] Government were prepared to back an arbitration treaty.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that if France and Germany agreed to arbitration any resort to force to enforce an award was bound to involve the crossing of a frontier.

General agreement was reached on the following points.

- (1) In case of a simple refusal to arbitrate by either party to an arbitration treaty, the guarantor would not move.
- (2) If a refusal were accompanied with a resort to force the guarantor would defend the party attacked.
- (3) There would be no obligation upon the guarantor to defend the recalcitrant party. In short, the guarantee would be only defensive and would operate in favour only of those who had accepted arbitration and the arbitral award.

It was agreed that little further progress could be made until the

¹² Secretary for India.

Committee had before it the actual draft of the communication concerning the **French** reply which Mr. Chamberlain would propose to make to the **French** government. Mr. Chamberlain undertook to prepare such a draft **and to** submit it to the Committee at its next meeting.¹³

¹³ A **draft** was prepared in the Foreign Office and was approved by the Cabinet Committee on May 28. For the communication of this reply to the French Government, see No. 349. **Enclosure**, below.

No. 344

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard (Washington)

*No. 843 [C 7156/450 18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 26, 1925

Sir,

After the American Ambassador had handed to me the note in reference to the Swift case, as recorded in my despatch No. 840,¹ he asked me whether I could tell him anything about the political situation. He observed that in Berlin² and Washington he had heard nothing but politics, but that, since he had been here, he had no news except what he read in the papers. I accordingly told him that I believed that the Allied Governments, and in particular the French Government and ourselves, were practically agreed upon the communication to be made to the German Government on the subject of disarmament,³ and that, if it were of the character which I anticipated—though our demands might wear a somewhat formidable appearance at first sight—there was nothing in them which the military advisers of His Majesty's Government did not consider necessary, and I was assured that the further measures which we should ask of the German Government were not only practicable but, with goodwill on their side, could be executed within three months. Upon their execution would follow the evacuation of Cologne.

As regards the German proposals for a mutual pact,⁴ we had received a draft reply from the French Government.⁵ We had been obliged to seek further explanations of its meaning,⁶ as certain passages in it appeared to us to be obscure, but I could say at once that its general tone and temper as towards Germany appeared to me to be all that could be desired, and I was informed by Lord D'Abernon that he thought a note conceived on

¹ Of May 25, not printed. The note of May 22, which was handed to Mr. Chamberlain during a conversation of May 25, concerned the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of the Chicago meatpacking firm Swift and Company *versus* the Board of Trade, in regard to meat requisitioned in 1919. See *The Times*, March 18, p. 6.

² Mr. A. Houghton has been Ambassador in Berlin April, 1922–February, 1925.

³ See No. 624, below.

⁴ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁵ See No. 318, Enclosure.

⁶ See Nos. 328, 330, and 340, Enclosure.

such lines would produce a favourable impression on Germany.⁷ Indeed, my principal preoccupation at the moment was not its effect upon Germany, but whether the language employed did not imply that the British Empire would undertake wider obligations than any for which we were prepared.

Mr. Houghton, who, owing to his long residence in Berlin, is perhaps inclined to think of Germany first and foremost, appeared gratified and reassured by my statements. He went on to say that he did not think that agreement would be reached by an exchange of notes, and that sooner or later—and sooner rather than later—a conference would be necessary, and he seemed to hint rather obscurely that the United States might be prepared to participate in such a conference in the same way as they had done in the Reparation Conference.⁸ I have observed that his reference was obscure, and I did not seek to elucidate it, for at first sight I do not see how, in negotiations for a political pact of this character where no American co-operation can be expected, the presence of American unofficial or semi-official participants could really help us to a solution. I think it necessary, however, to mention the matter to you, not in order that you may raise it with the American Government, but so that you may be on the look-out for any hint of the same kind which might proceed from the Secretary of State, which you would of course report to me.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁷ See No. 326.

⁸ See No. 225, n. 17.

No. 345

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 1)

*No. 285 [C 7280/459/18]**

WARSAW, May 26, 1925

Sir,

In the course of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, His Excellency told me that he had read with sincere gratification the account which M. Skirmunt had sent him of his interview with you on the 19th instant.¹

In reply to a question from me, Count Skrzynski intimated, but not very clearly, that he felt satisfied with the assurances regarding the eastern frontier contained in the proposed French reply² to the German note of the 20th February.³ He agreed with me that those assurances were not as definite as Polish public opinion might desire, but he counted on what was

¹ See No. 331.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

implied in the draft rather on what was explicitly stated. He instanced more especially the French insistence on the unconditional entry of Germany into the League of Nations, and the declarations, firstly, that any agreement to be concluded should neither imply, nor in practice lead to, any revision of the terms of the peace treaties, and, secondly, that the Allied Governments would renounce none of the rights or obligations derived from those treaties or the covenant of the League.

I have, etc.,

W. G. MAX MULLER

No. 346

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 28, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 196 Telegraphic: by bag [C 7177/459/18]

PARIS, May 27, 1925

In the debate in the Senate yesterday on the foreign affairs budget, Monsieur Briand made a statement on the main questions of the moment.

Dealing with the proposal for a pact,¹ he stated that France had shown herself ready to engage in conversations on condition that such conversations were based on absolute reciprocal loyalty. The French answer to the German proposals would only be given to Germany after it had been communicated to all the allies, and after their approval had been received in such a manner as to assure France that if the conditions stipulated were realised, the pact could be signed under favourable auspices and in such a way as to give to France all the security desirable. The pact would, of course, only be concluded within the framework of the treaties. There were in the peace treaties certain lacunae. It was not for France to ask her English, Italian and Belgian friends to give up anything of their national point of view any more than it was for them to ask France to abandon hers. In a question of security France was on excellent ground for securing attention for her arguments because her attitude was dictated by the instinct of self-preservation. In any case, the treaties such as they were had certain advantages, and to reject them on the plea of their drawbacks would be worse than to have to apply them.

Alluding to Herr Stresemann's recent speeches,² Monsieur Briand remarked that he had not observed in them that somewhat harsh attitude of *non possumus* which might have been expected after the German presidential election.³ As regards military control, Monsieur Briand stated that there were obviously certain failures on the part of Germany⁴ which, although if each were taken separately, did not give cause for alarm, nevertheless when considered collectively evidently justified 'un petit

¹ See No. 197, n. 1.

³ See Nos. 292, n. 8 and 611, n. 2, below.

² See e.g. No. 327.

⁴ See No. 592, below.

frisson d'inquiétude'. It was necessary that these failures should be put right. If Germany executed her engagements loyally and did not attempt to deceive, if she aimed at the full execution of the treaty and contemplated conditions of security honestly with the allies, France would know it very quickly and it would not be France who would regret such a result.

Turning to the question of inter-allied debts, as regards which he spoke almost exclusively of the debt to the United States,⁵ Monsieur Briand scouted the idea that the United States really believed that France was trying to avoid payment. France had never said at any time that she wished to avoid payment; she had merely said that the extent to which she had suffered and the extent to which debts were owing to her had placed her in a position of very real difficulty. Never had she said anything to justify such an unjust supposition as that she intended to avoid payment. He had himself stated to Americans of note that France wished to pay her debt. She would certainly suffer in doing so, but that did not matter. France had in fact acknowledged in conversations and had let it be known formally that she wished to settle her debt.

Full text in my despatch No. 1222 of today.⁶

⁵ At November 1924, France owed the United States over 4,137 million dollars.

⁶ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 347

Minute by Sir C. Hurst

[C 7299/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 27, 1925

Towards the end of the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on the Security Pact with France on May 26,¹ the view was put forward that in respect of the compulsory arbitration provisions Great Britain's participation should be limited to guaranteeing a comprehensive arbitration treaty between France and Germany.

If this plan is adopted, it would be better and more logical to reshape the draft security pact altogether. It should be put into the form of an undertaking between France (and Belgium) on one side and Germany on the other that neither will violate the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, and the British Empire (and other Powers like Italy if they are willing) should only come in as guarantors of the observance of the Franco-German undertaking.

The point made by Lord Cecil on May 26 must be borne in mind. The obligation not to go to war and the obligation to adopt some pacific method of settling a dispute must be co-extensive; if there is a gap

¹ See No. 343.

between them the treaty will not work. Suppose Great Britain and Germany pledge themselves not to wage war upon each other (as proposed in the German note² and in the departmental Security Pact draft)³ and Germany starts burning all the English babies in Germany, what is to happen? Under the Covenant the Council will make a report and if Germany ignores the report and continues to burn babies, Great Britain can go to war. If by the Pact Great Britain destroys her right to go to war, the existing machinery of the League won't help her in such a case as the above. If Great Britain is to pledge herself not to go to war, there must be some undertaking on the part of Germany to settle by peaceful means every dispute which would otherwise have necessitated a war.

The converse is equally true. Germany, if she surrenders her right in the last resort to go to war, must secure some method of settling a dispute peaceably.

If the obligation accepted by Great Britain to resort to a pacific method of settling a dispute is to be eliminated and she is merely to guarantee a Franco—German arbitration treaty, the obligation not to go to war should be eliminated also. Otherwise there will be a gap.

A re-shaping of the draft Security Pact so as to limit Great Britain's position to that of a guarantor would deprive her of all direct benefit under it and might entail a re-examination of the question of inserting a time limit.⁴

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See No. 319.

⁴ Mr. Lampson minuted on May 27: 'Sir C. Hurst.

'When you speak of the "draft security pact" in the enclosed paper, to what actually do you refer? Are we right in believing that it is your *draft* of such an instrument? In other words, are you referring to a paper which, in so far as our present correspondence with France is concerned, is still non-existent?

'Later.

'Sir C. Hurst, to whom I have spoken about this, does not want it sent in. He had in mind the eventual form of pact which will have sooner or later to take formal shape. For the moment his idea is to keep this particular point in the background pending developments.'

No. 348

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

*No. 790 [C 7262/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 27, 1925

Sir,

The Italian Ambassador called this afternoon to ask what information I could give him upon the attitude of the British Government to the French draft reply¹ to the German proposals² and as to the communications and

¹ See No. 318, Enclosure.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

explanations which it was known had passed between the French and British Governments.³ I told his Excellency that I had intended, when the terms of our reply had been definitely settled, to communicate at least the substance of it to Rome and Brussels as well as to Paris. In the meantime, I should prefer to make only some very general observations. The conciliatory spirit evidenced in the French draft entirely corresponded with the feelings of His Majesty's Government, but we had found some phrases and even paragraphs of the draft obscure, and had felt it necessary to seek further explanation of them. In general I might say the study of the note, even after these explanations, led me to feel that the French Government wished to engage their allies in larger and wider obligations than we, at any rate, were prepared to undertake. We had rejected the protocol⁴ amongst other reasons because it involved a general increase in our obligations for which we were not prepared. We were willing to co-operate in adding to the stability and security of the territorial settlement in the west, but we were not, for instance, prepared to undertake a guarantee of treaties of arbitration between Germany and her eastern neighbours, much as we should welcome the conclusion of such treaties between them. We had no desire to prevent France from undertaking broader obligations which might be desirable or necessary in her case, but which were unsuitable to the situation of the British Empire; but, since the note was to express the general opinion of the Allies, we should wish it to be confined either to those points of policy which were common to us all or to distinguish between that which was common to us all and such additional engagements as France might think it right to enter into.

The Ambassador enquired whether the explanations which the French Government had given were of a nature to lessen or increase the difficulty of an agreement between us. I said that I thought they tended to facilitate agreement, but they still left me with the impression that the language of the French note imported wider obligations than we could undertake. I had, however, every hope that we should arrive without any great difficulty at an agreement with France and with our other allies. His Excellency asked if he might then consider that there had been no check in the progress of these negotiations. I replied that this was certainly my view—far from regarding the French draft as a check, I regarded it as marking an advance and as being of good augury for their ultimate success.

His Excellency thanked me and said that he should report my observations to his Government. He believed that Signor Mussolini had not as yet sent any reply to France, and might be influenced by the character of the reply sent by His Majesty's Government, with whose views the Ambassador anticipated that he would be in general agreement.

³ See Nos. 318, Enclosure, 322, 328, 330 and 340.

⁴ See Nos. 10, n. 4 and 240, n. 13.

Signor **Mussolini**, as I knew, had not been very fond of the protocol, and he too **had** seen in the French note an effort to bring back by the door what **had** gone out of the window.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 349

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1887 [C 7174/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 28, 1925

My Lord,

I have received your Lordship's despatch No. 1126 of the 13th May,¹ enclosing the draft of the reply which the French Government propose to send to the proposals for a pact of security made to them by Germany on the 9th February last.² The subsequent explanations of this draft reply so courteously furnished by the French Government through their Ambassador in London³ at my request have greatly assisted His Majesty's Government in its examination, and I am now in a position to give their reasoned comments on the document, which they have considered with all the care that the importance of the subject demands.

2. It will be convenient to set out first of all the point of view from which His Majesty's Government have themselves approached the German proposals and the principles by which they have been guided in examining both those proposals and the suggested French reply.

3. The point of departure is to be found in the reasoned statement which I made on behalf of His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the 12th March last,⁴ in which the view was expressed that the best way to carry out programme of security, arbitration and disarmament was, with the co-operation of the League of Nations, to supplement the covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs. These arrangements should be purely defensive in character, and should be framed in the spirit of the covenant, working in close harmony with the League and under its guidance.

4. Secondly, in my speech in the House of Commons on the 24th March⁵ I indicated that, while His Majesty's Government could not accept an extension to every frontier of obligations of the most serious kind, they could properly undertake such obligations in that sphere with which British interests are most closely bound up, namely, the frontier between Germany and her western neighbours.

¹ No. 318.

³ See Nos. 328 and 340, Enclosure.

⁵ See No. 269.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 240, n. 13.

5. The basic principle, then, by which His Majesty's Government are guided in their approach to the matter now under discussion is, and must be, that any new obligation which they undertake shall be specific and limited to the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangement on the western frontier of Germany. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to assume fresh obligations elsewhere in addition to those already devolving upon them as signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Peace Treaties. At the same time, it may be well to repeat that, in seeking means to strengthen the position in the west, His Majesty's Government do not themselves question, or give any encouragement to others to question, the other provisions of the treaties which form the basis of the existing public law of Europe.

6. With these preliminary declarations I turn to the French draft. In the first place, His Majesty's Government would wish to express their appreciation of its conciliatory tone, which is in complete harmony with the spirit that inspires the policy of His Majesty's Government. The evident desire which it displays to maintain peace and to facilitate the peaceful solution of disputes is a happy augury of the success of the negotiations to which it forms a preliminary.

7. The substance of the note, however, goes in certain respects considerably beyond what His Majesty's Government could for their part endorse consistently with the principles enunciated above. Section IV, for example, contemplates the conclusion between signatories of the proposed Rhineland Pact of arbitration treaties which would apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and would be guaranteed jointly and severally by the signatories of the Rhineland Pact. Section V suggests that the same joint and several guarantee should be given by the same Powers to similar arbitration treaties between Germany and States other than the signatories of the Rhineland Pact.

8. I hasten to repeat what I have already said in my statement of the 12th March to the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva,⁴ that His Majesty's Government naturally look with sympathy on any effort to improve the international machinery for maintaining the peace of the world. They therefore welcome any treaties of arbitration or conciliation which the continental Powers concerned may be prepared to enter into, provided only that such treaties do not affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the covenant. But the position of His Majesty's Government is somewhat different from that of those Powers. In view of the position of the British Empire, with its world-wide responsibilities, His Majesty's Government are bound to regard the question of participation in treaties of this description from a different point of view to that of Powers whose interests lie mainly or exclusively in Europe. And as regards the proposals for the maintenance of peace which are now under discussion, His Majesty's Government feel that, while for the continental Powers concerned the conclusion of the suggested arbitration treaties forms, as is stated in the French draft reply,

the **natural** complement of a Rhineland pact, this is not equally the case with **Great Britain**.

9. **For** the same reasons, while His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be in the best interests of peace if the Rhineland Pact and the various arbitration treaties between Germany and her neighbours were to come into force simultaneously, yet they cannot support the proposal made in section VI of the French draft that all such arbitration treaties and the Rhineland Pact should form an indivisible whole and be co-ordinated in one general convention.

10. Nevertheless, though His Majesty's Government are not prepared to go so far as the French Government suggest, yet they are prepared *in principle* (and, of course, subject to a careful examination of the actual terms ultimately proposed) to give a guarantee, flowing logically from the territorial guarantee of the Rhineland, of arbitration treaties which may be concluded between Germany and her western neighbours, signatories of the pact. The type of guarantee which they have in mind would operate in the event of a failure on the part of one of the parties to refer a dispute to arbitration (using the term in its widest sense to cover both judicial awards and conciliation tribunals) or to carry out an award, if such failure were coupled with a resort to hostilities. The guarantee would be, so to speak, defensive; it would not entail upon His Majesty's Government—as they conceive it—any obligation to resort to force elsewhere than in the areas covered by the proposed Rhineland Pact; and would not operate in any event in favour of the party which had refused arbitration or had refused to give effect to an arbitral award.

11. It is clear from the four preceding paragraphs that the French draft as it stands cannot be accepted as accurately conveying the extent and character of the obligations which His Majesty's Government are ready to assume and that its terms require amendment if they are to express not merely the views of the French Government but, as the French Government suggest, the common policy of the Allies.

12. His Majesty's Government do not desire to suggest that the form of the note should be changed so to make it clear that it commits the French Government alone to the views and proposals which it contains. Rather, recognising to the full the great value and importance of an agreed statement of views common to the Allied Powers, they would strongly recommend that an effort be made so as to amend the draft as to achieve agreement.

13. With that object in view, His Majesty's Government have ventured to remodel the French draft in such a way as to confine it to such a statement of policy as they believe is common to both countries and thus to avoid raising particular points of principle in which this country cannot *ab initio* concur. A copy of this recast draft is enclosed (printed side by side, for convenience, with a translation of the original French draft), and, in communicating it to M. Briand, I request that your Lordship will lay emphasis on the fact that my object has been to produce a statement of

general principles without in any way committing either His Majesty's Government or their allies to exact phraseology or to particular proposals whose exact shape can only be determined when the time is reached for considering a draft instrument to give effect to these general objects.

14. Having said so much as regards underlying principles, it only remains to deal in detail with the French draft paragraph by paragraph, explaining where necessary the views of His Majesty's Government and giving the reasons for such alterations in the original draft as are now submitted to the French Government.

15. The preamble and the first three sections of the French draft remain unaltered in the revised version. But while accepting them as they stand, His Majesty's Government feel bound to point out that they are couched in terms so wide that His Majesty's Government must reserve their liberty to define more precisely at the proper time the interpretation which is to be placed upon them. This of course necessarily applies to the whole document; with this general reserve, His Majesty's Government only desire to make two specific remarks concerning the first three sections.

16. First, it is understood that the effect of section I is that Germany's entry into the League is an essential but not a prior condition of the agreement contemplated. The agreement, would, however, be so framed that it would only become operative on Germany joining the League.

17. Secondly, His Majesty's Government desire specifically to endorse the observation in section III that Belgium ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested. Without her inclusion the proposed pact would obviously be incomplete. This is so self-evident that the omission of Belgium's name from the German proposals can only have been due to an oversight, as, indeed, the German Government have since explained.⁶

18. In section IV the first paragraph of the original French draft remains unaltered, it being simply a summary of a portion of the German proposals themselves. The broad reasons for the amendments made in the remainder of the section will be apparent from the exposition of principles contained in the earlier part of this despatch. The second paragraph has been considerably modified and amplified. In the first place, as it reads in the revised version, it refers only to a possible Franco-German arbitration treaty, thus leaving the other Allies free to decide whether or not to conclude a similar arbitration treaty with Germany. At the same time, the hope is expressed that Belgium will be disposed to enter into a similar treaty. If, as His Majesty's Government feel should be the case, the draft is submitted to the Belgian Government before despatch and is subsequently sent with the approval of that Government, it will no doubt be possible to redraft the phrase regarding Belgium in a more positive sense.

19. Next, the latter half of the second sentence in the second paragraph

⁶ See Nos. 209 and 240.

of the **same** section has been redrafted in such a way as to make clear the **meaning** which, according to the explanations offered to me, the French **Government** attached to it.

20. **Thirdly**, in place of the third sentence of the second paragraph a new **paragraph** is added retaining the idea of a guarantee of an arbitration treaty, **and** making clear the implication of such a guarantee.

21. **The** alterations made in section V are two in number. In the first place, **the** words in the second paragraph 'the object of the pact could not be **attained**' have been omitted because it was felt that they were unnecessarily pessimistic. The idea which the words were presumably intended to convey has been retained, however, by the insertion of words to show **that** while the Rhineland Pact is an essential step towards the attainment of European peace, that peace cannot be completely guaranteed **if the** Rhineland Pact remains unsupported by other regional settlements.

22. **The** second alteration in this section consists in the omission of the final **paragraph** of the original draft. The paragraph provided for the guarantee by the signatories of the Rhineland Pact of arbitration treaties between **Germany** and her other neighbours. This, for reasons already explained in this despatch, is unacceptable to His Majesty's Government.

23. **A new** section has been inserted at this point, numbered VI. Its only object is, by a clear statement, to prevent misunderstanding. There can, of course, **be** no question that it expresses a view on which the Allied Governments are unanimously agreed.

24. **Section VII** is based on the original section VI in the French draft. The first two paragraphs of the latter section were in contradiction with the principle of limited obligations which His Majesty's Government have adopted, **and** were therefore unacceptable. They have been replaced by the first **paragraph** of section VII which expresses the view that the various agreements in contemplation, whether relating to the Rhineland or to the other frontiers of Germany, should come into force simultaneously.

25. **The rest** of the original section VI is reproduced in section VII, with only **one** alteration, viz., in the last paragraph the phrase 'French Government' has been substituted for 'Allied Governments' as being more in accordance with the form of a note which is to be sent to Germany by France alone, but in agreement with the Allies.

26. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the French Government will see **their way** to accept the modifications proposed above. It is, of course, far from being their intention to suggest that the French Government should renounce those ideas in their original draft, which His Majesty's Government have been unable to accept, and an acceptance of the modified draft would not be construed by His Majesty's Government as a renunciation by the French Government of those ideas. His Majesty's Government are solely actuated by the consideration that it would be of great advantage if at this stage a note were sent to Germany

setting out the basic principles on which the Allies are in agreement. They urge this course because they believe that it will serve a more useful purpose than the despatch of separate notes which, while having the advantage of showing the maximum limit to which each Allied Power was prepared to go, would have the disadvantage of laying undue emphasis on such divergence of views as may exist between the Allies.

27. I request that, in communicating to M. Briand the enclosed revised draft, your Lordship will read this despatch to him and leave with him a copy.⁷

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 349

*Draft Reply to the German
Memorandum²*

May 12, 1925

Suggested Alternative Draft

(N.B.—The passages which differ from the French draft are printed in italics.)

As they have informed the German Government in their note of the 20th February last,⁸ the French Government have studied, in common with their allies, the suggestions contained in the memorandum forwarded to them on the 9th February² by his Excellency M. von Hoesch.

The French Government and their allies regard the step taken by the German Government as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own.

Wishing to give to all the States concerned supplementary guarantees of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, they have examined the German proposals with all the attention that they merit in order to judge what elements they may afford for the consolidation of peace.

Before embarking, however, on

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Before embarking, however, on

⁷ The text of this despatch and its enclosure is printed in Cmd. 2435, op. cit., pp. 18–28.

⁸ See Nos. 208, n. 3 and 209.

an examination in detail of the German note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations:—

I

The memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations.

Now the Allied States are members of the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace.

The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant of the League.

This agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of the League of Nations dated the 13th March, 1925.⁹

II

The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the peace treaties.

The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to

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⁹ See No. 261, Enclosure.

result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses.

Thus the Allies cannot in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them.

III

The memorandum of the 9th February² contemplates first of all the conclusion between the 'Powers interested in the Rhine' of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles:—

1. Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States.

2. Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States.

3. A guarantee by the contracting States of the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarisation of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty (of Versailles), of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war (an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any time-limit) between the contracting States.

Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested.

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Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested.

It also goes without saying, and further results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.¹⁰

IV

The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States parties to the Rhineland Pact arbitration treaties guaranteeing 'a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts'.

France considers that such arbitration treaties would be the natural complement of a Rhineland pact. But it must be understood that they should apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and should not leave room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated in the present note. To give full effect to these treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers who participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland pact.

It also goes without saying, and further results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.¹⁰

IV

The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States, parties to the Rhineland Pact arbitration treaties guaranteeing 'a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts'.

France considers that *an arbitration treaty of the kind proposed* would be the natural complement of a Rhineland pact. But it must be understood that *as between herself and Germany it would apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and should not leave room for coercive action save where such action may be taken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties. It is hoped that the Belgian Government will be disposed to enter into a similar treaty.*

To give full effect to these two treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland pact, so as to ensure that any failure to refer a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an award would, if coupled with a resort to hostilities, bring the guarantee into immediate operation. In the absence of a resort to hostilities, the Council of the League shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty.

¹⁰ See No. 330, n. 5.

V

In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind.

The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the object aimed at by the pact could not be attained nor the peace of Europe completely guaranteed.

The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves.

The arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in paragraph IV and would be backed by the same joint and several guarantee.

VI

In the opinion of the French Government the general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be effectively assured unless the agreements contemplated in the present note form an indivisible whole.

They consider therefore that all the agreements, the observance of which should in each case be guaranteed by the signature of the same Powers, ought to be co-

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In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind.

The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, *towards which the pact is an essential step, could not be completely guaranteed.*

The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves.

VI

Nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present note would affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the covenant.

VII

The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present note come into force simultaneously.

Finally, it goes without saying that, if the United States were to

ordinated in a general convention registered by the League of Nations, placed under the auspices of the League and capable of forming, as suggested in the German memorandum itself, the nucleus of a still more general pacific entente.

Finally, it goes without saying that, if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realised, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security.

Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government.

The Allied Governments would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

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Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government.

The French Government would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

No. 350

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 1905 [C 7265/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 28, 1925

My Lord,

I asked the French Ambassador to call upon me this afternoon.

I told him that the Cabinet had today settled the terms of the reply¹

¹ The conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of May 28 (Cab. 27(25)) ran as follows: '... 3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed his colleagues that the Cabinet Committee on the draft reply of the French Government [see No. 318, Enclosure] to the German Note on Security [see No. 197, n. 1] had met on Tuesday, May 26th [see No. 343], and had made considerable progress. As the result of discussion the Committee had asked him to prepare a draft for their consideration at a meeting to be held the same afternoon. The proposals of the Committee, however, could not be ready before the dispersal of the Cabinet for the Whitsuntide holidays [Whitsun fell on May 31]. In the meantime the

which we should send in regard to their draft of a note² in answer to the German Pact proposals.³ Our reply would, I said, take the form of a covering despatch to Lord Crewe⁴ enclosing the terms of a note in which we could express our complete concurrence. This despatch, I said, would be sent to Your Lordship by tomorrow's bag, and I should at the same time send copies of it to Rome⁵ and Brussels⁶ and to the Ambassadors of the three Allies in London. I told His Excellency that it was the desire of the British Government to contribute to the security of Europe by joining in a mutual pact of guarantee for the territorial settlement in the west, but that, while we should welcome and would encourage treaties of arbitration of the widest character between Germany and her eastern neighbours, we were not prepared to be parties to such treaties or in any way to guarantee them except in so far as they would naturally fall within the terms of the Covenant and the obligations of a member of the League of Nations. My only anxiety was lest France, in endeavouring to engage us in obligations which our public opinion would not allow us to undertake, should make it impossible for us to give to France and Belgium the additional security which we desired to afford them.

As regards Germany and the western powers themselves, we had no desire to restrict the scope of any treaty for arbitration which France and Belgium were willing to make with Germany. For ourselves we should propose to arbitrate any question arising out of the territorial settlement which we guaranteed, but we could not undertake, even with these powers, to refer all possible causes of dispute to compulsory arbitration. Our views on this point were set out in para[graph] 8 of the covering despatch to Your Lordship,⁴ to which together with paragraph 10 I would draw particular attention.

I then proceeded to explain the extent and effect of the guarantee which, as stated in para[graph] 10 of the despatch, the British gov[ern]-

question had become one of great urgency. In this connection Mr. Austen Chamberlain referred to Lord D'Abernon's telegram No. 204, of May 26th [No. 342], conveying a message from the German Secretary of State to the effect that he was apprehensive of the effect on German opinion of the long delay in replying to the German Memorandum of February 9th. Before the Cabinet re-assembled, Mr. Chamberlain himself would have been compelled to proceed to Geneva to attend a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations arranged some weeks ago [see No. 137, n. 2]. He was most reluctant not to fulfil this engagement, more especially as M. Briand had intimated his intention to attend if Mr. Chamberlain did so, and this would provide an admirable opportunity for an exchange of views between the two Foreign Ministers. He therefore asked whether the Cabinet would prefer to meet again on the following morning or to delegate to the Cabinet Committee authority to approve finally on their behalf the terms of the reply to the French Government.

"The Cabinet agreed—To delegate to the Cabinet Committee full authority on their behalf to approve the terms of the reply of the Secretary of State to the French Note. . . ."

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁵ In Foreign Office despatch No. 779 to Rome of May 28, not printed.

⁶ In Foreign Office despatch No. 609 to Brussels of May 28, not printed.

⁴ No. 349.

men]t are prepared to give to arbitration treaties between Germany and her western neighbours, signatories to the Rhineland Pact.

My main purpose in requesting M. de Fleuriau to call was to impress upon him the necessity of making it clear to M. Briand that the despatch represented the limit to which the British gov[ernmen]t could go, and to emphasise the danger of risking the success of the whole policy of a Pact by an attempt to involve H[is] M[ajesty's] gov[ernmen]t in wider obligations which public opinion would not allow them to undertake.

I request that you will take an early opportunity to speak in the same sense to M. Briand.

I am, etc.,

In the absence of the S[ecretary] of S[tate],

HAROLD NICOLSON

No. 351

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 30, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 201 Telegraphic: by bag [C 7272/459/18]

PARIS, May 29, 1925

Your despatch No. 1887.¹

In accordance with your instructions I tried to see the Secretary for Foreign Affairs this morning, but he is engaged at a Cabinet Council which is likely to hold a long sitting, and he might not be free later; so that I thought it better to see M. Berthelot at once. There was this advantage, that his position at the Quai d'Orsay is so influential that any acceptance by him of your proposed modifications in the Draft would carry the greatest weight with the government. I went through the despatch with him, and though of course he could not state approval of particular passages, I got the impression that the whole will receive careful and fair consideration. M. Berthelot seemed to grasp fully the import of paragraph 10, and also to apprehend completely the purpose detailed in paragraph 13. He was evidently impressed by the terms of paragraph 26. He was also particularly insistent on the absolute necessity of the terms of the reply being such as could be whole-heartedly accepted by all the Allies, and when I laid stress on your desire to proceed by stages he raised no objection.

At the same time, though I do not derive this impression from anything said by M. Berthelot today. I shall not be surprised if the French government try to reassure the States outside the Rhineland pact by suggesting some more specific security for them over and above that which they enjoy under the covenant of the League of Nations.

¹ No. 349.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

[C 7296/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 29, 1925

My dear Phipps,

Your letter to Lampson of May 21st.¹ The point which it raised was one which had been exercising our minds also and we have gone carefully into it.

The answer to Laroche is briefly that there is no need to fly to specially guaranteed arbitration treaties to meet the situation which he contemplates. The remedy is already provided by the terms of the League Covenant. I quote an opinion given by Hurst:²

'My view certainly is that if Germany attacks Poland, article 16 of the Covenant will come into play and France will then be entitled to treat such resort to war against Poland as an act of war committed against herself and may proceed accordingly. This result will ensue whether Germany becomes a Member of the League or not, because article 17, paragraph 3, would apply if she has not become a Member of the League, and article 16 would apply directly if she has.

Great Britain would be in the same position as France if Germany resorted to war against Poland and would be bound to apply as against Germany the sanctions provided for in article 16. I cannot see how France would be any the more protected from the fear of reactions from Great Britain by Great Britain having become a party to a Polish-German arbitral treaty, the participation being limited to a "protest".'

The Secretary of State has approved the suggestion that you should let these views be known privately at the Quai d'Orsay and that you should intimate to Laroche that the question is one of such importance that if the French government desire to pursue it, it should be taken up by Fleuriau with the Secretary of State. Naturally a matter of such prime importance cannot properly be dealt with by private correspondence. But it is nonetheless just as well that the French should know our *departmental* view of the question. If they want more—i.e. the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government—let them raise it formally through their Ambassador here who will confirm this letter.

W. TYRRELL

¹ This stated that M. Laroche had contended that France should be free to go to the defence of Poland and Czechoslovakia and that, where Poland was concerned, Britain should be one of the guarantors or a party to a Polish-German Arbitral Treaty, being, however, only engaged to protest in the event of an attack on Poland.

² In a minute of May 22 (C7296/459/18).

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 2)

No. 1248 [C 7322/459/18]

PARIS, May 30, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, a memorandum by Mr. Phipps, giving an account of a conversation which he had last night with Monsieur Briand in regard to the comments of His Majesty's Government¹ on the draft reply which the French Government propose to send² to the German proposals for a pact of security.³

I have, etc.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 353

*Memorandum**

I met M. Briand at dinner last night, and after dinner I had a few minutes' conversation with him, in the course of which I expressed the hope that his first impression of the views of His Majesty's Government on the proposed French reply to the German pact proposals, as set forth in Mr. Chamberlain's despatch No. 1887 of the 28th May,⁴ was a favourable one. M. Briand replied in the affirmative, and declared that he was convinced that no great difficulty would be experienced in reaching an agreement. M. Briand assured me that he quite realised the reluctance of His Majesty's Government, in view of the feelings of the dominions in the matter, to bind themselves in regard to the eastern frontiers of Germany any more than they were already bound by the terms of the covenant. So far as he was concerned, he was absolutely convinced that the only hope for the future peace of Europe lay in close collaboration between Great Britain and France, and he would spare no efforts to attain that end. M. Briand added that he hoped that before long a solution satisfactory to all parties of the question of inter-Allied debts⁵ would be reached, for a settlement of that question was quite indispensable.

M. Briand said that he thought that the Germans, when they made their original proposals for a pact,³ had been actuated by a desire to divide France from Great Britain, but he thought that if the two latter countries showed in their replies to the German proposals that they were united, the Germans would find themselves, so to speak, caught in their own trap and would have to give effect to these proposals. M. Briand added that he felt

¹ See No. 349.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁵ See Nos. 61, n. 6, 299, and 346, n. 5.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

⁴ No. 349.

sure that there were many Germans who were genuinely anxious to reach a pacific solution of the various questions at issue, and he was hopeful that in course of time a peaceful solution would be found, even for those problems which now appeared entirely insoluble.

M. Briand said that he would make a point of going to Geneva⁶ in order to have an opportunity of discussing matters there quietly with Mr. Chamberlain, outside the limelight of the press.

It was most refreshing to hear these words of hope from so practical a politician as M. Briand, who seems inclined to put into practice the precept which he enunciated in the Senate⁷ only a few days ago: 'Je suis de ceux qui pensent que la négation perpétuelle est une attitude diplomatique stérile et dangereuse.'

M. Poincaré must, on hearing this, have wriggled in his seat like a devil in holy water.

The Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay, whom I saw this afternoon, when the French Government had had more time to consider Mr. Chamberlain's despatch,⁴ spontaneously assured me that it had caused them particular satisfaction. M. Laroche is convinced that we shall reach a full agreement on all points at an early date.

ERIC PHIPPS

⁶ See No. 137, n. 2.

⁷ See No. 346.

No. 354

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 4)

[C 7512/459/18]

PARIS, May 31, 1925

My dear Tyrrell,

I informed Laroche yesterday of the substance of your letter of May 29th,¹ and then at his urgent request I slowly read him a translation of it so that he could jot it down. I made it clear that it must be considered to be a private and verbal communication. He was very pleased indeed and seemed intensely relieved, for only yesterday morning Sauerwein commented pessimistically in the 'Matin' on the thesis which, according to him, had been expounded by the majority of the London and Manchester Press and which laid down that the Rhineland *was* to be a barrier for France and was to prevent her going to the assistance of Poland, even in the event of an unprovoked attack on the latter by Germany. Laroche said that Sauerwein had been rebuked for the undue pessimism of his article and expressed the hope that the 'Manchester Guardian' and 'Westminster Gazette' might be treated likewise. I replied that they were *opposition*

¹ No. 352.

organs over which the Foreign Office had no control, and that too much importance should not be attached to their views, which showed, however, some of the difficulties with which the British friends of France have to contend. Directly after our conversation Laroche must have proceeded to coach Sauerwein, who writes in the 'Matin', this morning as follows:—

'Au cas où la Pologne serait attaquée par l'Allemagne, l'Angleterre ne s'en désintéresse nullement; elle prend part aussitôt et activement à l'action du conseil de la Société des Nations pour arrêter le conflit et elle admet que la France, en vertu de ses engagements personnels, puisse intervenir par les armes devant une violation flagrante des traités, et cela sans perdre une heure.'

'Du fait que cette action militaire s'exercerait à travers la zone neutralisée, la France ne serait aucunement considérée comme agresseur, puisque le respect des traités commande tout l'accord.'

Laroche saw Benes² after our conversation and I expect informed him of its tenor without loss of time.

The other day Lucien Romier, the editor of the 'Figaro,' told me that he really believed that a statue would sooner or later be erected in France to the memory of Mr. Bonar Law.³ I have told several politicians and journalists that a far more sensible and fruitful plan would be to smooth down the path towards a real entente that Mr. Chamberlain has, ever since he took over the Foreign Office, been striving to tread.

In the short conversation which I had with Briand the night before last (see Lord Crewe's despatch No. 1248 of May 30th)⁴ I laid stress on some of the difficulties which Mr. Chamberlain had to encounter at home in the pursuit of his policy of whole-hearted collaboration with France and urged that everything possible should be done on this side of the Channel to facilitate his task. Briand replied that he was aware of those difficulties and that he would always do his best to assist Mr. Chamberlain in surmounting them.

What a relief it is to have Briand to talk to after the sinister Poincaré and the amorphous Herriot!

The Press has evidently been well coached by the Quai d'Orsay for today it is 'roses, roses all the way' except for the usual futile bleatings of the ineffable 'Pertinax'⁵ and a few other disgruntled die-hards.

Yours sincerely,
ERIC PHIPPS

² In a letter of June 4 to Mr. Lampson, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives, Sir G. Clerk stated that as far as was known, Dr. Beneš's sudden visit to Paris followed the cancellation of a visit to Vienna and a decision to spend the time visiting the Paris Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial Arts (April 28–November 8). Dr. Beneš left Paris for Geneva on May 31.

³ Mr. Bonar Law (1858–1923) had been Prime Minister of Great Britain October, 1922–May, 1923.

⁴ No. 353.

⁵ The pen-name of M. A. Géraud, leader-writer of the *Echo de Paris*.

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

No. 620 [C 7263/459/28]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 2, 1925

Sir,

[With reference to my despatch No. 424 of the 3rd April,¹ I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a memorandum containing the views of the Belgian Government on the draft of the reply which the French Government have proposed to send² to the suggestions for a pact of security made to them by Germany on the 9th February last.³

2. This memorandum, which was communicated to Sir William Tyrrell by the Belgian Ambassador on the 29th May, appears to be that which was summarised in your telegram No. 47 of the 25th May.]⁴

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 355

Aide-mémoire

AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE

Dans un Mémoire remis par le Baron Moncheur à Mr. Chamberlain,⁵ le Gouvernement du Roi a fait connaître sa manière de voir concernant les suggestions allemandes relatives au problème de sécurité, ainsi qu'au sujet des considérations développées à cette occasion par le Gouvernement français dans une Note remise par M. Herbet⁶ à M. Hymans le 19 mars 1925.⁷ Il ne croit donc pas devoir revenir sur les vues qu'il a exposées précédemment.

Toutefois, le projet de réponse que le Gouvernement français propose aux Alliés d'adresser en leur nom à Berlin, bien que concordant dans ses grandes lignes avec les idées du Gouvernement belge, appelle de sa part certaines réflexions et demande par ailleurs des précisions: tel est l'objet de cette Note.

Tout d'abord, le Gouvernement du Roi se félicite de ce que le Cabinet de Paris croit comme lui opportun de voir les Alliés arrêter en commun les termes de la réponse à adresser à l'Allemagne. Cette procédure ne peut que renforcer l'autorité des observations des Alliés et accroître ainsi les chances de succès d'un pacte qui peut être un puissant élément de paix pour l'Europe.

En ce qui concerne le fond même de la réponse, le Gouvernement belge croit devoir relever spécialement les points suivants:

¹ No. 286.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ No. 338.

⁵ See No. 286, n. 1.

⁶ French Ambassador in Brussels.

⁷ See No. 286, n. 2.

1. Le Gouvernement belge est heureux de constater que le projet de réponse insiste sur la nécessité de voir la Belgique être partie au Pacte, comme Puissance directement intéressée. Il croit savoir que le Gouvernement britannique est également de cet avis. Le Gouvernement du Roi estime, en outre, opportun que les frontières actuelles de la Belgique soient garanties d'une manière plus explicite que celle prévue dans la Note allemande.³ Celle-ci, en effet, parle de garantir les territoires sur le Rhin. Cette expression vague ne permettra-t-elle pas un jour à l'Allemagne de soutenir que les Territoires d'Eupen-Malmédy, qui ont été attribués à la Belgique par le Traité de Versailles, ne sont pas compris dans cette garantie?

Les propos tenus récemment par de hautes personnalités allemandes ainsi que le discours prononcé il y a quelques jours au Reichstag par le député socialiste Breitscheid,⁸ nous incitent à prendre des précautions à cet égard.

Il est donc extrêmement désirable que le projet de réponse demande à l'Allemagne de préciser ce point dans le texte du pacte.

2. Le projet de réponse français se préoccupe avec raison du respect du Traité de Versailles. Le Gouvernement du Roi a d'ailleurs fait connaître suffisamment sa manière de voir à ce sujet dans le Mémoire rappelé plus haut où il est dit notamment:

'Le Pacte ou les Pactes à conclure, dans la pensée du Gouvernement belge ne doivent pas remplacer ou affaiblir le Traité de Versailles, qui contient le Pacte de la Société des Nations, mais le fortifier en s'y superposant.'

Le Gouvernement du Roi se demande cependant si, le principe une fois affirmé, il n'est pas inutile d'énumérer, comme le fait la réponse française, les principales conséquences qui en découlent. En effet, ou bien l'énumération sera complète et alors c'est obliger l'Allemagne à signer une seconde fois le Traité de Versailles, ce qui paraît moralement impossible à l'heure actuelle, ou bien l'énumération sera incomplète, et alors l'Allemagne pourra en conclure que nous tenons plus à certaines clauses du traité qu'à d'autres, ce qui ne serait pas sans danger. Cette énumération figure aux paragraphes II, III et V du projet de réponse français.

3. Le projet français estime qu'un accord de sécurité ne pourrait être réalisé sans que l'Allemagne entrât dans la Société des Nations.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est également de cet avis, mais il pense que le Pacte de sécurité pourrait être négocié et peut-être même signé avant que cette condition fût remplie. Il suffirait de subordonner la mise en vigueur du Pacte à l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations.

4. Quant aux traités d'arbitrage, le Gouvernement belge considère leur large diffusion comme un moyen des plus efficaces de régler pacifique-

⁸ Lord D'Abernon transmitted a translation of the press account of the Reichstag debate of May 19/20 in Berlin despatch No. 320 of May 23, not printed. An account of Herr Breitscheid's speech on May 19 is given in *The Times*, May 20, p. 16.

ment les conflits. Il se déclare prêt à conclure des arrangements de ce genre dans la mesure où ces Traités visent des intérêts qui le concernent directement.

La Belgique ne saurait en effet, en raison de sa situation et de ses forces limitées, s'engager dans des accords qui s'étendent à des régions éloignées d'elle et à des intérêts qui ne la touchent pas directement. Mais elle entend d'ailleurs s'en tenir pour ces questions aux obligations qui lui incombent comme membre de la Société des Nations.

Bien qu'il semblât plus naturel de voir les grandes Puissances lui accorder leur garantie sans réciprocité, la Belgique est prête à donner toutefois sa garantie aux Traités d'arbitrage qui seront conclus entre les Puissances alliées parties au Pacte rhénan et l'Allemagne; en agissant ainsi, elle désire, dans la mesure de ses forces, apporter sa contribution à l'affermissement de la paix.

En ce qui concerne les objets que le Gouvernement de la République propose de soumettre à l'arbitrage et ceux qu'il entend y soustraire, le Gouvernement du Roi serait heureux de recevoir des précisions.⁹

⁹ The text of this *aide-mémoire* of May 25, which was communicated to the French Government also, is printed in *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 57, Annexe.

No. 356

Mr. Chamberlain to the Belgian Ambassador

[C 7263/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 2, 1925*

Your Excellency,

I have read with interest the memorandum which your Excellency was so good as to communicate to Sir W. Tyrrell on the 29th May,¹ containing the observations of the Belgian Government on the draft of the reply² which the French Government would propose to send to the suggestions for a pact of security made to them by Germany on the 9th February last.³

2. It is unnecessary for me to comment in detail on the various points raised in the memorandum, since the Belgian Government will now be fully informed of the views of His Majesty's Government on the French draft as a result of the communication to them of a copy of the despatch sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris on the 28th May.⁴

3. There is, however, one point in your memorandum upon which you may desire a specific statement of our intentions, or rather a formal repetition of what I have already said to you in the course of our conversations. That is the question of the guarantee to be given to the

¹ See No. 355, Enclosure.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

² See No. 318, Enclosure.

⁴ See No. 350, n. 6.

frontier between Belgium and Germany. It is true that the German note of the 9th February³ spoke of guaranteeing the present territorial situation 'on the Rhine,' but His Majesty's Government understand this general phrase (appropriate to a document which was a tentative suggestion and not a draft of the suggested treaty) as a proposal to guarantee the present frontier between Germany and her western neighbours. His Majesty's Government agree that the guarantee to be embodied in the proposed Rhineland pact should be so expressed as to cover the German-Belgian frontier as it exists at present.

I have, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 357

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard (Washington)

*No. 884 [C 7538/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 3, 1925*

Sir,

I asked the American Ambassador to call upon me this afternoon on my return to town.¹ I reminded his Excellency of his observation that since he had been here he had heard little political news,² and said that I had now news of some importance which I might give him. I then read to his Excellency the first seventeen paragraphs of my despatch to Lord Crewe No. 1887 of the 28th May,³ dealing with the French draft for a reply⁴ to the German Pact proposals,⁵ as well as the first three sections and the concluding paragraphs which stand unchanged in our redraft of the French text.

Mr. Houghton asked me for a few explanations and thanked me warmly for the information I had given him. He said that it had removed a great anxiety from his mind, and that he thought that the attitude of the British Government had laid foundations of real importance for an improvement in the European situation. If the French acted in the spirit of our note and avoided in their relations with Germany unnecessarily provocative and irritating phraseology, he believed that such an attitude on the part of France would produce a favourable reaction towards France among the American public, which was not at the present time very well disposed to French policy. This might be of consequence to France if she required financial assistance. American opinion had recently come to regard France as being a disturbing element in Europe, and Americans would not lend their money unless they thought peace was firmly established and the safety of their investments thus ensured.

¹ From his country house Twitts Ghyll, Five Ashes, Sussex. ² See No. 344. ³ No. 349.

⁴ See No. 318, Enclosure.

⁵ See No. 197, n. 1.

Mr. Houghton further enquired my views as to the future of the eastern frontiers. I think I have already observed in another despatch² that Mr. Houghton is still under the influence of the impressions obtained during his long stay in Berlin, and is apt to appreciate more easily the feelings and difficulties of Germany than those of France or Germany's other neighbours. He expressed his conviction that neither the Silesian settlement⁶ in its economic aspect nor the Polish corridor⁷ could endure permanently. As to this, I said that I had recently refreshed my memory of the circumstances which had led to the existing settlement in Eastern Europe and of the considerations which had guided the councils of the Allied statesmen in Paris. I did not suppose that any of them were unaware of the difficulties inherent in the solution which they had adopted, but they had found it impossible to discover a better. After all it was President Wilson⁸ who had promised Poland access to the sea,⁹ and the actual solution reached had been dictated by the desire to include in each country as many of its own race as possible and as small minorities as possible of other nations. I did not believe that the interests of peace were served by reopening these boundary questions now. What Europe needed first and foremost was stability, and there could be no stability or peace of mind as long as nations felt that their frontiers were insecure. The only wise course was to leave the settlement of these questions to time. The best thing would be that no one should speak of them for a generation—perhaps by that time some of our difficulties would be found to have settled themselves, and at any rate the others could then be considered in a better atmosphere than is now possible so soon after the close of the Great War.

Mr. Houghton again expressed his agreement. Whatever the difficulties in Silesia, in respect of the combined working of coal and iron, he believed that when the world had need for the product of the mines this question would settle itself. He did not again refer to the Polish corridor, but contented himself by meeting my reference to President Wilson's responsibility with that deprecatory smile and gesture which is perhaps the only recognition that an Ambassador may allow himself in the presence of a foreign Minister of the follies of his own Government.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁶ See Nos. 199, n. 2 and 205.

⁷ See No. 205.

⁸ President of the United States of America March, 1913–March, 1921.

⁹ In the Fourteen Points i.e. his address to Congress on January 8, 1918, outlining his peace aims: see *F.R.U.S.* 1918, Supplement 1: the World War, vol. 1, pp. 12–17.

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

[C 7446/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 4, 1925*

My dear Crewe,

I enclose a record of a conversation which I had with M. de Jouvenel on the 27th May. He came to me, of course, as a private individual and not as a representative of the French Government, but as I took occasion to try to explain the policy and outlook of the Government towards the League of Nations, and more particularly towards the problem of security, the conversation may be of use to you and to other British representatives abroad to whom I am circulating it.

Yours sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 358

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 27, 1925*

M. de Jouvenel, Senator of France and more than once a delegate of France to the League of Nations, who has come to this country at the invitation of the League of Nations Society, called upon me this morning by appointment made at his request through the French Ambassador.

He began by speaking of the addresss which he had delivered to the League of Nations Committee of the House of Commons,¹ and of the interest which he had found in the occasion, but he said that it had left him with some anxiety. He felt that it was of the utmost consequence that France and Great Britain should act cordially together in the assembly. We represented the northern mind and they the southern races, bred under the influence of Roman law. We were complementary to one another and together an epitome of the opinion of the world. When, therefore, we were in agreement, all went well; when we differed there was confusion, and in the end nothing was done. He hoped, therefore, that we might come to some agreement as to the course to be followed at the assembly meeting before we went to it in September. Great Britain had turned down the protocol.² Mr. Ramsay MacDonald himself had made it clear at Geneva that he was not a partisan of universal compulsory arbitration,³ but could we not save something from the wreck? Might we not revert to the proposition made by Lord Cecil⁴ when the representative

¹ On May 25. For an account, see *The Times*, May 26, p. 15.

² See No. 240, n. 13.

³ Cf. his speech of September 4, 1924 to the Assembly of the League of Nations. See *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1924), pp. 41-45.

⁴ In July, 1922, Lord Robert Cecil had submitted to the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments a proposal for a treaty of mutual guarantee which was

of South Africa, which, as somewhat amended by Mr. Fisher⁵ and the French representatives, had been the basis of the pact of mutual assistance,⁶ and could we not from that starting point agree upon some common principles? It must be admitted that the covenant was not complete. In particular, there was the provision which required unanimity in a decision of the council, which would enable a single party—acting, it might even be, in bad faith—to prevent any decision being taken and thus to throw the disputants back upon force for the solution of their differences, just as if no covenant and no League existed.

I think it may be useful to record my reply, as I endeavoured to set out the guiding principles of British policy in these matters. I said in the first place that I entirely shared his conviction of the importance of united action and complete agreement over the widest sphere between France and the British Empire. I agreed that the forces which we represented were complementary, but for this very reason they were different, and Frenchmen and Englishmen were apt to approach questions from different points of view, which were the natural result of the differences between their national characters and history. The Latin mind was more logical than ours, and was inclined always to try and press arguments and situations to their logical conclusion. It was our nature to shun these logical conclusions. The very fact that they were logical frightened us. We believed that in many cases safety lay in a middle course, and we attributed to our preference for the middle course the peaceful evolution of our national history and the strength of our institutions. It must be remembered too that our public law and Constitution were not the mere result of legislation or fully embodied in statute law. They were an historical growth and this gave them an elasticity and a strength which, in our view, was apt to be lacking in rigid provisions and precise definitions intended to cover every possible contingency arising in circumstances which it was impossible to foresee. Such efforts at precise definition and rigid law might easily place us face to face in the future with some solution dictated by law but opposed to sentiment and conscience, and we believed that more would be achieved in the end if rather less were attempted in

accepted (see *League of Nations: Records of the Third Assembly: Meetings of the Committees: Minutes of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments)* (Geneva, 1922), pp. 66–7 and 69). The principle of a treaty of mutual guarantee was accepted by the Third Assembly on September 27, 1922 which instructed the Temporary Mixed Commission to investigate the matter further (see *League of Nations: Records of the Third Assembly: Plenary Meetings: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1922), p. 291). For the text of the draft treaty of mutual guarantee submitted by Lord Robert to the Temporary Mixed Commission on February 4, 1923, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fourth Assembly: Meetings of the Committees: Minutes of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments)* (Geneva, 1923), pp. 153–5.

⁵ President of the Board of Education 1916–22, and a British delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations 1920–22. He was the British member of the Third Committee of the Third Assembly which discussed Lord Robert Cecil's proposals for a treaty of mutual guarantee (see n. 4).

⁶ See No. 282, n. 6.

the beginning. Take, for example, this question of unanimity or the attempt to define exactly what was aggression. Our conception of the pact and of the League was not that it should legally make war impossible, but that it should make recourse to war so difficult and subject to such exposure of and deliberation on the causes of dispute as would render war in the highest degree improbable by concentrating against the party who was in the wrong the moral opinion of the whole society of nations. We perhaps attached even more importance to this moral judgment than to the sanctions which lay behind it in the case of a unanimous decision of the council. We believed that it would be almost, if not quite, impossible for any nation to proceed against the clearly expressed judgment of the world, and that the German experience in 1914 showed how powerful was the effect of such a moral judgment upon the ultimate issue of the struggle. It was no doubt true that the rule of unanimity might be used by a single member of the council to prevent the council technically from taking a decision, but if that rule were abused by the dissenting party obviously acting in bad faith, I did not believe that that could or would lessen the moral effect of the unanimity of the other members. In the first place, therefore, we attached less importance than the Latin mind to theoretical imperfections in the covenant and more importance to what was likely to be its practical result.

Next I observed that I felt about the covenant what I felt about the frontiers of Europe. The statesmen who devised the settlement of 1919 had no pretensions to have been directly inspired or to have solved every question for all time, but I held that what the world needed today was a period of stability and rest, and that those who habitually talked about frontiers as open to revision did not serve the cause of peace. These questions ought to be allowed to sleep for a generation before we looked at them again. I would apply somewhat similar reasoning to the covenant. It was barely six years since it had been signed. There had been insufficient time for its effects to be fully developed or for the nations to acquire that confidence in it which only use and experience could give. All these efforts to amend it seemed to me premature, and not only premature but damaging to its influence—above all when they were ultimately unsuccessful. Any refusal to undertake new obligations or to accept fresh clauses had a reaction upon the covenant as it stood, created a sense of doubt as to the efficacy of the covenant, and prevented the growth of that sense of stability which was necessary to give the covenant its full force and effect. In my view, the proper policy for the League was to deal, as it was dealing, in a spirit of wise conciliation and moderation with the various questions that came before it, and to avoid, if that were possible, taking upon itself the strain of some great crisis or raising questions where grave divergencies of opinion prevailed until it was strong enough to overcome the difficulties that they involved. It was perhaps natural in an Englishman, having regard to the constitutional development of his own country, to attach special weight to this almost

insensible growth of influence and power as contrasted with dramatic acts of legislation.

Lastly, I observed that there were special difficulties in introducing a new discussion of these larger issues at the present time. Our two Governments were engaged in a discussion of the German pact proposals.⁷ I believed that we should reach without great difficulty an agreement as to the general lines of the reply to be made to the German Government, and if, as I anticipated, the German response was satisfactory, we should equally reach agreement as to the terms of an ultimate pact. The one danger which I foresaw was lest France, in seeking to engage us in greater or wider obligations than the British Empire was prepared to undertake, should render it impossible for us to make a contribution to security which otherwise it might be in our power to give. The first and most immediate necessity was to bring these pact negotiations to a successful conclusion. It was very desirable that they should be accompanied by agreements for arbitration for the peaceful settlement of disputes between Germany and her eastern neighbours, but the share of Great Britain and the British Empire in any new agreements must be limited, and we must avoid the danger that, in attempting to do too much, we should find ourselves unable to do anything at all. I would venture to quote to him a French proverb: 'Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien.'

M. de Jouvenel thanked me for my exposition of the British point of view, which he was good enough to say I had made clear to him. He appreciated the importance of what I had said and the inference to be drawn from it, only there was one observation which must be made. It postponed disarmament.

To this I demurred. I said that, in my opinion, if security was guaranteed on the west, and especially if treaties of arbitration were also concluded with the Eastern European Powers, there would be a sensible *détente* in the general political situation which ought to render further disarmament possible.

M. de Jouvenel then entered into some explanation of the criticisms which were made in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on the German pact proposals, in order to emphasise the importance which the Senators attached to Germany joining the League of Nations and the anxiety which they felt lest the western pact should only be a licence to Germany to attack Poland, while preventing France from rendering her any assistance. I endeavoured to combat these fears, and I told him that the British Government were at one with the French Government in insisting that, unless Germany entered the League, there would be no mutual pact. The German Government was well aware of our views upon this subject, and indeed it would be useless to proceed with negotiations on any other basis.

A.C.

⁷ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

No. 359

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 6, 9 a.m.)

No. 138 Telegraphic [C 7599/459/18]

ROME, June 5, 1925, 9.10 p.m.

Your despatch No. 779.¹

Italian government gratefully acknowledge your communication which is receiving careful attention and they will furnish their observations as soon as possible.

They can however at once declare their concurrence in view that reply to Germany should reflect common policy of the allies. They for their part are ready to do whatever is possible to bring about pact which they regard as calculated to assure peace in so far as it is drawn up in agreement with Germany. This result seems so important to Italian government that in principle, question of procedure and details of execution should be subordinated to its attainment more especially as in their opinion every consideration of secondary character loses all importance when confronted with fundamental fact of succeeding or not in guaranteeing peace.²

¹ See No. 350, n. 5.

² For the text of the Italian note of June 4, see No. 362, Enclosure, below.

No. 360

Mr. Chamberlain to the Prime Minister

[C 7565/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 5, 1925

I attach a copy of the note communicated to me today by the French Ambassador regarding the reply to be sent to the German proposals for a security pact.¹ The amendments now proposed by the French Government have been carefully considered by the Foreign Office in consultation with Sir Cecil Hurst. As a result we feel that we can safely accept the amendments with the following exception.

The French propose to cut out Section VI of our draft² which preserves intact all the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations, on the ground that this Section is unnecessary in view of the small addition which they propose to the third paragraph of Section V. Sir Cecil Hurst however attaches importance to retaining Section VI because it is wider and will cover Germany as well when she joins the League,

¹ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

² See No. 349, Enclosure.

whereas the French draft of Section V speaks only of the rights and obligations of the Allies.

The point raised by me this morning with Monsieur de Fleuriau in connection with Section IV paragraph 2³ does not appear to Sir Cecil to be of any importance in view of the meaning given to these words by the paragraph which immediately follows.

Subject to your authorisation I would propose to tell Monsieur Briand at Geneva⁴ that His Majesty's Government accept the draft now proposed provided that our Section VI is retained. I should embody the acceptance in a letter making it clear that His Majesty's Government do not unreservedly own to the views attributed to them in the present French covering note.

Should you think it necessary to call together a meeting of the Cabinet or of the Cabinet Committee to consider the matter before any reply is given to Monsieur Briand, I should be glad if the meeting could take place with as little delay as possible, as I understand that Monsieur Briand will only be at Geneva until Wednesday next (June 10th).

A.C.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 360

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères à M. de Fleuriau, Ambassadeur de la République française à Londres

[C 7565/459/18]*

PARIS, le 4 juin 1925

L'ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a, sur les instructions de son Gouvernement, remis la lettre ci-jointe en traduction que Mr. Chamberlain lui avait adressée le 28 mai dernier.⁵ Cette lettre formulait l'avis du Gouvernement anglais sur le projet de réponse français⁶ aux propositions allemandes de pacte de sécurité du 9 février.¹ Elle contenait en annexe un texte amendé du projet de réponse français.

Le Gouvernement français a été très sensible au ton amical et à la confiante franchise de la réponse britannique. Il n'a pas manqué d'apprécier l'effort fait par le Gouvernement anglais pour se rapprocher du point de vue français. Il tient spécialement à marquer tout le prix qu'il attache à voir le Gouvernement anglais, fidèle à la conception qui s'était traduite en 1919 par la signature des traités de garantie,⁷ reconnaître toute l'importance que présente pour la paix une étroite collaboration des deux nations. Il a été particulièrement heureux de constater que les vues du Gouvernement britannique s'accordaient avec les siennes sur la nécessité pour la France de faire aux propositions allemandes une

³ See No. 361, below.

⁶ See No. 318, Enclosure.

⁴ See No. 137, n. 2.

⁵ No. 349.

⁷ See No. 185, n. 1.

réponse exposant les vues communes des Alliés. C'est avec le désir de réaliser un accord si important entre la France et l'Angleterre que nous avons fait un nouvel effort pour aller au-devant des préoccupations du Gouvernement britannique qu'inquiéterait la généralisation de la garantie conjointe des traités d'arbitrage.

Nous nous rendons compte que, dans l'état actuel des choses, la dissémination à travers le monde des éléments qui constituent l'Empire britannique l'amène sur le continent européen à limiter ses engagements à ceux qu'il considère comme essentiels, alors même que ses intérêts se confondent avec ceux des Puissances continentales.

De la communication du Gouvernement britannique, il résulte que celui-ci ne croit pouvoir contracter de nouvelles obligations, en ce qui concerne l'ordre créé en Europe par les traités de paix, si ce n'est pour le maintien du statut territorial existant sur la frontière occidentale de l'Allemagne. Mais le Gouvernement français est heureux de constater en même temps que le Gouvernement anglais n'entend ni mettre en question lui-même, ni encourager aucune Puissance à mettre en question les dispositions des traités qui constituent la base du droit public de l'Europe. Nous comprenons d'ailleurs fort bien que le fait de ne pas prendre par avance des engagements positifs en dehors de la région rhénane signifie simplement que le Gouvernement britannique, sans se désintéresser des éventualités qui pourraient se produire sur d'autres points, réserve seulement toute sa liberté d'examen et de décision.

En ce qui le concerne, le Gouvernement français estime que le souci qu'il a du maintien de la paix générale et de la liberté de toutes les nations de l'Europe, aussi bien que les nécessités de sa défense nationale, ne lui permettent pas de limiter ses préoccupations au seul souci de sa propre sécurité. Il considère que toute tentative de modifier par la force l'état de choses créé par les traités constituerait pour la paix un danger tel que la France ne saurait y rester indifférente.

C'est la raison pour laquelle, dans son projet de réponse⁶ aux propositions allemandes,¹ il considère comme essentiel de conserver sa liberté de prêter assistance aux Etats auxquels il juge nécessaire d'accorder sa garantie, sans qu'on puisse lui opposer les dispositions du Pacte rhénan projeté, et les retourner ainsi contre lui. Les explications tant écrites que verbales qui lui sont venues du Gouvernement britannique lui en ont donné la ferme assurance. C'est, à ses yeux, une condition essentielle du pacte à intervenir, et comme elle est d'une importance capitale pour le maintien de la paix, il est indispensable qu'elle soit clairement exprimée dans la réponse à l'Allemagne, le silence qui serait gardé à cet égard risquerait, au contraire, de provoquer de fausses interprétations du Pacte rhénan et d'encourager des velléités dangereuses.

Tel est l'objet de la nouvelle rédaction proposée pour l'alinéa 2 de la Section IV, ainsi que du rétablissement, avec une modification appropriée, de l'alinéa 4 de la Section V.

Dans l'alinéa 2 de la Section IV, la formule française nouvelle précise à

cet effet que le traité éventuel d'arbitrage franco-allemand doit pouvoir laisser place à une action coercitive, non seulement dans le cas où une telle action serait entreprise 'conformément aux dispositions des traités en vigueur entre les parties' (ce qui répond à l'idée envisagée par le Gouvernement britannique), mais aussi 'en cas d'inobservation d'un traité garanti par les parties ou l'une quelconque d'entre elles'. La France entend ainsi réserver son action dans le cas de violation du traité d'arbitrage à intervenir, par exemple, entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne ou entre l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie.

L'alinéa 4 de la Section V a pour objet, tout en laissant à l'Angleterre et aux autres Puissances parties au Pacte rhénan toute liberté de ne pas garantir les traités d'arbitrage conclus entre l'Allemagne et ses voisins de l'est ou du sud, de donner à la France le droit de garantir elle-même ces traités de manière à en assurer la pleine efficacité et à mieux écarter encore les possibilités d'intervention par la force.

Les autres changements apportés à la rédaction britannique ne représentent qu'une expression, qui, en français, a paru plus claire, de notre sentiment commun. C'est ainsi que l'idée indiquée à la Section VI du projet anglais est exprimée et reportée sous forme d'adjonction à l'alinéa 3 de la Section V où elle trouve naturellement sa place. La Section VII anglaise devient ainsi la Section VI, où le Gouvernement français, acceptant de remplacer l'idée de coordination des accords par l'idée de la simultanéité, proposée par le texte anglais, juge cependant nécessaire, conformément à l'idée générale, qui domine tout le projet, de rétablir le principe que les accords à intervenir devraient être enregistrés par la Société des Nations et placés sous ses auspices. C'est d'ailleurs là l'idée exprimée par Mr. Chamberlain dans son discours du 12 mars dernier au Conseil de la Société des Nations,⁸ ainsi que dans sa lettre du 28 mai à Lord Crewe.⁵

En ce qui concerne le projet de traité d'arbitrage de la Belgique avec l'Allemagne, nous avons inscrit dès maintenant une formule positive sous la réserve de l'assentiment belge que nous avons des raisons de croire probable.

En terminant, le Gouvernement français tient à répéter qu'en répondant au mémorandum allemand¹ comme il se propose de le faire, il a tenu à considérer les offres de l'Allemagne comme faites dans un désir sincère de paix, et ne méconnaît nullement les difficultés avec lesquelles le Gouvernement allemand, de son côté, se trouve aux prises, du fait de l'opinion publique allemande et des préoccupations que lui inspirent ses relations avec la Russie, qui s'efforce de détourner l'Allemagne de la Société des Nations.⁹

Nous espérons que le Gouvernement britannique estimera, comme le Gouvernement français, qu'il y a le plus grand intérêt à ce que la réponse aux propositions allemandes, attendue avec impatience par le Gouverne-

⁸ See No. 240, n. 13.

⁹ See Nos. 290, 296, and 309.

ment de Berlin, lui soit adressée le plus tôt possible.

BRIAND

P.S.—Je vous prie de remettre à Mr. Chamberlain les pièces ci-jointes suivantes: (1) une copie de la présente lettre, (2) le texte des amendements anglais et les modifications françaises sur deux colonnes, (3) le texte révisé définitif du projet de réponse à l'Allemagne.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 360

*Amendements apportés au Projet de Réponse au Mémoire allemand**

PRÉAMBULE

(Sans changement)

SECTION I

(Sans changement)

SECTION II

(Sans changement)

SECTION III

(Sans changement)

SECTION IV

Amendements anglais

Alinéa 1. Sans changement.

Alinéa 2. La France considère qu'un traité d'arbitrage du genre qu'on propose formerait le complément naturel du Pacte rhénan. Mais il doit être bien entendu que, entre elle-même et l'Allemagne, il s'appliquerait à tous les conflits, de quelque nature qu'ils soient et ne laisserait place à une action coercitive qu'au cas où une telle action pourrait être entreprise d'une manière compatible avec les stipulations des traités en vigueur entre les parties. On espère que le Gouvernement belge sera disposé à conclure un traité similaire.

Nouveau texte français

Alinéa 1. Sans changement.

Alinéa 2. La France considère qu'un traité d'arbitrage du genre de ceux que propose l'Allemagne formerait le complément naturel du Pacte rhénan. Mais il doit être bien entendu que, entre la France et l'Allemagne, un tel traité devrait s'appliquer à tous les conflits et ne laisser place à une action coercitive qu'au cas où une telle action serait entreprise conformément aux dispositions des traités en vigueur entre les parties ou en cas d'inobservation d'un traité garanti par les parties ou l'une quelconque d'elles. Un traité d'arbitrage du même ordre entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne ne serait pas moins nécessaire.

Alinéa 3. Pour donner à ces deux traités une pleine efficacité,

Alinéa 3. Pour donner à ces deux traités une pleine efficacité,

leur observation devrait être assurée par la garantie conjointe et individuelle des Puissances participant (d'autre part) à la garantie territoriale inscrite dans le Pacte rhénan, *de manière à assurer que si un litige n'a pas été soumis à l'arbitrage ou si une décision arbitrale n'est pas exécutée, en même temps qu'on a recours à des hostilités, la garantie entrerait immédiatement en application. En l'absence de recours à des hostilités, le Conseil de la Société des Nations devra proposer les mesures à prendre pour donner effet au traité.*

leur observation devrait être assurée par la garantie conjointe et individuelle des Puissances participant d'autre part à la garantie territoriale inscrite dans le Pacte rhénan, de manière que cette garantie entre immédiatement en application si l'une des parties refusant de soumettre un litige à l'arbitrage, ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale, a recours à des actes hostiles.

Dans le cas où, sans recourir à des actes hostiles, un des contractants manquerait à ses engagements, le Conseil de la Société des Nations devra proposer les mesures à prendre pour donner effet au traité.

SECTION V

Alinéa 1. Sans changement.

Alinéa 2. Les Gouvernements alliés prennent acte avec satisfaction de cette assurance. Ils estiment même qu'à défaut de semblables accords entre l'Allemagne et ceux de ses voisins qui, sans être parties au Pacte rhénan projeté, sont signataires du Traité de Versailles, la paix de l'Europe, *vers laquelle le pacte constitue une étape essentielle ne pourrait pas être complètement garantie.*

Alinéa 1. Sans changement.

Alinéa 2. Les Gouvernements alliés prennent acte avec satisfaction de cette assurance. Ils estiment même qu'à défaut de semblables accords entre l'Allemagne et ceux de ses voisins qui, sans être parties au Pacte rhénan projeté, sont signataires du Traité de Versailles, la paix de l'Europe, que le Pacte rhénan tend à consolider et dont il doit constituer un élément essentiel, ne pourrait être complètement garantie.

Alinéa 3. Sans changement.

Alinéa 3. Les Etats alliés ont, en effet, de par le Pacte de la Société des Nations et les Traités de Paix, des droits auxquels ils ne sauraient renoncer et des obligations dont ils ne sauraient s'affranchir; rien dans les traités envisagés par la présente note ne saurait y porter atteinte.

Alinéa 4. Entièrement supprimé.

Alinéa 4. Ces traités d'arbitrage ainsi conçus auraient la même portée que ceux envisagés à la Section

IV. Les Puissances signataires du Traité de Versailles comme du Pacte rhénan envisagé auraient chacune, si elles le désirent, la faculté de s'en constituer garantes.

SECTION VI

Alinéa 1. *Il n'y aurait rien dans les traités envisagés par la présente note qui affecterait les droits et les obligations revenant aux membres de la Société des Nations en vertu du pacte.*

SECTION VII

Alinéa 1. La garantie générale de sécurité indispensable au maintien de la paix ne saurait être complètement assurée *que si tous les accords visés dans la présente note entrent en vigueur simultanément.*

Alinéa 2. Sans changement.

Alinéa 3. Sans changement.

Alinéa 4. Le Gouvernement français au lieu de 'Gouvernement alliés.'

Alinéa 1. (L'alinéa anglais doit être supprimé, l'idée qui y est exprimée étant plus à sa place dans l'alinéa 3 de la Section V complétée dans ce sens. La Section VII des amendements anglais redevient dès lors la Section VI.)

Alinéa 2. La garantie générale de sécurité indispensable au maintien de la paix ne saurait être complètement assurée que si tous les accords envisagés dans la présente note entrent en vigueur simultanément.

Ces accords, conformément au pacte, devraient être enregistrés par la Société des Nations et placés sous ses auspices.

Alinéa 3. Sans changement.

Alinéa 4. Sans changement.

Alinéa 5. Texte anglais accepté.

Le reste sans changement.

Le 4 juin 1925

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 360

*Projet de Réponse au Mémoire allemand (texte intégral amendé)**

Ainsi qu'il en a informé le Gouvernement allemand par sa note du 20 février dernier,¹⁰ le Gouvernement français a étudié, en commun avec ses alliés, les suggestions contenues dans le mémorandum qui lui a été remis le 9 février¹ par son Excellence M. von Hoesch.

Le Gouvernement français et ses alliés ont vu dans la démarche du Gouvernement allemand la manifestation de préoccupations pacifiques qui s'accordent avec les leurs.

Désireux de donner à tous les États intéressés, dans le cadre du Traité de Versailles, des garanties supplémentaires de sécurité, ils ont examiné les propositions allemandes avec toute l'attention qu'elles comportent, en

¹⁰ See Nos. 208, n. 3 and 209.

vue d'apprécier les éléments qu'elles peuvent fournir pour consolider la paix.

Il est apparu toutefois qu'avant d'aborder l'examen de fond de la note allemande, il convenait de mettre en pleine lumière les questions qu'elle soulève ou peut soulever et sur lesquelles il importe de connaître les vues du Gouvernement allemand, un accord préalable à leur égard apparaissant comme la base nécessaire de toute négociation ultérieure.

I

Le mémorandum ne fait mention qu'incidemment de la Société des Nations.

Or, les États alliés sont membres de la Société des Nations et liés par le Pacte de la Société qui comporte pour eux des droits et des obligations nettement définis, en vue du maintien de la paix générale.

Les propositions allemandes se réclament sans doute du même idéal; mais un accord ne pourrait être réalisé sans que l'Allemagne, de son côté, assume les obligations et jouisse des droits prévus par le Pacte de la Société.

Cet accord ne peut donc se concevoir que si l'Allemagne entrerait elle-même dans la Société des Nations dans les conditions spécifiées par la lettre du Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 13 mars 1925.¹¹

II

La recherche des garanties de sécurité que le monde réclame ne saurait comporter de novation aux Traités de Paix.

Les accords à conclure ne devraient donc ni impliquer une revision de ces traités, ni aboutir dans la pratique à la modification des conditions spécifiées pour l'application de certaines de leurs clauses.

C'est ainsi que, en tout état de cause, les Alliés ne sauraient renoncer au droit de s'opposer à toute inobservation des stipulations de ces traités, même si ces stipulations ne les concernent pas directement.

III

Le mémorandum du 9 février¹ envisage, d'abord, la conclusion entre les 'Puissances intéressées au Rhin' d'un pacte qui pourrait s'inspirer des principes suivants:

1. Répudiation de toute idée de guerre entre les États contractants.
2. Respect rigoureux du *statu quo* territorial des régions rhénanes avec garantie conjointe et séparée des États contractants.
3. Garantie par les États contractants de l'exécution des obligations relatives à la démilitarisation des territoires rhénans résultant pour l'Allemagne des articles 42 et 43 du Traité de Versailles.

Le Gouvernement français ne méconnaît pas l'intérêt que présenterait pour la cause de la paix, à côté de l'affirmation renouvelée des principes inscrits dans le traité, la répudiation solennelle de toute idée de guerre (engagement qui ne devrait d'ailleurs comporter aucune limite de temps) entre les États contractants.

¹¹ See No. 261, Enclosure.

Parmi ceux-ci doit évidemment figurer la Belgique, qui n'est pas expressément nommée dans le mémorandum allemand, et qui devrait être partie au pacte au titre d'État intéressé directement.

Il va de soi également, et il résulte d'ailleurs du silence observé à cet égard par le mémorandum allemand, que le pacte qui serait conclu sur ces bases ne saurait affecter les clauses du traité relatives à l'occupation des territoires rhénans, ni l'exécution des conditions stipulées à cet égard dans l'Arrangement rhénan.

IV

Le Gouvernement allemand se déclare ensuite disposé à conclure avec la France, ainsi qu'avec les autres États parties au Pacte rhénan, des traités d'arbitrage garantissant 'une décision paisible des conflits juridiques et politiques'.

La France considère qu'un traité d'arbitrage du genre de ceux que propose l'Allemagne formerait le complément naturel du Pacte rhénan. Mais il doit être bien entendu que, entre la France et l'Allemagne, un tel traité devrait s'appliquer à tous les conflits et ne laisser place à une action coercitive qu'au cas où une telle action serait entreprise conformément aux dispositions des traités en vigueur entre les parties ou en cas d'inobservation d'un traité garanti par les parties ou l'une quelconque d'entre elles. Un traité d'arbitrage du même ordre entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne ne serait pas moins nécessaire.

Pour donner à ces deux traités une pleine efficacité, leur observation devrait être assurée par la garantie conjointe et individuelle des Puissances participant d'autre part à la garantie territoriale inscrite dans le Pacte rhénan, de manière que cette garantie entre immédiatement en application si l'une des parties, refusant de soumettre un litige à l'arbitrage ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale, a recours à des actes hostiles.

Dans le cas où, sans recourir à des actes hostiles, un des contractants manquerait à ses engagements, le Conseil de la Société des Nations devra proposer les mesures propres à prendre pour donner effet au traité.

V

Le Gouvernement allemand a ajouté dans son mémorandum¹ qu'il était prêt à conclure, avec tous les États qui s'y montreraient disposés, des traités d'arbitrage du même genre.

Les Gouvernements alliés prennent acte avec satisfaction de cette assurance. Ils estiment même qu'à défaut de semblables accords entre l'Allemagne et ceux de ses voisins qui, sans être parties au Pacte rhénan projeté, sont signataires du Traité de Versailles, la paix de l'Europe, que le Pacte rhénan tend à consolider et dont il doit constituer un élément essentiel, ne pourrait être complètement garantie.

Les États alliés ont, en effet, de par le Pacte de la Société des Nations et les Traités de Paix, des droits auxquels ils ne sauraient renoncer et des obligations dont ils ne sauraient s'affranchir: rien dans les traités envisagés par la présente note ne saurait y porter atteinte.

Ces traités d'arbitrage ainsi conçus auraient la même portée que ceux envisagés à la Section IV. Les Puissances signataires du Traité de Versailles comme du Pacte rhénan envisagé, auraient chacune, si elles le désirent, la faculté de s'en constituer garantes.

VI

La garantie générale de sécurité indispensable au maintien de la paix ne saurait être complètement assurée que si tous les accords envisagés dans la présente note entrent en vigueur simultanément.

Ces accords, conformément au pacte, devraient être enregistrés par la Société des Nations et placés sous ses auspices.

Il va de soi enfin que, si les États-Unis croyaient pouvoir s'associer aux accords qui seraient ainsi réalisés, la France ne pourrait qu'être heureuse de voir la grande nation américaine participer à cette œuvre de paix générale et de sécurité.

Tels sont les principaux points sur lesquels il a paru nécessaire de connaître avec précision les vues du Gouvernement allemand.

Le Gouvernement français serait heureux de recevoir à ce sujet une réponse qui permette d'engager une négociation ayant pour but la conclusion d'accords constituant pour la paix une garantie nouvelle et efficace.¹²

¹² The texts of the French communications, together with an English translation, are printed in Cmd. 2435, op. cit., pp. 28-43.

No. 361

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1963 [C 7577/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 5, 1925*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador handed to me this morning the reply of the French Government to our observations on their draft answer to Germany.¹ I told the Ambassador that I must necessarily study carefully a document of this importance and that I could make no definite reply without consultation at least with the Prime Minister. I was, however, in full agreement with M. Briand as to the need for dealing quickly with this matter and I should endeavour to give an answer at the earliest possible moment.

I told M. de Fleuriau that on a first and hasty perusal, the only difficulty that presented itself to my mind was in connection with the amendments suggested by the French in the second paragraph of section 4. I thought that we were agreed in substance, but the new phraseology suggested by

¹ See No. 360, Enclosures.

M. Briand left me in a little doubt as to his meaning. I would beg the Ambassador to remember that the essential condition, on the fulfilment of which depended our power to join in a guarantee, was that the pact should be mutual; and I need not add that German agreement could not be expected on any other basis. We must consider therefore any phraseology which we used in the light of what it accorded to Germany, no less than of what it accorded to ourselves, and must take care that we did not use phraseology so wide or ambiguous as to involve us in subsequent unexpected and unwelcome obligations.

I observed that in the French re-draft of this paragraph a different language was applied to the two cases with which it dealt. In the first place, coercive action was only to take place in conformity with the dispositions of the treaties in force between the Powers, but, in the second case, the phraseology ran—‘or in case of a failure to observe a treaty guaranteed by the parties or one or other of them’. I asked M. de Fleuriau whether in his opinion it would make any difference to the sense if we were to make the sentence read—‘that coercion should only take place in case such action was undertaken in conformity with the dispositions of the treaties in force between the parties, or with treaties of arbitration guaranteed by the parties or one or other of them’.

M. de Fleuriau was not prepared to answer this question at once, but in the course of some further discussion suggested yet another alternative. I had observed that it seemed to me that the French amendment would be out of date as soon as the various treaties contemplated in the French draft had come into force. I understood the object of the French to be to preserve their right to guarantee an arbitration treaty between, for example, Germany and Poland, and to enforce respect for their treaty if need arose. It was then that the Ambassador suggested that the words might read—‘in conformity with the disposition of the treaties in vigour between the parties and the application of the guarantees given by the parties or one or other of them to the treaties of arbitration contemplated in this note’.

I begged the Ambassador not to consider me as formulating a definite suggestion nor as expressing any final opinion on the words proposed by him. I was afraid that I could not obtain the opinion of my colleagues before leaving home, but I should do my utmost to be in a position to settle the final terms of the note with M. Briand at Geneva.²

The Ambassador mentioned in this connection that M. Briand was afraid that he would only be able to stay two or three days at Geneva, as his great parliamentary experience and skill made his presence in Paris very necessary to the French Government.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

² See No. 137, n. 2.

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 8)

No. 476 [C 7658/459/18]*

ROME, June 5, 1925

His Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a *note verbale* from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 4th June, 1925, respecting the security pact proposed by Germany.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 362

Translation

Note verbale

ROME, June 4, 1925

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the communication¹ made to them on the 1st instant regarding the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the security pact proposed by Germany.

In view of its high importance the above-mentioned communication is undergoing the most careful examination and the Royal Government will furnish their views on the subject as soon as possible.

Already, however, they are in a position to declare that they agree with His Majesty's Government in the view that the reply to be given to the German Government should reflect the common policy of the Allies. They also confirm that they are disposed to do, so far as they themselves are concerned, what is possible in order to bring about a realisation of the pact which they consider calculated to secure the maintenance of peace, in so far as it is drawn up in agreement with Germany. This result seems to the Royal Government of such importance that, as a matter of principle, the procedure and particulars of its execution should be subordinated to the attainment of this—the more so since, in their opinion, every consideration of a secondary character loses all importance in face of the fundamental fact of succeeding or not in securing peace.

¹ See Nos. 350, n. 5 and 359.

Mr. Chamberlain to the French Foreign Minister

[C 7743/459/18]*

GENEVA, June 8, 1925

Shortly before my departure for Geneva¹ the French Ambassador in London, acting on your Excellency's instructions, was good enough to communicate to me a copy of a despatch, dated the 4th June,² which he had received from you concerning the proposals for a pact of security made by the German Government to the French Government on the 9th February last.³

This document has been carefully examined by His Majesty's Government, who note with pleasure that the French Government are ready to accept in the main the modifications in the French draft reply to the German proposals suggested in my despatch to Lord Crewe of the 28th May,⁴ a copy of which was handed to you by his Excellency. The effort which this acceptance represents on the part of the French Government to achieve the greatest common measure of agreement between themselves and His Majesty's Government is highly appreciated. His Majesty's Government, fully alive to the advantage of despatching the reply to Germany at the earliest possible moment, are happy to find that the further amendments now proposed by the French Government are of such a nature that their consideration need not delay matters. For their part, His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept them, with only one exception. The French Government suggest that section VI of the British counter-draft should be omitted. This section stipulated that nothing in the proposed treaties should affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant. The view of the French Government appears to be that this section is rendered unnecessary by the sentence which they now propose to add to the third paragraph of section V, which, in effect, stipulates that nothing in the proposed treaties should affect the rights and obligations of the Allied Powers under the Covenant of the League and the peace treaties. But if the amended section V is carefully compared with section VI of the British counter-draft, it will be seen that they do not quite cover the same ground. For, whereas the latter is widely drawn so as to safeguard all rights and obligations under the Covenant, the former is restricted to the rights and obligations of the Allied States. His Majesty's Government therefore desire that section VI in their counter-draft should be retained. They are inclined to agree with the French Government that it is superfluous to retain both section VI and the amended third paragraph of

¹ Mr. Chamberlain left for Geneva to attend the Council meeting (see No. 137, n. 2) on June 6.

² See No. 360, Enclosure 1.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ No. 349.

section V, since the idea conveyed in the latter is contained in a wider form as regards the Covenant of the League of Nations in section VI, and as regards the peace treaties in section II. At the same time, if the French Government prefer to retain the third paragraph of section V, His Majesty's Government have no difficulty in accepting it.

There is only one other point raised in your Excellency's despatch to M. de Fleuriau² to which His Majesty's Government desire at this stage to refer. The French Government are right in assuming that His Majesty's Government recognise that the proposed Rhineland pact cannot operate as a barrier to prevent France from taking action in conformity with such guarantees as she may have given to arbitration treaties between Germany and Germany's neighbours, and they therefore concur in section IV of the proposed reply as at present drafted. His Majesty's Government, in fact, regard this proposition as self-evident and as applicable equally to all States signatory of the proposed pact. It is one to which, if rightly understood, there should be no difficulty in obtaining the ready assent of any of the parties concerned, for it is the particular application of the general theory which, in the interests of all the parties, must be at the base of the mutual settlement now in contemplation. It would clearly be inequitable that the proposed Rhineland pact should in any circumstances operate in favour of any signatory Power which subsequently broke the treaty obligations into which it had entered. The pact and its cognate agreements must necessarily be so drafted that, on the one hand, they will give the fullest possible security to all the Powers concerned so long as they abide by their treaty undertakings, and that, on the other hand, they cannot be invoked by a guilty Power to protect it from the consequences of a wilful breach of its treaty obligations.

It is subject to this statement of principle, which not only appears to His Majesty's Government right in itself, but also, as I am happy to think, expresses the views and intentions of France, that His Majesty's Government welcome the present proposal and concur in the terms in which it is now expressed.⁵

I have, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ The text of this letter is printed in Cmd. 2435, op. cit., pp. 44-5.

No. 364

Mr. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 11)

[C 7862/459/18]*

BRITISH DELEGATION, GENEVA, *June 8, 1925*

My dear Tyrrell,

We lunched yesterday with Briand at a quiet little restaurant on the

borders of the lake a mile or two out of Geneva. The Eric Drummonds, the Onslows¹ and Selby completed the English side of the party, whilst Briand's French guests were Paul-Boncour, Clauzel² and the secretary of the Conference of Ambassadors.

Briand and Boncour repeated the suggestion that we should prepare a programme for the September meeting of the assembly.³ Briand said that he had been through the covenant, the protocol⁴ and my declaration about the latter,⁵ and that he thought he understood our point of view, and that, without running counter to it, we could make proposals to the assembly. Boncour added that there was, for example, the question of the unanimity required for a binding decision of the council. This might become all the more important if the various proposals for arbitration treaties now under discussion went through, since they might all be brought to naught if a single member of the council proved recalcitrant.

As you may imagine, I did not give a very hearty welcome to these ideas. Both men were, however, in that rather dangerous mood when it is felt that 'something must be done' without knowing exactly what is desirable—a mood which almost always results in the doing of some act of folly. However, I invited Briand to put his ideas on paper, and to let me know what were these additions to the covenant which he thought might be made without running counter to my protocol declaration.⁵ I said, however, at once that we could not agree to act by a majority on such a matter. After all, the strength of the League and the efficacy of the covenant must depend largely on the Great Powers. The difficulty in relation to all such efforts to create a machinery for the preservation of peace was to give the Great Powers their due weight while leaving a fair share of influence and authority to the smaller Powers. This had been achieved in the covenant, but I did not think that the Great Powers could safely submit to have their action determined by a majority which might be composed of little Powers, bringing a much smaller or even an insignificant contribution, and running much less risk; and I again tried to impress upon him my belief that, though it is easy to pick out theoretical imperfections in the covenant, or to imagine hypothetical cases in which its machinery would break down, these evil results would not follow in practice.

The second point which they mentioned at the luncheon was the definition of an aggressor, and again I showed myself very indisposed to attempt the task. I ventured to warn them that we could not foresee every eventuality, and that our definition might very easily prove a trap for ourselves.

After lunch Briand proposed that he and I should take a drive together,

¹ Lord Onslow, Under-Secretary for War, was the British Delegate to the Arms Traffic Conference which met at Geneva May 4–June 17.

² Baron G. Clauzel was Head of the French Permanent Delegation at the League of Nations.

³ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁴ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 240, n. 13.

and accordingly we drove slowly to Ouchy, where we had a cup of tea (and very nearly had to remain in pawn because the waitress, in the absence of the *patron*, was not prepared to change either French or English notes), and did not return to our hotels till half-past seven. In the course of this tour, besides much desultory conversation on other subjects, we ran over several problems. I had not then received your telegram on the latest re-draft⁶ of the reply to the Germans, but I indicated the line which I thought my instructions would take, and we both felt that in that case we should have no difficulty in rapidly arranging the text.

What struck me most about Briand was the width and liberality of his view, and the conviction which he holds, and which appeared again and again in the course of the conversation, that if we can bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion, our success will change the whole situation, and many problems which are now of great difficulty will solve themselves. For example, he proposed that we should adjourn the question of military control after evacuation of the Rhineland, which appears on the agenda of the council, remarking that, if our pact negotiations went through this would be easy to arrange. Many matters which would now present great difficulty would become of little or no importance.

Again he spoke of the eastern frontiers, and said that if we brought off our pact it would stimulate others to do the same; that Skrzynski had been working steadily for moderation and that Benes was exerting great pressure on him. It appears that the Germans have opened conversations with the Poles, and at the same time Briand has urged the Poles to do all they can to come to terms with Russia. Briand, who has a great sense of the real and practical, regrets that in the peace treaties the Poles bit off more than they can easily chew, and he appears to have some idea that eventually an arrangement may be made with Russia on the basis of some slight adjustment of territory, and with Germany at the expense of Lithuania, or so at least I suppose, for he said that it was in view of these conversations that they had postponed the coming into force of the Memel Convention⁷ at the Ambassadors' Conference.⁸

Briand also said that he had told the Italian Ambassador that he would not be unwilling to consider joining in a mutual pact about the southern frontiers to which, as I understood, both Germany and Austria would also be parties.

Then he turned to the Balkans, observing that the Roumanians ought to do their best to satisfy their citizens of Hungarian origin and that Serbia perhaps needed a word of counsel. Serbia had constituted the Bulgarian refugees into a frontier guard, with the obvious consequences, and France

⁶ Presumably Foreign Office telegram No. 143 to Geneva of June 6, not traced in the Foreign Office archives. See, however, No. 363.

⁷ Of May 8, 1924, between the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and Lithuania. For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 119, pp. 502-15. See also Vol. XXV, No. 385.

⁸ See Vol. XXV, Nos. 470, 471, and 475.

had been obliged to remonstrate. This led me to act upon your proposal and to enquire whether he did not think it might be a good thing for him and me to write to Mussolini inviting an exchange of ideas among the three Powers upon Balkan problems with a view to combining our influence in favour of a policy of moderation and peace.⁹ He very readily accepted the idea, and I shall probably submit the draft letter to him today.

Next he spoke of Spain and Morocco, and I told him that we licensed no arms for export to any part of Morocco except at the request of the local Government, and that I thought I could confidently assure him that none had gone from England or from Gibraltar. We could only look with pleasure on the rapprochement between Spain and France,¹⁰ and should desire to facilitate as far as within our power their regulations for the prevention of contraband. I added, however, that of course there could be no blockade and consequently no action on the high seas. Incidentally, Briand said that Malvy's conversations¹¹ had gone very well. One must have an occupation even in exile, and unfortunately for himself Malvy had a taste for baccarat. It appeared that the President of the Directory¹² shared this failing, and they had become friends over the green table. Briand had taken advantage of this friendship to send Malvy to see the Director, and his overtures had been received in a very friendly spirit.

Briand spoke also of Bolshevik activities. He thought that we should keep our eyes open. The Soviet Government had given up the idea of a forcible revolution in Europe. Their policy now was to strike at the Western Powers through their colonies, fomenting Communism and disorder in Africa, in Turkey and in the Far East.¹³ We must watch China and Turkey also, where he feared that Mustafa Kemal¹⁴ was not turning out to be the man that he had thought him. All this was satisfactory, and I agreed. He does not contemplate any action by the Governments, but he thinks it may be well that the police of our respective countries should be in close touch with one another.

Finally, he asked my opinion about the best method of negotiating a settlement of the debts.¹⁵ I said in reply that I thought the only way he

⁹ See No. 137.

¹⁰ This had been effected by the need for co-operation in the face of the invasion in April, 1925, of French Morocco, by the Rif Chieftain Abdul Karim. He had been waging war successfully in the Spanish Zone of Morocco since 1921, his aim being an independent Rif territory. See *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. 1 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1927), pp. 105-63.

¹¹ M. J. L. Malvy had been French Minister of the Interior March, 1914-September, 1917 but had been tried before the Senate for treason in August, 1918. He had been acquitted, but exiled for five years. He had been amnestied under the January, 1925 law (cf. No. 227, n. 6) and had been elected Deputy for Lot in May, 1924. M. Malvy was sent to Madrid in May, 1925, to discuss measures of Franco-Spanish co-operation in Morocco.

¹² General Primo de Rivera.

¹³ See Vol. XXV, Nos. 300, 303, 304, 310, and 314.

¹⁴ President of Turkey.

¹⁵ See No. 346, n. 5. For Franco-American discussions on war debt, see *F.R.U.S.* 1925, vol. 1, pp. 132-58.

could negotiate with America was by sending a mission to Washington. That would please the Administration and, indeed, I thought they would consider it indispensable. If they sent anyone over here, he would have no authority, and my impression was that the French would make a better bargain direct with the members of the Debt Commission¹⁶ than they could possibly make in London or in Paris. I further observed that they must treat the two negotiations simultaneously but separately. The United States had always refused to deal with its debtors as a body. It considered each debt stood by itself and was to be settled by a separate negotiation based upon the particular facts of the particular case. As far as we were concerned, we made only three stipulations: (1) that we were paid at the same time and (2) in the same proportion as the Americans, and (3) that the payments to us should be in part at any rate independent of French recoveries from Germany. As he knew, we were not intending to ask for full repayment, but the object of any concession we made was to help France and not to enable her to pay America at our expense. I thought that this was understood in America, and that it was recognised as fair. I thought also that the Americans were prepared to give the French more favourable terms than they had given to us, and to this was offered no objection. We had no desire to place any difficulty in the way of France in securing the best possible terms open to her. I told M. Briand further that I thought the negotiations would best be conducted between the two Ministers of Finance and not through the Foreign Offices. It was much better that those who were most familiar with all the details of this complicated matter should themselves be in charge of the negotiations.

Briand threw out one other suggestion. He said that he thought it might be well to somewhat enlarge the Council of the League on the occasion of the entry of Germany. Spain might perhaps be given a permanent seat, and he thought it would be a real advantage to have Poland on the council as well as Germany, for it would give an opportunity for conversations to proceed in a better atmosphere and in a more friendly mood than might be the case elsewhere. I said that I should be glad to see Spain in, but the difficulty I found was where to draw the line. What, for instance, were we to do about Belgium? to which Briand replied that it would certainly seem rather hard if Belgium was to leave the council just when Germany entered. This led me to repeat as my own Eric Drummond's suggestion to us in London, that the best thing we could do when Germany entered the League was to keep the council otherwise unchanged.¹⁷ I thought it undesirable for the smooth working of the council that at any moment there should be a large change in its personnel. The present members

¹⁶ i.e. the World War Foreign Debt Commission set up in February, 1922 by the U.S. Congress to refund or convert the obligations of foreign governments held by the U.S.A. A French debt commission negotiated with the Commission in September–October, 1925, but without reaching an agreement. See *Combined Annual Reports of the World War Foreign Debt Commission* . . . (Washington, 1927), pp. 44–8.

¹⁷ As recorded by Mr. Chamberlain in a minute of May 26 (W 4512/1993/98), not printed.

knew one another and had become accustomed to act together. They would receive the German in the right spirit, and I thought that there would be an advantage in postponing alteration for another year.

You will see that our conversation rambled over many subjects, apart from comments on Walter Scott's novels, Byron's poetry and the relative merits and demerits of Voltaire and Rousseau, and other topics suggested by the *genius loci*; but more important than the details of the conversation was, as I said at the beginning of this letter, the general spirit in which Briand approached the whole situation, and his confidence that if we have a favourable reply from Germany we can indeed transform the situation, and make peace as secure as it can ever be in this imperfect world. He has, in truth, as he said of Quiñones de León, a European mind, and he observed that at this moment it was only men with minds so constituted who were of any use to the world.

Yours sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

P.S.—I handed to him our reply on the pact¹⁸ this morning. He had it translated, and has now informed the press in my presence that we are in complete agreement and that the French answer to Germany will be sent in a day or two. We refused to give any indication of its contents, though he announced that its tone was very friendly and that he hoped and believed that we had done a great work for peace.

A.C.

¹⁸ No. 363.

No. 365

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 9, 1.45 p.m.)

No. 227 Telegraphic [C 7745/459/18]

GENEVA, June 9, 1925, 12.40 p.m.

Addressed to Berlin No. 4

Following for Lord d'Abernon from Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

M. Briand and I agreed without difficulty yesterday¹ upon final terms of French reply to German pact proposals.² M. Briand hopes to send reply to Berlin in a day or two. Whole tone most conciliatory and should not only be acceptable to German government but greatly ease position generally. If German government now sets to work with goodwill to carry out disarmament³ we ought to be able to carry through mutual pact negotiations smoothly and quickly; this is desire of Paris no less than of London.

¹ See No. 363.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See Chap. III, below.

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 10, 9 a.m.)

No. 233 Telegraphic [C 7785/459/18]

GENEVA, June 10, 1925, 1 a.m.

Addressed to Berlin No. 5.

Following from Secretary of State.

Your telegram Nos. 11¹ and 12.²

Havas agency's statement is incorrect.

We have agreed with France that a comprehensive arbitration treaty between her and Germany constitutes natural complement of new Rhineland pact, but this arbitration treaty must apply to all disputes and must leave no scope for coercive action except when undertaken in accordance with treaty stipulations in force between parties, or in accordance with new Rhineland pact or with guarantees to be given by parties, or any of them, to an arbitration treaty.

This latter phrase has reference to proposed arbitration treaties to be concluded between Germany and her eastern neighbours and which France desires liberty to guarantee.

Above is for your information.

I cannot authorize any statement to Ministry of Foreign Affairs pending presentation of French note which should not be delayed.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

¹ Of June 9, repeated to the Foreign Office as No. 226. This ran as follows: 'News of agreement between yourself and Monsieur Briand regarding security pact [see No. 363] has created considerable excitement. Broadly speaking fact of agreement is well received but telegram from Geneva correspondent of Havas contains following passage: "Finally it will formally be declared in Franco-British agreement that in the event of France's allies becoming victims of an unprovoked attack, France will be entitled to use demilitarised Rhineland zone as a field for operation in order to hasten to help of her allies when attacked."

'All the papers which publish comments state that a clause of this character would make it impossible for Germany to adhere and that no Minister could defend such a stipulation before the Reichstag.

'Outside the above-mentioned clause, no serious objection to basis of agreement has appeared in the press. There is some discussion as to whether entry into League is to be antecedent or subsequent to settlement of Cologne question [see Chap. III, below].'

² Of June 9 (No. 227 to the Foreign Office). In this Lord D'Abernon reported: 'Following for Secretary of State: "My immediately preceding telegram.

"Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked me to ascertain whether Havas version is correct so that he may be in a position to answer criticism."

No. 367

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 10, 2.30 p.m.)

No. 234 Telegraphic [C 7807/459/18]

GENEVA, June 10, 1925, 11.15 a.m.

Following for Sir W. Tyrrell from Mr. Chamberlain.
MacDonald questions.¹

Unless Prime Minister thinks earlier return necessary I shall reach London Wednesday night;² please arrange with Ambassador³ date and character of papers to be published.⁴

M. Briand on my initiative has had conversation with Italian delegate⁵ which he says was most satisfactory. If Italy is ready to join Rhineland pact on terms described to me by Italian Ambassador she will be heartily welcomed. M. Briand is further prepared on the part of France to consider mutual pact on similar lines with Italy for southern frontiers. M. Benes heartily welcomes Anglo-French accord.⁶

¹ See 184 *H.C.Deb.* 5 s, col. 1753, for Mr. MacDonald's questions of June 9 to the Prime Minister as to when papers would be laid before the House regarding the agreement come to with France, and on being told that this would depend on Mr. Chamberlain's return, as to when this would be.

² June 17.

³ i.e. M. de Fleuriau.

⁴ In Foreign Office telegram No. 155 of June 10, Sir W. Tyrrell replied: '[Prime Minister] wishes me to assure you there is no necessity for an earlier return, as he proposes to give a day for foreign affairs in the week following your return. Question of laying papers will be taken up with French Ambassador.'

⁵ Signor V. Scialoja.

⁶ See No. 363.

No. 368

*Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received June 10, 9.30 p.m.)*

No. 147 Telegraphic [C 7849/459/18]

ROME, June 10, 1925, 6.30 p.m.

Following for Secretary of State.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

I saw President of the Council and Secretary General last night and found them both a good deal disturbed over Havas communiqué.² Signor Mussolini said that he was completely nonplussed. Agreement did not seem to tally with your views on French note which I had recently communicated to him.³ In fact French seem to have completely carried

¹ Of June 10, not printed.

² See No. 366, n. 1.

³ See Nos. 350, n. 5 and 359.

their way and we were back in position of a three-power pact directed against Germany. Italy appeared to be left out of account and certainly she had no desire to enter into a pact which would impose upon her responsibilities with no corresponding advantages. If the worst came to the worst Italy could always make her own arrangements with Germany over Brenner frontier. It was natural frontier of country and he would render it impregnable within a few years.

His Excellency did not believe Germany would ever accept an arrangement which tied her down in regard to her eastern frontier for he was convinced that there was a secret Russo-German agreement regarding Poland and Baltic States. In the meantime he had instructed Scialoja to see you and Monsieur Briand and to ascertain exactly how land lay.⁴

Both Signor Mussolini and Senator Contarini referred to question of Anschluss. The Senator said that Berthelot had complained to Italian Ambassador in Paris of Lord d'Abernon's language and of doubtful attitude of His Majesty's Government on the subject.⁵ Berthelot had suggested tentatively a triple pact of France, Italy and Austria to deal with this question.

I told Mussolini that he should not accept Havas communiqué as gospel.

As regards Anschluss Berthelot had probably got hold of a re-hash of Lord d'Abernon's alleged language.⁶

⁴ See *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 24.

⁵ See *ibid.*, No. 17.

⁶ In Rome despatch No. 414 of May 15, Sir R. Graham had reported: '... I have the honour to report that, in a conversation yesterday with the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I asked him if he could tell me why the Italian press seemed to be showing fresh anxiety over the election of Marshal Hindenburg as President in Germany [see No. 611, n. 2] and the attitude of that country in general. Senator Contarini replied that such anxiety was certainly noticeable, and he considered it due to the question of the "Anschluss," which was bound to arouse nervousness here. It was a subject on which an Italian representation in London in the near future was not improbable. The Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Bosdari, whom the Senator described as far more pro-German than the German Ambassador in Rome, had recently sent home several reports on the matter, including records of conversations with his British colleague. Count Bosdari had received the impression that Lord D'Abernon would not regard the "Anschluss" with great disfavour and that he was reflecting the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the question. As regarded the Germans, they seemed to consider that the "Anschluss" was only a question of time, and that when it came there would be little general opposition towards it. Senator Contarini said that such a state of mind in Germany was dangerous, and the sooner the Germans were disabused the better. Italian feeling on the subject was extremely strong, although Italy was one of the countries concerned which could most easily make some arrangement with Germany in the matter. For instance, a German guarantee of the present Italian frontier might be exacted. But this would not satisfy Italian feeling on the subject and he personally could only consider that if the Germans were permitted to absorb a country of 8,000,000 inhabitants, then there could be no question that Germany had won the war. The Senator imagined that sentiment in France, Belgium and especially Czechoslovakia, would be so violent that it would become a *casus belli*.

I expressed my interest in Senator Contarini's remarks, but said that I thought an altogether false impression must have arisen here as regards the attitude of either His Majesty's Government or of Lord D'Abernon in the question. Count Bosdari must evidently

Nothing could have been clearer than your declarations to Lord d'Abernon and Marquis Torretta⁷ nor than those recently made by myself to him which you had since approved.⁸

British communiqué⁹ published here this morning will do something to correct first impressions; also possibly Senator Scialoja may have sent explanations.

Mussolini referred to private telegram from the King¹⁰ to the King of Italy¹¹ on the 7th and said that its wishes had been warmly appreciated both by His Majesty and by the Italian government.

Repeated to Geneva.

have misunderstood the latter. The Senator replied that he had, himself, at first been under a similar impression, but it had been shaken by Count Bosdari having reported more than one conversation with Lord D'Abernon in the sense indicated. I repeated that I felt sure that there had been a misunderstanding, and as regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government, I recollected that you had made it clear to the Marchese della Torretta when he had alluded to the subject [see No. 281]. The Senator declared that he was quite satisfied on this head, but that it was the state of mind in Germany which troubled him, and its present trend ought to be discouraged.'

A copy of the despatch was forwarded to Lord D'Abernon in Foreign Office despatch No. 971 of May 26. In Foreign Office despatch No. 1008 of June 2 Mr. Chamberlain stated: '... I am firmly of the opinion that European security will not be achieved without stability, and that this feeling of stability is only weakened by constant suggestions as to the revision of this or that part of the treaty settlement. For this, if for no other reason, I am definitely opposed to the "Anschluss," nor shall I hesitate to say so anywhere and every time that the subject is raised.'

Lord D'Abernon replied (Berlin despatch No. 338 of June 6): '... I ... will take an opportunity to disabuse my Italian colleague of the erroneous impression which he has reported.'

'2. How he can have derived the impression is beyond comprehension, as no one here in a responsible position has regarded the discussion of the "Anschluss" question as relevant to the Western pact. All authorities with whom I have conversed on the subject have held the view that the raising of the "Anschluss" today is neither relevant nor opportune. ...'

⁷ See No. 281.

⁸ Foreign Office despatch No. 737 to Rome of May 23, not printed.

⁹ See *The Times*, June 11, p. 14.

¹⁰ George V.

¹¹ Victor Emmanuel III. He was celebrating his reign of twenty-five years.

No. 369

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 158 Telegraphic [C 7819/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 10, 1925, 8.30 p.m.*

Your telegram to Berlin No. 5 (of June 10th. Security).¹

Havas communiqué of June 8th² has given rise to some apprehension here also. As we feared that the same might be the case in Germany and in the Dominions, we took the opportunity offered by a private notice question today by Sir Robert Hamilton³ to make statement contained in

¹ No. 366.

² See *ibid.*, n. 1.

³ Liberal M.P. for Orkney and Shetland.

our telegram to Berlin No. 126 (of June 10th).⁴ Prime Minister tells me that his answer to question and supplementaries was well received and contributed to restore calm in an atmosphere which had become heated by Havas. I trust you will approve.

I suggest an opportunity being taken to correct the inversion of the facts in the Havas communiqué regarding the relation between the signature of the security pact and Germany's entry into the League? We are correcting this in our telegrams to the Dominions.

⁴ No. 370, below.

No. 370

Sir W. Tyrrell to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 126 Telegraphic [C 7819/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 10, 1925, 9.30 p.m.*

Following is statement made today in Parliament by Prime Minister¹ in reply to Sir Robert Hamilton who asked whether the French semi-official version of the proposed security pact published in the press² correctly represented the arrangements agreed to by Great Britain; if the security of the western frontier of Germany was based on the principle of mutuality proposed by Germany, and whether Italy was a party to the proposed pact. Begins:—

I can fully understand the desire of the House to have the earliest opportunity of discussing this question and I have already undertaken, in reply to a question yesterday by the Right Honourable Member for Aberavon,³ to make a statement on the return of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Meantime I would ask the House to exercise patience in the full assurance that no security pact has yet been signed or will be concluded without the House being given an opportunity for full discussion.

Meantime, in view of certain misapprehensions which have arisen in the public mind, I think it well to say that the position up to date is that the British and French governments, after careful examination of the German proposals to the French government of February 9th,⁴ have reached complete agreement on certain basic principles to which any such settlement must conform⁵ and to which there is every reason to anticipate the adhesion of Belgium and Italy. It is understood that these views will be communicated by the French government to the German government and if the German government see their way to share them, the way will

¹ See 184 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 1987–8.

³ Mr. MacDonald. See No. 367, n. 1.

⁵ See Nos. 363 and 366.

² See No. 366, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

then be **open** for the actual negotiation of a pact to be negotiated between the allied powers interested in the Rhineland and Germany on a footing of equality. The settlement contemplated is of strictly bilateral character and is **not** one-sided as may possibly have been inferred from certain reports that have appeared. The view of both the British and French governments is that the settlement must be such that it will give the fullest possible security to all the signatory powers so long as they abide by their treaty obligations and that on the other hand it cannot be invoked by any guilty power to protect it from the consequences of a wilful breach of its treaty obligations.

I would only add that as soon as the French government's reply has been despatched to Berlin, I propose, subject to the concurrence of the French government, to communicate its text to Parliament. Ends.

Repeated to Geneva No. 157, Brussels No. 47 and Rome No. 189.

No. 371

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 11, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 60 Telegraphic: by bag [C 7816/459/18]

BRUSSELS, June 10, 1925

Pact negotiations.

The Havas telegram from Geneva,¹ reproduced in my telegram No. 59 of yesterday's date,² is universally regarded here as a *communiqué* exactly representing an agreement come to between the British and French governments. The news, set forth in such striking terms, has had an exhilarating effect on public opinion here.

When the German security proposals³ first became known, Belgian opinion was inclined to look at them askance and to suspect German good-faith, but various leaders of opinion pointed out that what really mattered was to secure a promise from Great Britain to go to war to defend Belgian security, and that this might be obtained under cover of the wider pact.

It is felt here that, by the Geneva agreement, Great Britain has undertaken all that Belgium has been seeking from British statesmen since the armistice, and that it would be even more satisfactory than the guarantee proposals of 1919⁴ and 1922,⁵ seeing that no limit of time is set to British obligation to intervene in a war in defence of Belgium.

Some doubt is expressed as to whether Berlin may not reject the Anglo-French conditions for the pact, and the hope is expressed that

¹ See No. 366, n. 1.

² Not printed.

³ See No. 197 n.1.

⁴ For the discussions for a guarantee treaty for Belgium in 1919, see Vol. V, Chap. I, *passim*. See also *D.D.B.*, vol. I, Chap. I.

⁵ See *ibid.*, Nos. 201-34.

should this happen, the way will have been smoothed for a return to the discarded proposals for Anglo-Belgian⁵ and Anglo-French defensive military agreements.⁶

⁶ See No. 315, n. 4.

No. 372

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

No. 704 [C 7840/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 10, 1925*

Sir,

I transmit to Your Excellency herewith a record of a conversation which took place today between the Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Lampson on the subject of the proposed security pact.

I am, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 372

*Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Belgian Ambassador**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 10, 1925*

The Belgian Ambassador called this afternoon, bringing with him his copy of the latest note to the French from us on security.¹ He questioned me on one or two points.

The thing that interested him most was the passage agreeing that the proposed pact could not act as a barrier to prevent France going to the help of Poland. I pointed out to him that this right was strictly conditional on the hostilities having been begun by Germany. In that case all that we had said was in fact in absolute harmony with our existing obligations under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant.

The Ambassador raised the question of what would happen supposing that Poland were attacked by Russia and that France then wished to go to her help?

I said that in such an eventuality I could hardly believe, after looking at the map, that France would send troops all the way across German territory. What about her lines of communication? Was it not much more probable that any help she sent would be by sea? But, in any case, here again the Covenant seemed to govern the position. If Russia were still not

¹ See No. 349.

a **member** of the League, then under article 17 she would be summoned to **submit** the dispute to the council; and, if she refused, then she would be liable **to all** the pains and penalties of article 16; and as Germany would be in the **League** if there were any pact at all, Germany certainly could not **oppose** any measures of assistance to an attacked Poland which the council, under their mandate in article 16, might assign to France or, indeed, **to** anyone else. But the point seemed to me so theoretical (for the **reasons in** connection with lines of communication which I had given) that I did **not** see much use in pursuing it.

In **all** this I made it clear that if the Ambassador wanted any **authoritative** ruling on any point in connection with the pact he must wait until **Mr. Chamberlain** returned.

Baron Moncheur said that he had hoped that M. Hymans from Geneva would **have** kept Brussels fully informed of what was going on there between **Mr. Chamberlain** and M. Briand, but he learnt by telephone that such **was not** the case: hence his present enquiries.

He then asked what we looked for as regarded the 'itinerary' of the pact negotiations. What was the next step after the Germans had digested the French reply? I replied that I presumed they would answer saying that they **concurred** in the basic principles formulated to them, and asking 'What next?' I did not know precisely what procedure the Secretary of State **had in** mind, but I did know that he regarded expedition as the essence **of the** thing. Baron Moncheur asked whether it was not inevitable that almost the next thing must be a regular conference. If the negotiations were to be pursued through the diplomatic channel they might go **on till** the end of all time. Had we any views about a conference? I said that **I had** no indication of the Government's view on this, and that I certainly **was not** authorised to say anything in reply to his question; but, with that **reserve**, I personally agreed with him that the natural thing would be **a conference** in the near future. What we all wanted was to get to the drafting stage as soon as possible, for until we did so not much progress **was to** be anticipated.

The Ambassador then said that he had a suspicion amounting almost to a certainty **that** the French would not be at all displeased if the present negotiations **failed**, for they hoped that we would then fall back upon our original **idea of** a one-sided pact. I said that, be that as it might, I feared *that they* would receive a rude shock if such was in fact their expectation. *The British* public had been educated to the idea of a bilateral pact, but even **that** would not go through without some difficulty. To revive the **idea of a one-sided** pact was merely to invite inevitable disappointment.

M. W. LAMPSON

No. 373

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 159 Telegraphic [C 7871/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 11, 1925, 1.30 p.m.*

Following from Lampson for Sir C. Hurst:—

If Monsieur Fromageot is in Geneva, Sir W. Tyrrell authorises me to suggest for the consideration of Secretary of State that you should get into touch with him regarding terms of proposed security pact and see how far his ideas and ours as to its actual terms coincide. You would of course make it absolutely clear that your discussions were non-committal and merely with a view to seeing how far our conceptions of the instrument aimed at tally.

For your information we have it from a first rate source that M. Briand's policy towards the pact is largely inspired by M. Fromageot who now has a most important and beneficent influence.

If M. Fromageot is not in Geneva, it is worth considering whether it would not be of advantage that you should stop in Paris on way home and see him.

No. 374

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 11, 8.15 p.m.)

No. 246 Telegraphic [C 7876/459/18]

GENEVA, *June 11, 1925, 5.40 p.m.*

Addressed to Rome No. 4.

Following from Mr. Chamberlain.

Your telegram No. 146¹ and 147² to Foreign Office.

For (? scope of) conversation refer to my telegram No. 3 today from Geneva.³

¹ Of June 10, not printed.

² No. 368.

³ This was sent as No. 243 to the Foreign Office, and ran as follows: 'Following from Secretary of State.

'Mussolini appears to be much pre-occupied by report mentioned to you by Contarini that Lord d'Abernon had spoken favourably of union of (? Austria and) Germany. It would appear that Mussolini himself only heard of report four days ago when it reached him from Paris. On this occasion Marx was named as authority. Scialoja was instructed to speak to me and later Attolico [Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations] raised question again. To each I replied that you had at once said that Lord d'Abernon must have been misunderstood and misrepresented, that I had approved and confirmed your language and although I knew there could not be any foundation for story I had for greater security at once addressed despatch to Lord d'Abernon of which I told them substance [see No. 368,

As regards participation of Italy in mutual Rhine pact, Monsieur Briand's answer⁴ took me entirely by surprise. I told him later of Italian Ambassador's communication to me.⁵ It would seem that no similar communication had been made to him in Paris and that he had assumed that Italy would not wish to join (? our) pact since Great Britain was not prepared to give further guarantees of frontier other than those of Germany, France and Belgium. He at once said that if Italy was ready to join on terms described to me by Torretta⁵ she would of course be heartily welcomed.

He indicated that France might be prepared for her part to consider mutual pact on similar lines for southern frontiers. At my request he undertook to explain at once to Scialoja and subsequently told me conversation was most satisfactory.⁶ Scialoja also appeared satisfied when I discussed matter with him yesterday.⁷

Repeated to Berlin and Paris.

n. 6]. From the way they both spoke I gathered that Mussolini must be seriously disturbed. I think therefore that it would be well for you to speak directly to him on the subject reading to him last paragraph of my despatch to Berlin and drawing his attention to paragraph in my reply to French proposal for note to Germany in which His Majesty's Government disclaimed any desire to change or to encourage others to change the frontier [see No. 349].

⁴ See No. 377, below.

⁵ See No. 281.

⁶ For this conversation of June 9, see *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 27. ⁷ See *ibid.*, Nos. 28 and 29.

No. 375

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 11, 9.35 p.m.)

No. 228 Telegraphic [C 7895/459/18]

BERLIN, June 11, 1925, 7.28 p.m.

The general atmosphere in Berlin is favourable to rapid progress of negotiations both as regards pact of security and disarmament.

Concerning former there was considerable alarm about right to march through Germany which was reported in Havas communiqué.¹ This alarm has been somewhat diminished by subsequent telegrams from Geneva and by Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons yesterday.² The German Government propose to publish original text of their memorandum of February 9th³ and do not anticipate any outburst from the Right as public opinion has now been more or less reconciled to declaration regarding . . .⁴, as well as to general tendency of memorandum.

Secret discussion yesterday in Foreign Affairs committee appears to

¹ See No. 366, n. 1.

⁴ The text is here uncertain.

² See No. 370.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

have shown general acceptance of Government policy. As regards disarmament Allied note⁵ has been received in German military circles much more quietly than any previous similar communication. The criticism most often heard is that Allied demands are petty and insignificant compared with what has been accomplished, a line of argument which precludes any subsequent complaint that they are inexecutable or dishonouring to Germany.

There can be no doubt that the Government want to fulfil Allied demands rapidly. Their difficulty is how to secure co-operation between their own officers and commission of control so as to achieve positive result without delay.

Repeated to Geneva for Secretary of State.

⁵ See No. 631, below.

No. 376

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Chilton¹ (Washington)

No. 935 [C 7897/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 11, 1925*

Sir,

I transmit to you, herewith, a record of a conversation which took place today between the United States Ambassador and Sir William Tyrrell on the subject of the German proposals for a security pact.

I am, etc.,

(for the Secretary of State)

HAROLD NICOLSON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 376

*Record by Sir W. Tyrrell of a conversation with the United States Ambassador**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 11, 1925*

The American Ambassador called upon me today and enquired whether I could give him any information supplementary to that which the Secretary of State had given him on the 4th [*sic*] instant with regard to Anglo-French conversations respecting the proposed pact with Germany.²

I told his Excellency that the meeting between Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand at Geneva had resulted in perfect agreement between the two Governments with regard to the French reply³ to the German proposals of the 9th February,⁴ which I expected would be delivered in Berlin at the end of this week.

¹ Chargé d'Affaires June 10–October 17.

² See No. 357. Mr. Chamberlain had seen the United States Ambassador on June 3.

³ See No. 363.

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

His Excellency expressed great gratification, and gave me as his personal opinion that, provided German susceptibilities were considered in the course of the further negotiations, the German Government would be eager to conclude such a pact. He added that as soon as we had reached the stage of discussing the broad lines on which the instrument was to be drawn up, it would be essential that this should be done at a meeting of the Ministers of all countries concerned, who he thought would be best qualified to lay down the lines which should be adopted. One of the reasons he gave in favour of such a machinery was German susceptibility to be treated on a footing of equality, and he mentioned the Dawes Report⁵ as a case in point, in which the presence of German Ministers had largely contributed towards the success of the scheme. In this connection he also expressed his readiness to place his services wholly unofficially at the disposal of the Secretary of State with a view to influencing the views and attitude of German Ministers, should they be asked to attend such a conference.

I thanked his Excellency for his offer, of which I felt sure Mr. Chamberlain would be very pleased to take advantage, if a favourable opportunity presented itself.

W. T.

⁵ See No. 27, n. 8.

No. 377

*Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
(Received in the Foreign Office, June 16)*

[C 8052/459/18]*

BRITISH DELEGATION, GENEVA, June 11, 1925

Sir,

My telegrams from this place have dealt fully with the situation produced by M. Briand's unfortunate reply to an American press representative on the subject of Italy's participating in the proposed Rhineland Pact.¹ In my long conversation with M. Briand on Sunday² I had made allusion to the attitude of the Italian Government as described to me by the Marquis Torretta,³ but I had assumed that a similar communication would have been made to M. Briand by the Italian Ambassador in Paris, and that he would therefore understand what I said without further explanation. Unfortunately, he appears so little to have understood my allusion that he did not even ask me to explain it, and to

¹ At the press conference on June 8. For an account, see *The Times*, June 9, p. 16.

² June 7. See No. 364.

³ See No. 281.

my great surprise and embarrassment, when he and I received the press representatives together, he replied to a question about Italy's participation by begging his auditors not to expect more than was possible and dwelling upon the magnitude of the result already obtained. Obviously I could not correct him at that moment or discuss the matter with him before a large body of journalists, but I took the first opportunity to tell him exactly what the Marquis Torretta had said to me and to beg him to speak to Signor Scialoja on the subject. As I have already informed you by telegram, my communication appeared to come to him as a complete surprise, but he warmly welcomed the idea of Italian participation if it did not involve such conditions as were incompatible with the limits which Great Britain had laid down for itself. He saw Signor Scialoja the next day⁴ and informed me that the conversation had been entirely satisfactory, and that Signor Scialoja had appeared much pleased. He had indicated to Signor Scialoja, as he did to me, that France, for her part, would be quite ready to consider becoming a party to, or a guarantor of, a mutual pact among the Powers immediately interested for the preservation of the southern frontier.

Signor Scialoja himself took me aside yesterday⁵ before one of the Council meetings. I repeated to him that we should warmly welcome the co-operation of Italy on the terms suggested by the Marquis Torretta, and he appeared to me thoroughly satisfied. At the same time he raised the question of Lord D'Abernon's supposed expression of opinion in favour of, or at least not opposed to, the union of Austria and Germany, and I repeated to him in detail the assurances which you had given to Signor Contarini⁶ and the further precautions against misunderstanding which I had taken.⁶ I had not at this time received your telegrams,⁷ which did not reach me till after the Council broke up this morning, but on reading them I at once sent you a telegram⁸ requesting you to see Signor Mussolini personally and to read to him the concluding paragraph of my despatch to Lord D'Abernon,⁶ as well as to draw his attention to the passage in my despatch to Lord Crewe dealing with the Pact proposals,⁹ in which, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, I expressly disclaimed any desire for a change of the treaty frontiers or any encouragement to others to seek such a change.

I have dwelt on this matter at some length because, as I now find confirmed by your telegram and had already anticipated from the fact that, even after my conversation with Signor Scialoja, I was again taken aside—this time by Signor Attolico, who repeated the same story—it had evidently greatly disturbed Signor Mussolini. Signor Attolico informed me that Signor Mussolini himself had only heard of the story four days ago, when it reached him from Paris,¹⁰ with the added detail that Herr

⁴ See No. 374, n. 6.

⁵ See *ibid.*, n. 7.

⁶ See No. 368, n. 6.

⁷ Rome telegram No. 146 of June 10, not printed, and No. 368.

⁸ See No. 374, n. 3.

⁹ No. 349.

¹⁰ See *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 17.

Marx had informed the Austrian representative in Berlin¹¹ that Lord D'Abernon had spoken not unfavourably of the union of the countries.

It is interesting in this connection to observe that Prince von Bismarck,¹² who was in London and lunched with me just before I left for Geneva, explained Hindenburg's majority in the Presidential election¹³ as being due to the number of 'Protestant' votes cast in his favour. The Prince observed that the Lutheran Church had been losing influence with the masses of the population even before the fall of the Empire, and that that event had greatly shaken the Church's authority, since it had always been a State Church, closely allied with the throne. The Roman Catholic Church had been quick to take advantage of their opportunity, and everywhere the Lutheran churches were empty; there were little circles of Roman Catholics very active in spreading their influence. 'We did not,' said the Prince, 'speak of these things in our election speeches, but everyone was thinking of them, and everyone was afraid of the blacks (as we call them).' And again he repeated the phrase that never before had so many 'Protestant' votes been cast in a German election. It is, I think, obvious that, if this question is not pressed upon the attention of the Germans by outside forces, or upon that of the Austrians by economic distress, the difference of religion will create a sufficient obstacle to the 'Anschluss' to make it a highly improbable event.

I have, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ Dr. R. Riedl.

¹² Grandson of the former German Chancellor (see No. 186, n. 2).

¹³ See No. 611, n. 2, below.

No. 378

Mr. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 17)

[C 8198/459/18]

BRITISH DELEGATION, GENEVA, June 11, 1925

My dear Tyrrell,

Many thanks for your note of the 9th¹ which I received this morning. I have sent you, I think, only one letter recording my first conversation with Briand.² Each day I have meant to write again but, though it would be difficult to explain how the time has passed, I have in truth not had a moment to myself from morning till mid-night, and this in spite of the fact that, having joined Briand when he received the Press,³ I have confined my press interviews to two or three individuals, leaving poor Selby to

¹ Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

² See No. 364.

³ On June 8. For an account of this press conference, see *The Times*, June 9, p. 16.

battle with the clamorous crowd who besieged him for further information, especially after the publication of the mischievous Havas telegram.⁴ I am told that Fleuriau sent to Briand a violent remonstrance on this subject, explaining to him the harm which it had done in London, and that Briand, who had not inspired it, gave the representative of the Havas agency a thorough dressing-down for what he had done.

Briand himself, as I have already told you, seemed to me to view the situation generally in just the spirit in which we should have hoped to find him. Boncour professes to expect a refusal from Germany. Briand is more hopeful, but his more hopeful expressions nearly always take a negative form, such for instance as that he thinks Germany can hardly refuse to follow up the negotiations. These doubts are encouraged by the talk of the German Consul General⁵ and other Germans here, but I myself remain hopeful. I do not think it is possible that Germany can refuse to go on with conversations, which she herself began, after receiving a note couched in such a friendly spirit as is shown by the French reply. It seems to me much more likely that, after perhaps asking for some further elucidation, they will use the opportunity to demand a meeting such as they have always desired.

Briand left in a hurry and earlier than he had intended.⁶ Quinones tells me that Briand admitted to him that this was on account of the news of Painlevé's visit to Morocco.⁷ Briand regarded Painlevé's sudden decision as an act of political madness, and hastened his return in order to deal with the resultant situation in the Chamber. Quinones added that the French had had a nasty set-back no news of which has reached us here, but I suppose you will have heard of it from Paris.⁸ The last despatch to the 'Times' from Walter Harris⁹ which I have seen seemed to indicate the loss of some posts.

Please let the Prime Minister see this note. It is not worth circulating to Cabinet. His answer¹⁰ was admirable.

Y[ou]rs sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ See No. 366, n. 1.

⁵ Herr G. Aschmann.

⁶ M. Briand arrived in Paris from Geneva on June 11.

⁷ M. Painlevé had left Paris on June 9, and arrived in Rabat by air on June 10. He returned to Paris on June 16.

⁸ No information reached the Foreign Office from Paris as to French reverses. In Tangier telegram No. 61 of June 9, the Consul-General, Mr. R. Clive, reported: '... Besides losing five posts [in Beni Ouriagel], including thirty-five French missing apart from natives, French have abandoned some thirty other posts which Abdel Krim in his propaganda takes credit for having captured. In two larger posts French had to destroy large quantity of ammunition before evacuation. ...'

⁹ Morocco correspondent of *The Times*. See *The Times*, June 10, pp. 15 and 16.

¹⁰ See No. 370.

Mr. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 18)

[C 8199/459/18]

BRITISH DELEGATION, GENEVA, June 12, 1925

My dear Tyrrell,

Many **thanks** for your further letter¹ received this morning. The Havas despatch² was deplorable. It is indeed hard that no sooner do the **governments** reach an accord than the Press in one form or another, and in one **country** or another, sets to work to destroy it. However, as I have already **told** you, I understand that the Havas representative here acted without **consultation** with Monsieur Briand, who washed his head for him in thorough French fashion.

As I **look** back on the whole episode I see that the Press of both countries, and indeed of the world, supposed that Monsieur Briand and I were **arriving** at Geneva without any previous agreement, and that all the difficult **questions** remained to be treated between us here. As you know, the **contrary** was the case, and the two government were practically in full accord **before** I left London; but it is, I think this idea that many outstanding difficulties remained to be treated here, coupled with the fact that we **reached** agreement so quickly,³ that has made people suppose that either **Briand** or I must have sacrificed something essential. Thereupon the French agent, thinking only of French public opinion, hastens to assert that **France** has secured her demands in their extremest form, lest it should be **thought** that Monsieur Briand had succumbed to my wiles; whilst on **the** other hand, in England they very readily assume that I am conducting a policy of my own which is more French than that of my colleagues. The Prime Minister's declarations⁴ in reply to Hamilton's question, **and** the supplementaries, were admirable. I am glad to hear that they had **an** immediate calming effect in the House of Commons, and I see that **they** are well received by the Temps, which is the only French paper whose comments I have yet seen. The Temps, indeed, has a most sensible **article**, such as might have been written for it by us.

By the **way**, if you have any chance of seeing Gwynne,⁵ of the Morning Post, or a **representative** of his, do beg him to cut Soviet Russia out of his discussion **of** this Pact. If the Labour Party get the idea, which the Soviet Government **is**, I see, trying to spread, that the Pact is directed against Russia,⁶ it **will** only damage the policy to which the Morning Post attaches as much **importance** as I do myself.

Lyautey's⁷ conversation with Walter Harris⁸ show[s] how depressed he

¹ Presumably Sir W. Tyrrell's letter of June 11, not printed.

² See No. 366, n. 1.

³ See No. 363.

⁴ See No. 370.

⁵ Editor of *The Morning Post*.

⁶ Cf. Vol. XXV, No. 316.

⁷ Marshal H. Lyautey was French Resident-General in Morocco.

⁸ In Tangier telegram No. 60 of June 9, Mr. Clive reported: 'Harris arrived from Fez last

is by the difficulties which confront him, and show that the report given by Quinones of a setback to the French arms is true.⁹ I do not see, however, that we can possibly act on proposals from Lyautey, made apparently without the knowledge of his government, with no certainty that that government would approve. I should not take on the job with any enthusiasm in any case, but I should be very indisposed to meddle except on a direct request from the French or Spanish government.

Please show this letter to the Prime Minister, and thank him for the support which he has given me. I meant to write to him this morning, having, as I thought, finished my work last night, but I am hard put to it to get through the interviews and papers which remain to be undertaken before I can start on my holiday. I have decided to take an extra day, and shall not be back in London till Thursday night.¹⁰ I am assuming that if there is a Foreign Office debate it will probably be fixed for the Thursday following, that being the ordinary estimate day. I shall want a little time after I get back to London to grasp what has happened in various places since I have been away, and, above all, to consider exactly what declaration I am to make to the House of Commons; but I think all the material that I require exists in our own despatches, and in your letter to Phipps.¹¹

Y[ou]rs sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

McNeill's statement on China¹² was exactly right.

A.C.

night charged by Marshal Lyautey to inaugurate in any way he might think advisable a movement for peace on any of the following lines:—

1. Direct negotiations with Abdel Krim.
2. Combined Franco-Spanish action leading to Abdel Krim's discomfiture and eventual peace.
3. The good offices in the interests of peace of either British or American Governments or both.

'Marshal Lyautey and his generals agree that direct negotiation for the moment would be unlikely to succeed. Abdel Krim, who has corresponded over a long period with Harris, has communicated with him that the moment is not propitious for him to give his opinion, as Harris had requested, on the subject of peace. He is, however, known to favour English or American intervention. Marshal Lyautey and his generals make no secret of the fact that France's position on Riff frontier is one of stalemate owing to political, diplomatic and physical features. French Government desire to avoid international intervention on the part of other Powers, but an outlet must be found before the autumn rain. . . .'

⁹ See No. 378.

¹⁰ June 18.

¹¹ No. 352.

¹² To the House of Commons on June 11. See 184 *H.C. Deb.* 5s, cols. 2252–55.

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received June 13, 8.30 p.m.)

No. 153 Telegraphic [C 7957/459/18]

Confidential

ROME, June 13, 1925, 4.15 p.m.

As it **was** impossible to see President of the Council yesterday, I made communication¹ at once to Secretary-General who promised me that it should **reach** Signor Mussolini before this morning.

Senator Contarini said that German Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent a **special** message through Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the effect that Lord d'Abernon had never used language attributed to him and that anxiety **on** Anschluss question was quite unnecessary. Signor Mussolini had **already** noticed discrepancy between paragraph in your reply to French **proposed** note to Germany² and attitude regarding Anschluss ascribed **to** you. His Excellency had seen Count Bosdari's account of Lord d'Abernon's alleged language³ when first reported but had paid little attention **to** it until confirmed by M. Berthelot.⁴ Scialoja's satisfactory reports,⁵ my assurances given with your authority, and your and Prime Minister's language⁶ as re-produced in Italian press, have, I think, succeeded in removing impression created by unfortunate Havas **communiqué**⁷ and I gather Signor Mussolini is now quite re-assured.

I asked Senator Contarini why Italian government had changed their attitude **regarding** Italian participation in the pact as stated to you by Italian Ambassador.⁸ He said they had not. But Havas communiqué had given **impression** that new agreement would be one in which allied powers would be **placed** in position of antagonism to Germany. He considered that if **pact** was one of mutual reconciliation and included Germany, Italian Ambassador's offer still represented attitude of Italian government.

Public **opinion** here is calming down but if in your forthcoming statement⁹ you could make some special reference to value attached to Italian **co-operation** etc., it would not be wasted on this extremely susceptible **people**.

Sent to. . . .¹⁰

¹ See No. 374, n. 3.

² See No. 349.

³ See No. 368, n. 6.

⁴ See *ibid.*, n. 5.

⁵ See No. 374, nn. 6 and 7.

⁶ See No. 370.

⁷ See No. 366, n. 1.

⁸ See No. 281.

⁹ See No. 379.

¹⁰ The text is here uncertain. Presumably, the telegram was sent to Geneva.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 14, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 223 Telegraphic: by bag [C 7956/459/18]

PARIS, June 13, 1925

My telegram No. 221¹ and Rome telegrams Nos. 146² and 147.³

I saw M. Briand yesterday, when he expressed his anxiety that, in your temporary absence from London, the Prime Minister should be explicitly told that the Havas message from Geneva⁴ had no official character whatever, and that he himself had never seen it till it appeared in print. He is anxious to make it clear that the Havas Agency ought not to be described even as '*officieux*'. The government often make use of it, but when they do their statement is always separately printed and described as a '*communiqué*', in a paragraph of its own. Havas also have correspondents of their own, like any other newspaper or Press Agency, and this particular paragraph was a piece of ordinary journalism. I promised that M. Briand's explanation should be conveyed to the Prime Minister, and observed that the same misunderstanding sometimes arose in connection with Reuter's telegrams, which are erroneously supposed to be inspired from a government source.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs expressed himself as absolutely satisfied with the results of the Geneva conversations.⁵ He had heard no unfriendly note regarding the proposed Security Pact in any quarter whatever, and he regarded as specially important that the first accord had been reached at Geneva, where not only the Council of the League of Nations were collected,⁶ but also the important subsidiary bodies who have been holding meetings there. This meant that the whole world feels itself in a sense being taken into the confidence of the negotiating countries.⁷

¹ Of June 12, not printed.

² Of June 10, not printed.

³ No. 368.

⁴ See No. 366, n. 1.

⁵ See Nos. 363-5.

⁶ See No. 137, n. 2.

⁷ Foreign Office telegram No. 170 of June 17 in reply ran: 'Please convey to M. Briand the thanks of the Prime Minister for his courteous explanation. While it was clear to His Majesty's Government that the Havas message could not have been officially inspired, it undoubtedly caused widespread misunderstanding in the public mind. There is reason to believe that this has now been dispelled and Mr. Baldwin is greatly relieved to think that it has failed to impair the happy outcome of the Geneva conversations between M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain.'

Mr. Addison¹ (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 16, 6 p.m.)

No. 235 Telegraphic [C 8139/459/18]

BERLIN, June 16, 1925, 5.10 p.m.

Security

I have just seen French Ambassador on his return from presenting note.²

Minister for Foreign Affairs merely said he would read the note with care as soon as it had been translated and would then submit it to Cabinet.

In conversation with Secretary of State, latter suggested to French Ambassador that the best method would be to hold a conference of experts for purpose of drafting a text which could then be submitted to conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

French Ambassador replied that he could give no indication of views of his government on points of further procedure since he did not know them. He suggested that German government should lose no time in replying that they were in agreement in principle. Note had been carefully drafted and conveyed an exact meaning. He was at the disposal of Minister for Foreign Affairs for any explanation as to exact meaning and intention of any particular phrase.

¹ Chargé d'Affaires June 12-27.

² See Nos. 318, Enclosure, 349, 360, and 363. A copy of the revised text of June 10 was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1331 of June 11, not printed. A Foreign Office note on the text ran: "The points on which this version differs from that enclosed in M. Briand's despatch of June 4 to M. de Fleuriau . . . [see No. 360, Enclosure 1] are the following:— 1. The second sentence of the second paragraph of Section IV has been redrafted in a clearer manner.

2. The word "propres" is omitted from paragraph 4 of Section IV. This is a mere drafting amendment.

3. The phrase "rien dans les traités envisagés par la présente note ne saurait y porter atteinte" in paragraph 3 of Section V has been omitted, as suggested in Mr. Chamberlain's note to M. Briand of the 8th June . . . [see No. 363].

4. Section VI of the British counter-draft, contained in Foreign Office despatch No. 1887 to Paris of the 28th May . . . [see No. 349] has been restored in accordance with the request in Mr. Chamberlain's note to M. Briand of the 8th June.

5. Section VI of the draft in M. Briand's despatch of the 4th June accordingly becomes Section VII.

The text of the note together with an English translation is printed in Cmd. 2435, op. cit., pp. 45-51.

*Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Addison (Berlin)
and Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)*

No. 1099¹ [C 8063/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 16, 1925*

Sir,

The German suggestions for a Security Pact between the States interested in the Rhine² have resulted—somewhat paradoxically at first sight—in focussing attention anew on Germany's frontier in the East, and in arousing, at least in this country, one of those outbursts of criticism which from time to time since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles have been directed against those sections of the treaty in virtue of which the frontier was fixed.

2. The attempt made by the French Government, acting no doubt in concert with the Polish Government, to link up the proposed Western security pact with some arrangement which would give to the German-Polish frontier as it now exists the same permanence and stability as it is hoped to give to the frontier between Germany and her western neighbours,³ has made it necessary for His Majesty's Government to submit the German-Polish frontier to close scrutiny in the light of the above-mentioned criticism. To facilitate this examination, a memorandum,⁴ of which copies are enclosed, has been drawn up by Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office, describing the discussions at Paris in 1919 which led up to the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles concerning Danzig and the Danzig corridor. A knowledge of these discussions is essential for a proper understanding of the questions at issue.

3. The memorandum shows that, when the Peace Conference opened, the Allies were committed to providing Poland with free access to the sea,⁵ and the problem was how this promise could be adequately fulfilled without inflicting undue harm on Germany by the isolation of some of her territory and without including in Poland territories which were not Polish by population. The choice lay between a Polish corridor running between German territories in order to secure for Poland unhampered communication with the sea, and a German corridor running across Polish territory in order to maintain connection between East and West Prussia.

4. The claims made by the Poles themselves were of a very extensive nature and included Danzig and a considerable amount of other German-inhabited territory. The memorandum shows that it was chiefly

¹ No. 1099 to Berlin and No. 470 to Warsaw. ² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

³ See Nos. 222, 224, 225, 318, Enclosure, 328, 349, and 360, Enclosures.

⁴ Of April 4 (C 5410/459/18), not printed. See, however, Vol. XXIII, Appendix.

⁵ See No. 357, n. 9.

due to **British** influence, exercised in the face of considerable opposition from **the other principal Powers**, that these exaggerated claims were resisted and, more especially, that its peculiar status was given to Danzig; and it is important to note that the final settlement leaves to Poland, in unrestricted ownership, only territory in which there is a Polish-speaking majority.

5. In fact, the first point that clearly emerges is that the solution reached was ethnographically correct, whatever else may be said about it. It has undoubtedly raised difficulties, both economic and political, but this was bound in some degree to be the result of any solution which in the circumstances of the moment was within the limits of practical politics. The difficulties arose from the separation of East and West Prussia, and from the control over Danzig vested in Poland. Mr. Headlam-Morley's memorandum is valuable, because it shows clearly that these twin sources of difficulty were each the lesser of two evils, or, in view of the multiplicity of solutions considered, it would be perhaps more correct to say the least of many evils. In Mr. Headlam-Morley's own words: 'From the beginning it was quite clear that no decision was possible against which very cogent arguments could not be brought.'

6. Admitting, then, that the solution is not perfect, but recognising that it represents the most satisfactory of the courses open when the Treaty of Versailles was drafted, it remains to consider whether there is today any other solution which the Paris Conference either could not or did not envisage, but which now holds out more promise of success and is capable of attainment.

7. Two solutions have been recently suggested. The first is that the sea-board of the Polish corridor might be given up and an alternative outlet provided for Poland at Memel. The reasons why this solution was out of the question at the time when the Peace Treaty was drawn up are fully explained in Mr. Headlam-Morley's memorandum. It is now, however, understood to be favoured in German official circles. Its advantage would be that it would reunite Danzig to Germany and link up once more East and West Prussia, while the disadvantage which it would have of replacing at least a portion of the sparse Polish population of the corridor under German rule would no doubt be outweighed by the removal of a constant source of friction and of a potential cause of war between Germany and Poland. But, whatever the future may hold in store, the suggested solution is not at present within the realm of practical politics.

8. Lithuanian feeling against Poland has been so bitter since the Polish seizure of Vilna,⁶ that even an attempt to secure for Poland special export

⁶ On October 9, 1920, the Lithuanian-held city of Vilna had been seized by the Polish General Zeligowski (see Vol. XI, Nos. 564-7). An armistice was concluded on November 29/30, 1920 (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, pp. 875-7) under the auspices of the League of Nations. Negotiations for a settlement of the Vilna question were unsuccessful, and on February 3, 1923, the Council of the League of Nations accepted a line of demarcation

facilities in Memel over and above those accorded by the Memel Convention,⁷ would probably be resisted, and, apart from these difficulties, there is now the Memel Convention to be reckoned with. Under the terms of this instrument, when it comes into force, Memel formally passes under the sovereignty of Lithuania, and any alteration of the territorial status of both the city and territory of Memel, unless secured by the willing assent of Lithuania, which is out of the question, would mean a gross breach of faith by the signatories of the Memel Convention, which it is impossible to contemplate. The incorporation of Memel in Polish territory might at one time have been possible, given a close political union between Lithuania and Poland. But the prospects of such a union are now so remote that nothing short of a war of aggression by Poland is likely to bring Memel under Polish political control.

9. The second suggestion is that East Prussia should be neutralised. Whereas the Memel solution would replace the present arrangement, the neutralisation of East Prussia is put forward as a device for giving strength and permanence to the present arrangements by diminishing the difficulties inherent in it. Its object is to loosen the sentimental ties between East and West Prussia, it being assumed that the dissatisfaction with which the Polish corridor is viewed is due to those sentimental ties and not to any considerable practical inconvenience resulting from the separation of two portions of the Reich.

10. Now, in the first place, it is very uncertain whether this assumption is correct. It is quite true that the practical economic difficulties resulting from the separation of East and West Prussia are not so great as might have been supposed and are no doubt magnified wherever possible for propaganda purposes. At the same time it is idle to pretend that they do not exist at all, or to under-estimate them and to regard complaints as purely factious. The relative part played by real economic difficulties and national sentiment is hard to determine, as the two react upon each other. But inconvenience in matters of communication and administration there must be, in the circumstances, whatever regulative conventions may exist, and however well those conventions may work.

11. Even assuming for the moment that the question is purely one of sentiment with no economic side to it, it is still not clear how the neutralisation of East Prussia would provide a remedy. It is necessary, first of all, to decide what is meant by 'neutralisation'. The conception put forward by His Majesty's Minister at Warsaw/you in a recent despatch⁸ was that East Prussia should be placed under some separate régime, markedly different from that existing in the rest of Germany, and under the ægis of the League of Nations; that the perpetual neutrality and inviolability in

based on the *status quo* (see *L.N.O.J.* 1923, pp. 224-7, and 237-40). After a request by the Polish Government for a settlement of their frontiers, the Conference of Ambassadors on March 15, 1923, recognised Vilna as falling within the Polish frontier (see Vol. XXIII, Nos. 627, 637, 639, and 661-2).

⁷ See No. 364, n. 7. ⁸ Warsaw despatch No. 233 of May 5 (C 6277/459/18), not printed.

case of **war** of East Prussia territory should be guaranteed by a group of Powers **or** by the League of Nations; that Germany should undertake not to utilise **East Prussia**, even in the event of war, for any kind of military or naval **operations**; and that the inhabitants of East Prussia should not undergo **any** military training except for frontier defence and [sh]ould not be **transferred** from East Prussia to a seat of war.

12. It **is** not altogether clear whether this conception contemplates the setting **up** of East Prussia as a separate State, independent both of Germany **and** of Poland, but under the ægis of the League of Nations, or merely **its** maintenance as part of the German Reich, but with a separate military **status**. The second or purely military solution would seem to offer no **remedy**, for it would leave untouched both national sentiment and the economic difficulties inherent in the geographical situation. The first, on the other **hand**, seems likely rather to tighten than to loosen the existing bonds of sentiment between East Prussia and the Reich. For the East Prussians **are** almost ultra-German, and there is nothing to show that they or the **Reich** would willingly agree to separation or that they would readily abandon **the** struggle for reunion if separation were imposed upon them.

Neutralisation, in fact, whatever interpretation is placed upon it, would only be **possible** if Germany could be brought to regard East Prussia as something not quite the same as the remainder of the Reich; but if Germany **could** be brought to this state of mind, the principal psychological objection to the corridor would have disappeared, and with it the necessity **for** neutralisation would also have disappeared. To speak of neutralisation in these circumstances is not so much to propose a remedy as to **restate** the problem in other words.

13. Of **the** two suggestions considered, then, the first is impracticable, and the **second** does not appear to offer any prospect of success.

14. **The** principle underlying the Memel solution is the replacement of the **present** arrangement by some entirely new arrangement. This principle **I** believe to be both wrong and harmful. We are in some danger of working on a tacit assumption that a change in the conditions laid down by the **peace** treaties is inevitable, and that it is the business of His Majesty's Government to initiate such alteration. With barely six years elapsed **since** the treaties were signed, it is early to talk of the inevitability of change. Our object should rather be to change as little as possible unless and until existing arrangements prove unworkable. For not only are changes **likely** to bring with them new problems in place of old ones, but the idea that His Majesty's Government favour a change, if it gains ground, is likely to diminish confidence in our policy and to increase the feeling of general insecurity.

15. The principle underlying the second solution—neutralisation of East Prussia—is that an effort should be made to maintain the present arrangement but to diminish the difficulties which it causes. Though, for the reasons I have explained, the solution suggested is a faulty application of this principle, I believe that the principle itself is the right one, and that

His Majesty's Government should encourage it. This has, in fact, been my constant endeavour in the advice which I have given to both the German and Polish Governments. On the one hand, I have urged upon Poland the necessity of avoiding action which would unnecessarily irritate or offend German susceptibilities, and of endeavouring to overcome outstanding difficulties and possible causes of dispute with Germany by friendly discussion and negotiation. On the other hand, I have, in my conversations with the German Ambassador,⁹ done my best to discourage any expectation which might exist of a change in the treaty settlement and to emphasise the unfortunate effect for Germany likely to be produced by any attempt at the present time to call in question the settlement of Germany's eastern frontier. It is an undoubted fact that if Germany joins the League of Nations she will have the right of appeal to article 19 of the Covenant. I have, however, made no secret of my view that, to enter the League with the idea of utilising this right at once, would be pure folly. To stir up the question now would be a disservice to the cause of peace and would be likely to undo all the good that may result from Germany's entry into the League and from the proposed western security pact. It would re-awaken the sense of insecurity which we are trying to lull, and it would range against Germany every Power which had anything to lose by a reversal of the 1919 settlement. Nor, as this despatch shows, is there any probability under existing conditions that a solution less objectionable than the present one could be found. An alteration in the outlook of the world will first be necessary, and this can only come about when the passions of war have been appeased and the uneasy suspicions with which Germany is watched have been allayed. If the Germans are wise they will let this question sleep for a generation. If the Poles are wise they will make it possible for them to do so.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁹ See e.g. No. 325.

No. 384

Notes by Sir C. Hurst on the Revised Draft Security Pact¹

[C 8211/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 17, 1925

The accompanying draft is a revise of the draft Security Pact relating to the western frontiers of Germany, dated the 12th May (C 6579/459/18).²

¹ The revised draft was drawn up by Sir C. Hurst after consultation with the Central Department. It survives in the original.

² No. 316.

Article 3. The solemn obligation not to resort to war is restricted to France, Germany and Belgium. The rôle of the British Empire and of Italy will be solely that of guarantors. If Great Britain is not to enter into a comprehensive agreement to submit all disputes to some machinery for peaceful settlement but is only to guarantee a Franco-German treaty to that effect, her undertaking not to resort to war must be similarly limited. The Covenant of the League leaves certain loopholes open for a resort to hostilities. If those loopholes are to be closed so far as Great Britain is concerned, some method for adjusting disputes by peaceful means would be necessary to close the gap. The obligation not to resort to war must not be more extensive than the obligation to resort to a peaceful method of settling the dispute.

Article 4. One of the objects of this article is to make it clear that the Council of the League has a *locus standi* to intervene if a violation of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles is alleged. The French Government is now disposed to maintain that article 44 means that any violation by Germany of 42 or 43 results automatically in the creation of a state of belligerency.

Article 6. This article constitutes a very drastic and far-reaching guarantee. It gives France all she would have been entitled to claim if the Defence of France Treaty, 1919,³ had come into force, but it recognises the part to be played by the Council of the League in that the council's notification is a condition precedent to the guarantee being operative.

Article 7. The treaties of arbitration to be guaranteed by the British Empire should constitute separate instruments, but they are an integral part of the scheme, and it is, therefore, provided in article 12 that they must be concluded before the ratification of the Rhineland Pact.

Article 11. As drafted this article enables any dominion or India to declare its unwillingness to adopt the obligations of the pact.

Article 13 is a reproduction of article 3 of the Defence of France Treaty of 1919.³ It is put forward as an alternative to a time-limit.

Final Clause. A footnote⁴ on the page containing the text of this clause gives an alternative formula. The discussions have hitherto proceeded upon the assumption that Germany must come into the League. If Germany refuses to come into the League, France's claim to the conclusion of some instrument which should increase her security would be strengthened, but the effect of rendering the pact conditional on Germany's entry into the League would be to leave France worse off if Germany refused to join than if she joined.

³ See No. 185, n. 1.

⁴ See n. 6, below.

Draft Security Pact

[C 8158/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 17, 1925*

Belgium, the British Empire, France, Germany and Italy,

Realising the need of satisfying the desire for security of the peoples upon whom fell the brunt of the fighting in the war of 1914-18;

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium,⁵ and conscious of the necessity of stabilising the territorial *status quo* in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts;

Have agreed as follows:-

1. The High Contracting Parties severally and collectively guarantee the maintenance and inviolability of the frontiers between France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other hand as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919.

2. Germany reaffirms her obligation to respect and faithfully to observe the provisions of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919.

3. France and Belgium of the one part and Germany of the other part undertake that they will in no case resort to war against the other except in resistance to invasion or attack or when acting with the authorisation of the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations.

4. If any party to the present treaty alleges that a violation of article 3 of this treaty or of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles has been, or is being, committed, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League forthwith.

5. As soon as any violation of article 3 of this treaty or of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles shall have been established to the satisfaction of the Council of the League, the Council shall forthwith notify such violation to each of the parties to this treaty.

6. The parties to this treaty severally agree that in the event of any notification being made to them as provided in article 5, they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against which the act complained of is directed.

7. Treaties shall be concluded between France and Germany and between Belgium and Germany respectively providing for the peaceful settlement of all disputes, whether juridical or political, which may arise between them.

8.—(1) The treaties referred to in article 7 shall be placed under the guarantee of the parties to the present treaty.

(2) If it is alleged by a party to one of the said treaties that the other party has failed to comply with its provisions, either by refusing to submit

⁵ See No. 316, n. 1.

a dispute to the machinery therein provided for the settlement of disputes, or by failing to comply with an award, recommendation or report resulting therefrom, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League.

(3) If the Council of the League is satisfied that a party to one of the said treaties has failed to comply with its provisions as alleged, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to secure compliance with the treaty.

(4) If the party which has failed to comply with the provisions of the treaty resorts to war against the other party to the treaty, the parties to this treaty severally agree that they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power attacked.

9. The provisions of the present treaty shall not be deemed to prevent military or naval action in fulfilment of a guarantee given by one of the parties to the present treaty for the fulfilment of an arbitration treaty of the same purport as those referred to in article 7, concluded by another party to the present treaty with a third state, where the party failing to comply with the provisions of the said treaty resorts to war against the other party to the treaty. Nor shall they be deemed to affect the rights enjoyed by any of the parties to the present treaty under Part XIV, Section 1, of the Treaty of Versailles or under the subsequent agreements there provided for, or to prevent action in pursuance of rights enjoyed by any of the parties to the present treaty under a treaty now in force between that party and another party to the present treaty.

10. Nothing in this treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties as Members of the League of Nations, nor shall it prejudice the power and the duty of the League to take, in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant, any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

11. If any of the British Dominions or India gives notice within a period of from the ratification of this treaty that it is unable to accept articles 1, 6 and 8 (4) of this treaty, the provisions of those articles shall not be binding on the Dominion, or on India, giving such notice.

12. Copies of the treaties referred to in article 7 shall be communicated to each of the parties to this treaty before its ratification.

13. The present treaty must be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations and must be recognized by the Council, acting if need be by a majority, as an engagement which is consistent with the Covenant of the League; it will continue in force until on the application of one of the parties to it, the Council, acting if need be by a majority, agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

The present treaty shall be ratified, but shall not come into force unless and until Germany has become a Member of the League of Nations.⁶

⁶ A note on the original reads: 'An alternative provision, and one better calculated to meet the situation if Germany refuses to join the League would be to add a new clause 14 as follows:-

"No State shall be entitled to claim the benefits of this treaty unless it is a Member of the League of Nations."

'If this clause were adopted, France would obtain the security afforded her under the present treaty, and Germany would fail to obtain it only because of her own action.'

No. 385

Memorandum on the proposed Security Settlement on Germany's Western Frontier, in its relation to Germany's Eastern Frontier

[C 8209/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 18, 1925*

The main difficulty in the recent conversations with France regarding the German proposals for a Security Pact¹ has been the fear of the French Government lest the proposed pact should result in the Rhineland becoming a barrier which would stop the French from going to the help of Poland in the event of an attack by Germany on that country. It was to provide for this contingency that the French Government, in the first draft of their proposed reply to Germany,² suggested that general arbitration treaties between Germany and her eastern neighbours guaranteed by the signatories of the Rhineland Pact should, with that pact and similar arbitration treaties between Germany and the signatories of the pact, form an indivisible whole, and be linked up with them in a general convention. When His Majesty's Government declared themselves unable to guarantee arbitration treaties between Germany and her eastern neighbours or to participate in a general convention of which such arbitration treaties would be an integral part,³ the French Government put forward a modified suggestion, reserving to themselves the right to guarantee such treaties, and stipulating that the proposed Rhineland Pact should not be allowed to operate as a barrier against France if she were called upon to implement her guarantee.⁴

II. In Mr. Chamberlain's note to M. Briand of the 8th June⁵ His Majesty's Government accepted the idea that France should retain the right to guarantee arbitration treaties between Germany and her eastern neighbours, and agreed that in the circumstances contemplated by the French Government, *i.e.*, assuming the violation by Germany of an arbitration treaty, voluntarily entered into by her with Poland, in such a manner as to bring into play the guarantee of the French Government, the Rhineland Pact should not act as a barrier to prevent France from taking action in conformity with her guarantee. His Majesty's Government justified this attitude by laying down as a general principle that the proposed Rhineland Pact clearly could not be allowed to operate in favour of a signatory Power which subsequently broke treaty obligations into

¹ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

² See No. 318, Enclosures.

³ See Nos. 322, 330, 340, and 349.

⁴ See No. 360, Enclosures.

⁵ No. 363.

which it had entered. The Rhineland Pact should give the fullest possible security to all the Powers concerned, so long as they kept their treaty undertakings and could not be invoked by a guilty Power to protect it from the consequences of its wrongdoing.

III. It is probable that criticism will be directed against the linking up in any way with the Rhineland Pact of fresh responsibilities in respect of Germany's eastern frontiers. In order to be in a position to meet this criticism it is necessary to understand clearly how the arrangement will work out in practice. It is with the object of demonstrating this that Sir C. Hurst has written the memorandum which is quoted verbatim below. The memorandum is, of course, to be read subject to one important reservation. The Rhineland Pact and the guaranteed arbitration treaties exist as yet only as conceptions and not as concrete documents. Much will, of course, depend on their actual terms, and it will therefore be prudent at this stage not to be too categorical in any public explanation of their operation. It is quite possible that some of the situations to which the proposed settlement may apparently give rise will not, in fact, materialise, because when the drafting stage is reached it may be possible to introduce safeguards against them. For instance, while the type of arbitration treaty contemplated is a treaty under which all disputes of a whatever nature will be submitted to peaceful settlement, the precise form and scope of the guarantee to be given to such an arbitration treaty is not yet settled. Much will turn on this. Again, such apprehensions as now exist will no doubt be greatly diminished should it be found possible so to draft the proposed settlement that the Rhineland can only be crossed for hostile purposes by a party which has behind it the *authorisation of the League of Nations*. It will be desirable that His Majesty's Government should during the forthcoming negotiations insist on this condition, basing themselves on the principle that the possibility of *private* war should be ruled out in the Rhineland, which they regard as an area of vital concern to the security of this country. The way is already prepared for His Majesty's Government to take up this attitude by the terms of Mr. Chamberlain's memorandum to the French Ambassador of the 19th May.⁶ In that memorandum, commenting on the phrase in the French draft note to Germany² that the proposed arbitration treaties 'should leave no room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated' in the draft note, Mr. Chamberlain wrote:—

'But even in the latter case, the French Government can hardly contemplate actual coercive action without a preliminary reference to some procedure for peaceful settlement, such, for example, as the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with the general provisions of the Covenant.'

IV. It is in the light of these preliminary observations that the memorandum by Sir C. Hurst, which now follows, should be read:—

⁶ No. 330.

*The Proposed Rhineland Pact in relation to France's Commitments
to Poland*

Memorandum by Sir C. Hurst

The British policy of separating the arrangements for guaranteeing the security of the western frontiers of Germany from those relating to the eastern frontiers, coupled with France's known commitments on Poland and the intention she has announced of guaranteeing an arbitration treaty between Poland and Germany, produces a situation which is somewhat complicated. It is therefore necessary to know exactly the circumstances in which, under the proposed Rhineland Pact, France, acting in support of Poland, will be at liberty to take action against Germany when such action involves measures directed against the Rhineland. It is the point as to which enquiries and criticism are most likely to be made.

2. France's existing engagement to Poland⁷ appears to be limited to common action with Poland in the case of unprovoked aggression from Germany. So long, however, as France believes the support and maintenance of Poland to be essential to France's security, there can be no certainty that French action would be limited to occasions covered by the treaty. It is French interests, and not French treaty engagements, which will determine the measure of the support to be accorded to Poland. It is well, therefore, to consider every case which can arise.

The Security Scheme

3. The elements in the security scheme outlined in the correspondence between the French and British Governments to be borne in mind are—

(1) The British guarantee (a) against violation of the Rhineland by either Germany or France; (b) of British support to the other party in case of any failure on the part of either France or Germany to observe the provisions of a treaty providing for the peaceful settlement of all disputes between them, where such failure is followed by a resort to hostilities on the part of the wrong-doer.

(2) The French guarantee of support to the other party in case of any failure on the part of either Germany or Poland to observe the provisions of a similar treaty for the peaceful settlement of all disputes between Germany and Poland, where such failure is followed by a resort to hostilities;

(3) Germany's entry into the League, so that she will come under all the obligations and enjoy all the rights of membership in the League.

4. If a dispute between Poland and Germany should arise after all the arrangements indicated in paragraph 3 have come into being, and Germany should refuse to submit the dispute to peaceful settlement in accordance with the provisions of her arbitration treaty with Poland and should thereupon attack Poland, France will be at liberty to attack Germany and to invade the Rhineland without committing any breach of

⁷ See No. 187.

the Rhineland Pact or involving Great Britain in any obligation. The Franco-German Arbitration Treaty (see above, paragraph 3 (1) (b)), is not to exclude coercive action pursuant of an arbitration treaty guaranteed by either party, and the British guarantee cannot be invoked by a guilty Power to protect it from the consequences of a wilful breach of its treaty obligations, but, except in the case where the guilty party resorts to aggression on the western frontier, Great Britain is not involved in any obligation under the proposed pact.

5. If in the dispute between Germany and Poland envisaged in paragraph 4 it is Poland which refuses to submit the dispute to peaceful settlement under the Arbitration Treaty between her and Germany, and follow up that refusal by an attack on Germany, France, as the guarantor of the Germano-Polish Treaty, would come under an obligation to support Germany and join in coercing Poland. France would not be at liberty to attack Germany in pursuance of the Franco-Polish military alliance.⁷ If France did attack Germany and violate the Rhineland for the purpose, Great Britain would be bound, by virtue of the guarantee of the Rhineland, to support Germany in resisting France.

6. Another possible case is that Germany refuses to submit her dispute with Poland to peaceful settlement under the arbitration treaty between them and Poland then resorts to hostilities in consequence and attacks Germany.

Germany's refusal to fulfil the arbitration treaty without resorting to hostilities will have set the Council of the League in motion to use moral pressure on both the parties to settle the dispute and keep the peace. It will not bring France's guarantee of the Germano-Polish Arbitration Treaty into play, because that guarantee is only to operate where failure to observe it is followed by resort to hostilities. Consequently, France can have no right to support Poland by force of arms or violate the Rhineland. If she did so, the British guarantee of the Rhineland would come into play and His Majesty's Government would be bound to support Germany. Except in the case corresponding to that which is discussed in paragraph 8 below, Poland, by her attack on Germany, would have violated article 16 of the Covenant, and all members of the League, including France and the British Empire, would be bound to apply the sanctions of article 16 against Poland.

7. The observations in the above paragraph equally apply, of course, *mutatis mutandis*, if the case is reversed and it is Poland who refuses to submit the dispute to peaceful settlement under her arbitration treaty with Germany and Germany who attacks her in consequence. In that case, too, France's guarantee of the Germano-Polish Arbitration Treaty will not come into play, because the refusal to submit the dispute to arbitration will not have been coupled with a resort to hostilities. Consequently, France will not, under the Rhineland Pact, have any right to violate the Rhineland; the coercive action involved in such an attack would not be in pursuance of a treaty of arbitration guaranteed by her.

Germany's action, however, will have been taken in disregard of the League—subject to the exception discussed in paragraph 8 below. Poland's refusal to submit her dispute to peaceful settlement under the arbitration treaty with Germany will have brought the Council of the League into action, and the Council of the League will be endeavouring to secure that effect is given to the arbitration treaty. Consequently, Germany's attack on Poland will have violated article 16 of the Covenant, and France will be entitled, under that article, to regard Germany's attack on Poland as an act of war committed against herself and to apply against Germany the sanctions provided by that article. Such action will not violate the Rhineland Pact, nor bring the British guarantee to protect the Rhineland into play. The British Empire, as a member of the League, will be in the same position as France, and should apply as against Germany the sanctions of article 16 of the Covenant, because of Germany's resort to war in disregard of her obligations as a member of the League.

8. It is possible that the attack made by Germany on Poland (see paragraph 7) after Poland's refusal to submit the matter to peaceful settlement, will have been made after the Council of the League has done its utmost to secure compliance on the part of Poland with the provisions of the arbitration treaty and after Germany has taken all the steps which are provided for in the Covenant of the League, so that under the Covenant her resort to war against Poland would be justifiable. She will have violated no treaty engagement; France would have no right to take measures against Germany, either under the Covenant of the League or under the Rhineland Pact, or under the Germano-Polish Arbitration Treaty of which she would be a guarantor. If France did move against Germany and violated the Rhineland Pact in so doing, it would bring into play the British guarantee of the inviolability of the Rhineland and would oblige Great Britain to come to the support of Germany.

9. One further hypothesis needs consideration, as it has already been mentioned in the newspapers.

Suppose Germany fails to carry out her arbitration treaty with Poland and attacks Poland, so that France's guarantee of the treaty comes into play. France then proceeds to attack Germany across the Rhineland (as she is entitled to do), but her armies are not successful; they are driven back by the Germans, and the German forces proceed to march across the Rhineland and invade France. Would such entry into the Rhineland violate the new pact? From the strictly legal point of view, it would be difficult to say that Germany's action in defending herself against France made her a wrongdoer as against France, even though she was a wrongdoer in the first instance against Poland. If France chooses to attack Germany, she cannot claim that Germany is not to be allowed to defend herself to the best of her ability, and Germany's defence of herself must include the right to attack and defeat her enemy. If the Rhineland Pact is not to prevent France attacking Germany in fulfilment of the guarantee of the Germano-Polish Treaty, it must not prevent Germany defending

herself when so attacked. At the same time it must be realised that Germany's original action against Poland would in all probability have already brought article 16 of the Covenant into operation, so that we might be involved in action (not necessarily military) against Germany in virtue of our obligations under the Covenant, though not under the pact.

If Germany's action in repelling such French attack involves no breach of the pact, neither would it bring into operation the British guarantee which is contained in the pact. Politically, it may well be that circumstances would compel Great Britain to intervene in such a case, but intervention would be dictated by British interests, and not by the Rhineland Pact.

C. J. B. HURST

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 17, 1925*

V. A contention which is likely to be advanced by critics of the proposed settlement is that the introduction of the idea of arbitration treaties between Germany and her eastern neighbours guaranteed by France has the practical result of involving Great Britain indirectly in commitments regarding the German eastern frontier. The answer to this is that under the terms of the Covenant of the League, Great Britain, as a member of the League, is already liable in certain circumstances to be involved should war break out between Germany and Poland. It is true that the proposed settlement will leave the liabilities of France in respect of Germany's eastern frontier greater than those assumed by other members of the League of Nations, but it will greatly restrict the freedom of either Poland or France or Germany to provoke hostilities and be far safer than the present Franco-Polish Treaty of Alliance;⁷ and further, His Majesty's Government will not be bound to any greater extent than they are at present by the Covenant to defend Poland's frontier against Germany, or *vice versa*. The only case that can be put forward with any show of justification to prove that Great Britain's liabilities are increased by the French guarantee of a German-Polish arbitration treaty is the case discussed in paragraph 9 of Sir C. Hurst's memorandum, *i.e.*, if France, in virtue of her guarantee, made a legitimate attack on Germany and that attack failed, Great Britain might find herself bound to come to the help of France if Germany, in a successful counter-attack, crossed the Rhineland. It will be observed that Sir C. Hurst is doubtful whether, even in this case, the Rhineland Pact would entail upon Great Britain any legal obligations to intervene. But assuming, for the purpose of argument, that Great Britain did find herself compelled to intervene—and indeed, whatever the legal position might be under the Rhineland Pact, it is almost inconceivable that in the situation contemplated Great Britain would not intervene either in virtue of obligations under the League Covenant or from sheer political necessity—the possibility still does not constitute a fresh liability in respect of Germany's eastern frontier. The most that can be said about it with any show of justification is that it increases our liabilities in respect of the Rhineland. But the whole basis of our policy is

that the Rhineland is an area of such vital concern to us that we are prepared to use force to resist any unlawful incursion into that area.

VI. For the sake of completeness mention must be made of one other point which, though not really relevant, has already been raised in the press and which may be raised again. It has been assumed in some quarters that as a result of the Rhineland Pact and its cognate arrangements France will not only have the right to cross the Rhineland in certain circumstances to attack Germany in support of Poland, but will also acquire the right to send troops in transit across Germany to help Poland in the event of a Russian attack upon Poland. This, of course, is incorrect. The right to send troops in transit across Germany can only be claimed under paragraph 3 of article 16 of the Covenant of the League, which reads as follows:—

‘The members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the Covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.’

At present Germany, not being a member of the League, is not bound to allow French troops to cross her territory, and it is her objection to assuming this obligation that is the main ostensible reason for her reluctance to join the League. The view of the Council of the League is that if Germany desires to become a member of the League she must accept this obligation with the rest of the Covenant.⁸ Now, the Allies are insisting that Germany must join the League before the Rhineland Pact can come into force. It therefore follows that when the Rhineland Pact comes into force Germany will be under the theoretical obligation to allow the transit of French troops if so required by the League. But it should be clearly understood that this is the effect of Germany's entry into the League and not of the Rhineland Pact, which does not itself affect or aim at affecting the question in any way.

⁸ See No. 261, Enclosure.

No. 386

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 20, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 228 Telegraphic: by bag [C 8266/459/18]

PARIS, June 19, 1925

Your telegram No. 170 of June 17th.¹

I gave this morning the Prime Minister's message to Monsieur Briand, who begged that an expression of his thanks might be conveyed to Mr. Baldwin, to whom he is most grateful.

Monsieur Briand went so far as to assure me that he had not, on that particular occasion at Geneva, received any members of the press excepting in your presence.

Monsieur Briand is delighted with the manner in which this morning's French press has received the White Paper on the pact proposals,² and declares that all French political circles take a most favourable view of the matter. His information from Berlin leads him to hope that the German government will return a satisfactory reply,³ and he feels convinced that the road to real peace has been considerably cleared.

¹ See No. 381, n. 7.

² Cmd. 2435, op. cit., was issued on the evening of June 18. See No. 367.

³ To the French note of June 16 (see No. 382, n. 2). It had been arranged between the British, French, and German Governments that the documents be published so as to appear spontaneously in Great Britain, France, and Germany in the morning newspapers of June 19. The documents were published in France as *Pacte de Sécurité: Neuf pièces relatives à la proposition faite le 9 février 1925 par le Gouvernement allemand et à la réponse du Gouvernement français* (9 février 1925–16 juin 1925) (Paris, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1925).

No. 387

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 22)

*No. 526 [C 8345/459/18]**

ROME, June 19, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith, in translation, the text of the reply of the Italian Government¹ to the French communication of the French answer² to the German note on the question of security.³ This document was communicated to me confidentially last night by the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Senator Contarini said that the French Ambassador⁴ had come to convey M. Briand's warm

¹ For the Italian text, see *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 35.

² See No. 197, n. 1.

³ See No. 382, n. 2.

⁴ M. R. Besnard.

thanks for this reply. The Senator added that for the present the Italian Government did not intend to take up the tentative proposal made by M. Berthelot for a separate pact regarding the Brenner frontier.⁵

2. I asked Senator Contarini whether Signor Mussolini shared his, the Senator's, views regarding Italian participation in a security pact as reported in my telegram No. 153 of the 13th June.⁶ I pointed out that, as had been well stated in the British press, if Italy joined such a pact, even without a guarantee of her Brenner frontier, she would be joining it in the same spirit as Great Britain, that is to say, for the maintenance of European peace and security. Italian prestige would certainly be enhanced by such participation. Senator Contarini said that this was exactly his own view, and that he was doing his best to induce Signor Mussolini to share it. But his Excellency, whose knowledge of the question was limited, had somewhat committed himself in recent speeches on the subject in a contrary sense. The Senator hoped, however, to bring him round to his own point of view.

I have, etc.,
R. GRAHAM

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 387

The Italian President of the Council to the French Ambassador (Rome)

Translation

ROME, June 15, 1925

M. l'Ambassadeur,

In reply to your Excellency's note of the 14th June, I have the honour to confirm the declarations of principle repeatedly made by the Italian Government⁷ since the presentation to the French Government of the German memorandum of the 9th February,³ namely that the Italian Government is favourable to a five-Power pact of security, as the surest means of giving a solid basis for the general pacification of Europe. The Royal Government hope that it may be possible to conclude the pact in such terms that it may effectively assume this significance and this scope.

However, from the course of the negotiations and of the events in connection with drawing up a final text for the reply which the French Government propose to send to the German Government and of which the Royal Government understand that it would be inopportune to continue the discussion at the present time, it appears that a situation is likely to arise involving two different orders of guarantees for the maintenance of the peace treaties.

Not being able to form an exact idea from the documents of the manner in which the pact could attain its object given the above-mentioned difference of guarantees, the Italian Government find themselves obliged

⁵ See No. 368.

⁶ No. 380.

⁷ See Nos. 239, 262, 281, 288, 359, 362, 368, 377, and 380.

to reserve the definition of their own particular decisions until the nature of this double order of guarantees, the concrete undertakings which would arise from them, and the eventual position of Italy in respect of the protection of interests connected with the problems which directly concern her, have been made quite clear.

MUSSOLINI

No. 388

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Addison (Berlin)

No. 132 Telegraphic [C 8305/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 21, 1925, 4.10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 240.¹

I most sincerely trust that German government are not going to be misled into making quibbling difficulties over French note of June 16th.² It was drafted by the French government in markedly conciliatory terms which indicate as I know well a real desire on their part to move forward to new and more friendly relations which may and should render less difficult the ultimate settlement of other problems between Germany and the allies. This note carefully examined and in its final form approved by His Majesty's Government³ offers to Germany golden opportunity of regaining once and for all their position of full equality in the comity of nations. It is surely inconceivable that they will throw away such an opportunity. I am anxious to avoid all suspicion of lobbying German government, but matter is of such absolutely vital importance and the moment is so critical for immediate future of our relations with Germany and the ultimate peace of Europe that I feel bound to let my view be known. To my mind the proper course for the German government is to express acknowledgement of the spirit of conciliation which so obviously inspires French note,² to avoid all petty discussion of detail, and to accept without cavil the broad general principles which it enumerates. All discussion of actual detail had much better be reserved until we reach the drafting stage when we shall have as much and probably more of it than we any of us want. Meantime if Germans are sensible they will reply promptly on the above lines, and add that the ground of general principle being thus clear they now await an intimation as to what the next step in the negotiations is to be.

I need not dwell on the conclusions which would be drawn everywhere if in face of so conciliatory an answer from France after consultation with

¹ Of June 19. This gave a summary of German press comment on the French note of June 16 (see No. 382, n. 2) which had been included in the documents published on June 18 (see No. 386, n. 2).

² See No. 382, n. 2.

³ See No. 363.

her allies Germany should now frustrate her own initiative and bring the mutual pact proposals to nought. I have publicly pledged my belief in the good faith of the German government. Am I as publicly to withdraw? I speak in House of Commons on Wednesday⁴ on this subject.

You are authorised to let my views [b]e known in such quarters as you think best: but should avoid anything in the nature of an official or written communication.

⁴ June 24. For Mr. Chamberlain's statement, see 185 *H.C.Deb.* 5 s, cols. 1555-70, and 1652-63.

No. 389

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 22)

*No. 1398 [C 8310/459/18]**

PARIS, June 21, 1925

Sir,

The publication of the correspondence regarding the German proposals for a security pact¹ has been the occasion for a series of comments here, which are worthy of analysis as throwing much light upon the attitude of public opinion towards the relations between Great Britain, France and Germany.

2. It is clear that the greatest satisfaction has been caused by three considerations in particular, namely, first, the evidence afforded of the closer approach of France and Great Britain to one another and of the public recognition by the two Governments of the solidarity of their mutual interests; secondly, the fact that His Majesty's Government, while speaking their opinion frankly and unhesitatingly, have said nothing tending to weaken the efficacy of the present treaty system upon which Europe rests; and, thirdly, that French essential interests have been adequately and successfully safeguarded by M. Briand. The press greets the friendly tone of the correspondence, and describes the task performed as a work of goodwill and good faith, a sincere effort at conciliation and realisation of the desire to safeguard treaty rights. It welcomes the fact that each side has scrupulously avoided all attempt to draw the other beyond the limits within which that side thought it prudent to remain, and almost unanimous homage is paid to yourself for the attitude which you have taken up.

3. The British position is clearly understood and readily accepted, a fact which in itself is evidence of the progress made, especially when one remembers the frequent misinterpretation and misrepresentation of

¹ See No. 386, n. 3.

British policy which has been indulged in here in recent years. On the present occasion there is no trace of any such tendency. British imperial obligations are realised, and it is pointed out that the position of Great Britain in continental policy must be largely governed by her position as the centre of a large non-European Empire.

4. As regards direct French interests, it is observed that, as soon as His Majesty's Government agreed that France should not be prevented by the Rhineland Pact from acting on behalf of any Power whose Arbitration Treaty with Germany she had guaranteed,² and as soon as it was clear that the pact could not operate to the advantage of a Power which infringed its treaty obligations, the negotiations were at once on solid ground. It is almost universally acknowledged, with evident relief, that France maintains full liberty of action in the event of an unprovoked attack on Poland by Germany, and the retention of her power to cross the Rhine is one of the main causes of satisfaction. As regards the eastern frontier of France, it is pointed out that, in addition to articles 42, 43 and 44 of the Versailles Treaty, these frontiers are now also protected by the 'personal, unlimited and automatic responsibility of Great Britain'.³ Two main risks, namely, the revision of the treaties and the possibility of obstacles to the functioning of the French alliances with Poland⁴ and Czechoslovakia,⁴ have been averted, while Great Britain will gain in security to the Channel ports and in the increased political and economic stability in Europe which will be a consequence of the pact.

5. The bilateral character of the proposed pact is recognised. The 'Temps' observes, for instance, that 'being bilateral by definition, the pact will be valid for German security as well as our own,' and other organs of the press draw attention to the same point. As regards the power of France to cross the Rhine, it is, however, remarked in one passage that this advantage is really unilateral in practice, seeing that it is not conceivable that Germany would require to come to the assistance of France, Spain or Italy.

6. It can be said that British policy has won complete confidence here on this subject. The small amount of criticism, which is entirely on the lines that His Majesty's Government have taken care not to commit themselves, may be discounted. German policy remains, of course, on trial and as much under suspicion as ever. It is almost universally thought that the original proposal⁵ had an ulterior motive, and that subsequent developments are the result of the diplomacy of France and Great Britain by which Germany has been cleverly hoisted with her own petard. French opinion realises that the supreme test of German honesty is now being applied, and does not appear over-confident as to the satisfactory result of that test. It is therefore almost entirely as a stage in the improvement in Anglo-French relations that the publication of the correspondence is greeted here, and the satisfaction which is universally expressed may be

² See No. 363.

³ Cf. No. 349.

⁴ See No. 187.

⁵ See No. 197, n. 1.

taken as proof of the importance attached by public opinion here to the maintenance of the closest relations between the two countries.

I have, etc.,
CREWE

No. 390

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 22)

[C 8512/459/18]

PARIS, June 21, 1925

My dear Tyrrell,

Grosclaude¹ told me this afternoon that Foch and Barrère,² in spite of the fact that they are both very pro-English, are carrying on somewhat of a campaign against the pact on the pretext that it places England in the position of a protecting power towards France. I am glad to say, however, that I do not think their views will carry much weight, for Foch is known to be terribly intransigent and to represent the views of extreme militarism, and Barrère is now somewhat of a back number. The great majority of French politicians and journalists whom I have met lately are very much pleased with the present course of events. Bailby, proprietor of the 'Intransigent', for instance, whom I met at luncheon today, is quite sound in the matter, and he has, as you know in the past, not always held such reasonable views. As Grosclaude himself put it to me: 'It is folly for us to decline to take anything from England merely because she will not give us *all* we want.'

2. Poliakoff³ told Hugessen⁴ this morning that he had heard from Berthelot that Stresemann had expressed himself privately to Margerie as satisfied with the French note⁵ as far as he personally was concerned. Berthelot had also told Poliakoff that he would have no objection if Germany proposed a Conference, provided Germany came to it with a written programme.

Yours sincerely,
ERIC PHIPPS

¹ Sir W. Tyrrell noted in the margin: 'A big financier married to a Rothschild.'

² French Ambassador in Rome 1897-1924. ³ Diplomatic correspondent of *The Times*.

⁴ Mr. H. Knatchbull-Hugessen was a First Secretary at the Paris Embassy.

⁵ See No. 382, n. 2.

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received June 22, 10.15 p.m.)

No. 242 Telegraphic [C 8418/459/18]

BERLIN, June 22, 1925, 7.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 132.¹

I have just had a long conversation with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as being the best method of conveying your views rapidly and unofficially to the proper quarter. After expounding considerations contained in your telegram I laid stress on desire that German reply should be couched in such terms as not to ruin negotiations at the start and that obvious course which you would prefer would be that they should return a conciliatory answer acknowledging generous spirit of French note² and stating that general principles on which future negotiations are to be conducted are acceptable to German government.

I pointed out that you were to speak in the House of Commons on Wednesday³ and that you would probably desire to have some assurance from me—not for use in debate but as a basis upon which to frame your statements—that German government meant to abide by their original offer⁴ and would not reply to French note in such a manner as to make further negotiations impossible.

Secretary of State said that comment of press must not be taken as in any way indicating opinion of German government. Obviously newspaper writers could not be expected to grasp exact meaning of a document which as correspondence between French government and His Majesty's Government show was not always clear to experts. He could assure me at once that German government were determined to reply in a conciliatory manner and in such a way as to facilitate further negotiations. Meaning of note was however not quite clear in many particulars. It had taken four months to draft and its examination and a proper appreciation of its meaning must take a few days to achieve.

With regard to question of reply in general terms misfortune was that in paragraph 7 French note asks for views of German government 'avec précision' and German government could not give their precise views until they knew precise meaning of certain stipulations. To agree in principle now and to raise specific points later would be to risk an accusation of bad faith. This necessarily led to necessity of asking for elucidation of those passages meaning of which did not appear clear to German government but he could assure me again that request for information on these points would not be couched in querulous terms or in a spirit of destructive criticism and would be so accompanied by

¹ No. 388.

³ See No. 388, n. 4.

² See No. 382, n. 2.

⁴ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

conciliatory language of a general nature as to further and not retard achievement of an end which German government desire as much today as when they initiated discussion.⁵

⁵ In a letter of June 26 to Mr. Lampson, Mr. Addison stated: '... So far as I can gather, Stresemann and his colleagues are smudging their brains with ink to such an extent that they do not know where they stand, and they incline at the present time to the policy of the weak man, namely, that of dragging things out and waiting to see if anything turns up.

'Brockdorff-Rantzau, who has been reported erroneously in the press as having returned to Moscow, is still, in fact, in Berlin. He returns to Moscow tomorrow and, significantly, is to be accompanied by von Dirksen, the head of the Russian department of the Foreign Office. Brockdorff-Rantzau has been spending the whole time in Berlin explaining to the German Government how terrible it would be if they allowed themselves to be brought into a position of servitude to the west, and how much more desirable it would be to lean to Russia, who would then in the near future help Germany to solve the Polish and other problems. Incredible as it may sound, such arguments are not without their effect on people to whom phrases such as "Drang nach Osten" [see No. 132, n. 3] actually mean something and whose ordinary method of diplomacy is to attempt to do several things at the same time for fear of missing something. ... my informant, who is extremely well informed, fears that the policy of the German Government will be to return a dilatory answer to the French note in the hope of keeping more than one avenue of escape open. ...'

No. 392

Memorandum¹ showing the Various Verbal Amplification which have been made of the German Proposals for a Security Pact²

[C 8441/459/18]*

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE, June 22, 1925

The point may be raised in the debate in the House of Commons on the 24th June³ that the correspondence published in the White Paper⁴ concerning the German proposals for a security pact² is not complete, since it does not show the amplifications of the German memorandum to His Majesty's Government and the French Government which have subsequently been made verbally on behalf of the German Government.

2. The papers containing reports of the various amplifications made are attached.⁵ Some of them are reports of speeches by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. To these reference can properly be made,

¹ Mr. Lampson minuted on June 22: '... it is really rather waste of time dealing with all the minutiae that are at the moment being served up by the daily press. The Government have formally undertaken that they will enter no pact which has not been fully discussed in Parliament. When we get to the drafting stage, things will get much clearer: if anything on the lines of our own departmental draft (Sir C. Hurst's draft submitted two days ago [No. 384]) is finally adopted there will not really be a great deal to fuss about.'

² See No. 197, n. 1.

³ For the debate on Mr. Chamberlain's statement (see No. 388, n. 4), see 185 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 1570-1672.

⁴ See No. 386, n. 2.

⁵ Not here printed.

and the statements contained in them can be regarded as authoritative. The rest are reports of conversations with German representatives. The verbal and semi-official nature of the communications made in such conversations makes it of course impossible to publish them. Until they are committed to writing or proclaimed in a public statement by a responsible German statesman, they can only be regarded as indications of the intentions of the German Government and not as firm offers.

3. The subjects of the amplifications are:—

- (i) Participation of Belgium.
- (ii) German intentions as regards Germany's eastern frontiers.
- (iii) The scope of the arbitration treaties proposed.
- (iv) The relation between the proposed pact and the military occupation by the Allies of the Rhineland.

4. These points have been dealt with in public speeches as follows:—

- (i) *Participation of Belgium*.—No reference in public speeches.
- (ii) *German Intentions as regards Germany's Eastern Frontier*.—(a) The following extract is taken from a public statement made by Dr. Stresemann on the 13th March:—

'In all the negotiations of the League of Nations and during the discussion regarding the evacuation of the northern zone there has always been talk of the security of France. . . . How little Germany intends to pursue an aggressive policy on other domains is evident from her readiness to conclude comprehensive arbitration treaties with all other countries. . . .

'No idea played a greater rôle during the world war on the Allied side than the idea of self-determination. There is no party in Germany, from the Deutschvölkische to the Communists, which could conscientiously admit that the eastern frontier was drawn in accordance with the right of self-determination. Germany has not got the strength to force an alteration of the frontier, and she has not got the will to do it. But when article 19 of the Covenant of the League makes express mention of the fact that treaties which have become impracticable can be altered, nobody can expect Germany to renounce once and for all any claim to have recourse to this refugium. In the sincere desire to live in peace with all her neighbours, Germany can only wish that the general development will be towards a solution of the differences existing here by peaceful methods.' (See 'Germany' print, March 17, Section 2.)⁶

(b) In a speech by Dr. Stresemann in the Reichstag on the 18th May the following passage occurred:—

'Incredible as it may seem, the statement made in the German memorandum that Germany is ready to conclude a general arbitration agreement with all States has led people to construe aggressive intentions towards Poland. I can only attribute that, in so far as it is not

⁶ A translation of this German press statement was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 186 of March 14, not printed.

due to complete ignorance of the nature of general arbitration agreements, to deliberate misconstruction. Arbitration treaties such as we have already concluded with a number of States, and such as have been recently concluded between other states constitute, in my view, a first-rate means for effectively securing peace. Even if the value of such arbitration treaties be estimated otherwise, it is at all events ridiculous to maintain that they are symptoms of a desire for aggression. At the same time, I have the impression that this unjustified criticism has recently given place to a more reasonable view. We have never made a secret of our views regarding our eastern frontiers, neither in public nor in the course of diplomatic conversations. There is nobody in Germany who could genuinely recognise that the frontier drawn in the east in flagrant contradiction to the right of self-determination of nations is an unalterable fact for all time. Consequently, no settlement of the security question can be taken into consideration by Germany which involves a fresh recognition of that frontier. To bring about a forcible alteration of the eastern frontiers Germany has neither the strength nor the will.' (See 'Germany' print, May 21, Section 1.)⁷

(iii) *The Scope of the Proposed Arbitration Treaties*.—No reference in public speeches.

(iv) *The Relation between the Proposed Pact and the Military Occupation of the Rhineland*.—No reference in public speeches.

5. The points have been dealt with in a purely verbal and semi-official way as follows:—

(i) *Participation of Belgium*.—(a) Lord D'Abernon reported on the 13th March that, in discussions with leading members of the German Government, he had been assured that it was their intention to assure the Belgian frontier in the same way as French territory (Berlin telegram No. 97).⁸

(b) On the 11th March, in conversation with Mr. Chamberlain at Geneva, M. Hymans stated that the German Ambassador at Brussels had assured him that it was the intention of the German Government to include Belgium and the Belgian frontier in their proposals, and that the omission was due to an accidental drafting error.⁹

(ii) *German Intentions as regards Germany's Eastern Frontiers*.—(a) On the 24th February the French Ambassador in London communicated to the Foreign Office a memorandum outlining the German offer to the French Government of the 9th February,² and recording very shortly certain subsequent conversations between M. Herriot and the German Ambassador in Paris. According to this record the German Ambassador told M. Herriot that Germany's eastern frontier would not be guaranteed in the same way as that of the west. A way out might,

⁷ A translation of this German press statement was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 318 (see No. 327, n. 3).

⁸ No. 241.

⁹ See No. 240.

however, be found by reference to article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and all idea of solution by force would be obviated. (See 'Germany' print, February 24, Section 1.)¹⁰

(b) Subsequent to the delivery to the French Government of the German memorandum of the 9th February,² the German Ambassador in Paris informed M. Herriot that Germany was prepared to consider the conclusion of a treaty of arbitration with Poland and Czechoslovakia. (See 'Germany' print, February 24, Section 1.)¹⁰

(c) On the 13th March Lord D'Abernon reported that the German Chancellor, in private conversation, had expressed the view that a primary foundation of pacification must be established through the settlement of the Franco-German frontier danger. He was anxious not to impair that foundation by linking up with such a settlement another settlement of a less essential character. In his view the Franco-German frontier was ripe for final and permanent settlement; the German-Polish frontier, involving the Danzig corridor and the separation of East Prussia from Germany, was not ripe. To adopt exactly identical conditions for the Polish and the French frontiers would dim the value of the French agreement and diminish its authority. Nevertheless, the submission to arbitration of German-Polish disputes had been included in the German offer, the object of which was to avoid settlement by force and to introduce peaceful methods. (See Berlin telegram No. 98.)¹¹

(d) On the 17th March Herr von Schubert referred to the apprehension evidently felt in Poland that Germany designed to obtain a modification of the Polish frontier by means of arbitration. He said that to attribute this intention to the German Government was 'complete nonsense'. In the arbitration treaties which Germany had already signed and to which she had referred as models, frontier questions were placed in the category of disputes to be submitted to conciliation procedures (where the award was not binding) and not among those to be submitted to legal arbitration (with binding award). However, if Poland so desired, frontier questions could be specifically excluded from the proposed arbitration treaty. A negative clause could be introduced excluding frontier problems from the whole procedure. Germany would not advise this method, but would be ready to accept it (see Berlin telegram No. 108 of the 17th M[arch]).¹² In a further conversation with Lord D'Abernon on the 22nd March Herr von Schubert confirmed in the most definite manner that the German Government were ready to exclude all frontier questions from the scope of the arbitration treaties to be signed, and particularly from the arbitration treaty with Poland. While Germany would be ready to agree

¹⁰ A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to Paris in Foreign Office despatch No. 686 (No. 590, below).

¹¹ No. 242.

¹² No. 254.

to this exclusion, she did not desire it. Herr von Schubert further declared that in point of time Germany had no desire to raise the question of Poland at present. When a new atmosphere had been created through the conclusion of a pact stabilising the western frontier, the matter of the eastern frontier could be discussed in a friendly way with Poland, but this might be at a much later date. (See Berlin telegram No. 114 of the 22nd March.)¹³

(e) Owing to doubt expressed by the German Ambassador in London as to whether Mr. Chamberlain in his speech in the House of Commons on the 24 March¹⁴ had not exaggerated the German position regarding the eastern frontier, Lord D'Abernon was instructed on the 25th March to ask the German Government categorically whether or not Germany renounced ultimate resort to war to rectify the existing settlement with Poland.¹⁴

On the 28th March Lord D'Abernon reported that Herr von Schubert, after consultation with the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had sent him a message to the effect that a misunderstanding had arisen. 'The German Government,' the message ran, 'renounce any idea of bringing about by warlike measures an alteration in the present German-Polish frontier. They are of opinion that the right means to exclude the possibility of war between Germany and Poland would be a far-reaching treaty of arbitration, the technical details of which should be fixed by verbal negotiations. If, therefore, Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Baldwin, in their speeches in the House of Commons on the 24th March,¹⁴ gave expression to the view that the German Government had no intention of obtaining an alteration of the German-Polish frontier by warlike measures, but that they had a definite hope of seeing this frontier altered at a given time in some other way, the ideas of the Government have been correctly interpreted.' (See Berlin telegram No. 129 of the 28th March.)¹⁵

(iii) *The Scope of the Arbitration Treaties Proposed.*—(a) On the 23rd January the permanent head of the German Foreign Office (Herr von Schubert) explained to Lord D'Abernon that the arbitration treaties which Germany had in mind as models were the German-Swiss Treaty of the 3rd December, 1921,¹⁶ and the German-Swedish Treaty of the 29th August, 1924.¹⁷ Under these treaties all disputes of whatever nature which are impossible of settlement within a reasonable time through diplomatic channels are submitted either to tribunals of arbitration or of conciliation. Legal questions are submitted to an arbitral tribunal which makes an award definitely binding on the parties. Political questions are submitted to a conciliation board which does not make a definitive binding award, but the parties are obliged to declare within a limited period of time whether they accept the

¹³ No. 265.

¹⁴ See No. 269.

¹⁵ No. 274.

¹⁶ See No. 190, n. 3.

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, n. 5.

conciliation proposals. Herr von Schubert emphasised the fact that Germany's readiness to sign arbitration treaties extended to *all* Powers. It would include notably those Powers whose frontiers touch Germany on the east. In the protocol attached to the German-Swiss Treaty it was stated that 'disputes immediately connected with events in the world war' are outside its purview. Herr von Schubert said that Germany did not propose to insert a similar phrase in protocols attached to the suggested new treaties. (See Berlin telegram No. 39 of the 23rd January.)¹⁸

(b) For proposed scope of arbitration treaty with Poland, see section (ii) (d) above.

(iv) *The Relation between the Proposed Pact and the Military Occupation by the Allies of the Rhineland.*—On the 9th March His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin was informed that one of the points regarding the German offer of the 9th February² which M. Herriot in his conversation with Mr. Chamberlain on the 7th March¹⁹ had raised as presenting difficulties was the possible effect on the military occupation of the Rhineland by the Allies. M. Herriot held that it was impossible to evacuate the Rhineland before the expiration of the fifteen-year period, and Germany ought to give a definite assurance that she accepted that period.

Lord D'Abernon replied on the 13th March that, in discussions with leading members of the German Government, he had been assured that the German Government would not demand the modification of articles 428–432 of the Treaty of Versailles (the occupation clauses). On the other hand, they would not abandon any right conferred by those articles. (See Berlin telegram No. 97.)²⁰

¹⁸ No. 190.

¹⁹ See No. 225.

²⁰ No. 241.

No. 393

Memorandum on the French Claim, under Paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, to take Independent Action against Germany, including the Occupation of the German Territory

[C 8449/1279/18]*

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE, June 23, 1925

Some apprehension has been expressed lest a security agreement on the lines laid down in the recently-published correspondence¹ between His Majesty's Government and the French Government may not ensure security, because it will still leave France with the right, on her own initiative, to occupy the Ruhr or other portions of German territory under

¹ See No. 386, n. 2.

the terms of paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles in the event of a reparation default on the part of Germany.

Paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, on which the French Government based the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923,² reads as follows:—

‘The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and, in general, such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances.’

The meaning of this paragraph has never been satisfactorily cleared up, the French Government taking a view which is not accepted by the German Government or by the British Government. The dispute centres on the phrase ‘such other measures’ and on the word ‘respective’. The French Government held, and still hold, that ‘such other measures’ include the occupation of territory other than that which the Allied Powers already have the right to occupy under Part XIV, Section I, of the treaty. They further claim that the word ‘respective’ allows each of the Allied States to take such measures against Germany independently of the other Allied States.

There is no reason to suppose that the French Government have renounced their claim to take action under paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the treaty in accordance with their interpretation of it. We have certainly no power to compel them to change their views. The only solution would be to reopen the dispute and insist on a definite interpretation being established once and for all. Such a course is obviously not practical politics.

The real point for consideration at the present time is whether the retention of the right is any longer a practical danger. In the first place account must be taken of the changes brought about by the London Conference of August 1924.³ Before that conference, all that had to happen before paragraph 18 could come into operation was that the Reparation Commission, acting by a majority if need be (and as actually happened in 1923), should, at the request of any one of its members, declare Germany in default in her reparation obligations. One of the main results of the London Conference was to replace this arbitrary and defective machinery by a fairer and more elaborate procedure.

1. First, the Allied Governments undertook in the London agreements⁴ that sanctions in pursuance of paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the treaty would not be imposed on Germany unless a default within the meaning of Section III of the Dawes Report⁵ had been declared. That section laid down that sanctions should not be reimposed ‘except in the

² See Vol. XXI, Chap. I.

⁴ See No. 343, n. 9.

³ See No. 225, n. 17.

⁵ See No. 27, n. 8.

case of flagrant failure to fulfil the conditions accepted by common agreement' (*i.e.*, except in case of failure to fulfil the Dawes plan).

2. Now, before the Dawes plan was adopted the Reparation Commission consisted of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. The London agreements, however, provided that, when the Reparation Commission was deliberating on any point relating to the Dawes plan, a citizen of the United States of America should take part in the discussions with power to vote.

3. A further safeguard was established by the introduction by the London agreements of the right of appeal from the Reparation Commission when that body does not come to a unanimous decision on any application that Germany be declared in default. Thus, paragraph 16(a), which the Allies at the London Conference agreed to insert in Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, contains the following passage:—

'If the decision of the Reparation Commission granting or rejecting an application to declare Germany in default has been taken by a majority, any member of the Reparation Commission who has participated in the vote may within eight days from the date of the said decision appeal from that decision to an arbitral commission composed of three impartial and independent persons, whose decision shall be final. The members of the arbitral commission shall be appointed for five years by the Reparation Commission deciding by a unanimous vote, or, failing unanimity, by the president for the time being of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. . . . The president of the arbitral commission shall be a citizen of the United States of America.'

4. Lastly, even if a German default is established, the prospect of independent action by any one of the Allies has been diminished by a further undertaking under the London agreements that in the case of a declaration of default 'the signatory Governments, acting with the consciousness of joint trusteeship for the financial interests of themselves and of the persons who advance money upon the lines of the said plan, will confer at once on the nature of the sanctions to be applied and on the method of their rapid and effective application'.

Quite apart from the London agreements, a fresh factor has been introduced into the situation by the protocol signed on the 22nd November,⁶ amending paragraph 13 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. The interpretation of the reparation section (*i.e.*, Part VIII of the treaty) is vested in the Reparation Commission by the following portion of paragraph 12 of Annex II:—

'The commission shall, in general, have wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole reparation as dealt with in this part of the present treaty, and shall have authority to interpret its provisions.'

⁶ For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 119, pp. 585-7.

Paragraph 13 of the same annex lays down the rules for voting on the Reparation Commission, and as originally drafted contained the following passage: 'On the following questions unanimity is necessary:— . . .

(f) Questions of the interpretation of the provisions of this part of the present treaty.'

There was no provision for the case where unanimity was not achieved.

In 1921 the Supreme Council decided, on the recommendation of the Reparation Commission, to amend paragraph 13 of Annex II so as to allow of the submission to arbitration of questions of interpretation on which the Reparation Commission could not reach unanimous agreement.⁷ Owing to various difficulties, however, this amendment had still not been embodied in a formal document when the French occupation of the Ruhr took place in January 1923.² The question of giving formal effect to the amendment had, in fact, been taken up shortly before that event, but, in view of the supreme importance which the meaning of paragraph had at that time, the French used all possible excuses to delay the signature of the protocol embodying the amendment of paragraph 13. When the Ruhr adventure was over, however, the French had no further cause for procrastination, and the amendment has now been embodied in a protocol signed on the 22nd November, 1924,⁶ by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Jugoslavia. In virtue of this protocol, paragraph 13 (f) of Annex II to Part VIII of the treaty now reads:—

'Questions of the interpretation of the provisions of this part of the present treaty. In case of difference of opinion between the delegates as to the interpretation of this part of the present treaty, the question may be submitted to arbitration by a unanimous agreement of the delegates. The arbitrator must be chosen unanimously by all the delegates, or, failing such an agreement, nominated by the Council of the League of Nations. The award of the arbitrator shall be binding on all the interested parties'.

While it is true that reference to arbitration of a disputed question of interpretation still requires the unanimous agreement of the commission, it would be morally almost impossible for a single Power to hold out against arbitration if the question again became acute, more especially if an appeal had been made by Germany to the League of Nations, as foreshadowed in the following paragraph.

It is also for consideration whether the practical importance of the French claim would not be further diminished by Germany's entry into the League of Nations, which is being laid down as an essential condition of the entry into force of the proposed security pact. By entering the League, Germany would at once enjoy the benefits of membership, including the protection afforded by articles 12 and 16 of the Covenant.

It might, of course, be open to the French to claim that an occupation of

⁷ For this decision of August 13, 1921, see Vol. XV, No. 104, minute 2, and Appendix 1.

German territory under paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles could not be characterised as 'resort to war,' and could not, therefore, bring article 16 of the Covenant into operation, because Germany has undertaken by paragraph 18 of Annex II not to regard action taken under that paragraph as 'an act of war'. But that begs the whole question of what is legitimate action under paragraph 18 of Annex II. On this point Germany would, at all events, as a member of the League, be entitled to appeal to the League, and, though the action of the League might be confined to referring the matter to the Reparation Commission as the competent interpretative body, there is infinitely more prospect of a definite interpretative decision being reached than there would be with Germany outside the League.

The above considerations lead to the conclusion that the danger of an abuse of paragraph 18 has been considerably diminished in two ways:—

(a) An improvement has been introduced into the machinery for establishing the facts, which, if proved, may bring paragraph 18 into play.

(b) It is already possible, and will be still more possible by the time the proposed security pact is signed, to clear up, if need arises, any doubt which may exist concerning the type of action which can legitimately be taken in virtue of paragraph 18 by the Allies or by any one of them.

No. 394

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 2168 [C 8474/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 23, 1925*

My Lord,

I asked the French Ambassador to call upon me yesterday at the first moment I had available for an interview since my return from Geneva.¹ I told his Excellency that I sought this interview rather to renew our relations than because I had at the moment anything of consequence to say to him, but I took the opportunity to express the pleasure which it gave me to co-operate with M. Briand, and to acknowledge that since I had held my present position I had found my relations both with M. Herriot and M. Briand most agreeable and easy. It seemed to me that the prospect of a successful issue of our labours were promising. I had been a little disturbed by the tone of the German press,² but I hoped that it did not accurately reflect the mind of the German Government.

I then referred to the position of Italy in relation to the proposed Western Pact. M. Briand's answer to a press representative at Geneva, implying that the adhesion of Italy was not to be expected, had taken me

¹ See No. 379.

² See No. 388.

entirely by surprise.³ I believed that I had told M. de Fleuriau at the time of the communication which the Marquis della Torretta had made to me on this subject,⁴ and I had assumed that a similar communication would have been made to M. Briand by the Italian Ambassador in Paris. It seemed to me that this reference to Italy had had a disturbing effect in Rome, and had somewhat altered Signor Mussolini's attitude towards our proposals.

The Ambassador said that he had transmitted to M. Briand my account of the Marquis della Torretta's statement, but that in the interval before Geneva there had been some change in the situation, and the Italian Government had taken up a less decided position. This explained M. Briand's answer to the American reporter.³

As to the prospects of the pact generally, his Excellency told me that there had already been some conversations between the French Ambassador in Berlin and the German Foreign Secretary, and he left with me a note, a translation of which I annex to this despatch, in which he summarised the questions put by the German Government and the answers which M. de Margerie had given. M. de Fleuriau further observed upon the desirability of making rapid progress with these negotiations, an opinion in which I most heartily concurred. For this purpose we agreed that an early exchange of views between the French and British Governments was highly desirable, and I told his Excellency that I hoped, after consultation with my colleagues, but with very little delay, to submit, for M. Briand's consideration, a draft of such a treaty as we might conclude.

As the Ambassador was leaving I mentioned to him the Spanish proposal for an increase of their forces in the Tangier zone,⁵ and expressed my strong objections to it, on the ground that it would be a direct provocation to Abd-el-Krim to infringe the neutrality of the zone, and that it would in all probability lead to further international complications. The French Ambassador said that the French Government entirely shared this view.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ See No. 377.

⁴ See No. 281.

⁵ In a note of June 13, a translation of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Madrid despatch No. 286 of June 15 (W 5751/18/28), not printed.

Translation

*Memorandum containing the Substance of certain Verbal Explanations given to the German Government by the French Government concerning the meaning of certain Passages in the French Note on Security of June 16, 1925*⁶

Section V, paragraph 4. What is the meaning of the words 'same scope' of the Franco-German or Belgian-German treaty and of the treaties between Germany and other neighbouring Powers?

The arbitration treaties would all apply to all disputes of whatever nature.

The apparent contradiction between the immediate application of the guarantee given to an arbitration treaty (section IV, paragraph 3) and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Covenant and the machinery set up by it contemplate disputes which do not fall under a special arbitration treaty. The application of the proposed guarantee is designed to ensure that the procedure of the League of Nations for the prevention of resort to force will be respected. Precautions to be taken, moreover, to fulfil article 21 of the Covenant. Finally, the guarantee is only brought into play if the violation of the treaty of arbitration is coupled with hostile measures, a situation which involves the application of article 16 of the Covenant.

German doubts regarding the willingness of Poland to conclude an arbitration treaty with Germany.

We do not share these doubts. In the absence of this treaty, the desired object would not be attained and the guarantee of security would not be completely assured.

Demilitarised zone—To be looked into later.

⁶ See No. 382, n. 2.

No. 395

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Addison (Berlin)

*No. 1175 [C 8548/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 23, 1925*

Sir,

I received this morning a message from the German Ambassador to the effect that he was in receipt of long and important telegrams from Berlin, and particularly desired to see me before I made my speech tomorrow.¹ I accordingly fixed an appointment for 3 o'clock this afternoon, when the Ambassador stated that some conversations had taken place between Herr

¹ See No. 388, n. 4.

Stresemann and the French Ambassador in Berlin as to the meaning of the reply addressed to the German Government, and that the explanations offered by the French Ambassador had given rise to considerable anxiety. He was therefore instructed to ask me whether I was in agreement with the French interpretation.² Proceeding, the Ambassador drew my attention to a passage in the first draft of the French reply³ to the German memorandum,⁴ which appears as the second paragraph of section VI on p. 10 of our White Paper;⁵ with this he connected No. 5 of the enquiries addressed by me to M. de Fleuriau,⁶ which appears on p. 12 of the White Paper, and, again, section VI of the reply as finally adopted by the French and British Governments, and transmitted by France to Germany.⁷ Herr Sthamer's explanations are never very lucid, and it was difficult to ascertain exactly what he thought that the French Ambassador had said, but I gathered that the German Government had interpreted the Ambassador's reply as indicating that the new pacts to be concluded were to supersede and override the provisions of the Covenant.

In reply, I naturally pointed out in the first instance that, though this White Paper might be very interesting to the German Government, and indeed deserved their study, the only document in it with which they were really concerned was the note which had been delivered to them.⁷ The documents to which Herr Sthamer had been referring were drafts submitted for the observations of the English Government and an enquiry addressed by me to the French Government. These were merely a part of the preliminaries by which we had arrived at our agreement, and I felt myself entirely dispensed from explaining or commenting upon a draft which had indeed been submitted to us, but which had not been adopted for presentation at Berlin.

In the second place, I observed that, without in any way impugning the good faith of the account which he had given of the French Ambassador's conversation, it was quite impossible for me to comment upon a conversation at which I had not been present, and of which I had only learnt at second hand. All that I could say to him was that M. de Fleuriau had been good enough to leave with me yesterday a brief note of some enquiries which had been addressed by the German Government to the French Ambassador and of the replies which he had given,² and that I was unable to relate all that Herr Sthamer had just reported to me with this account of the French Ambassador's conversation. I could not therefore enter into any discussion on the basis which he had submitted, but I would invite him to look at the reply actually delivered by France, and in particular to section VI of that reply. It was there provided that nothing in any of the new treaties which were contemplated should affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant of the League. The section was of general application to all

² See No. 394, Enclosure.

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁵ See No. 386, n. 2.

³ See No. 318, Enclosure.

⁶ See No. 330.

⁷ See No. 382, n. 2.

the proposed treaties and of mutual obligation among all the signatory Powers. He would see by turning to my letter to M. Briand,⁸ printed on p. 44 of the White Paper, the reasons for which the British Government had pressed for the inclusion of this section and the scope they gave to it. No signatory of the Covenant was entitled to have recourse to war under any circumstances unless he had first exhausted the peaceful procedure provided by the Covenant.

Herr Sthamer received this declaration with satisfaction and went on to remark that in that case disputes would not be settled by the contemplated arbitration treaties but by the Council of the League under the Covenant. I replied that this did not by any means follow. The Council only intervened when the parties themselves had failed to arrive at a friendly settlement. Supposing, for instance, that there were in existence a general treaty of arbitration between France and Great Britain and that a difference arose between us, we should not at once have recourse to the Council. We should try in the first instance to settle that difference through the ordinary diplomatic channels; if we failed in that, we should propose arbitration in accordance with our arbitration treaties. It would only be if one of the parties refused the arbitration or refused after arbitration to carry out the award that it would be necessary to invoke the aid of the Council and the provisions of the Covenant.

This appeared to satisfy the Ambassador, and I then told him that I had been a little anxious at the reception of the Covenant by the German press, but I had been reassured by your telegram No. 242 of the 22nd June⁹ which I had received this morning. I thought that the Foreign Secretary's statement of the position of the German Government was entirely reasonable. I did not want to hustle them and I recognised that it might be necessary for them not only carefully to consider the terms of the French note, but possibly to ask for some explanation. I trusted, however, that they would carry forward the negotiations which they themselves had initiated without any unnecessary delay, and that in any questions which they might feel it necessary to ask and in any observations that they made at this moment they would carefully refrain from small points of meticulous criticism. I expressed high appreciation of the courage and statesmanship shown by the German Government in their initiative. It had met with a far more friendly reception from the French Government than would have been possible a little time ago. The prospects were now hopeful. I could not but wish it had been possible for the Ambassador to have overheard some of my conversations with Frenchmen. I thought that he would have been surprised by the moderation and the conciliatory spirit which those conversations displayed, and would have been encouraged to expect a successful result of the great work in which we were now engaged. After all, at this stage we were not making a pact and there was no pact in existence; we were only laying down the general principles on

⁸ No. 363.

⁹ No. 391.

which negotiations could proceed and it seemed to me that the wisest course for the German Government, in pursuance of their own policy, was to accept in broad and general terms the bases which we had indicated and to let us all get to work as early as possible upon the actual framing of the necessary treaties. This work could not be carried out by an exchange of notes. A conference of Ministers, or of representatives possessing the complete confidence of their Governments, would be necessary for the negotiations, and the sooner we got to that stage the better it would be, in my opinion, for all concerned.

The Ambassador begged me not to pay too much attention to the German press. I must remember that just as there were suspicions on our side, so the war had left suspicions on the German side, and time must be allowed for careful examination of the Allies' proposals lest Germany should commit herself to suggestions which on closer examination she might find it impossible to accept. It would be far better that Germany should take all the time necessary and make all the enquiries needed to clear up doubtful points rather than that she should give a hurried acceptance which she might afterwards have to withdraw.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 396

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

*No. 923 [C 8475/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 23, 1925*

Sir,

Immediately after the interview with the French Ambassador, recorded in my despatch No. 2168 to Lord Crewe,¹ I received the Italian Ambassador whom I had also invited to call upon me on my return from Geneva.² I told his Excellency that I did not in the least desire to criticise the note which Signor Mussolini had sent to the French Government³ on the subject of their reply⁴ to the German pact proposals.⁵ Signor Mussolini's attitude was perfectly reasonable, and I had no thought of taking any objection to it, but I confessed that I was a little puzzled. His Excellency would remember the statement which he made to me on the 1st April, as recorded in my despatch No. 446,⁶ of which I read to him the relevant paragraph (paragraph 5). It was clear that since that time there had been some change in the feeling of the Italian Government, the reasons for which I did not entirely understand. Apparently M. Briand had received no such communication, and to this fact was due the form of

¹ No. 394.

² See No. 379.

³ See No. 387, Enclosure.

⁴ See No. 382, n. 2.

⁵ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁶ No. 281.

his statement to the American reporter⁷ who questioned him at our interview with the press at Geneva. I desired only to say that if the Italian Government, when the negotiations had further developed, felt able to join in our mutual pact for the security of the Rhine frontier, their co-operation would be most heartily welcomed by us and not less so, I was confident, by the French Government.

His Excellency replied that in the statement of which I had reminded him he had, of course, spoken in strict conformity with the instructions that he had received, but that since then considerable anxiety had been raised in Italy about the *Anschluss*. It was sometimes said that Italy was seeking a guarantee of the Brenner frontier. This was a complete misapprehension, but she did attach the utmost importance to the prohibition of the union of Austria with Germany which would constitute a formidable menace not only to herself but to all the border countries. Speaking now personally and without instructions, he believed that if it were made clear to the Italian Government that the *Anschluss* was not rendered easier by our western pact, all their doubts would be removed; but he repeated they had been a good deal disturbed by this idea that the Western Powers, and Great Britain in particular, were not unfavourable to the union of Austria and Germany.

I told his Excellency that there was not the slightest foundation for this suspicion. I had on all occasions declared myself as opposed to any change in the treaty position, and His Majesty's Government had taken pains, in the first despatch which I sent to Lord Crewe,⁸ to affirm in the clearest possible language that they neither desired a change themselves nor encouraged others to expect it. The only method of change which in any circumstances His Majesty's Government could contemplate was that provided by article 19 in respect of the frontiers generally, and by article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain in respect of Austria, but in neither case did Her Majesty's Government view with any favour an attempt to revise the treaty provisions under those clauses at the present time.

The Ambassador enquired whether he might inform his Government that, if a proposal were made to the Council of the League of Nations for permission for Austria to join Germany, Italy would receive the diplomatic support of His Majesty's Government in resisting it. I replied that this support would most certainly be given, and the Ambassador expressed the satisfaction with which he was sure that my declaration would be received in Rome if I would permit him to transmit it. I replied that I not only authorised, but I requested that he would report it to his Government.⁹

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁷ See No. 377.

⁸ Presumably the reference is to No. 349.

⁹ For Marquis Torretta's account of this conversation see *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, Nos. 43 and 44.

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 2220 [C 8684/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 26, 1925*

My Lord,

I transmit to your Lordship herewith a record of a conversation which took place today between the French Ambassador and Mr. Gregory¹ on the subject of the security negotiations.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 397

Record by Mr. Gregory of a conversation with the French Ambassador

June 26, 1925

The French Ambassador, who came to see me today, said that in the opinion of his Government the time was coming when we ought to consider what the next step should be in the pact negotiations, and more or less to agree on the form of procedure to be followed. The preliminary German reply might be expected in the next eight or nine days, and, from the reports of M. de Margerie, who was in close touch with M. Streseman[n], was likely to be fairly favourable. But it would in any case indicate whether Germany was ready to start negotiations on the basis of the agreement arrived at between the British and French Governments² and on the conditions which they had proposed. M. Briand thought that as soon as the reply was received, and provided that it was satisfactory, Mr. Chamberlain and he ought to go into the question of procedure and come to an agreement as to the essential points in the negotiations. He (M. de Fleuriau), on the other hand, thought that we might already begin thinking about all this informally without even waiting for the German reply. But the actual decision to hold a conference as the form of procedure necessary to secure a final solution could clearly only be taken on receipt of the note. The programme of the conference must, however, be limited to determining the details of the texts already agreed on in principle, and, in fact, M. de Margerie had been told that there could be no question at the present stage of the conversations of setting up a conference with a vague programme which would allow every conceivable question arising out of the German memorandum and the French reply to be discussed. This would simply give the Germans the opportunity, for

¹ An Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office.

² See Nos. 363 and 383, n. 2.

which they are always on the look out, for exploiting differences against us. M. de Margerie had been already authorised to clear up verbally any doubts that might exist in the mind of M. Streseman[n], and he would continue to give explanations, but only up to a point. Where there was any serious risk of ambiguities or misinterpretations, the Germans would have to put their questions in writing and get written replies.

M. de Fleuriau said that he understood that we already had some sort of draft for a pact ready.³ The Quai d'Orsay on their side had none so far, but they had got a sort of rough idea of how it ought to be modelled, of which the annexed plan⁴ purports to be, as far as I could understand, a kind of skeleton indicating comparatively the restatement of prevailing engagements contemplated in the pact. I assumed from the way he spoke that the French would be glad to work on our draft, but I could not be quite sure. As against this, however, M. de Fleuriau began reading out an interminable catalogue of all the possible different methods of violating the zone. I did not, however, gather that this was more than a kind of handy commentary on all the possible contingencies that might arise and was not intended to appear in the draft, as he seemed to think the shorter it was and the more confined to broad principles the better.

Finally, M. de Fleuriau spoke of the Secretary of State's speech,⁵ which he said he had listened to with great interest and approval, and he uttered no word of criticism. He said that he did not consider that the Opposition speeches⁶ amounted to anything.

J.D.G.

³ See No. 384.

⁵ See No. 388, n. 4.

⁴ Not printed.

⁶ See No. 392, n. 3.

No. 398

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 29, 9 a.m.)

No. 245 Telegraphic [C 8699/459/18]

BERLIN, June 28, 1925, 8.10 p.m.

I had an interview yesterday with Secretary of State and found him far from optimistic regarding prospects of security pact. He appeared to be unduly impressed¹ by demands in Monsieur Briand's note of June 1[6]th² and asserted that under it French remained sole judges of what would constitute a hostile act and would be entitled to take immediate action as guarantors of German Polish arbitration treaty whenever it suited them to do so.

I referred him to your speeches in House of Commons³ and said that

¹ This word was queried in the Foreign Office, and 'depressed' suggested.

² See No. 382, n. 2.

³ See No. 388, n. 4.

his view appeared a totally erroneous interpretation of French declaration.

Apart from anything contained in Monsieur Briand's note difficulties of German government proceeded in large measure from complicated position of internal politics here. Government are by no means sure of majority and security pact does not now enjoy cordial support with larger parties. The Right dislike the whole pact policy and would only give their support against a price, the price being high duties on . . .⁴ products. The Left on the other hand like the pact at present so much that they cannot bear to see it carried through by anybody but themselves. They therefore criticise method of negotiation of Stresemann and will combine their efforts with the Right to turn him out.

In addition to above elements of opposition there can be no doubt that Russian propaganda has produced a certain effect and many politicians are asking themselves whether it is wise for Germany to break altogether with Russian connection.

As regards Russian attitude it remains unaltered. They are doing everything possible both by promises and menaces to prevent Germany from joining the League of Nations or forming part of a western pact.⁵

⁴ The text is here uncertain. In another text, this read 'agrarian.'

⁵ See Nos. 296, 305, 309, and 391, n. 5.

No. 399

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 29, 9 p.m.)

No. 244 Telegraphic [C 8770/459/18]

BERLIN, June 29, 1925, 6.10 p.m.

I had a long conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs last night. He said that during last ten days he had had the severest fights of his career.

Political opinions here had been very unfavourably impressed by Monsieur Briand's note¹ and now appeared to be divided between those who thought Stresemann had been wrong to start pact negotiation and those who thought he had the right to start it but had conducted it with great lack of skill. Notwithstanding opposition from Bavaria and Würtemberg, he had ultimately succeeded in getting a general vote of approval for negotiation from representatives of Right. He hoped that he would have a similar success next Wednesday² with Foreign Affairs Committee but he was not very confident. Article in 'Deutsche Zeitung' of this morning would show kind of opposition he was up against.

Apart from exaggerated criticism of M. Briand's note which opponents of pact brought forward, he himself considered clause giving France right

¹ See No. 382, n. 2.

² July 1.

to guarantee a German Polish arbitration treaty and to intervene by force in certain eventualities was quite unacceptable to Germany.

Regarding future course of negotiations, he recognised that in interests of progress it might be desirable for Germany to give a general reply of a favourable character and to reserve criticism for verbal discussion.

French note, however, was too precise to admit of this. Germany could not accept basis proposed until point he had mentioned above and perhaps some others had been cleared up.

I argued for some time with His Excellency on interpretation to be given to French note basing myself upon your declaration in House of Commons.³ Conversation ended, however, without anything definite.

I took an opportunity of drawing Stresemann's attention to French declaration regarding evacuation of the Ruhr⁴ and to measures already initiated for carrying out that evacuation.

He admitted that gesture of France was favourable and was an indication of good-will and of good faith on her part. He said, however, that question of evacuation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort⁵ was still in suspense and that until this was overcome favourably for Germany, he could not make full public use of French action. He hoped to receive from Paris a favourable reply regarding the three towns as soon as they had found certain documents which had apparently gone astray.

Impression I derived from conversation was that:

1. Stresemann himself is determined to press forward pact negotiation with maximum speed and is still whole-hearted behind it.

2. Opposition he has met with has been unexpectedly severe and he is not confident of the event either as concerns himself or as concerns pact.

3. Offer of France regarding evacuation of the Ruhr has helped German government to meet criticism no less than your declaration regarding evacuation of Cologne.⁶

4. The sooner we can get to conference stage the better. It would be the most effective method of meeting opposition here.

³ See No. 388, n. 4.

⁴ In Paris telegram No. 235 of June 23, Lord Crewe reported: "This evening's 'Temps' contains the following official communiqué:—

'The Council of Ministers today approved the resolution prepared by the President of the Council, Minister for War and the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the execution of the undertakings entered into regarding the evacuation of the Ruhr [at the Conference of London July–August, 1924: see Vol. XXVI, No. 537–45, *passim*]. These operations will begin very shortly'.

⁵ These towns had been occupied by the Allies in March, 1921, as a reparation sanction (see Vol. XV, Nos. 45–7, and Vol. XVI, No. 458). For the French undertaking as to evacuation, see Vol. XXVI, No. 558.

⁶ In Mr. Chamberlain's speech of June 24 to the House of Commons (see No. 388, n. 4). For the reference to Cologne, see 185 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s, col. 1662.

*Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)**No. 135 Telegraphic [C 8770/459/18]*FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 30, 1925, 7 p.m.*Your No. 244.¹

This conversation causes me great concern.

When you saw first draft of French reply² to German proposals³ you expressed opinion that its publication would produce favourable impression in Germany.⁴ All the alterations made at our request⁵ and embodied in reply as actually sent⁶ should have rendered a favourable reception even more certain. My definition of British attitude and of limits of action by France or others as given to House of Commons⁷ should have further contributed to quick and ready acceptance of proposed basis of negotiation. Before leaving London⁸ you told me⁹ that you were 'frankly optimist' and I shared your hopes. Never was France so set on peace or her government so liberally inclined. Never since the war has the British government so definitely marked its desire for better relations with Germany or spoken with such generous appreciation of the attitude of the German government.

What is the result? As we advance, Germany recedes. Germany having opened to her a prospect which would have seemed impossible a few months ago now shows a disposition to delay and haggle which would justify every suspicion of her good faith and would not only deprive us of all power to help her but must make us feel that it is not only useless but dangerous to attempt it. I have staked much on the good faith of the German offer. I am now forced to ask myself whether I am being used as the dupe in a negotiation in which the German proposals were only put forward with the hope of creating dissension in the councils of the allies or to enhance the price which Germany might obtain from Russia in return for breaking them off.

I must leave the choice of occasion, argument and language to you, but the highest authorities in Germany should be left by you in no doubt as to the deplorable impression which your report has made upon His Majesty's Government. The occasion is critical. The German government itself gave it birth. The British government at once responded and insisted that the German proposals must be given full and favourable consideration. The French government has shown a spirit of conciliation and a desire for peace which are all that could be desired. Germany has it in her power to

¹ No. 399.² See No. 318, Enclosure.³ See No. 197, n. 1.⁴ See No. 326.⁵ See Nos. 349, 360, and 363.⁶ See No. 382, n. 2.⁷ See No. 388, n. 4.⁸ On June 27 (cf. No. 382, n. 1).⁹ For Lord D'Abernon's account of the conversation, see *An Ambassador of Peace . . .*, vol. III, op. cit., pp. 172-3.

resume her place in the comity of nations and to bring to an end the conditions of active suspicion, latent hostility and growing danger with which the events of the last few years have confronted her. The next word is with her. If she refuses or delays acceptance the opportunity may pass for ever and it will not be in France and Great Britain alone that the blame will be laid at her door. It is an occasion for speaking quite frankly and for using all the influence that you command.

Repeated to Paris No. 174 (by bag), Brussels No. 50 and Rome No. 201.

No. 401

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 7)

No. 388 [C 9066/459/18]

BERLIN, *July 1, 1925*

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose memorandum of a conversation with Herr von Schubert, the Secretary of State, and Herr Gauss, the legal adviser of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. The object of the conversation was to ascertain what specific points in the French note¹ created difficulties for the German Government. While both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State had stated that the French note was unacceptable, neither had gone into detail nor had they indicated any special clauses to which objection was taken.

3. On reading the enclosed memorandum it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the objections raised are rather juristic than substantial—theoretical rather than practical. It would not seem extravagant to hope that, when the drafting stage is reached, no serious difficulty will be experienced in devising a text to meet most of the German objections.

4. A good deal of German apprehension appears to arise from a misunderstanding both of the terms and of the spirit of the French note. Moreover, it may be fairly hoped that the signature of a security pact will so alter the atmosphere and so improve relations between Germany and the western powers that there will be less danger than today of advantage being taken of legal quibbles or of doubtful juridical rights. German opinion, outside the Government, appears to have been somewhat slow to grasp the broader political aspect of the negotiations or to appreciate the gain to Germany of being represented at Geneva, which is in effect something of a Court of Appeal.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

¹ See No. 382, n. 2.

*Notes of conversation with Herr von Schubert and Herr Gauss**

Herr von Schubert and Herr Gauss stated that, apart from the League of Nations issue, their principal objections to the proposals contained in the French note of the 15th June were:—

Section IV, White Paper,² p. 50

The French proposal that the Rhineland Pact should be accompanied by arbitration treaties applying to all disputes presented a problem of extraordinary difficulty. To draw up an arbitration treaty so as to be applicable to and impossible on every possible eventuality would take a great deal of time—in fact it was technically impossible. To take a concrete example. There was a dispute at present between Germany and Poland regarding future commercial relations. If a similar dispute with France had to be submitted to arbitration, the arbitration court would have to decide what the German customs tariff for coal, corn, etc., should be. This was unthinkable.

Further, as they read the French proposal every arbitration decision was obligatory. They were of the opinion that two kinds of arbitration should be available, each applicable to a special category: the one obligatory, the other advisory. This would be on the basis of the arbitration treaty between Germany and Switzerland.³

Section IV, paragraph 2

‘The arbitration treaty ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties, or of the Rhineland Pact, or in virtue of the guarantee given to an arbitration treaty by the parties or by any one of them.’ In other words, France reserves the right claimed by her to impose sanctions under the Treaty of Versailles without submitting the matter under dispute to arbitration. Herr von Schubert admitted that the London Agreement⁴ rendered the imposition of sanctions very unlikely, but it would be very difficult to get public opinion in Germany to accept the fact that sanctions are not excluded by the Rhineland Pact, and that France is in theory free to go into the Ruhr again without preliminary arbitration.

Herr Gauss pointed out that even the London Agreement abolished sanctions, except in the event of the Reparation Commission unanimously deciding that a flagrant default had been committed by Germany.

According to the French note, it would seem that if France decides that articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles are violated, she can invade Germany without English consent and without arbitration.

Guarantee to be given to Arbitration Treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia

Herr von Schubert said it was clear from the exchange of notes between

² See No. 386, n. 2.

³ See No. 190, n. 3.

⁴ See No. 343, n. 9.

France and England⁵ that France claimed the right to decide whether Germany had violated an arbitration treaty or not, and to take action accordingly.

If France claimed that Germany had violated an arbitration pact and taken hostile measures, France could proceed to act without waiting for the League. Mr. Chamberlain's speeches in the House of Commons⁶ did not dissipate the obscurity on this point. M. de Margerie had made enquiries in Paris at the instigation of the German Government, but the response was not satisfactory. Supposing the German minority in Posen gave trouble and guerilla war took place, with shooting and pillaging, France could say that Germany began it and could march into the Rhineland.

Section III, paragraph 2

'The French Government did not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with the renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty of Versailles', etc. Herr von Schubert said it was this renewed affirmation of the Versailles Treaty which was causing such trouble with public opinion and with the political parties.

In conclusion, they stated that from a purely legal standpoint Germany was worse off if she signed the proposed pact than if she joined the League of Nations and dropped the pact entirely. Their original idea was a short and simple agreement. The French had twisted the original German offer⁷ out of all recognition.

⁵ See Nos. 318, Enclosure, 330, 340, Enclosure, 349, 360, Enclosures and 363.

⁶ See No. 388, n. 4.

⁷ See No. 197, n. 1.

No. 402

Mr. Chamberlain to the French Foreign Minister

[C 8604/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, [July 2], 1925

Dear Monsieur Briand,

Since I parted from you at Geneva¹ I have been very carefully considering the suggestion² made by you and supported by M. Boncour, that we should prepare some agreed programme in relation to security for the Assembly of the League of Nations to be held in September next.³ You told me that, after comparing carefully my declaration on the Protocol⁴ at the March meeting of the Council with the clauses of the Covenant and the Protocol itself,⁵ you thought that we could extract from the Protocol provisions to which His Majesty's Government had taken no objection,

¹ See Nos. 363-79, *passim*.

⁴ See No. 240, n. 13.

² See No. 364.

³ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

and that we might make these the basis of a new proposal to the Assembly. M. Boncour at the same time suggested that we could usefully take up at any rate the question of the unanimity required for decisions of the Council (except in certain specified matters) and of the definition of an 'aggressor'. I indicated to you my doubts upon this subject at the time. The more I have reflected on it, the less expedient does it seem to me that we should enter, at the present stage at any rate, on any further attempt to amend the Covenant. We are in fact engaged at this moment in a great effort to support it by the system of mutual pacts and arbitration treaties contemplated in our negotiations with Germany. If we are, as I think there is every prospect we shall be, successful in these negotiations, we shall have made a very great contribution to the peace of the world and to the strength of the League of Nations.

If we can terminate these negotiations in time to present their results to the Assembly, that fact will make the September gathering the most remarkable since the first occasion on which the Assembly met, and will itself have done more than any revision of the Covenant to render peace secure. If, on the other hand, the negotiations are not terminated, I cannot think that it would be wise that we should start at Geneva a discussion which must necessarily overlap the negotiations in course of progress between Germany and her various neighbours, and might greatly embarrass us at some critical moment of our conversations. Indeed, if we had any difficulties with the German Government, we might in such circumstances find that the discussion was practically removed from the conference room where our treaty was being negotiated to the Assembly Hall of the League.

These seem to me sound practical reasons for not reopening at the September Assembly the questions which occupied the main attention of its meeting last year.⁶ But there is another reason which I would like to submit to you. A considerable section of this country views our negotiations and the proposed British guarantee of the Rhineland and the arbitration treaties with some suspicion lest Great Britain should be involved in obligations which might later become embarrassing and even dangerous. I do not believe that this opinion is that of the majority of our countrymen or even of a large minority, but undoubtedly there is a certain uneasiness upon the subject, and I should be very loth to imperil those negotiations by undertaking at the same time a discussion of larger issues about which we might find it difficult to agree and which would certainly increase any apprehensions that are felt here about our narrower pact. For all these reasons I feel, and my colleagues in the Government agree with me, that it is not in the interest of a successful treaty of guarantee that we should be called upon to discuss these wider issues at this time.

It is scarcely necessary for me to say that in submitting these views for your consideration, I have no idea of suggesting any curtailment of the

⁶ See No. 205, n. 10.

liberty of the Assembly, nor need I add that His Majesty's Government would warmly welcome at this Assembly, or on any other occasion, any practical advance towards the limitation of armaments. But this is a very different thing from suggesting to the Assembly yet another attempt to rewrite or amend the Covenant.

This letter arises so directly out of our conversation at your luncheon party that I have thought it better to put our views before you in this informal way rather than to deal with the matter in a despatch to Lord Crewe or in any formal communication to M. de Fleuriau.⁷

Believe me, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁷ A translation of M. Briand's reply of July 13 ran as follows: '... The reasons for which you consider it undesirable to allow the next Assembly of the League of Nations to engage this year in further discussions on questions relating to the Covenant or the Protocol are not without great weight. I recognise that it is unlikely that such discussions will be fruitful so long as our negotiations with Germany are not completed. Even if these negotiations have reached the happy consummation which we both desire before the month of September, it may be undesirable, for the reasons which you set forth so clearly, to allow further discussion of the Covenant to take place at Geneva. I cannot help doubting, however, whether it will be possible to achieve the end you have in view and for us to succeed in preventing the Assembly from expressing an opinion on questions which are of particular interest to the majority of European States.

I am all the more doubtful for the reason that, whether we wish it or not, the problem has already actually been referred to the Assembly. You will certainly remember that on the 13th March last [see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, p. 461] the Council decided to refer to the Sixth Assembly the statements on the Protocol made by you and myself and the other members of the Council [see *ibid.*, pp. 445–60], and that the Assembly is called upon to express its view on the subject. A discussion is thus inevitable. This is yet a further reason why we should come to an agreement between now and the month of September on the attitude which the British and French delegations are to adopt.

It was therefore not without a certain misgiving that I read the sentence in your letter in which you assure me that "His Majesty's Government would warmly welcome at this Assembly any practical advance towards the limitation of armaments".

You are aware that certain delegations at Geneva have always shown a tendency to treat the question of armaments independently. This is a doctrine which the French delegation, for their part, have always resisted, and they have been happy to find themselves in agreement with the British delegation, both last year and in previous years in maintaining another principle—namely, that the question of the reduction of armaments cannot usefully be dealt with until a satisfactory solution has been found to the problem of security, which, in turn, cannot be separated from the question of arbitration.

Consequently if our two Governments agree upon joint action in September next to prevent the Assembly from discussing the question of amendments to the Covenant, we must at the same time agree as to the attitude which we should adopt should another delegation desire nevertheless to raise the question of disarmament. I may say at once that the French Government, for their part, adhere to the doctrine which they have held hitherto, and that they cannot dissociate the question of disarmament from that of arbitration and security. . . .

No. 403

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 4, 9 a.m.)

No. 250 Telegraphic [C 8938/459/18]

BERLIN, July 3, 1925, 7.45 p.m.

Your telegram No. 135.¹

Situation has improved somewhat.

Cabinet yesterday decided to send answer to Briand note² before general debate in Reichstag.

Answer will probably be sent about July 12th; it is being drafted by Foreign Office but will have to be approved by Cabinet. Latter may not improbably consult party leaders. In previous cases this consultation has led to regrettable delay.

I have had a long discussion with Secretary of State and legal adviser to Foreign Office on their objections to specific points in Briand note. I am sending their views by bag.³

Generally speaking their objections are juristic rather than substantial and many of them can be met without undue difficulty.

Their point of substance is hostility to claim of France to act as guarantor of German-Polish arbitration treaty. They contend that a military ally of Poland lacks the necessary impartiality for a quasi-judicial function.

¹ No. 400.

² See No. 382, n. 2.

³ See No. 401.

No. 404

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 4, 9 a.m.)

No. 251 Telegraphic [C 8939/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, July 3, 1925, 7.45 p.m.

I have again urged on Secretary of State necessity of framing German reply to French note on lines indicated in Mr. Lampson's interview with German Ambassador on June 30th.¹ Secretary of State will prepare a draft as far as possible on this basis. He points out however difficulty of finding terms which will conform with English advice which will gain acceptance of parties in Germany and which will give necessary precision demanded by France. It is the latter's requirements which causes him the greatest difficulty. If note is merely a general acceptance he fears the

¹ An account of this interview was sent to Lord D'Abernon in Foreign Office despatch No. 1208 of June 30, not printed. Mr. Lampson had suggested that the German Government should reply to the French note (see No. 382, n. 2) that they accepted its underlying principles and that they awaited the next stage in order to go into matters of detail.

French will reply that their demands for precision has not been met.

However general the reply it is in his opinion impossible to avoid a negative as to French demands to act as guarantor of a German Polish arbitration (see my immediately preceding telegram).²

² No. 403.

No. 405

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 2286 [C 8861/459/18]**

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 4, 1925

My Lord,

The progress of the security negotiations is at present of necessity delayed pending the reply of the German Government to the French note of the 16th June.¹ I am anxious, however, that, once the reply has been received, every effort shall be made to reach a speedy conclusion, and I am convinced that the most satisfactory procedure will be to replace as soon as possible the method of written exchanges of view by a personal meeting of the parties concerned to discuss the terms of a definite agreement.

2. In order to facilitate progress on these lines, the enclosed draft of a suggested treaty of mutual guarantee has been prepared by my direction.² This draft, which conforms to the principles laid down in the correspondence ending with the French note to Germany of the 16th June, has been approved, after careful consideration, by His Majesty's Government, and I am today handing copies of it to the French Ambassador.³ Although M. de Fleuriau will no doubt at once forward these to his Government, I request that your Lordship will also communicate a copy to M. Briand, impressing upon his Excellency its strictly confidential nature at the present stage. You should also emphasise that it is put forward, not as a text to which His Majesty's Government are to be regarded as necessarily committed, but merely as a concrete suggestion for the negotiations which it is intended to facilitate.

3. For your Lordship's own information I would explain that in putting forward the draft I am actuated by two motives. In the first place, I consider it of importance that the initiative should remain with His

¹ See No. 382, n. 2.

² Not printed. For previous drafts of May 12 and June 17, see Nos. 316 and 384, respectively. Sir C. Hurst submitted a further revised draft on June 22 (C 8599/459/18), not printed. After amendment in the light of suggestions by Lord D'Abernon, the new draft was submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence on July 1. The text was approved by the Cabinet on July 3.

³ Under cover of a letter of July 4, not printed.

Majesty's Government. In the second place, I am anxious that nothing shall be lost of the ground already won—that is to say, that the discussion shall not be allowed to return to points which His Majesty's Government have been at pains to exclude in the recent correspondence between the two Governments, and which might conceivably be reintroduced under cover of a French draft.

4. Should the French Government desire any elucidations of particular passages in the draft, they will no doubt instruct M. de Fleuriau to make the necessary enquiries in London; should they, on the other hand, address their enquiries to your Lordship, it will be preferable that you should refer to me before replying. At the same time the following observations may be of service for your personal information and general guidance:—

Article 1 is in effect a general declaration of the purpose of the whole treaty.

Article 2.—The solemn obligation not to resort to war is restricted to France, Germany and Belgium. Our rôle will be solely that of guarantor. If Great Britain is not to enter into a comprehensive agreement to submit all disputes to some machinery for peaceful settlement, but is only to guarantee a Franco-German treaty to that effect, her undertaking not to resort to war must be similarly limited. The Covenant of the League leaves certain loopholes open for a resort to hostilities. If those loopholes are to be closed so far as Great Britain is concerned, some method for adjusting disputes by peaceful means would be necessary to close the gap. The obligation not to resort to war must not be more extensive than the obligation to resort to a peaceful method of settling the dispute.

Article 3.—One of the objects of this article is to make it clear that the Council of the League has a *locus standi* to intervene if a violation of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles is alleged. The French Government have been disposed to maintain that article 44 means that any violation by Germany of articles 42 or 43 results automatically in the creation of a state of belligerency. It is therefore useful to make it clear that the League of Nations would be entitled to intervene.

Article 5.—This article constitutes a very drastic and far-reaching guarantee. It gives France all she would have been entitled to claim if the guarantee treaty of 1919⁴ between herself and Great Britain had come into force, but it recognises the part to be played by the Council of the League in that the council's notification is a condition precedent to the guarantee becoming operative.

Article 6.—The treaties of arbitration to be guaranteed by Great Britain should constitute separate instruments, but they are an integral part of the scheme, and it is therefore provided in article 11 that they must be concluded before the ratification of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. It is assumed that both the French and the German Governments would give

⁴ See No. 185, n. 1.

sufficient opportunity to His Majesty's Government to consider the text of those treaties and to make observations upon their terms before they were signed.

Article 8 is based on the principle laid down in my note to M. Briand of the 8th June,⁵ that though the proposed agreements must give the fullest possible security to all the Powers concerned so long as they abide by their treaty undertakings, they must not, on the other hand, be such that they can be invoked by a guilty Power to protect it from the consequences of a wilful breach of its treaty obligations. The first sentence of the article is intended to cover the case of a German–Polish arbitration treaty, guaranteed by France. The second sentence is particularly intended to cover the rights of the Allies under the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the Dawes plan⁶ and under the occupation clauses in Part XIV, section 1, of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhineland Agreement.⁷ It does not, of course, affect the position under paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. His Majesty's Government have never admitted, and still do not admit, that the Allies enjoy any right under that paragraph to occupy German territory in excess of that specified in Part XIV, section 1, of the treaty.

Article 10 is in reproduction of article 3 of the Guarantee Treaty of 1919⁴ between Great Britain and France appended to the Treaty of Versailles. It is put forward as an alternative to a time-limit.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ No. 363.

⁶ Sec No. 27, n. 8.

⁷ Sec No. 330, n. 5.

No. 406

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 137 Telegraphic [C 8939/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 5, 1925, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 251. (Secret, of July 3rd.¹ Security negotiations.)

First paragraph is welcome news and your action is approved.

Second paragraph is far less satisfactory, for if attitude there foreshadowed represents real view of German government whole scheme may be jeopardised. You personally of course realise nicety of this question of France's commitments in the East and necessity of finding some way out for her. Whilst therefore you should be especially careful to say nothing of the sort to the Germans, you would do well to point out to them that a Franco–Polish treaty of alliance already exists² of a purely unilateral nature whereas proposed French guarantee of a German–Polish arbitra-

¹ No. 404.

² See No. 187.

tion treaty (itself proposed on German initiative) would clearly be bilateral—and if German government still remain sceptical do they not realise that during the negotiations which must necessarily take place between themselves and Poland prior to the conclusion of proposed arbitration treaty there will be ample opportunity to go fully into the terms of the proposed French guarantee and even to stipulate that before Germany signs the treaty her concurrence in the terms of that guarantee must have been secured?

Copies (by bag) to Paris, Brussels, Rome and Warsaw.

No. 407

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 9, 9 a.m.)

No. 257 Telegraphic [C 9177/459/18]

BERLIN, July 8, 1925, 7.25 p.m.

German reply on security.

I have had further interview with Secretary of State regarding this but find His Excellency impressed and indeed oppressed with extreme difficulty of drafting an answer of a satisfactory nature. He has torn up two first drafts produced by his department. Tomorrow he proposes to spend a day in the country with Stresemann in order to discuss a new reply.

Foreign Affairs Committee have now put forward a claim to see outline of German reply before it is sent. Although Foreign Office dispute legality of this claim it may be politically expedient to take some account of it. But it means delay. The general position is as follows:

The German government particularly Foreign Minister and Foreign Office are anxious to get forward with negotiations and fully realise deplorable effect which a breakdown of negotiations would make. They have however to contend with great internal difficulties owing to hostility of certain sections of opinion and to personal hostility to Stresemann. The German government are convinced that a conversation between Ministers or a conference is essential to progress of negotiations; not much advance will proceed from an exchange of notes. But they have not yet devised proper method to attain what they recognise as indispensable.

The considerations suggested in your telegram No. 137¹ should prove of great value.

¹ No. 406.

*The French Foreign Minister to the French Ambassador (London)*¹

[C 9216/459/18]★

July 9, 1925

Pacte de Garantie

J'ai pris connaissance du projet de traité de garantie² que Mr. Chamberlain m'a fait parvenir par votre entremise.³

Voici les premières observations que m'a suggérées la lecture de ce document.

Sans m'arrêter, pour le moment, à la formule proposée pour le préambule (qui fera l'objet de remarques ultérieures et demande des modifications de rédaction), je crois devoir vous signaler que les dispositions essentielles du projet de traité appellent de ma part d'expresses réserves. J'ai donc été heureux de constater que ce projet vous a été remis non pas comme un texte, par lequel le Gouvernement britannique se considère comme engagé, mais 'simplement comme une suggestion concrète en vue de faciliter des négociations'.

1. Le texte britannique aurait pour effet d'enlever la plus grande partie de leur valeur aux garanties de sécurité envisagées. Il subordonne, en effet, dans tous les cas, leur jeu à une décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations, ce qui représenterait une répétition pure et simple du Covenant, alors que les dispositions de celui-ci ont déjà été maintes fois reconnues insuffisantes et que l'intention des deux Gouvernements est précisément de rechercher des garanties de sécurité complémentaires à celles résultant des traités de paix, ainsi que Mr. Chamberlain l'a indiqué dans son mémorandum du 19 mai⁴ (paragraphe numéroté 2).

2. L'article 2 envisage le droit incontestable de légitime défense contre une invasion ou une attaque, mais il n'apparaît pas clairement que la garantie énoncée à l'article premier doive jouer immédiatement en pareil cas. En effet, une telle attaque constituant une violation du traité d'arbitrage, il ressortirait du texte que l'application de la garantie serait subordonnée à une décision préalable du Conseil de la Société des Nations. Il est à peine utile de signaler insuffisance qu'aurait, en pareil cas et dans état actuel du Covenant, une garantie donnée dans de semblables conditions.

3. L'article 3, en tant qu'il est relatif au jeu des articles 42 et 43 du Traité de Versailles, non seulement ne répond pas au but même du mémorandum allemand,⁵ qui envisage la garantie de l'exécution de ces articles par l'Allemagne, mais tend à diminuer, par une interprétation à

¹ A copy of this telegram was communicated to the Foreign Office by the French Ambassador on July 10 (see No. 410, below).

² See No. 405, n. 2.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 3.

⁴ No. 330.

⁵ See No. 197, n. 1.

laquelle le Gouvernement français ne saurait se rallier, la portée littérale des articles 42 et 43, dont la violation, d'après l'article 44, est expressément qualifiée d'acte hostile envers tous les signataires du traité, parmi lesquels figure la Grande-Bretagne.

Le 11 mars dernier, au cours d'une séance privée du Conseil de la Société des Nations, j'avais rappelé que l'article 44 confère aux pays intéressés qui seraient l'objet de l'acte hostile envisagé le droit d'agir immédiatement.⁶ Mr. Chamberlain, avec l'unanimité du Conseil, avait reconnu la justesse de mon observation. Cette manière de voir est, d'ailleurs, conforme, non seulement au texte précis de l'article 44, mais au but visé par cet article. Il est clair que toute violation par l'Allemagne de la zone démilitarisée prendrait rapidement un caractère d'une extrême gravité, si la grantie des Alliés ne jouait pas *immédiatement*. Le Gouvernement français ne comprendrait pas une interprétation qui lui ferait perdre, ainsi qu'à la Belgique, le bénéfice d'une disposition qui a eu précisément pour objet de préserver les territoires français et belge contre les facilités d'agression que fournirait aux armées allemandes l'utilisation de la région rhénane comme base d'opérations. L'État agresseur serait par là favorisé au détriment de l'État attaqué.

Le Gouvernement britannique avait d'ailleurs, à Cannes,⁷ distingué entre la simple menace, qui ne donnait lieu qu'à l'engagement pour lui de se concerter avec nous, et l'agression directe et non provoquée qui entraînait immédiatement son intervention aux côtés de la France.

4. L'article 6 relatif aux traités d'arbitrage franco-allemand et belgo-allemand devrait être placé immédiatement après l'engagement initial relatif au *statu quo* rhénan, dont ces traités sont la contre-partie naturelle et nécessaire. En effet, la répudiation de toute idée de guerre est le complément indispensable de l'engagement de maintenir le *statu quo*, et en découle logiquement, selon les expressions mêmes de Mr. Chamberlain (paragraphe 10 de la lettre du 28 mai à Lord Crewe).⁸ Ces deux stipulations devraient figurer au début du pacte pour en dominer les dispositions.

5. En ce qui concerne la garantie donnée aux traités d'arbitrage, telle qu'elle est exposée dans l'article 7, il convient de remarquer que la rédaction proposée est en contradiction avec les termes de la réponse française aux Allemands, en date du 16 juin.⁹ L'article 7 défère, en effet, au Conseil le soin de décider dans tous les cas du jeu et des effets de la garantie, sans distinguer s'il y a eu ou non acte hostile. Or, nous avons nettement distingué dans notre réponse à l'Allemagne le cas où l'une des parties recourt à un acte hostile, et le cas où, sans y recourir, elle manque à ses engagements. Dans ce dernier cas, c'est le Conseil de la Société qui devra proposer les mesures à prendre, ce qui s'explique parce que l'on a

⁶ See No. 240, n. 12.

⁸ No. 349.

⁷ See No. 315, n. 4.

⁹ See No. 382, n. 2.

considéré qu'il y avait alors une simple menace, de nature à troubler la paix générale.

Par contre, dans le cas où le manquement s'accompagnerait d'actes hostiles, la garantie doit, pour avoir quelque efficacité, entrer immédiatement en application. En effet, dans cette hypothèse, il n'y a pas *menace*, mais *acte* de guerre. La preuve se trouve matériellement faite de la violation des dispositions stipulées pour empêcher le recours à la force.

6. Il n'est fait aucune mention dans le projet britannique de la condition énoncée dans la section 7 de la réponse française,⁹ à savoir qu'il est indispensable que tous les accords envisagés entrent en vigueur simultanément.

7. Enfin l'article 9 du projet de Mr. Chamberlain paraît reconnaître à la Société des Nations un droit d'intervention en tout temps et en toute circonstance, de nature à remettre éventuellement en question les engagements figurant au traité. Sur ce point des éclaircissements sont nécessaires.

8. Je me réserve d'étudier plus en détail le projet britannique, mais je vous prie de bien vouloir, dès à présent, attirer la plus sérieuse attention de Mr. Chamberlain sur les observations essentielles qui précèdent. Je suis convaincu qu'il se rendra compte de la nécessité de rédiger le traité futur de manière qu'il constitue bien la garantie complémentaire de sécurité envisagée dans l'alinéa 3 du préambule de la note française du 16 juin,⁹ but qui ne saurait être atteint par le projet qui nous a été soumis.

Je vous prie donc de bien vouloir donner connaissance de ces observations au Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté britannique, à qui vous en laisserez copie en lui faisant remarquer que ces observations que je vous communique sont présentées d'une manière purement technique en raison de leur caractère officieux et dont il excusera la forme.

A. BRIAND

No. 409

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received July 10, 10 p.m.)

No. 259 *Telegraphic* [C 9248/459/18]

BERLIN, July 10, 1925, 6.25 p.m.

I dined with Chancellor last night and had a long conversation with him during the course of the evening on the subject of the pact and of other negotiations.

Chancellor said that he was a firm and indeed enthusiastic supporter of policy of German memorandum of February 9th.¹ This was plain political initiative by Germany. It was a clear and simple proposal but Briand note of June 15th² turned discussion on to juristical lines with many pit-falls.

¹ See No. 197, n. 1.

² See No. 382, n. 2.

German public opinion suspected traps in Briand's reserves and precisions.

Moreover the atmosphere for discussion of the pact had been affected unfavourably by reply of Conference of Ambassadors regarding conditions of aviation in Germany.³ This reply took us back to the bad spirit of 1919 and away from the tendency towards conciliation and agreement initiated by German memorandum of February. The increased facilities allowed to German aviation were more than compensated for by new restrictions imposed on German aerial development. The nett impression of the note had made German opinion more difficult concerning the pact.

He hoped that I would bring home to His Majesty's Government the very real difficulties of his position and the necessity for effective co-operation of all those who desired to make the pact a reality. He recognised parliamentary difficulties of other Ministers: he hopes that his own would not be forgotten.

In reply I pointed out to Chancellor that much of the criticism evoked by the Briand note² was not justified by the text and that juristical twist of which he complained was possibly due as much to the reader as to the writer. The Briand note was as favourable an answer to Germany as could be expected in view of M. Briand's obligations and necessity of protecting himself against nationalist attack. I had (been through the) juristic (criticisms) of German lawyers and had formed opinion that they were somewhat unsubstantial.⁴

As regards aviation note German opinion remained singularly blind to concessions which had been granted. I was informed that those concessions permitted construction of machines more powerful and more rapid than those which were in current use in international aviation.

The conversation then turned on to date when German reply might be expected. Chancellor said he disliked making promises which he might not be able to fulfil so that he would not name a fixed date. He hoped however to get agreement on German reply by the end of the next week. It was in his opinion indispensable for him to have general support of larger parties to reply he would send. German attitude in this grave matter must not be one determined by a bare majority.

I did not find Chancellor as urgent as I expected about an early conference although he was in favour of it. On the other hand he appeared to hold that if discussion could be transferred from antecedent conditions of an agreement to terms of the agreement itself or to some draft of such agreement many of the present divergencies and preoccupations would vanish. This is probably true. The tendency to discuss antecedent conditions is one to which the German mind is extremely prone and their fertility in inventing hypothetical hard cases is absolutely inexhaustible.⁵

³ See No. 633, n. 4, below.

⁴ See No. 401.

⁵ In Berlin telegram No. 260 of July 10, Lord D'Abernon reported: 'I had a conversation

last night with Schiele Minister of the Interior and leading member of German national party in government.

'His principal statement was that main difficulty of his friends regarding pact proceeded from obligation to join League of Nations without some modification of article 16 or some reserve exempting Germany from its purpose.

'He appeared to think a concession on this point would greatly facilitate acceptance of pact by his party.

'He laid curiously little stress on other objections which are current in press.'

No. 410

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 2362 [C 9223/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 10, 1925*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador brought me this morning a communication from M. Briand on our draft of a pact of guarantee.

The Ambassador said that he would be happy to discuss these matters with me or with any of the officials of this Office whom I might designate for the purpose as soon as we both were in a position to do so. At present he had not himself been able to study M. Briand's observations, and in the course of our interview he read to me only the paragraph marked No. 1, indicating very briefly some of the other points raised in the message.

I told his Excellency that I would at once begin the study of this document. I entirely agreed with him that it required careful examination before I made any comment upon matters of such high importance. I would only observe for the moment, and with reference to the criticism, that the earlier clauses as drawn added nothing to the Covenant, that this description did not at all correspond with my conception of the draft.

The Ambassador repeated that they had reason to expect that the German answer would be delivered about the 14th, and the matter was therefore of great urgency. I assured him that there should be no delay on our side.

I then took the opportunity of referring to the memorandum which he had left with Sir William Tyrrell,² in which some anxiety was expressed lest Lord D'Abernon should offer in Berlin explanations of the French note.³ I said that I had no reason to think that Lord D'Abernon was doing anything of the kind, but that his Excellency must recognise that Lord D'Abernon could not avoid conversations with the German Ministers or refuse explanations on any questions arising out of my own speech in the House of Commons.⁴ I added that I mentioned the matter because Sir William Tyrrell had not known and could not have told him of what had

¹ No. 408.

³ See No. 382, n. 2.

² On July 8 (C 9170/459/18), not printed.

⁴ See No. 388, n. 4.

passed between me and M. Briand at Geneva⁵ on this subject. As soon as we had reached our agreement,⁶ I had told M. Briand that I should instruct Lord D'Abernon to use his whole influence with the German Government to induce them to send a reply of an equally conciliatory character, to refrain from offering meticulous criticisms and to get to practical negotiations as early as possible.⁷ M. Briand had replied: 'Yes, please do so; that is very important'. I then told the Ambassador what had passed between me and Herr Sthamer when Herr Sthamer came to enquire whether I agreed with some reported observation of M. de Margérie (see my despatch No. 1175 to Berlin of the 23rd June).⁸

Before entering on this subject, the Ambassador informed me that he had received instructions this morning to press upon me the great importance which M. Briand attached to the proposal for our co-operation in the surveillance of the Tangier territorial waters,⁹ but that at the time these instructions were given M. Briand had not been in possession of the reply of the British Government,¹⁰ and he would therefore await further instructions before saying more upon the subject.

In connection both with the answer we had returned about this naval surveillance and with what he said about the pact of guarantee, the Ambassador suggested that there might be useful conversation between our legal advisers. I replied that I should warmly welcome a visit from M. Fromageot to Sir Cecil Hurst, which I thought might be very useful.¹¹ They had been accustomed to work together with great harmony in many difficult matters, and the explanations which they might interchange might greatly facilitate an agreement.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ See Nos. 363-79, *passim*.

⁶ See Nos. 363 and 364.

⁷ Mr. Chamberlain so instructed Lord D'Abernon in a private letter of June 26 (F.O. 800, vol. 258, ff. 226-9), not printed.

⁸ No. 395.

⁹ The French and Spanish Governments had signed an agreement on the naval surveillance of Tangier (to prevent arms reaching Abdul Karim (see No. 364, n. 10)) on June 22 (a text was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1460 of July 1, not printed) and had asked for British co-operation (the French and Spanish Ambassadors had presented notes on July 3 and June 27, respectively).

¹⁰ In a note of July 8, the French and Spanish Ambassadors were informed that His Majesty's Government considered such naval surveillance both ineffective (because ships flying the flags of countries with extra-territorial rights in Tangier could not be searched) and inexpedient (because the six-mile limit proposed was illegal).

¹¹ Cf. No. 373.

Memorandum by Sir C. Hurst on the extent to which the Obligations of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee¹ exceed the Obligations of the Covenant

[C 9259/459/18]*

July 11, 1925

I

The question has been asked whether there is anything in the draft Pact that is not in the Covenant *if every member of the League conscientiously carried out the provisions of the Covenant to the letter.*²

The words in italics make a great deal of difference.

The need of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee arises from an ephemeral circumstance—French nervousness—and French nervousness would greatly diminish if the League were universal and all men believed that every State would act loyally up to the letter of its engagement. It is because that belief can only be a matter of gradual growth that it is proposed to make the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee terminable—as was the Defence of France Treaty of 1919³—so soon as a majority of the Council are prepared to say that the League itself is strong enough to give the necessary protection.

The implication in the question, viz., that the new treaty does not go further than the Covenant—perfectly understood and enforced—gives the exact reason why the new treaty is to be terminable when the League itself affords sufficient protection.

It is because the Covenant is not at present perfectly understood and certain to be enforced that some States have got to shoulder an obligation pledging themselves to take action more effective than the generality of States can be counted on today to regard themselves as bound to take merely because they are members of the League.

II

To specify the extent to which the obligations of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee surpass the obligations of the Covenant it is necessary to set out the measure of the obligations of the Covenant. It should be remembered that agreement is by no means universal as to what the Covenant of the League means, but the following is my understanding of its effect:—

Firstly, it renders resort to war legitimate only (1) where it is undertaken in resistance to attack; (2) where it is undertaken to enforce the Covenant of the League, *i.e.*, the imposition of sanctions; or (3) where use has been made of the machinery of the League in order to settle a dispute, *and (a)*

¹ See No. 405, n. 2.

² The question was posed by Major R. Casey, Liaison Officer of the Australian Government in respect of foreign affairs, in a letter of July 3 to Mr. Lampson, not printed.

³ See No. 185, n. 1.

the Council is unable to arrive at a unanimous report, or (b) finds that the dispute arises out of a matter of domestic jurisdiction, and, therefore, the League cannot help unless both parties are prepared to accept its suggestions (article 11), or (c) the other party has failed for three months to carry out the recommendations contained in a unanimous report of the Council or in an arbitration award.

Secondly, when a State resorts to war in breach of its engagements in the Covenant, all members of the League are bound to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant. The method by which they fulfil that obligation is determined by themselves, but economic and financial sanctions are compulsory. Nevertheless, the discretion which members of the League are entitled to exercise as to the military or naval measures they will take does not mean that they are entitled to do nothing if they can help effectively.

It is possible that the resolutions adopted by the 1921 Assembly⁴ relating to the application of economic pressure under article 16 and the amendments then proposed to that article require the addition to the concluding sentence of the preceding paragraph of the words 'and if other members of the League play their part'. All the members of the League agreed in 1921 that pending the coming into force of the proposed amendments to the Covenant they would act in accordance with the resolutions.⁵ The Assembly of 1921 was impressed with the danger and the uselessness of isolated action in the economic sphere and endeavoured to surmount the difficulty by discouraging individual action before the Council gave the word. Pressure in the economic sphere was the only matter under discussion in 1921, and it is not clear what bearing either the resolutions or the discussions of 1921 have on military and naval measures. The preceding paragraph, as it stands, represents the explanation which the British delegation at Geneva in 1924⁶ gave of the meaning of article 16, and the Assembly of 1924,⁷ though dealing with the imposition of sanctions generally, was principally concerned with measures of coercion by the use [of] military and naval forces.

III

France, Germany and Belgium assume in the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee certain obligations which are not undertaken by Great Britain.

France and Belgium on one side and Germany on the other are pledged not to resort to war against each other except in resistance to attack, or

⁴ The Second Assembly met September 5–October 5, 1921. For the resolutions passed on October 4, 1921, relating to Article 16, see *League of Nations: Records of the Second Assembly: Plenary Meetings*. . . (Geneva, 1921), pp. 807, 812 and 814.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 814.

⁶ For Sir C. Hurst's explanation to the First Committee on September 9, 1924, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Meetings of the Committees: Minutes of the First Committee (Constitutional Questions)* (Geneva, 1924), p. 13.

⁷ See No. 205, n. 10.

when authorised by the Council or the Assembly. The authorisation of the Council or the Assembly will cover cases where under the Covenant sanctions are legitimate. The cases of legitimate war under the Covenant, which are comprised in 3 (a) and 3 (c) of section II in this paper, will not arise under the proposed treaty. These two gaps are closed. It is part of the scheme that arbitration treaties rendering obligatory the peaceful settlement of all disputes shall be concluded, and therefore France, Belgium and Germany will have introduced between themselves a method of peaceably settling a dispute and will be bound to comply with the results. Consequently, no legitimate war can arise through inability on the part of the Council to agree (3 (a)), or through the failure of the other party to comply with the Council's report or with an arbitration award (3 (c)). It is of course possible that in the last resort the Council might have to authorise the enforcement by measures of war of a report or an award in a case where the Council fails to secure compliance by moral suasion and the recalcitrant party does not resort to hostilities, but in that case justification for the measures of war undertaken to enforce the report or the award will be found in the authorisation by the Council.

What machinery France and Belgium on one side and Germany on the other will adopt to secure a peaceful settlement of disputes covered by 3 (b) is not at present apparent. The German arbitration treaties with Sweden⁸ and Switzerland⁹ make no special provision for this case; disputes as to matters within the domestic jurisdiction of one party are apparently left to the conciliation bodies under those treaties, and the reports of the conciliation bodies are not obligatory—they are only recommendations.

The question of disputes as to matters within the domestic jurisdiction of one party is not of the same importance to France, Belgium and Germany, as it is to His Majesty's Government and the Dominions, particularly since minorities problems have been made the subject of special treaties and placed under the control of the League.

So far as regards France, Belgium and Germany, therefore, the obligations resulting from the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee differ from those resulting from the Covenant, in that their liberty to resort to war is restricted as indicated above.

IV

All the parties to the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee assume the obligation to come to the assistance of another party who is the victim of the resort to war by yet another party to the treaty, if that resort to war involves a violation of the Rhineland frontier, or is coupled with a violation of a guaranteed arbitration treaty in force between them. A resort to war in these circumstances will be in violation of the Covenant and is, therefore, sufficient to bring article 16 into play.

The extent to which the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee imposes a greater

⁸ See No. 190, n. 5.

⁹ See *ibid.*, n. 3.

burden than the Covenant properly interpreted is measured by the difference between 'coming immediately to the assistance of a Power', and 'co-operating loyally and effectively' in support of the Covenant for the benefit of that Power, against the party which has resorted to war. The language of the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is a little plainer. In substance the effect is the same.

I should perhaps add that divergence between the working of article 16 of the Covenant and the guarantee clauses of the proposed treaty might in theory arise from the difference between the rôle played by the Council under article 16 and the rôle played by the Council under the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

Under article 16 as at present in force, though a member of the League is entitled to take military and naval action at once and has a discretion as to whether or not he will take the military or naval action recommended by the Council, he can scarcely be said to come under an obligation to take military or naval action if the Council think that help from him will be unnecessary, and, therefore, make no recommendation at all, *e.g.*, if there was a war in Eastern Europe it is unlikely that Panamá would be recommended to take military or naval action, and Panamá cannot be said, therefore to be under an obligation to take military or naval action in order to co-operate loyally and effectively. This argument cannot, however, apply to Great Britain in the event of a struggle breaking out between France and Germany. If such a struggle broke out and the Council fulfilled its duty of 'recommending in such case to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute . . .' it is inconceivable that none should be addressed to Great Britain, and if such a recommendation were addressed to Great Britain and Great Britain fulfilled its duty in co-operating loyally and effectively, the result would in practice be the same as that under the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

If there is under the Covenant a right for a State intimately affected to wait and see whether other States play their part before 'co-operating loyally and effectively' by taking military and naval measures (see II, last paragraph, above), the obligation imposed by the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is greater, because the assistance there provided for is quite independent of what other States may do.

The parties to the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee are also to come to the assistance of another party when the Council of the League notifies that Germany has committed a violation of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and that such violation is directed against that party. A violation by Germany of those articles is a 'hostile act' committed by her against every signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, but need not necessarily be a 'resort to war' by her. The articles prohibit such action as constructing fortifications in the demilitarised zone or assembling troops.

It is improbable that the Council of the League will notify a violation of those articles and thereby set the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee in

operation in a trivial case. The Council would refrain from doing so unless it were convinced that Germany intended war, but if a notification were made before Germany had commenced hostilities, the obligation to come to France's assistance constitutes an obligation which is more extensive than that of the Covenant. If it were made after Germany had commenced hostilities, it is not in substance greater than the obligation of the Covenant.

C.J.B.H.

No. 412

Mr. Chamberlain to the French Ambassador

[C 9216/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 11, 1925*

Your Excellency,

You were good enough to hand to me on the 10th July a copy of a telegram addressed to you by M. Briand¹ containing his Excellency's preliminary comments on the draft treaty of mutual guarantee put forward by His Majesty's Government.² A careful examination of this telegram shows clearly that the major issue to be discussed by our two Governments is the part which the League of Nations is to play in the operation of the proposed treaty and of the arbitration treaties which are to supplement it. I should like to say at once that I am loath to believe that there is any substantial difference between us on this point. The difference which, to judge from M. Briand's telegram, appears to exist is—I would fain hope—in fact no more than the result of a misapprehension of what His Majesty's Government propose.

2. The French Government draw a clear distinction between a threat of war and an act of war, and they fear that His Majesty's Government are proposing to meet an act of war with measures which are only fit for dealing with the threat of war. This is not so. It is true that the draft treaty, in the words of M. Briand's telegram, subordinates the proposed guarantees of security in every case to a decision of the Council of the League of Nations, but a careful examination of the draft will make it clear that the nature of the decision required is not the same in every case.

3. If one of the parties to the proposed arbitration treaties between France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other, without resorting to war, refuses to submit a dispute to arbitration or fails to comply with an award, recommendation or report resulting therefrom, then, according to article 7 (3) of the British draft, the Council of the League is to endeavour to settle the dispute.

4. If on the other hand the violation of an arbitration treaty is coupled

¹ No. 408.

² See No. 405, n. 2.

with resort to war, His Majesty's Government agree with the French Government that any guarantee of that arbitration treaty should enter into immediate operation, subject always to the proviso explained in paragraph 5 of the present note. Similarly, in the view of His Majesty's Government as in that of the French Government, a violation of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles or an unauthorised resort to war by one of the parties to the proposed treaty against another party will, subject to the same proviso, bring into immediate operation the joint and several guarantee of the signatory States. There is thus no difference of opinion between His Majesty's Government and the French Government as to what is to happen when the *casus fæderis* arises.

5. In the view of His Majesty's Government, however, it is essential to set up some machinery for deciding beyond all possibility of challenge whether the *casus fæderis* has in fact arisen. It is evident that no guarantor can be expected automatically to take action of the serious nature contemplated on a mere allegation by one of the interested parties. In the interest of all parties concerned and of the world at large, it must be established that the allegation is correct, and it is this duty which, under articles 3, 4 and 7 (4) of the British draft treaty, it is proposed to entrust to the Council of the League. The rôle of the Council in such a case would be simply to declare whether a certain situation existed or not, and there is no reason to anticipate that this would entail any appreciable delay. The more certain and obvious the facts, the less the delay in pronouncing a decision upon them.

6. His Majesty's Government attach paramount importance to this provision. The debates which have recently taken place in both Houses of Parliament³ will have made clear to the French Government the emphasis laid by all parties in this country on the necessity of associating the League of Nations in the greatest possible measure with the proposed treaty. It is in fact scarcely too much to say that the people of this country will not be prepared to endorse guarantees of the far-reaching nature proposed unless it is provided that before those guarantees become operative the question whether the *casus fæderis* exists shall be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision.

7. Apart from this particular—but vital—consideration I feel sure that the French Government will on reflection recognise the advantage to all concerned that the Council should fulfil the task marked out for it in the British draft. Indeed, the French Government themselves appear to have had some such idea in contemplation when, in their memorandum of the 22nd May,⁴ they suggested that all the proposed treaties should be placed under the auspices of the League 'in order to enable the League in case of need to establish the legitimacy of action undertaken in accordance with

³ See No. 392, n. 3. For the debate in the House of Lords on July 6, see 61*H.L. Deb.* 5 s. cols. 1018–51.

⁴ See No. 340, Enclosure.

the terms of these agreements'. It must be borne in mind that the bi-lateral character of the proposed settlement is such that any signatory Power which acts without first establishing the legitimacy of its action to the satisfaction of the other guarantors will run a grave risk of finding itself not merely unsupported but perhaps actually opposed by them.

8. The above explanations will, I trust, suffice to demonstrate that His Majesty's Government have not in their draft treaty departed in any way from the spirit of the French note of the 16th June⁵ and that the subordination to a decision of the Council of the League of the operation of the proposed guarantees in the manner suggested by His Majesty's Government, so far from taking away the greater part of the value of those guarantees, will give greater certainty to their operation.

9. There are certain other minor points raised in M. Briand's telegram with which it is necessary for me to deal. The telegram suggests that article 6 of the British draft, concerning the proposed arbitration treaties between France and Germany and Belgium and Germany, should have an earlier place in the agreement. His Majesty's Government gladly accept this suggestion. The article would perhaps most appropriately appear as article 3, but this point, together with any slight drafting alterations which its transfer may necessitate in other portions of the draft, can be decided at a later stage.

10. A further comment made in M. Briand's telegram is that the British draft contains no mention of the condition expressed in section VII of the French note to Germany of the 16th June,⁵ namely, that all the agreements aimed at must come into force simultaneously. His Majesty's Government had regarded this portion of section VII purely as an expression of opinion, and, while sharing the opinion, they did not—and still do not—contemplate its embodiment in the proposed treaty. Indeed, they would find it difficult to subscribe to any such condition which would result in making the settlement in the west dependent to some extent on a settlement between Germany and her eastern neighbours in a manner which His Majesty's Government have already declared their inability to accept.

11. The last point concerns article 9 of the British draft treaty.² On this point His Majesty's Government frankly fail to understand the difficulty of the French Government, since article 9 contains nothing which is not either expressed or implied in various sections, notably section I, paragraph 2, section V, paragraph 3, and more particularly in section VI, of the French note to Germany of the 16th June.⁵ There can be no question of prejudicing, by any agreement now entered into, the power and duty of the League to take, in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant, any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world, and His Majesty's Government cannot believe that the French Government can intend to suggest that the power and duty of the League in this respect should be in any way curtailed. If there is any

⁵ See No. 382, n. 2.

misunderstanding on this question His Majesty's Government feel that it should be cleared up without delay by frank discussion.

12. This leads me to repeat the welcome which I gave in our conversation on the 10th July⁶ to your suggestion that M. Fromageot should visit London to discuss the proposed treaty with Sir Cecil Hurst, the legal adviser to this Department. The sooner such a personal meeting between the British and French legal advisers can take place the greater the prospect of an agreed draft between our two Governments. I am convinced that a discussion between them would be of the greatest value and that the explanations interchanged would greatly facilitate an agreement on points of complexity with which it is difficult to deal satisfactorily in formal correspondence.

13. I shall be grateful if your Excellency will be so good as to bring the contents of this note to the immediate attention of the French Government.

I have, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁶ See No. 410.

No. 413

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Graham (Brussels)

*No. 831 [C 9411/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 14, 1925*

Sir,

I learnt today from a communication made to Mr. Lampson¹ by M. de Fleuriau that M. Briand had mentioned to M. Vandervelde² the existence of our draft of the pact³ and had asked his opinion upon it. I had myself refrained from communicating the draft to the Belgian Government and to Baron Moncheur because I had understood that M. Briand desired that he should have an opportunity of making some preliminary comment upon our draft before it was communicated to anyone else. Evidently there was some misunderstanding, and I, therefore, at once asked Baron Moncheur to call upon me. I handed him copies⁴ of the draft,³ of the comments made upon it by M. Briand⁵ and of my reply,⁶ and I explained to him the reason for which alone I had refrained from communicating with him at the same time as with M. de Fleuriau as I had done on

¹ An account of the conversation between Mr. Lampson and the French Ambassador on July 14 was transmitted to Paris in Foreign Office despatch No. 2405 of July 14, not printed.

² Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs since June 17. He had visited Paris July 8-10.

³ See No. 405, n. 2.

⁴ These copies, together with Baron Moncheur's record of July 15 of his conversation with Mr. Chamberlain, are printed in *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 79. See also *ibid.*, No. 76, Annexe.

⁵ See No. 408.

⁶ No. 412.

previous occasions. His Excellency admitted that M. Vandervelde had been a little surprised and perhaps a little hurt not to receive the documents earlier—perhaps also a little inclined to blame the Ambassador for not having secured communication of them. Baron Moncheur remarked, however, that I had always treated him with great courtesy and frankness, and he trusted that he had always shown discretion in his use of my communications. I told his Excellency that I still desired the draft to be treated as a most confidential document: it would be extremely embarrassing if I were asked in the House of Commons to produce it at this stage, as I might well be if its existence became known.

I observed that, when he had time to study the papers, he would find that the principal question raised in the exchange of views between M. Briand and myself was as to the exact part which the League of Nations should play in our scheme. I called his attention to the discussion last Monday week in the House of Lords,⁷ and I pointed out, the great importance attached to the intervention of the League by every section of public opinion in this country. His Excellency appreciated the point, but enquired what would happen if Germany suddenly invaded Poland on the one hand or Belgium on the other. Was France in the first case, were Great Britain and France in the second, precluded from taking any action until the League had met and given a decision?

I replied that it seemed to me unlikely that, if the issue arose, it would present itself in this form. If a German army were marching on Paris or Brussels, no one would expect the French and Belgians to abstain from self-defence whilst long discussions were taking place at the Council, nor could it be expected that, if the British Government had become the guarantors of their frontiers against such an unprovoked attack, they should wait until Paris or Brussels were occupied and the fortune of war decided before taking action. But no such invasion could take place without the previous course of events giving alarm to the world. Baron Moncheur had spoken of 1914, and I observed that if, for example, the Covenant of the League had been in existence at that time, the Council would already have been in session and using its influence to avert the danger of war before the invasion took place. This idea, therefore, that there might be a long delay in summoning the Council and obtaining a decision appeared to me very fanciful. On the other hand, it was more probable that, at the first moment of trouble, there might be some uncertainty as to the facts and that each of the parties immediately concerned might allege that the other was the aggressor. In such a case it was essential that the guarantor should have the facts clearly established in order to decide what his obligations were, and it must surely be to the interest of us all to have the immense moral influence of a League decision behind us if we were forced to take action.

Baron Moncheur then remarked that, if the provisions of the Covenant

⁷ See No. 412, n. 3.

were to play so great a part, it might be asked whether, in fact, the proposed pact added anything to the existing safeguards. I replied that I should answer him with another question. Why was it that France and Belgium felt that their security was not sufficiently guaranteed by the Covenant? Was it not because, under the Covenant, the obligations of all of us were general and in terms equal wherever and in whatever circumstance war arose? Suppose, for instance, that a quarrel arose between two South American States. All other members of the League had certain obligations, but did anyone suppose that Belgium or Great Britain would in such circumstances despatch armies to South America to defend the aggrieved nation? What the pact would do was to indicate the circumstances and the conditions in which, instead of the general obligation imposed by the Covenant on us as on all others to do, at the invitation of the League, what we could to the extent compatible with our situation for the support of the injured and the repression of the aggressor, we should make the quarrel our own and fight it as our own just as we had done in 1914. I added, however, that I would much prefer that he and his Government should carefully consider the papers that I had handed to him before we went any further into this question.

His Excellency then enquired of me whether I could give him any information about Russia and whether any change had taken place in our relations with the Soviet Government. I told him the substance of what had passed between M. Rakovski⁸ and me yesterday.⁹ Baron Moncheur asked whether M. Rakovski had made any suggestion for recognising the Russian debts or for restoring confiscated British concessions. I replied in the negative. I observed that the Soviet Government approached each of us in turn holding out hopes of a satisfactory settlement and perhaps cherishing hopes of financial support to be obtained in return, but that nothing substantial came of these negotiations, whether conducted in Rome or in Paris or in London, and that, for my part, it seemed to me that our best course was to let Russia alone for the time being, neither giving her the impression that she was courted nor that she was feared, but leaving her to discover that the world could do without her much better than she could do without the world.¹⁰

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁸ Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London.

⁹ See Vol. XXV, No. 324.

¹⁰ Sir G. Grahame discussed the contents of this despatch on July 17 with M. Vandervelde, who was aware of the terms of the British draft treaty and of M. Briand's objections (see No. 408). He was not aware, however, of Mr. Chamberlain's reply (see No. 412) and Sir G. Grahame left a copy with him for study. In Brussels despatch No. 538 of July 17 which recorded this conversation Sir G. Grahame commented: '... I realised before seeing M. Vandervelde that there would be two currents of feeling in his mind in connection with the present difficulty. The first, his desire as a leader of international Socialism to bring in the League of Nations upon all possible occasions and to increase its prestige and power; the second, his keen wish as a Belgian statesman who had been one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Versailles and was now responsible for the foreign policy of

Belgium to set in the forefront of his programme the attainment of direct and unconditional security for his country.

'It seems to me that this second sentiment has been uppermost in his mind when considering the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. I have no doubt that a strong attempt has already been made by the French Government to enlist his sympathies on their side. I hope, at any rate, that my conversation with him this morning on the eve of his departure for three weeks' rest and cure at Spa will have called his serious attention to the other side of the question as set forth by you. . . .'

No. 414

Memorandum¹ by Mr. Chamberlain on Disarmament

[W 6843/9/98]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 16, 1925

I have given careful thought to the paper on Disarmament by Lord Cecil circulated to the Cabinet under number C.P. 329 (25).² With Lord Cecil's object I am in full sympathy, nor will anyone dispute the force of the argument which he derives from the language of the Covenant and the communication made by the Allies to the German negotiators. But I find myself very much opposed to the instruction which he recommends should be given to the British delegates to the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly of the League.³

Lord Cecil suggests that the British delegates should propose that the recently formed Co-ordination Committee⁴ or some similar body should enquire into and report upon the principles of international disarmament by land and air. Incidentally I may observe that I do not think that the Co-ordination Committee is in any case a suitable body for this purpose and that for the British Government to propose such a step in regard to land and air forces, whilst omitting all reference to the sea, would, as I think Lord Cecil himself sees, provoke very invidious comment. But these are minor difficulties for which a solution could be found. My objection to the proposal goes deeper.

From the date of the First Assembly⁵ down to the present time the question of disarmament has occupied a prominent, perhaps the most prominent, place in the discussions of the Assembly. It is not through apathy or from lack of effort that the problem remains unsolved, but

¹ This memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet.

² The Foreign Office copy of this paper has been transferred to the Cabinet Office files.

³ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁴ On October 3, 1924, the Council of the League of Nations resolved to set itself up as a Committee to oversee, with the aid of technical experts, the preparatory work necessary for the proposed conference on the reduction of armaments (see No. 206, n. 6). The Co-ordination Committee met first on February 16, 1925. For the setting-up of the Committee, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1924), p. 182, and *L.N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 1379-80 and *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 130-1.

⁵ The First Assembly met November 15-December 18, 1920.

because the basic conditions required for disarmament have not yet been attained. At an early stage the conclusion was reached that security was the first step on the road to reduction and our efforts were concentrated on providing security first by Lord Cecil's Treaty of Mutual Assistance⁶ and then by the protocol.⁷ The avowed object of both was to pave the way to a reduction.

There can be no reduction without security. This proposition is incontestable, and, in putting forward the suggestion made in his present memorandum, Lord Cecil is proceeding on the assumption that the Western Pact provides the security for which Europe is asking, and that the time has arrived to consider the next step forward. But is this assumption justified? In the first place the new pact is not yet concluded, and the news from Germany shows that her attitude towards it is still very uncertain.⁸ Secondly, as Lord Cecil himself most congenitly points out, the new pact does not touch Russia, and Russia is the key to the problem, at least as far as Eastern Europe is concerned. Is it the slightest use to propose reduction of armaments to the Powers of Eastern Europe while they remain under the nightmare of Bolshevik Russia, and, even if the latter were to come in to any scheme for reduction, who can trust or be expected to trust a Russian promise or signature in the light of what is happening about propaganda?⁹

The attitude of France, it must be observed, has been consistent throughout. Her refusal to disarm is not a result of military fever but of deep-rooted fear, arising from past history, in regard to her future safety. All French Governments and all French parties—indeed, it may be said, the whole French people—have consistently stated the path of progress in the sequence: security, arbitration, disarmament. If the mutual pact and its accompanying treaties are successfully negotiated and ratified by the respective Governments, French security and the triumph of arbitration will have been achieved, and, as far as the Western Powers are concerned, disarmament will have been rendered possible and the pressure of economic events will, I think, force a great reduction upon a not unwilling France. This, I believe, would be the case even though the Russian danger remained menacing and prevented comparable reductions among the Eastern Powers, but I hope that the Cabinet will remember Lord Balfour's warning that, as long as Russia maintains such large forces, it may not be to our interest that the continental Powers should carry disarmament as far as we ourselves have done.

Be this as it may, however, I am strongly opposed to the British delegates taking any initiative in this matter at the forthcoming conference. Lord Cecil's memorandum arose out of the Cabinet discussion¹⁰ on the draft which I submitted of a personal letter to M. Briand¹¹

⁶ See No. 282, n. 6.

⁸ See Nos. 404, 407 and 409.

¹⁰ Of July 1 (Cab. 32(25)).

⁷ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁹ Cf. Vol. XXV, Nos. 307, 314, 322 and 323.

¹¹ No. 402.

deprecating any Franco-British initiative at this same conference in reopening the protocol discussions. Lord Cecil, it will be remembered, took a slightly different view from the rest of the Cabinet, and in deference to his suggestion I introduced into my letter a paragraph on disarmament. I have now received, and circulate with this memorandum, M. Briand's reply.¹² It is very much what I expected. M. Briand maintains the traditional policy that disarmament can only follow upon the achievement of security. He not obscurely indicates that, if the British Government are going to press forward or to support an immediate policy of disarmament in advance of the settlement of the security question, the French Government must counter this British initiative by themselves reopening the question of the protocol.⁷ M. Briand admits the inconveniences and even the dangers of this course, and, not without a certain humorous appreciation of the situation, he intimates that, if Great Britain is going to pillory France as the obstacle to disarmament, France will be obliged to point out that Great Britain and the British Empire have been the principal influence at work to defeat all attempts at progress in the question of security. Does anyone suppose that the British delegation and the British Empire will come well out of a discussion conducted on these lines in the atmosphere of the Assembly, where France is always certain of a majority in favour of enlisting the whole strength of the British Empire in defence of any country which is menaced by aggression?

Twice has the Assembly discussed at length this allied question of security and disarmament. Twice has the Assembly elaborated an agreement, and both times largely on a British initiative, given first by Lord Cecil himself¹³ and last year by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.¹⁴ Each time the agreement achieved at Geneva has been rejected by the Government at home. Lord Cecil's scheme for a treaty of mutual assistance was destroyed by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.¹⁵ The protocol was destroyed by the present Government.¹⁶ To take the initiative a third time without the certainty of success would be, in my opinion, disastrous to the influence of Great Britain, and scarcely less disastrous to the influence of the League. Every unsuccessful attempt to amend the Covenant casts doubt upon the validity and efficacy of the Covenant as it stands. Every conspicuous failure of the League, such as these failures to secure the adoption of the agreements reached at Geneva, brings the League into deconsideration if not into contempt. I trust, therefore, that my colleagues will authorise me

¹² See No. 402, n. 7.

¹³ See No. 358, n. 4.

¹⁴ In his speech of September 4 at the Assembly. For the text, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1924), pp. 41-5.

¹⁵ In his letter of July 5, 1924, to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, stating that His Majesty's Government found the draft treaty of mutual assistance (see No. 282, n. 6) unacceptable. For the text, see Cmd. 2200, *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations respecting the Proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance* (H.M.S.O., 1924), pp. 10-14.

¹⁶ See Nos. 224, n. 2 and 240, n. 13.

to reply to M. Briand that we recognise the force of his argument that the question of security must be settled before the Assembly can fruitfully begin the discussion of a general limitation of land armaments, and that we are prepared to support the French delegation in endeavouring to secure the postponement of action on this matter till the fate of the proposed Pact of Mutual Guarantee is determined.

I had understood Lord Cecil to make a rather different proposal in Cabinet, and it is one which I think the Cabinet might usefully adopt. Sooner or later we shall have to face this question of disarmament, and it would be well that we should prepare ourselves for such a discussion by an examination of what is practical. If such an examination is not undertaken, it may well be that we shall be confronted at some future Assembly with a definite scheme presented by some other Power which we cannot accept, and to which we are not in a position to offer any alternative. I had understood that it was against this danger that Lord Cecil desired to guard, and that the decision which he sought from the Cabinet was that our technical advisers should be instructed to study the problem, and to submit to the Cabinet the best scheme of general disarmament that they can devise, or at least of the principles upon which any such scheme should be framed. Such a proposal I should heartily support, for it would give us the basis upon which, after adequate examination and discussion in the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet, we could prepare ourselves for a discussion in which, sooner or later, we shall have to take part.

A.C.

No. 415

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

*No. 2456 [C 9530/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 17, 1925*

Sir,

The French Ambassador called this morning to read to me the preliminary observations which M. Briand had addressed to him on my note of the 11th July.¹ These were couched in very friendly terms and did not seem to me to present insuperable difficulties. The Ambassador did not attempt to comment upon them as he thought that they would be better treated, as indeed M. Briand intended that they should be, between our jurists. I again expressed my pleasure that M. Fromageot was coming to discuss the draft² with Sir Cecil Hurst, and said that I only desired to make three observations of a general kind.

The first two of these observations related to the questions put to me by

¹ No. 412.

² See No. 405, n. 2.

Baron Moncheur. You will find them recorded in my despatch to Sir George Grahame, No. 831 of the 14th instant,³ together with my answers, which I now repeated to M. de Fleuriau. The third was that we were contemplating a pact of long and indeed indefinite duration, and that, whilst I attached due importance to M. Briand's desire for precision, it was important, as I had already remarked to the Ambassador, that we should not use language which, in circumstances not at present foreseen, might catch us as in a trap and involve us in a clear legal obligation to do something which neither the French nor we had ever intended and which was opposed to the equity and justice of the case. I added one other remark which I begged M. de Fleuriau to bear in mind. What we were undertaking to do was to define in a pact without limit of time conditions in which we were prepared today to give an absolute guarantee that we would act at whatever time in the distant future they might arise. We did not thereby deprive ourselves of our right to act in other conditions if, when the moment came, the situation in our opinion called for action. In other words, our pact was not designed to declare that we would never act in any other circumstances, but only to define those conditions in which we would here and now bind ourselves to act whenever they occurred.

M. de Fleuriau said that he thought that the problem before us was well stated by M. Briand, who, in the letter which he had read to me, had remarked that he could well understand the desire of Great Britain that her guarantee should only take effect in cases which clearly justified action, but that it was equally important for France that where action was justified it should be effective action, that is to say, immediate action. I agreed that this was the root of the matter. We had in fact to decide upon some form of pact that would give confidence to France and preserve national unity in Great Britain.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ No. 413.

No. 416

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 1307 [C 9066/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 17, 1925*

My Lord,

I have received your despatch No. 38[8] of the 1st July,¹ enclosing a memorandum of a conversation with Herr von Schubert and Herr Gauss, concerning the difficulties raised by the German Government in connection with the French note of the 16th June on the subject of security.²

¹ No. 401.

² See No. 382, n. 2.

2. After a careful examination of the points raised on the German side, I agree with your Lordship that they are juristic rather than substantial and ought in themselves to cause no great difficulty. I prefer, however, to reserve all explanations concerning them for the discussion which will no doubt ensue if the German reply to the French note is drafted in a manner calculated to facilitate negotiations. To embark upon explanations at the present stage would mean one of two things. They would be given either independently of, or in concert with, the French Government. Independent explanations would not only be undesirable in themselves as liable to cause misunderstanding or even suspicion in other quarters, but would also have little value, as they would not be binding on the French Government; moreover, there would always be a risk of expressing a view with which the French Government subsequently found themselves unable to agree and of thus laying ourselves open to a charge of disloyalty. On the other hand, to concert explanations with the French Government would not only involve delay, but would result, in practice, in the continuance of negotiations by the method of formal correspondence, which I am anxious to curtail as far as possible.

3. There are, nevertheless, two points arising out of your despatch on which I feel bound to comment forthwith. The first is that the conversation with Herr von Schubert and Herr Gauss appears to indicate that the German Government are becoming afraid of the initiative which they themselves took, and may be seeking to belittle its purpose and its scope. I take as an example the curious statement that 'the French proposal that the Rhineland Pact should be accompanied by arbitration treaties applying to all disputes presented a problem of extraordinary difficulty'. Now whose, in fact, was the proposal that the Rhineland Pact should be accompanied by arbitration treaties? The German memorandum of the 9th February³ provides a clear answer: 'A comprehensive arbitration treaty', the memorandum runs, 'such as has been concluded in recent years between different European countries, could be amalgamated with such a pact. Germany is also prepared to conclude analogous arbitration treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts with all other States as well.' If that were not sufficient in itself, the German Government subsequently intimated that, as a model for the proposed arbitration treaties, they had in mind the German-Swiss Treaty of the 3rd December, 1921,⁴ article 1 of which reads: 'The contracting parties undertake, in accordance with the present treaty, to submit to a tribunal either of arbitration or conciliation all disputes of whatsoever nature which arise between them and which are impossible of settlement in a reasonable time through diplomatic channels.'

4. The second point on which I think it necessary to comment is the tendency on the German side to search for, and to create, difficulties in the language of the French note. However short and simple an agreement

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 190, n. 3.

the German Government may have contemplated, the fact remains that their proposals were both comprehensive and elastic, and it is quite unjustifiable to allege that they have been twisted out of all recognition by the French note. Had such been the fact you will realise that His Majesty's Government would never have been a consenting party either to its terms or to its despatch. The note represented, in fact, an honest attempt to carry a step further tentative suggestions of German origin which were taken at their face value, that is, as having for their object the preservation of peace, the removal of the prevailing sense of insecurity and the cultivation of more friendly relations between the nations recently at war. The French note, based on this assumption, was intended to be a further step towards lasting peace, and this has been recognised as such in this and other countries. If, at this stage, the German Government draw back, the world will quickly revise its estimate of the nature and purpose of their original proposals. It will draw the natural inference that Germany has deliberately repudiated the policy of peace, and that of set purpose she is now seeking to destroy the chances of such a settlement as she herself was the first to propose. No other inference will be possible if the German Government, having proceeded so far, now go back upon their proposals of the 9th February.³ I cannot suppose that any responsible statesman, realising what this would mean, will enter upon so disastrous a course.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 417

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 19, 5 p.m.)

No. 271 Telegraphic [C 9521/459/18]

BERLIN, July 19, 1925, 1.50 p.m.

There has been a remarkable improvement in the position here during the last week. It is now thought that foreign affairs debate on Wednesday¹ means little or no danger to the government. The main subject of discussion will be the German reply² on security pact and this document has already received the approval of the leaders of the principal parties.

The German government are therefore to an unexpected extent in a position to continue pact negotiation with the support of public opinion.

This result is due largely to the news received of preparations for a rapid and complete evacuation of the Ruhr³ and to confidence in a simultaneous evacuation of the three towns.⁴

As regards disarmament there should be no insuperable difficulty in

¹ July 22.

² To the French note of June 16 (see No. 382, n. 2).

³ See Nos. 399, n. 4, and 635, below.

⁴ i.e. Duisburg, Düsseldorf and Ruhrort (see No. 399, n. 5).

hastening it in such a way as to permit of evacuation of Cologne at an early date. That is provided that all members of the commission of control put their hearts into the work and are practical. The effective evacuation of the Ruhr has gone a long way to increase the belief in Germany that disarmament will free Cologne.

As regards commercial treaty⁵ it is still being used as a means of pressure on the ministry to extort concessions regarding taxation of imported agricultural produce but enhancement of government prestige will give them increased power to resist pressure and obtain ratification.

⁵ See No. 250, n. 2.

No. 418

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 1336 [C 9636/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 20, 1925*

My Lord,

The German Ambassador called at 5 o'clock this afternoon to read to me the German reply¹ to the French note² on the Security Pact, and left with me a copy of the reply. After reading the reply to me, His Excellency said that he desired to supplement the note by a few observations. The German Government would have desired to return a general answer, but they felt that this form of reply would lay them open, on the one hand, to the charge of being evasive, and, on the other, to the danger of being thought to accept every detail of the French proposals. They had therefore steered a middle course, but he desired to 'underline' the fact that not merely the German Government, but the heads of all the German States, the Foreign Affairs Committee and, indeed, the German people, with the exception of the most extreme section of opinion at either end of the scale, sincerely desired the success of the initiative which the German Government had taken, and trusted that this communication would lead onwards to agreement. His Excellency added that he would only express the hope, speaking for himself personally and not under instructions, that the next step would not be too long delayed.

I replied that, though some reflections upon the German reply had occurred to me whilst the Ambassador read it, I preferred to say nothing in comment or criticism upon it until I had considered it with the care which its importance demanded, and, indeed, had had an opportunity of

¹ A translation of the note is filed at C 9581/459/18, not printed. For the text of the note, together with a translation, see Cmd. 2468, *Reply of the German Government to the Note handed to Herr Stresemann by the French Ambassador at Berlin on June 16, 1925 respecting the Proposals for a Pact of Security*. . . . (H.M.S.O., 1925).

² See No. 382, n. 2.

discussing it with the French and Belgian Governments. I would only say that I entirely shared the hope which he had expressed that the initiative taken by the German Government (with a courage and foresight to which I had already paid public tribute)³ would lead to the establishment of peace on a securer foundation, and to the creation of better relations between Germany and the Western Powers than any which had existed since the outbreak of war. I might add that, though owing to a Government crisis in France⁴ and a Presidential election in Germany,⁵ much time had elapsed between the receipt in Paris of the German proposals⁶ and the delivery in Berlin of the French reply,² yet I felt that this time had not been altogether lost. The interval had served for the education of public opinion in both countries, and there had been a sensible rally towards this policy of a mutual pact both in Great Britain and France. I would say nothing of German public opinion, as of that the Ambassador was better informed and more competent to speak than I.

Herr Sthamer remarked that I had probably read some very disagreeable speeches in Germany, but these had been made mainly for domestic consumption, and he was happy to say that in Germany also a similar movement of opinion had taken place, and the policy of the pact was now generally accepted.

His Excellency explained that, for the purposes of the Reichstag debate, the reply was to be published in Germany on Wednesday morning,⁷ and he begged that it might not be published here before that time.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ For Mr. Chamberlain's tribute in the course of his speech of June 24 to the House of Commons, see 185*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, col. 1564.

⁴ See No. 292, n. 5.

⁵ See Nos. 217, n. 3, 292, n. 8 and 611, n. 2, below.

⁶ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁷ July 22.

No. 419

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received July 22, 9.35 p.m.)

No. 274 *Telegraphic* [C 9738/459/18]

BERLIN, July 22, 1925, 7.15 p.m.

Reichstag assembled in considerable strength this afternoon for debate on foreign affairs. Doctor Stresemann's speech was unusually short and mainly intended for internal consumption. He scarcely referred to Monsieur Briand's note¹ or German reply of July 20th.²

¹ See No. 382, n. 2.

² See No. 418, n. 1.

After welcoming evacuation of the Ruhr³ and emphasising fact that Allies, contrary to expectations of his critics of the Extreme Right, had been faithful to their undertaking he stated that he was confident that the three towns⁴ would also be evacuated. As regards evacuation of Cologne government had set up a committee to deal with demands of recent disarmament note.⁵ A large portion of the demands had already been fulfilled. Negotiation was necessary in order to see whether certain other demands were in accordance with treaty of Versailles.

He then turned to his main theme, defence of government initiative in security question. Memories were short and people were inclined to forget that security of the Rhineland was in jeopardy.

He quoted statements of Monsieur Poincaré in support of his point. One of the main advantages of proposed Pact was that it would give Germany security in the west. In recent debate in the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain had recognized justification of France's claims for security.⁶

His speech which was conciliatory in tone was well received. The house was somewhat listless owing to the extreme heat.

³ See Nos. 399, n. 4 and 635, below.

⁴ i.e. Duisburg, Düsseldorf and Ruhrort (see No. 399, n. 5).

⁵ See No. 641, n. 2, below.

⁶ See No. 388, n. 4.

No. 420

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 252 Telegraphic: by bag [C 9729/459/18]

PARIS, July 22, 1925

German note¹ is recognized by majority of French press as keeping the door open for further negotiations. This is described as its real achievement. The note is even in some cases described as conciliatory and ample allowances are made for Dr. Stresemann's internal difficulties.

But there is a very strong undercurrent of suspicion that Germany is trying to secure a modification of the Versailles treaty and to deprive France of the advantages afforded by her present system of alliances.² Of the specific points touched on in the note, the claim for privileges in regard to Article 16 of the Covenant, if Germany joins the League, is unanimously and strenuously rebutted. The German contention regarding the unfairness of the claims put forward by France in her capacity of guarantor of the arbitration treaties is objected to and the suggestion that the conclusion of the Pact should in itself operate favourably in modifying the Rhineland occupation is adversely commented on.

The usual die-hard organs describe the note as an attempt against the

¹ See No. 418, n. 1.

² See No. 187.

present order of things in Europe, but apart from these there is a consensus of opinion that while the negotiations can be continued they will be laborious and difficult and that France must exercise great caution.³

³ In Paris telegram No. 254 of July 22 Mr. Phipps reported: 'I met at luncheon today M. Massigli, Secretary-General of the Ambassadors' Conference, who was largely responsible for drafting the French note to Germany of June 16th [see No. 382, n. 2].

'M. Massigli expressed himself quite violently about the German reply, which he declared to be entirely unacceptable. He said that so far as he was concerned he would like merely to inform the Germans that until they agreed to enter the League of Nations unconditionally any further exchange of views on the subject of the pact as useless.

'Fortunately M. Briand's disposition is of a more supple nature than M. Massigli's, but the latter's outburst today shows which way the Quai d'Orsay wind is blowing.'

No. 421

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Chilton (Washington)

*No. 1186 [C 9740/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 22, 1925*

Sir,

The American Ambassador called today and said that he would permit himself to ask two questions, to which I was at perfect liberty to decline to answer. He enquired whether the British Government had made any proposal or were contemplating any proposal to France and Germany and perhaps Italy for united action against the Soviet Government. I replied in the negative. Mr. Houghton then told me that this information had reached him at second hand from very high French sources. I was unable to explain how this could be, but I read to him my memorandum of the 10th June,¹ as indicating the policy which I had proposed for His Majesty's Government, and which had received the approval of my colleagues.

His Excellency then asked whether I found the tone of the German reply² to the French note³ satisfactory, and on my hesitating for a moment, he repeated and emphasised the word 'tone'. I answered that I thought the tone satisfactory, but the tone appeared to be reserved for the opening and the closing sentences, and the operative parts of the note did not seem quite in harmony with it. Mr. Houghton then went on to observe that the paragraph in it relating to Germany's entry into the League of Nations was obviously a trading point, but that the real difficulty was the proposal of France to guarantee a German-Polish Arbitration Treaty. Did I, he enquired, think it possible that Germany should accept that proposition even if the guarantee were to be mutual? Did I think that Germany was afraid of Poland? The very idea of a guarantee of Germany

¹ See Vol. XXV, No. 317.

² See No. 418, n. 1.

³ See No. 382, n. 2.

against Poland would make the whole world sit back and laugh. He alluded to President Coolidge's recently expressed approval of the pact policy,¹ but he said that, speaking personally, he would find it difficult to advise the President that it was reasonable to ask Germany to accept a guarantee that must be a humiliation.

In reply, I asked the Ambassador not to take up a position on this question at present, but to keep something of an open mind. I had naturally been giving more thought to the situation on the west, and in particular to the position of a guarantor of arbitration treaties between France and Belgium and Germany. It was not an easy problem to solve. Possibly the arrangement we might make in regard to the west might form the basis for a solution in the east. Possibly Germany might find it acceptable for the east. Possibly, also, France might find on further examination that a guarantee of a German-Polish Arbitration Treaty raised so many difficulties that she herself might not desire to press it. Mr. Houghton expressed himself as ready to defer the formation of a definite judgment. There was, however, no mistaking the fact that my arguments did not remove his doubts. He pressed upon me that it was not necessary to France's security that she should enter into such a guarantee and that, if she obtained security on the one hand, and the credit which might follow upon security on the other, she might be expected to forgo a proposal so distasteful to Germany.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ In a speech of July 3 at Cambridge, Massachusetts (see *The Times*, July 4, p. 14).

No. 422

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 24, 9 a.m.)

No. 276 Telegraphic [C 9817/459/18]

BERLIN, July 23, 1925, 11.15 p.m.

Further course of debate on Foreign Affairs proved unexpectedly placid. Breitscheid declared that Government were pursuing policy of fulfilment and consequently his party would oppose vote of no confidence.

German National leader Westarp saw no object in further controversy as to genesis of German offer.¹ His party would support Government.

Moderate parties expressed approval of Note.² Only opposition came from extremists on right and Communists. Latter declared that Germany in signing pact was entering an anti-Soviet League of the Western Powers.

Chancellor intervened with a short statement delivered with more

¹ See No. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

² See No. 418, n. 1.

vigour than that of Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was clear that majority of house and country approved of German answer. He insisted that terms of pact should not curtail any advantages accruing from membership of League nor absolve the other Powers from obligation to disarm. He indicated that Germany expected some alleviations, notably of burden of occupation if pact came into being.

Debate concluded with vote of confidence. Figures were 235 for and 158 against Government with 13 abstentions.

No. 423

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 2515 [C 9802/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 23, 1925

Sir,

The French Ambassador brought Monsieur Fromageot¹ to see me this afternoon. I asked Sir Cecil Hurst to be present at our interview.

2. Sir Cecil Hurst presented to me a summary of the results of the conversations which had passed between Monsieur Fromageot and himself [on] the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. I attach a copy of this document.²

Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.—These require no comment, and there is no difficulty in accepting the conclusions recorded in them.

Paragraph 4.—I said that I was prepared to recommend to His Majesty's Government the acceptance of the suggestion made by Monsieur Fromageot for the addition to article 1 of a provision for the purpose of including in the guarantee the observance of the *status quo* of the Rhineland area.

Paragraph 5.—I expressed a strong dislike to the addition of the words 'hostile act' in article 2. The matter was, as pointed out by Sir Cecil Hurst, sufficiently safeguarded in article 8, and its introduction in the place proposed by Monsieur Fromageot would only give rise to misapprehension. If the words were to be inserted anywhere in section 2, it should be earlier in the article so that the governments concerned should 'undertake that they will in no case resort to a hostile act or to war', etc.

Paragraph 6.—To the proposal contained in paragraph 6 His Majesty's Government have, as recorded, already agreed.

Paragraph 8.—The most important point discussed between Monsieur Fromageot and Sir Cecil Hurst is dealt with in paragraph 8 of the memorandum. Here again I said that I was prepared to recommend the

¹ M. Fromageot had arrived in London on July 19.

² Of July 23 (C 9801/459/18), not printed.

amendments which they had together drafted to the favourable consideration of His Majesty's Government.

Paragraphs 9 and 10.—I accepted the French point of view embodied in paragraph 9, and adhered to the position taken up by Sir Cecil Hurst as stated in paragraph 10.

Paragraph 11.—As Sir Cecil Hurst had already explained fully to Monsieur Fromageot the reasons for the wording adopted for article 10, I did not discuss this matter.

3. In the course of dealing with the detailed proposals, I made some observations which I resumed and amplified at the end of our discussion, and which it will be convenient to record.

4. I said that I believed it now to be within the power of His Majesty's Government to give with general national approval a guarantee of French security that would operate effectively in case of any serious menace from Germany, but that there were two dangers in the path of our negotiation against which I wanted to warn the Ambassador and M. Fromageot. In the first place, the power of His Majesty's Government to persuade British public opinion to accept the obligations of the guarantee was dependent upon the guarantee itself being clearly limited to the real dangers against which it was intended to provide, and I was apprehensive lest the French, in seeking to fill every gap and to provide against unimportant contingencies such as some slight infraction of the delimitarisation clauses, should so confuse and alarm public opinion that the real guarantee of security which was within their grasp might escape from their hands.

5. Secondly, I remarked that I had said very little to the Ambassador at any time about the arrangements in regard to the eastern frontier of Germany, in which Great Britain did not intend to take any direct part. It was in regard to these arrangements that I foresaw the greatest difficulty in reaching agreement with Germany, but I trusted that the western pact would not be allowed to founder on these eastern rocks, for I must say plainly that if it thus came to grief there would be an end of any possibility of a British Government taking part in any pact at all.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 424

Mr. Chamberlain to the French Foreign Minister

[W 6867/9/98]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 24, 1925*

Dear M. Briand,

Many thanks for your letter of the 13th July,¹ in which you give me your

¹ See No. 402, n. 7.

first impressions on the questions raised in my letter of the 2nd July² regarding the agenda of the forthcoming Assembly of the League of Nations.³

I agree with you that it may well be impossible to avoid some discussion on the Protocol,⁴ and perhaps some restatement of our respective points of view, since as you say the Council has referred to the Assembly the statements made by all of us at the Council meeting in March.⁵ This was what I had in mind when I wrote in my letter of the 2nd July, and I had no idea of suggesting any curtailment of the liberty of the Assembly, whether in regard to discussions on the Protocol or on disarmament; but, as I added, this is quite a different thing from our two Governments taking the initiative in proposing to amend or rewrite the Covenant at the present time or even encouraging others to do so.

Nor is there, as I think, any difference of purpose between us on the question of disarmament. France desires the reduction of armaments as we desire it. We recognise, as France recognises, that the obstacle to disarmament is the sense of insecurity which prevails in Europe, and that the road to disarmament lies through security. This is the basis of the policy of the Mutual Pact which we are pursuing together at this moment. The objections which I feel to a detailed discussion of the Protocol—still more to any attempt to draw up a new protocol—at this Assembly apply, as you say, in large measure to any attempt to formulate a scheme of disarmament in the same Assembly. The time to consider further action on these subjects will come when the Pact negotiations have been completed and the Pact itself has come into force.

What, therefore, I desired to propose was that if we are obliged, as we may not improbably be, to take part in discussions on these subjects in September, our two delegations should content themselves with restating the well-known positions taken up by their respective Governments, that neither collectively nor individually should we take the initiative in making new proposals on these matters to the Assembly at the present time, and that if such proposals are made by others, we should together deprecate their discussion until the result of the communications now passing in regard to the Mutual Pact and its accompanying instruments are concluded.

You will, I know, share my wish that in this matter, as in all others relating to the Pact, we should act in full agreement with Belgium. I will, therefore, take the first opportunity of explaining my views to Baron Moncheur.⁶

Yours very sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

² No. 402.

³ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁴ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 74, n. 4.

⁶ In Foreign Office despatch No. 882 of July 24 to Brussels, Mr. Chamberlain recorded his conversation of that day with Baron Moncheur in which he informed him of his communications with M. Briand, and of the conversations between Sir C. Hurst and M.

Fromageot (see No. 423) and handed him copies of these communications. Baron Moncheur's account of this conversation is printed in *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 85, together with a translation of the Hurst-Fromageot conversations (see *ibid.*, Annexe).

No. 425

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 28, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 259 Telegraphic: by bag [C 9984/459/18]

Private and Confidential

PARIS, July 27, 1925

I had some conversation this afternoon with Monsieur Berthelot about the German note,¹ which is not much to his liking. He regrets to learn from the French Ambassador in London that a copy of the despatch from M. Briand² contained in your despatch to me No. 2503 of July 23rd³ was left with you. He used a French musical term to describe it, viz: 'un monstre', which was not meant for exhibition, but only as a first rough sketch for the personal use of M. de Fleuriau. M. Berthelot told me very confidentially that he intended to draft a reply to the German government (to be submitted, of course, to you) in which it would be made perfectly clear that (1) Germany must at all costs agree to regular arbitration treaties as distinct from the emasculated treaties which she now had with Switzerland⁴ and Sweden.⁵ It would be pointed out that compulsory arbitration must be the cardinal object of all those sincerely desirous of peace, and (2) Germany's unconditional entry into the League of Nations was a *sine qua non* of any pact. In this connection, and in spite of the hope expressed by M. Briand in paragraph 6 of his above-mentioned despatch to M. de Fleuriau, M. Berthelot declared it to be his conviction that Germany had no intention of joining the League at present, or at any rate unless she could succeed in making it part of a bargain in which she would gain advantages in regard, for instance, to a curtailment of the occupation of the Rhineland, etc.

2. M. Berthelot said that the French government had received somewhat surprising information from Berlin to the effect that Herr Stresemann begged that no reply might be addressed to the German note until after the adjournment of the Reichstag.⁶ This M. Berthelot considered to be suspicious, but I observed that it was surely only natural in view of the German parliamentary situation.

3. M. Berthelot then referred to the question of a conference with the Germans, and declared with great emphasis that that—and he knew that M. Briand shared his opinion—was now altogether premature. It would be folly to consent to a conference until all the principle points had been settled beforehand between the British and French governments. I urged

¹ See No. 418, n. 1.

² To M. de Fleuriau of July 22.

³ Not printed.

⁴ See No. 190, n. 3.

⁵ See *ibid.*, n. 5.

⁶ The Reichstag adjourned on August 12 for the summer recess.

that finally a conference would seem to be indispensable, and that M. Berthelot somewhat unwillingly admitted, and only on condition that previous agreement had been reached between Great Britain and France. He hopes that the French draft reply will be ready to submit to you in about ten days.

No. 426

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

*No. 2539 [C 9789/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 27, 1925*

Sir,

I have already forwarded to you, under separate cover,¹ a copy of a despatch dated the 22nd July² from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador in London, which M. de Fleuriau was good enough to communicate to me on the 23rd July, containing M. Briand's preliminary comments on the German note of the 20th July³ on the subject of security.

2. It may be of service if I, on my part, place on record at this stage my preliminary impressions of the German note and of the situation created by it. It will, I think, be found that there is no great difference of substance between us, but in any case I desire to make it clear that my comments are not to be looked upon as in any sense a rejoinder to M. Briand. My purpose is to make an independent contribution to the common stock of ideas in the hope that, by so doing, I may conduce to an early accord between us and facilitate the commencement of negotiations which, in the interest of all concerned, should not be too long delayed. M. Briand has stated how the German note has struck him. I, on my side, simply wish to show how it struck me before reading M. Briand's comments. Parallel statements of this nature should make it easier to decide on our next step than if I were to discuss not the German note itself, but M. Briand's comments on that note.

3. The outstanding feature of the German note is its studied caution. Considering the political circumstances in which it was prepared and the verbal explanations tendered both in Paris and London, this is not perhaps matter for surprise, though it may be for regret, as involving further delay. Nevertheless, to my mind, the reply contains a not unsatisfactory answer to the main points raised in the French note of the 16th June.⁴ That note did not ask definite questions to which categorical answers were required. The method adopted in it was to state the views of the Allied Governments on certain important questions raised by the

¹ Foreign Office despatch No. 2503 to Paris of July 23, not printed.

² Not printed.

³ See No. 418, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 382, n. 2.

German proposals and to invite the German Government to state in return their views on the same points. A careful examination of the German reply shows on the whole a closer approximation of views than might have been expected. Thus, Germany accepts in principle the Allied stipulation that the entry of Germany into the League of Nations shall be an essential condition of the new settlement. Again, Germany accepts the view that the new settlement must not modify existing treaties; and she states in particular that its conclusion is not dependent on a modification of the provisions in force concerning the military occupation of German territory. Apart from these points, the French note of the 16th June was chiefly concerned with the nature and scope of the proposed arbitration treaties and of the guarantees which might be given to such arbitration treaties. On this subject, if the German Government do not accept the proposals made in the French note, neither do they reject them. They put forward criticisms and ask for further elucidation in order to show whether or not their criticisms are well founded. These are matters which, in my opinion, it would have been better to reserve for conversations, but I cannot deny the right of the German Government to seek explanations upon them.

4. It is perhaps inevitable that the German Government should in certain cases couple their acceptance of the Allied points of view with observations which call for express reservations on the part of the Allies. But it should not be difficult to formulate these reservations effectively without impairing the progress of the negotiations.

5. Such are the first general impressions left upon me by the German note; it remains to consider what course of action it would now be most profitable for the Allies to take. It seems to me impossible to continue indefinitely a written and public exchange of views in which it must be clear that neither side will be willing, or indeed able, to commit itself beyond a certain limit. The sooner the discussions can be transferred from vague general principles to a concrete text, the easier it will be to see exactly what each party means; and it is clear that personal meetings and informal conversations will be necessary before complete harmony of views can be obtained.

6. At the same time it is evident that some answer must be returned to the German note before this stage can be reached. My sole anxiety is that it should be such as will facilitate the early opening of personal conversations and will not encourage the German Government to prolong the exchange of notes.

7. In considering the German note, the circumstances of political difficulty in which it was written must be kept in mind. The reply should, I suggest, take account of those difficulties, and should therefore concentrate not on the details of the note, but on its opening and closing passages, which display a spirit which the Allies can welcome and reciprocate.

8. While the reply might, after an opening on these lines, proceed to

express the desire of the Allies to eliminate extraneous issues, it will of course be necessary to refer briefly to the German remarks on the relation of the new settlement to the peace treaties and to the occupation of the Rhineland, and on the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. The remarks on the first point have given rise to an apprehension in some quarters for which I see no valid reason. M. Clemenceau, in his note of the 16th June, 1919,⁵ to the president of the German delegation at Versailles, wrote that 'it (*i.e.*, the Treaty of Versailles) creates the machinery for the peaceful adjustment of all international problems by discussion and consent, whereby the settlement of 1919 itself can be modified from time to time to suit new facts and new conditions as they arise'. The Allies cannot disavow—and it is important that they should not give the appearance of wishing to disavow—this statement. It would seem best to state the position as it is frankly: The new settlement cannot impair the validity of the peace treaties, or the rights which either Germany or the Allies possess under those treaties. If and when Germany joins the League she will enjoy the benefits of that article of the Covenant to which M. Clemenceau referred in the passage which I have quoted. Of the right to have recourse to this article we could not deprive her if we would, and, let me add, we should not desire to deprive her if we could. But beyond that we cannot go. I doubt whether the German note was intended to do more than preserve that right of appeal to the League if the circumstances contemplated by article 19 of the Covenant should ever present themselves.

9. On the second point I should be inclined to reply by repeating that the new settlement cannot in itself 'affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement'⁶ (section 3 of the French note of the 16th June), and to add that the Allies cannot commit themselves to any idea of modifying, as a result of the settlement, provisions which exist expressly as a guarantee for the execution by Germany of the Treaty of Versailles, and which themselves lay down the conditions under which an alleviation of the occupation can be obtained. The reply might repeat the assurance already given by the Allies of their determination scrupulously to observe on their part their obligations in this matter.

10. Concerning the entry of Germany into the League, I think it important to repeat that Germany's entry is an essential condition of the new settlement. The conditions of entry are determined by the Covenant, and have already been stated by the Council of the League. It is not for the Allies to enter into a discussion of the arguments which Germany adduces against the Council's decision. It is for Germany to decide whether those considerations outweigh the solid advantages which membership of the League will give her, but in any case the Allies are unable to contemplate a

⁵ See No. 231, n. 5.

⁶ See No. 330, n. 5.

mutual guarantee on any basis except that of common membership of all the parties in the League.

11. It will then remain to answer the most important part of the German note, namely, section II, on the subject of arbitration treaties. Here I feel all the more diffidence in suggesting a reply in that the matter is one which concerns the French Government more nearly than His Majesty's Government, and that I am not myself as yet in full possession of the mind of the French Government in regard to the scope and character of these arbitration treaties. At the same time it is permissible to say that it appears to me that the question whether there is any real difference of aim between the French and German Governments on this point can only be decided when the actual drafting stage is reached.

12. As regards the occasions, cited in section IV of the French note of the 16th June, on which coercive action may be taken, the principle by which His Majesty's Government are themselves actuated is that where treaties give the right to take certain action in certain circumstances, the party enjoying the right cannot allow the right itself to be called in question by arbitration unless, of course, a point of textual interpretation is involved. On the other hand, the question of fact whether the circumstances which would bring the right into play do or do not exist appears to be one which it is proper in any case of doubt to submit for impartial decision. This is the principle underlying the British draft treaty,⁷ which proposes the Council of the League of Nations as the deciding body in such cases. If the French Government found it possible to state this principle in the reply to Germany, I am convinced that it would go far to meet the German criticisms in a manner calculated to command general approval.

13. A reply on the lines which I have indicated should do away with the need of further formal correspondence, and I should myself like to see the reply close with an expression of hope that this will be its effect and with a proposal that an attempt be then made, on the basis of the correspondence which has passed, to draft the actual terms of the proposed treaties.

14. I request that you will read this despatch to M. Briand and leave with him a copy.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

(N.B.—A copy of the despatch has also been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Brussels,⁸ for communication to the Belgian Government.)

⁷ See No. 405, n. 2.

⁸ Foreign Office despatch No. 893 to Brussels of July 27, not printed.

No. 427

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received July 28, 10 p.m.)*

No. 285 Telegraphic [C 9992/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, July 28, 1925, 7.25 p.m.

German government asks me to convey the following message:—

It is felt here that, with a view to obtaining general German assent, most perilous form which pact negotiations could take would be new formal note from France without previous diplomatic discussion. Divergencies which remain are not of such a nature that agreement regarding them is unlikely, provided they are discussed confidentially through diplomatic or other channels. Apprehension is acute lest a new French note should be sent, and is still more acute lest it should be published. Such a course would gravely increase party difficulties here.

No. 428

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 29, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 261 Telegraphic: by bag [C 9994/459/18]

PARIS, July 28, 1925

Your despatch No. 2539 of yesterday.¹

1. I was received this afternoon by M. Briand, who, when I suggested reading to him your despatch, admitted that he knew no English. I had, however, taken the precaution to make a short French summary of its chief points, and this I proceeded to discuss with him.

2. (1) M. Briand agreed that the sooner informal conversations take the place of a written and public exchange of views the better, and when I enquired what place M. Briand might have in mind for such conversations he immediately replied Geneva, where, in that international atmosphere peculiar to it and in peaceful lakeland surroundings, informal meetings between himself, Herr Stresemann and you might be productive of so much good. M. Briand, however, laid great stress on the vital necessity of presenting a united front to the Germans by reaching an absolute agreement between Great Britain and France before meeting them, and, with this object in view, he declared himself willing to accompany M. Caillaux to England on August 5th, if that date suits you, in order to proceed with you to a full exchange of views on the pact question whilst M. Caillaux discusses debts with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

3. (2) M. Briand is quite willing in his reply to concentrate, not on the

¹ No. 426.

details of the German note,² but on those passages which display that conciliatory spirit which he much appreciates.

4. (3) In regard to the relation of the new settlement to the peace treaties, M. Briand did not seem to be *prima facie* averse from referring to M. Clemenceau's statement in his note of June 16th, 1919,³ although my impression is that he may prefer to make a more general statement, pointing out that the Germans must adhere to those provisions of the Treaty which impose duties on them just as the allies would adhere to those provisions which gave certain rights and facilities to the Germans.

5. (4) In regard to the occupation of the Rhineland, I do not think that M. Briand will make any difficulty in repeating the assurances already given by the allies of their determination to observe on their part their obligations in the matter.⁴

6. (5) As to the entry of Germany into the League, M. Briand is in entire agreement with you. In this connection I enquired what his impression was of Germany's intentions in the matter, and he readily admitted that he thought the present German government were desirous of entering the League and of signing the pact. They were, however, he said, the object of considerable pressure on the part of what he described as the Bismarckian party in Germany, of which the German Ambassador at Moscow was a prominent member, to induce them to throw in their lot with Russia. For instance, M. Briand said, just before the last German note² was despatched, all the chief Soviet officials together with the German Ambassador at Moscow collected together at Berlin in order to put all possible pressure in this sense on the German government.⁵ I remarked how vital it seemed to give every possible encouragement to the German government to counter this move, and to this M. Briand most heartily agreed, observing that if you and he were successful in detaching Germany from Russia you would both have achieved a very great and a very worthy object of which you might both well feel proud.

7. (6) Coming to the vital question of the arbitration treaties, I laid stress on the principle by which His Majesty's Government are actuated, viz., that where treaties give the right to take certain actions in certain circumstances, the party enjoying the right cannot allow the right itself to be called in question by arbitration except on a point of textual interpretation, but that—and on this I laid particular stress—the question of fact whether the circumstances which would bring the right into play do or do not exist appears to be one which should in case of doubt be submitted for impartial decision, that is to say, to the Council of the League of Nations. I urged that if the French government were to state this principle in their reply it would go far to meet German criticisms in the matter. M. Briand here declared that the great aim and object of France was to close the door hermetically on the possibility of any future

² See No. 418, n. 1.

⁴ See Nos. 360, Enclosure 3 and 382, n. 2.

³ See No. 231, n. 5.

⁵ See No. 391, n. 5.

armed conflict of any sort, and if that object could be attained, as indeed he felt sure it could be, the French government would be only too well pleased. What M. Briand particularly wishes to avoid is that France should on some future occasion be prevented from taking perfectly justified measures against possible German aggression by the dissentient vote of one power only on the Council of the League. If measures could be taken to devise some method of overcoming this difficulty, he would willingly subscribe thereto.

8. The above are only M. Briand's first impressions of your despatch, of which I handed him a copy. He will communicate his considered reply through the French Ambassador in London.

9. The impression I derived from the interview was favourable, and I feel certain that the more M. Briand himself, as distinct from the permanent Quai d'Orsay officials, has to do with the drafting of his reply the more reasonable it will be.

10. I may have been unduly influenced by M. Briand's deep-toned eloquence and persuasive gestures, which are certainly difficult to resist, but I am persuaded that his desire to bring the pact negotiations to a happy issue is genuine.

11. I shall be grateful for a reply to his suggestion to visit you in London next week.⁶

⁶ In Foreign Office telegram No. 204 of July 29, Mr. Chamberlain replied: 'Monsieur Briand will be most cordially welcome. . . .'

No. 429

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 1413 [C 10034/459/18]**

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 28, 1925

My Lord,

The German Ambassador, whom I met at dinner last night, observed in the course of conversation that he could not help remarking when he had read to me the German note on security of the 20th July¹ that its terms produced an unfavourable impression upon me.

2. I am bound to admit that he had correctly diagnosed my feeling, and that subsequent examination of the note has only confirmed my first impression. I have in my despatch No. 2539 of the 27th July² to His Majesty's Minister at Paris endeavoured to put the most favourable construction possible upon the note, and I shall of course continue my efforts to persuade the French Government to agree to a reply which will eliminate polemics and facilitate negotiations.

3. At the same time, I think it right that I should indicate frankly to

¹ See No. 418, n. 1.

² No. 426.

your Excellency—not for communication to the German Government, but for your own general guidance in your conversations with Herr Stresemann—those features of the German note which I cannot regard with satisfaction.

4. I may say by way of introduction, what your Excellency well knows already, that my object has been, and still is, to bring the parties concerned into personal contact at the earliest possible moment. I am convinced that many misunderstandings and difficulties will disappear if this can be achieved, and the main test which I have applied to the German note is the extent to which it assists or impedes the attainment of this general object. Such is the standpoint from which most of my comments are made.

5. It was in pursuance of that object that I expressed the opinion to the German Government, through your Lordship, that they would be well advised to avoid discussion of detail in replying to the French note of the 16th June³ and to accept without cavil the broad general principles enumerated in that note.⁴ The German Government have not seen fit to accept this advice. They had it in their power to write a note which would have enabled me to insist on immediate conversations. They have chosen instead to write a note which will probably render unavoidable a further reply before any effective progress can be made.

6. I cannot of course deny the right of the German Government to make the very pertinent criticisms contained in section 2 of their note. Indeed, all the criticisms contained therein have already been made in this country either in Parliament or in the press, and it was only to be expected that the German Government would advance them at some stage. I had hoped, however, that they would have found means of reserving such questions of detail for later verbal discussion.

7. Nevertheless, if the comments contained in section 2 had been coupled with an unequivocal acceptance in principle of the other stipulations laid down in the French note of the 16th June as the basis of discussion, it might still have been possible for me to urge upon the French Government that the next step should be, not a further written communication from the Allies, but an offer to make the necessary explanations at a personal meeting. Unfortunately, however, instead of accepting without cavil the stipulations in the French note regarding the entry of Germany into the League and the relation of the new settlement to the peace treaties and to the Rhineland occupation, the German Government coupled their acceptance with remarks so ambiguous as to diminish the value of the acceptance and to invite on the part of the Allies a written reassertion of their stipulations.

8. To take these points in turn. The German Government have known from the beginning that the Allies regarded the unconditional entry of Germany into the League not, indeed, as a prior condition to the negotiation, or even necessarily to the signature, of a Treaty of Mutual

³ See No. 382, n. 2.

⁴ See No. 388.

Guarantee, but as an essential condition of its entry into force. The Allies cannot enter into a discussion of the difficulties which Germany may find in entering the League. Any discussion of that nature must be conducted between Germany and the League itself, on whose behalf the Allies have no right to speak. But the simple fact which Germany must realise is that, until she becomes a member of the League, the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee cannot materialise, and it is for her to decide whether this fact, together with the direct advantages to be derived from membership, does not outweigh the supposed difficulties which she foresees. The German Government appear to take the view that to enter the League is merely to assume fresh obligations. It must be obvious to them that it is also to acquire rights and to gain increased influence and security.

9. As to the relation of the new settlement to the peace treaties, I cannot, of course, complain of the German remarks in themselves regarding the possible eventual revision of those treaties, but it is permissible to question the wisdom and statesmanship of attempting to raise that issue at the present time and in the present connection.

10. The remarks about the effect of the new settlement on the Allied occupation of the Rhineland were to me the most disquieting detail of the German note, because of the assurances which I had previously received from the German Government through your Lordship⁵—and which I had thought myself justified in communicating to the French Government⁶—that although the German Government would not abandon any right conferred by articles 428–432 of the Treaty of Versailles, they would not demand the modification of those articles as a condition of a pact. It may be that the observations on this subject in the German note do not actually contradict the letter of that assurance, but they certainly do not conform to its spirit. And here again, quite apart from its relation to their previous assurances, it is permissible to question the wisdom of the German Government's attitude. Even if it be true that the conclusion of a security pact 'could not but react on the conditions in the occupied territories and the questions of occupation in general', the manner and moment chosen by the German Government for its assertion are such as merely to invite rebuff.

11. The German Ambassadors in London and Paris have been careful to explain that the note was drafted with an eye to German public opinion and is to be read subject to that explanation.⁷ My despatch No. 2539² to Mr. Phipps will have made it clear that I have given full weight to this consideration. At the same time I feel bound to observe that, if it is desired to reach an international settlement, it is not sufficient to please one section—and that the most extreme—of one's own public opinion. It is necessary also to satisfy public opinion in the other countries concerned which also have their extremists. In their anxiety to overcome internal difficulties the German Government appear to have overlooked this

⁵ See Nos. 200, n. 12 and 241.

⁶ See Nos. 224 and 225.

⁷ See e.g. No. 418.

aspect of the matter. It is true their reply has been hailed in some quarters as dexterous. It may be so; but it fails in what should have been its main object. It does not promote the cause of security. It cannot be too strongly insisted that the problem which faces us is psychological. Security is a state of mind rather than a physical fact. It can only exist in stable conditions and when there is confidence that stability will continue. The German offer of the 9th February⁸ was valuable because it tended to produce stability and confidence, and therefore, in the end, security. It diagnosed the situation correctly and proposed the proper remedy. In the words of the Chancellor, Dr. Luther, on the 29th April: 'The German Government . . . wanted to co-operate in order to find a means of doing away with the existing international tension; this in the interest of all European peoples'.⁹ The German note of the 20th July, on the other hand, appears to have been based on a different principle and wears a wholly different aspect. The German Government no longer appear in the rôle of a far-seeing contributor to the general cause of peace, but rather in that of a somewhat unwilling participant, who acquiesces in a scheme, not because of its intrinsic merits, but merely in the hope that consent will enable him to drive a bargain in other directions. In a word, the German note raises again those doubts as to Germany's real intentions, which had in a large measure been allayed, and which must be cleared up if a lasting settlement is to be reached.

12. It will be my endeavour to ensure that any further Allied note which may now unfortunately be necessary shall pave the way to personal conversations, but whether such conversations eventually materialise or not depends largely on the German Government themselves. They have already lost one opportunity. When the next presents itself I can only trust that they will return from the narrow views which inspired their note of the 20th July to the broader spirit in which they made their offer of the 9th February, and that they will show unmistakably that their object is peace and not a bargain.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁸ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁹ A translation of the German Press extract from this speech was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 280 of April 29, not printed. The above quotation is not in the extract, but a version appears in the account of the speech in *The Times*, April 30, p. 16.

*Mr. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)**No. 592 [C 10000/459/18]**FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 28, 1925*

Sir,

The Polish Minister came to see me today.

He desired, he said, to present to me some observations on the German reply¹ to the French note² and to seek some information from me. The German reply in his view contained three points of consequence. The first related to the military occupation of German territory; the second to the character of the Arbitration Treaties, and particularly the suggested French guarantee of the Treaty between Poland and Germany; the third to Germany's entry into the League of Nations. It seemed to M. Skirmunt that neither the first nor the third raised much difficulty, but the question of the Arbitration Treaties was more serious. He assured me that he had no instructions to approach me, but for the purpose of informing his Government he would like to know my views on this subject. He repeated the assurance already given to me by M. Skrzynski³ and himself⁴ that Poland did not wish in any way to be an obstacle to the Western Pact. Poland accepted, though with some regret, the proposed Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland under the guarantee of France as a substitute ('Ersatz') for the more complete security that would have been afforded by the protocol, but some information had reached him to the effect that I was putting pressure on the French Government to limit the engagements of France to Poland. Could I say anything to him on this subject?

I said that I would answer him with complete frankness as far as I was myself in a position to express an opinion. I hoped that he was right in thinking that the first and third points of the German note as enumerated by him would give rise to no difficulty. I had not myself quite made up my mind how much importance ought to be attached to them. As to the guarantee of Arbitration Treaties, this was a novelty, as M. de Fleuriau had observed to me,⁵ in public law, and we had no model upon which to work. Some exchange of views had taken place between the French Government and ourselves upon the conditions under which the British guarantee of the Western Pact should operate. I thought that the two Governments were in substantial accord, but I could not say that they had yet reached complete agreement. Possibly when we were agreed, and if the arrangements upon which we agreed were accepted by Germany, they might facilitate the conclusion of a similar arrangement in regard to Germany's eastern frontiers, but M. Skirmunt did not need my help to

¹ See No. 418, n. 1.² See No. 382, n. 2.³ See No. 247.⁴ See No. 331.⁵ See No. 340.

discover that Germany could not be expected to regard a guarantee of a German-Polish Arbitration Treaty by France as exactly on all fours with a guarantee of a Franco-German Arbitration Treaty by Great Britain. To these arrangements, however, about the eastern frontiers of Germany Great Britain did not propose to be a party. We were not, therefore, immediately interested, though we were very much concerned by (and he might have observed that British opinion was very sensitive to) the possible results of any engagements which France might undertake in the east upon the working of the British guarantee in the west. I did not know what was the nature of the information which he said that he had received about my communications with the French Government, and he himself had spoken only in the vaguest language and without giving any precision to his words. The only observation of mine which could by any possibility have formed the foundation for such 'informations' was that undoubtedly the conditions of the French guarantee of the Polish Treaty presented considerable difficulties.⁶ I did not know what the French Government had in mind or whether they had indeed themselves decided what form such a guarantee ought to take, but I had observed to M. de Fleuriau that, if our policy was shipwrecked on these eastern rocks, it would be the end of all possibility of any British guarantee whatever. I would add that, as I had told M. Skirmunt from the first, though His Majesty's Government would welcome the conclusion of an Arbitration Treaty providing for the peaceful settlement of all disputes between Germany and Poland and though we regard such an agreement as necessary to the full achievement of the sense of security which we desire to attain for Europe, yet His Majesty's Government have never made the conclusion of such a treaty an essential condition of their participation in a western pact.

M. Skirmunt then asked me whether I thought that there was any prospect of Germany entering the League of Nations at the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly, and whether there was any present proposal for a conference with Germany and what form I thought such a conference should take. To the former question I replied in the negative; to the latter that the sooner there was a personal conference of some kind the better I should be pleased, for we should never bring this question to a satisfactory issue by an exchange of notes: but the terms of the German reply had rendered a rejoinder necessary, and it was too soon to consider what form an eventual conference should take or where it should be held.

Finally M. Skirmunt, alluding to a previous conversation with me,⁷ made some observations upon the importance of the proposed eastern treaties as helping to detach Germany from Russia, and he used language which might have implied that he understood it to be the policy of His Majesty's Government to secure by the entry of Germany into the League some kind of common front against Russia. I believe that M. Skirmunt

⁶ Cf. No. 322.

⁷ Of July 7. This was recorded in Foreign Office despatch No. 540 to Warsaw of July 7, not printed.

supposed that this consideration would cause me to take a greater interest in the French guarantee of Poland, but it did not correctly represent what I had said to M. Skirmunt or indeed to anyone else, and I thought it necessary to correct at once this misconception of my attitude whether calculated or involuntary. I therefore told M. Skirmunt that what I had said to him was not that I desired to detach Germany from Russia, but that I desired to avoid throwing Germany into the arms of Russia by repelling her from the society of the Western nations. This was a matter of interest and importance to us all, but the less we spoke of it in public the better it would be, for the German Nationalist opposition to the policy of agreement with the Allies perverted this argument into a suggestion that our only object in making the pact was to embroil Germany with Soviet Russia and use her as a cat's-paw to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us. I had no doubt, however, that the strongest reason of Germany for hesitation about entering the League was the opposition and the threats of Russia.

You will observe that as usual M. Skirmunt came to seek information, and that I followed my usual practice in answering his questions frankly and fully. How far and how accurately M. Skirmunt reports these conversations to his Government I have no means of judging, but you will understand and, if need be, indicate to M. Skrzynski that unless he shows an equal frankness in his conversations with you it would be unreasonable in him to expect that I should continue on these lines.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 431

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 153 Telegraphic [C 9992/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 30, 1925, 3.40 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 285 (of July 28th. Security).¹

I am amazed at the blindness of the German government to the inevitable consequences of their own action. They had it in their power to close the exchange of notes. Thinking only of the party position in Germany they published an election manifesto and addressed it to the French government.² Only after publication do they consider the effect of their action on allied opinion and then they ask you to transmit to me a message begging that the allied governments will show a patience, forbearance and statesmanship, not to say a courage, in face of public opinion of which in effect they avow themselves incapable. I have given you my views on their note by despatch.³ I fear you do not realize what

¹ No. 427.

³ No. 429.

² i.e. in their note of July 20 (see No. 418, n. 1).

difficulties they have quite gratuitously created for others as well as themselves.

Secret. There is just a possibility that with Briand's help we may yet save them from the natural consequences of their folly but I dare not count on it. You ought not to conceal from them the impression which their reply has made upon us.

No. 432

Note communicated by the French Ambassador on July 31, 1925

[C 10146/459/18]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, 31 juillet 1925

M. Briand a fait savoir à M. de Fleuriau qu'il approuvait d'une façon générale les suggestions consignées dans le procès-verbal des conversations entre Sir Cecil Hurst et M. Fromageot le 23 juillet.¹

Afin de se rendre clairement compte de leur portée M. Briand a fait rédiger le projet anglais tel qu'il le conçoit après la lecture de cet échange de vues entre les jurisconsultes des deux pays, et en tenant compte des observations faites de part et d'autre.

L'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint ce texte² à M. Austen Chamberlain. Ce document ne constitue qu'un avant-projet qui ne sera communiqué au Conseil des Ministres français que lorsque M. Briand aura reçu l'avis de M. Chamberlain.

M. Briand tient cependant à appeler l'attention du Secrétaire d'État sur les deux points suivants:

1. Suggestion française d'ajouter dans l'article 2, après les cas d'invasion ou d'attaque les mots 'ou à des actes hostiles' en référence à la rédaction des articles 42 et 43 du traité de Versailles.

M. Briand croit qu'une addition en ce sens est indispensable, mais serait disposé à accueillir toute autre formule réservant les droits que la France tient des articles 42, 43 et 44 (pour la prémunir par exemple contre l'entrée ou le rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée), sans toutefois autoriser une application abusive.

2. Appréhension du Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne l'article 10 du projet britannique visant d'une part (contrairement à l'article 5 du Pacte) un vote du Conseil à la majorité et prévoyant d'autre part le pouvoir du Conseil, agissant sur la demande d'une des hautes parties contractantes et statuant à la majorité, de mettre fin au traité s'il estime que la Société des Nations apporte elle-même une garantie suffisante. Si cette rédaction subsistait, on risquerait de voir disparaître d'un bloc tout le traité, c'est-à-dire l'obligation de ne pas recourir à la guerre, l'obligation d'arbitrage et les garanties données.

¹ See Nos. 423, n. 2 and 424, n. 6.

² Not printed.

Le mieux serait selon M. Briand de limiter cette disposition à la formule suivante qui deviendrait l'article 10: 'Le présent traité devra être soumis au Conseil de la Société des Nations et devra être reconnu par le Conseil comme un engagement conforme au Pacte de la Société'.

On pourrait d'ailleurs prévoir une faculté de dénonciation avec un préavis d'une durée suffisante pour se prémunir contre les conséquences de la dénonciation.

No. 433

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 294 Telegraphic [C 10388/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, August 6, 1925, 8.05 p.m.

Complete evacuation of Ruhr¹ and decision to evacuate three towns² have made a marked difference in the situation. German government are now stronger and would be better able to negotiate conclusively regarding Pact of mutual guarantee. If immediate advantage could be taken of this favourable atmosphere I should anticipate early acceptance by Germany of a basis similar to Sir C. Hurst's draft³ with some modifications in direction indicated in my despatch No. 450.⁴

If a formal reply to German memorandum is inevitable could it not be framed in such a manner as to permit of immediate verbal negotiations provided that German government adhere to preconditions?

Reichstag adjourns either August 10th or August 15th and Ministers would then be more free to treat on broad lines.

¹ See No. 635, below.

² i.e. Duisburg, Düsseldorf and Ruhrort. See No. 645, below.

³ See No. 405, n. 2.

⁴ Of July 30, not printed. This summarised views held in German official circles.

No. 434

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 2675 [C 10417/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 6, 1925

Sir,

I transmit to you, herewith, a record of a conversation which took place today between the French Ambassador and Mr. Lampson on the subject

of the security negotiations. A copy of the Belgian note¹ referred to was sent to you in my despatch No. 2637 of August 5th.²

I am, etc.,

(for the Secretary of State)

HAROLD NICOLSON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 434

*Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the French Ambassador**

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 6, 1925

The French Ambassador called this afternoon and began by expressing his thanks for the offer of official Government hospitality to M. Briand and his staff during their forthcoming visit to London next week.³ He added that he had suggested to Paris that M. Fromageot should precede the rest of the party, and reach London on Saturday night⁴ or Sunday so that he might get into touch with Sir Cecil Hurst before M. Briand arrived, with a view to expedite matters.

He next said that he was rather preoccupied as to what was to happen about the protocol⁵ at Geneva.⁶ He had seen the exchange of private views between Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand, but he was still not quite clear as to what course was to be adopted before the Assembly⁶ as regarded the Geneva Protocol. This led him to refer to the Belgian note which the French and British Governments had just received.¹ He thought that the proposals in that note were hardly possible of acceptance; for did they not amount, in essence, more or less to a proposal to reconstitute out of the proposed treaty of mutual guarantee a fresh edition of last year's Geneva Protocol? I said that I feared the Belgian note was too technical and too far-reaching for me to comment upon at this stage; it was full of legal intricacies; at the same time I could say that the main impression it had left upon my mind was that we already had quite sufficient complications to overcome in negotiating our proposed treaty of mutual guarantee without bringing in the additional factor of having to carry the whole Assembly at Geneva with us. M. de Fleuriau said that he had no doubt that the Belgian note was largely due to the initiative of M. Vandervelde's private secretary, M. Rolin, who was an out-and-out League man, having spent much time at Geneva. He made no secret of his general dislike of the Belgian proposals.

There followed some general talk as regards the League and its

¹ This note of July 27 was communicated to the British and French Governments under cover of a note of July 29 from the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Copies of the notes are filed at C 10080/459/18, not here printed. The texts are printed in *D.D.B.*, vol. 11, No. 86.

² Not printed.

³ See No. 428. The French party was due to arrive on August 10.

⁴ August 8.

⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁶ See No. 165, n. 4.

methods of working, leading up to an expression of opinion by the Ambassador that Geneva was not at all a suitable place for the proposed meeting with Dr. Stresemann. I pressed the Ambassador to define what his objections were, but obtained nothing very definite from him, nor did he say where he thought the meeting should more suitably take place. Possibly Paris, he thought—but quite vaguely. I said that in that case he must contemplate that the meeting with Dr. Stresemann should take place either before or after the Assembly; the first seemed hardly possible; the latter seemed a rather undesirable delay. This drew nothing from him, and I was left in some doubt as to exactly what His Excellency had in mind.⁷

M.W. LAMPSON

⁷ In a private letter to Mr. Chamberlain of August 6, Mr. Phipps reported: '... Berthelot told me that Briand was in an unusually agitated frame of mind owing to his fear lest Vandervelde should seek to butt in to the London conversations and had even—but this he begged me to keep to myself—declared that if Vandervelde went to London on Monday [August 10], he, Briand, would prefer to stay in Paris.

"The view taken by the French Government is that they must consult in the first place Great Britain *only* in regard to their reply to the German Note, etc. After Anglo-French agreement in the matter, the Belgian Government will be consulted and then, as a matter of courtesy, the Italian and Japanese Governments. Their point of view, moreover, is fully set forth in the enclosed reply from Briand to Vandervelde, which Berthelot has just handed to me. He begs that it may be treated as strictly confidential. It will only be handed tonight or tomorrow morning to the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires [Viscount A. Obert de Thieusies, the Counsellor] and Briand may not even refer to it in his conversations with you in London. ...'

On August 7, Mr. Phipps transmitted to Mr. Selby copies of the note enclosed in M. Briand's reply of August 6 to M. Vandervelde commenting on the Belgian note (C 10502/459/18), not printed. For a text of the French replies, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 92.

No. 435

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 297 Telegraphic [C 10554/459/18]

BERLIN, August 10, 1925, 5 p.m.

It may be convenient for you to receive an indication of probable attitude of German government towards (? major) points of pact discussion.

The following has been obtained from a secret source but may be regarded as exceptionally reliable.

German government will assert: (i) The broad principle that forcible intervention can only take place after a certain impartial procedure and not upon any unilateral decision. This rule to apply without exception.

(ii) Germany does not desire to alter treaty of Versailles but arbitration

procedure must be water-tight and include cases in which a difference of opinion exists regarding interpretation of treaty of Versailles. This is consistent with Article 13 of the Covenant.

(iii) Germany will contend that guarantee by France and Polish-German arbitration treaty is: (a) unacceptable and (b) without effective utility. France is not impartial. Moreover, if action by France is subordinated to impartial procedure (and this is an indispensable condition) the proposed guarantee would add nothing to France's rights under Article 16 of the Covenant. This article permits military action against Germany under certain conditions.

German opinion would regard as absolutely unacceptable a French guarantee of Polish-German treaty combined with a unilateral power of decision for application of that guarantee.

Objections to entry into League of Nations seem lately to have receded into the background. It is generally conceded that agreement on this question is attainable consequent on agreement on other points. There is still opposition to Article 16 but it is hoped that a formula can be found which will enable the German government to enter the League of Nations. It is beginning to be recognized in reasonable circles that 'durchmarsch'¹ danger is rather theoretical.

For other points of future discussion summary given in my despatch No. 450² holds good.

Inordinate importance is attached in official quarters to point of form.

If it is desired to facilitate the task of negotiation for the German government no excuse must be given for their critics to say that German government has only been consulted in last instance, nor to suggest that present negotiation is not in fullest sense reciprocal and bilateral.

¹ i.e. marching through. See No. 385.

² See No. 433, n. 4.

No. 436

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 11, 9 a.m.)*

No. 298 Telegraphic [C 10555/459/18]

Secret

BERLIN, August 10, 1925, 7.35 p.m.

Prague despatch No. 264.¹

Litvinoff passed through Berlin on Saturday² and had long interviews with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State.

¹ Of July 31, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives. This despatch reported information received from the Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs as to conversations between Herren Stresemann and Brockdorff-Rantzau, and M. Litvinoff, the Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and M. Krestinski.

² August 8.

He is stated to have made renewed and very vehement protests against Germany signing a pact of mutual guarantee. He said 'whatever your sentiments towards Russia may be after this document is signed, you will have been overpowered and will have become incorporated in western alliance. It will be impossible for Russia not to regard signature as a serious departure from existing basis'.

I gathered confidentially that relations between Berlin and Moscow have not been particularly smooth lately. Russians recently accused a member of German embassy at Moscow of belonging to consul organization³ and of conspiracy against Soviet. It took three weeks negotiation to obtain withdrawal of the charge and an apology.

In commercial treaty discussion⁴ Russians are said to demand extravagant concessions from Germany and grant nothing in return.

³ An extreme German right-wing nationalist organisation. See Vol. XX, No. 237, n. 2.

⁴ See Vol. XXV, Nos. 313, Enclosure and 331.

No. 437

Mr. Chamberlain to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

[C 10502/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 10, 1925

Your Excellency,

I have examined with all the attention which they merit the views contained in your Excellency's letter and memorandum of the 29th July¹ on the subject of security.

2. As regards the draft of a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee put forward by His Majesty's Government² and the conversations concerning it which have taken place between the British and French legal advisers,³ I note with particular interest the observations and suggestions of the Belgian Government. At the same time I think it best to defer detailed comment upon them, because, in the first place, I share your reluctance to embark at this stage upon a minute discussion of texts, and, in the second place, I feel sure that, when the proper moment for such discussion comes, it will be more profitable and more convenient that it should be conducted verbally between representatives of the parties concerned rather than by means of formal correspondence.

3. The immediate question which must engage the attention of the Allies is the nature of the reply to be sent to the German note of the 20th July.⁴ On this subject M. Briand has expressed a desire to consult me,⁵ and His Excellency is to visit London tomorrow for that purpose. If, as I trust

¹ See No. 434, n. 1.

³ See Nos. 423, n. 2 and 424, n. 6.

⁵ See No. 428.

² See Nos. 405, n. 2.

⁴ See No. 418, n. 1.

will be the case, a frank exchange of views shows that His Majesty's Government and the French Government are in agreement on certain outstanding points of principle, the way will be clearer for the consideration of the eventual form which the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee may take, though even then it will be premature for the Allies to commit themselves to particular phrases or to detailed methods before Germany on her side has entered the negotiations on the stipulated bases.

4. The remainder of your letter dealt with the manner in which it might be most convenient to treat the questions of arbitration, security and disarmament at the next Assembly of the League,⁶ and to that subject I will now turn.

5. Your Excellency suggests that if the collaboration of the Council in the operation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is to be ensured, it would be wise to obtain the prior approval of the Assembly. I am, however, by no means convinced that it is necessary or advisable to take the particular action which you suggest.

6. In the first place it is clear that the treaty can only be submitted for the approval of the Assembly when all the parties to it have agreed upon its terms. Otherwise the discussions in the Assembly, with all the publicity involved, could not fail to hamper and complicate negotiations which, if they are to succeed, must be kept in the hands of the Governments immediately concerned and conducted by them in the strictest confidence.

7. Quite apart from this consideration, however, the question whether there is any need for a general resolution on the lines suggested in your letter, as well as the possible effect of such a resolution, require the most careful consideration from the legal point of view.

8. In so far as the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee itself is concerned, it provides, as at present contemplated, for action:—

(a) In the event of resort to war in breach of treaties for the peaceful settlement of all disputes; and

(b) In the event of a violation of the demilitarisation of the Rhineland.

9. It may be argued that, while the sanctions provided by article 16 of the Covenant are already applicable in the first of these two cases, it cannot be shown that they are necessarily applicable in the second case, and it is safe to assume that a proposal designed to extend the provisions of article 16 to the second case would not meet with unanimous acceptance in the Assembly.

10. As far as His Majesty's Government themselves are concerned, the wider implications of the resolution would prevent them from sharing in taking the initiative in submitting it to the Assembly, and indeed, His Majesty's Government would have difficulty in supporting it at all. Its aim is admittedly to extend the obligations of the Covenant in such a way as to return as nearly as possible to the Geneva Protocol;⁷ whereas His Majesty's Government, while prepared to undertake obligations of the most serious

⁶ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁷ See No. 10, n. 4.

kind in the limited area covered by the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, have made it clear that they cannot assume fresh obligations elsewhere in addition to those already devolving upon them as signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the peace treaties.

11. I have thought it best to write to you quite frankly on this subject. I attach, as you know, the highest importance both to the development of the influence of the League and to the solution of the general question of security; but I hold that the greatest assistance which the Assembly of the League could render at the present moment to the cause of security would be to refrain from discussing it at its next meeting unless, indeed, the progress of the negotiations for the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is such that it proves possible to submit it to the Assembly in its final form before its close. In putting forward this view I am actuated solely by the wish that nothing shall be done to imperil the success of a project which, by its example, may point the way to the surest methods of confirming peace. It is by concentrating exclusively on that project for the time being that we shall most effectively serve the cause of peace and contribute to the ultimate strength of the League of Nations, which you and I are equally anxious to ensure.

I have, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 438

Notes of a conversation which took place at the Foreign Office on August 11, 1925, at noon, between representatives of Great Britain and France¹

[C 10609/459/18]*

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Cecil Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. de Fleuriau, M. Fromageot, M. Léger.²

(N.B.—These notes have been accepted by the French delegation as a correct record.)

The question of publicity was first discussed, and it was agreed that a communiqué might be issued at the end of the final conversation, but not until then. In the meantime it would be sufficient to tell the press verbally and quite generally how the discussions were proceeding.

The French draft reply (Annex) to the German note of the 20th July, 1925,³ on the subject of security was then discussed. A copy of this draft had been communicated earlier to the Foreign Office. MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he had examined this with care, and would suggest to M. Briand certain amendments which might perhaps be introduced into it.

¹ See Nos. 428 and 434, n. 3.

² *Chef de Cabinet* to M. Briand.

³ See No. 418, n. 1.

Section I, paragraph 1

MR. CHAMBERLAIN questioned whether the reference to the German memorandum of the 9th February⁴ was correct, since he did not think that that memorandum contained any declaration that the German Government did not intend to subordinate the conclusion of a pact of guarantee to a modification of the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT explained that the reference should be to the German note of the 20th July³ and not to that of the 9th February.

Paragraph 3

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether it would not be possible and desirable to introduce some special reference to article 19 of the Covenant, and he suggested the addition, at the end of the sentence, of the words:—

‘pas plus de l'article 19 que des autres’.

M. BERTHELOT deprecated particular reference to article 19, which might be interpreted as almost an invitation to Germany to make use of that article. It was clear from the text that article 19 was covered, and the French Government had also intended to allude to that article in the phrase in the following paragraph ‘et en prévoient dans certains cas l'allègement’.

M. BRIAND suggested, and it was agreed, that the following phrase should be introduced after the first sentence of the paragraph:

‘Elle n'ignore pas les articles du traité auxquels fait allusion la note allemande et elle n'a l'intention de se soustraire à aucune des stipulations du Pacte.’

Paragraph 5

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed the addition to the paragraph of the words:—

‘Du reste, elle renouvelle, en ce qui la concerne, la déclaration qu'ont déjà faite les Alliés qu'ils entendent se conformer scrupuleusement à leurs obligations.’

This was agreed to. The declaration to which this phrase refers was contained in the allied notes of the 26th January⁵ and the 2nd June⁶ to Germany on the subject of German disarmament and the evacuation of the Cologne zone.

Section II

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that the German note had referred to the relation of German disarmament to the question of general disarmament. He would propose to insert some reference to this subject in the reply, and he therefore proposed the addition at the end of section II of the words:—

‘C'est justement le manque de cette sécurité qui a jusqu'à présent fait obstacle au désarmement général prévu par le Pacte auquel la note allemande fait allusion.’

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁵ See No. 570, below.

⁶ See No. 631, below.

Section III

MR. CHAMBERLAIN explained that paragraph 2 raised a slight drafting difficulty, since it referred more to the obligations which France and Belgium were prepared to undertake than to the obligations of Great Britain as guarantor, which would not include the signature of general arbitration treaties. He therefore proposed in paragraph 2 to add after the word 'litiges' the words—

'entre les pays limitrophes,'

and in place of the words—

'pour toutes les nations signataires du Pacte. Le principe de l'arbitrage obligatoire en est l'indispensable condition'.

to substitute—

'au moyen soit d'une décision juridique soit d'un tribunal de conciliation, mais obligatoire dans l'un et l'autre cas. Le principe de l'arbitrage obligatoire ainsi conçu semble être l'indispensable condition d'un pacte tel qu le Gouvernement allemand l'a proposé dans sa note du 9 février'.

Paragraph 3

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed to substitute for the words—

'il fait appel à des moyens de force',

the words—

'il recourt aux armes ou viole les frontières ou la zone démilitarisée.'

M. FROMAGEOT questioned whether this phrase did not contradict the French view that a violation of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles did not give rise to arbitration, but gave France the right to go to war at once.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN explained that the phrase did not refer to arbitration, but was meant to be an amplification of the phrase in the original draft 'moyens de force'. It was a question not of arbitration but of the operation of the guarantee.

It was left to M. Fromageot, in consultation with Sir C. Hurst, to draft a text on the lines of Mr. Chamberlain's amendment which should not be open to misinterpretation.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN then proposed to substitute for the words—

'L'idée de garantir . . . Traité de Paix,'

the words—

'Il est évident que le garante aurait le plus haut intérêt à empêcher de telles violations d'un côté ou de l'autre et au premier signe de danger exercerait toute son influence à ce but. Du reste, il ne dépendra que des nations limitrophes elles-mêmes que ce système de garantie, conçu pour leur protection mutuelle, ne joue pas à leur préjudice.'

The French delegation undertook to consider this amendment.

Paragraph 4

For the words—

('qu'elle soit donnée par l'Angleterre ou par la France, qu'elle')

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed to substitute—

(‘quel que soit le garant et que la garantie’.)

To the end of paragraph 4 Mr. Chamberlain proposed to add the following phrase taken from the observations on the German note of the 20th July,⁷ communicated to the French Ambassador in London by M. Briand on the 22nd July:⁷

‘Si l’Allemagne a la préoccupation que le cas de coercition ne soit pas laissé à l’interprétation arbitrale d’une seule partie intéressée, il y aurait lieu de rechercher s’il n’est pas possible d’instituer une procédure qui assurerait l’impartialité des déterminations, pourvu qu’une telle procédure ait les qualités de rapidité et d’efficacité indispensables.’

M. FROMAGEOT explained that what the French Government had in mind was to provide for immediate action in the case of a ‘flagrant délit’. The proposed addition would appear to involve arbitration on all cases of violation, even including ‘flagrants délits’.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN explained that he in no way wished to nullify the operation of the guarantee in a flagrant case. There was agreement on what was to happen in such a case, but the object of his amendment was simply to make a general statement which would show that the methods by which the guarantee would operate were a matter for discussion with the German Government. It was inadvisable that the French and British Governments should appear to have fixed everything in advance.

The addition of the sentence quoted above was agreed to, subject to such verbal modifications as might be necessary.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether it would not be possible to introduce at this point some reference to the London agreements of August 1924⁸ as showing that the Allies had already gone far to refer to impartial procedure matters which by the treaty were left to their unilateral decision.

The French delegation undertook to consider this suggestion.

Paragraph 7

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that the invitation to the German Government to enter into verbal negotiations should be made more definite.

M. BRIAND agreed and promised to draw up a new text.

M. Briand here expressed the view that if the French and British Governments were in agreement in principle it would yet be well not to give the impression of having reached too close an agreement, on account of the possible effect of any such impression upon Germany. Germany must not be given an opportunity of saying that the treaty was being forced upon her. He was ready for verbal discussions with the Germans, but was not in favour of a formal conference.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN expressed his entire agreement with the idea that

⁷ Not printed. See, however, No. 426.

⁸ See No. 343, n. 9.

there should be a conversation with Herr Stresemann. It had been represented to him, however, that it might be difficult for Herr Stresemann to come to a meeting if he knew nothing beforehand of the proposals which he would be called upon to discuss. He therefore thought that the best way would be to ask the German Government to send Herr Gaus to London to meet Sir Cecil Hurst and M. Fromageot, and possibly the legal adviser of the Belgian Foreign Office. Ideas could then be exchanged and explanations given. Herr Gaus would then be able to go back to Berlin and explain matters to Herr Stresemann, who would then visit Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand, perhaps at Geneva or perhaps elsewhere.

M. BRIAND agreed that a meeting of legal advisers was the best way out. It was essential that the French and British Governments should not have the appearance of having arranged everything 'in the wings' before the play started.

It was decided that, after the meeting, the experts should meet to prepare a final draft of the draft note, taking into consideration the modifications which had been suggested.

NOTE

At the meeting of experts referred to above, which was held in the Foreign Office at 6.15 p.m. on the 11th August, the following modifications in the French draft were finally agreed on:—

Introduction.

Unchanged.

Section I

Paragraph 1.

Omit 'conformément à son mémorandum du 9 février'.

Paragraph 3.

Omit 'n'a l'intention,' and between 'internationaux' and 'de se soustraire' insert 'n'ignore pas les dispositions du traité auxquelles fait allusion la note allemande, et elle n'a l'intention'.

Paragraph 5

Add: 'D'ailleurs, elle renouvelle, en ce qui la concerne, la déclaration qu'ont déjà faite les Alliés qu'ils entendent se conformer scrupuleusement à leurs obligations.'

Section II

Paragraph 1.

First sentence ends at 'en ce qui les concerne.' Omit 'tout en étant,' and begin new sentence: 'L'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société est'.

Paragraph 3.

Add 'C'est justement le manque de cette sécurité qui a, jusqu'à présent, fait obstacle au désarmement général prévu par le Pacte et auquel fait allusion la note allemande.'

Section III

Paragraph 1.

Omit 'conformément aux' and substitute 'selon le modèle des'.

Paragraph 2.

(a) After 'litiges' add 'entre les pays limitrophes'.

(b) Place 'impossible' after 'la force' and add 'au moyen d'un règlement pacifique obligatoire dans tous les cas. Le principe de l'arbitrage obligatoire ainsi conçu est, à notre avis, la condition indispensable d'un pacte tel que le Gouvernement allemand l'a proposé dans sa note du 9 février'.

Paragraph 3.

Omit 'il fait appel à des moyens de force' and substitute 'il recourt aux armes ou viole soit les frontières soit, dans le cas du Rhin, la zone démilitarisée. Il est évident que le garant aurait le plus haut intérêt à empêcher de semblables violations d'un côté ou de l'autre, et au premier signe de danger exercerait toute son influence à cet effet. Du reste, il ne dépendra que des nations limitrophes elles-mêmes que ce système de garantie, conçu pour leur protection mutuelle, ne joue pas à leur préjudice. Aussi bien l'idée de garantir . . . '.

Omit 'Il ne dépendra . . . Traité de Paix.'

Paragraph 4.

Omit '(qu'elle soit donnée par l'Angleterre ou par la France,' and substitute '(quel que soit le garante et . . . '.

Omit 'dans lesquelles cette garantie est appelée à s'exercer,' and substitute 'et au degré d'urgence que nécessite l'exercice immédiat de cette garantie'.

Add at the end of paragraph: 'Dans cet ordre d'idées on pourrait rechercher s'il n'est pas possible d'envisager des moyens d'assurer l'impartialité des déterminations sans nuire au caractère immédiat et efficace de la garantie.'

Paragraph 6.

Omit 'Il appartient au Gouvernement allemand de faire connaître définitivement si, après la sincérité de ces explications préalables, destinées à écarter tout malentendu, il lui convient,' and substitute: 'Après la sincérité de ces explications préalables, destinées à écarter tout malentendu, le Gouvernement français, d'accord avec ses alliés, invite le Gouvernement allemand à'.

Substitute 'vivement' for 'hautement'.

ANNEX

French draft reply to the German Note of July 20, 1925,³ on the subject of Security

le 8 août, 1925

En prenant connaissance de la note allemande du 20 juillet 1925, le Gouvernement français se plaît à constater la communauté de vues qui

s'affirme entre les deux Gouvernements, également soucieux de voir la paix de l'Europe basée sur une entente assurant aux peuples des garanties complémentaires de sécurité. Il a la satisfaction de noter que le Gouvernement allemand, après une étude attentive de la note française du 16 juin,⁹ exprime sa conviction de la possibilité d'un accord.

Le Gouvernement français, désireux de n'en pas retarder l'heure, s'attachera seulement à exposer les observations auxquelles, en communauté de vues avec ses Alliés, il a été amené par l'examen des trois points essentiels de la note allemande. Celle-ci, ne s'exprimant pas sur certaines questions soulevées par la réponse française du 16 juin, paraît vouloir marquer que le Gouvernement allemand n'y voit pas d'objection de fond, se réservant seulement de discuter sur des points de détail.

I

Il a été agréable au Gouvernement français de constater que, conformément à son memorandum du 9 février,⁴ le Gouvernement allemand n'entendait pas subordonner la conclusion d'un pacte de garantie à une modification des stipulations du Traité de Paix.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement allemand attire à deux reprises l'attention sur la possibilité qu'il y aurait, en invoquant d'ailleurs certaines dispositions du Pacte, d'adapter par des accords les traités existants à des situations nouvelles. Il suggère également l'hypothèse d'une modification au régime de l'occupation des territoires rhénans.

La France, dans son attachement aux engagements internationaux, n'a l'intention de se soustraire à aucune des stipulations du Pacte. Mais elle rappelle que celui-ci est fondé avant tout sur le respect scrupuleux des traités, qui forment la base du droit public de l'Europe, et qu'il fait de l'intention sincère d'observer ses engagements internationaux la condition première de l'entrée d'un État dans la Société des Nations.

D'accord avec ses Alliés, le Gouvernement français estime que l'on ne saurait porter atteinte au Traité de Paix ni aux droits que, l'Allemagne comme les Alliés, possèdent aux termes de ce traité. Pas plus que le traité, les garanties de son exécution, ainsi que les stipulations qui règlent l'application de ces garanties et en prévoient dans certains cas l'allègement, ne sauraient être modifiées par les accords envisagés.

Si la note du 16 juin a précisé que le Pacte de Sécurité ne saurait 'affecter les clauses du traité relatives à l'occupation de la rive gauche du Rhin, ni l'exécution des conditions stipulées à cet égard dans l'Arrangement rhénan,' c'est que, quels que soient l'esprit libéral et les intentions pacifiques dans lesquels la France est prête à poursuivre les négociations actuelles, elle ne saurait renoncer à ses droits.

II

Les Alliés demeurent convaincus que la qualité de membre de la Société des Nations conférerait à l'Allemagne, une fois entrée dans la Société, le

⁹ See No. 382, n. 2.

moyen le plus sûr de faire valoir ses desiderata, comme l'ont fait les autres États en ce qui les concerne, tout en étant la seule base solide d'une garantie mutuelle et d'un accord européen. En effet, ce n'est pas de l'extérieur qu'un État peut valablement exprimer des réserves, qui prendraient ainsi le caractère de conditions; c'est du dedans qu'il peut soumettre ses vœux au Conseil, par l'exercice d'un droit commun à tous les États faisant partie de la Société. Aussi avons-nous lu avec regret les réserves de la note allemande déclarant que la question de l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations avait besoin d'être élucidée, la lettre du Conseil de la Société des Nations datée du 13 mars 1925¹⁰ n'ayant pas, selon le Gouvernement allemand, éliminé ses objections.

Le Gouvernement français n'a pas qualité pour parler au nom de la Société des Nations. Le Conseil, saisi des réserves formulées par l'Allemagne, a fait connaître au Gouvernement allemand sa décision, qui est fondée sur le principe de l'égalité entre les Nations, lequel ne comporte au profit d'aucune ni exception ni privilège.

En ce qui les concerne, les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent que s'en tenir à leurs déclarations antérieures et répéter que l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations, dans les conditions du droit commun, demeure, dans leur opinion, la base de toute entente sur la sécurité.

III

Le Gouvernement allemand a formulé sur le caractère et la portée des conventions d'arbitrage à conclure entre l'Allemagne, d'une part, et, de l'autre, soit la France et la Belgique, signataires du Pacte rhénan, soit les autres États voisins de l'Allemagne et signataires du Traité de Versailles, des réserves de nature à limiter leur caractère obligatoire, conformément aux traités d'arbitrage que l'Allemagne a conclus déjà avec quelques-uns de ses voisins. Ces traités impliquent le recours dans tous les cas à une Commission permanente de Conciliation, mais le règlement arbitral proprement dit, tout en s'appliquant aux cas les plus nombreux, permet de laisser en dehors les plus importants, d'ordre politique, ceux justement qui seraient susceptibles de conduire à la guerre.

Par là, seraient dangereusement restreintes les dispositions envisagées par le mémorandum allemand initial du 9 février 1925, qui envisageait la conclusion de traités d'arbitrage garantissant la solution paisible des conflits politiques aussi bien que des conflits juridiques. Dans l'opinion des Alliés, une convention d'arbitrage ainsi limitée et ne s'appliquant pas à tous les litiges serait sans valeur sérieuse comme garantie de paix, puisqu'elle laisserait place à des risques de guerre. Ce que nous voulons avant tout, c'est, dans les conditions prévues par la note du 16 juin, de rendre impossible tout nouveau recours à la force pour toutes les nations signataires du Pacte. Le principe de l'arbitrage obligatoire en est l'indispensable condition.

Les appréhensions dont témoigne le Gouvernement allemand au sujet

¹⁰ See No. 261, Enclosure.

de la garantie d'une convention d'arbitrage ne sauraient résister à un examen objectif. Dans le système envisagé, le garant ne décide pas souverainement et unilatéralement qui est l'agresseur. C'est l'agresseur qui se désigne lui-même par le seul fait qu'au lieu de se prêter à une solution pacifique, il fait appel à des moyens de force. L'idée de garantir une convention d'arbitrage est une idée proclamée conforme à l'esprit du Pacte par l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, à sa dernière session de Genève. Il ne dépendra que de l'Allemagne, aussi bien que de chacune des autres Puissances signataires des traités d'arbitrage, que ce système de garantie ne joue pas à son préjudice et que la France et les Alliés n'aient pas à exercer les droits qu'ils tiennent spécifiquement du Traité de Paix.

Il ne paraît pas impossible de formuler des dispositions adaptant le jeu de la garantie (qu'elle soit donnée par l'Angleterre ou par la France, qu'elle s'applique aux frontières ou à l'arbitrage) à la nature de la violation et aux circonstances dans lesquelles cette garantie est appelée à s'exercer.

En résumé, sur les trois points essentiels de la note allemande du 20 juillet 1925, le Gouvernement français, d'accord avec ses Alliés, et sans prétendre se soustraire à la légitime application d'aucune des dispositions du Pacte de la Société des Nations, ne peut que confirmer ses précédentes observations sur la nécessité d'un scrupuleux respect des traités. Il n'a pas qualité pour discuter les questions qui sont relatives à l'admission de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations et sur lesquelles le Conseil de la Société a statué; enfin, il se plaît à espérer que les garanties envisagées sont susceptibles d'être formulées dans des termes à la fois justes et raisonnables, et à l'abri d'interprétations et d'applications abusives ou injustifiées.

Le Gouvernement français, d'accord avec ses Alliés, est conscient de la difficulté et des retards que comporte la poursuite, par échange de notes, d'une négociation sur des questions aussi délicates. C'est pour ce motif que, tout en rappelant sa note du 16 juin, il s'en tient à ces observations générales, sans entrer dans plus de détails.

Il appartient au Gouvernement allemand de faire connaître définitivement si, après la sincérité de ces explications préalables, destinées à écarter tout malentendu, il lui convient d'engager, sur ces bases, une négociation, avec la volonté d'aboutir à un traité dont, en ce qui la concerne, la France désire hautement la conclusion.

No. 439

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

[F.O. 800/258]

Private [and] Personal

August 11, 1925

[Dear D'Abernon,]

I snatch ten minutes to answer your letter of the 7th and give you news

¹ Not printed.

of the result of my first conversation with Briand.² We met this morning, he accompanied by Berthelot, Fromageot, Léger and the French Ambassador, and I by Tyrrell, Hurst, Lampson, Selby and Bennett.

We started at once upon the consideration of the changes that I wished to suggest in the draft of the French reply³ to the German Note.⁴ The attitude of the Frenchmen was admirable, and indeed, the only points at which we became really argumentative, were when Fromageot first resisted an amendment advised by us in the interests of France, and secondly, when he found fault with the logic of a phrase which we had taken straight out of Briand's letter to Fleuriau.⁵ But the essential thing from our point of view, is not these little details, but that the Note will conclude with a direct invitation to the Germans to enter on conversations on the basis of this correspondence. It will therefore make it easy for them to reply simply that they will be glad to arrange a meeting of representatives.

As to this meeting, Briand was the first to insist upon a point which I had intended to make, namely:— that we must prepare for a real discussion with the Germans so as to arrive at a mutual agreement, and not another treaty imposed by the Allies upon Germany. I therefore suggested to him that we should invite the German Government to send Gaus to meet Hurst, Fromageot and a Belgian jurist in London for a preliminary exploration of the ground, in the course of which Gaus could be given a copy of the form in which we had put our ideas, and all the explanations which he might require could be furnished to him. He could then return to Berlin and discuss the general lines of our plan with Stressmann and after that Stresemann with Gaus and any other representative he chose to bring could meet Briand. Vandervelde and myself at Geneva or in the neighbourhood of Geneva where we Ministers could enter into conversation. The whole purpose of this, as you will see, is to put the Germans on an equality with us, to enable Stresemann to know in advance the general character of the propositions we shall make, and to enable him to consult, if necessary, with his colleagues in Berlin before he sees us.

You will observe that it is not part of this plan that Gaus should commit himself to anything at the London meeting. He will come here to get information, to make, if he desires, his suggestions; above all, to ascertain what are the real intentions of the Allies, and thus to avoid misunderstandings which might arise from the presentation of a text without any opportunity for exposition or explanation.

We meet again in five minutes when we shall consider this text; it is essential to have a text in order to clear our minds and to determine with sufficient precision the general principles which must govern any Pact, but I repeat that it is our desire, and that Briand was the first to express it, that

² See No. 438.

⁴ See No. 418, n. 1.

³ See *ibid.*, Annex.

⁵ Not printed. See, however, No. 426.

we should meet Stresemann on an equality as the representatives of Nations who are anxious to make an agreement equally acceptable to us all, as it is equally in the interests of us all.

6 p.m. A second meeting has gone equally well. If not yet absolutely agreed, we are very near agreement and I doubt not that we shall reach complete agreement tomorrow—of course subject to the approval of our two Governments, for I must reserve the rights of the Cabinet.

In sketching the terms of a pact my object has been to secure that there shall be arbitration (judicial or by a tribunal of conciliation) in every case, and that the decision of the arbitrators should be of binding force. The only case justifying resort to force without first exhausting the procedure of conciliation would be where one of the Parties had been guilty not of some minor infraction but of such a flagrant act as constituted an immediate danger to the others. If for instance, German armies are on the march or troops are being assembled in the demilitarized area, Germany cannot expect those who are threatened to do nothing till they are on French or Belgian soil. In such a case and only in such a case is immediate recourse to force (in order to meet force) contemplated, and what applies to Germany applies of course also to France. In such a case it is we, the guarantor, who would have to be satisfied that the flagrant act had taken place and that the immediate danger existed. If a treaty be framed on these lines Germany ought not to find anything to object to in it.

As to the Eastern guarantee, don't the Germans see that this is the way and the only way of rewriting the Franco-Polish Alliance.⁶ It is all in the German interest—and ours.

All this is written very hastily and for your information. Be *very* careful how you use any part of it except in the most general terms at present—and avoid using the word *Conference*. It sounds as disagreeable to French ears as Protocol to English. Let us talk as we do here of *conversations* first between jurisconsults for the juridical side of the treaties and then between politicians for the political issues.

I received a letter⁷ from Lindley⁸ of which, I think, it is worth while to enclose two paragraphs. As Lindley says 'these Germans are funny people', but I presume that you have found that out long ago.

Yours sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁶ See No. 187.

⁷ Of August 7, not printed.

⁸ H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Oslo.

Proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (including the amendments provisionally agreed upon by Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand on August 12, 1925)

C.P. 399 (25) [C 10615/459/18]*

French Text

Le Président de la République allemande, Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges, le Président de la République française, Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des territoires britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes;

Soucieux de satisfaire au désir de sécurité et de protection qui anime les nations qui ont eu à subir le choc de la guerre de 1914-1918;

Constatant l'abrogation des Traités de neutralisation de la Belgique,¹ et conscients de la nécessité de stabiliser le *statu quo* territorial dans la zone qui a été si fréquemment le théâtre des conflits européens;

Et également animés du sincère désir de donner à toutes les Puissances signataires intéressées des garanties complémentaires dans le cadre du Pacte de la Société des Nations et des Traités en vigueur entre elles;

Ont résolu de conclure un Traité à ces fins et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu les dispositions suivantes:—

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes

English Text

The President of the German Republic; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; the President of the French Republic; and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India;

Anxious to satisfy the desire for security and protection which animates the peoples upon whom fell the brunt of the war of 1914-18;

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium,¹ and conscious of the necessity of stabilising the territorial *status quo* in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts;

Animated also with the sincere desire of giving to all the signatory Powers concerned supplementary guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties in force between them;

Have determined to conclude a treaty with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The High Contracting Parties

¹ See No. 316, n. 1.

garantissent individuellement et collectivement, ainsi qu'il est stipulé dans les articles ci-après, le maintien et l'inviolabilité des frontières entre la France et la Belgique, d'une part, et l'Allemagne, d'autre part, telles qu'elles sont fixées par ou en exécution du Traité de Paix, signé à Versailles, le 28 juin 1919, ainsi que le statut des régions rhénanes tel qu'il est fixé par les articles 42, 43 et 180 dudit traité.

ARTICLE 2.

La France et la Belgique, d'une part, et l'Allemagne, d'autre part, s'engagent, chacune en ce qui la concerne, à ne recourir de part et d'autre en aucun cas à la guerre.

Toutefois cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit de résister à une invasion, ou à une attaque, ou d'agir avec l'agrément du Conseil ou de l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, ou encore en case de violation flagrante des articles 42, 43 ou 180 du Traité de Versailles, lorsqu'une telle violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire.

ARTICLE 3.

Tous différends, qui viendraient à s'élever entre l'Allemagne et la Belgique ou entre l'Allemagne et la France et qui n'auraient pu être arrangés à l'amiable, seront l'objet d'un règlement par voie d'arbitrage, auquel lesdites Puissances s'engagent dès à présent à se conformer.

Les modalités, selon lesquelles il

severally and collectively guarantee in the manner provided in the following articles the maintenance and inviolability of the frontiers between France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other hand, as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the 28th June 1919, and also the status of the Rhineland as laid down in articles 42, 43 and 180 of the said treaty.

ARTICLE 2.

France and Belgium of the one part and Germany of the other part severally undertake that they will in no case resort to war against the other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of resistance to invasion or attack or in the case of action undertaken in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations, for in case of a manifest violation of articles 42, 43 or 180 of the Treaty of Versailles, if such violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone, immediate action is necessary.

ARTICLE 3.

Any disputes which may arise between Germany and Belgium or between Germany and France and which cannot be settled by negotiation shall be settled by means of arbitration, and the said Powers hereby agree that they will comply with the settlement so arrived at.

The detailed arrangements for effecting such settlement shall be

sera procédé à ce règlement, sont l'objet de dispositions particulières.

ARTICLE 4.

1. Si l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes estime qu'une violation de l'article 2 du présent Traité ou des articles 42, 43 ou 180 du Traité de Versailles a été ou est commise, elle portera immédiatement la question devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

2. Dès que le Conseil de la Société des Nations aura constaté qu'une telle violation a été commise, il en donnera sans délai avis aux Puissances signataires du présent Traité et chacune d'elles s'engage à prêter, en pareil cas, immédiatement son assistance à la Puissance contre laquelle l'acte incriminé aura été dirigé.

3. En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent Traité ou des articles 42, 43 ou 180 du Traité de Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes, si les autres Parties contractantes sont d'accord pour reconnaître qu'une telle violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire, chacune desdites parties s'engage à prêter immédiatement son assistance à celle d'entre elles contre laquelle l'acte incriminé est dirigé. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, saisi de la question conformément au premier paragraphe du présent article, fera néanmoins connaître le résultat de ses constatations et les Hautes Parties contractantes agiront en conformité.

the subject of special agreements.

ARTICLE 4.

(1) If one of the High Contracting Parties alleges that a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or of articles 42, 43 or 180 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

(2) As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such a violation has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.

(3) In case of a manifest violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of article 2 of the present treaty or of articles 42, 43 or 180 of the Treaty of Versailles, if the other Contracting Parties are agreed that such violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression, and that by reason of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary, the said parties severally agree that they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which is to be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the High Contracting Parties will act in accordance therewith.

ARTICLE 5.

La stipulation de l'article 3 ci-dessus est placée sous la garantie des Hautes Parties contractantes ainsi qu'il prévu ci-après:

1. Dans le cas où, sans recourir à la force, une des Puissances visées à l'article 3 refuserait de soumettre un différend à l'arbitrage ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale, l'autre partie saisira le Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui proposera les mesures à prendre pour donner effet aux dispositions de l'article 3.

2. Si l'une des Puissances visées à l'article 3 refuse de soumettre un différend à l'arbitrage ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale et recourt à la force, les dispositions de l'article 4 s'appliqueront.

ARTICLE 6.

Les dispositions du présent Traité ne portent pas atteinte aux droits et obligations résultant pour les Hautes Parties contractantes du Traité de Paix de Versailles ainsi que des arrangements complémentaires, y compris ceux signés à Londres le 30 août 1924,² non plus qu'aux droits pour l'une quelconque des Hautes Parties contractantes d'agir, dans la mesure qui ne serait pas contraire au Pacte de la Société des Nations, en exécution d'une garantie donnée par elle à l'observation des conventions d'arbitrage conclues à la date de ce jour entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne ainsi qu'entre l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie, si la partie contrevenante recourt à la force.

ARTICLE 5

The provisions of article 3 above are placed under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided by the following stipulations:—

(1) Where one of the Powers referred to in article 3, without resorting to force, refuses to submit a dispute to arbitration or to comply with an arbitral decision, the other party shall bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken to secure compliance with the provisions of article 3.

(2) If one of the Powers referred to in article 3 refuses to submit a dispute to arbitration or to comply with an arbitral decision, and resorts to force, the provisions of article 4 shall apply.

ARTICLE 6.

The provisions of the present treaty do not affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Treaty of Versailles or under arrangements supplementary thereto, including the agreements signed in London on the 30th August 1924, nor yet the rights of any one of the High Contracting Parties to take action, in so far as such action is not inconsistent with the Covenant, in fulfilment of a guarantee given by it to the observance of the arbitration conventions concluded this day between Germany and Poland and between Germany and Czechoslovakia, if the party which violates such a convention resorts to force.

² See No. 343, n. 9.

ARTICLE 7.

Rien dans le présent Traité ne portera atteinte aux droits et obligations des Hautes Parties contractantes en tant que Membres de la Société des Nations, et ne sera interprété comme restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre les mesures propres à sauvegarder efficacement la paix du monde.

ARTICLE 8.

Le présent Traité sera déposé à la Société des Nations conformément au Pacte. Il restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce que, sur la demande de deux au moins des Hautes Parties contractantes, le Conseil, votant s'il y a lieu à la majorité, reconnaisse que la Société des Nations assure aux Hautes Parties contractantes des garanties suffisantes.

ARTICLE 9.

Les conventions particulières sur les modalités du règlement par voie d'arbitrage, visées à l'article 3 et signées en date de ce jour, ainsi que les conventions d'arbitrage visées à l'article 6 entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne et l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie, seront, avant la ratification du présent Traité, communiquées à chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes qui ne seraient pas parties auxdites conventions.

ARTICLE 10.

Le présent Traité n'imposera aucune obligation à aucun des Dominions britanniques ou à l'Inde, à moins que le Gouvernement de ce Dominion ou de l'Inde ne signifie qu'il accepte ces obligations.

ARTICLE 7.

Nothing in the present treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties as Members of the League of Nations, or shall be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 8.

The present treaty shall be deposited with the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting on the request of at least two of the High Contracting Parties, and voting if need be by a majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 9.

The special agreements embodying the detailed arrangements for effecting a settlement by arbitration, referred to in article 3 and signed this day, and the arbitration conventions referred to in article 6 between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia, shall, before the ratification of the present treaty, be communicated to each of the High Contracting Parties who are not parties to the said conventions.

ARTICLE 10.

The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such Dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof.

ARTICLE 11.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié, mais n'entrera en vigueur que lorsque l'Allemagne sera devenue Membre de la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 11.

The present treaty shall be ratified, but shall not come into force until Germany has become a Member of the League of Nations.

No. 441

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

No. 984 [C 10614/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 12, 1925

Sir,

My conversations with M. Briand¹ ended this morning. They have been conducted throughout in the most friendly spirit on both sides, and we reached agreement with even less difficulty than I had anticipated; indeed, I might say simply without difficulty.

We first settled the terms of the reply² which the French Government will send to the last German note.³ We then took the opportunity of our meeting to go more closely into the form which, in our view, the eventual Pact might take. M. Briand (and I entirely agreed with him) observed that it was very important to refrain from doing anything which had the air of confronting the Germans with a cut-and-dried scheme which they had nothing to do but to accept or reject as it stood. We were not now making a new Treaty of Versailles, but attempting to reach a mutual and voluntary agreement among equals. While, therefore, we found it necessary, for the purpose of making sure that we meant the same thing, to put our agreement in the form of a draft Pact,⁴ it is important that at this stage nothing should be said publicly about the existence of such a draft, and that we should speak only as we have done in the communiqué⁵ about an exchange of views.

I have, however, taken Baron Moncheur fully into my confidence. I have not given him a copy of either document, for it is obviously for the French Government to communicate to the Belgians the terms of the reply which that Government propose, in agreement with their allies, to send to Germany; but I read him the terms of this reply as agreed by us, and I explained to him the more important alterations which had been made in the French counter-draft of the Pact.⁶

As regards the terms of the reply to the Germans, my agreement was absolute. In the case of the Pact, however, I could only express agreement

¹ See No. 438.

² See No. 438, Note and Annex.

³ See No. 418, n. 1.

⁴ No. 440.

⁵ See *The Times*, August 13, p. 10.

⁶ For Baron Moncheur's record of a conversation of August 12, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No.

up to the point of saying that I was prepared to recommend to my colleagues the proposals which M. Briand and I, with the aid of our experts, had formulated.⁴ Until His Majesty's Government had considered these terms and taken their decision, it is obviously undesirable to give any circulation to that document. Should it, however, receive the acceptance of His Majesty's Government, I shall communicate it confidentially to you and also to Baron Moncheur.⁷

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁷ A copy of the draft treaty was transmitted to Sir G. Grahame in Foreign Office despatch No. 993 of August 14. That same day, Mr. Lampson explained the document to Baron Moncheur and gave him a copy, emphasising that it was essential to keep it strictly confidential. For Baron Moncheur's record of this conversation, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 95.

No. 442

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 222 Telegraphic [C 10656/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 13, 1925, 5.30 p.m.*

Please inform Monsieur Briand at once that His Majesty's Government have received with great satisfaction my report of our conversations.¹ They entirely approve the terms of the draft reply to Germany as agreed between Monsieur Briand and me:² further I am now authorised to give the assent of His Majesty's Government to the terms of the draft treaty of mutual guarantee³ as provisionally settled between us yesterday.⁴

It gives me great pleasure to be able thus to confirm and crown our joint labours within so few hours of Monsieur Briand's departure. Tell him how greatly I feel that we are indebted to him for this satisfactory result and renew to him the assurance of my personal regard and sincere friendship.

¹ See Nos. 438 and 441.

² See No. 438, Note and Annex.

³ No. 440.

⁴ The draft was approved by the Cabinet at the meeting of August 13 (Cab. 45 (25)).

No. 443

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 158 Telegraphic [C 10657/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 13, 1925, 9 p.m.*

My conversations with M. Briand which ended yesterday¹ were

¹ See Nos. 438 and 441.

conducted throughout in the most friendly spirit and there was little difficulty in reaching agreement. Records of the conversations will be sent to you as soon as possible.

We first agreed upon the terms of the reply² which the French government will send to the German note of July 20th.³ Before actual despatch it remains for the French government to secure the concurrence of the other allies, as before, which should not take long. The reply as at present drafted is couched in most conciliatory terms and should do away with the need of further correspondence. M. Briand expressed himself to me as ready for verbal discussions with Herr Stresemann and the note will close with a definite invitation to the German government to enter into negotiations.

We also took the opportunity to go more closely into the form which, in our view, the eventual pact might take.⁴ I was glad to observe that M. Briand particularly emphasised the importance of avoiding any appearance of confronting the Germans with a cut and dried scheme which they would have to accept or reject as it stood. What we were aiming at, he said, was a mutual and voluntary agreement. While therefore M. Briand and I have agreed upon a draft subject to the approval of our respective Cabinets it is to be clearly understood that even when thus approved the draft is to be regarded purely as an embodiment of what His Majesty's Government and the French government would suggest as a basis for free discussion.

The main difficulty which had to be overcome was the nature of the action to be taken in the event of a violation of articles 42 and 43 of the treaty of Versailles. M. Briand however showed himself fully alive to the need of distinguishing between flagrant violations and purely technical infractions of these articles and he admitted frankly that Great Britain could not be expected to give a guarantee which might involve her in a war as a result of a trivial incident. The effect of the draft as at present worded is that a decision by the Council of the League of Nations will normally be necessary before the guarantee comes into play. It will only operate prior to such decision if all the contracting parties, other than the one against whom the allegation is made, are agreed that the violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. Complete freedom of decision is thus left to His Majesty's Government.⁵

The above is for your own information only but it will help you to meet any criticisms that may be made in German official circles.

Question of a meeting between British, French, Belgian and German

² See No. 438, Note and Annex.

³ See No. 418, n. 1.

¹ See No. 440.

⁵ In Foreign Office despatch No. 1209 to Rome of August 13 Mr. Chamberlain conveyed an account of his conversation with the Italian Ambassador that day in which he had informed him of the agreements reached with M. Briand. For Marquis Torretta's account of this conversation, see *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 93.

jurists was also gone into thoroughly, and the idea thoroughly endorsed; but as to this I shall shortly be sending you detailed instructions.

Repeated to Paris by bag No. 224 and Brussels No. 67.

No. 444

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

No. 68 Telegraphic [C 10723/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 16, 1925, 5 p.m.

I have received copy of instructions dated August 14th addressed by Monsieur Briand to French Ambassador at Brussels concerning the French draft reply¹ to the German security note of July 20th,² and also future procedure. Copy has been sent to you by registered post.³

Monsieur Briand has expressed a wish that you should speak to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the same sense as the French Ambassador.

It is of course for the French government to obtain the concurrence of the Belgian and other allied governments to what is the answer of the French government to a note addressed to them by Germany, but I desire that you will express to Monsieur Vandervelde my confident hope that the Belgian government will approve the terms of the draft on which the French and British governments have agreed and will signify their approval at the earliest possible moment.

As to future procedure, you should of course strongly support the idea of a meeting of legal advisers prior to a meeting of Ministers. This is in accordance with what was agreed upon by Monsieur Briand and myself in London (see minutes of first meeting on August 11th).¹ It is proposed to explain to the German government that Herr Gaus would not be called upon to commit his government in any way but simply to seek and receive full explanations of the allies' suggestions.

While it may not prove practicable for Ministers to meet before the end of the Assembly⁴ you should not give the Belgian government the impression that in my view the possibility of a meeting before then is excluded. My wish is that it should be held as soon as possible after the jurists have completed their preliminary work.

If it is true as stated in the press that Monsieur Vandervelde on receipt of a report from Baron Moncheur of what I said to him⁵ has decided to be at Geneva for the opening of the Council please tell him that I much

¹ See No. 438.

² See No. 418, n. 1.

³ Under cover of a letter of August 15 from Mr. V. Wellesley, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, not printed.

⁴ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 441, n. 6.

appreciate his ready acceptance of my suggestion. I am really desirous of a personal exchange of views as early as possible.⁶

Repeated to Paris by bag No. 225.

⁶ In Brussels telegram No. 86 of August 17, Sir G. Grahame reported: 'A communication in the sense of your telegram No. 68 was made to M. Vandervelde this afternoon.

'2. His Excellency, who had just received a note [see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 96] from the French Ambassador [*sic*: the Chargé d'Affaires, M. V. Jaunez] in compliance with the instructions contained in M. Briand's despatch of the 14th instant, promised to study the documents contained in it and to let me know as soon as possible his views with regard to them.

'3. He said that he was entirely in favour of the proposed meeting of legal advisers, and he took note of your wish that the discussions between Ministers should take place as soon as possible.

'4. He added that he was much looking forward to meeting you at Geneva on September 2.'

No. 445

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 160 Telegraphic [C 10822/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 20, 1925, 3 p.m.

My telegram No. 158 (of August 13th. Security).¹

After last meeting with M. Briand on August 12th² it was agreed that, when French reply³ to German note of July 20th⁴ was delivered, a definite proposal should be made verbally to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs that, if Germany accepted the basis of negotiations, a meeting should be held in London at the earliest possible moment between the legal advisers of the British, French, Belgian and German Foreign Offices in order to prepare the way for a meeting between Foreign Ministers. It was agreed that you should support your French colleague in making this proposal and I request that you will act accordingly. The Belgian government are being asked by the French government to instruct their Ambassador to do the same.⁵

The reason for the suggested meeting is explained in the record of my conversation with M. Briand at noon on August 11th.⁶ The object is to provide opportunity for the German legal adviser to seek and receive explanations of the views of the British, French and Belgian governments regarding the form which the proposed treaty of mutual guarantee should take. While Herr Gaus will naturally be free to make any suggestions he desires, it should be emphasised that he will not be called upon to commit his government in any way or to discuss anything but legal issues. The intention is simply to enable Herr Stresemann to come to

¹ No. 443.

³ See No. 438, Note and Annex.

⁵ See No. 444, n. 6.

² See No. 441.

⁴ See No. 418, n. 1.

⁶ No. 438.

a meeting with the French and Belgian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and myself with full knowledge of our proposals.

With regard to the date of this eventual meeting of Ministers, I am anxious that it should take place as soon as possible after the jurists have completed their preliminary work. (See my despatch to Paris No. 2790 of August 18th,⁷ copy of which has gone to you by bag.)⁸

Repeated to Paris No. 228 and Brussels No. 70.⁹

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Foreign Office despatch No. 1529 to Berlin of August 19.

⁹ In Foreign Office telegram No. 229 to Paris and No. 71 to Brussels of August 20, Mr. Chamberlain stated: 'You should acquaint government to which you are accredited with instructions sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.'

No. 446

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 231 Telegraphic [C 10857/459/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 21, 1925, 4.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 292 (of August 18th. Security).¹

Memorandum communicated by French Embassy on August 19th¹ confirms that verbal representations by French Ambassador in Berlin regarding proposed meeting of jurists will be based on instructions sent to French Ambassador at Brussels on August 14th² (see my despatch No. 2790 of August 18th).¹

It is observed that those instructions speak of an eventual meeting of Ministers to discuss the political aspects of the question 'when the legal experts have prepared a common text'. We trust that the matter will not be represented to the German government in exactly these terms which would make it difficult to secure German consent to the proposed meeting of legal advisers and which moreover do not accurately represent the object of the meeting as agreed upon between Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand.³ The intention was simply to give full explanations of the allied proposals to Herr Gaus in order to enable him to report to Herr Stresemann, and it was clearly understood that Herr Gaus was not to be called upon to commit his government. Any mention of the preparation of a common text by the jurists at this stage is certain to frighten the German government and might according to my information lead them to refuse to send Herr Gaus. Far better let the jurists meet on the footing agreed between Briand and me. If they can carry things further at this first meeting so much the better but we must not press it in advance.

We feel sure that there is no actual divergence between the intentions of

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed. Cf., however, *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 96.

³ See No. 438.

the Quai d'Orsay and ourselves and that the point is merely one of drafting. But you should immediately draw attention to it since it is important that there should be no misunderstanding.

Repeated to Berlin No. 163 and Brussels No. 73.

No. 447

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 22, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 89 Telegraphic: by bag [C 10915/459/18]

BRUSSELS, August 21, 1925

Your telegram No. 71.¹

I communicated this morning to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of your telegram No. 160 to Berlin.² He was entirely in agreement with proposed action.

M. Vandervelde has replied to M. Briand concurring in the French draft reply³ to the German security note of July 20th.⁴ He made some suggestions on one or two points of minor importance but stated at the same time that they were merely suggestions. He has not yet given the Belgian official view with regard to the text of the proposed treaty of Mutual Guarantee,⁵ but he told me privately that he thought it was excellent.

Generally speaking, M. Vandervelde seemed sincerely pleased with the result of the meeting between you and M. Briand,⁶ and optimistic as to the favourable issue of the negotiations with Germany. His information from Germany, mostly I fancy from Socialist quarters, is of a nature to confirm his optimism. He is going to the forthcoming International Socialist Congress at Marseilles⁷ largely in deference to the wishes expressed by Herr Breitscheid and other Socialists from Central Europe who desire to speak to him about the Pact. There is no doubt that he will use all his influence with them in favour of its acceptance by Germany.

¹ See No. 445, n. 9.

³ See No. 438, Note and Annex.

⁵ See No. 440.

² No. 445.

⁴ See No. 418, n. 1.

⁶ See Nos. 438 and 441.

⁷ This met August 22-28.

Mr. Ovey¹ (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 21)

*No. 705 [C 10994/459/18]**

ROME, August 21, 1925

Sir,

As indicated in your despatch No. 1209 of the 13th instant,² the French Chargé d'Affairs communicated on the 17th instant to the Italian Government the copy of the French reply³ to the last German note⁴ regarding the [p]act.

2. M. Roger informs me that he has telegraphed to his Government the written reply of Signor Mussolini, which will doubtless therefore have reached you by now.⁵

3. M. Roger did not seek an interview with the President of the Council, but handed over the text to the 'chef du cabinet'⁶ at 6 o'clock in the evening, thus securing a written reply from the head of the Government. This reply was forthcoming early the following morning. Both from the text of the reply and from the unexampled expedition with which it was forthcoming M. Roger deduces considerable satisfaction on the part of the Italian Government. He further reads into it a very considerable advance in opinion in favour of the pact as witnessed by the acceptance of the terms without reserve and the approval of the plan of advancing from the stage of exchange of notes to a verbal discussion among all parties interested. Signor Mussolini, as his 'chef du cabinet' explained, is a realist. At first, while he had felt in the earlier stages of the negotiations somewhat disturbed at the absence of any guarantee affecting the Italian frontier, he was also not convinced, I think, in his mind that the exchange of notes would lead to any tangible results. He now appreciates the fact that the negotiations have reached a practical stage, and that their success on the present lines, while not affording Italy any special guarantee, will be to her general interest and advantage.

4. Inspired press comments clearly indicate this change of view.

I have, etc.,

E. OVEY

¹ See No. 173, n. 1.

² Not printed. This recorded Mr. Chamberlain's conversation of August 13 with the Italian Ambassador. For Marquis Torretta's account of this conversation, see *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 93.

³ See No. 438, Note and Annex.

⁴ See No. 418, n. 1.

⁵ The Italian reply of August 18 does not appear to have been communicated to His Majesty's Government.

⁶ Marquis G. Paulucci de'Calboli Barone.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 25, 9 a.m.)

No. 308 Telegraphic [C 11070/459/18]

BERLIN, August 24, 1925, 10 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

On instructions from Paris delivery of note² from French government was postponed from 12 today until 5 o'clock. Date of publication remains fixed for Friday,³ French government having declined to accede to German proposal to publish on Wednesday as Monsieur Briand only returns to Paris on Thursday and is stated to be anxious to give press his own comments.

French Ambassador informs me that when Stresemann had read the note he asked several questions regarding meaning of particular passages. After some dissension the French Ambassador gave a verbal declaration regarding proposed mission of Herr Gaus¹ and emphasised that this official would not be called upon to commit his government in any way. The intention was simply to allow him to obtain such further information that Stresemann could discuss the question with his colleagues with full knowledge of the position and could then come to a meeting with British, French and Belgian Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

Stresemann asked what the date of the eventual meeting of Ministers was. The French Ambassador replied that he had no official information but his private impression was that it was desired that this meeting should take place as soon as possible after meeting of jurists.

I have arranged a meeting with Stresemann for tomorrow morning and will report further.

I have communicated substance of your telegram No. 160⁵ to German government and shall press them to send their legal adviser in time to obtain information from Sir C. Hurst and other legal advisers before latter leave for Geneva.

¹ No. 307 of August 22, not printed.

² See No. 438. Certain amendments had been agreed between the British and French Governments after the meetings of August 11-12 (see Nos. 438 and 441). A text and translation of the French note as communicated to the German Government on August 24 is filed at C 11044/459/18, not printed. For a printed text, see *Pacte de Sécurité. II: Documents signés ou paraphés à Locarno le 16 octobre 1925, précédés de six pièces relatives aux négociations préliminaires (20 Juillet 1925-16 Octobre 1925)* (Paris, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1925), pp. 6-8.

³ August 28.

⁴ See Nos. 438 and 444-46.

⁵ No. 445.

No. 450

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 25, 11.30 a.m.)

No. 304 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 11069/459/18]

Very Urgent

PARIS, August 25, 1925

My telegram No. 302 of yesterday.¹

Political Director telephoned last night to Monsieur Briand who only returned to Paris late this afternoon and therefore presses that publication² should not take place before Thursday morning's³ press.

The French Ambassador at Berlin has just telegraphed saying that Herr Stresemann agrees to meeting of legal experts to be followed by that of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Stresemann suggested September 1st for former as he remarks that it would be difficult for Herr Gaus to leave Berlin until sufficient time had been given for public opinion to express itself on the French note.² For the Ministers' meeting Herr Stresemann suggested middle of September, some quiet place in the Swiss mountains.

Herr Stresemann asks the French Ambassador whether the sense of the verbal communication⁴ respecting both above meetings could be published at the same time as the note. Monsieur Briand will be consulted in this matter directly he returns this evening. Meanwhile please telephone me your views on this point and on the question of publication on Thursday morning as soon as possible.

¹ Not printed.

² Of the French note of August 24 (see No. 449, n. 2).

³ August 27.

⁴ See No. 449.

No. 451

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 237 Telegraphic [C 11069/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 25, 1925, 5 p.m.

Your telegram No. 304 (of August 25th. Security).¹

I accept proposal to publish in Thursday morning's² press. I think it most desirable to agree to Stresemann's proposal to publish at same time sense of verbal communication made to him³ regarding meeting of legal advisers and subsequent meeting of Foreign Ministers. I suggest that terms of joint communiqué on this subject should be left for representatives at Berlin to arrange with Herr Stresemann. If French government agree we will inform Lord d'Abernon accordingly. I assume that French

¹ No. 450.

² August 27.

³ See No. 449.

government are taking all necessary steps to co-ordinate action with Belgian government.

As regards date of legal advisers' meeting we cannot resist Stresemann's plea and though it is frankly very inconvenient that Sir C. Hurst's arrival at Geneva should be delayed even 2 or 3 days we accept date of September 1st if earlier date cannot be arranged.

No. 452

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 25, 6.50 p.m.)

No. 310 Telegraphic [C 11084/459/18]

BERLIN, August 25, 1925, 5 p.m.

I have just had a long conversation with Herr Stresemann.

He said that his first impression of note¹ was rather favourable although there was a good deal he did not understand. His principal objection was to words 'on these bases' in last paragraph which would certainly cause him great difficulties with German National critics. Stresemann confirmed that French Ambassador yesterday had described purpose of Doctor Gaus's mission in terms similar to those adopted in your telegram No. 160.² This explanation of proposed mission had made a favourable impression on Cabinet and had greatly facilitated discussion of note.

Ministers had debated best course of action yesterday and inclined to the view that Doctor Gaus could not be sent to London until some days after note had been published—at the earliest next Monday.³

I pointed out to Stresemann that this plan would involve most undesirable delay. I urged him to obtain agreement for sending Doctor Gaus to London at once, deferring main discussion in Berlin until Gaus had returned from his mission and full information had been obtained of allied proposals.

Stresemann saw the advantage of this plan and will propose it to his colleagues today. He will let me know this evening what they decide.

¹ See No. 449, n. 2.

² No. 445.

³ August 31.

No. 453

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 165 Telegraphic [C 11070/459/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 26, 1925, 11 a.m.

Your telegram No. 308 (of August 24th. Security).¹

¹ No. 449.

Publication

On receipt of your telegram No. 307 (of August 22nd)² we pressed French government to agree to publication³ on Wednesday.⁴ For reasons given in your telegram under reference French government were reluctant to consent but have now proposed publication in Thursday morning's press. To this we have agreed.

French Ambassador at Berlin has reported that Herr Stresemann has asked whether sense of verbal communication⁵ regarding meeting of legal advisers and subsequent meeting of foreign Ministers could be published at same time as note.³ We have told French government that we support this proposal and have suggested that communiqué on this point should be drawn up in Berlin by British, French and Belgian representatives in consultation with Herr Stresemann. French government agree. We suggest for your guidance that communiqué might be on lines of my immediately following telegram⁶ but we are content to leave matter to your discretion.

French government are taking necessary steps to co-ordinate action with Belgian government.

Please telegraph urgently text of communiqué when arranged.

Repeated to Paris No. 238 (by bag) and Brussels No. 75.

² Not printed.

³ Of the French note of August 24 (see No. 449, n. 2).

⁴ August 26.

⁵ See No. 449.

⁶ No. 166 of August 26, not printed.

No. 454

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 26, 9 p.m.)*

No. 313 Telegraphic [C 11102/459/18]

Urgent

BERLIN, August 26, 1925, 6 p.m.

(? Your telegram No. 166).¹

The following communiqué has been agreed to with French and Belgian representatives² and with the German government:

"The French Ambassador has supplemented the handing over of note³ by two following declarations which have been confirmed by identic declarations by British Ambassador and Belgian Minister.

'1. France and her allies consider that it would be of practical advantage for legal advisers of the four Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Belgium, France and Great Britain to meet as soon as possible in order to allow representative of Germany to become acquainted with views of the

¹ Of August 26, not printed. See, however, No. 453.

² The Belgian Minister in Berlin was M. R. Everts.

³ See No. 449, n. 2.

allied governments on juridical and technical sides of problems involved.

'2. Once this preliminary study has been finished the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Belgium, France and Great Britain could arrange a meeting which, in accordance with desire of allied Powers, would accelerate the definitive solution of problems under discussion.'

Communiqué will be published at the same time as note.⁴

⁴ For a text of the note, see *The Times*, August 27, p. 9. A summary of the declaration was printed *ibid.*, p. 10.

On August 27, the German Minister and Counsellor at London, Herr A. Dufour-Feronce, communicated to Mr. Wellesley a copy of the German reply of that date. An English translation runs as follows: 'The German Government have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the French note of the 24th August [see No. 449, n. 2].

'They entirely share the opinion expressed at the end of the above note that a continuation of the correspondence is scarcely calculated to lead to further elucidation of the questions connected with the conclusion of a security pact, and in their note of the 20th July [see No. 418, n. 1] they had given expression to the desire that discussions might be expedited as much as possible. The German Government therefore welcome the suggestion made verbally by His Excellency the French Ambassador that the legal experts of Germany, Belgium, France and Great Britain might meet as soon as possible in order to afford the German experts the opportunity to become acquainted with the views of the Allied experts regarding the legal and technical aspects of the problems under discussion.

'In these circumstances the German Government, having in the note of the 20th July defined their attitude concerning a number of the most important matters, now consider it advisable to refrain from further written elucidation of these matters and from stating their views in regard to the observations made in the French note.'

No. 455

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 29)

*No. 398 [C 11210/459/18]**

WARSAW, August 26, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 82 of today's date,¹ I have the honour to report that, in the course of my conversation yesterday with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I enquired of his Excellency whether he had discussed with M. Briand² the proposed western pact between Great

¹ This ran: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that he will arrive at Geneva on September 5th and expresses hope that you will be staying there over opening of the Assembly [see No. 165, n. 4], so that he may have the opportunity of a talk with you. Meanwhile he begs me to repeat his great pleasure at close accord established between you and French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his determination that Poland shall not prove an obstacle to conclusion of Western Pact, his only condition being that Pact must contain nothing that could be interpreted in any way as weakening Poland's claim to her present frontier. I was able to reassure His Excellency on the latter point.'

² Count Skrzynski had returned from a visit to the United States intended to revive American interest in Poland (July 15–August 5) via France, and had had a conversation with M. Briand in Paris on August 14.

Britain, France, Belgium and Germany. Before venturing too far, I was anxious to ascertain how far M. Briand had informed Count Skrzynski of the substance, or indeed of the existence, of the draft pact, but I failed to extract any indication from his Excellency, though I have little doubt, from certain remarks published in the 'Messenger polonais', that he must have seen the draft pact³ or, anyhow, have a shrewd notion of its contents.

2. I therefore asked him whether he had any ideas on the subject of the pact which he would like me to convey to you, and I took the opportunity to speak to him in the sense of the last paragraph of your despatch No. 592 of the 28th July.⁴ I said that he had no doubt gathered, from the reports which he must have received from M. Skirmunt of his conversations with you, that you always answered M. Skirmunt's questions most freely and frankly, and I knew that you expected that he, Count Skrzynski, should show equal frankness with me. Count Skrzynski made no direct reply to this rather broad hint, but said that he could only repeat what he had frequently stated before, namely, that he welcomed the close understanding established between the British and French Governments and that he was a warm supporter of the western pact, which he felt would conduce to the pacification not only of Western Europe, but of the whole continent. He was most anxious to co-operate in every way possible in the negotiation of the pact, but he naturally did not wish to intrude his advice or assistance until called upon to do so. His one proviso was that the pact should be so worded as not to contribute to the weakening of Poland's right to her present frontiers or to encourage Germany to attempt their modification, either by peaceful or by warlike means. I replied that I thought that I could reassure him on this head.

3. We then proceeded to discuss the possibility of concluding an arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland, such as is contemplated by the pact, and I expressed the opinion that, in the existing state of feeling between the two countries, such a task would appear almost impossible of achievement. Count Skrzynski replied that this was unfortunately true, and that he was much distressed by the recent growth of animosity, but he begged me to assure you that it had always been, and still was, his policy to improve Poland's relations with Germany. It was his honest conviction that the major portion of the blame for the present unfortunate conditions was attributable to a fixed anti-Polish policy on the part of the German Government. Nevertheless, he was prepared to do everything within the bounds of reason to conciliate Germany and to prove that Poland was anxious to live on correct terms with her big neighbour, provided always that there was no question of any cession of territory.

4. I enquired whether he could suggest any way in which we could assist in moderating German antagonism towards Poland, and he replied that he felt sure that nothing would contribute towards this end so

³ See No. 440.

⁴ No. 430.

powerfully as a categoric statement by our Ambassador in Berlin that His Majesty's Government in their present negotiations do not even contemplate the possibility of a modification of Poland's frontiers as established by the Treaty of Versailles and the subsequent arrangements made in execution of that treaty. His Excellency also suggested, though he fully appreciated the reasons which prevented His Majesty's Government from figuring as a guarantor of the arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland, that it might nevertheless be possible to insert in the pact a formula expressing British approval of the guarantee to be given by the French Government.

5. Finally, Count Skrzynski referred to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, a consummation which he would heartily welcome, but he went on to express his apprehension regarding the proposal to give Germany a permanent seat on the Council, a step which he said was contrary to the first sentence of article 4 of the Covenant, according to which this privilege was reserved to representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. He repeated the old arguments that Poland would in such an event be placed at a disadvantage, as compared with Germany, in any dispute between them which might be referred to the Council, and he said that if Germany were given a permanent seat Poland must demand similar treatment.⁵

I have, etc.,
W.G. MAX MULLER

⁵ For Sir W. Max Muller's account of another part of this conversation, see Vol. XXV, No. 485.

No. 456

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 27, 4.25 p.m.)

No. 312 Telegraphic [C 11158/459/18]

Very Urgent

PARIS, August 27, 1925, 2 p.m.

My telegram No. 310.¹

I learn from Secretary General that Italian Chargé d'Affaires² yesterday approached Minister for Foreign Affairs officially with these suggestions.³ Monsieur Briand pointed out that Italian government had hitherto refused to sign Security Pact but that if it had changed its mind and now . . .⁴ do so he would be happy for Italian expert and Italian Minister for

¹ Of August 26. This ran: 'The Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay informs me that members of the Italian Embassy here have hinted that the Italian government would like their expert to be present at the meeting of the jurists and that Signor Mussolini would be pleased to be present at the subsequent meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs [see No. 454]. . . .'

² Signor C. Summonte.

³ See *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 111.

⁴ The text is here uncertain. In another text, this read: 'consented to'.

Foreign Affairs to attend respective meetings. Otherwise there was no reason for Italy to be represented.

Monsieur Berthelot tells me that to ensure that the matter is made perfectly clear to the Italian government a telegram is being sent to French Ambassador at Rome to point out absolute impossibility of Italian representation at meetings unless Italy be decided to sign the Pact and to guarantee Rhine frontier.

No. 457

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 169 Telegraphic [C 11206/459/18]

Most Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 28, 1925, 2.55 p.m.

Your private telegram of the 27th.¹

Your leave approved. I leave London Saturday, Dover Monday next.²

Secret

Before you leave I wish you to tell Stresemann in firm but friendly terms that I do not understand the action of the German government. He and I are, I believe, sincerely desirous of success of Pact Negotiations and we have every reason to be thankful that we have to deal with a Frenchman equally desirous of its success and anxious to open a new chapter in the relations between Germany and the Allies. Briand has done all he could to help Stresemann e.g. evacuation of Ruhr³ and Three Towns.⁴ Yet the German Ministry of the Interior chooses this moment to publish a White Book on the Separatist movement in the Rhineland⁵ reviving the bitterest memories of 1923⁶ and announces publication of further White Book on outrages by the Army of Occupation.⁷ Is this stupidity or malice? Was the German Foreign Office consulted? Does not Stresemann see that it must make it much harder for Briand to make any concession to German feeling and produces the worst possible atmosphere for negotiation?⁸

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

² August 31, for Geneva. See No. 165, n. 4.

³ See No. 635, below.

⁴ See No. 399 and No. 645, n. 8, below.

⁵ *Urkunden zum Separatisten putsch in Rheinland im Herbst 1923* (Berlin).

⁶ i.e. the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (see Vol. XXI, Chap. I).

⁷ On August 6 the French Ambassador had communicated a note to the Foreign Office reporting that representations had been made in Berlin over the publication by the German Government of a work entitled *Denkschrift über die Ausschreitungen der Besatzungstruppen im besetzten Gebiet*.

⁸ In Foreign Office despatch No. 1485 to Berlin of August 12, Lord D'Abernon had been instructed to make representations to the German Government over the publication of *Die politischen Ordonnanzen der Interalliierten Rheinland Kommission und ihre Anwendung in den Jahren 1920-1924* (Berlin), 2 vols., and the publication cited in n. 5.

I observe further in today's 'Times' in statement of 'the German official view' that 'Germany requires that she shall be admitted to colonial mandates on the same footing as other nations who claim this right'.⁹ If 'Times' correspondent¹⁰ derived this from Foreign Office or official sources, demand an explanation. Am I to understand that at the moment when His Majesty's Government are negotiating a guarantee of German no less than French territory, Germany is putting forward a claim to any part of British Mandated Territories?

⁹ See *The Times*, August 27, p. 10. This telegram had been drafted on August 27.

¹⁰ Mr. H. Daniels.

No. 458

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

No. 45 Telegraphic [C 11103/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 28, 1925, 4.10 p.m.

Your No. 82 of 26th August.¹

I shall still be at Geneva on 5th, and for some days longer. Please thank M. Skrzynski for his message and say that I shall be delighted to renew our acquaintance. Add that I have never in any interview with anyone held any language inconsistent with what I said to him at Geneva about position of Poland and her frontiers.²

Secret. Find if you can an opportunity in this interview to define my attitude to Russia as explained in my private letter of August 12th.³ I want this done before he sees me.¹

¹ See No. 455, n. 1.

² See No. 247.

³ This letter (N 5059/102/38), is not printed.

¹ This telegram crossed Sir W. Max Muller's private letter of August 25 to Mr. Chamberlain in which he reported his conversation with Count Skrzynski on that day when he had spoken in accordance with Mr. Chamberlain's letter of August 12 (see Vol. XXV, No. 485). For an account of part of the conversation, see No. 455.

No. 459

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 168¹ Telegraphic [C 11156/459/18]

Very Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 28, 1925, 6 p.m.

Your telegram No. 315 (of August 27th. Security).²

¹ This telegram was despatched after No. 169 (No. 457).

² This reported German opposition to a suggestion by Sir C. Hurst (Foreign Office

In the circumstances we have no desire to press the idea of Geneva and we accept London as the place of meeting. We are informing French and Belgian governments that Herr Gaus will arrive in London in time for first meeting to be held on Monday August 31st, and are requesting them to send over their representatives for that date.

Repeated to Paris No. 243, by bag.

telegram No. 167 of August 26) that the meeting of the legal advisers (see No. 454) be held at Geneva rather than London in order that they might more easily consult their Foreign Ministers (see No. 165, n. 4).

No. 460

Mr. Ovey (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 28, 9.15 p.m.)

No. 205 Telegraphic [C 11190/459/18]

ROME, August 28, 1925, 7.15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 244.¹

President of the Council received me this morning to return reply to your message communicated to him through Chef de Cabinet. His Excellency thanks you warmly and hopes that he may possibly be able to go to Geneva but is unable to decide at present. He will send definite answer as soon as circumstances permit through Italian Embassy in London.

¹ Of August 25. This ran: 'Please inform Signor Mussolini that I have asked you to enquire whether there is any chance of his coming to Geneva [see No. 165, n. 4]. I should much like to meet him again and to discuss developments since we met in Rome. My present plan is to arrive Geneva on 1st September and stay 10 days, but I think I could stay another day or two if by so doing a meeting with Signor Mussolini were rendered possible. It would to my mind be a great advantage if Signor Mussolini could come while Briand is also there.'

No. 461

Mr. Ovey (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 29, 9 a.m.)

No. 206 Telegraphic [C 11215/459/18]

ROME, August 28, 1925, 9 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

After interview Chef de Cabinet asked me by His Excellency's instructions to inform you of following facts. After your interview with Italian Ambassador² regarding pact negotiations in which you explained plans for meeting of jurists and subsequent meeting with Foreign

¹ No. 460.

² See No. 448, n. 2.

Ministers of allied countries President of the Council instructed Marquis della Torretta about August 17th or 18th to enquire whether you would agree to presence of Italian jurist at jurists meeting and whether Signor Mussolini could join in meeting of Foreign Ministers, such meeting however to be held in some place in extreme northern Italy. This démarche³ was made with the idea that participation of Italy in these two discussions might facilitate conclusion of pact and eventual adherence of Italy to pact.

Italian government have just learnt from German reply that German jurist has actually left for London and that meeting is imminent.⁴ Italian Ambassador in Berlin hearing of instructions sent to Torretta had referred in conversation to possible presence of Italian jurist and had been told that Germans would welcome the idea. But up to this moment no reply had been received from Torretta, who perhaps did not realise how quickly matters would proceed, except to say he has been unable to get in touch with you.

³ Signor Mussolini's circular telegram of August 20 to Berlin, London, and Paris is printed in *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 102.

⁴ See No. 459.

No. 462

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 245 Telegraphic: by bag [C 11101/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 28, 1925

Your telegrams Nos. 310¹ and 312² (of August 26th and 27th. Participation of Italy in jurists' meeting on security).

Councillor of Italian Embassy has made similar suggestion here.³

I agree that participation of Italian expert in jurists' meeting would be inappropriate for reasons given by M. Briand, unless Italian government has decided to participate as the other Powers who are to be represented have already done.

I shall cause Italian Councillor to be so informed and shall add that the sole object is to explain to the Germans the agreed views of the British, French and Belgian governments on the form which the pact should take. At the same time it will be pointed out to Signor Preziosi that there will be ample opportunity while the meeting of the Assembly is being held at Geneva⁴ to explain separately to the Italian representatives what our attitude and proposals are, and that for my part I shall welcome this

¹ See No. 456, n. 1.

² No. 456.

³ In a conversation of August 27 with Mr. Gregory. The record of this conversation is not printed.

⁴ See No. 165, n. 4.

opportunity, more especially if Signor Mussolini is able to be present in person. Signor Preziosi will also be informed that I should be most pleased if Signor Mussolini then found it possible to participate in the pact and thus to come to the subsequent meeting of Foreign Ministers.⁵

Please acquaint M. Briand with foregoing and also with substance of my telegram to Rome No. 244 of August 25th,⁶ and ask M. Briand to support my invitation to Signor Mussolini to meet us in Geneva.

Repeated to Rome No. 247 and Brussels No. 78.

⁵ The Italian Ambassador was so informed in a conversation of August 28 with Mr. Gregory. The record of this conversation is not printed.

⁶ See No. 460, n. 1.

No. 463

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received August 29, 12.45 p.m.)

No. 317 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 11220/459/18]

Very Urgent

PARIS, August 29, 1925

In Monsieur Briand's absence I informed Secretary General as instructed by your telegram No. 245.¹

The situation has now changed as will be explained to you by the French Ambassador² owing to urgent and pressing communications just made to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Rome under Signor Mussolini's instructions by his Chef de Cabinet and by Signor Contarini expressing strong desire for Italian representatives to be present at the jurists' and Ministers' meetings. Signor Mussolini is now evidently highly desirous of participating in the pact, though he could not absolutely guarantee doing so and Monsieur Briand is most anxious to do everything possible to facilitate Italian participation as their guarantee of the Rhine frontier would be of vital interest to France particularly as hitherto the only condition made by Italy is the inviolability of the peace treaties. It seems moreover that the Germans favour the presence of Italian representatives at the meetings and that the Belgians have no objection.

Monsieur Briand has instructed French Chargé d'Affaires at Rome to inform Italian government that he would under these conditions cordially welcome Italian delegates at jurists' and Ministers' meetings but that, before giving his consent, he must consult His Majesty's Government.

Monsieur Berthelot urges that if necessary the jurists' meeting might be

¹ No. 462.

² In a minute of August 29, Mr. Nicolson recorded his conversation of that day with the French Counsellor, M. R. Cambon, on the Italian communications.

postponed until Tuesday³ in order to enable Italian representatives to arrive.

In case you agree, please telegraph direct to Rome and inform me.⁴

³ September 1.

⁴ In Foreign Office telegram No. 250 of August 29 to Rome, Mr. Chamberlain stated: '... I shall welcome presence of Italian representative at jurists' meeting and sincerely trust that Mussolini himself will attend meeting of Ministers.

'Please press that jurist should arrive earliest possible moment. Tuesday morning [September 1] is latest date. Hurst's enforced absence from Geneva [to attend the Jurist's meetings in London] is very inconvenient to me.'

Mr. Ovey replied (Rome telegram No. 207 of August 29) that he had made the communication, and continued: 'Chef de Cabinet expressed appreciation and hoped that Signor Pilotti the Italian representative would be able to leave for London Sunday morning [August 30]. He added that Italian government intended to publish brief communiqué in press regarding Italian participation in jurists' meeting.'

No. 464

Mr. Wellesley to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 184 Telegraphic [C 1139/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 3, 1925, 1.20 p.m.

(Security).

Following for Secretary of State¹ from Sir C. Hurst.

Discussions of the lawyers continued all yesterday.² We have found an acceptable basis for a new article on the pacific settlement of all disputes between Germany and her western neighbours. Various small points on other articles have been arranged without difficulties. Three questions of importance have emerged. The first concerns the extent and operation of the guarantee of the arbitration treaties (article 5).³ The language now used suggests that the guarantee may operate when something less than war occurs. A change of words will correct this. The second concerns the first part of article 6³ and relates to the extent to which arbitration under article 3³ covers provisions in the treaty of peace. The third relates to the French Guarantee of the Polish-German arbitration treaty. It is unlikely that on either of these two latter points the lawyers will be in a position to agree a text. Political issues are raised which can only be settled by Ministers; but our discussions will I hope pave the way for concession by the French on the first and for German acceptance of an alternative scheme on the second. A note shall be prepared for you on these two points.

¹ See No. 457, n. 2. Mr. Chamberlain arrived in Geneva on September 1.

² Informal discussions had taken place on August 31 before the arrival of the Italian representative on September 1. For the account of this meeting by the Belgian representative, M. H. Rolin, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, pp. 316-20. For the meetings on September

2, see *ibid.*, pp. 320-5.

³ Of the Draft Treaty (see No. 440).

Our meetings will probably terminate on Saturday⁴ and I shall leave London⁵ on Sunday.

⁴ September 5.

⁵ i.e. for Geneva (see No. 165, n. 4).

No. 465

Record by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the Belgian Foreign Minister¹ (Received in the Foreign Office, September 7)

[C 11500/459/18]*

BRITISH DELEGATION, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GENEVA, *September 3, 1925*

I had an hour's conversation yesterday with M. Vandervelde in my room. He repeated what he had already told me at our first introduction, that the general lines of the draft pact agreed upon between M. Briand and myself² entirely responded to the ideas of the Belgian Government. He wished, however, to suggest one or two alterations, or perhaps he should rather say, to ask for one or two explanations. Incidentally, he commented on the phrase in the preamble about the treaties of 183[9]³, and said that the language of this phrase was entirely satisfactory to the Belgian Government, since it described that treaty as abrogated, whereas in the proposed Anglo-French treaty recognising the agreement come to between Holland and Belgium the French and British Governments had proposed language which seemed to suggest that Belgium was still in some sort *en tutelle*. Going to the text of the pact, he raised three questions. He enquired in the first place whether the reference in article 2 to articles 42 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles was really necessary, or, indeed, had any meaning, since the words which followed confined the exception in which immediate resort to force was permissible to the single case of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone. This was the case dealt with in article 13 of the Treaty of Versailles, whereas articles 42 and 180 dealt with other infractions into which the element of immediate danger did not enter, and which were therefore reserved by the draft for arbitration and such action as might be advised by the Council of the League. M. Vandervelde suggested, therefore, that the reference to articles 42 and 180 was unnecessary, and that its omission would be agreeable to the Germans.

I replied that, as far as I could see, we need take no objection to the omission of those articles, since the governing words of the exception were, as he had observed, those postulating the assembly of troops in the demilitarised area.

¹ M. Vandervelde was Belgian Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations (see No. 165, n. 4).

² See No. 440.

³ See Nos. 22, n. 3 and 316, n. 1.

M. Vandervelde then touched upon the arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia with France as guarantor in each case, the existence of which was presupposed by our draft, and remarked that he thought that this might prove wholly unacceptable to the Germans. Did M. Briand, and did I, consider the conclusion of such agreements essential to a western pact?

I replied that I could not answer for M. Briand. I had pointed out to him that this was probably the greatest difficulty in the path of the negotiations, but as Great Britain had no intention of guaranteeing those treaties, and was only indirectly interested in so far as they might affect the operation of her guarantee of the western pact, I had felt that it was a matter which in the first instance should be discussed between M. Briand and M. Stresemann. M. Briand had agreed that the arrangement might offer some difficulty, but appeared to feel confident that in conversation with M. Stresemann the difficulty could be overcome.

Finally, M. Vandervelde enquired whether the terms of article 6 of the draft, saving the rights of the parties under the Versailles Treaty, did not conflict with the earlier clauses of the treaty, by which the Allies did, in fact, limit their freedom of action in case of a default in the payment of reparations. M. Vandervelde explained that he was as anxious as Germany to prevent some new Poincaré from undertaking a fresh occupation of the Ruhr.⁴ 'You know', he observed, 'in what difficulties Poincaré's policy involved the late Government of my country.'

I replied that I thought the point was sufficiently dealt with by the words which immediately followed those which he had quoted, and which coupled with the Treaty of Versailles agreements arising out of it, such as the London Agreement of August 1924.⁵

M. Vandervelde said that this might be the case, but could we not state the facts more explicitly? The Germans were extremely sensitive on this point, and he repeated that he entirely shared their anxieties. He thought a clearer statement of what we really intended would facilitate agreement.

I pointed out to him that the British Government had placed on record their view that the occupation of the Ruhr was contrary to the treaty.⁶ His Majesty's Government would be bound by the view which they had publicly expressed, and the French Government would therefore, if a new occupation were carried out in similar circumstances, not only prevent us from guaranteeing France against the consequences of her action, but oblige us to side with Germany in resisting it. I thought it quite inconceivable that in such circumstances any French Government, however chauvinistically inclined, would embark on so disastrous an adventure.

M. Vandervelde shared my interpretation of the treaty and my view of

⁴ For the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr in January, 1923, see Vol. XXI, Chap. I.

⁵ See No. 343, n. 9.

⁶ See Vol. XXI, No. 330, for the note of August 11, 1923, from His Majesty's Government to the French and Belgian Governments.

its consequences upon French policy, but he, nevertheless, thought that the words of the article might be amended with advantage. I suggested that we had better await the report of the jurists' discussion⁷ before coming to any decision, so that we might see whether Herr Gauss had indicated any desire by the Germans to make the changes which he had suggested. In the meantime, however, I said that I should be quite ready to discuss his points with himself and M. Briand.

M. Briand and I invited Signor Scialoja⁸ to join with us and M. Vandervelde in a general examination of the position at the first convenient opportunity.

A.C.

P.S.—I attach a copy of a note⁹ since received from M. Vandervelde giving the points which he wishes to discuss with M. Briand and me.

A.C.

⁷ See Nos. 464 and 466, below.

⁸ Italian Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations (see No. 165, n. 4).

⁹ Not printed.

No. 466

Report by Sir C. Hurst on the Proceedings of a Meeting of Jurists¹ held at the Foreign Office, September 1–4, 1925, in connection with the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee

[C 11425/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 4, 1925

The meetings at the Foreign Office of the legal advisers of the German, Belgian, British, French and Italian Governments lasted from Tuesday, the 1st September, till Friday, the 4th September, 1925.

Copies of the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, which had been prepared by M. Fromageot and Sir C. Hurst as a basis for consideration by their respective Ministers, were communicated to Herr Gaus, M. Rolin and Signor Pilotti. This text (Annex (A))² was used as a basis of discussion at the meetings of the legal advisers.

The following notes contain a résumé of the points which were raised when discussing the draft treaty article by article, and indicate the results of this exchange of views. It must be understood, however, that the new texts which figure in the following notes were only agreed upon as drafts which the legal advisers would lay before their respective Ministers and are in no way binding.

¹ For M. Rolin's report of the meetings (see No. 464, n. 2), see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 104.

² Not printed here. See, however, No. 440.

Preamble

M. Fromageot explained that the various paragraphs in the preamble were not mere rhetoric, as was often the case in treaties, but had been prepared with care and with a desire to mark the reciprocal nature of the treaty.

Sir C. Hurst stated that some importance was attached by the British Government to the third paragraph of the preamble. The reference to the abrogation of the Belgian treaties of 1839³ was introduced in order to meet the criticism which had been made in some quarters that a special treaty to guarantee the part of the Versailles settlement, which related to the Rhineland area and the western frontiers of Germany, would necessarily weaken the part of the treaty which related to the arrangements on the eastern frontiers of Germany. A special guarantee had for eighty years covered this territory on the west of Germany, and its abrogation constituted a suitable opportunity to introduce the new territorial guarantee which the circumstances of the moment required.

The second part of this paragraph embodied a veiled reference to the policy so long maintained by Great Britain that her security was intimately connected with the independence and the stability of the adjacent territory on the east of the narrow seas.

Herr Gaus said that these matters had not as yet been considered at Berlin. They dealt with political questions.

Article 1

Attention was drawn to the fact that only two of the four paragraphs of article 180 operated permanently in the Rhineland demilitarised zone, and it was agreed that it would be better to substitute 'article 180, paragraphs 1 and 3', for 'article 180'. Similar changes would be required in articles 2 and 4.

Article 2

To remove an apparent want of co-ordination between the two paragraphs it was agreed to substitute the following text:—

'La France et la Belgique, d'une part, et l'Allemagne, d'autre part, s'engagent, chacune en ce qui la concerne, à ne se livrer de part et d'autre à aucune attaque ou invasion et à ne recourir de part et d'autre en aucun cas à la guerre.

'Toutefois cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit de s'opposer à une violation de l'engagement ci-dessus, ou d'agir avec l'agrément du Conseil ou de l'Assemblée de la

'France and Belgium of the one part and Germany of the other part severally undertake that they will in no case attack or invade the other or resort to war against the other.

'This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of resistance to action in violation of the above undertaking or in the case of action undertaken in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations, or in case of a

³ See Nos. 22, n. 3 and 316, n. 1.

Société des Nations, ou encore en cas de violation flagrante des articles 42, 43 ou 180 alinéas 1 et 3 du Traité de Versailles, lorsqu'une telle violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire.'

Article 3

This article gave rise to detailed discussions of a technical nature. Questions were raised as to the meaning of the word 'dispute' ('différend'), as to whether, if the word were used in a strict sense, it would cover all questions at issue between States which might lead to war, and as to whether it is possible to render it obligatory upon a State to accept the recommendations of a tribunal or commission on a matter in which the action of that State is within its rights, but is in conflict with the interests of another State.

As a result of these discussions, it was agreed that the article should be redrafted as follows:—

'Prenant en considération les engagements respectivement pris par elles dans l'article 2, l'Allemagne et la France, et l'Allemagne et la Belgique s'engagent à régler par voie pacifique et de la manière suivante toutes questions de quelque nature qu'elles soient, qui viendraient à les diviser et qui n'auraient pu être résolues par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires.

'Toutes questions au sujet desquelles les Parties se contesteraient réciproquement un droit, seront soumises à des juges à la décision desquels les parties s'engagent à se conformer.

'Toute autre question sera soumise à une commission de conciliation et si l'arrangement proposé par cette commission n'est pas agréé par les deux parties, la question sera portée devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations statuant con-

flagrant violation of articles 42, 43 or 180 paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Treaty of Versailles, if such violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone, immediate action is necessary.'

'In view of the undertakings entered into in article 2, Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium, undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein, all questions of every kind which may arise between them, and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy.

'Questions with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision, and the parties undertake to comply with such decision.

'All other questions shall be submitted to a conciliation commission. If the proposals of this commission are not accepted by the two parties, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which will deal with it in accordance with the Covenant.

formément au Pacte.

‘Les modalités de ces méthodes de règlement pacifique sont l’objet de dispositions particulières.’

‘The detailed arrangements for effecting such peaceful settlement shall be the subject of special agreements.’

Article 4

In view of the possible participation of Italy, the language of the third paragraph was modified in order to make it clear that the guarantee would operate as regards any of the guaranteeing Powers if that Power agreed with the Power attacked that there was a flagrant violation and that immediate action was necessary.

It was also agreed that, where the Council of the League was required to frame its conclusions on a case in which action had already been taken under this paragraph, the votes of States which had acted in advance of the Council's finding should not be counted when the Council arrived at its decision, and that words to that effect must be introduced, as the case would not be covered by article 15 of the Covenant. Unless their votes were excluded, the unanimity required for a decision by the Council adverse to the action taken would never be obtained.

The paragraph was altered to read as follows:—

‘3. En case de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent traité ou des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes, chacune des autres Parties contractantes qui reconnaît qu'une telle violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire, prêterait immédiatement son assistance à celle d'entre elles contre laquelle l'acte incriminé est dirigé. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, saisi de la question conformément au premier paragraphe du présent article, fera néanmoins connaître le résultat de ses constatations. Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent en pareil cas à agir en conformité avec les recommandations du Conseil qui auraient recueilli l'unanimité des voix à l'ex-

‘3. In case of a flagrant violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of article 2 of the present treaty or of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles, each of the other contracting parties which agrees that such violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression, and that by reason of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary, will come at once to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the High Contracting Parties undertake to act in accordance with recommendations of the Council, provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the

clusion des voix des représentants des parties engagées dans les hostilités.'

representatives of the parties which have engaged in hostilities.'

Article 5

The wording of article 5 was found to be defective. The use of the words 'resort to force' suggested that the guarantee given to the arbitration treaty would impose on the guaranteeing State the obligation to take military action against the party refusing to comply with the arbitration treaty in cases not covered by article 4 (1), whereas the contrary had been intended. They would also exclude action in some cases which were covered by that provision. The wording was, therefore, altered to read as follows:—

'La stipulation de l'article 3 ci-dessus est placée sous la garantie des Hautes Parties contractantes ainsi qu'il est prévu ci-après:

'The provisions of article 3 above are placed under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided by the following stipulations:—

'(1) Dans le cas où, sans commettre une violation visée à l'article 4, paragraphe 1, une des Puissances mentionnées à l'article 3 refuserait de se conformer aux méthodes de règlement pacifique ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale, l'autre Partie saisira le Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui proposera les mesures à prendre.

'(1) Where one of the Powers referred to in article 3, without committing a breach of article 4, paragraph 1, refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral decision, the other party shall bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken.

'(2) Si l'une des Puissances mentionnées à l'article 3 refuse de se conformer aux méthodes de règlement pacifique ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale et commet une violation visée à l'article 4, paragraphe 1, les dispositions dudit article 4 s'appliqueront.'

'(2) If one of the Powers referred to in article 3 refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral decision, and commits a breach of article 4, paragraph 1, the provisions of the said article shall apply.'

Article 6

The two parts of this article were discussed separately.

Herr Gaus said that he read the first part of this article as not excluding from the operation of the arbitration article (article 3) disputes which might arise as to the meaning and application of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, but the point ought not to be left in obscurity. The German Government accepted the view that the new treaty was not to alter the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, but the rights enjoyed by the Allies under the treaty were in some cases liable to misconception. He

instanced article 279, as to which it had been contended that it gave the Allies the right to appoint consuls without obtaining the exequatur of the German Government. He stated frankly that this question of arbitration was of great importance to Germany in connection with article 44, clauses 17 and 18 of the Reparation Annex II, and articles 429 and 430. He did not suggest that where the treaty gave the Allied Governments the right to decide a question that question should be submitted to arbitration. In such a case the treaty provision would be binding on the arbitrators and they would be bound to hold that the matter was left to the decision of the Allies. To remove any doubt he would prefer to change the order of the articles as follows, viz: 1, 2, 4, 6 (first part), 3, 5; and instead of the existing wording at the beginning of article 6 to make it read: 'Les dispositions des articles précédents ne portent pas atteinte. . . .'

M. Fromageot and Sir C. Hurst explained that there was no intention of excluding arbitration as to the meaning of provisions in the Treaty of Versailles such as article 279, or of the provisions of other treaties, but where a treaty gives the Allied Governments the right to make a decision, that right would naturally not be affected by the arbitration clause of this new agreement. There did not seem to be any advantage in the change in the order of the articles, and this suggestion was abandoned.

It was agreed that on the existing wording of the draft treaty a dispute as to the interpretation of the text of the Treaty of Versailles fell within article 3 and could be made the subject of arbitration proceedings, but wherever the Treaty of Versailles gave the Allied Governments the right to decide a question, the treaty provision would be binding on the arbitrators and they would be obliged to give effect to it.

The second part of article 6 relates to action taken in execution of a French guarantee of a Germano-Polish or a Germano-Czech Arbitration Treaty. This provision relates to matters of high policy, but Herr Gaus said that he did not think any German Government could sign an agreement which formally recognised in this way a French guarantee of an arbitration treaty with Poland. Public opinion against it would be too strong for the Government. It would accentuate their difficulties with Russia and would provoke violent opposition among the parties who supported the policy of maintaining close contact with Russia. It would also be misinterpreted in Berlin as being intended to give France a constant excuse for interfering in matters affecting Germany's relations with Poland. Furthermore, it seemed to him that action taken by France in pursuance of the guarantee must be in accordance with article 16 of the Covenant, and, therefore, the article was superfluous.

M. Fromageot stated that it was part of the scheme outlined in the German memorandum of the 9th February⁴ that arbitration treaties should be concluded by Germany with her eastern neighbours. In the French note of the 26th [sic] June⁵ this intended guarantee was specifically

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁵ See No. 382, n. 2.

mentioned. He believed that it would not be possible for his Government to induce Poland to sign such a treaty with Germany unless it were guaranteed by France. It was as much in the interest of Germany as of France that disputes with Poland should be settled amicably. It must be remembered that the guarantee was reciprocal and would operate in Germany's favour as well as in that of Poland.

Sir C. Hurst explained what he believed to be Mr. Chamberlain's views on this point. Mr. Chamberlain had accepted the idea of a French guarantee of a Germano-Polish arbitration treaty because he considered it offered solid advantages both to Germany and to France.

Herr Gaus took note of these explanations, but said he feared that people in Germany would not understand them.

It was agreed that this subject must be left to be discussed between Ministers.⁶

As regards articles 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the draft, Herr Gaus said he had no remarks to make.

A revised copy of the draft treaty, containing the modifications indicated above, is attached as Annex (B).⁷

CECIL J. B. HURST

⁶ Foreign Office telegram No. 189 to Geneva of September 5 ran: 'Following for Secretary of State from Sir C. Hurst:

'Jurists' meetings finished yesterday. Agreement was reached on all points save French guarantee of eastern arbitration treaties which is question for ministers. New text of certain articles was agreed but on the footing that it binds neither ministers nor governments.'

⁷ Not printed.

No. 467

Note by Sir C. Hurst

[C 11455/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 5, 1925*

I annex the report¹ of the meetings of the legal advisers of the British, French, German, Belgian and Italian Governments as to the technical details of the Security Pact. We came to the conclusion that it would be better that the report should be in the form of a report by me to the Secretary of State, rather than a joint report by all of us, but the terms of this report by me were discussed and settled between the five of us, and copies of it are being supplied to the other legal advisers for communication to their respective Governments. One of the reasons which made me propose this form of report, though I did not mention it to my colleagues, was that the Belgian and Italian representatives, particularly the Italian,

¹ No. 466.

did not take a very prominent part in the discussions. It is, of course, to be understood that when the report mentions a new text as being substituted for the old text, our work was merely *ad referendum*, as we were not in a position to commit any of our Governments.

The only question upon which we were unable to arrive at a recommendation which we could each submit to our respective Ministers was in connection with the French guarantee of the Polish Arbitration Treaty. In the first draft of my report I set out at length the reasons, so far as I understood them, which led the Secretary of State to accept the French view as regards the guarantee of an arbitration treaty, but after talking the matter over with M. Fromageot the paragraphs were cut out, because he was rather afraid of such arguments appearing in a paper which would get into the hands of the Italian and the Belgian Governments. His reason certainly was not that the explanations I gave were inaccurate, as he thanked me effusively for them. It may be useful, therefore, if I set out here the passages I suppressed:—

‘Sir C. Hurst explained that he believed Mr. Chamberlain had accepted the idea that France should guarantee a Germano–Polish Arbitration Treaty because the Franco–Polish military alliance² existed, and France was bound to fulfil the engagements she had entered into with Poland. The Polish Government was inclined sometimes to act hastily, and there was always a risk that Poland, feeling that France was bound to support her, might take some unwise action and precipitate a conflict with Germany. In case of a Polish attack on Germany, France would be in a difficult situation if the obligations of the alliance with Poland obliged her to support Poland, while her obligations as a member of the League obliged her to resist Poland and support Germany. The proposed guarantee of a Germano–Polish Arbitration Treaty would, therefore, not merely diminish the risk of armed conflict in the east, but would bring the existing treaty arrangements more into harmony with the system of the League and enable France to exercise a moderating influence on Poland. He understood Mr. Chamberlain to consider that these were solid advantages, not merely to France but also to Germany.’

M. Gaus fully grasped the explanations which were given upon this point, and I hope they may have some effect in Berlin; but I think it is unlikely, judging by his attitude, that when the meeting of Ministers takes place it will be found that Germany is prepared to accept the specific mention of a French guarantee of a Polish Arbitration Treaty in the Security Pact. It would look like a formal recognition by Germany of the Franco–Polish military alliance, but I cannot see why an alternative scheme should not satisfy Poland and achieve all that France has in mind.

That alternative scheme is that France should give a unilateral guarantee to Poland of such a Germano–Polish Arbitration Treaty in a

² See No. 187.

separate instrument of which official notice would be given to the League, and Germany therefore would have knowledge of it. This separate instrument would enable France, if Germany attacked Poland without fulfilling the terms of the arbitration treaty, to take action against Germany, because such German action would violate article 16 of the Covenant and that article would justify the French action. The terms of article 7 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee would enable such French action to be taken against Germany without violating the terms of the pact.

At one time in the course of our discussions it looked as if M. Fromageot would not be able to agree with Dr. Gaus as to the extent to which the arbitration clause in the draft pact enabled Germany to demand an arbitration as to the interpretation of provisions in the Treaty of Versailles, but our discussions cleared away any difficulty on this point as shown in the report.

During our meetings in London M. Fromageot prepared a rough draft of the special Franco-German Arbitration Treaty and showed it to Dr. Gaus. He also gave me a copy, but it is not quite complete, as one article has yet to be prepared for the purpose of restraining either party from taking measures to prejudice the other during the progress of the arbitration. I do not think there is likely to be any difficulty between Paris and Berlin with regard to the terms of this instrument, but I do not feel quite so sure that M. Rolin sees eye to eye with M. Fromageot as to the contents of such an arbitration treaty.

The only incident that disturbed the success of our meetings in any way was the series of articles published in the 'Daily Telegraph'.³ These articles purported to give detailed accounts of what was going on, and attributed various views to individual members of our meetings. They annoyed M. Rolin and Dr. Gaus extremely, and in the end we had to ask the News Department to take measures to warn the foreign journalists that these articles were pure invention, and to beg them not to telegraph their contents to their respective capitals.⁴ Both Dr. Gaus and M. Rolin, and to a less extent M. Pilotti, were frightened that the preposterous views which the 'Daily Telegraph' correspondent was attributing to them would do great harm if they were published in their respective capitals. All the other newspapers have behaved with the utmost discretion.

C. J. B. HURST

³ See *Daily Telegraph*, September 1, p. 9, September 2, p. 9, September 3, p. 10, September 4, p. 8, September 5, p. 10, and September 7, p. 8.

⁴ The action taken was reported in a Foreign Office telegram of September 4, No. 253 to Paris, No. 175 to Berlin, No. 255 to Rome, No. 89 to Brussels, No. 46 to Warsaw, and No. 13 to Prague, which continued: 'Should the articles in question be reproduced or referred to in the press in the country to which you are accredited, please take such action as you properly can to counteract their effect. . . .'

*Memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain (Received in the Foreign Office,
September 11)*

[C 11670/459/18]*

GENEVA, September 9, 1925

MM. Briand,¹ Vandeveld, Scialoja and I met in my room this morning to consider the results of the jurists' conversations.² M. Briand expressed the view that they were broadly satisfactory and that some of the small changes were even an improvement on the original draft.³

He recognised that the eastern frontiers formed the great stumbling-block, but suggested that the difficulty about the French guarantee might perhaps be overcome by putting the eastern treaties under the guarantee of the League with France acting in some sort as the agent of the League for enforcing them. He had suggested this idea to M. Skrzynski,⁴ who was not altogether unfavourable to it.

M. Vandeveld approved and added that the idea would certainly be favourably received by M. Benes.⁵ I see no objection, and this idea may develop into some suggestion acceptable to Germany.

M. Briand dwelt forcibly on the dangers involved to Europe if the possibility of war in Eastern Europe is not excluded. If Germany contemplated war, it could only be as the result of a return to the Bismarckian policy of a Russian alliance which would expose all European civilisation to the perils of Bolshevism. Certainly at this moment the Soviet Government was doing all it could to dissuade Germany from entering into any pact,⁶ and both the Soviet and German Governments were encouraging and inciting Turkey to resist a settlement of the Mosul question.⁷

M. Scialoja preserved the attitude of an observer. Such observations as he made had only a personal character.

We decided to ask M. Mussolini to say what place in Switzerland would be most convenient to him for the meeting of Ministers and then to invite the German Government to send representatives to meet us there towards the end of this month or at latest in the beginning of October. I declined

¹ M. Briand was an Assistant French Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations (see No. 165, n. 4).

² See Nos. 464, 466, and 467.

³ See No. 440.

⁴ See No. 455, n. 2.

⁵ Dr. Beneš was Czechoslovak Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations.

⁶ See No. 436.

⁷ i.e. the frontier between Iraq and Turkey in the oil-rich vilayet of Mosul. Great Britain and Turkey had referred the question to the League of Nations. For the Thirty-Fifth Council's discussion of the question, see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 1307-37, 1377-86 and 1404-5. See also *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. 1 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1927), pp. 471-531, and Vol. VII, No. 12, Vol. VIII, Nos. 2 and 16, and Vol. XVIII, Nos. 228, 257, 273, 322, 325, 334, 340, 342, 344, 345, 370, 606, 632 and 635.

to waive in favour of Italy my claim to have London chosen as the meeting place if it was not thought necessary to choose a neutral country.

The question of the relation of Poland and Czechoslovakia to this ministerial meeting was raised. Their representatives did not ask to be present at our conversations on the Western Pact, but especially for the effect on their own public opinion they urged that we must not appear to have decided their fate also without consulting them, thus leaving them no alternative except either to appear as the cause of the failure of the whole project or as submissively receiving a decision dictated to them by us. They asked therefore for simultaneous but separate conversations in the same place.

I proposed that we should begin with the Western Pact. This was the easiest part of the subject, and any solution adopted for it might perhaps serve as a model or at least a starting-point for discussions on the more thorny subject of the eastern frontiers. Thus perhaps the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia might be invited to join us forty-eight or even twenty-four hours after our first meeting. This suggestion was approved by MM. Briand and Vandeveldé.

There are some rather grave indications that Germany is unwilling to put in black and white the assurances given in Paris and repeated to Lord D'Abernon after the debate in the House of Commons of the 24th March⁸ that she renounces recourse to war as a method of securing a change in the eastern frontiers.⁹ Herr Gaus apparently explained that the German Government could not sign a document definitely renouncing recourse to war for this purpose, but that they were willing to tie themselves up with such conditions that recourse to war would in fact be impossible.

M. Briand took this amazingly well and said he was not going to quarrel about words.

⁸ See No. 269.

⁹ See No. 274.

No. 469

*Memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain (Received in the Foreign Office,
September 15)*

[W 8775/9/98]*

[GENEVA], September 11, 1925

After discussion with Lord Cecil,¹ Sir G. Grahame¹ and Mr. Amery,¹ and prolonged negotiations between the French and myself, we agreed that we could recommend the Empire delegation to support the enclosed resolution. It is not one which I should be prepared to propose myself, nor would the French delegation be prepared to put it forward as their

¹ A member of the British Delegation at Geneva.

own proposition; but we both felt that we could accept it if it came from some other quarter, and the delegate of Spain² has consented to father it. I held a meeting of the first members of all of the British delegations this morning, and received their assent. The words 'arbitration, security and disarmament' were added at the end of the fourth paragraph, as a definition of the principles of the Protocol,³ to meet the views of the representatives of Australia and New Zealand, who feared that without a definition the principles might be held to include the Japanese amendment.⁴

ENCLOSURE IN No. 469

Resolution

L'Assemblée,

Profondément attachée à la cause de la paix et convaincue que le besoin actuel le plus pressant est le rétablissement de la confiance mutuelle entre les nations;

Proclamant à nouveau que la guerre d'agression constitue un crime international;

Prenant acte des déclarations produites devant le Conseil et l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations au sujet du Protocole³ pour le règlement pacifique des différends internationaux et du fait que ledit Protocole n'a pas reçu jusqu'à présent un nombre suffisant de ratifications pour recevoir une application immédiate;

Voit avec faveur l'effort fait par certaines nations pour faire progresser ces questions par la conclusion de traités de sécurité mutuelle conçus dans l'esprit du Pacte de la Société des Nations lui-même et qui sont en harmonie avec les principes du Protocole—arbitrage, sécurité, désarmement;

Constate que de tels accords ne doivent pas nécessairement être limités à une région restreinte mais peuvent s'appliquer au monde entier;

Exprime le désir que, après le dépôt de ces Pactes à la Société des Nations, le Conseil les étudie afin de faire un rapport à la septième Assemblée⁵ sur le progrès que ces pactes auront fait faire à la sécurité générale;

S'engage à nouveau à travailler à l'établissement de la paix par la sûre méthode de l'arbitrage, de la sécurité et du désarmement;

² Señor Quiñones de León.

³ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁴ For the Japanese amendment to Article 5 of the draft Geneva Protocol, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Meetings of the Committees: Minutes of the First Committee (Constitutional Questions)* (Geneva, 1924), p. 105. For the discussion in the First Committee in September 1924, of this article which raised the question of the domestic jurisdiction of states, see *ibid.*, pp. 45–91, *passim*. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand feared that such an amendment might lead to international discussion of their embargo on Japanese immigration.

⁵ This met in Geneva September 6–25, 1926.

Et invite le Conseil à préparer l'organisation d'une conférence en vue de la réduction des armements dès qu'il estimera que, du point de vue de la sécurité générale, des conditions satisfaisantes ont été réalisées et comme il est prévu dans la résolution XIV de la troisième Assemblée.⁶

⁶ The Third Assembly met in Geneva September 4-30, 1922. For Resolution XIV, adopted on September 27, 1922, see *League of Nations: Records of the Third Assembly: Plenary Meetings: Texts of the Debates*, vol. 1 (Geneva, 1922), p. 291.

No. 470

Record by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister¹ (Received in the Foreign Office, September 15)

[C 11813/459/18]*

GENEVA, September 11, 1925

M. Skrzynski came to see me on the 9th September at my invitation. I told him that I had replied very frankly to all the questions put to me in London by M. Skirmunt,² that I knew that the French Government had informed him in detail of all that had passed between them and me and between us and the Germans, and that I should be glad to have his views on the situation as it had developed since he and I had met in March.³

M. Skrzynski appeared to me, both then and next evening when he dined with me, preoccupied and anxious about the situation of Poland and the opinion entertained of her by other Powers. He admitted that the Government and public of the United States of America (he returned a few weeks ago from a visit to America)⁴ approved the policy of the Mutual Pact, and were inclined to regard Poland as the obstacle to peace. He repeated his former assurances that he did not wish to be a *trouble fête* or place any difficulties in our way, but he urged that, if Germany once got her pact with France and Great Britain, she would snap her fingers at Poland, refuse to treat with her and prepare for a *revanche*. He urged that my action would be decisive as to the attitude of Germany, which must have large credits at an early date and would not get them without the pact. If I insisted on a settlement with Poland, a settlement there would be; Germany could not refuse. On the other hand, if the Western Pact were concluded without a settlement of the eastern frontiers, no such settlement would ever be reached, war would break out there again, and do and say what we might Great Britain would inevitably be involved in a conflagration which would destroy all Europe and perhaps embrace the world.

It took me a long time to find out what exactly M. Skrzynski was aiming

¹ Count Skrzynski was Polish Delegate to the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations (see No. 160, n. 4).

² See No. 430.

³ See No. 247.

⁴ See No. 455, n. 2.

at. At last it appeared that it was the participation of Italy in these conversations, whilst Poland was excluded, that had excited Polish opinion. What had Italy got to do with the matter? She was not going to join in the guarantee. She was not interested in the Rhine frontier. Poland was interested, for Poland had guaranteed France no less than France had guaranteed Poland, and on her side France *could* not desert the Poles.

I replied that Italy participated on the basis that, whether interested or not, she at any rate contemplated the possibility of joining, and indeed desired to join in a guarantee of the Western Pact.⁵ But I told M. Skrzynski that I recognised the strength of his position if he asked that the Western Powers should not decide the eastern questions in the absence of representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia. I believed that M. Briand also felt the force of this argument,⁶ and he and I were, I believed, agreed to endeavour to secure the presence of himself and Dr. Benes to discuss the eastern problem in the same place, and even in the same week, in which our conversations began; but I desired our first conversations with the Germans to be on that part of the negotiations which offered the least difficulty, namely, the Rhineland Agreement. The subject of an agreement for the east had probably best be first discussed between Germany and her eastern neighbours, with the assistance of M. Briand if that were desired; but in any case I should be at their disposal if my presence were desired, and if it was thought that my help would be useful.

M. Skrzynski expressed himself satisfied if the conversations with Poland began *in the same place and the same week* as the conversations between Germany and the Western Powers.

A.C.

⁵ See No. 463.

⁶ See No. 468.

No. 471

Mr. Wellesley (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Addison¹ (Berlin)

No. 181 Telegraphic [C 11673/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 12, 1925, 3.15 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram (of September 12th.² Security).
Following is translation of French note.³

¹ Chargé d'Affaires September 1-21.

² Foreign Office telegram No. 180 which ran as follows: 'My immediately following telegram contains the text of a note which the French Ambassador in Berlin has been instructed by Monsieur Briand to communicate to the German Government on the subject of the security negotiations.'

'The French note is to be communicated to the German Government on September 15th.

'You should present a note to the same effect on behalf of His Majesty's Government concerning your action with that of your French colleague.'

³ For the French text, see *Pacte de Sécurité. II*, op. cit., p. 10.

Begins:—

When communicating the note of August 24th⁴ to M. Stresemann, the French Ambassador, acting on instructions, informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the French government, in agreement with their allies, considered that, if the note referred to were favourably received by the German government, it would be of advantage to accelerate the conclusion of the negotiations by a meeting of legal experts and ultimately by a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the states concerned.

After the conversations which have just taken place between the jurists in London⁵ it appears to the French government and to their allies that it is to the common interest of the nations concerned that the negotiations should not be spun out and that the time has come to fix a date for the meeting of the suggested conference.

For this purpose the end of September or at latest the first days of October would be a convenient time. The conference might take place in neutral territory, preferably in Switzerland, in a locality to be fixed later by agreement between the governments.

The French government and their allies earnestly hope that these proposals will meet with the approval of the German government and that the latter will shortly be in a position to communicate to them their assent. End.

Repeated to Paris No. 259 (*By Bag*), Brussels No. 92 and Rome No. 262.

⁴ See No. 449, n. 2.

⁵ See Nos. 464, 466, and 467.

No. 472

Memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain
(Received in the Foreign Office, September 15)

[C 11815/459/18]*

GENEVA, September 12, 1925

For anyone placed as I am at this moment at the head of the British delegation to the Assembly,¹ and perhaps more particularly for one who, like myself, is also Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is interesting to compare the public debates of the Assembly with the conversations in the lobbies, or at the dinners and luncheons which bring the Ministers together, or again in their private interviews. I say that it is interesting; a cynic would choose a different word to express his thought, for one cannot wholly escape the oppression caused by the wide divergence which exists between the views expressed in the lobby and the sentiments uttered in the tribune. If Great Britain and the British Empire exercise in the long run the influence which is due to their position and their policy, it will be because

¹ See No. 165, n. 4.

we hold but one language whether on the stage or in the coulisses, because our policy and attitude, however strange or insular they may at first appear to foreign nations, are found by experience to be the true expression of our thoughts and convictions, and because it may thus in time come to be realised that what we say we mean, what we promise we perform, and that, if we are less ready than others to indulge in fine phrases and to win applause by emotional appeals, it is not because we cannot experience for ourselves or appreciate in others these elevated sentiments, but because we are less ready to raise hopes which we cannot fulfil or to give lip service to principles which we cannot put into practice.

These reflections occur to me as, at the moment of my departure, I review the speeches to which I have listened and the conversations in which I have taken part.

M. Boncour,² M. Hymans,³ M. Benes, M. Skrzynski, and I know not what others have mounted, or will mount the tribune of the Assembly to profess the deep and even passionate attachment of themselves and of the nations which they represent to the protocol.⁴ Yet there is not one of them who in private even affects to pretend that that protocol, if it had been adopted universally and without the alteration of a phrase or a word, would have settled the question of security and reassured their countrymen. The French Government have never concealed their view that the protocol by itself was insufficient, that to make it an effective guarantee it required not only the continuance of the existing French alliances⁵ but their completion by an Anglo-French Treaty. M. Hymans proclaimed this doctrine from the tribune. M. Skrzynski implied it throughout his conversation with me⁶ in his insistence on the paramount importance of the line which I might take in the conversations with Germany. M. Benes, who claims to be in large measure its author, does not hesitate to tell me that it is not what he would have wished, and assures me that, protocol or no protocol, Czechoslovakia is safe if Great Britain can make peace secure between France and Germany. M. Uden⁷ had already expressed to me his apprehensions of the possible implications of the protocol, and of the obligations which it might throw on Sweden. The representative of one of the South American States has assured me that regional agreements on the British model are much better suited than the protocol to South American conditions, particularly as avoiding all danger of complications with the United States. Finally, M. Nintchitch⁸ sought me out this morning to say that, if a pact were successfully negotiated with Germany, peace in Europe would be assured. It was the rivalries of the Great Powers which rendered possible or provoked wars. The smaller Powers would keep the

² M. Paul-Boncour was an Assistant French Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations (see No. 165, n. 4).

³ Belgian Delegate to the Council.

⁴ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 187.

⁶ See No. 470.

⁷ Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Delegate to the Council.

⁸ Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegate to the Assembly.

peace if the Great Powers were agreed among themselves and, indeed, if the Great Powers were so agreed, they could in case of need impose peace on any small nation which might seek to disturb it.

Upon the whole I am disposed to say that none of them, except perhaps the Pole, are inclined to shed tears over the protocol, though they will continue to sing its praises, to place wreaths on its tomb, and to predict for it a joyful resurrection. It is beginning to be seen that the policy of His Majesty's Government offers at once greater prospects of success and, in case of success, a surer guarantee of peace.

A.C.

No. 473

Record by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister (Received in the Foreign Office, September 15)

[C 11814/459/18]*

GENEVA, September 12, 1925

I am not surprised that I found M. Skrzynski in a troubled mood.¹ Yesterday at a luncheon of eight or ten people, in an English villa where Mr. Samuel² was present, M. Briand described Poland as 'the rheumatism of Europe'; and in a long and very interesting exposition of his views, which M. Benes gave me later in the afternoon, he dwelt with emphasis on the difference between the situation of Czechoslovakia and that of Poland, and on the impossibility for him to take exactly the same line as Poland, or to commit Czechoslovakia to the same engagements towards Poland as it had undertaken towards France.³ M. Benes, it is true, also expressed his desire not to isolate the Poles, but he repeated that the interests of the two countries were not the same, nor did they stand in the same danger; and with whatever friendly phrases he may have clothed this difference of opinion when talking to M. Skrzynski, the Polish Minister must see that he can only count upon M. Benes's help up to a certain point. It is, I think, also evident from the manner in which M. Briand has spoken to me and others of Poland, and from what M. Benes said of M. Skrzynski's irritation at the language held to him by M. Briand, that France has also made it clear that there are limits beyond which, however loyal to her ally, she cannot subordinate her own interests to the unreasonable exigencies of the Poles.

M. Benes recalled the account he had given me some time ago⁴ of the

¹ See No. 470.

² Mr. A. M. Samuel, Unionist M.P. for the Farnham Division of Surrey, was Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and a Substitute Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations (see No. 165, n. 4).

³ See No. 187.

⁴ The record of this conversation between Mr. Chamberlain and Dr. Beneš at Rome on December 11, 1924 (W 10866/909/98), is not printed.

part which he had played in reconciling the divergence of views between Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot and in framing the protocol.⁵ He was, of course, a supporter of the protocol, but he must say that some of its provisions were inserted against his advice and that he did not like them. In any case, the protocol was now impossible, and he repeated that he was whole-heartedly in favour of our proposed Rhineland Pact. The interest of Czechoslovakia was to see Germany peaceful and France secure. Unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia was menaced by no danger if France was not involved in war. Only if France became engaged would the existence of Czechoslovakia be menaced and that country drawn inevitably into the struggle.

But there was another reason why he welcomed the pact with its proposed accompaniment of a new agreement between Czechoslovakia and Germany. The French alliance³ was vague and general. He welcomed the limitations imposed in our sketch of the Western Pact⁶ upon automatic resort to war, and he would be glad to see the obligations of France to Czechoslovakia and of Czechoslovakia to France thus limited and defined. At present the definition or absence of a definition of aggression left the obligations of each party so vague that they might be called upon to intervene in consequence of some petty frontier incident, such as should be resolved by arbitration or conciliation and not be allowed to involve a recourse to war, and yet for the same reason help might fail in a real crisis. He therefore saw a direct interest for Czechoslovakia in the success of the pact negotiations and wished them well from the bottom of his heart. Nor did he desire to take any part in the discussions in regard to the arrangements to which Great Britain proposed to be a party. He would be quite content if in the future as in the past he might be kept in touch with what we were doing and allowed, if necessary, to submit his views to us. On the other hand, he used the same arguments which M. Skrzynski had employed as to the danger of finally concluding the Western Pact without having covered the questions concerning the eastern frontiers. Not only would Germany be far more intractable in all questions relating to Poland and Czechoslovakia if she had already secured a pact with the western Powers, but Poland herself would be more difficult to deal with if the western arrangements were carried to a conclusion before her representatives were brought into the discussion. Both he and M. Skrzynski had to consider their public opinion, and M. Skrzynski's position would become almost impossible if his countrymen felt that their fate was being decided in the absence of any representative of Poland. M. Benes suggested that it might be embarrassing for me if the western and the eastern questions were dealt with in a single conference, but he begged that representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia might be summoned to our place of meeting, there to carry on parallel and simultaneous negotiations with the Germans.

⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁶ See Nos. 440 and 466.

I made the same reply to M. Benes that I had made to M. Skrzynski. It was obvious that the policy of pacification, which I was endeavouring to pursue by means of the Western Pact, would not be complete without some parallel and simultaneous arrangement in the east. This, indeed, had been clearly indicated in the communications which M. Briand had made to the Germans in agreement with the Allies.⁷ It was, of course, clearly understood that Great Britain could undertake no fresh obligations in respect of the eastern frontiers beyond those which already attached to every member of the Society of Nations; but it was not on that account to be inferred that we took no interest in the peace of that part of Europe, nor could I conceive that I could be in any way embarrassed, in handling public opinion in Great Britain, by the fact that conversations on this subject were going on at the same time and in the same place as the western negotiations. I was anxious that the first meeting with the Germans should be confined to the western Powers and Italy, if she were prepared to join us, and that our first contact should be taken on the easiest part of the problem, where fewest susceptibilities would be aroused and success might be most readily attained; but I had always felt (and I understood that M. Briand and M. Vandervelde took the same view)⁸ that at a very early date it would be necessary for us to propose to the Germans that Polish and Czechoslovakian representatives should be invited and that the eastern questions should be simultaneously treated. I had always supposed that conversations about the eastern frontiers would best begin between the Powers immediately interested, among which might possibly be included France, but I should have no objection to attending the discussions if the presence of a representative of Great Britain were desired and if it was thought that I could be of any use in assisting the parties to come to an agreement.

M. Benes had dwelt upon the necessity to Czechoslovakia of a French guarantee, even though, as he had explained, he would prefer that that guarantee should conform more nearly to the terms suggested for the British guarantee in the west than to the present Treaty of Alliance between France and Czechoslovakia.³ Referring to this insistence on a French guarantee, I dwelt upon the difficulties, perhaps amounting to impossibilities, which its acceptance would present to the Germans, and I begged M. Benes to consider very carefully whether the same result might not, in fact, be obtained in some manner not only less offensive to German pride, but to criticism than that which we had at first contemplated. M. Benes said that he had already had some discussion with M. Fromageot and Sir Cecil Hurst upon this subject. He was giving it his close attention, for he was anxious to come to the conference prepared with a practical proposal, and in full possession of all the difficulties and all the possibilities of the problem. He should continue to study it carefully between now and the date of the meeting.

⁷ On June 16 and August 24 (see Nos. 382, n. 2 and 449, n. 2).

⁸ See No. 468.

Finally, M. Benes thanked me warmly for receiving him and for the time which I had accorded to him in the midst of a very busy week to express his views, and he assured me that he was entirely satisfied with what I had said, and felt that our policy and views were in close harmony.
A.C.

No. 474

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

*No. 709 [C 11210/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 12, 1925*

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 398 of the 26th August¹ reporting a conversation with the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the proposed Rhineland pact.

2. I note Count Skrzynski suggested that nothing would help so powerfully to moderate German antagonism towards Poland as a categorical statement by His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin 'that His Majesty's Government in their present negotiations do not even contemplate the possibility of a modification of Poland's frontiers as established by the Treaty of Versailles and the subsequent arrangements made in execution of that treaty'.

3. I fully realise how welcome to Poland a statement of this nature would be and I imagine that it was this consideration which was uppermost in Count Skrzynski's mind, for I cannot believe—and I cannot credit him with the belief—that it would assist in moderating German antagonism towards Poland. In any case it is, of course, quite out of the question for me to authorise any such statement on behalf of His Majesty's Government either by Lord D'Abernon or by anyone else, for Count Skrzynski evidently desires that even peaceful means of modifying the frontier shall be ruled out. To this His Majesty's Government naturally cannot assent. The right of Germany to seek the modification of her eastern frontier by friendly and direct negotiations with Poland or eventually by appeal to article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations cannot be denied, though the unwisdom of such action on her part is so apparent that, as you will be aware from previous correspondence, I have done my best to discourage Germany from making an attempt to call her eastern frontier in question either now or for some considerable time after her entry into the League.

4. The correspondence already published regarding the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee² and my own speeches in the House of

¹ No. 455.

² i.e. Cmd. 2435, op. cit.

Commons contain declarations which ought to be amply sufficient to allay Polish apprehensions regarding the attitude of His Majesty's Government on the question of Germany's eastern frontier.

5. In the first place I would draw your attention again to the following passage from my speech of the 24th March³ which I quoted in my despatch No. 277 of the 3rd April:—⁴

'It is equally obvious that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, our obligations could not be extended in respect of every frontier. That is one reason, the main reason, why we rejected the Protocol. It was because it was a universal extension of our obligations of the most serious kind. But we thought that what we could not do in every sphere we might properly undertake, and advise our people to undertake, in that sphere with which we were most closely connected. But it must be made quite clear that, in trying to underpin the Covenant and to stabilise peace in the west, we were not licensing or legitimising war elsewhere; that to enter into fresh engagements of a mutual character, turning into a friendly agreement, voluntarily made on both sides, what is now a peace imposed by the victors on the vanquished, that that must not be held to be an encouragement to those who were defeated yesterday to try and reopen conclusions in other spheres. On the contrary, we held that by the mere fact of stabilising peace in the west you would give an additional guarantee to the frontiers of the east.'

6. A further declaration on the same lines appeared in my published despatch⁵ to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris of the 28th May.⁶ It read as follows:—

'The basic principle, then, by which His Majesty's Government are guided in their approach to the matter now under discussion is, and must be, that any new obligation which they undertake shall be specific and limited to the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangement of the western frontier of Germany. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to assume fresh obligations elsewhere in addition to those already devolving upon them as signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the peace treaties. At the same time, it may be well to repeat that, in seeking means to strengthen the position in the west, His Majesty's Government do not themselves question, or give any encouragement to others to question, the other provisions of the treaties which form the basis of the existing public law of Europe.'

7. I took the opportunity to emphasise this passage by repeating it in my speech in the House of Commons on the 24th June,⁷ and I added the following statements:—

'I desire to repeat that, in seeking to make that frontier secure and to prevent war from breaking out there, nothing could be further

³ See No. 269.

⁴ No. 287.

⁵ See Cmd. 2435, No. 6.

⁶ No. 349.

⁷ See No. 388, n. 4.

from our thoughts than to cast any doubt upon the stability of the position elsewhere or on the sanctity of the obligations imposed by other provisions of the treaties. . . . The idea that we should set to work within six years of the signature of the treaty, and, after all the labour they involved, rewrite the boundaries of Europe and tear up the settlements then arrived at—to try to create a fresh one—seems to me to be an idea that cannot be conceivable to anyone outside Bedlam. I am certain that, whatever their intention, whatever their object, those who at this time raise these frontier questions, and keep the minds of the nations concerned unsettled and disturbed, are not serving the interests of peace or the renewal of the prosperity of Europe.'

8. Beyond these declarations I am unable to go, but they are themselves so explicit that should Count Skrzynski at any time revert to the subject I request that you will recall them to his Excellency's attention.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 475

Mr. Chamberlain¹ to Sir G. Grahame² (Geneva)

Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 11799/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 14, 1925, 11.30 a.m.*

I am concerned by the freedom with which Monsieur Skrzynski appears to have spoken to French press correspondents about my confidential conversation with him.³ Nothing is more likely to make the realisation of his wish difficult or even impossible than to speak as if we had already taken decisions which concern Germany without consultation with her and that she had nothing to do but to accept what we have decided. Monsieur Briand and I have been most careful to avoid any such appearance and to make it clear that we meet Germany as an equal for an open discussion within the limits fixed by the exchange of notes.

Please speak to Monsieur Skrzynski and Monsieur Benes in this sense and say to both that I trust that the greatest discretion may be henceforth practised and nothing said or done that will make it more difficult for the Western Powers to secure for them the meeting which they both desire.⁴

Inform Lord Cecil.²

¹ Mr. Chamberlain had returned to London from Geneva on September 13.

² See No. 469, n. 1.

³ See No. 470.

⁴ Geneva telegram No. 322 of September 15 in reply ran: 'Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs while professing to be unconscious of any indiscretion declares now that he understands necessity for great circumspection.'

'M. Benés said he had noticed statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is himself fully alive to the danger to which you draw attention and wishes you to know that he has not said anything and will not say anything to the press on the subject.'

No. 476

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 16, 9 a.m.)

No. 335 Telegraphic [C 11848/459/19]

BERLIN, September 15, 1925, 8.20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 182.¹

French Ambassador communicated a memorandum to Minister for Foreign Affairs at midday today.² I consequently visited Minister for Foreign Affairs at 12.30 and gave him a note³ extending an invitation on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would take the matter up at once after returning from his visit to the Ruhr. He anticipates that necessary formalities—such as a meeting of the Cabinet and consultation with the various state governments and foreign affairs committee of the Reichstag—will take a very short time and that reply of German government will be despatched to both communications respectively on or about 22nd instant. He will probably propose that conference shall begin on Monday the 5th of October and he favours Lucerne as place of meeting. In all likelihood he will only be accompanied by Doctor Luther as German nationals are now opposing instead of urging inclusion of Schiele.⁴ German nationals were now anxious to reserve to themselves possibility of posing as principals after the event instead of being accessories before the fact, but their attitude was dictated merely by considerations of internal policy which in the long run were of no importance.

Repeated to Geneva.

¹ Of September 14, not printed.

² See No. 471, n. 3.

³ A copy of this note of September 15 was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 530 of September 15, not printed.

⁴ See No. 409, n. 5.

No. 477

Mr. London (Geneva) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 16, 8.10 p.m.)

No. 324 Telegraphic [W 8824/9/98]

Very Urgent

GENEVA, September 16, 1925, 6.40 p.m.

Third Committee¹ is debating disarmament proposal and British

¹ For the meetings of the Third Committee, see *League of Nations: Records of the Sixth Assembly: Meetings of the Committees: Minutes of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments)* (Geneva, 1925).

representative will have tomorrow to express opinion thereupon. So far all speakers have been favourable to reference to a committee of work preparatory to a disarmament conference. If we take up simply negative attitude some resolution in this sense will nevertheless be passed.² I suggest that we should propose modification (of Hungarian amendment³ to Spanish resolution)⁴ providing that Council be asked to consider what steps it would be useful to take preparatory to disarmament conference, and to appoint any committee for the purpose which they may think desirable. It is understood that no conference will be summoned until satisfactory conditions of security have been achieved. Boncour strongly urges some action in this direction. British Empire Delegation divided in opinion but none would be much opposed to this proposal.⁵

² Commenting on this telegram, which he did not see until after the reply (No. 478, below) had been sent, Mr. Chamberlain stated (September 17): 'Busybodies want to do "something" [and] don't know what. Provided they keep to machinery or setting out of problems *without* offering solutions no great harm will be done.'

³ For a text, see . . . *Minutes of the Third Committee* . . . , op. cit., p. 12.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 11. See also No. 469, Enclosure.

⁵ In Geneva despatch No. 2 of September 16, Lord Cecil gave a detailed account of the meeting of the Third Committee on September 15.

No. 478

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 207 Telegraphic [W 8824/9/98]

Very Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 17, 1925, 2.05 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 324.¹

Following for British delegation:—

We have not had time to take instructions of Secretary of State, who is in the country, but subject to his views we agree that your proposed amendment is improvement on Hungarian proposal.² As it is not clear what really useful preparatory work could be done much in advance of the time when sufficient progress will have been made in security to justify convocation of conference, might it not be better to modify your wording to read 'and to appoint a committee for the purpose if they think it desirable'?

We think it important it should be perfectly clear that no conference will be summoned until satisfactory conditions of security have been attained. Any conference held before then would do more harm than good.

Prime Minister has seen and approves.

¹ No. 477.

² See *ibid.*, n. 3.

Mr. London (Geneva) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 18, 2.20 p.m.)

No. 331 Telegraphic [W 8909/9/98]

GENEVA, September 18, 1925, 11.20 a.m.

Your telegram No. 207.¹

Delegates without exception are agreed that no international conference for disarmament can be summoned until sufficient degree of security has been obtained. At the same time we are faced with unanimous demand that preparatory work should commence forthwith.²

French delegation who are privately sounding us as to possibility of finding agreed text of last paragraph of Spanish resolution,³ have proposed that it should be amended so as to invite council to begin preparatory work and that further resolution should be added indicating lines which work should follow i.e. by means of questionnaire to governments.

Questionnaire should invite study of

1. Military, economic, geographical, etc., factors of war strength of a country
2. Study of various elements constituting peacetime strength of armies taking account of diversity of methods of recruiting, etc.
3. Method of estimating war time efficiency of peacetime armaments.
4. Possibility of establishing relative equality between countries when due account has been taken of pre-arranged plans of action, and economic assistance under Article 16 of the Covenant so far as concerns their means of industrial and economic mobilization.
5. Examination of principle that no Power should be able to maintain armaments capable in the event of her committing act of aggression of enabling her to dispose forces superior to those which League would oppose to her.

It must be remembered that proposals summarized above are not made officially but have reached us only tentatively through a junior member of the French delegation but it may be useful to indicate their nature so as to show lines on which French are thinking.

They seem to be convinced that this is the least that can be done to prove that League is honestly continuing its efforts for disarmament and they profess to have some hopes that enquiry conducted on these lines may prove even to extreme enthusiasts that it is useless to search for formula for *general* reduction of armaments.⁴

¹ No. 478.

² In Geneva despatches Nos. 4 and 7 of September 17 and 18 respectively, Lord Cecil gave accounts of the discussions in the Third Committee on September 17 and 18.

³ See No. 477, n. 4.

⁴ Geneva telegram No. 332 of September 18 added: 'Feel convinced that acceptance of

principle of immediate enquiry is inevitable. It is no use to say we are in favour of disarmament if we alone resist any steps in that direction. Such an attitude would destroy both our reputation and our influence.'

No. 480

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 213 Telegraphic [W 8909/9/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 18, 1925, 9.50 p.m.*

Following for Lord Cecil:—

Your No. 331.¹ Disarmament.

I find it difficult to reconcile attitude of French delegation with consistent thesis of French government that disarmament must be preceded by arbitration and security. I cannot believe that any useful purpose will be served by suggested questionnaire to governments nor that any real advance will be made on these lines. Success of Washington Conference² was due to fact that the one of the two greatest naval powers which had summoned conference came forward with definite plan for reducing its own armaments and inviting other powers to join and that the other greatest naval power at once accepted the general scheme. When France is ready to come forward with similar proposals about land and air forces, we shall make progress. Until then I do not believe that anything will be accomplished by questionnaires of so vague a character and so wide a scope, whilst if nothing practical results Council and Assembly will suffer from another failure.

I agree however that we must not allow ourselves to be made to appear the sole obstacle to progress and must ask you to handle question as seems best on the spot in the light of the above considerations. I suspect that there is more French domestic politics than genuine League policy in these proposals.

¹ No. 479.

² See No. 185, n. 2.

No. 481

Mr. London (Geneva) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 19, 4.15 p.m.)

No. 337 Telegraphic [W 8938/9/98]

GENEVA, *September 19, 1925, 12.20 p.m.*

My telegram No. 331.¹

¹ No. 479.

Third Committee finished general discussion this morning² only speakers advocating our point of view being Australian and Italian delegates. At end of discussion Sir G. Grahame proposed text of terms of reference to sub-committee³ so drafted as not to commit sub-committee but to leave them free to examine on their merits the various resolutions already submitted. This was preferable to an objectionable Danish proposal⁴ previously moved which contained too categorical terms of reference to sub-committee. British proposal was adopted.

Sub-committee was then appointed and met this afternoon. It indulged in rather confused discussion, several speakers begging the question whether preparatory work should begin at once, and giving detailed expression of their views on composition and functions of body that should be charged with that work.

Sir G. Grahame strongly opposed committing of premature decisions. Discussion will be renewed tomorrow morning.

Course of debate⁵ shows that we have very little support in urging moderation and delay.

² i.e. September 18, the date of the drafting of the telegram.

³ For the text, see . . . *Minutes of the Third Committee* . . . , op. cit., p. 21.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁵ An account of the first meeting of the sub-committee is given in Geneva despatch No. 8 of September 18, not printed.

No. 482

*Mr. London (Geneva) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 20, 2.50 p.m.)*

No. 341 Telegraphic [W 8939/9/98]

GENEVA, September 20, 12.45 p.m.

Your telegram No. 213.¹

At meeting this morning² of sub-committee of Third Committee M. Benes, with a view to reconciling divergent views, submitted following text in replacement of last paragraph of Spanish resolution.³

'Assembly invites Council to proceed to preparatory study for organisation of a conference for reduction and limitation of armaments so that when from point of view of general security satisfactory conditions have been assured, as is provided in resolution 14⁴ of third assembly, reduction or limitation of armaments may be achieved.'

Instruction to Council to begin preparatory work 'without delay' which appears in Dutch⁵ and Hungarian⁶ resolutions thus disappeared. Two

¹ No. 480.

² i.e. September 19, the date of the drafting of the telegram.

³ See No. 477, n. 4.

⁴ See No. 469, n. 6.

⁵ See . . . *Minutes of the Third Committee* . . . op. cit., p. 11.

⁶ See No. 477, n. 3.

minor amendments were adopted (1) to make beginning read 'assembly in conformity with spirit of article 8 of covenant invites etc.' and (2) to insert 'general' before 'reduction' at end of resolution.

M. Benes then moved adoption of following additional resolution:

'Assembly draws⁷ note of Council's resolution of October 3rd, 1924,⁸ constituting co-ordination committee and draws attention of Council to suggestions made in course of discussions of Third Committee⁹ and contained in report submitted to Assembly¹⁰ in regard to designation and composition of that committee and also in regard to necessity for determining its rules of procedure.'

Sir G. Grahame indicated his personal agreement with these texts but said he had no instructions to commit British delegation.

French delegate then announced that he proposed to move further resolution this afternoon outlining programme of work (see my telegram No. 331).¹¹ Sir G. Grahame at once indicated that he would have strong objections to raise.

Before the afternoon session your telegram No. 213¹ was received and after discussion with Sir G. Grahame, I decided that it justified delegation in accepting above resolutions but that French delegate's proposal must be resisted. I subsequently saw French delegate and expressed to him our strong objections.

At afternoon session French delegate withdrew his proposal and the two other resolutions were finally approved.¹²

⁷ In the Foreign Office, 'takes' was here suggested.

⁸ See *L.N.O.J.* 1924, p. 1380. See also No. 414, n. 4.

⁹ See Nos. 477, 479 and 481.

¹⁰ For the text of the Report as finally submitted to the Council, see . . . *Minutes of the Third Committee* . . . , op. cit., pp. 38-41.

¹¹ No. 479.

¹² In Geneva despatches Nos. 9 and 18 of September 19 and September 22 respectively, Lord Cecil gave accounts of the meetings of the sub-committee on September 19 and 21. On September 22 he reported (Geneva telegram No. 350): 'After long and controversial discussion third committee today approved of text of last paragraph of Spanish resolution as amended by sub-committee inserting only after words "third assembly" words "said conference may be summoned and".'

'Committee also approved text of Monsieur Benes' additional resolution and of his report to assembly.'

In a letter of September 27 to Mr. Villiers, the Head of the Western, General, and League of Nations Department of the Foreign Office, Mr. Cadogan stated: '... You will have noticed (see our telegram No. 331 of September 18th [No. 479]) that the French have been trying to ram down our throats a "programme" for the "preparatory work". They first of all wanted to make the sub-Committee embody it in a resolution, then they wanted it put in Benes' report to the full Committee. They dropped their request for this, but a passage crept into Dr. Benes' report making mention of the French views on this subject. Finally, Benes' report to the Council contains, in resolution (2), the proposal that the Council Committee shall, before the next Council Session, "undertake the work necessary for determining what questions should be submitted to a preliminary study". On top of this comes the annexed passage in the "Temps" [of September 26, not printed], which shows that Boncour will try to ram the programme down the throats of the Council Committee.'

'All this may seem unimportant, and may indeed be so, but Grahame suggests that what

we know of the programme is sufficient to justify the suspicion that **what the French** are aiming at is to get the League to adopt a programme of enquiries that **would assure them** a tight control of *German* armaments and semi-military organisations etc. and so fill up the deficiencies that may exist in the League control when the Allied commissions cease to function.

'This may well be so, and if it is, it seems that the adoption of any such plan by the League may have reactions in Germany, and may be very undesirable from other points of view.'

No. 483

*Mr. London (Geneva) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 21, 3.15 p.m.)*

No. 344 Telegraphic [W 9012/9/98]

GENEVA, September 21, 1925, 12.55 p.m.

There are signs of a marked anti-British bias in public opinion here both in and outside the League.

Our attitude on several of principal questions under debate has necessarily to be of a critical or restraining nature in pursuance of our instructions and this might account for a certain degree of animadversion at a later stage. But proceedings in commission are not yet sufficiently advanced to permit of judgment to be passed on general attitude of British delegation.

In my opinion this anti-British attitude is partly the result of unfriendly and unjustifiable critics in a number of important Paris newspapers, 'Daily Mail', 'Matin', 'Temps' etc., which are widely read here, and in certain Swiss papers. Leading article in the 'Temps' of September 20th for instance wilfully misrepresents our attitude respecting disarmament question. So far from opposing Spanish resolution we have not only given it hearty support but have gone beyond it with a view to satisfying demand for preparatory studies. We have agreed to new resolutions proposed in sub-committee somewhat extending it and they have now been adopted unanimously.

I propose to take an opportunity in the final debates in the Assembly¹ of trying to remove this impression.

Sir G. Grahame concurs.

Repeated to Paris No. 8.

¹ See No. 165, n. 4.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 23, 9 a.m.)

No. 338 *Telegraphic* [C 12109/459/18]

BERLIN, September 22, 1925, 9.35 p.m.

I had a private conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs today and found him optimistic regarding prospects of Pact negotiations. He appeared to consider it would not be impossible to form an alternative government to present one if German National Party proved recalcitrant and compelled some of present ministers to resign. Such a government could carry through Pact with assistance of the Centre and Socialists. Stresemann thought, however, that German National Party will not proceed to extremes and that it will be possible for German government to despatch a favourable answer to allied note¹ on Thursday² or Friday.

The date October 5th appeared to him suitable for a meeting of ministers as well as locality mentioned—Locarno.³

With reference to draft Pact elaborated in London¹ his criticisms bore only on minor points susceptible of being arranged in verbal conversation. On essential point of a French guarantee to German Polish arbitration treaty he suggested a solution similar to that mentioned by Monsieur Briand on September [9]th.⁵ This was that German Polish treaty should be placed under guarantee of League of Nations and that League of Nations should designate powers (not power) who would act as its agents in applying pressure. His Excellency underlined that 'powers' must be in plural and not in singular: otherwise the phrase would be taken to mean France—and France could not be impartial in matter of Poland. There could, of course, be no idea of involving England but other powers would presumably be available for League of Nations and could act in conjunction with France.

¹ See Nos. 471 and 476.

² September 24.

³ Mr. Nicolson minuted on September 21 that M. R. Cambon had informed him that day that the French Ambassador in Berlin was being instructed to propose to the German Government that the conference on security should begin on October 5 at Locarno, and that Signor Mussolini concurred in this proposal.

¹ See Nos. 440 and 466.

⁵ See No. 468.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 23, 9 a.m.)

No. 339 Telegraphic [C 12110/459/18]

BERLIN, September 22, 1925, 9.40 p.m.

Your telegram No. 185.¹

I have already impressed upon Minister for Foreign Affairs and on Secretary of State that the only sensible reply to proposal of a ministers meeting is an acceptance without conditions. Any points which Germany desires to raise should be reserved for verbal discussion. Stresemann fully realizes above considerations. His present idea is to obtain authority from Cabinet to send a naked acceptance of proposed meeting.

In handing this acceptance to allied representatives he will add verbally something of the following nature:

I am bound in loyalty to inform you that German government, in sending delegates to proposed meeting, does not recede from its previously declared attitude that Pact can only be signed if Cologne zone is evacuated. He will add that in entering League of Nations Germany does not recede from position regarding responsibility for the war which was contained in German note of September 1924.²

¹ Of September 22. This ran: 'Press messages from Berlin indicate that the German reply to the French and British notes of September 15th [see Nos. 471 and 476], may qualify acceptance of the invitation by a fresh statement of conditions which must be fulfilled before Germany can sign the security pact or join the League.'

'I cannot believe that these messages accurately forecast the German reply. Surely the German government could not at this stage indulge in such destructive tactics. They must realise that any controversial reply to the invitation might wreck prospect of verbal discussions for which they have always protested their desire. The choice and the responsibility lie entirely with them.'

'An immediate warning from you on the lines of my despatch No. 1413 (of July 28th) [No. 429] may be of assistance. But I leave it entirely to your discretion.'

² See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 566 and 569. In Berlin telegram No. 340 of September 23, Lord D'Abernon added: 'I have made further representations to German government in the sense of your telegram and have left no room for ambiguity as to limits of answer which should be sent.'

'German government realize soundness of policy indicated but they are meeting with obstinate resistance from nationalist organizations. The latter endeavour to add conditions to acceptance of invitation and to confine powers of German representative at projected meeting by every sort of restriction and limitation.'

No. 486

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 24, 9 a.m.)

No. 93 Telegraphic [C 12148/459/18]

WARSAW, September 23, 1925, 8.10 p.m.

Action of Czechoslovakian government in officially informing German government¹ of their readiness to open negotiations for a treaty of arbitration has aroused considerable surprise here.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that he knew nothing of intention of Czechoslovakian government and he understands that they had not consulted French or British governments. He has since received message from M. Benes explaining that he had taken this action as he had learnt that German Minister for Foreign Affairs had complained to some journalists that neither Czechoslovakian nor Polish governments had shown any sign of approaching German government and time for pact conference was drawing near. Minister for Foreign Affairs was evidently not convinced by this explanation and he qualified M. Benes' action as a gaffe which was very likely due to weakening of his position at home and a consequent desire to assert himself. Although he did not say so in so many words he evidently resented M. Benes's action which is generally regarded here as disloyal to Poland.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to assure you that he had no intention of following suit and would abstain from all action until he heard from allied governments.

Sent to Prague. Copy by bag to Berlin.

¹ This had been reported in Berlin telegram No. 337 of September 21, not printed.

No. 487

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 224 Telegraphic [W 9012/9/98]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 24, 1925, 12.20 p.m.

Following for Lord Cecil from Mr. Chamberlain.

Your No. 344.¹

I am glad that you propose to speak and think that it may be very useful. You will of course explain, if explanation be required, the British attitude but you will I know avoid anything resembling an apology for it. You and I have so completely agreed as to the unwisdom of some of the projects and the futility of others and the injury which both classes do to the

¹ No. 483.

League itself that any attempt to send you instructions would be an impertinence. The League has no more disinterested friend and no better supporter than Great Britain. No other country has paid such practical homage to the League itself and the underlying principles of the Covenant as we have done in the case of Mosul,² and such criticisms as you mention are grotesquely unjust, but I would not abate one jot of our principles or practice to curry favour with the Assembly or the critics. The great danger of the Assembly is that speeches in the Tribune so frequently do not express the real thoughts and intentions of Government. We shall prevail eventually if we are strictly honest and profess no more than we are ready to perform.

As to disarmament you can I think speak quite frankly without causing unnecessary offence to others. We have disarmed. What is required are not platonic resolutions or elaborate questionnaires but similar action by others. *Que messieurs les assassins commencent.*

² See No. 468, n. 7.

No. 488

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 187 Telegraphic [C 12110/459/18]

Very Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 24, 1925, 5.50 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 339 (of September 22nd. Security).¹

We fully realise difficulty of Dr. Stresemann's position but his proposed declaration would be most ill-timed and even though verbal would be likely to have most unfortunate effect. He should be left in no doubt about this.

All that German government are asked to decide is whether or not they will take part in a conference where they will have full opportunity of making such declarations as seem good to them. Surely in these circumstances they will realise that it is unnecessary to make specific reservations which can only be regarded as conditions and will thus introduce precisely that controversial element which it is essential to avoid at this stage.²

¹ No. 485.

² Lord D'Abernon replied (Berlin telegram No. 348 of September 25): 'I have impressed the view contained in your telegram upon German Government. They will limit their declarations to minimum with which they can fulfil decision of Cabinet and engagements taken in the course of discussion between parties. They have already reduced demands made not only by German national but by other parties for conditions limiting acceptance to simple declarations which do not require a specific reply. They have thus gone a long way in the direction indicated by you.'

No. 489

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 24, 10.20 p.m.)*

No. 343 Telegraphic [C 12156/459/18]

BERLIN, September 24, 1925, 8.35 p.m.

I confirm my immediately preceding telegram¹ announcing Cabinet's decision to accept invitation.²

Secretary of State informs me that acceptance is without conditions.

In communicating German government's decision to Allied Powers Minister for Foreign Affairs will make certain verbal declarations regarding views of German government.

While decision is already official, formal communication cannot be made to Allied Governments before Saturday³ since, as a matter of constitutional practice representatives of Laender and Foreign Affairs Committee of Reichstag have to be informed.

¹ Of September 24, not printed.

² See Nos. 471 and 476.

³ September 26.

No. 490

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 25, 9 a.m.)*

No. 344 Telegraphic [C 12160/459/18]

BERLIN, September 24, 1925, 8.35 p.m.

It is proposed that German delegation to Switzerland should consist of Luther Stresemann Von Schubert and Gaus.¹ The Foreign Office are endeavouring to restrict members of staff to lowest limits.

When it was decided that Schiele should not go as one of the delegates the German National spokesmen advocated that Stresemann should go alone. This was considered a trap and Luther appears to have spoken very energetically against it, declaring that Stresemann's policy was his and that he would stand or fall with success or failure of pact negotiations. He identified himself completely with pact policy.

¹ In Berlin telegram No. 341 of September 23, Lord D'Abernon had reported: 'Party meeting of the Right has ended inconclusively. There was acute divergence between different sections. The result of this divergence and of knowledge that an alternative government was ready to take office has broken the opposition of the Right to the President's policy.'

'It is now considered certain that a favourable answer will be sent by government and that German delegates will be Luther and Stresemann. It is still uncertain whether they will be accompanied by Schiele.'

No. 491

Record by Mr. Wellesley of a conversation with the French Ambassador

[C 12372/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 24, 1925*

The French Ambassador called this morning and said he had received instructions from M. Briand to make the following statement.

M. Briand proposes, as soon as the German reply is received, which he thinks will almost surely be without conditions, to telegraph to Berlin, London, Rome, Brussels, Prague and Warsaw, to inform those Governments of the date and place of the proposed meeting¹ between the Ministers and of the procedure which he has in view. He proposes to suggest that conversations, parallel, but independent of each other, should be held. Firstly negotiations for the Rhineland Pact between the four Allied Powers and Germany. Secondly, negotiations for a Treaty of Arbitration between Germany, Belgium and France, in which he would eventually like to see Italy and Great Britain participate, and lastly, negotiations for Treaties of Arbitration between Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, in which France will participate.

M. Briand would be glad to know whether Mr. Chamberlain agrees with these proposals.

The Ambassador then went on to say that M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger and M. Massigli would attend the forthcoming meeting and would be accompanied by two attachés or secretaries.²

V.W.

¹ See Nos. 471 and 476.

² Mr. Chamberlain minuted on September 24: 'I accept this programme'.

No. 492

Mr. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

No. 57 Telegraphic [C 12148/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 25, 1925, 5.45 p.m.*

Your No. 93.¹

Although M. Benes did not inform me that he proposed to take this step, his expression of his views² prepared me for it and I was not surprised when I read it in the papers. Personally I welcome it. I do not think that it can possibly hamper the general negotiations, and I should not wish Monsieur Sk[r]zynski to be left under the impression that I resented it or had any wish to prevent him from taking steps of a similar

¹ No. 486.

² See No. 473.

kind, which in his opinion, would open the way to improved Polish-German relations. I have always desired to see direct negotiations begun between Poland and Germany, for I believe that if skilfully conducted with a real desire to promote peace, they would assist and not hinder the joint effort of France and Great Britain.

Please communicate the substance of the above to Minister for Foreign Affairs in manner and language you think best. Avoid anything that could appear as a snub, but make it clear that I do not wish to stand in the way of direct and immediate conversations between Poland and Germany as he implies.

Repeated to Paris No. 262 by bag, Berlin No. 188, and Prague No. 16.³

³ In his telegram No. 18 to Prague of October 3, Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir G. Clerk as follows: 'Please inform Monsieur Benes of the gist of my views regarding his move with the German government, for which I feel nothing but sympathy and approval. You should of course refrain from communicating to him Monsieur Skrzynski's comments.'

No. 493

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 1726 [C 12224/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 26, 1925*

My Lord,

I came to town this morning to receive the German Ambassador who had sent me word that he wished to deliver to me personally the German reply to our invitation to a meeting to discuss the Pact¹ and at the same time to make to me an important declaration on behalf of his Government.

Herr Sthamer accordingly handed to me the reply which, as Your Lordship will see from the copy enclosed,² is a simple acceptance of the invitation, proposing October 5th as the date of the meeting. He then handed to me the declaration³ which I ascertained the German Government intend to publish next Tuesday (September 29th) together with the formal acceptance. This declaration (copy also enclosed)⁴ recalls the

¹ See No. 476, n. 3.

² Not printed.

³ See No. 489.

⁴ An English translation of this runs as follows: 'At the time when the Ministers of the Powers concerned are about to meet for important conversations on the subject of the consolidation of peace between their countries, the German Government consider it necessary to acquaint the British Government in all candour with their attitude in two matters which are most closely connected with the objects of those conversations.'

'In the preceding correspondence the Allied Governments have made the conclusion of a Security Pact conditional upon the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. The German Government have not contested the linking up of the two problems, but find themselves thereby confronted by the necessity of reverting to a point which, in connection with the League of Nations question, they have already in their memorandum of September

pronouncement made by Chancellor Marx on August 29th, 1924,⁵ on the subject of German war guilt, and records the view of the German Government that the Pact negotiations cannot be brought to a successful conclusion until the question of disarmament is settled and Cologne evacuated. Herr Sthamer added that in making this declaration the German Government had no desire to put difficulties in the way of the negotiations or to take up any aggressive or argumentative position. They had expressly refrained from quoting the actual words of Chancellor Marx's declaration for they were very strong, but they felt that it would be better that this matter should be frankly raised now rather than left to be mentioned at the last moment, when greater exception might be taken to its introduction. The declaration was not the result of party differences in Germany—the approval of all sections of the Cabinet had been given—and it was necessary that this protest against war guilt should be made for the satisfaction of the German people, who felt that the charge cast an unmerited stigma upon them and prevented that friendly feeling which it was the object of the pact negotiations to establish between the former enemies. It was, in fact, necessary to make the declaration in order to bring a united Germany to the support of the German Government in the Pact policy.

I listened to the declaration and to Herr Sthamer's explanations in silence, but when he had finished I said to him that the German Government was indeed the most difficult Government to help of any of which I had experience. They had repeatedly pressed upon me, through Lord D'Abernon and through Herr Sthamer himself, their desire that the

1924 [see No. 219, n. 5] mentioned to the Governments represented on the League Council. They repeat the declaration made in that memorandum to the effect that the eventual entry of Germany into the League of Nations is not to be understood as a recognition of the allegation made to establish their obligations, and which implies a moral charge on the German people and is made to establish Germany's international obligations. They are of opinion that the public notification in this sense issued by the then German Government on the 29th August 1924 [see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 566 and 569], assists the object of an understanding and sincere reconciliation between nations, and for their own part they identify themselves with this proclamation with the express desire of creating the condition of mutual esteem and true equality of rights which is the prior condition for the success of the confidential conversations now contemplated.

'Further, the understanding and conciliation, which are the object sought, would be prejudiced if, before the entry of Germany into the League of Nations and before the conclusion of the Security Pact, the elimination of a dispute which still separates Germany from the Allies were not achieved. That dispute is the evacuation of the Northern Rhenish zone and the final settlement of the disarmament question. As long as the present situation continues, namely, the prolongation of the occupation of a large tract of German territory, which is felt by the German nation to be unjust, faith in peaceful development, upon which depends the efficacy of the contemplated international agreements, cannot be established.

'The German Government trust that the British Government will take these statements in the same spirit of loyalty in which they are made, and that they will recognise in them the honest determination to smooth the way for the realisation of the great work of peace now to be commenced.'

⁵ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 566 and 569.

exchange of notes should cease and that we should arrange a meeting of Ministers. Sharing this wish, the French Government, in agreement with its Allies, had sent the most conciliatory [and] least argumentative reply⁶ to the last German note⁷ that the terms of that note made possible, and had concluded with an express invitation that we should now proceed to conversations. Yet the German Government, like a nagging woman, must have the last word and at this moment introduced a new subject for the first time. As far as my memory served me, not one word had passed between the German and British Governments on the subject of war guilt since the Pact negotiations opened. Why on earth did the German Government raise the question now? What possible useful purpose could be served by their so doing? There were some things in the Treaty of Versailles which I thought stupid, and one of them was the confession wrung from the German people of their war guilt; not, I hastened to add, because I thought it untrue as a statement of fact, but because everyone knew that Germany signed it under compulsion, and a confession so extorted was of no value. There it was, however. Nobody asked the German Government to repeat it; there was no occasion to refer to it and history must be left to judge as to its truth or falsity, for upon that subject Herr Sthamer and I would never agree. I did not take any objection to the reference to the evacuation of Cologne. That subject had often been mentioned between us and I had always held that until disarmament had been completed and the evacuation could be carried out, the Pact would not be concluded. My only regret was that the German Government had not shown more goodwill and moved more quickly in this matter, for I was as anxious to bring the occupation to an end as they themselves could be; but this resurrection of the question of war guilt at the last moment and on the eve of our meeting was quite a different thing. I could only say that if the French Government had shown as little wisdom [and] suppleness as the German Government displayed throughout the negotiations, we should never have made the progress which had been accomplished.

Herr Sthamer insisted that he did not ask for any answer to the declaration; on the contrary, he made it abundantly clear that he hoped that none would be made. Indeed his attitude throughout irresistibly reminded me of a little dog which knows it has done wrong but anxiously deprecates the punishment which it feels it has deserved. He again emphasised the sense of injustice and inequality felt by the German nation owing to the stigma which, as they considered, had been unjustly put upon them, and he reiterated that it was not for the purpose of raising difficulties that the German Government now referred to the matter, but because public opinion in Germany would not support the Government if they had passed the matter over in silence. He understood my feelings about the declaration and the difficulties which it might create, but it was necessary for Germany, and he hoped that I should not allow it to interfere with the proposed meeting.

⁶ Of August 24 (see No. 449).

⁷ Of July 20 (see No. 418).

I replied that I should do my best to carry forward the negotiations, but I must repeat that the German Government was a very difficult Government to help and singularly indifferent to the feelings of those with whom they were negotiating.

I ought perhaps to add that at one moment in speaking of the reference to German war guilt, Herr Sthamer used the words: 'this condition'. I at once interjected that I had spoken of the introduction at this late moment of a 'new subject'. Was I to understand that acceptance of the German point of view on this question was now propounded as a condition? That would be far more serious.

The Ambassador said that it was not his intention to make any conditions. That would be exceeding his instructions. He was only instructed to explain why the German Gov[ernmen]t had felt it necessary to make this declaration.⁸

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁸ In Foreign Office despatch No. 3212 to Paris of September 26, Mr. Chamberlain stated: 'M. de Fleuriau, who was in the office at the time I received the German Ambassador, as recorded in my despatch of this date to Lord D'Abernon, came to see me immediately Herr Sthamer left me.

'2. I gave him the substance of the German reply and declaration and an account of what I had said to Herr Sthamer. This, I observed, was for the consumption of Herr Sthamer and his government, but as regards ourselves, I trusted that we should not allow the declaration to alter our course. I hoped that M. Briand would be willing to reply accepting the date, the 5th October, and naming the place of meeting, saying only, in regard to the declaration, that we did not feel it necessary to make any observations upon it.

'3. M. de Fleuriau said that the declaration would come as a surprise to M. Briand, but he thought M. Briand would take the same view of it as I did and desire to act as I had suggested.'

On September 27, the French Ambassador informed Mr. Chamberlain that the German Ambassador in Paris, Dr. L. von Hoesch, had communicated to the French Foreign Ministry on September 26 a note accepting the invitation to the proposed conference, and a declaration regarding war guilt, disarmament, and the evacuation of Cologne (for the texts, see *Pacte de Sécurité. II* . . ., op. cit., p. 11).

No. 494

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 29, 9 a.m.)

No. 100 Telegraphic [C 12339/459/18]

WARSAW, September 28, 1925, 11.26 p.m.

Your telegram No. 57 of September 25th.¹

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in the sense of your telegram.

¹ No. 492.

His Excellency was rather taken aback at first. He said he had no idea that you would have liked him to take initiative in Berlin as neither you nor M. Briand had even hinted this in your conversations,² while after your departure³ Lord Cecil had impressed on him your desire that he should say and do nothing that might embarrass German government. Had you indicated to him at Geneva that you wished Polish government to raise question of arbitration treaty in Berlin it might have been possible for him to take joint action with M. Benés. Now it was too late with conference opening in a week⁴ and fact that Czechoslovak government had already made a *démarche* in Berlin rendered it still more difficult for him. Relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia had never been so strained as between Germany and Poland. Moreover German government had kept Czechoslovak government regularly informed of the course of pact negotiations which had not been the case with Poland. He was convinced that under present conditions any independent action on his part in Berlin would be most unwise and might arouse such an outcry both here and in Germany as might prejudice chances of subsequent negotiations. His view all along had been that it would be for French representative at conference with your approval to suggest to German representative advisability of getting into personal touch with Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs and he would then be only too pleased to open negotiations for an arbitration treaty with German delegates.

Repeated to Berlin and Prague.

² See No. 470. In a letter of October 2 to Sir W. Max Muller, Mr. Nicolson stated: 'The Secretary of State, who is very rushed today with his preparations for Locarno, asks me to draw your attention to the record of his first conversation with Count Skrzynski at Geneva in March last [see No. 247], when he suggested Poland's interest in getting on better terms with Germany. . . .'

³ See No. 475, n. 1.

⁴ See Nos. 476 and 484.

No. 495

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received September 28, 4 p.m.)

No. 327 Telegraphic [C 12299/459/18]

Immediate

PARIS, September 28, 1925, 12.45 p.m.

Your telegram No. 264¹ and No. 265.²

Neither Monsieur Briand nor Berthelot were in Paris last evening and after consulting clerk in charge at Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was

¹ Of September 27. This telegram (No. 264 to Paris, No. 93 to Brussels, and No. 269 to Rome) gave the substance of No. 493, and concluded: 'You should . . . inform government to which you are accredited.'

² Of September 27. This stated: 'I shall be glad of earliest intimation of M. Briand's intentions as I desire to conform my reply as far as possible to that of French Government.'

therefore decided to make communication on Berthelot's arrival at Ministry at 9 a.m. this morning.

Berthelot speaking of course subject to the views of Monsieur Briand, who only returns to Paris at midday, said that you need not be afraid that French government had any intention of abandoning or postponing conference. Either German government would insist on publishing declaration,³ in which case it would be necessary to answer it and to publish the answer on lines of draft which Berthelot would submit to Monsieur Briand and text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram.⁴ Or German government would agree not to publish, in which case allied reply would not be published and a *concerted* communiqué would suffice. This communiqué would simply state that on the one hand German government had recalled terms of its note of September 29th 1924⁵ and had expressed a desire for an understanding respecting Cologne evacuation, and that on the other hand allies had referred German government to French answer of October 6th 1924⁶ and allied note of May 30th 1925.⁷ Berthelot did not think that German government would withdraw declaration as he would . . .⁸ Monsieur Briand to demand in the first instance.

Text of communication made to Berthelot is contained in despatch No. 20 (?88).⁹ It is perhaps worth adding that record of your conversation with German Ambassador, London,¹⁰ was read to him and that he expressed most whole-hearted agreement with all you said.

Monsieur Briand will see German Ambassador at 5 p.m. this evening and Berthelot will, at 6.30 p.m., communicate results to this embassy. If you have any comments on proposed procedure no doubt it would help if you would telegraph or telephone them before that hour.

³ See No. 493, n. 4.

⁴ Paris telegram No. 328 of September 28 ran as follows: ' . . . French government can only remind German government that it is the duty of League of Nations to make pronouncement on this question and can only request it to refer to note addressed to it on October 6th 1924 [see n. 6] by French President of the Council in answer to German memorandum of September 29th [see No. 219, n. 5].

'German government has equally alluded to evacuation of Cologne zone and to final settlement of disarmament question.

'Solution of these questions depends entirely on German government as Allies have explained in their note of May 30th 1925 [see No. 631, below] to which French government must refer.'

⁵ See No. 219, n. 5.

⁶ A copy of this note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2190 of October 6 (C 15536/2072/18), not printed. See, however, Vol. XXVI, No. 590.

⁷ See No. 631, below.

⁸ The text is here uncertain.

⁹ Paris despatch No. 2088 of September 28 is not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

¹⁰ No. 493.

*Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 29, 8.30 p.m.)*

No. 329 Telegraphic: by bag [C 12300/459/18]

PARIS, September 28, 1925

My telegrams Nos. 327¹ and 328.²

M. Berthelot states this evening (7 p.m.) that M. Briand has seen the German Ambassador and strongly emphasized to him the disloyalty with which the German government is behaving. The German Ambassadors in Paris and London announce that their government does not wish to make difficulties for the Allies. Yet that government, fully aware of the reaction on at least the French press of the declaration of September 26th,³ communicates the whole of its purport to the Berlin press agencies and even to a French correspondent in Berlin against the expressed wish of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Further, the German government, fully aware of the vigorous nature of the replies returned by the French government⁴ and the League of Nations⁵ to the communications made by it on almost this very subject less than a year ago, returns to the charge with an equally provocative note on the very eve of the Locarno conference.⁶ What, observed Monsieur Briand to the German Ambassador, did His Excellency suppose would be the effect on the chances of success of the Locarno conference, should its opening coincide with an allied reply to the German declaration in any sense similar to that of the French note of October 6th, 1924?⁴ In those circumstances he must strongly advise withdrawal of the German declaration, or if not withdrawal, at least a clear and published understanding that it was verbal only and that the reply to it was equally verbal.

2. This expression of M. Briand's views M. von Hoesch undertook to telephone at once to Berlin, and he hopes to be in receipt of French instructions tonight or at latest tomorrow (September 29th) morning.

3. M. Berthelot stated that the final decision of the French government as to the action required on the German declaration would therefore probably not be taken before the meeting of the Council of Ministers tomorrow (September 29th) morning. He repeated what he said this morning—that the French government wished the Conference to take place, and, in reply to an enquiry, he said that of course there would be further consultation with His Majesty's Government should any action be contemplated with which there was any reason to believe they would not be in agreement.

¹ No. 495.

⁴ See No. 495, n. 6.

² See *ibid.*, n. 4.

⁵ See No. 261, Enclosure.

³ See No. 493, n. 4.

⁶ See No. 484.

*Mr. Wingfield¹ (Brussels) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 29, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 96 Telegraphic: by bag [C 12312/459/18]

Confidential

BRUSSELS, September 28, 1925

M. Vandervelde, to whom I today communicated the contents of your telegram No. 93,² informed me that the German Minister had also on the 26th instant made to him a verbal communication respecting (a) evacuation of Cologne zone and (b) responsibility for the war.³ He had replied (a) that, as had been indicated by Ambassadors' Conference, evacuation would take place when disarmament had been carried out;⁴ and (b) that, whatever opinions might be held on the question of general responsibility for the war, in the case of Belgium no controversy was possible, since the German Chancellor⁵ had himself admitted in 1914⁶ that the invasion of Belgium constituted a violation of Germany's international obligations.⁷

Herr von Keller had admitted the responsibility of Germany towards Belgium.

M. Vandervelde also said that the French Ambassador had told him this morning that the German Ambassador in Paris, in making a similar verbal communication to M. Berthelot,⁸ had informed him that the declaration as well as the note would be published. After telephonic consultation with Herr von Schubert, however, Herr von Hoesch had stated that only the note would be published tomorrow, though the verbal declaration might be published later. In these circumstances the French Ambassador had suggested to M. Vandervelde that it was desirable for the Allies to make a verbal answer, which could be published whenever the German declaration was published. M. Vandervelde had replied that he had no objection.

I asked whether he considered it necessary, in view of the verbal answers which both you⁹ and he had made to the German declarations, that a further answer should be concerted between the Allies. On this he expressed no opinion, but said that if M. Briand desired to make one, he

¹ Counsellor at H.M. Embassy at Brussels, and Chargé d'Affaires September 3–October 13. Cf. No. 469, n. 1.

² See No. 495, n. 1.

³ For a French text, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 107, Annexe.

⁴ See No. 631, below.

⁵ Dr. T. von Bethmann-Hollweg was Chancellor 1909–17.

⁶ In his speech before the Reichstag on August 4, 1914. For a translation, see *Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European war* (H.M.S.O., 1915), Appendix.

⁷ In a *note verbale* of September 26 (for the text, see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 108). A translation of the text issued to the Belgian press was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Brussels telegram No. 97 of September 30, not printed.

⁸ See No. 493, n. 8.

⁹ See No. 493.

had no objection. He added, however, that he was in agreement with you in hoping that this incident would not make any difference to the meeting taking place on October 5th.¹⁰

¹⁰ See No. 484.

No. 498

Record by Mr. Wellesley of a conversation with the German Ambassador

[C 12343/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 28, 1925

The German Ambassador called this afternoon to inform me that at the request of the French Government the German Government had decided to postpone publication of the Declarations¹ until Wednesday.² I told His Excellency that we had already received this information from Paris.³ Herr Sthamer showed very great anxiety lest these Declarations might produce an awkward situation. He said his Government were fully aware of the difficulties that it might raise, but that they were bound to act in this way for internal reasons, more especially as if Germany were to join the League it might be regarded as voluntary acceptance on her part of the articles of the Versailles Treaty regarding German war guilt. The Ambassador suggested that there should be no answer at all to the Declarations, to which I replied that I thought it would be hardly possible to pass over a matter of such importance in silence. Herr Sthamer then suggested that possibly a way might be found out of the difficulty by adopting the procedure which seemed to commend itself to the Italian Government. His Government had just heard from Rome that the idea was not to reply to the German Declaration, but when publication took place to issue a sort of communiqué commenting on the Declarations in a mild form, so as not to arouse public sentiment in Germany. I told His Excellency that I would submit his suggestions to the Secretary of State, but that I thought the latter would hardly be in a position to give him a definite answer until he had an opportunity of consulting with Monsieur Briand. I understood that the German Ambassador in Paris was going to have an interview with Monsieur Briand this afternoon, and we hoped to learn Monsieur Briand's views some time tonight.⁴ His Excellency said he quite understood, but as the matter was one of urgency he proposed to ring me up tomorrow morning and ask whether the Secretary of State was in a position to give a reply.

V.W.

¹ See No. 493.

² September 30.

³ Cf. No. 499, below.

⁴ See No. 496.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 29, 2.05 p.m.)

No. 330 *Telegraphic: by telephone* [C 12345/459/18]

Very Urgent

PARIS, September 29, 1925

My telegram No. 329.¹

M. Berthelot stated this morning before Council of Ministers was finished that subject to Council's approval procedure would be as follows: German Ambassador this morning informed M. Briand that the German government could not for constitutional reasons withdraw declaration² and that publication would have to take place on September 30th. In the circumstances M. Briand said that he would hand his reply to the German Ambassador at 3 p.m. today, but that in his reply he would treat declaration as verbal.

Reply, subject to M. Briand's approval is as follows:—

'Government of Republic happy to receive reply by which German government declares its acceptance of Locarno conference.' It notes that this is without reserve. As regards verbal observations by which German note was accompanied French government notes with satisfaction that they in no way constitute conditions preliminary to Foreign Minister's meeting on October 5th.

It considers in fact that questions raised have nothing to do with discussion of Security Pact. As regards those observations which referred to German note of September 29th 1924³ relative to entry of Germany into League of Nations and raise question of German war responsibility, French government considers that question was settled by Versailles Treaty which, it had clearly explained in its note, negotiation of security pact can in no way modify. French government maintains further the answer made on October 6th 1924⁴ to the German memorandum of September 29th 1924. As to question of evacuation of Cologne zone and question of disarmament of Germany with which it is bound up French government recalls that it depends only on Germany to hasten the solution by the execution of her undertaking and in this connection it can only refer to allied note of May 30th 1925.⁵ Ends.

In communicating to this Embassy copy of note M. Berthelot drew particular attention to words disarmament of Germany in last paragraph and said that in French text of German declaration original wording was disarmament question only. This German Ambassador had undertaken to alter to conform with version in French reply.

It was pointed out to M. Berthelot that the proposed reply went beyond that advocated in your telegram No. 264⁶ but he said that it was in

¹ No. 496.

² See No. 493, n. 4.

³ See No. 219.

⁴ See No. 495, n. 6.

⁵ See No. 631, below.

⁶ See No. 495, n. 1.

accordance with its general spirit and that in any case the whole incident could now be regarded as closed. M. Berthelot thought that the Council of Ministers should not make any alteration in draft note and he said that unless he telephoned anything further in course of afternoon you could regard all above as final.

French government much hoped you would conform your answer as closely as possible to theirs for in view of announcement made in Berlin they had no alternative procedure.

M. Berthelot said French note would be published here in morning papers September 30th and he hoped you would publish your reply in London at same time. German declaration (since French government regarded it as verbal) would not be published here so far as French government was concerned.⁷

⁷ In Foreign Office telegram No. 269 to Paris of September 29, Mr. Chamberlain stated: 'I will make a similar though not verbally identical communication to German Ambassador this evening and publish it tomorrow. I warmly appreciate moderation of French government.'

The text of the reply was communicated on September 29 in a telegram to Berlin (No. 191); Rome (No. 279); and Brussels (No. 101) (copy to Paris by bag).

In Paris telegram No. 333 of September 29, Lord Crewe referred to Foreign Office telegram No. 269, and continued: 'The substance was immediately communicated to Monsieur Berthelot, who said he was very sorry, but, since the interview this morning, Monsieur Briand had, at request of German Ambassador, slightly modified French note though in the direction of moderation. The modified form of note was telephoned to Central Department this evening, and confirmatory copy will be found in my despatch No. 2102 of tonight [not printed].'

This telegram was received in the Foreign Office on September 30 at 8.30 a.m. Already, on September 29, Mr. Chamberlain had instructed the Foreign Office as follows: 'Please tell the French Ambassador that I rec[eive]d the terms of M. Briand's proposed reply by telephone about 4 p.m. today [see No. 499]; that I at once sent my telegram saying that I would reply similarly tho' not identically; [and] that I then wrote the published reply.'

'Say that I purposely made my reply a little stiffer than M. Briand's because I desired to show clearly that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] shared to the full the feelings of the French Gov[ernmen]t on receiving the German Declaration; because I thought it unfair to leave to the French Gov[ernmen]t the onus of saying all that had to be said, [and] because I wished by the stiffer terms of the British reply to show to public opinion both here [and] in Germany that the difficulties of the past [and] forth-coming negotiations as disclosed to H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] lay not in any intransigence in the French attitude but in the singular ineptitude (not to use a stronger phrase) of the German Gov[ernmen]t.'

Mr. Wellesley minuted on September 30: 'M. de Fleuriau is in Paris, but I spoke to M. Cambon in this sense this afternoon. He said he would tel[egraph] this to Paris [and] felt sure that M. Briand would be most gratified.'

Record by Mr. Wellesley of a conversation with the German Ambassador

[C 12344/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 29, 1925*

In accordance with the Secretary of State's instructions, I sent for the German Ambassador this morning and I told him that I had reported to Mr. Chamberlain the substance of our conversation yesterday.¹ The S[ecretary] of S[tate] now wished me to say that he had nothing to add to what he had already said to His Excellency when he had handed him the declaration.² He had left H[is] E[xcellency] in no doubt as to the deplorable impression which this communication had made on his mind. I then went on to say that the Secretary of State had not yet decided how to deal with so unexpected and so regrettable a situation. Mr. Chamberlain would still try to bring the Pact policy to a successful issue, and that he stood by that. At the same time he did not wish to conceal from H[is] E[xcellency] that the German Government, in his opinion, had done what it could to jeopardise it, and in face of this very uncalled-for provocation he would act in concert with the French Government. If the situation were saved it would be largely due to M. Briand's moderation. The more the Secretary of State considered the communication which the German Ambassador had made to him, the more uncalled-for and provocative he felt it to be. The German Government had, in fact, invited the Allies to restate Germany's war guilt. Mr. Chamberlain wished to remind His Excellency that the repudiation of yet another Treaty as only a scrap of paper was a bad introduction for the negotiations for a Pact, and that he had not yet made up his mind as to whether or not to return the answer which the German Government have invited. I made it clear to the German Ambassador that I was speaking with the full authority of the Secretary of State.

Herr Sthamer at once strongly protested against the use of the term repudiation of the Treaty. He said he thought it was a very unfair and unjust interpretation of what he had said to the Secretry of State. He wished to emphasise once more, and that very forcibly, that there was no intention on the part of the German Government to repudiate any part of the Versailles Treaty. The German Government had always objected from the very first to the articles in that Treaty referring to war guilt which they considered both humiliating and unjust. The declaration was merely a restatement of those objections but nothing more. His Government was genuinely sincere in their wish to bring the Pact negotiations to a successful issue. The German Government had considered the step which they had taken as essential to ensure the goodwill of German public

¹ See No. 498.² See No. 493.

opinion towards the negotiations which were about to take place, and that it was intended to facilitate and not to impede matters.

His Excellency then went on once more to disclaim any idea of repudiation of any part of the Versailles Treaty. He hoped he had explained sufficiently the internal difficulties with which the German Government was faced and he hoped that the Allies would try to understand those difficulties in the same way as the German Government appreciated those of the Allies. I told His Excellency that I would report the substance of this conversation to the Secretary of State.

V.W.

No. 501

Record by Mr. Wellesley of a conversation with the German Ambassador

[C 12387/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 29, 1925*

The German Ambassador called again¹ this afternoon, and said that he had an urgent message to deliver. He told me that he had just received information from Berlin to the effect that Monsieur Briand had made a proposal that the German Declaration² should be published in the German press in what he described as some indirect form, making it clear that no written communication had been made. The French Government would then issue a communiqué giving their comments on what had appeared in the German press. Monsieur Briand hoped that this would be the easiest way out of the present difficulty. Unfortunately, however, the German Ambassador said this proposal was one which the German Government could not possibly accept. He went on to explain that the Federal Ministers and the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Reichstag had been informed of the steps which the German Government had decided to take in Paris, Brussels and London. If they were now to fall in with the French proposals it would at once create a storm, as it would be evident that their action had not conformed to what had been agreed upon. Herr Sthamer then said that when the Dawes Conference was being held last year³ it had been the original German intention to mention this question of war guilt, but in order not to jeopardise the success of the Conference it had been dropped. Chancellor Marx however found it necessary subsequently to declare⁴ in the most solemn way that the acceptance of the Dawes plan⁵ did not in any way mean the acceptance by Germany of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. The German Government therefore felt it absolutely necessary on this occasion to put

¹ For the previous conversation, see No. 500.

² See No. 493, n. 4.

³ See No. 225, n. 17.

⁴ On August 29, 1924. See Vol. XXVI, No. 566.

⁵ See No. 27, n. 8.

in the present Declaration.² Otherwise they could not carry with them public opinion in Germany, nor would they have a free hand which they considered absolutely necessary for the forthcoming negotiations.

The Ambassador however went on to say that while at first the German Government had thought that a written reply to the Declarations would necessarily entail the breaking off of the Pact negotiations, they were now disposed to think that if a written reply were couched in considerate terms they would still be able to continue with them. Everything however would depend on the terms of such a reply. The Ambassador once more assured me of the sincere desire of the German Government to bring the Pact negotiations to a successful issue, and he begged me most insistently to believe that the present difficulties were very real to the German Government, difficulties which they would far prefer to have avoided if this had been possible.

I told the Ambassador that I would at once communicate his message to the Secretary of State.⁶

V.W.

⁶ Mr. Chamberlain minuted on September 29 in a note to the Cabinet: 'I circulate to my colleagues a record of a conversation between the German Ambassador and Mr. Wellesley which I received this evening at 8.30.

'I sent my reply to the Ambassador's note [and] declaration by telephone about or before 5 p.m. [see No. 499, n. 7].

'The German Gov[ernmen]t [and] the German Ambassador continue to talk as if no-one's feelings were of any account except their own, as if no other country or Gov[ernmen]t had a public opinion to consider, [and] as if no-one else had toes to be trodden on. This conversation would not have caused me to alter the terms of my reply. It would be a hopeless task to go to Locarno, if the German Gov[ernmen]t received the impression that they can say what they please, no matter how irrelevant or how provocative, without fear of any reply. I thought it right to mark on behalf of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] not only surprise but some indignation.

'I received the terms proposed by M. Briand for the French reply by telegraph [and] telephone at the very moment of sitting down to write the reply of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment]t [see No. 499]. I purposely made the British reply a little stiffer than the French answer, for (i) Herr Sthamer had handed me a written declaration [and] had not offered to transform it into a verbal explanation [and] (ii) I thought it right to mark for public opinion here [and] in Germany that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment]t shared to the full the surprise [and] indignation felt by M. Briand at the character of the communication: [and] to indicate that throughout the Pact negotiations from the month of April onwards such difficulties as there have been have all come from the German side. I trust that my colleague[s] will approve. As the German Gov[ernmen]t refused to delay publication, there was no time to ask for a Cabinet.'

Mr. Chamberlain to the German Ambassador¹

[C 12345/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 29, 1925

[Your Excellency,]

H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] have received with pleasure the acceptance by the Government of the Reich of the proposal for a conference on the 5th October at Locarno.² His M[ajesty's] G[overnment] note with satisfaction that the acceptance is given without reserve.

In reply to the declaration which Y[our] E[xcellency] made to me at the same time³ I have the honour to take note of the assurance of Y[our] E[xcellency] that the questions therein raised do not constitute conditions preliminary to a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

These questions have in fact no relation to the negotiations for a Security Pact [and] have formed no part of the preliminary exchange of views.

As regards that part of the declaration which deals with Germany's entry into the League of Nations H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] note with satisfaction that the German Gov[ernment] raises no objection to this essential condition of any mutual pact. The question of Germany's responsibility for the War is not raised by the proposed Pact [and] H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] are at a loss to know why the German Gov[ernment] have thought proper to raise it at this moment. H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] are obliged to observe that the negotiation of a Security Pact cannot modify the Treaty of Versailles or alter their judgment of the past.

As regards the evacuation of the Cologne Zone I have the honour to repeat that the date of that evacuation depends solely on the fulfilment of Germany's disarmament obligations, [and] that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] will welcome the performance of those obligations as permitting the Allies at once to evacuate the northern zone.⁴

I have, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

V. WELLESLEY

¹ For the text of the French note handed to the German Ambassador in Paris by M. Briand, see *Pacte de Sécurité. II* . . . op. cit., p. 12.

² See No. 493.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 4.

⁴ In a minute of September 29 to Mr. Wellesley, Mr. Nicolson stated: 'It may be as well to record the stages by which the Note to the German Ambassador was despatched this evening.'

'On the receipt of Lord Crewe's telegram No. 330 [No. 499], I telephoned to Mr. Bennett the text of that telegram and asked him to obtain the Secretary of State's instructions. The Secretary of State asked that an immediate message might be sent to Paris to the effect that he would himself reply to the German Note in similar but not identical terms [see No. 499,

n. 7]. He also instructed us to prepare for publication in tomorrow's papers of the German Note, the German Declaration, and our eventual reply. He would himself draft that reply and telephone its text during the course of the afternoon. Meanwhile we were to obtain the consent of the German Ambassador to the alteration of the words "the disarmament question" to the words "the disarmament of Germany".

'While awaiting a further telephone message from Mayfield [Mr. Chamberlain was staying at his country house, Twitt's Ghyll, Five Ashes, Sussex, for which Mayfield was the station] and the text of the Secretary of State's draft, I telephoned his message to Paris and took the opportunity to obtain a repetition of the last paragraph of Lord Crewe's No. 330 which, as originally transmitted, did not seem to me to make sense. I found that there had in fact been a mistake, and that the message should have run . . . "he hoped you would publish your reply in London at the same time. The German declaration (since the French Government regarded it as verbal) would not be published here so far as French Government were concerned." The Embassy added that the French would be much embarrassed if we published in London a declaration which they were refraining from publishing in Paris. I therefore instructed the News Department only to publish the German acceptance and our reply: if the Press were puzzled by any references in the latter to certain verbal declarations, the News Department could explain that although these declarations would probably be published in Berlin, they were not being published in London or Paris since both Governments regarded them as in the nature of verbal communications.

'The next point to decide was whether, if the German declaration were not to be published, it was necessary to insist on the alteration of the words "disarmament question" to the words "disarmament of Germany". In the case of the French reply, which implied a quotation from the German declaration, such a change might be necessary. But our own reply (the text of which had by then been telephoned from Mayfield) implied no such quotation and necessitated no request for an alteration of the German Note. Moreover, as Herr von Hoesch had consented to this alteration it would probably figure in the text of the declaration as published in Germany. I felt therefore that to raise the point with the German Ambassador here was not essential, and might lead to a further confusion in a situation already sufficiently intricate. I therefore did nothing on this point.

'The Draft reply telephoned from Mayfield was then typed and signed. A copy was sent to Paris, and copies were prepared for the French and Belgian Embassies. A telegram was also drafted to Berlin, Brussels and Rome giving the text of the note. We then waited to hear from Paris that the draft contained in Lord Crewe's telegram No. 330 had been finally despatched.

'At 6.30 the Paris Embassy telephoned to say that in view of the urgent representations of Herr von Hoesch the draft had been modified at the last moment [see No. 499, n. 7]. The Embassy read me the text. The alterations which had been introduced, and the omissions which had been made, in the original draft were all in the direction of greater moderation. It did not appear to me that the new French text necessitated any modification of the draft which had been telephoned to Mayfield. I therefore, at 6.45, sent the Note off to the German Embassy having first obtained your signature. The two Notes were at the same time released for the Press, and the telegram to Berlin etc. was despatched. Copies of the Note were sent privately to the French and Belgian Ambassadors, and the text was shown to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires [Signor G. Preziosi].

'Paris were informed at the same time by telephone that the Note had been delivered to the German Ambassador and was practically, if not verbally, identical with the new French draft.'

No. 503

Mr. Seymour¹ (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 1, 9 a.m.)

No. 221 Telegraphic [C 12410/459/18]

ROME, September 30, 1925, 11.15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 278.²

Italian government have returned reply to German declaration³ simply saying that as pact of mutual guarantee is based on absolute respect for treaties it is not possible to take into consideration question raised in verbal declaration communicated by German government in accepting conference. Ministry of Foreign Affairs state that text is being given to press today.

Ministry also informed me that final decision as to who will represent Italian government at conference will be taken tomorrow.

¹ First Secretary at H.M. Embassy at Rome, and Chargé d'Affaires September 27–October 10.

² Of September 29, not printed.

³ See No. 493, n. 4.

No. 504

*Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received October 1, 9 a.m.)*

No. 101 Telegraphic [C 12427/459/18]

WARSAW, September 30, 1925, 11.32 p.m.

German minister called this morning to discuss significance of Monsieur Chicherin's visit.¹ He told me nothing new except that Russo–German commercial treaty² would probably be signed during latter's visit to Berlin.³

In the course of conversation he mentioned that he had bet a well-known Polish deputy that Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs would not attend meeting of foreign ministers at Locarno.⁴

¹ The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs visited Warsaw September 27–9. See Vol. XXV, Nos. 490, 492, and 493.

² On October 12, 1925, a treaty was signed at Moscow comprising (i) an agreement regarding conditions of residence and business and legal protection; (ii) an economic agreement; (iii) a railway agreement; (iv) an agreement regarding navigation; (v) a fiscal agreement; (vi) an agreement regarding commercial courts of arbitration; (vii) an agreement regarding the legal protection of industrial property. For the text, see *S.T.S.*, pp. 288–302. See also Vol. XXV, No. 331.

³ M. Chicherin, who was suffering from diabetes and rheumatism, arrived in Berlin on September 30 ostensibly for medical treatment. He left Berlin for a cure at Wiesbaden on October 18. For his visit, see Vol. XXV, Nos. 331–3.

⁴ See No. 484.

I asked him what he meant by this as I understood on the contrary that idea was that Polish and Czech Ministers for Foreign Affairs would be at Locarno to negotiate arbitration treaties in which their governments were interested if not at very outset of meeting in any case some time during negotiation of western pact.

German minister who has only just arrived from Berlin assured me that view of his government was that it would be useless to embark on a discussion of arbitration treaties with eastern powers until it was quite certain that western pact would be signed.

I pointed out to him that article 9 of draft as adopted by legal experts⁵ lays down that the arbitration treaties must be communicated to signatories of pact before it can be ratified and establishes a clear inter-dependence between them which renders simultaneous negotiation almost inevitable.

German minister said that his government were very apprehensive of possible effect on German public opinion of such negotiations with Poland and urged that it would be a mistake to press the plan too far. With Czechoslovakia it was a different matter as possible points of difference between the two countries were of relative unimportance whereas with Poland they were of the greatest political moment.

I report these remarks as German minister is generally well-informed regarding views of his government and if they are as he represents them to be they are diametrically opposed to your intentions as explained to Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.⁶

⁵ See Nos. 440 and 466.

⁶ See No. 470.

No. 505

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 1, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 337 Telegraphic: by bag [C 12401/459/18]

PARIS, September 30, 1925

Your telegram No. 270 of September 30th.¹

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been informed of date of arrival of British Delegation at Locarno.

Monsieur Briand and Monsieur Berthelot are leaving Paris by motor on October 3rd and expect to be at Locarno on the afternoon of October the 4th. The remainder of the French Delegation is, it is understood, leaving October the 1st and 2nd by train.

It was thought useful to communicate today unofficially to the Ministry

¹ This telegram (No. 270 to Paris; No. 192 to Berlin; No. 102 to Brussels; No. 280 to Rome) ran: 'Please inform Government to which you are accredited that Secretary of State proposes to arrive at Locarno on afternoon of 4th October in time for first meeting on 5th October. He will be accompanied by Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby and Mr. Bennett.'

for Foreign Affairs the substance of Mr. Wellesley's conversations with the German Ambassador on September the 28th² and 29th³ (Germany Print. September 28th Section 2, and Germany Print. September 29th Section 1). Monsieur Laroche said that the French government was much pleased with the close accord maintained in this matter between themselves and His Majesty's Government. The newspaper comment on the notes⁴ also stresses the close agreement existing between the British and French governments and although the German manœuvre is universally condemned as an example of blundering disloyalty there has really been no attempt in any way to use it against the Locarno Conference.

² See No. 498.

³ See Nos. 500 and 501.

⁴ See No. 502.

No. 506

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 275 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 12429/459/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 1, 1925, 6.20 p.m.*

Please telephone following to His Majesty's Minister at Berne. Begins:—

Swiss government will have seen that German government have accepted the invitation¹ to meet allied representatives to discuss the question of a treaty of mutual guarantee and that it is proposed that the meeting shall begin at Locarno on October 5th as at present arranged. It will be in the first instance between British, French, Belgian, Italian and German representatives, but Polish and Czechoslovak representatives will probably arrive later.

The proceedings will be as informal as possible and in view of this we do not propose to trouble Swiss government by asking them to open the meeting formally as they were good enough to do, for instance, at Lausanne² but His Majesty's Government feel sure that they can count on the customary goodwill with which the Swiss government, with invariable courtesy, have always encouraged and facilitated holding of international meetings on Swiss soil.

French government are being asked³ to send similar instructions to your French colleague with whom you should concert your action.

¹ See No. 493.

² The Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs was held November 20, 1922–February 4, 1923, and April 23–July 24, 1923. See Vol. XVIII, Chaps. II and IV.

³ Lord Crewe was so instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 276 to Paris of October 1, not printed.

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received October 3, 9 a.m.)*

No. 357 Telegraphic [C 12490/459/18]

BERLIN, October 2, 1925, 8.20 p.m.

I dined at American Embassy last night and met the Chancellor with whom I had long conversation.

I found him . . .¹ less optimistic and somewhat less conciliatory than might have been expected.

He began by complaining bitterly of unfriendly tone of British answer² to German declaration. It was much harsher than Belgian³ or French.⁴

I replied that complaints in German press about English reply had no real justification. We had repeatedly warned German government against course they adopted.

The Chancellor then turned to prospects of Locarno.⁵ He said that he was a sincere advocate of pact and that he would do his utmost to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion. At the same time over-confidence was out of place. He was told that signature of pact would change the atmosphere and that he ought to rely on this change of atmosphere to bring about subsequent removal of Germany's grievances but same language had been held last year in London⁶ and improved atmosphere had lasted exactly three months when non-evacuation of Cologne and controversy regarding disarmament⁷ had put everything back.

I pointed out to Chancellor the vast improvement in relations between France and Germany which had occurred, the conciliatory tone adopted by M. Briand and punctual evacuation of the Ruhr⁸ and of the three towns.⁹ He rejoined that only those points had been carried out which had been precisely stipulated; otherwise nothing had been done and recent reports he had received from Rhineland indicated that in many directions grievances to which Germans were subjected were now worse than ever.

Chancellor then reverted to internal political situation in Germany. The pact and entry of Germany into League of Nations would probably require a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag. This meant that vote of German nationals had to be obtained. Apart from constitutional necessity, it was obvious that a pact endorsed by German nationals had far greater value as a means of pacification than any instrument carried out by the Left against German national opposition. Should they obtain the German national vote, Chancellor would have to show that apprehensions of Germany regarding article (? 16) had been met or that Germany's alarm on the subject was justified.

¹ The text is here uncertain.

³ See No. 497.

⁵ See No. 484.

⁸ See No. 635, below.

² See No. 502.

⁴ See Nos. 499 and 502, n. 1.

⁷ See Chap. III, below.

⁹ See No. 645, below.

Further it was essential that certain improvements in conditions in Rhineland should be introduced. I had said that improvements should be left to better atmosphere which pact would create but his compatriots in occupied area counted upon him to obtain some definite alleviation of their lot.

As regards French guarantee of Polish treaty of arbitration that was quite unacceptable to Germany in its original form.¹⁰

The Chancellor brought forward no new points but reiterated all the various conditions regarding pact which Germany has put forward at different times. While he admitted truth of contention that signature of pact would mean a great gain to Germany both in security and status and that this fact overshadowed all other considerations he appears to lay undue emphasis upon subsidiary questions which Germany desires to see settled simultaneously. There was a marked lack of proportion in importance which he attached to these different issues.

It is difficult to estimate how far Chancellor's attitude was tactical or how far his opinions were dictated by a consciousness of his own parliamentary difficulties and necessity to obtain conditions which would satisfy Reichstag. My impression is however that he will prove more difficult at Locarno than representatives of the (? Foreign Office).

At conclusion of conversation Chancellor said that he hoped Locarno would mean a free interchange of ideas on a non-official basis. Official meetings with a chairman and a stenographer led to no beneficial result.

¹⁰ See No. 484.

No. 508

Mr. Seymour (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 3, 9 a.m.)

No. 223 Telegraphic [C 12488/1/22]

ROME, October 2, 1925, 9.40 p.m.

Your telegram No. 2[8]1.¹

Signor Mussolini being much engaged today on his return to Rome I conveyed your message to him through Chef de Cabinet and he returned an answer this evening through the same channel.

He wishes to thank you for the message you so courteously sent to him deploring attacks of 'Daily News' and also for soliciting his personal

¹ Of October 1. This ran: 'Italian Chargé d'Affaires has made representations regarding article in "Daily News" of September 29th in which M. Mussolini is violently attacked and accused among other things of negotiating a Triple Alliance with Germany and Russia.

'Please tell M. Mussolini that I deplore this attack but that I cannot control the newspapers of our own party still less those of the opposition. M. Mussolini can however give a triumphant refutation of these silly attacks in the most dignified and unanswerable form by attending personally the conference fixed at Locarno [see No. 484] especially to suit his convenience and assisting us in the negotiations by his authority and experience.'

participation in the Locarno conference² which would have the effect of refuting any such attacks.

His Excellency will do his best to take part in the conference or at least in a part of it if it appears that his personal presence would really be useful both owing to the interest with which he follows the problems to be dealt with and out of respect for the representatives of other Powers. His plans cannot of course be affected by journalistic fables which find their best refutation in the policy which Italian government has followed and is following.

² See No. 484.

No. 509

Memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain on the Locarno Conversations

[C 12491/459/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 2, 1925

On the eve of my departure for Locarno¹ it may be useful that I should summarise my latest impressions:—

1. I was at first not a little disturbed by the provocative and most inopportune declaration which the German Government instructed their Ambassadors to make in the Allied capitals at the same time that they handed in the German acceptance of our invitation to a conference.² Herr Sthamer, as my colleagues are aware, went so far as to hint in a later conversation with Mr. Wellesley³ that if the Allied Governments showed any resentment at this declaration it might prevent the meeting of the conference. My reply had actually been sent off⁴ before this communication reached me, but it only strengthened my conviction that it was necessary to deal firmly with the Germans on this point, which would otherwise be but a prelude to a series of similar vexatious and dangerous episodes at Locarno. Upon the whole I think the incident has done good. It has exhibited once again, and on the eve of the conference, the union existing among the Allies and has strengthened their mutual confidence. The declaration made to please the German Nationalists has drawn upon that party the censure of the other German parties (of the Centre no less than the Socialists), who accuse the Nationalists of having wantonly exposed the German Government to a rebuff; and the Nationalists themselves appear to feel that their declaration lost its intended effect as it appeared only simultaneously with the Allied replies.⁵

2. On the whole, therefore, I go to the conference in a spirit of sober hopefulness. Undoubtedly the French Government desire the negotia-

¹ See No. 505, n. 1.

⁴ No. 502.

² See No. 493.

³ See No. 501.

⁵ See Nos. 497, 499, 502 and 503.

tions to succeed and M. Briand will do everything in his power to secure that success. The Belgians can be equally counted upon for moderation and liberality of view; whilst the jurists' conversations in London⁶ would seem to show that no great difficulties are likely to occur in the discussions on the Western Pact itself. The German Government may prove troublesome, but to me, at any rate, it seems that whilst, owing to the weakness of individuals or of the Government as a whole, they yield unduly to Nationalist pressure and thus at every moment increase the difficulties of the French Government with French public opinion, they still desire the success of a proposal which originated with them. But I have to confess that they hold at times a language incompatible with their earlier statements and assurances and that their attitude may present unexpected difficulties.

3. The position in relation to the eastern frontiers of Germany is obviously one of much greater difficulty and even with goodwill it may not be easy to reach a solution. Here again the attitude of M. Briand, given the necessary conditions of French policy, is all that we could expect or desire. He is bound to respect the obligations of France to Poland⁷ and Czechoslovakia;⁷ but ever since the jurists' conversations he has been directing his efforts to finding a solution which shall put what is essential from the French point of view into a form acceptable to Germany. As he said to me at Geneva, he would not 'quarrel about words';⁸ if a guarantee by France was unacceptable, he would be prepared to propose a guarantee by the League of Nations, placing, as it were, the army of France at the disposal of the League in support of that guarantee. This, as the Cabinet may remember, revives a suggestion made by Sir M. Hankey's Committee on the protocol⁹ for the form which a British guarantee of France might take.

4. M. Benes has made it clear that he heartily supports the pact and that, provided peace is maintained between France and Germany, he considers Czechoslovakia safe. No difficulties need be anticipated from his side; nor do I expect any serious difficulty in regard to Czechoslovakia from the side of Germany. The case of Poland is a more difficult one; for it would be almost impossible to exaggerate the hatred and contempt felt by the Germans for the Poles, or the hatred and distrust felt by the Poles for the Germans, and there have been at times ominous signs that the Germans were trying to escape from the assurance they formally gave, alike to the French Government in Paris and to us through Lord D'Abernon, that, whilst they were unable to repudiate the desire to change their eastern frontiers, they had neither the power *nor the will* to seek a solution of that problem by force.¹⁰

5. It is therefore in relation to Poland that I anticipate the greatest difficulty. It is contemplated by the Allies that, after reaching a certain

⁶ See Nos. 464, 466 and 467.

⁸ See No. 468.

⁹ See No. 191, n. 5.

⁷ See No. 187.

¹⁰ See Nos. 273 and 274.

stage of progress in relation to the Western Pact, simultaneous but separate conversations should be carried on among the parties directly interested in the treaties of arbitration—in the west, between France and Belgium on the one side and Germany on the other, in the east, between Poland and Czechoslovakia on the one side and Germany on the other—with the cognisance and, where necessary, the assistance of the representative of the guaranteeing Power. I shall therefore not be, in the first instance at any rate, and may not be at any time, an actual participant in the negotiations regarding these eastern treaties, and I shall of course strictly maintain the oft-times declared decision of the British Government that they can undertake no new liabilities in respect to the eastern frontiers.¹¹

6. It would, however, in my opinion be a grave mistake to allow ourselves or others to suppose that because we are not prepared to accept fresh obligations in that sphere we are therefore indifferent to what goes on there. We have, in fact, one great interest—the maintenance of peace, and though the Western Pact by itself would in my opinion enormously strengthen the prospects of peace in Europe, a full measure of security cannot be obtained without corresponding arrangements on the eastern frontiers. The spark that kindled the Great War fell in Serbia,¹² but the war involved us and nearly all the world. It is not right that we should accept any obligations in advance in respect of a war originating in Eastern Europe, but it does not follow that we ought to be or can be indifferent to the possibilities of such a conflict, for it might easily raise issues and assume dimensions which would compel the Government of the day, free though it were from any treaty obligation, to take a part. My primary business no doubt is with the Western Pact, and is to see that the engagements of France in the east do not indirectly impose obligations on the British Government which it is not willing to assume directly; but for the above reasons I hold that it will also be my duty to show an interest in the success of the eastern negotiations, and, if opportunity offers, to use any influence I can command for the purpose of securing that success. Apart, therefore, from the practical difficulties involved in concluding the western negotiations without knowing what the situation in the east is going to be, I should, as at present advised, not wish to go too far or too fast with the western negotiations until the eastern situation has developed. It is, I think, true that the eastern treaties will only be realised as part of the western negotiations and that for us to make a firm bargain with the Germans in relation to the west before the eastern questions are settled would militate strongly against the chances of such a settlement.

¹¹ As revealed, for example, in the speeches in the House of Commons on March 24 of Mr. Chamberlain (see No. 269) and Mr. Baldwin (see 182 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 402–8) and in Mr. Chamberlain's speech of June 24 (see No. 388, n. 4)

¹² i.e. when Serbia called on Russia for aid after the presentation of an ultimatum by Austria-Hungary after the murder by a Serb of the Heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

I have dictated these general notes in the idea that the Cabinet might like to see how my mind is moving, more particularly as I carry no special instructions with me—but these I think are unnecessary, for the policy of the Government is clearly defined, has been publicly stated by both the Prime Minister and myself in the House of Commons¹¹ and has been developed in great detail with the approval of the Cabinet in the correspondence which has proceeded between the Governments concerned and in the draft pact¹³ which was the basis of the jurists' discussions.⁶ Obviously I must as to details be largely guided by the course of events and by the attitude and temper of the German representatives, but I shall endeavour to keep the Cabinet fully informed of the proceedings by telegraph and, where necessary, by despatch, and I shall of course seek their advice if any unforeseen problem arises. Throughout I shall keep constantly in my mind the limitations which our policy sets to any new commitments by His Majesty's Government. I shall not be surprised nor unduly disappointed if a single conference is insufficient to reach complete agreement.

A.C.

P.S.—I should like the Cabinet to know that I informed the Prime Minister that I should be very willing to have a Cabinet colleague associated with me in the Locarno conversations if he thought such a course desirable in view of their great importance. He was good enough to say that he and the Cabinet had complete confidence in me and thought such a course quite unnecessary. It certainly might have led to an inconvenient increase in other delegations.

A.C.

¹³ See No. 440.

No. 510

Mr. Seymour (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 5)

No. 833 [C 12544/459/18]*

ROME, October 2, 1925

Sir,

Your telegram No. 279 of the 29th ultimo,¹ giving the text of the reply² to the German Ambassador's note of the 26th September³ relative to the conference on security, reached me on the 30th. Signor Mussolini, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and Signor Mussolini's 'chef de cabinet' were none of them in Rome, but I called at the Ministry and communicated the text of the reply of His Majesty's

¹ See No. 499, n. 7.

² No. 502.

³ See No. 493, n. 4.

Government to M. Mamelli, the official in charge of the Minister's Cabinet. M. Mamelli supplied me in return with a copy of the declaration which the Italian Government were making in reply to the German declaration, a copy of which had been communicated to the Ministry on the 26th September. A translation of this reply, the substance of which was given in my telegram No. 221 of the 30th ultimo,⁴ is enclosed herewith.⁵

2. No official decision with regard to the Italian representatives at the conference⁶ could be taken until Signor Mussolini's return to Rome, and it was not until late yesterday evening that it was announced that the delegation would be composed as follows:—

Delegates—

Senator Vittorio Scialoja.

Signor Dino Grandi, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Assistant delegates—

Commendatore Chiaramonte Bordonaro, Minister Plenipotentiary.

The Marquis Medici del Vascello, Minister Plenipotentiary.

Experts—

Commendatore Massimo Pilotti and

Commendatore Gino Buti.

3. The Italian attitude towards the conference, as reflected in the press, does not appear to have undergone any marked change. Italy's definite adherence to the pact, writes Signor Bellonci in the 'Epoca' (1st October), depends on whether it will actually solve the problems with which Europe is confronted. Even if the pact brings about a true and real peace, the Italian Government will have to see that Italian interests are more effectively guaranteed than under the Treaty of Versailles. In the same article Signor Bellonci analyses the position of the other countries attending the conference. With regard to Great Britain, he says that she goes to Locarno at a moment when Turkey is threatening to resume hostilities. Chinese hostility against England is increasing, and the Bolsheviks are fomenting anti-British agitations all over Asia. In the circumstances, Mr. Chamberlain's desire to detach Germany from Russia should be keener than ever.

4. The 'Idea Nazionale' takes exception to a statement of the 'Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung' that towards Russia alone had Italy pursued an independent policy, while on every other question she had moved in the Anglo-French orbit. Fascist foreign policy, says the 'Idea Nazionale' has constantly followed an independent course, from which it would not depart in the pact negotiations. Germany must learn to consider Italy as an independent force, and not as a satellite. The same error had been fatal to Germany before the war.

5. The Italian press generally regards the observations brought forward in the course of the verbal communications made by the German Ambassadors to the Allied Foreign Ministers⁷ as highly inopportune. The

⁴ No. 503.

⁶ See No. 484.

⁵ The text of the reply of September 30 is not printed.

⁷ See Nos. 493, 496, 497 and 499.

'Tribuna' regards them as 'superfluous and harmful'. Herr Stresemann's gesture, points out the 'Giornale d'Italia', has only resulted in making Germany cut a poor figure and in weakening the position of her delegates at the forthcoming Locarno Conference.⁶ It has also confirmed the impression that the Reich, through the conference, was tending towards a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. The three Allied Governments have, in three declarations, identical in substance if not in form, affirmed in common and explicitly their will that the revision of the Treaty of Versailles shall not be allowed in any case or under any pretext.

I have, etc.,

H.J. SEYMOUR

No. 511

*Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received October 4, 8.10 p.m.)*

No. 33 Telegraphic [C 12529/459/18]

PRAGUE, October 4, 1925, 6 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs made long statement to press yesterday of which following is résumé of the more important parts.

Contrary to fears awakened in some sections of public opinion position of Czechoslovakia is ameliorated by coming events.

One. Rhine pact will lead to consolidation in central Europe and exclude possible conflicts there.

Two. Present treaties and guarantees with France¹ and little entente¹ remain absolutely unaltered.

Three. Without co-operation of Russia, European problem cannot be solved. Pact of guarantee will bring Russian co-operation nearer; without it situation of Czechoslovakia will remain unsettled. Czechoslovakia desires relations of complete friendliness of Russia. But that is a question of the future.

Negotiations at Locarno² and documents to be signed form an indivisible political whole.

Fears that guarantor may be prevented from coming to the assistance of party guarantees are groundless.

Two unsolved problems are definition of guarantees of arbitration treaties and extent of these treaties.

Czechoslovakian démarche in Berlin³ was a formality following naturally from past negotiations and has been recognised as such by all Governments concerned including Polish Government.

In spite of an unfortunate German communiqué Monsieur Benes is

¹ See No. 187.

² See No. 484.

³ See No. 486.

convinced that German Government bring to negotiations with Czechoslovak Government genuine desire for their success.

He was in complete concurrence with Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Geneva¹ regarding substance of problems and procedure to be followed as far as it was possible to define them then; and of course they will consult together at Locarno again and, he is convinced, agree.

Yugoslav and Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs both wish negotiations to succeed.

Question of minorities has no place in coming guarantee and arbitration negotiations.

Any rapprochement between Poland and Russia would be profitable and welcome to Czechoslovakia.

¹ See No. 165, n. 4.

No. 512

*Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received October 4, 7.10 p.m.)*

No. 34 Telegraphic [C 12530/459/18]

PRAGUE, October 4, 1925, 6 p.m.

Your telegram No. 18.¹

Message delivered orally. M. Benes thanks you for it; he has had similar approbation from French government.

He had little to add to press statement, see my telegram No. 33,² but he asked me to inform you that he made *démarche* to facilitate task of allies and he was satisfied that he had succeeded. He chose the psychological moment; he wished to support Stresemann against his opponents. German Cabinet was to meet on Monday September 21st. He telegraphed instructions for *démarche* to the Czechoslovak Minister at Berlin³ on the Saturday afternoon and to Czechoslovak Minister at Warsaw⁴ at the same time to inform Polish government. Former acted on Sunday in time for Cabinet meeting; latter was only able to do so on Monday. This evidently explains occasion of M. Skrzynski's displeasure. But I gather that latter had now also approached German government and that M. Benes and he had made it up and would act in harmony at Locarno.⁵

M. Benes also informed Lord Cecil and Polish delegation at Geneva of despatch of instructions at the time.

M. Benes leaves for Locarno at 11 a.m. on Tuesday and looks forward to meet you.

¹ See No. 492, n. 3.

³ Dr. K. Krofta.

⁴ Dr. R. Flieder.

² No. 511.

⁵ See No. 484.

Record¹ by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with Herr von Schubert

LOC/12/B.D. [C 12660/459/18]

[LOCARNO], October 4, 1925

By the direction of the Secretary of State Mr. Selby and I called upon Herr Schubert of the German Delegation at his hotel this afternoon.

The immediate object of our visit was to inform him of the arrangements proposed for the first meeting of the conference tomorrow, and to secure German assent—more particularly to the French proposal that Mr. Chamberlain should be in the Chair.

After we had disposed of that business we had a certain amount of general conversation, from which I gleaned that the main difficulty which the Germans foresaw to the proposals embodied in the draft pact² as it at present stands arises over the second part of Article 6, namely the French guarantee of a German-Polish arbitration treaty. Herr von Schubert stated most emphatically that it would be absolutely impossible for Germany to agree to that proposal as it at present stood. However, he went out of his way to emphasise the desire of the German delegation to be helpful and—as he said twice over—he thought the only way would be to get the jurists on to the point and see if they could not discover some ‘Schlengel-Wege’ or way round so as to circumvent the difficulty.

The only other point of special interest on which he touched was the visit of Chicherin to Berlin.³ He took the initiative in raising this question and it was evident that he did so expressly in order to disabuse us of any idea that the proceedings at Berlin with Chicherin in any way modified the German government’s policy as regards the pact. This he stated emphatically was not the case. Germany repudiated the idea of an orientation towards the east. German policy was to steer a middle course and to orientate neither to the east nor to the west. He was sincerely desirous of seeing the pact negotiations come to a successful issue. He added that the German government had not in the least wished Chicherin to come to Berlin. The latter had first of all put forward illness as an excuse, saying that he was going to Vienna and that he would visit Berlin en route. When they arrived in Berlin, added Herr von Schubert, he was in rude health. In short, the negotiations that had taken place had merely been the conclusions of discussions which had already been proceeding for a good two years, dealing with a variety of technical matters outstanding between the two countries. There was no idea whatsoever of Germany being drawn into the Russian orbit. He had seen it suggested in

¹ A copy of this record was transmitted to Sir W. Tyrrell in Locarno despatch No. 1, and was received in the Foreign Office on October 7.

² See Nos. 440 and 466.

³ See No. 504, n. 3.

certain quarters that this was a second Treaty of Rapallo.⁴ This was absolute nonsense; it was nothing of the kind.

M.W. LAMPSON

⁴ See No. 211, n. 3.

No. 514

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 9)

LOC/7/B.D. [N 5714/710/38]

LOCARNO, October 4, 1925

My dear Tyrrell,

This is a most heavenly spot, and if we cannot make peace here then peace in this world must be impossible.

Briand has just been with me. He proposes that I should preside over the conference on the double ground that, had we not desired to choose a neutral place, London would have been the seat of the conference and the British minister its natural president, and also because he feels that he himself would be embarrassed by the restrictions of the chair, and will be in a better position to talk freely if he is not at the same time presiding.

I am accordingly sending Selby to see the Germans to say that I understand that it would be agreeable to the other delegations, if also agreeable to the Germans, that I should preside,¹ but that I hope we shall keep the proceedings as informal as possible, treating them rather as conversations between the foreign ministers than as a formal conference, and indeed discussing with the same freedom and absence of formality as characterised the conversations between Briand and myself in London.²

Briand told me that he was a little preoccupied by Chicherin's activities.³ He heard that Bernstorff⁴ had been saying at Geneva that Chicherin was attempting to form a Russo-German-Polish combination, to include also Italy and extending to Turkey and China, and Briand thought Mussolini had been lending some countenance to the idea. Skrzynski had consulted Briand before receiving Chicherin, and he had encouraged him to do so, saying that Poland had every interest in getting on good terms with Russia if she could. Her situation between Russia and Germany was obviously dangerous, and her relations with Germany could only be facilitated and the prospects of our negotiations improved if Germany felt that there was no likelihood of Russia making trouble for Poland in the rear. Indeed, if Poland had nothing to fear from Russia, it might help to dispel from the minds of the Germans their night-mare of a French army marching across

¹ See No. 513.

² See Nos. 438 and 441.

³ See No. 504.

⁴ Count J. von Bernstorff, Ambassador to Washington 1908-17, was a member of the Reichstag and President of the League of Nations Union in Germany.

Germany to the relief of Poland (an idea which Briand observed no Frenchman contemplated).

Upon the whole, Briand is not sorry that Mussolini is not here, and he feels that the beauty of the view from the terrace from which I am writing more than compensates for the absence of the Prime Minister of Italy!

I had a few words with Briand about Turkey and Mosul.⁵ I told him that I was not greatly disturbed by the Turkish threats, and did not anticipate serious trouble if the League gave a satisfactory decision, but I had been greatly concerned by Undén's proceedings and proposals,⁶ and I trusted that Briand himself would make a point of presiding at the Council whenever the question came up again as it was of too great consequence to be left even to the most distinguished rempłaçant.

I took the opportunity to add some observations on the common danger to both France and Great Britain of allowing the Turks again to get a hold upon the Arabs. Briand warmly agreed, but he said he was not sorry that a decision was being delayed for a little. He thought that the Turks would be easier to deal with when the trouble in Syria⁷ had been ended. This would not now take long, and he might tell me in confidence that he then intended to recall Sarraïl⁸ and to send out a civilian governor, whose administration would be conciliatory rather than authoritative. He spoke strongly of the outrageous attitude adopted by Undén, which he was inclined to impute to German influence, the Germans hoping that they could obtain from the Council a decision so thoroughly unsatisfactory to us that it would make trouble between the French and ourselves and generally embroil the situation to their advantage.

I also have been inclined to suspect that German influence played a part in Undén's obliquities, and I am inclined to add another motive for their conduct in the hope which they may possibly cherish of our throwing up the mandate,⁹ and of Germany then obtaining it on her entry into the League with the position that that would give her on the line of the old Bagdad railway, and an immediate proximity with Turkey.

I told Briand of what Skrzynski had said to Max Müller about Benes's overture to Germany, and of my reply.¹⁰ I added that I entirely approved the advice which he had given to Skrzynski about Russia, and that it was no part of the British policy to embroil the relations of Poland and her

⁵ See No. 468, n. 7.

⁶ Professor Undén had been a member of the Committee set up by the Council of the League of Nations on September 4 to consider the Mosul question. The Committee had recommended on September 19 that certain points be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice (see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 1337 and 1377). For the 'inside story' of the work of the Sub-Committee, see Mr. Amery's letter from Geneva of September 26 to Mr. Chamberlain (F.O. 800, vol. 258, ff. 539-42), not printed.

⁷ For the Druze rebellion in French mandated territory 1925-6, see *Survey of International Affairs* 1925, vol. I (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1927), pp. 416-57.

⁸ General M. Sarraïl was French High Commissioner in Syria.

⁹ Of Iraq.

¹⁰ See Nos. 486 and 492.

neighbours on either side, but that on the contrary we should be very glad to see them improved.

Briand observed that Skrzynski's remark about Benes's gaff was partly inspired by jealousy.

Please show this letter to the Prime Minister. I do not think there is anything in it of sufficient interest to make it worth circulating to the Cabinet.

The Germans have accepted the proposal that I should preside tomorrow without prejudice to discussion of a rotation afterwards among all the Powers.

Y[ou]rs sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 515

Record¹ by Mr. Chamberlain of conversations with Signor Scialoja and Herr von Schubert

LOC/19/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(2)]

LOCARNO, October 4, 1925, 11 p.m.

I

Signor Scialoja has just been with me. He said that he desired to explain his present position on this occasion. It was something more than that which he had occupied at Geneva. There, as he had explained to us at the time of our conversation on the report of the Jurists' Meetings,² he had been a mere observer, and could offer nothing but a personal opinion; now he was something more. He had been unable to persuade Signor Mussolini to come himself to the opening of the conference, but the President of the Council did not exclude the idea that he might come at a later time. In any case, Signor Scialoja had now authority to adhere (*adhérer*) to the Western Pact if it were concluded in the terms which had been foreshadowed.

Signor Scialoja did not anticipate any great difficulties with the Germans about the Western Pact, but he remained of opinion that the arrangements for the eastern frontier would be very difficult. I replied that they no doubt offered difficulty, but I did not believe the difficulty was insurmountable if the Germans adhered to the assurances which they had originally given, that they were ready to exclude recourse to force as a method of altering the situation in the east. If they remained true to that assurance, and were prepared to put it in black and white, I had great confidence that M. Briand would find a means of reconciling the engagements of France to Poland³ and Czechoslovakia³ with the legiti-

¹ A copy of the memorandum of these conversations was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 3, not printed, and was received on October 7.

² See No. 468.

³ See No. 187.

mate susceptibilities of the German people.

Signor Scialoja then repeated to me one after another various statements alleged to have been made by members of the German delegation since they arrived here, which had been reported to him from some unnamed source. The first was the insuperable obstacle presented by article 16 of the Covenant. Then the question of Cologne, and, lastly, a rumour that the Germans would make it a condition that some of their former colonies were restored to them under mandate. Had I any confirmation of these rumours? I replied that I had not, that as to article 16 we had no power to waive it, and there was no probability that the Assembly would be agreed upon changing the constitution of the League; nor did the matter seem to me of great intrinsic consequence from the German point of view. They were frightening themselves with a hypothetical situation which, in fact, would never arise. As to the German colonies, I had heard no confirmation of this report of late, though some months ago I had seen something of a campaign in the German papers on the same subject, and had at once instructed Lord D'Abernon to let it be known to people of authority that there was no possibility of our resigning any of the British mandates in favour of Germany.⁴ I added that the air was thick with rumours of this kind, and that I had even heard it suggested⁵ that Bernstorff at Geneva had been saying that negotiations had made much progress for some kind of alliance or accord between Germany, Russia, Italy and Poland as a counter-balance to the agreement of the Western Powers. I did not myself attach much importance to any of these reports. I was, however, a little afraid that some Germans were repeating their old mistake of supposing that any agreement between two other nations must be injurious to Germany; whereas, if they would think for a moment, they must see that, for example, the renewed *entente* between the French and British Governments, instead of aggravating, had greatly eased the situation of Germany.⁶

II

Herr Schubert has just come over to say that the Germans are perfectly satisfied to accept my presidency, and the other arrangements proposed *for tomorrow*, but that, though they admit that the point is one of no real consequence, to have the presidency of the Conference permanently in the hands of the English would create a difficult domestic situation in Germany. Would I, therefore, object either to a rotation of the presidency or, what they would prefer, to making a statement tomorrow that at the invitation of the Allies I had taken the initiative in summoning the first meeting, but that I hoped that our future gatherings would be as informal

⁴ See No. 336.

⁵ See No. 514.

⁶ In a memorandum of October 9 (LOC/83/B.D.), Mr. Chamberlain stated: 'Signor Scialoja informed me today that, after communicating to Monsieur Mussolini an account of the proceedings of the Conference up to date, he was "even more authorised" to participate than when he had last spoken to me on the subject. A straw is proverbially useful as showing how the wind blows!'

as possible, and that it would appear unnecessary that there should be any formal presidency.

I have authorised Mr. Selby to tell Herr Schubert that, if the Germans will join in the invitation to me to take the chair tomorrow, I have no objection to making a statement of this kind, provided it is acceptable to M. Briand, and this had been agreed to by all concerned.⁷

⁷ In a minute of October 5, Mr. Lampson recorded: '... Late last night—about 10.30 to be accurate—I received an urgent telephone message from Herr von Schubert asking whether I could receive him at once. He arrived shortly afterwards and came up to my room. He then explained—somewhat haltingly, that his delegation unfortunately found considerable difficulty in agreeing to the arrangement whereby Mr. Chamberlain should be permanent Chairman of the meeting; his Ministers wished to suggest that an alternative Chairmanship would be the best arrangement. He made many apologies for having to make these difficulties but there it was; he must follow his instructions. I pressed him as to the exact reason of the disinclination of his Ministers to accept the proposed system; but the only real reason which I could extract from him was that it would have an unfortunate effect upon German public opinion if it were announced that the permanent Chairmanship had been assigned to Great Britain. Some general discussion followed between him, Mr. Selby (who was present) and myself as a result of which we suggested that a way out of the difficulty would be that Mr. Chamberlain should preside at the opening meeting on Monday, October 5, when arrangements as to procedure, etc., would have to be made. Thereafter the meetings should resolve themselves into a round table conference at which there would be no question of Chairmanship at all. (This incidentally was in fact the idea with which Mr. Chamberlain had left London as he had only modified it in order to meet M. Briand who had suggested that it might have advantages if Great Britain had the presidency of the conference.)

'Herr von Schubert said that such a round table arrangement would suit his delegation if we could arrange to put it through. Mr. Selby accordingly went down and consulted the Secretary of State, who at once agreed, and I subsequently saw M. Léger, of the French delegation (whom I had to pull out of bed for the purpose, and who in his turn had to extract M. Briand from a similar position), and as a result we informed Herr von Schubert that, after the first meeting at which Mr. Chamberlain would preside, the round table system with no president would be agreeable to all of us. Herr von Schubert departed highly satisfied. By this time it was about 12.30. . . . I have only recorded this trivial incident as an indication of the somewhat strange mentality of the Germans. It might almost have been expected that they would have welcomed British Chairmanship of these meetings, but not at all. M. Briand and the French delegation are highly amused at the whole incident, which they consider typical.'

No. 516

*Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 5, 7.40 p.m.)*

No. 4 Telegraphic [C 12598/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 5, 1925, 5.10 p.m.

First meeting of conference¹ took place in Palais de Justice, building

¹ No official minutes were kept of the Locarno Conference. Notes, however, were made by the Secretary of the British Delegation (Mr. Bennett) and were revised with those of the

which local authorities have placed at our disposal.

Proceedings were opened by a speech of welcome by Syndic, to which I replied on behalf of conference in suitable terms. I then took the chair as had been arranged previously² with the other delegations that I should do so until necessary decisions regarding routine and procedure had been passed. As soon as this was done it was resolved that we should form ourselves into a round table conference with no formal chairmanship. It was further agreed unanimously that proceedings should be as informal as possible and that character of 'conversations' should be maintained throughout.

We then got to serious business and, avoiding by common consent any preliminary discussion of a general character, took as the basis of our discussion draft Pact as it left the jurists on September 4th.³ On this I invited German delegation to give us their views and I may preface what follows with general comment that most striking atmosphere of helpful goodwill prevailed throughout. M. Briand and Dr. Luther went out of their way to emphasize their determination not only to bring Pact to a successful conclusion but also to eliminate once and for all division of Europe into rival camps of victor and vanquished.

To turn to actual discussion articles 3, 5, 9 and 10 were agreed to without comment by all delegations. Preamble and articles 7 and 11 were at the request of the Germans referred back to jurists for what I gathered were purely technical reasons with which Stresemann did not wish to trouble main conference for the time being.

On article 1 Stresemann proposed certain drafting alterations which will be studied by jurists this afternoon but which so far as I could gather from verbal discussion seemed *primâ facie* unobjectionable to everyone.

secretaries of the other delegations. Mr. Bennett's notes of the nine plenary meetings of the Conference are printed as Appendix to this volume, the text of those notes which survive in the final copy being taken from F.O. 840/1: *Locarno Conference 1925. (Treaty of Mutual Guarantee)*.

In a letter of October 5 to Sir W. Tyrrell, Mr. Lampson stated: 'I had a talk this afternoon with the Secretary of State about various routine matters, amongst others the question of reporting home.

'Our intention is to keep you fully informed of what is going on by daily telegrams; we do not propose to supplement these by despatches unless there is anything special which lends itself better to that form. But you will of course receive at the office copies automatically of the notes kept by Bennett of the daily meetings of the conference. It is especially in regard to these notes that the Secretary of State wished me to write. He is most anxious that if printed they should not at present be circulated outside the office—even to the Cabinet. As he said, the situation is liable to change so quickly that a reference in the notes of one day may be entirely without importance the next, and he is nervous lest, if the first record went outside the office false alarms or ideas might be started either amongst the Cabinet or elsewhere. For this reason, as I said above, he wishes the minutes kept for the present strictly within the office, though he has no objection to their being printed for our own departmental use; indeed, he quite agreed that they must be so printed as they will be our only record of what passed and without them our series of archives on the various international meetings that have taken place since the Peace would be incomplete. . . .'

² See Nos. 513, 514 and 515.

³ See No. 466.

Article 2 Vandervelde suggested some purely verbal alterations which should cause no difficulty.

Article 4 (3) Germans proposed two amendments in this text about one of which M. Briand expressed some doubt whilst the other seemed to me unobjectionable but I cannot usefully comment until we have seen and considered their text. Their translation was so inadequate that Chancellor had more than once to explain in French what Stresemann had said in German.

Article 6 contains real difficulty ahead of us, namely French guarantee of German Polish arbitration treaty. This, German delegation declared themselves absolutely unable to accept. They proposed to use this first meeting only to give a reading to draft, indicating as we did so, points requiring consideration.

Article 8 gave rise to some difficulty as Germans wished to make notification to Council dependent on request of one party only. Their arguments were not without weight and I think had considerable influence on the conference. Finally both Vandervelde and Scialoja made alternative suggestions and these also have been referred to jurists for report.

It would be rash to presume too much upon very satisfactory character of this morning's discussion.

It was easy, frank and loyal and Chancellor seemed to me to show just the qualities which, joined with M. Briand's, are needed for success. They will be tested when we take up one of the bigger questions tomorrow morning.

Repeated to Rome No. 284, Berlin No. 194 and Brussels No. 103.

No. 517

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 10 Telegraphic [C 12700/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 6, 1925, 10.05 p.m.

Conference met at 4.30.¹

Though there is no official president Secretary of State was tacitly accepted by all as actually performing duties of a president.

M. Vandervelde drew attention to article in 'Popolo' which revealed knowledge not derived from communiqué of what had passed at yesterday's (? session)² when on a mere point on drafting he had requested that France and Belgium should be specified rather more clearly as separate entities in their engagements towards Germany under

¹ For the British Secretary's Notes, see Appendix, No. 5.

² See No. 516, and Appendix, No. 1.

article 2. Note was taken by conference and regret expressed by M. Scialoja for the leakage which he said he would of course cause to be investigated. Secretary of State took an opportunity to remind conference of our pledge of strict secrecy, any breach of which would mar the frankness of our language. In view of this incident Secretary of State begs that all who see his reports of the proceedings will observe the greatest secrecy in regard to them.

Secretary of State then proposed that conference should (? hear,) objections of Germany to article 6 of draft pact and invite Germans to state characters of these objections.

There followed a prolonged interchange of views and arguments between Herr Stresemann and Herr Luther and M. Briand conducted with excellent temper on both sides but not disclosing any possible basis for agreement. M. Briand insisted that principle was fundamental but offered to consider any alternative form of its application.

Each side was trying to get a suggestion from the other and was unwilling to produce a scheme of its own. This was to be expected. Secretary of State learns that a personal meeting between M. Briand and German Minister has been arranged for tomorrow and it is to that we must look for discovery of a possible solution.

At close of discussion Secretary of State defined attitude of His Majesty's Government to question of eastern frontier on lines of memorandum circulated by him to Cabinet on the eve of his departure.³

As no one else spoke and as it was obvious that neither French nor Germans wished to say more at the moment he proposed adjournment till tomorrow afternoon.

Repeated to Paris, Rome, Brussels and Berlin.

³ No. 509.

No. 518

Record¹ by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the German Chancellor

[C 12746/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 6, 1925

At the close of this afternoon's meeting² of the Conference Chancellor Luther spoke to me of the position disclosed by the discussion. He assured me that the German Government honestly desired the conclusion of the Pact, but this question of the eastern frontiers presented an almost insuperable difficulty. It was impossible for any German Government to

¹ A copy of this record was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 8 of October 7, and was received in the Foreign Office on October 9.

² See No. 517.

accept the guarantee of France. It was one thing to take the guarantee of Great Britain for the west; but the position of France was quite different from that of Great Britain, and a guarantee by France of a Polish—German treaty was, he repeated, impossible of acceptance by any representatives of Germany.

I replied that I fully appreciated the difficulty, and could well understand the objection felt by the Germans, but I would beg him to remember that treaties of alliance already existed between France and Poland,³ and France and Czechoslovakia,³ and that it was impossible that France should repudiate these obligations, or that Germany should ask her to do so. He had spoken of the feeling in Germany about a French guarantee. French public opinion would be equally outraged if France was false to her pledged word.

I then asked his attention to the practical result of the guarantee apart from the objections of sentiment of which he had spoken. I observed that the real effect of the guarantee would be to limit the obligations of France and Poland to one another as laid down by the existing alliance, for the conclusion of arbitration treaties coupled with the guarantee would exclude many cases in which, under the existing treaty, Poland might call for the assistance of France, by defining and limiting the occasions on which such assistance could be either asked for or given. So clearly was this the case that it had been given to me by M. Benes⁴ as one of the reasons for which he viewed our pact negotiations with satisfaction, for he had observed that he did not wish Czechoslovakia to be involved in a quarrel between France and Germany arising out of any trifling matter; the alliance ought only to be effective in the last resort and for the most serious cases.

The Chancellor said that he saw the force of this argument. If only the Franco—Polish and Czechoslovakian treaties were not in existence, how simple the matter would be, but he must repeat that, whatever force my argument had, no German Government could accept the idea of the French guarantee. He had thought that M. Briand had some alternative proposal in his mind, and asked whether I knew what it was. I replied that I did not. I had never discussed the question with M. Briand beyond saying that it obviously presented the greatest difficulty in our path, but that it was a matter which must, in the first instance, be discussed between M. Briand and Herren Luther and Stresemann; and I suggested that the sooner a private conversation took place between them the better it would be. The Chancellor informed me that such a conversation had been already arranged. I added that, whilst I knew nothing of what possible alternative might be in M. Briand's mind, I had reason to know that he was in earnest in all that he had said as to his readiness to consider any alternative form more acceptable to the German Government which would fulfil the fundamental French condition.

³ See No. 187.

⁴ See No. 473.

Finally, I spoke most earnestly to the Chancellor upon the consequences of any failure of this conference. I remarked that the world had been following the negotiations for the Pact with increasing interest, that all eyes were now directed to Locarno, and that if we parted without an agreement our want of success would be a disaster. No doubt the Chancellor felt that he had many causes of complaint against France or Great Britain in the course of the last few months, just as I certainly felt that Great Britain had many reasons to complain of the German Government, but in spite of all this, who could doubt that in the months since the German proposal was first made⁵ there had been a great improvement in our relations? All this would be destroyed by any failure to agree here; but more than that, we should not simply go back to where we stood at the opening of these negotiations—their failure would leave us in a far worse position, and I saw no end to the trouble and bitterness that would follow.

The Chancellor answered that he fully shared my feelings, and repeated that he and his colleagues were genuinely anxious for a successful issue. I invited him to consider whether there might not be the germ of a possible solution in the observations which I had made to the Council at the close of our sitting on the real effect of the British guarantee in the west.² I did not expect or want from him any immediate answer, but I begged him to think the matter over.

A.C.

⁵ See No. 197, n. 1.

No. 519

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 7, 8.20 p.m.)

No. 12 Telegraphic [C 12720/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 7, 1925, 7.15 p.m.

Council continued discussion of draft of pact today.¹ Sitting was occupied by consideration of changes proposed by jurists² which appeared generally acceptable. Some further alterations were suggested and referred to them. They were also invited to consider clause 6. Council proposes to discuss tomorrow question raised in regard to Germany's entry into League.

Most confidential.

M. Briand met Herr Luther this morning. M. Briand tells me that he thinks that they will settle question (? at issue). Luther surprised M. Briand

¹ For the British Secretary's Notes, see Appendix, No. 6.

² See *ibid.*, No. 4.

by indicating entry into League and article 16 as Germany's greatest difficulty more serious than that of guarantee itself.

Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Rome.

No. 520

Memorandum¹ by Mr. Lampson

LOC/56/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(4)]

Confidential

LOCARNO, October 7, 1925

The Secretary of State has called for suggestions on alternative schemes which, in view of the fundamental difference of view shown yesterday between France and Germany regarding the Polish guarantee,² might serve as substitutes for article 6 of the pact as at present drafted.

It would, of course, be far preferable if the French and Germans could themselves find a solution mutually acceptable. And it would be rash to assume that they will not do so. But meantime certain suggestions were made during the discussion in Mr. Chamberlain's room last night³ which can at least be usefully considered, even though the moment may never come to put them forward at all. From the British political (*i.e.*, internal) point of view, the less we are drawn into the position of sponsors of the eastern arrangements the better and the more consistent with our public declarations.

We must always remember one thing. France has already very definite commitments, both to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The existence of these treaties is a dominating factor in the whole situation, and is one to which the Germans are apt to attach far too little importance.

The first of these treaties (dated February 19, 1921,⁴ and signed by M. Briand himself⁵ with Count Sapieha)⁶ speaks in the Preamble of 'safeguarding, by the maintenance of the treaties which have been signed in common . . . the security and the defence of their (Polish and French) territory as well as of their mutual political and economic interests'. By article 1 the two parties pledge themselves to 'concert on all questions of foreign policy . . . in the spirit of the treaties and in conformity with the Covenant'; and under article 3 they undertake that if 'one or other is attacked without provocation, the two governments will concert as to the

¹ A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 10 of October 7, not printed, and was received on October 9.

² See No. 517.

³ The notes of the discussion between members of the British Delegation are filed at C 12749/459/18, not printed.

⁴ See No. 187.

⁵ M. Briand was French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister January, 1921–January, 1922.

⁶ Prince Sapieha was Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs June, 1920–June, 1921.

defence of their territory and the safeguarding of their legitimate interests as defined in the preamble'.

The Franco-Czech Treaty (dated February 25, 1924)⁴ is perhaps less explicit, but the first two articles are in point. Under article 1 the two parties undertake 'to concert on matters of foreign policy of a nature to endanger their security and to affect the order established by the treaties of peace,' and article 2 stipulates that the parties 'will agree on the measures proper for the safeguarding of their common interests in the event of these being threatened'.

It is thus perfectly obvious that France has very far-reaching commitments both to Poland and Czechoslovakia which she cannot ignore; if Germany were wise she would help to build a bridge for France rather than accentuate her difficulties by asseverating that no form of French guarantee can be accepted.

Assuming, however, that Germany holds firm and that article 6 of the pact as at present drafted has to go by the board, what alternatives could the Secretary of State put forward as a possible basis of compromise in case of need?

1. Mr. Chamberlain threw out the suggestion that it might take the form of something on these lines:—

(a) Arbitration treaties between Poland (and Czechoslovakia) and Germany.

(b) No new French guarantee.

(c) A note from Poland to France asking how the pact affected the Franco-Polish alliance.

(d) A reply from France saying that, if Poland, in breach of the arbitration treaty, were subjected to unprovoked aggression (as defined in the pact), the *casus fœderis* would arise and France would give the support promised by the treaty of alliance.

2. Another solution tentatively thrown out last night was that France should place it on record that, in the event of a Polish-German dispute going to the Council, France's forces would be at the disposal of the Council and ready to act as the Council's mandatory. In cases where the Council failed to reach a decision, and where, consequently, there was no mandate for France to act upon, the position would automatically revert to that prescribed by paragraph 7 of article 15 of the Covenant, whereby: 'If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, *the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice*'.

Germany might object to this; but, after all, she could hardly do so with reason. It is merely the Covenant position, [and] Germany will be a member of the League [and] have accepted all its obligations. The only party which might have a just grievance would be Poland, who might claim that France was whittling down the pledges to which she is bound by

her existing treaty with Poland. But as to that M. Briand could no doubt be relied upon to deal effectively with any Polish objections.

There is one more point in connection with this solution which would have to be considered very carefully if it were decided to proceed further with it. How far do the rights of independent action conferred in certain eventualities by paragraph 7 of article 15 of the Covenant clash with the terms of article 2 of the proposed pact, whereby France undertakes never (save in certain defined cases) to go to war with Germany? It would have to be made clear beyond all doubt that article 2 of the pact did not restrict France's rights under paragraph 7 of article 15 of the Covenant. Otherwise we should be in a hopeless tangle.

3. There is yet a third possible solution, which Mr. Bennett has evolved. On the whole, it is probably the one which from all points of view is the most satisfactory and acceptable to all concerned. It is as follows:—

The essential point seems to be that there should be on record a definite agreement between Germany and Poland (and Czechoslovakia), containing not only an undertaking to submit all disputes to pacific settlement on the lines of article 3 of the Security Pact, but also an undertaking *not to resort to war*. The Germans have already intimated verbally that they are willing to renounce resort to war with Poland so that there should be no material difficulty in getting them to give a written undertaking to that effect. It is suggested, therefore, that the basis of the arrangement on the eastern frontier should be a treaty, in addition to the technical arbitration treaty, between Germany and Poland, consisting of two articles on the following lines:—

Article 1.

(Taken from article 2 of the pact.)

Germany of the one part and Poland of the other part severally undertake that they will in no case attack or invade the other or resort to war against the other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of resistance to action in violation of the above undertaking or in the case of action undertaken in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Article 2.

(Taken from article 3 of the Security Pact.)

In view of the undertaking entered into in article 1, Germany and Poland undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy.

Questions with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision, and the parties undertake to comply with such decision.

All other questions shall be submitted to a conciliation commission. If

the proposals of this commission are not accepted by the two parties, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which will deal with it in accordance with the Covenant.

The detailed arrangements for effecting such peaceful settlement shall be the subject of special agreements.

Now as to the question of guarantee which is the real crux. It has been the understanding throughout the negotiations that the guarantor will only be called upon to use force if there is a resort to force by one of the parties to an arbitration treaty.

If the suggested article 2 above stood alone it would be necessary to consider the case where a dispute was referred to the Council, *but the Council failed to reach a decision*. As pointed out earlier, if such a case occurred in present circumstances, the parties would reserve the right to take such action as they thought necessary under paragraph 7 of article 15 of the Covenant. This would presumably include the eventual right to resort to force. But by the suggested article 1 above, Germany and Poland would forfeit this ultimate right to resort to force (*i.e.*, there would be no article corresponding to art[icle] 7 of the proposed Pact. In other words the right of independent action under art[icle] 15, para[graph] 7, of the Covenant, would be cut out). If this is correct, it would have two results:—

1. It might be necessary to have a provision, whereby the two parties would agree in the last resort to accept a majority decision of the Council for the settlement of the dispute. (Or the dispute might be referred to the arbitrament of some particular Power or person.)
2. If Germany and Poland did resort to war with each other, they would be breaking article 16 of the Covenant, by which the situation would then alone be governed.

All that seems necessary, therefore, in the way of a guarantee is a declaration by France that, in the event of action by Germany against Poland (or by Poland against Germany) involving a breach of article 16 of the Covenant, France would be prepared to place all her forces at the disposal of the League for the purpose of upholding the Covenant.

Whether this declaration should be—

- (a) embodied in a separate instrument;
- (b) notified to the League of Nations; or
- (c) notified to Poland and/or Germany are points for further consideration if the general principle is accepted.

But the whole of this suggestion [and] the possibility of its consideration must turn upon whether it is possible for Poland [and] Germany respectively to abandon, so far as they are concerned, the right of independent action conferred in certain eventualities by art[icle] 15 of the Covenant.

M. W. L.

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 12)

No. 14: LOC/67/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(5)]

LOCARNO, October 8, 1925

Sir,

At the close of yesterday's sitting of the conference¹ Herr Stresemann asked if he could have a private interview with me today. I arranged that he should come to my hotel at half-past ten this morning, and he has just left me after a two-hours' conversation.

I begged him to speak English, but, though as far as I could judge he speaks our language with considerable ease, he pressed that he should speak German, whilst I might reply in my own language. I felt obliged to accept this arrangement, since insistence on either French or English might impede the frankness and fullness of the expression of his thoughts; but I am bound to confess that it is so long since I have talked German that some sentences escaped me. I am confident nothing that I lost could in any way affect his meaning.

Herr Stresemann began by saying that, in the course of his conversations with M. Chicherin in Berlin,² the latter had reverted to a subject of which he had often previously spoken to the German Ambassador, namely, a memorandum alleged to have been circulated by me to Paris, Brussels, Rome and other capitals, inviting these different Governments to combine in an anti-Soviet movement.³ Might he ask me whether any such document existed?

I replied at once that there was not a word of truth in this story, and I summarised the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Russia practically in the same terms as I had used to the American Ambassador when he spoke to me on this matter in London.⁴ We had ample grounds for a breach with Russia if we chose to use them, but I did not desire a breach if it could be avoided. I had at no time made to any government any proposal for united action against Soviet Russia. On the contrary, I had always encouraged Russia's neighbours to get on the best terms they could with them. The recent conversations between M. Chicherin and M. Skrzynski at Warsaw⁵ had caused me no anxiety. Indeed, in so far as they indicated a more friendly relationship between these two countries and

¹ See Appendix, No. 6.

² See No. 504, n. 3.

³ The reference is to the memorandum published as No. 205. This memorandum had not been communicated to the Dominions, contrary to custom, because of the rapidly changing situation. A full copy of the memorandum was published in the American Press in May, 1925 (for sources of texts of this memorandum, see E.H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country* 1924-1926, Vol. 3, part I (London, 1964), p. 263, n. 1).

For references to an anti-Soviet movement, see Vol. XXV, Nos. 299, 305, 307, 308, 314, 317, 325, 332 and 334.

⁴ See No. 421.

⁵ See No. 504, n. 1.

eliminated the probability of war, I heartily welcomed them, for the less danger there was of a quarrel between Russia and Poland, the easier it seemed to me would be our work here in Locarno, since the smaller that danger, the less the practical importance of the discussions about the possible march of French troops across Germany to the assistance of the Poles. I saw no advantage in seeking a new agreement with Russia as long as she failed to keep the terms of the Trade Agreement,⁶ but the policy of His Majesty's Government was to leave her alone until she discovered, as sooner or later she was bound to do, that she had more need of Europe than Europe had of her.

Herr Stresemann observed that Soviet Russia had already made this discovery. He was obliged for my communication. He had never given the least credence to this story of a memorandum, and when its supposed text had been transmitted to him he had observed that such a document certainly never emanated from the British Foreign Office, nor, if they were pursuing such a policy, would they take that method of advancing it.

Herr Stresemann then gave me a long, a very interesting, and at times, an amusing account of his conversations with Chicherin. Chicherin's whole argument had been that for Germany to conclude the mutual Pact, and still more to enter the League of Nations, was to make herself a party to an anti-Russian combination. It would be contrary to the whole spirit of the Rapallo Treaty,⁷ even though it did not conflict with the literal text. It would make Lord D'Abernon the dictator of Berlin, and the German army the 'landsknechte'⁸ of Great Britain. Herr Stresemann had repudiated any such interpretation of the policy, had sought to show M. Chicherin how utterly unfounded these suspicions were, and, finally, to obtain from M. Chicherin the evidence on which he based this conviction of an English plot against Russia.

I forget exactly how many interviews Herr Stresemann had had with M. Chicherin, or how many hours each of them lasted; but I recall that Herr Stresemann said that, at an interview which lasted four hours and ended only at 2 o'clock in the morning, he had at last extracted from M. Chicherin the statement that an English bank (*not* the Bank of England) had advised a German bank to discontinue giving credits to Russia. Herr Stresemann had observed that, if this was the only proof of the plot, M. Chicherin must admit that the evidence was slender.

In the course of these conversations, M. Chicherin had suggested that Herr Stresemann should invite the leaders of the Nationalists to meet him, to which Herr Stresemann had replied that, if M. Chicherin desired to meet them, he had better arrange the meeting at the Soviet Embassy, but that he himself could not be expected to bring them together in order to give M. Chicherin an opportunity of inciting them against his policy. In

⁶ Of March 16, 1921. For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, pp. 373-9. See also Vol. XII, No. 845.

⁷ See No. 211, n. 3.

⁸ Hired foot-soldier.

this connection, Herr Stresemann observed upon the contrast between the Prussian and the English Conservatives. It was among the Prussian Conservatives that the strongest pro-Russian sentiment existed. They had evolved a formula which was summed up in the phrase that Soviet Russia was the Prussia of Frederick William I⁹—the same centralisation, the same stern discipline and stark authority—and they had found in this comparison a new point of sympathy between them. Apart from this, they recalled the Bismarckian tradition of friendship with Russia, and they saw in the change of policy which had followed almost immediately upon Bismarck's retirement the origin of all their later misfortunes. In spite, therefore, of Herr Stresemann's warnings that they were playing with fire, and that if they ever allowed Russian influence to get a hold in Germany the Red flag would wave on the castle of Berlin, and Bolshevism and its commissars would rule Germany up to the Elbe, they continued to look to Russia as the natural ally of Germany, and were not uninfluenced by the Soviet propaganda; though later he observed in another connection that to carry on from Berlin, as Chicherin was now doing, an active public propaganda in the press with the intention of influencing German public opinion was unskilful, for in Berlin people read the 'Rote Fahne,'¹⁰ and had before their eyes examples of what the communists were. In Berlin such attempts would have had more chance of success if they had been confined to conversations in the Nationalist Club or in private houses among a few of the Nationalist leaders and some of the generals. M. Chicherin had tried to frighten him with the suggestion that a Russo-Polish-French understanding was in progress, but Herr Stresemann had replied that M. Chicherin must decide which horse he meant to ride and which story he wished Herr Stresemann to believe. If there was a Franco-Polish understanding with Germany, it was obvious that the western pact could not have as its basis or its object an attack upon Germany. If, on the other hand, an agreement between France and Germany was to be taken as indicating a danger to Russia, it was obvious that there could be no such Franco-Russian rapprochement. M. Chicherin's journey had been a failure. If he meant to produce his effect in Berlin he should not have gone to Warsaw; if he meant to produce his effect in Warsaw he should not have come to Berlin. He had not been invited to Berlin, but he had indicated that he was coming, and now, to Herr Stresemann's obvious annoyance, was staying there. Herr Stresemann had, indeed, felt some anxiety about the possible results of the interview with the President of the Reich for which Chicherin had applied. President Hindenburg was naturally influenced by the Bismarckian tradition of which he had spoken, was anxious about and, as I understood, *primâ facie* indisposed to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. Herr Stresemann had been afraid that Chicherin might work upon these prejudices and fears in the interview. He had, however, received a

⁹ King in Prussia 1713-40.

¹⁰ A Communist newspaper.

telegram from Berlin to say that nothing of the sort had taken place, and that Chicherin had spoken only of comparatively unimportant matters.

Herr Stresemann went out of his way to express regret for the interpretation which the 'Daily Telegraph' had put upon the commercial negotiations between Russia and Germany.¹¹ These had been going on for a long time. M. Chicherin himself was not in a position to deal with all the points that were raised, but said that he must consult M. Litvinov. Herr Stresemann had not wished to adjourn the whole question till after Locarno, because any conditions that the Germans might then make would be alleged to be the result of the Locarno Conference; but the negotiations turned upon how it was possible to conduct commercial relations between a state organised economically on the ordinary western system and a state like Soviet Russia, in which all trade was a monopoly of the Gove[r]nment, and upon the rates of duty to be charged upon German imports, and like matters. These questions would have to be settled in Moscow. He repeated that these negotiations in no way affected the attitude of Germany towards the Locarno Conference, nor in any way circumscribed her liberty of action.

I drew his attention to the statement I had made in answer to a journalist on the morning after my arrival here, that I had been perfectly satisfied with the explanations which he had given;¹² and I took the opportunity of amplifying my previous statement of my views regarding a rapprochement between Germany and Russia. I observed that, at the present time, it was the policy of Russia to approach each of us in turn with the same offers always contingent for their fulfilment, as Herr Stresemann had found, upon a loan of money; that I did not think that at present much would come of them, but that I viewed without jealousy a recovery of German trade with Russia. Whenever the time came when a large trade with Russia was again possible, Germany in the future as in the past, owing to its geographical situation and other circumstances, would naturally have the largest share of it. We, too, should have a share, though a smaller one, but a large part of the advantage to us would be the general restoration of normal trade conditions and the increased capacity of Germany to purchase Empire products resulting from the profits of her trade with Russia. I had, I repeated, never sought to interfere with the establishment of good relations between Russia and any other country. When the Polish Minister in London, summarising something I had said to him, had spoken of my desire to 'detach' Germany from Russia, I had said that the word did not correctly represent my idea.¹³ I had no desire to detach Germany from Russia, but I had a very real desire not to throw

¹¹ See No. 436, n. 4.

¹² For an account of Mr. Chamberlain's statement on October 5, see *The Times*, October 6, p. 14. For an account of Dr. Stresemann's statement to the journalists at Locarno on October 4 on foreign policy, which included an explanation of M. Chicherin's visit to Berlin, see *The Times*, October 5, p. 14.

¹³ See No. 430.

Germany into the arms of Russia by closing to her every other opportunity of friendship or even of normal relations.

It will be convenient that I should deal in a separate despatch with the other subjects of our conversation.¹⁴

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹⁴ No. 522, below.

No. 522

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 12)

No. 15: LOC/68/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(5)]

LOCARNO, October 8, 1925

Sir,

After speaking in the manner I have elsewhere recorded of the relations between Germany and Russia,¹ Herr Stresemann directed the conversation to the question of Germany's entry into the League of Nations.

He observed that this was the greatest difficulty now confronting us at Locarno. He thought that the question of the eastern frontiers and the French guarantee was in a fair way of settlement owing to the excellent work done by the lawyers, but it was quite otherwise with the question of the League, and, in particular, article 16. There had been a conversation between Herr Gaus and M. Fromageot on this subject. Germany interpreted the stipulations of article 16 as obligatory. M. Fromageot appeared to interpret them as leaving full liberty of choice to the individual nation. It was while he was expounding M. Fromageot's argument and Herr Gaus's reply that I had the greatest difficulty in following what he said, and I do not, therefore, attempt to reproduce the exchange of arguments between them, which, indeed, Herr Stresemann only formulated at a later point of the conversation. For the moment he confined himself to asking if I could tell him what was the view of the British Government.

I replied that I must admit, as he had said, and, indeed, as I had already remarked at the conference,² that article 16 was not very easy to interpret. That it imposed obligations was certain, but the exact character and scope of the obligations [were] uncertain. I imagined that the framers of the article, who had contemplated that America would be a member of the League from the beginning, and that Germany would be admitted in a short time, had felt that the moral effect of an examination of a dispute before the Council, and of the unanimous decision by the Council—and I

¹ See No. 521.

² See Appendix, No. 5.

begged him to observe that it must be unanimous—would be so great as to make it in the highest degree improbable that any State would act in defiance of it.

In the next place, the economic pressure which, in such circumstances, could have been exerted against any recalcitrant State, would have been of so overwhelming a character as to convince that State in advance that it would be hopeless to resist. This at least would be true of any State, even the greatest, which was sufficiently civilised to have ceased to be wholly independent of the outside world. It must, therefore, have appeared to them in the highest degree improbable that resort to military measures of compulsion would ever be necessary, though they had felt obliged to provide for this improbability. It must be frankly admitted that the force of the economic sanctions had been greatly weakened by the abstention of America, and I had myself been led to consider what would be the position of the British Empire, as the greatest sea Power in the League, if it were called upon to enforce those sanctions by sea, and were thus brought into direct conflict with the United States of America. I had put this question to Sir Eric Drummond, and his answer had been that he could not conceive that the Council would invite the members of the League to take such action unless it was assured of the goodwill, amounting at least to a benevolent neutrality, of the United States of America.³

With these preliminary observations, I called his attention to the concluding paragraphs of the reply of the Council⁴ to the German Government's note of the 12th December, 1924.⁵ I said that I could not more precisely define the meaning of the article. It was there stated that: 'Under the existing provisions of the Covenant, it is the duty of the Council to recommend what effective military, naval or air forces the members of the League shall contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenant of the League, and it would be for Germany herself to say to what extent she could comply with the recommendations of the Council'; that the German Government, as a member of the Council, 'would always have a voice in deciding the application of the principles of the Covenant'; and that, 'as regards economic measures, the States members of the League themselves decide, either separately or by prior agreement, the practical steps to be taken for the execution of the general obligation which they have undertaken. But the provisions of the Covenant do not permit that, when action is undertaken in pursuance of article 16, each member of the League should decide separately whether it shall take any part in the action. The Council feels bound to express its clear opinion that any reservation of this kind would undermine the basis of the League of Nations and would be incompatible with membership of the League. It seems to the Council impossible that a member of the

³ No record of this communication has been traced in the Foreign Office archives.

⁴ See No. 261, Enclosure.

⁵ For the text, see *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 323–6. See also No. 219.

League and of the Council should, in the event of operations undertaken against a Covenant-breaking State, retain a status which would leave its nationals exempt from the general obligations imposed by the Covenant'. It seemed to me impossible to go beyond this.

As regards military measures, the League would recommend, but Germany would decide whether and what she could contribute.

As regards the economic measures, there was a certain liberty left to the Powers as regards the extent and even the time of their co-operation; but it would obviously be impossible, if the Council had declared a particular country *hors la loi*, and all the other countries had forbidden commercial, financial and personal relationships to continue between their citizens and the citizens of that country, that economic relations between it and Germany should continue unaltered and unchanged.

Herr Stresemann then developed to me at great length an argument which need not now be recorded here, because he repeated it, completely as to its sense and in many passages almost textually, at the afternoon sitting of the Conference, of which I shall send a full account tomorrow.⁶ It was directed to the special position of Germany and the impossibility for her in her defenceless position of incurring the dangers incident to active participation, even by economic measures, in a war with Russia.

Finally, Herr Stresemann suggested, as he subsequently did at the conference, that a solution of the difficulty might be found in an agreed interpretation of the application of the obligations of article 16 to a disarmed nation. He laid stress on the fact that Germany did not wish an exception to be made for herself alone. He could well understand that an exception made solely for the benefit of Germany would be so invidious as to be impossible, but there were other countries in the same situation. In the discussions on the Protocol, the necessity of taking account of their military and geographical situation had been recognised. He would only ask that their economic situation should also be taken into consideration, and he would suggest that Germany, writing to the Secretary-General of the League, should explain that she understood from the reply of the Council that they would, in fact, be so considered; that the Secretary-General might reply that the Council agreed with this interpretation of their letter; and that this public exchange of letters between the German Government and the Society of Nations might be supplemented by a private and unpublished correspondence exchanged between Germany and the principal Allies, in which the Allies would explain that the special consideration for the military, geographical and economic conditions, which was acknowledged in the public correspondence to be necessary, would in their opinion make it unreasonable to expect either the active or passive participation of a disarmed nation like Germany in the military or economic measures that might be taken in the case of aggression by Russia.

I told Herr Stresemann that I could express no opinion upon this

⁶ See No. 523, below, and Appendix, No. 8.

proposal at the moment. I must have time for careful reflection upon it before I expressed any opinion, but I must at once tell him that public opinion in Great Britain attached the highest importance to the League; that the fact that the pact would bring Germany into the League was one of the arguments which had most weight in securing support for the Pact policy, and that, if anything we did here had the air of weakening the Covenant or lessening the authority of the League of Nations, it would at once turn the great mass of British opinion against the Pact policy. I would most carefully consider what he had said. I could understand how natural it was for the German people to feel these anxieties and for the German Government to raise this question; but I must frankly say that this suggestion appeared to me very difficult to accept.

I told Herr Stresemann that as it had been decided to discuss this question at the Conference this afternoon,⁶ I would invite him to take the course which we had previously taken in regard to other questions, and open the discussion by explaining, as he had done to me, the objections and the difficulties of Germany to the Allied proposition. At the close of the discussion, I would either simply suggest an adjournment in order to give us all time to think over what had been said, or I would propose a reference to the Jurists in order that they might consider article 16 in the light of the discussion.

Herr Stresemann welcomed the idea of a conversation between Sir Cecil Hurst, Herr Gaus and M. Fromageot, but he particularly begged that upon this point it might be confined to them. He evinced the greatest distrust of the intentions of the Italian Government and the discretion of the Italian jurist. He had derived the impression that M. Pilotti's interventions were directed to making impossible the western pact unless Germany would guarantee the Brenner frontier. He had said to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin that that was an impossibility, that Germany had no common frontier with Italy, and it was out of the question that she should guarantee the frontier between Italy and Austria. It was for the Italian Government to discuss that question directly with Austria. It was not for him to initiate such a discussion. It is interesting to set beside Herr Stresemann's observations on the trend of Italian policy an observation which M. Briand made to me yesterday, that Italy seemed to him to resemble a submarine that was floating just below the surface of the water undecided into which ship to fire its torpedo.

Herr Stresemann showed an equal suspicion about the relations of Mussolini with the Soviet Government. I have myself sometimes wondered what communications have been passing in the last few months between Rome and Berlin. If at any moment I was inclined to suppose that some kind of accord for common action here might have been reached between them, it is, I think, now clear that that is not the case, and I should be disposed to add that, whatever the nature of these communications, they have only sown distrust in the mind of the German Government.

I should here add what I did not say to Herr Stresemann, that I cannot conceive that His Majesty's Government would consent to give so binding and so important a pledge as to the manner in which they would interpret article 16 without communicating to Parliament what they proposed to do.

Passing from this subject, Herr Stresemann then alluded to the necessity of getting the disarmament question settled and proceeding to the evacuation of Cologne. He said that the settlement of these questions would affect the mentality of the Germans more than anything else, and would render far easier the acceptance of the Pact in whatever form it might result. There were three questions of consequence outstanding.⁷ He was not well informed about details. There had been the question of the machinery at Krupps, but that, he said, was settled. There was the question of the title to be borne by General von Seeckt, and the question of the numbers of the police force. There was another question, but he could not recall it at the moment.

As regards General von Seeckt's title, I understand that he desired permission for the use of the term 'Chef des Heeresleitung' and that the Allies insisted on something different. Herr Stresemann believed that the French were under a misapprehension as to the significance of the German words, but it was a question of words, a real *querelle allemande*, though this time it did not proceed from the Germans. Surely it could have no importance for us, and it had an immense sentimental and even moral importance for them.

Similarly in regard to the police. What possible interest could the Allies have in leaving the German Government so weak that it might be at the mercy of communism? He developed at length the dangers of communism in Germany. He illustrated the activity of the German agents in inciting and paying for revolution. He repeated what he had said of the danger of Bolshevism sweeping all Germany up to the Elbe. Nothing but the intervention of the Federal troops in Saxony⁸ had prevented the communist movement there from spreading to Berlin and overcoming all east Europe. Could not M. Briand, M. Vandervelde, Herr Luther, himself and I discuss these matters while we were here and try to get them out of our path?

I replied that my latest information from General Wauchope (of whose helpfulness, by the way, Herr Stresemann spoke most appreciatively) led me to believe that considerable progress had been made in the last few weeks. General Wauchope had informed me that the question of Krupp's machinery would probably be settled, and, as Herr Stresemann told me, that had now been done, and at the same time General Wauchope had reported that the question of the police was likely to be settled satisfactorily to all parties. As to their [*sic*] title to be borne by General von Seeckt, I knew nothing about it, but, in view of the satisfactory report from General Wauchope, I thought it would be a pity to take these matters

⁷ See No. 650, Enclosure 2, below.

⁸ In October, 1923. See Vol. XXI, No. 631, n. 8.

out of the hands of those who were negotiating in Berlin lest we should only impede instead of promoting a settlement. In any case, I suggested that the moment had not yet come for us to treat this matter. If all went well with the Pact negotiations, I had no doubt that it would render the situation easier, and that some things would become possible that had not been possible hitherto.

I had better here note that the Chancellor referred to this subject with me at the close of the Conference this afternoon. He was anxious that a private conversation should be held between the Ministers tomorrow to go into this matter, and, at any rate, to prepare its consideration. I told him that I had myself thought that, in any case, the moment had not yet come for such a conversation, but that I would, in accordance with his wish, sound M. Briand. He said that he was prepared to leave the matter to my discretion.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 523

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 12)

No. 21: LOC/89/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(6)]

Most Confidential

LOCARNO, October 8, 1925

Sir,

The meeting of the conference today¹ was devoted to the consideration of the question of Germany's entry into the League of Nations. I opened the discussion by emphasising the great importance attached to this question in Great Britain. His Majesty's Government could not in fact, I said, contemplate the conclusion of a security pact unless Germany entered the League. I then asked Dr. Stresemann to explain the German point of view.

2. Dr. Stresemann began by sketching the history of the question, beginning with the rejection by the allies in 1919 of Germany's request that she might be allowed to join the League,² and ending with the correspondence which has passed this year in connection with the pact. He recalled that on certain points the views of Germany had been met. For instance, a seat on the Council was practically assured to her. Other points, however, remained unsatisfied. In particular, the question of the application to Germany of article 16 of the Covenant remained open. In regard to article 16, Germany was in a special position, due to the fact that

¹ See Appendix, No. 8.

² For the German request, contained in the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace of May 29, 1919, see *F.R.U.S. The Paris Peace Conference*, Vol. VI, pp. 795-901. The Allied rejection was contained in their Reply to the Observations of June 16, 1919 (for the covering letter and text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 244-316).

she was disarmed to such an extent that she could not make a war of aggression, and was incapable even of defending herself. The argument had been advanced that Germany's apprehensions regarding article 16 were without foundation, because Germany would have a permanent seat on the Council, whose decisions, to be effective, had to be unanimous. Germany could therefore easily veto action which was unwelcome to her. While fully appreciating this argument, Dr. Stresemann recalled that there would be occasions when a decision would have to be taken as to which party to a dispute was the aggressor. If the facts were clear it was evident that Germany could never, for personal reasons only, prevent action by the Council. The German veto could therefore only operate when there was doubt concerning the aggressor. Passing to the actual obligations imposed by article 16, Dr. Stresemann recalled that they fell into three categories:—

- (a) direct participation in military action;
- (b) indirect participation in military action (permission to foreign troops to cross German territory);
- (c) participation in economic sanctions.

Germany's disarmed condition prevented her from participating in the first category. Participation in the second was impossible, for the passage of foreign troops across German territory would lead to complications. As regards economic sanctions, Dr. Stresemann said that it was impossible to consider all the various eventualities which might arise, but he would discuss the case of the possible application of economic sanctions against Russia. He interjected at this point that he did not choose the example because there existed any agreement between Germany and Russia. On the contrary, there were no agreements between Germany and Russia of which the world was unaware. Beyond the Treaty of Rapallo³ Germany was not bound to Russia in any way. But what, he asked, would be the result of the participation of Germany in economic sanctions against Russia. If Germany declared an economic boycott, Russia would naturally regard it as an act of war. There was nothing to defend Germany from a Russian advance, and the result would be the march of Bolshevism right up to the Elbe. The position of Germany was thus exceptional. She did not ask for privileges but only for special treatment during the transitional period until general disarmament was complete. The question of article 16 had not been raised by Germany alone. M. Briand had himself admitted that the necessity for particular security agreements arose from the insufficiency of that article. Dr. Stresemann concluded his *exposé* by saying that he thought that the situation might be cleared up by a further exchange of notes between Germany and the League of Nations, in which an assurance might be given to Germany that the considerations to which he had just drawn attention would be taken into account.

3. M. Briand at once replied to Dr. Stresemann. He said that the

³ See No. 211, n. 3.

League of Nations was, so to speak, the pivot on which the whole guarantee pact turned. Without it the entire scheme would break down. The League of Nations was not a formula but a reality. It was an association of nations for the purpose of ensuring mutual security. It was based on the idea of equality, and equality was one and indivisible. It was not compatible with choosing what was pleasant and rejecting what was unpleasant. Everyone must take the same obligations. The ultimate object of the League was to do away with all possibility of war, but for the present it was necessary to have organised force in support of this ideal. Only when the League of Nations was fully organised would it be possible to realise the general disarmament of which the Germans spoke. But there would be no general disarmament if, in the meanwhile, one or other of the members of the League did not support the League in case of need. Germany's army was small, but not negligible, and if she said she could not help the League because her forces were too small, the League would not be in a position to ask other countries which had larger forces to disarm. In any case, Germany was strong enough to give economic help. If she refused even this her attitude would no longer be merely negative. It would amount to positive aid to the aggressor. The German point of view was the point of view of the individual and not that of the whole body. A *non possumus* attitude was out of the question. The idea that a nation could take everything and give nothing would be badly received by the League. What would those other nations say which had had to conform to the usual conditions if Germany obtained special treatment just because she was a great country. M. Briand took the opportunity to emphasise that the pact was not directed against Russia. But it was impossible for Germany to have one foot in the League and the other in another camp where different sentiments prevailed. There was no problem concerning Russia unless Russia had aggressive designs. In that case Germany would have the protection of the League. Germany would be in a much stronger position within the League to urge her own disarmed condition in order to obtain general disarmament. The questions which Germany was now raising ought to be raised from inside the League, when her views would be heard. The Powers assembled at the conference had no competence to deal with them or to bind the League. They had done all that was possible. Germany had been promised a seat on the Council. She had mentioned the question of mandates,⁴ and her attitude on that question was quite legitimate. M. Briand closed with an appeal to Germany to consider the whole problem further in the hope of coming to an agreement.

4. M. Vandervelde then said how much Belgium was in agreement with the French point of view. He confessed that Dr. Stresemann's words had been a deception to him. He had understood from what had been said at previous meetings that Germany had decided to enter the League, and he had not expected the objections which had just been raised. His one care

⁴ i.e. in the note of September 29, 1924 (see No. 219, n. 5).

for Belgium was to ensure her security, and from this point of view he valued the alliance of France and England, though, fearing to see Europe divided into two camps, he had always wished Germany to enter also into a system of mutual protection. He had been always in favour of Germany's entry into the League with rights equal to those of other Powers, but he was no more able than M. Briand to understand why Germany should demand inequality of treatment in her own favour. The dangers which Germany feared could not occur unless Russia committed an act of aggression. He wished to emphasise that the pact was not directed against any power, and that if he had thought that it was directed specially against Russia he would not be present at Locarno. As for Germany's objections, it seemed to him that there was nothing to prevent her from having them considered within the League once she had entered the League.

5. I then intervened in the discussion and said that I proposed to speak of British public opinion. The idea of a pact between the powers represented at the conference had been at first regarded with some misgiving in Great Britain. It had been objected that I was trying to substitute the pact for the League of Nations, thus reducing the position and power of the League. Opinion in Great Britain had now, however, decided for the pact practically unanimously, and sincerely desired the real success of the Locarno meeting. This was largely due to the fact that it was a part of the scheme that Germany should join the League. This development might easily be changed if what was done at Locarno seemed to change or diminish the force of the Covenant. I understood quite well Germany's anxieties, and would not say that the German arguments were without force. But, while sympathising in a certain measure with the German point of view, I did not see any way of changing the views of the other parties concerned or of inducing them to accept the German argument. I imagined that in any case of war which might arise the League of Nations must necessarily consider the situation of each country upon which it made demands. It must take into consideration the armed force of each country, the dangers to which that country was exposed and its economic situation. But for a nation to say that it would join the League and enjoy all the privileges and guarantees which the League afforded, and at the same time to refuse all help to the League or the members of the League in certain cases was to take up an absolutely impossible position. If the League were to give its consent to such a proposition, where was the process to stop? Every nation that had small forces would say: 'We are not a great nation like Germany. We have not the same resources as Germany. You ought at least to accord to us the same right of neutrality as you accord to Germany.' That would really be the end of the League of Nations. I wished also to draw attention to another consideration. It was perhaps inferred that because His Majesty's Government and the other Allied Powers were members of the Council and because they had a very considerable influence, they had only to say in the League that a thing should be done and it would be done. Such was not the case. The

Assembly regarded with the utmost jealousy every effort to extend the powers of the Council. Even if the Council could do anything in this matter there would be opposition from the small nations in the Assembly and it was precisely the smallest nations who would unite in saying: 'No exceptions in the League of Nations.' I said that had I been a German I should no doubt have acted as the German Government were doing. At the same time it was certain that the League of Nations would not accept the German view. I hoped that when the German delegation had given further consideration to the subject they would be able to find a solution and accept the obligations of the Covenant. It was a case of equality not merely before the law but in spirit also.

6. M. Scialoja supported me. He said that the election of Germany to the Council was a practical certainty. She would have a great, almost a determining, influence in the League. It would be easy for her to make her views felt in every case and it would be impossible for the League to impose upon her more than she could bear. Moreover, article 16 did not operate except in case of aggression, and as he supposed that Germany had not promised to aid Russia in aggression, he saw no insurmountable difficulty.

7. I took the opportunity at this point to say that, lest silence might give rise to misunderstanding, I desired to state clearly, frankly and categorically, that it had never entered into the head of His Majesty's Government to make, either through the League of Nations or through the pact, any kind of alliance or *bloc* against Russia. His Majesty's Government would not lend themselves to any such idea.⁵

8. MM. Briand and Scialoja indicated their entire concurrence.

9. Dr. Luther then replied to M. Briand. He said that he quite agreed that Germany could not have one foot in one camp and the other foot in another camp. This was not Germany's intention. Germany wished to be a member of the League in the fullest sense. He wished to emphasise again that there were no bonds with Russia; but Germany could not change her geographical situation, which was made worse by the fact of her disarmament. The German people felt acutely the danger resulting from that situation, and it was necessary to find a formula which gave to Germany both safety and a feeling that safety existed. As a matter of principle he recognised that the point of view of the League must prevail over the point of view of the individual member. There were certain limits, however, which the individual could not pass. His idea was to find a solution between these two points of view.

10. M. Briand replied that he fully realised how sensitive German public opinion was. But owing to a very courageous and noble initiative on the part of the German Government a work was being undertaken which far transcended those minor considerations which pressed upon Ministers of State. He was sure in advance that whatever he did would be criticised.

⁵ See No. 521.

The politician who was able to count on unanimity had never existed. The German people were preoccupied because their country might become a battlefield. But if war came from the east and Germany was in the League it could only reach Germany over the bodies of her associates. If they were crushed it would be because Germany did not help them. For the benefit of a misinformed public opinion they were creating obstacles which were mirages. Besides which, if Russia marched on Germany, Dr. Luther was surely too experienced a statesman to believe that Germany could stand by with folded arms. If she did she would have worse than war; she would have civil war. Germany was about to enter an organisation for mutual security. She was about to become one of the directors of that organisation. Yet she did not wish to assume the obligations of the position. If Germany acted in the spirit of reciprocity which dominated the Covenant, she would run no risk.

11. Dr. Luther then said that he wanted to find a means of ensuring that Germany should not aid the aggressor by failing to participate in the sanctions. All that Germany asked was that her obligations should only become completely effective when disarmament was universal and complete. In the meantime, she asked for treatment appropriate to her situation.

12. Dr. Stresemann in a further speech said that Germany did not wish to evade her obligations. She did not wish to employ her position on the Council to stop all action unwelcome to her. If Germany took part in designating a given power as an aggressor she was morally bound to support the League, and must fulfil her obligations in spite of difficulties if she was not to suffer in the future. But he reminded the conference that Bolshevism would spread quickly in an industrial country like Germany. M. Briand had talked of nationalist societies. He must not forget that armed red societies existed also, and in case of war with Russia all Germany's forces would be required to deal with them. He also pointed out that if there was war with Russia it would be impossible for Germany to help Russia. There would be a complete economic boycott of Russia, and the British fleet would be blockading the Baltic. As to the practical side of the question, he thought that the Covenant might remain intact. Germany would be satisfied if it could be adapted to her special situation. The question was only a temporary one and could perhaps be met by a special interpretation of article 16. If a declaration could be made to Germany by the League that the military and geographical situation of a country would be considered in making demands upon that country, Germany would be satisfied and the statutes of the League would not be impaired.

13. I then read out the following passage from article 16 of the Covenant:—

'The members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimise the loss and

inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the Covenant-breaking State. . . .'

If, I said, Germany participated in action by the League, Germany would become the ally of all other states members of the League. Her strength would become their strength. Her weakness would be their weakness. All the other nations would be forced to aid Germany, and those who had disarmed her must then rearm her.

14. M. Briand interjected that this was self-evident.

15. On my proposal, the meeting was then adjourned in order to give time for the delegates to reflect on the points which had been brought out in what I cannot help feeling was a discussion of considerable value.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

In reporting in this detail a discussion in the Conference, I must again impress the highly confidential character of the discussion on those who receive this report. I have had occasion, once at the request of a colleague and a second time for my own protection and for the sake of preserving confidence among the members of the Conference, to make representations about the indiscretions of others.⁶ Any indiscretion emanating from me would be fatal to my position here.

A. C.

⁶ See Nos. 517 and 528, n. 5, below.

No. 524

Mr. Chamberlain¹ to the German Chancellor

LOC/74/B.D. [C 12821/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 8, 1925

Dear Mr. Chancellor,

I seized the opportunity this evening to report to Monsieur Briand what had passed between Herr Stresemann and me this morning,² and what you had said to me this afternoon² in regard to a conversation between the four of us on the questions outstanding in regard to disarmament. I find that Monsieur Briand shares the view which I had expressed to you, that we are scarcely ready for such a conversation, and that it would be better in the interests of the work in which we are engaged that we should postpone it to a later date.

¹ A copy of this letter was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 20 of October 9, not printed, received in the Foreign Office on October 12.

² See No. 522.

You were good enough to say that you would leave the final decision to my discretion and, in the circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that it would be a mistake to invite you and Monsieur Briand to meet me for a discussion of this matter tomorrow; but I understand from Monsieur Briand that he is seeing Herr Stresemann at 11 o'clock, and Monsieur Briand seemed to think it not unlikely that Herr Stresemann would desire to say something to him upon the subject.

I am, etc.,
[AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN]

No. 525

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received October 10)

*No. 562 [C 12807/459/18]**

BERLIN, October 8, 1925

Sir,

Since the departure of Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann for Locarno¹ I have devoted particular attention to ascertaining the views held by the parties of the Right regarding the Pact of Mutual Conciliation and the various problems connected therewith.

2. It is clear that whatever danger of non-acceptance there may be when the German Ministers return from Locarno will proceed from the German National party, who will have, from their parliamentary position, a considerable voice in the matter. The views held by this party on international politics are not often wise nor are their demands reasonable, but their convictions are firmly held and constitute one of the important factors of the problem. It remains true that among the leading members of the party, and still more among their country members, there is quite insufficient appreciation of the gain in security and status which will result to Germany from the conclusion of the pact.

3. In this connection I had the advantage yesterday of a long conversation with Dr. Schiele, the leader of the German National party and Minister of the Interior.

4. He appeared to be frankly in favour of the pact and determined to support Luther and Stresemann when they return, provided certain conditions are fulfilled.

5. His first point was that any document agreed at Locarno would have to be submitted to the Reichstag and ratified. In his judgment, ratification depended less upon an acceptable solution with regard to the 'Durchmarschrecht'² in article 16 than upon a satisfactory issue regarding the stigma upon the German people with respect to war guilt. Notwith-

¹ On October 2.

² See No. 435, n. 1.

standing the sharp replies³ which Germany had received in answer to her recent declaration,⁴ he maintained that this was the essential point so far as his party was concerned. They could not remain under the moral stigma of war guilt. In desiring to be absolved from this there was no idea whatever of repudiating their reparation engagements. He had, indeed, desired that a clear declaration of this character should accompany the recent *note verbale*. Moral responsibility for the war was entirely distinct from, and could be dis severed from the obligation to pay reparation. Germany had lost the war—that was why she had to pay. This fact subsisted whether article 231 was wisely drafted or not. He could not insist too strongly upon the fact that some recognition of the German view in the matter was indispensable to his party if they were to consider Germany was being treated as an equal. That she should be treated as an equal was a condition precedent of the pacification which he anticipated and hoped from the pact policy.

6. It was quite clear from Dr. Schiele's language that in Cabinet discussion he had already pressed the reopening of the war guilt question at Locarno, and he is still somewhat inclined to make it a condition of the approval of his party.

7. I did not fail to impress upon him the extreme danger of such a course. The way in which the question had been raised a fortnight ago in the *note verbale* had awakened the suspicion in public opinion, both in France and England, that absolution from war guilt was a prologue to subsequent repudiation by Germany of reparation obligations. Such being the case, it was obvious that no Government could consent even to discuss the question.

8. I cannot say to what extent these arguments had effect upon Dr. Schiele's mind. He is regarded as a sincere but somewhat narrow-minded man, who clings with great tenacity both to his own convictions and to the dogmas of his party.

9. A second point connected with the pact which Dr. Schiele declared to be of great interest to the German National party was that there should be no final relinquishment of German soil or of soil once German. They would agree to a binding declaration against Germany resorting to hostilities for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, but they would not go further; they would renounce war but not territory.

10. Both on the question of article 16, which I have mentioned above, and on the question of a French guarantee of the Polish-German Arbitration Treaty, I found Dr. Schiele confident that some solution satisfactory to both sides would shortly be found at Locarno. It was somewhat unexpected to find that these problems troubled him much less than the moral stigma of war guilt.

11. In the above conversation Dr. Schiele spoke rather as a party leader than as a member of the Government. His language shows the very

³ See Nos. 497, 499, 502, and 503.

⁴ See Nos. 485, 488, 489, and 493.

special, and characteristically German, kind of difficulty which Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann have met and will probably have to meet again before they get their ship to port.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

No. 526

Record¹ by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister

LOC/80/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(6)]

LOCARNO, October 9, 1925

I had a long conversation with M. Skrzynski this morning. He asked to see me as soon as he arrived yesterday, and I was glad to have the opportunity of marking by an early interview with him, as by a similar conversation with M. Benes, that Great Britain did not disinterest herself in the settlement of Eastern Europe.

I opened the conversation with M. Skrzynski by giving him a brief account of my impressions of the Conference, my growing hopes of its success, and of the attitude which I myself had taken in the Conference upon the eastern question.

M. Skrzynski had already seen M. Briand and had received a similar account from him. He was to see M. Briand again today. Meanwhile, he had derived from M. Briand the same impression of hopefulness, especially as regards the solution of the question of the French guarantee of the eastern treaties, which I had derived from both M. Briand and Herr Stresemann. M. Skrzynski himself said that he would be willing to substitute for the Treaty of Alliance with France² a Tripartite Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between France, Germany and Poland.

I said that he would doubtless discuss this suggestion with M. Briand. As I had always told him,³ whilst deeply concerned for the success of the eastern negotiations, I did not feel that I ought to be a prime mover in them, and I should be reluctant to put forward any solution of my own, even if I had one, unless it were clear that the parties themselves were at a loss to find a ground of agreement. I invited M. Skrzynski to discuss with M. Briand whether it would not be well that M. Skrzynski should make some communication to Herr Stresemann of his readiness to take up with the German representatives a discussion of the terms of an arbitration treaty to be concluded between them. I told him that I had made the same suggestion to M. Benes (and I may here add that M. Benes said that he

¹ A copy of this record was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 17 of October 9, not printed, received in the Foreign Office on October 12.

² See No. 187.

³ See Nos. 247 and 470.

would act upon it), that I subsequently spoke in this sense to the Chancellor and Herr Stresemann, and Herr Stresemann expressed his readiness to go into the matter at any time. In this connection, it was natural for me to refer to my view of the step taken by M. Benes in this direction before leaving Prague,⁴ and to say that I welcomed anything which might lead to a *détente* between Poland and her neighbours. I had, for instance, followed with interest, but without any kind of jealousy or suspicion, the events of M. Chicherin's visit to Warsaw,⁵ and neighbours. I had, for instance, followed with interest, but without any kind of the speeches exchanged between M. Skrzynski and him. As I made this reference, a broad smile spread over M. Skrzynski's face, which encouraged me to observe that I had no doubt that M. Skrzynski was able to measure the exact value and intention of the language which M. Chicherin had used and of any offers which he might have made, but that if, in fact, the visit had produced or could produce any improvement in Russo-Polish relations, I should rejoice without qualification, and consider that it helped rather than hindered our business in Locarno.

M. Skrzynski replied that the visit had marked a *détente* in Russo-Polish relations which was of value and importance to him, as he wished to live on good terms with both his great neighbours. 'And this', he observed, 'I owe entirely to you, Mr. Chamberlain. It is the profound fear with which you have inspired Chicherin that caused him to approach me.' M. Skrzynski then went on to say that M. Chicherin had begged him to omit from the speech which he was to make at the banquet⁶ any allusion to difficulties or differences between Poland and Russia. He had obviously been anxious to produce the impression that there was some kind of eastern block in course of formation and, whilst M. Skrzynski's own speech at the banquet had all been in the future and conditional, M. Chicherin spoke throughout as if all for which M. Skrzynski hoped had been already achieved. In fact, M. Chicherin had offered him nothing but a pact of non-aggression.

M. Skrzynski had replied that he was ready to sign such a pact at any time and with anyone, for Poland had no intention of acting aggressively anywhere; but this agreement with Russia must not in any way endanger or disregard the Baltic States and Roumania. To the Baltic States Poland had no engagement,⁷ but she sympathised with them as small nations, wished them well and was interested in their security. With Roumania she had an alliance² and military arrangements, and these must be respected.

Chicherin then said that, as far as the Baltic States were concerned, there was no difficulty. Russia also desired their continued existence, but why had Poland guaranteed Bessarabia? Bessarabia was in no sense

⁴ See Nos. 486 and 512.

⁵ See No. 504, n. 1.

⁶ Count Skrzynski had given a dinner in honour of M. Chicherin at his private residence on September 28. For an account of the speeches, see *The Times*, September 30, p. 12.

⁷ For Poland's relations with the Baltic States, see Vol. XI, Chap. II, Vol. XXIII, and Vol. XXV, Chaps. V and VI.

Roumania. Roumania had no claims to it. Why was not the Polish guarantee confined to Roumania up to the Pruth instead of up to the Dnieper?

M. Skrzynski had replied that this treaty had been signed five years ago at a time when the frontier of Poland had not been recognised by others, when, nevertheless, Roumania acknowledged it and was prepared to guarantee it, and the guarantee had therefore been mutual. He did not ask M. Chicherin to renounce his claims if he thought he had good claims upon Bessarabia. Of the juridical position of the Bessarabian settlement he knew nothing, but if M. Chicherin thought that Russia had good claims, let her pursue them by such means as she pleased, provided only that she renounced a recourse to war. This was all that had passed between them.

I gave him some indication of the use which Chicherin had sought to make of these conversations in Berlin,⁸ and of the impression which they had produced upon Herr Stresemann. M. Chicherin has been trying to sit on two stools at once and appears to have fallen between them. Upon the whole, his visits to Warsaw and Berlin would seem to me to have improved rather than impeded the prospects of our present negotiations. Instead of inspiring in either capital distrust of the other, he has succeeded only in affirming and increasing the distrust felt in both for all that he has said and done.

The discussion at yesterday's meeting of the Conference⁹ on the entry of Germany into the League and article 16 was in this respect both illuminating and profoundly interesting. If all goes well I shall be tempted to address at the proper time a letter of thanks to M. Chicherin for the assistance which he had unwittingly given me.

A. C.

⁸ See Nos. 504, n. 3 and 521.

⁹ See No. 523.

No. 527

*Memorandum*¹

LOC/78/B.D. [C 12820/459/18]

BRITISH DELEGATION, LOCARNO, *October 9, 1925*

Mr. Chamberlain received the representatives of the British press for a confidential talk on Friday, the 9th, in his room at the hôtel. Having finished his confidential conversation, which he clearly explained was not for publication, he said that he would give them something for publication.

¹ A copy of this memorandum was transmitted in Locarno despatch No. 19 of October 9, not printed, received in the Foreign Office on October 12.

'You may say', he said, 'that I continue to be soberly hopeful as to the prospects of success. The conversations have had all the informality and frankness and friendliness for which I had hoped. It was a good augury that the Conference, at its first meeting,² had gone directly to work on the draft prepared by the Jurists in London,³ avoiding by common consent any general preliminary discussion. From the first we had found that much common ground existed between us, and that as the discussions proceeded, the sphere of agreement extended. I could not indicate any time for the close of the Conference. Work of such importance could not be hurried. No doubt many difficulties remained for which, as yet, the solution had not been found, but it was hard to believe that with so much good-will and with so sincere a desire for success in all quarters, the solution would not emerge. In the meantime you must not be too optimistic or suppose that all is easy; but still less should you allow yourselves to lose hope. Above all, you must be patient and not grudge the time which the Conference finds necessary, nor the secrecy which it has imposed upon itself. And in this connection I would like to read to you a passage from Lord Grey's memoirs⁴ which I came upon a couple of days ago. Lord Grey is speaking of the success of the Ambassadors' Conference in 1912.⁵ He explains how all worked as friends, but none sought a triumph over the other, that "if a concession was made" by one . . . "it was never exploited as a diplomatic score or used like a victory to press a further advance. On the contrary, if a concession was made . . . it was used as a reason for urging moderation and concession on the other side. To this end the Conference worked as quietly as it could. The press was never exploited or inspired in the interests of any individual or government. Had this been done, it would have been fatal to our work. An atmosphere of reticence, even to the point of dullness, is favourable provided there be at work good faith and a living desire to keep the peace. Sensation and éclat produce the atmosphere that is favourable to storms. To avoid creating that atmosphere will be the great difficulty of open diplomacy if by that phrase is meant daily publicity."

'A word about open diplomacy. The phrase is sometimes used rather loosely. The truth is that if everything has to be said aloud in the hearing, as it were, of our constituents, if every difference of opinion that reveals itself at the conference table is immediately to find an echo in each of our countries, the result must be in any Conference that, instead of thinking of those who are present at the Conference, the members of the Conference are necessarily thinking of the effect of their words on public opinion at home. Every time that one member of the Conference exposes

² See No. 516.

³ See No. 466.

⁴ See Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916*, vol. 1 (London, 1925), p. 273.

⁵ This met in London 1912-13 in the attempt to settle the Balkan frontiers after the First Balkan War (see No. 120, n. 7). For its proceedings, see Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. IX, part II (London, 1934), Nos. 391-1226, *passim*, and Apps. IV and V.

his standpoint and takes up his position, the press of his country will mobilise in favour of his argument, and the press of the country with which he is negotiating will react against it. A concession under these circumstances, or even the discovery of the solution which is satisfactory to all (as you can sometimes have it without a concession of substance) becomes impossible. Open diplomacy in that sense never has been practised, and never can be practised with success. When people originally spoke about contrasting open and secret diplomacy, surely that was not what they meant by open diplomacy. What they had in mind was the taking of secret engagements which were not disclosed, the committing of a country by its government without the country being aware of what was being done or having an opportunity of expressing an opinion. In that sense secret diplomacy is at an end and our diplomacy is open. There will be no final decision taken without the assent of the British Parliament. There will be no secret undertaking added to any public engagement. You must allow us, shall we say, to cook the meal in the kitchen, but as soon as it is ready it shall be properly served and submitted to the approbation of Parliament, and through Parliament to the public. That is, I think, the guarantee for open diplomacy which the country has a right to expect. I am sure that sensible people, to whatever party they belong, when they come to think of it and see what is really done, will not doubt that we serve the interests of peace and agreement by the secrecy which we preserve as to these discussions in the Conference, and that nothing but mischief could be done if we transformed our friendly private conversations into a formal public debate in the presence of the whole world and of the interests concerned. That is all I have to say, but I am ready to answer questions if you have any to put.'

Mr. Chamberlain then answered certain questions, in each case indicating whether the reply he gave was for publication or for purely private guidance.

No. 528

Record¹ by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the German Chancellor

LOC/84/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(6)]

LOCARNO, October 9, 1925

I called upon Chancellor Luther this afternoon. I told him that the real reason of the visit was my desire to pay him a visit, but I should like to explain more fully what I had said in the Conference yesterday² as to the

¹ A copy of this record was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 23 of October 10, not printed, received in the Foreign Office on October 12.

² See No. 523.

great importance attached by public opinion in England to the entry of Germany into the League. After having put the argument as strongly as I could, and having told him that it was an essential condition of British support for the policy of the mutual Pact, I went on to refer to the suggestion which Dr. Stresemann had made at the close of yesterday's discussion in the Conference, and more particularly to the form in which he had developed the same suggestion in his conversation with me that morning.³ I had then told Dr. Stresemann that I must have time for consideration, and I had been thinking very seriously of it. As he would have seen from what I said in the Conference itself, I thought it impossible to accept the German proposal that they should be permitted to preserve neutrality in a case where action was taken under article 16. I had not yet heard the result of the conversation of the Jurists,⁴ and did not know what progress they had been able to make. Still, I believed that with so much goodwill as existed on all sides we should presently find some solution of the question. I had mentioned to no one except to members of my own delegation Dr. Stresemann's proposal for an exchange of letters between Germany and the Allies which would be held secret. It was absolutely necessary that if we arrived at an agreement, I should be able to present it to the House of Commons with the assurance that every engagement that we had undertaken was in the published documents, and that no secret undertakings existed. Whatever arrangement we came to, it must be one which was capable of publication, and which we must be prepared to publish and defend in our different countries.

The Chancellor, after thanking me for my visit and expressing the pleasure which it gave him, thanked me also for the more detailed explanation of my views which I had given him. He had just received a report from Herr Gaus of the result of the Jurists' meeting,⁴ and if I liked he would show it to me.

I said that I would prefer not to discuss it with him until I had seen Sir Cecil Hurst and had received Sir Cecil Hurst's explanations. I thought that any expression of opinion before I entirely appreciated the character and import of the Jurists' proposal might merely lead to a misunderstanding.

The Chancellor said that he entirely shared my feeling. He had not yet discussed the matter with Dr. Stresemann. Certainly, he would have to make great reservations about the solution which had been sketched. It was very different from that which he had contemplated when he left Berlin, but he thought that it perhaps gave the basis for a further exchange of views.

After a few words about Dr. Stresemann's interview with the press, and the letter which I had addressed to Dr. Stresemann on the subject,⁵ our

³ See No. 522.

⁴ Of October 9. For a report, see Sir C. Hurst's memorandum of that date, not printed.

⁵ Mr. Chamberlain's letter of October 9 to Dr. Stresemann ran as follows: 'I beg your attention to a message from Locarno printed in the second column of the first page of this

morning's "Neue Zürcher Zeitung". This message purports to give an account of an interview which you accorded to the representatives of the press yesterday. It alleges that you dealt with the meeting of the conference on Tuesday afternoon [see No. 517]; that you set forth briefly the argument of M. Briand in regard to the eastern treaties and your own reply. Incidentally, it introduces my name and that of M. Vandervelde, and describes our attitude inaccurately.

'No one would desire to dispute your right to explain the point of view of the German Government to the journalists, though to what extent it is wise that any of us should continue, during the sittings of the conference, to reassert publicly and argumentatively the views with which we entered it must, I suppose, be left to the judgment of the individual. But it seems to me incompatible with the decision as to secrecy taken at our first sitting that any of us should pretend to give even the briefest *compte rendu* of the discussion. I have not yet spoken to any of our colleagues on the subject. I am unwilling to bring the matter formally to the notice of the conference, but I am bound to say that I am placed in a position of some difficulty by the inaccuracy of the account of the attitude attributed to me, and by a report which purports on your authority to give a résumé of arguments employed in the conference. I hope you will be able to assure me that the report is inaccurate. In any case, I trust that there may be no further reference in public statements to anything that passes in the very free and friendly atmosphere of the conference room.'

Dr. Stresemann replied the same day: 'I have the honour to acknowledge with my best thanks the receipt of your letter of today's date. It is only from this communication that I have become acquainted with what the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" has published, and hasten to confirm to you the fact that the report contained in that journal regarding the meeting of the 7th October is untrue.

'In regard to the origin of what was published, I would observe as follows:

'In its No. 1565 of the 7th instant, the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" contained a notice which I venture to send you herewith [missing from the file]. As such statements regarding the progress of a meeting of the conference were in conflict with the agreement made at our first gathering [see No. 516] regarding the secrecy of the meetings, I caused a protest to be made by our Minister at Berne against the Swiss telegraph agency publishing reports of this nature, especially in this case, as you will be convinced yourself from the enclosure, when a completely inaccurate description of the proceedings was given.

'Thereupon, the representatives of the German press in this town called my attention to the fact that the report of the Swiss telegraph agency in question had been reproduced in the German press. You will understand that it is an intolerable state of affairs for the German delegation, when the observations of a delegate, in this case M. Briand, are inaccurately rendered, and when it is said that the German remarks avoided the pith of the matter. In response to repeated requests of the German press representatives I gave them, in a purely private conversation, a description of the course of the discussion, in which the German and French attitudes were depicted objectively side by side. I did not mention your name at all in my statements, but referred to the fact that the information regarding the attitude of Scialoja and Vandervelde at the meeting in question, which was contained in the first reports of the Swiss telegraph agency, was untrue, because the said gentlemen had not opened their mouths at all on this occasion. With the exception of the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", no newspaper mentioned my name in reproducing my verbal statements.

'I entirely concur in the view expressed by you that it is extremely desirable for the success of the conference to adhere strictly to the decision arrived at in the first meeting [see No. 516] regarding the secrecy of the discussions. I would therefore be grateful to you if you also would take steps that the Swiss telegraph agency may not by means of their reports place a delegation in the position of either tolerating an inaccurate report seriously injurious to their interests or of being obliged to comment upon the same. But, in addition to this, it appears to me to be exceedingly open to objection when this agency continues to publish, from information of which I am unable to state the source, daily reports regarding the meetings of the conference which go far beyond the limits of the communiqués agreed to by us jointly. I venture to send you herewith this morning's issue of the agency which

conversation took a more general character. But something which the Chancellor said led me to observe that if an inhabitant of Mars suddenly visited the Conference room, knowing nothing of the history of the last few years, he would certainly get no idea that those who were sitting round the table were lately bitter enemies: he would think, rather, that they were good friends who had indeed differences of opinion upon serious matters, but were bent upon settling them in the most amicable spirit. What I hoped was that, having come together here, we should succeed in our immediate work, that Germany would enter into the League, and that we should continue our co-operation at Geneva. Already our relations had sensibly improved; if we succeeded in our present task they would become normal, and with time (for time was needed to heal our wounds) they would ripen into friendship. My colleagues in the British delegation had been greatly impressed by yesterday's discussion.² Who would have dreamed a few months ago that a discussion of that kind, so frank, so open, so conciliatory on both sides, would have been possible?

The Chancellor confirmed all I said and expressed his complete agreement. He was very glad that I recognised that he and Dr. Stresemann, no less than M. Briand, were working in this spirit and with the same earnest desire for success. He was struck by my picture of the visitor from Mars and believed that it was true. He admired the lofty yet practical idealism of my outlook (I believe I blushed!). If the British Government continued to work in that spirit, my vision would surely be realised. He must add that if the Conference had become a fact, if my description of its tone and temper were true, as he agreed they were, it was owing to the spirit in which I had worked in London and to the manner in which I had directed its opening proceedings.

I believe I blushed again, but I seized the occasion to say that all the influence of His Majesty's Government, such as it was, had been directed to this end. I was suspected or accused by many people at home of allowing my French sympathies to run away with me and of being completely under the thumb of M. Briand, but I could have exerted no influence with the French unless I had won their confidence and had sometimes yielded on a minor point for the sake of the greater objects which I had in view.

Further, I observed that the Chancellor would not, I knew, suspect me of any intention to '*lâcher les anciennes amitiés pour en acquérir de nouvelles*'. A man who would sacrifice his old friend to win a new friend was not himself a friend worth having. He would inspire confidence in no one.

contains a report regarding yesterday's meeting [see No. 523]. Last evening the agency communicated this report to the German delegation, and requested them to define their attitude or to amplify it. It was thereby confirmed that the statements underlying this report had emanated from a delegation, and not the German one. I refrained from commenting upon the report, but simply stated that its publication would be a serious indiscretion and an infringement of the agreement arrived at between the delegations. . . .'

The Chancellor took my first point but made no comment on it. To the second he replied that he entirely agreed and that no one would suspect me of such an intention.

We talked on pleasantly for some time. He returned my visit almost as soon as I had reached my hotel. My wife joined us and we chatted agreeably for some little time, but nothing of any consequence was said on either side.

My object had been to mark my sense of the spirit in which he was working by paying him a visit of courtesy. I think I may say that my intention was understood and much appreciated. I had been the first to shake hands with him and his colleagues when they entered the Conference room and I was the first to call upon him at his hotel.

In the course of the conversation the Chancellor had observed that he and his colleagues had been especially impressed by the concluding words of my speech at the close of the last sitting of the Conference, in which I had appealed to the Germans to enter the League and to take for themselves not only equality in the letter but also equality in the spirit of their association.

I have been anxious to prove to them in these small things, which yet count for much, that from the moment they show themselves ready to work with us, it is in this spirit that we will ourselves act.

No. 529

Mr. Lampson (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 14)

LOC/79/B.D. [C 12984/459/18]

BRITISH DELEGATION, LOCARNO, *October 9, 1925*

Dear Tyrrell,

The Secretary of State is keeping you fully informed of all our official doings. The telegrams and records of conversations cover that side of the picture.

But it may interest you to have a more general and quite informal account of the impressions which the proceedings here leave on me.

In the first place no one who is not a Robot could fail to be favourably affected by the place in which we find ourselves. It is perfectly beautiful: a nice little town, rather Italian than Swiss in character, nestling under high mountains on the shores of the Lake. Opposite—three miles as the crow flies—more mountains across the Lake. The whole place is simple and unaffected. In addition, a good hotel, good rooms, and excellent food for the inner man! Are you surprised that what the Germans would call the 'general-Stimmung'¹ of the conference is good? Even those ravening wolves, the reporters, have apparently succumbed to the atmosphere of

¹ i.e. general mood.

general contentment and to be fairly benevolent in their attitude towards the conference, despite the complete lack of real news which is given them.²

So much for the place: now as to the conference itself. Frankly I am amazed—I think everyone must be—by the absence of all chicanery. All parties come to the table and explain their particular difficulties in the simplest and most straightforward language. Fundamental divergencies of view of course there are: but in no single instance have they been expounded in such a way as to cause the slightest umbrage to the other party.

I claim to be as phlegmatic and unemotional as most of my countrymen: but I admit having been thrilled to the bone once or twice by the eloquence and obvious sincerity of both Briand and Stresemann. Yesterday, over the question of Germany's entry into the League,³ they were both at their best and I have never before had the good fortune to hear a discussion conducted on so high a plane. It was really wonderful, and here let me say that what has undoubtedly greatly contributed to the general progress and harmony of the proceedings up to date has been the unerring judgment with which, at precisely the psychological moment, our own Secretary of State has intervened in the debate. Both the French and the Germans have testified to this. And sitting at my place at the table I have particularly noticed the way in which the eyes both of Luther and Stresemann are rivetted upon Mr. Chamberlain the moment he begins to speak.

This is the third real conference at which I have been present: Washington⁴, London last year,⁵ and now Locarno, and there can be no question that there is all the difference in the world between the last two named. True that at London we met the Germans ostensibly on an equal footing. But in actual fact, was that true? Surely not. Did we not carefully arrange that before the Germans joined us we should have got our proposals into cut and dried form? And when, after much difficulty with the French, the Germans did arrive, and did join us, were they not (through the accident of lack of space, no doubt) placed at the end of the room at a table facing the Chairman, and for all the world like prisoners at the bar? And then came the dramatic moment when Hankey⁶ advanced and, at the request of the Prime Minister, handed to the German Chancellor a voluminous bundle containing the Resolutions etc. already adopted by the inter-allied conference.⁷ These the Germans were invited to chew and digest, after which we, the allies, would be pleased to meet them and discuss their application. However much in theory we may have met in London on a footing of complete equality, in practice we certainly did not: we, the allies, decided what we wanted; we, the allies, then

² See No. 527.

³ See No. 523.

⁴ See No. 185, n. 2.

⁵ See No. 225, n. 17.

⁶ Secretary-General to the Conference of London.

⁷ At the meeting of August 5, 1924. See Cmd. 2270, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

persuaded the Germans to accept our proposals after, it is true, thorough and perfectly fair discussion; so that it was in fact a division into two groups. What is the position here? Strikingly different. No grouping of parties, no division into allies on one side and Germans on the other. On the contrary, Briand, Stresemann and Luther sit opposite to one another in the Conference Room and discuss with the utmost discretion and good humour their various difficulties. Each goes out of his way to show that he realises those of the other; each is obviously genuinely desirous of helping the other out so far as he possibly can consistently with his own national interests. In short, there is a complete absence of bitterness or back-biting. As the Secretary of State said in his first interview with the journalists,⁸ it is a case of the 'dead past burying its dead'. This strikes me as really the most significant feature of the whole conference. For the first time since the war the French and the Germans meet as man to man, one might almost say as friend to friend. There is complete equality; there is no longer a division into groups; all that is past and gone.

My pen has somewhat taken charge and you may well think that I am overdoing it as regards enthusiasm. Optimism is a catching complaint, and perhaps it blinds my vision; but I do not wittingly exaggerate. So far as I can judge this is a very remarkable gathering, voilà!

Yours ever,

MILES W. LAMPSON

⁸ On October 5. See *The Times*, October 6, p. 14.

No. 530

*Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 10, 4.10 p.m.)*

No. 16 Telegraphic [C 12814/459/18]

LOCARNO, *October 10, 1925, 2.15 p.m.*

Conference¹ sat for only one hour this morning and will not meet again till Monday,² all delegations feeling at this point that more progress would be made by personal conversations than by further discussions in full sitting.

Sitting was rendered notable by definite request of Scialoja that preamble should be amended to include Italy in pact which thus definitely takes the form of a five power pact. The Italian delegation particularly desire that this should not be given appearance of sudden or dramatic decision.

You will remember that Scialoja gave me as president on first day clear indication that this was most probable development.³

Repeated to Paris, Rome, Brussels and Berlin.

¹ For the minutes of the meeting, see Appendix, No. 9.

² October 12.

³ See No. 515.

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 13)

No. 25 [C 12900/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 11, 1925

Sir,

As there is an evident desire in all the delegations to reach agreement, and as considerable progress has already been made in the plenary sittings of the Conference and the private conversations which take place amongst its members, it is not possible that the question of signature of the proposed treaty will arise before the end of this week.

2. I have accordingly thought it well to have the enclosed memorandum prepared showing, for the information of His Majesty's Government, the amendments which have been made in the draft text since they last saw it,¹ and the reasons for these amendments.

3. My object in sending this home is that I should be in a position, should any doubtful point arise, to telegraph home with reference to it, and that His Majesty's Government, when considering the particular point, should be able to refer to it and to understand the particular question at issue.

4. I shall assume that the changes already made are acceptable to His Majesty's Government unless I receive telegraphic instructions to the contrary.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 531

Memorandum

LOCARNO, October 10, 1925

The basis of the discussions at Locarno has been the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee as it emerged from the meeting of the British, Belgian, French, German and Italian jurists in London, September 1st-4th last.¹ The text of this document is attached to this memorandum as Annex A.² As a result of the discussions at Locarno it has been considerably amended and Annex B² is the text as it stands as at present. The following notes indicate the amendments made in each article and the reasons underlying the amendments.

Preamble

Section 1. The Italian government having decided to adhere to the pact,³ the text of this section will be amended accordingly.

¹ See No. 466.

² Not printed.

³ See No. 530.

In *Section 2* there has been a purely drafting alteration, the word 'scourge' being substituted for the word 'brunt'.

[In] *Section 3* the phrase 'the necessity of ensuring peace' has been substituted for 'the necessity of stabilising the territorial *status quo*'. This substitution was effected because the words as to the guarantee of the territorial *status quo* have been transferred provisionally to article 1.

Sections 4, 5 and 6 are unchanged.

Subject to the necessary redrafting of *Section 1* the preamble is agreed to.

Article 1

(a) The original article contained a guarantee of the 'maintenance' of the frontiers between France and Germany and Belgium and Germany. This guarantee is now more clearly defined and refers to 'the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers'. The Italian delegation is still hesitating as to the acceptance of this phrase.

(b) M. Vandervelde took objection to the reference in the original text to France and Belgium as though the two countries formed a single entity. A slight drafting alteration has been made to meet this objection.

(c) The reference in the original text to 'the status of the Rhineland' has been deleted at the request of the German delegation, who pointed out that the new treaty might outlast the status of the Rhineland as at present fixed, whereas mention of it added nothing to the article.

(d) The new text, therefore, simply refers to 'the observance of the stipulations of articles 42, 43 and 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles'. On the other hand, at the request of the German delegation, the words 'concerning the demilitarised zone' have been added to indicate, for the benefit of the general public, the subject of the articles referred to.

(e) M. Scialoja has reserved the right to return to this article, and it is understood that he desires the omission of the reference to article 180 of the Treaty of Versailles on the ground that mention of the first and third paragraphs of the article, which are alone germane to the Rhineland Pact, might weaken the force of the fourth paragraph, which is of interest to Italy. The fourth paragraph reads:—

'The system of fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany shall be maintained in its existing state.'

Subject to M. Scialoja's reservations, the article is agreed to.

Article 2

(a) In the first paragraph, the original text referred to France and Belgium jointly as a single party. On this point, at the request of M. Vandervelde, a drafting alteration has been made similar to that introduced into article 1.

(b) In the original text the word 'violation' occurred three times; and when it was used for the third time, it was not clear whether the reference was to a breach of article 2 of the present treaty or to a breach of articles

42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles. The word 'breach' has therefore been substituted for the word 'violation' in the cases of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(c) The whole article is reserved pending the result of discussions which are in progress concerning article 6. A redraft of article 2 may overcome the difficulty caused by article 6.⁴

Article 3

Article 3 remains unchanged and is agreed to.

Article 4

(a) Section 1 is unchanged except that, just as in article 2, the word 'breach' has been substituted for the word 'violation' in respect of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(b) The word 'breach' has been similarly introduced into sections 2 and 3. Section 2 is otherwise unchanged.

(c) The German delegation were reluctant to accept the original text of section 3 and proposed a far-reaching amendment. The ostensible reason was that the original text was in form inappropriate to a treaty, but the real ground was that the discretion in judging the facts which it left to Great Britain as guarantor by the words 'which agrees that such violation', etc., might have the effect in practice that Great Britain would help France against Germany but would find excuses for not helping Germany against France. The drafting alterations which have now been made have enabled the German delegation to withdraw their suggested amendment.

(d) The German delegation proposed that after the words 'the assembly of armed forces' in section 3, the words 'whether German, French or Belgian' should be added in order to bring the article into conformity with the mutual character of the Treaty. M. Briand pointed out however that, while he fully appreciated the need of making the treaty reciprocal, the question of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone was a question of the application of the Treaty of Versailles. In the end the German amendment was withdrawn but, in order to meet the idea underlying it, 'the crossing of the frontier' has been added to the list of

⁴ In Locarno despatch No. 26 of October 11, Mr. Chamberlain transmitted to the Foreign Office the following new draft of Article 2 which Sir C. Hurst had submitted to the consideration of his colleagues: 'La France et l'Allemagne et de même la Belgique et l'Allemagne s'engagent réciproquement à ne se livrer de part et d'autre à aucune attaque ou invasion et à ne recourir de part et d'autre en aucun cas à la guerre.

'Toutefois cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit de: (1) L'exercice du droit légitime de défense, c'est-à-dire, de s'opposer à une violation de l'engagement de l'alinéa précédent ou à une contravention flagrante des articles 42, 43 et 180, alinéas 1 et 3 du Traité de Versailles lorsqu'une telle contravention constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire;

(2) L'application des sanctions prévues à l'article 16 du Pacte;

(3) Une action permise par le Pacte, soit en raison d'une décision prise par l'Assemblée ou par le Conseil, soit en application de l'article 15, alinéa 7, pourvu que dans ce dernier cas cette action soit dirigée contre un état qui a eu recours à la guerre.'

cases which may justify immediate action by the guarantor before the League of Nations has decided on the facts.

Just as in article 1, the Italian delegation may ask for the suppression of the references in article 4 to article 180 of the Treaty of Versailles. Subject to this contingency, the article is agreed to.

Article 5

(a) There was some doubt as to the scope of the obligation imposed upon the guarantor by the section numbered (1) in the original text. The words 'the high contracting parties shall comply with these proposals' have therefore been added at the end of the section.

(b) The order of the original sections (1) and (2) has been inverted so as to correspond with the order of the relevant paragraphs in the French note to Germany of June 16th, 1925.⁵

(c) The phrase 'a breach of article 4, paragraph 1' in the original text was an error. It has been replaced on the two occasions where it occurs in this article by the phrase:— 'A violation of article 2 of the present treaty, or a breach of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles.'

The article was agreed to.

Article 6

The second part of this article, dealing with the guarantee by a third party of arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia, is entirely unacceptable to Germany. Discussions are still in progress on the subject, and there is a hope of finding a solution of the difficulty by means of a redraft of article 2. In that case, that part of article 6 which deals with the subject would disappear from the treaty.

Article 7 is reserved on account of its connection with articles 2 and 6.

Article 8

The effect of this article is that the Treaty shall remain in force until the Council of the League decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the contracting parties.

(a) According to the original text this decision was to be taken at the instance of two at least of the contracting parties. The German delegation feared lest German public opinion might take the view that it would be easy for an allied power but not so easy for Germany to find another power willing to co-operate for this purpose. As the question was not one of the denunciation of the treaty, but only one of moving the Council of the League to take a certain decision as a preliminary step to the lapse of the treaty, it was felt that no important point of principle was involved, and an amendment has been introduced to meet the German point of view.

(b) The Belgian delegation were ready to agree to the above German

⁵ See No. 382, n. 2.

proposal on condition that the decision of the Council should require not a simple majority but a two-thirds' majority. Effect has been given to this proposal in the new text.

(c) The new text provides that a year shall elapse between the decision of the Council and the lapse of the treaty. This is necessary because the treaty contains not only guarantees of security but also provisions for the peaceful settlement of all disputes. It is advisable therefore that the whole treaty shall not disappear at once without warning. It is necessary to allow time for the making of such alternative arrangements as its lapse may necessitate.

(d) On the proposal of M. Briand a provision has been inserted in the new text whereby any power which wishes to move the Council of the League to take the decision contemplated must give three months' notice of its intentions to the other signatory powers.

The new text of article 8 is agreed to.

Article 9

The beginning of the original article 9, in which reference was made to 'settlement by arbitration', was not altogether consistent with article 3, which contemplates the peaceful settlement of all disputes, but not necessarily by means of arbitration in the commonly accepted sense of the term. The point has been covered by a slight drafting alteration.

The article is agreed to.

Article 10 is agreed to.

Article 11 is so far unchanged. Final agreement is reserved pending agreement on article 7.

No. 532

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 12, 6.30 p.m.)

No. 22 Telegraphic [C 12899/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 12, 1925, 4.40 p.m.

Conference met again this morning¹ and further considered German difficulty in entering the League owing to Article 16 of covenant.

Since our last meeting we had elaborated a form of declaration to meet their point of view so far as we reasonably could. Text follows in my immediately following telegram.² After discussion in which Monsieur

¹ For the minutes of the meeting, see Appendix, No. 10.

² Locarno telegram No. 23 of October 12 ran as follows: 'La délégation allemande a bien voulu demander quelque précision au sujet de l'article seize du pacte de la société des nations.

'Nous n'avons pas qualité pour nous prononcer au nom de la société mais nous ne

Briand, Stresemann, Luther and I took leading part this text was accepted by German delegation who however are most anxious that fact that a solution has actually been found shall not be disclosed for the moment as its immediate publication would in that case be demanded by all parties in Germany. I beg therefore that greatest discretion may be observed.

German delegation made much play of their special position, disarmed as they are, whilst others in the League are not. We were able to agree that when Pact is signed we will make some form of solemn declaration as final act of conference to the effect that security of Europe has been sufficiently assured to permit of practical application of Article 8 of the covenant.

What Germans want and we ought to give is a definite assurance that we now mean business and that disarmament is no longer a mere pious aspiration.

There now thus remains outstanding only question of Eastern guarantee. This is being dealt with by means of informal conversation amongst those concerned.

I understand that neither French nor Belgian delegations anticipate any special difficulty in regard to their arbitration treaties with Germany. Nor apparently does Monsieur Benes. As to Poland, position is not yet clear but I have pointed out to Stresemann that he cannot ask of France what he is not ready to accord to Poland and Monsieur Briand and Monsieur Benes are using all their influence to bring Poland into line.

Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Rome.

hésitons pas à la suite des discussions qui ont eu lieu déjà dans l'assemblée et dans les commissions de la société des nations et après les explications qui ont été changées entre nous à vous dire l'interprétation que pour notre part nous donnons à l'article 16.

'D'après cette interprétation les obligations resultantes du dit article pour les membres de la société doivent être entendues en ce sens que cha[c]un des états membres de la société est tenu de collaborer loyalement et efficacement pour faire respecter le pacte et pour s'opposer à toute acte d'agression dans un mesure qui soit compatible avec sa situation militaire et qui tienne compte de sa position géographique.'

No. 533

Record¹ by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the French Foreign Minister and the German Chancellor

LOC/121/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(7)]

LOCARNO, October 12, 1925

I think it is right to put on record a passage of the discussion between M. Briand, the Chancellor and myself during our Saturday² excursion on the

¹ A copy of this record was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 35 of October 14, not printed, received October 16.

² October 10. In a private letter of October 12 to Mr. Amery, Mr. Chamberlain

lake. We were discussing Germany's position in relation to the economic sanctions of article 16, and the German representatives were pressing strongly the exceptional position of Germany. So far the discussion had been in the main between M. Briand and the Chancellor, but at this point I intervened somewhat as follows:—

'Mr. Chancellor, I beg you to observe that your position is not so exceptional as you think it. You look eastwards at the forces confronting you; you are preoccupied by the dangers which they might entail for Germany; and you think that your military and geographical position create for you so singular a position that you are not merely unable to contribute armed forces for the execution of the decrees of the League, but that it is impossible for you even to employ the economic sanctions. But I beg you to consider the position of my own country; which Member of the League has the greatest international commerce and would suffer most by the breaking off of economic relations? Clearly it is the British. Which Power within the League has the greatest naval force? Clearly the British Empire. And a fleet would be necessary to secure the observance of the maritime blockade which these sanctions require for their efficacy. To which Power, then, would the League address itself in the first instance for this necessary naval assistance? Clearly to the British Empire. Now turn your eyes from the east to the west. It is a fundamental condition of British policy, I might almost say a condition of the continued existence of the British Empire, that we should not be involved in a quarrel with the United States of America. If anyone in England suspected me of pursuing a policy that would lead to war with the United States, they would certainly shut me up in a madhouse; but you will observe that these economic sanctions which cause you so much anxiety must necessarily equally preoccupy us, because of the difficulties which their employment might introduce into our relations with America. So much is this the case that in the sketch for the declaration which I made upon the Protocol at Geneva,³ there had been a page dealing with this very subject. I omitted it in order that, when obliged to do something which would be disagreeable to many Members of the League, I might not make myself more disagreeable than was necessary. But you can see that other nations besides yourselves undertake very weighty obligations, and that, as I began by saying, your position is not nearly so exceptional as you suppose. Come into the League. You can discuss the application of the article from within the League. You can put forward your views and your difficulties when the

commented: '... This is, I should think, the most remarkable Conference that has ever been held. I do not now believe that any one of us can afford to allow it to fail, but I rub my eyes and wonder whether I am dreaming when the French Foreign Minister invites the German chancellor and me to celebrate my wife's birthday, and incidentally talk business, by a cruise on the Lake of Locarno in a launch called the "Orange Blossom", habitually used by wedding parties. It really looks to me as if the "mariage de convenance" once celebrated, it might ripen into sincere respect and in time even into sincere regard on both sides.'

³ See No. 240, n. 13. See also No. 255, n. 4.

moment comes for such discussion, and perhaps, since there appears to be a certain community of interest between you and us in this matter, we may find that we are working together and that together we may persuade the Assembly to adopt a view to which neither of us separately could secure their adhesion.'

'Voilà', said M. Briand jokingly, 'une alliance qui se forme contre moi.' The Chancellor began his reply by summarising my statement and in doing so he too spoke of my having, as it were, suggested an alliance. I at once interrupted to say that I feared I had expressed myself badly, and the Chancellor observed politely that he had misinterpreted me. I said I had not proposed any alliance. 'All that I desired to do is to call your attention to the fact that your position is not so exceptional as you think, that others besides yourself have their preoccupations as to the possible consequences of the fulfilment of their duties under this article, and that since there would be a certain rapprochement of our interests, it may be that we shall find ourselves acting together if the subject again comes before the Assembly. In any case', I added, 'that is certainly what I expect to happen if not on this question then on some other. If we once bring our negotiations here to a satisfactory conclusion, and you take your place with us on the Council of the League, I trust that we shall not always be found in opposition. I expect that sometimes you and M. Briand will be united to oppose the British view, and that sometimes you and I will take a line different from the French. All that I want to emphasise for the moment is that here in the economic sanction is a point where the greatest English interests may be as deeply affected as any German interests which you may put forward.'

As far as I know, no notes were taken of this discussion, though I am not quite certain that M. Berthelot may not have summarised it, but I have thought it well to place on record at once exactly what I said, and as nearly as possible in the words in which I said it.

A. C.

No. 534

*Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 14, 9 a.m.)*

No. 31 Telegraphic [C 12993/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 13, 1925, 8 p.m.

Conference today¹ considered final report by jurists and gave further reading to draft of Pact.²

Sir C. Hurst explained various alterations made which were accepted by

¹ For the minutes of this meeting, see Appendix, No. 12.

² See No. 531, Enclosure.

Conference subject to reserve of final consent by Monsieur Briand until he has consulted Polish and Czechoslovak Ministers for Foreign Affairs on specific points of his eastern commitments. Position thus is that the draft as amended has now to all intents and purposes been accepted by all. I am repeating to you in a separate telegram³ the texts of alterations made and now approved and will send home explanatory comments as soon as possible.

Next discussed the question of signature and found that though all other delegations were ready to sign German delegates were unable to do so without first returning to Berlin and obtaining full powers from their government. It was accordingly decided to initial only. Procedure now is that final text as approved today will again come before the Conference tomorrow when Monsieur Briand hopes to be in a position to signify definite assent and when it is anticipated that Franco-German and Belgian-German arbitration treaties will be ready for submission to the Conference; there will then only remain German-Polish and German-Czech arbitration treaties with regard to which there appears to be some slight anxiety in certain quarters. I said that I hoped that the parties immediately concerned would hurry on this work. I was interested only in the result. Monsieur Briand and Chancellor joined in asking me to lend my help and I placed Sir C. Hurst and my own services at their disposal.

If all goes well, therefore, we should be in a position to initial on Friday⁴—but that must depend on the course of Polish negotiations.

It was next decided that as we could not sign Pact here but only initial it we should adopt the same procedure as that followed in London last year⁵ and I warmly invited the principal delegates to sign in person as what will be known as the treaty of Locarno in order by their presence to mark the importance which we attach to it and hopes which we derived from its conclusion. Monsieur Briand and the Chancellor both said that they were very disposed to accept for reasons given by me.

We then came to the question of language and in order to avoid difficulty of four different texts (English, French, German and Italian) all equally binding I said I was willing to waive my right to an English version and provided that all agreed to accept a French for signature. To this each delegation assented, Chancellor again warmly thanking me for making proposal and consenting to the sacrifice.

Repeated to Berlin, Brussels and Rome.

³ No. 536, below.

⁴ October 16.

⁵ See No. 225, n. 17.

Record¹ by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with Herr von Schubert

LOC/145/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(8)]

BRITISH DELEGATION, LOCARNO, October 13, 1925

Herr von Schubert called upon me today, ostensibly to pay his respects, but, also, no doubt, with the object of having a general conversation on the situation. It is unnecessary, in view of the progress made here, that I should record in detail what passed between us. Much of it merely repeated or elaborated arguments used on either side in earlier discussions, but I took the opportunity of developing a little more fully some observations which I had made in my conversation with the Chancellor² as to the policy of His Majesty's Government since their accession to office, and the means by which they had brought about the Conference of Locarno, so near at this moment to the realisation of its immediate purpose, and so full of hope for the future.

Some observations of his on the attitude of M. Chicherin gave me the opportunity of saying to him that M. Chicherin was at this moment making the same fatal mistake into which German diplomacy had fallen in the years before the war. M. Chicherin saw in the establishment of good relations between any other two countries a menace to his own. How utterly false this point of view was was demonstrated by the relations between Germany on the one side and Great Britain and France on the other. I need only ask him to consider the position of Germany from the time when Mr. Bonar Law's proposals were rejected by the French Government in Paris³ until last year,⁴ and to contrast it with the position of Germany now. During the earlier period there had been constant bickering between France and Great Britain, including a very sharp exchange of published notes.⁵ Some improvement had been introduced in the time of my predecessor⁶ when the Dawes arrangements were made,

¹ A copy of this record was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 34 of October 14, received on October 16.

² See No. 528.

³ In January, 1923. See Vol. XXI, Nos. 2-4.

⁴ i.e. until the London Conference met to execute the Dawes Plan on reparations (see No. 225, n. 17).

⁵ i.e. the British note of June 13, 1923 (see Vol. XXI, No. 264); the French note of June 14 (see *ibid.*, No. 292, Enclosure); the British note of July 20 (see *ibid.*, No. 306); the French note of July 30 (not printed: see, however, *ibid.*, No. 318, n. 2); the British note of August 11 (see *ibid.*, No. 330) and the French note of August 20 (not printed: see, however, *ibid.*, Nos. 337, n. 1 and 362). See also Cmd. 1943, *Correspondence with the Allied Governments respecting Reparation Payments by Germany* (H.M.S.O., 1923) and *Documents Diplomatiques: Documents relatifs aux Notes Allemandes des 2 Mai et 5 Juin sur les Réparations (2 Mai-3 Août 1923)* (Paris, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1923) and *Documents Diplomatiques: Réponse du Gouvernement Français à La Lettre du Gouvernement Britannique du 11 Août 1923 sur les Réparations (20 Août, 1923)* (Paris, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1923).

⁶ Mr. MacDonald.

but it was not until the present British Government came into office⁷ that the old relations of complete confidence and loyalty were re-established between the two Governments.

I invited Herr von Schubert to consider in which period the position of Germany had been the more comfortable. I had from the first worked for the results which we were now on the eve of achieving in Locarno, but it would have been impossible for me ever to bring the French to Locarno had I not first re-established these conditions of complete confidence between the two governments. I had always felt that it was only on the solid foundation of loyal friendship between France and England that a reconciliation with Germany could be effected.

Herr von Schubert replied that it was unnecessary that I should emphasise this point of view to him. In Germany they had always felt that their safety depended on agreement between the French and British Governments, but whether M. Chicherin would share the same view was more than he could vouch for.

A. C.

⁷ In November, 1924.

No. 536

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 14, 9 a.m.)

No. 32 Telegraphic [C 12994/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 14, 1925, 1.20 a.m.

My telegram No. 31.¹

Following are amendments introduced into draft treaty at today's meeting.²

Article 1 for 'from frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France and inviolability' read 'from frontier between France and Germany and between Belgium and Germany and inviolability'. Following words have been deleted 'and 180 paragraphs 1 and 3'.

Article 2. Following is new text 'Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not however apply in the case of

(1) The exercise of right of legitimate defence that is to say opposition to a violation of undertaking contained in previous paragraph to a flagrant

¹ No. 534.

² This telegram was drafted on October 13. For the minutes of that meeting, see Appendix, No. 12.

breach of Articles 42 or 43 of treaty of Versailles if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of assembly of armed forces in demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary;

(2) An action in application of Article 16 of covenant of League of Nations.

(3) An action as result of a decision taken by Assembly or by Council or in application of Article 15, paragraph 7 of the covenant of League of Nations provided in this last event that action is directed against state which was the first to attack.'

Article 3 first paragraph begins. 'In view of undertakings entered into in Article 2 Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake etc'. Last portion of paragraph 3 reads as follows 'which will deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of covenant of League of Nations'. Last paragraph reads 'detailed arrangements effecting such peaceful settlement shall be subject to special agreements signed this day'.

Article 6. Portion in italics beginning 'nor yet right' to the end of the Article has been deleted.

Article 7. Following is revised version: 'the present treaty which is designed to ensure maintenance of peace and is in conformity with covenant of League of Nations shall not be interpreted as restricting duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard peace of the world'.

Article 9 has been suppressed.

Article 11 which will now be 10: revised version reads 'present treaty shall be ratified and ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva in the archives of League of Nations.

It shall enter into force as soon as all ratifications have been deposited and Germany has become member of the League of Nations.

Present treaty done in a single copy will be deposited in archives of the League of Nations and Secretary-General will be requested to transmit certificate of copies to each high contracting party.

In faith whereof abovementioned plenipotentiaries have signed present treaty.

Done at Locarno the—October 1925 and signed at London the—1925.'

Last paragraph of this Article is not yet finally settled on account of technical difficulties in connection with initialling treaty at Locarno and signing in London.

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 14, 4.20 p.m.)

No. 34 Telegraphic [C 12999/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 14, 1925, 1.20 p.m.

My telegram No. 31.¹

New texts of article 1, article 2, article 3, article 6, article 7 and article 10 which have been approved by conference subject to such small drafting amendments as may be necessary during final reading have been telegraphed to you separately in my telegram No. 32.² They should be substituted for texts appearing in memorandum of October 10th enclosed in my despatch No. 25 of October 11th.³ Following explanatory comments may be of assistance to Cabinet.

Article 1.

Italian delegation have withdrawn their objection reference to maintenance of territorial status quo.

It was decided upon re-examination that all reference to article 180 of Treaty of Versailles both in this and in other articles of Pact might be deleted. . . .⁴ This has been done.

New *article 2* enables reserved passage in article 6 regarding French guarantee of eastern arbitration treaties to be dropped. French guarantee will now be embodied in a separate document and will only bind France to come to the aid of Poland (or Czechoslovakia) if and when that Power is attacked by Germany.

Article 7 has been modified in form. As new treaty restricts cases in which war may be resorted to legitimately under Covenant a statement that all rights and obligations of members of League of Nations were unaffected was not strictly accurate.

Article 9 has been dropped as special agreements are to form part of work of conference and to be signed the same day. A slight change at end of article 3 has been made accordingly.

Article 10 becomes article 9 and final provisions which become article 10 have been amplified.

Full correction of text up to date goes to you by bag tonight.⁵

¹ No. 534.

² No. 536.

³ No. 531.

⁴ The text is here uncertain. In another text, 'danger' was suggested.

⁵ Locarno despatch No. 38 of October 14, not printed.

No. 538

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno)
(Received in the Foreign Office, October 15, 11 a.m.)

No. 230 Telegraphic [C 13047/459/18]

ROME, October 14, 1925, 7.40 p.m.

Addressed to Locarno.

In our conversation this evening M. Mussolini only made two points worth recording as regards pact and previous negotiations at Locarno.

1. That if German-Polish and German-Czech arbitration treaties seemed likely to delay the matter it would be best to sign at once pact as at present drawn out and leave treaties for later consideration as time would help towards a solution.

2. That he had been struck by unreality of (? German) pose as a defenceless (? lamb) whereas she had next to France most powerful army in Europe. He intended to call the attention of Dr. Stresemann to this in a friendly way if a favourable chance arose at Locarno.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

No. 539

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno)
(Received in the Foreign Office, October 15, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 229¹ Telegraphic [C 13042/459/18]

Urgent

ROME, October 14, 1925, 9.35 p.m.

Sent to Locarno.

Mussolini informed me this evening that he had made up his mind to go to Locarno. He is with characteristic suddenness leaving tonight. He said that he would like you to realize that he went there almost entirely to see you and because he knew you wished him to come. He desired to remain there as short a time as possible but he would be prepared to stay for two or three days if necessary. I asked him if he had let you know of his arrival but he said he had not even told Scialoja. Press know nothing about it and he hoped would not discover his departure (? before) tomorrow morning.

I expressed my gratification at being able to make announcement to you. You would value his presence at Locarno very highly and would greatly appreciate his coming there and reason he had given me for it.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

¹ This telegram was despatched after Rome telegram No. 230 (No. 538).

No. 540

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno)
(Received in the Foreign Office, October 15, 10 a.m.)

No. 369 Telegraphic [C 13049/459/18]

BERLIN, October 14, 1925, 9.50 p.m.

Addressed to Locarno No. 8.

I hear that Cabinet last night and today generally approved action of German delegate at Locarno but did not feel itself called upon to take a precise decision.

The solutions regarding article 16 and guarantee of Polish treaty were considered not unsatisfactory.

On the other hand importance was attached to obtaining specific declarations that régime in the Rhineland would be improved and that Cologne area would be evacuated without delay.

Several members held that English and French (Parliamentary) statements on these points would hardly be adequate to carry Reichstag and pressed for something more precise. The papers of the Right have recommenced attacks on Pact but without either point or vigour. Press of Centre and Left increasingly favourable.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

No. 541

*Memorandum recording a conversation between Mr. Chamberlain and
the German Foreign Minister*
(Received in the Foreign Office, October 17)

LOC/164/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(8)]

BRITISH DELEGATION, LOCARNO, October 14, 1925

Mr. Chamberlain called on Herr Stresemann this morning at the Esplanade Hotel. He explained to Herr Stresemann that the object of his visit was to make a suggestion as regards the forthcoming meeting of the full Conference to consider the Franco-German and Belgo-German arbitration treaties, which, it was hoped, might be ready sometime today. He considered that it would be very useful if an invitation were extended to Count Skrzynski and Dr. Benes to attend this meeting, since, although the particular treaties affecting them would not come up for discussion, it might possibly facilitate matters when the German-Czechoslovak and German-Polish arbitration treaties had to be considered if Count Skrzynski and Dr. Benes had had the advantage of hearing the discussion on the other treaties. The French and Belgian treaties might be regarded in the nature of a precedent for the subsequent treaties and make the

negotiation of these subsequent treaties easier.

Herr Stresemann said that at first sight the suggestion seemed to him to be acceptable. He thought, however, that if Count Skrzynski and Dr. Benes were admitted to the meeting it was important that the communiqué should be drawn with some care. The presence of these ministers might convey the impression that the negotiations had come to an end, and this might be embarrassing from the point of view of the German Delegation. It was essential to avoid giving this impression until the Pact and all the instruments arising out of it were ready for signature.

Mr. Chamberlain said he appreciated Herr Stresemann's point and thought it would be possible to draft a communiqué on the lines indicated by Herr Stresemann. Herr Stresemann promised to consult the Chancellor in the matter and to inform Mr. Chamberlain of Dr. Luther's decision with as little delay as possible.

Mr. Chamberlain then told Herr Stresemann that it was his intention to stay a day in Paris on his way home with a view to paying a visit to M. Painlevé. His proposed visit had two objects. Herr Stresemann would remember that throughout his conversations both with him and the German Chancellor,¹ Mr. Chamberlain had emphasised the importance he attached to avoiding any impression arising that Great Britain was abandoning an old friend for a new one. That had never been in his mind and Herr Stresemann would appreciate the force of his reason. Secondly, the proposed visit had a further object in view. Herr Stresemann had put forward certain views as to the alleviations which would be expected by Germany as a result of the signature of the Pact. As Herr Stresemann was aware, M. Briand had expressed generally his sympathy with these objects. Mr. Chamberlain thought that M. Briand's hand would be greatly strengthened in the discussion of these matters with the French Cabinet on his return if Mr. Chamberlain had himself expressed his views to M. Painlevé, who was President of the Council and Minister of War, and, consequently, largely responsible for much of the régime which resulted in the situation which the German Government desired to see improved. Herr Stresemann expressed his entire agreement with Mr. Chamberlain's proposal.

Herr Stresemann then reverted to the question of the declarations to be made by the respective ministers on their return to their country. He explained that he thought it unlikely that any declaration could be made in the German Reichstag before the early days of November, whereas the French Parliament would probably assemble at the end of October, and it would consequently fall to M. Briand to make the first declaration on the subject of the Locarno negotiations. In this connection Herr Stresemann thought that it was essential that some agreement should be come to between M. Briand, Mr. Chamberlain and the Chancellor as to the nature of the declaration to be made, in particular in regard to the alleviations in

¹ See e.g. No. 528.

the Rhineland which it was hoped might flow from the signature of the Pact. M. Briand had indicated that he was prepared to go even further than the Germans could hope in this matter, and if this was the case and M. Briand could indicate some points at least on which a mitigation of conditions in the occupied territories might be expected, it would greatly help the German Ministers in the forthcoming debates in the Reichstag. If some form of declaration were agreed to in advance, it would be possible for the three ministers to play into each other's hands and mutually to strengthen their hands.

Mr. Chamberlain answered that he thought it very desirable that some agreement should be reached between himself, the Chancellor and M. Briand in this matter, and agreed that they might meet to consider it.

Herr Stresemann then again referred to the question of the evacuation of Cologne, and said it was essential, if difficulties were to be overcome as regards the Pact, that some definite agreement should be come to in this matter. He said that the report of General Pawels[z], the German representative negotiating with the Allied Commission, was just coming through. It indicated one or two points on which it was unlikely that the Control Commission and the German Commission would be likely to agree,² and Herr Stresemann said that the questions would in all probability have to be referred to the Conference of Ambassadors, where he hoped that it might be possible that a settlement should be reached.

He then explained in some detail the German difficulties. In the matter of titles of the police, the Control Commission were insisting on the title of 'inspector' instead of the title desired by the Germans of 'Hauptmann'. Herr Stresemann explained that, small as the point seemed to be, the greatest importance was attached to these questions of title. The German word 'Inspektor' did not convey the same meaning to German ears as it might to French or British. Indeed, it was a title of low degree in the social rank, and Herr Stresemann laughingly said that, so far as German young ladies were concerned, it was an entirely different thing for them to walk out with an 'Inspektor' instead of a 'Hauptmann'. After all, he urged, what was wanted so far as the police were concerned was to get the best men for the very important duties which they had to undertake, especially in view of the communist movement in Germany, and, with this limitation of titles standing in the way, the German Government felt themselves to be in face of a great obstacle.

There was another point. There were certain associations in Germany who were accustomed to celebrate 'Feiertage'³ by meeting and wearing their steel helmets and other military adornment of which they might at one time have been possessed. This was objected to by the Allied Commission, but Herr Stresemann could assure Mr. Chamberlain that the practice was a harmless one, that the 'Verbände'⁴ in question were, in the

² See No. 650, Enclosure 2, below.

³ i.e. holidays.

⁴ i.e. associations.

main, composed of the German middle classes which he, Herr Stresemann, represented, and had little connection with the old military caste.

Mr. Chamberlain said that he fully appreciated the importance of the evacuation of Cologne, and had repeated that he had no greater desire than that it should be effected as soon as possible. On the other hand, the German Government must endeavour to assist matters so far as lay in their power by meeting the wishes of the Allied Governments. His desire was that if an agreement could be come to on some of the points outstanding, and if the German Government would give an undertaking that these points would be liquidated by a certain date, the Allies, on their side, should meet the German Government by giving an undertaking that they would commence the evacuation of Cologne by that date, leaving other outstanding questions to be liquidated by the German Government subsequently. Herr Stresemann considered that this idea would meet the German point of view, and declared himself ready to co-operate accordingly.

W. SELBY

No. 542

Record¹ by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with Herr von Schubert

Loc:160/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(8)]

LOCARNO, October 14, 1925

Herr von Schubert called on me at 7 o'clock this evening.

He began by asking whether we yet had any reply from Berlin to our telegram asking for General Wauchope's latest report on military control.² On my telling him that we had not as yet received anything, he said that the German Delegation had received a telegram sent off from Berlin today to the effect that matters were not going too well and that there were still some 14 points outstanding on which the Pawelsz Commission could get no reply from the Control Commission. I contented myself with saying that until we had our report obviously we could not discuss the matter any further.

Herr von Schubert then got on to the main object of his visit. He handed me two *aide-mémoires*,³ informing me that he had already given copies to M. Vandervelde, with whom he had had a long discussion on the subject, and that he had intended to give copies to [M.] Berthelot also, but unfortunately he had left for Milan and would not be back until late

¹ A copy of this record was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 39 of October 14, not printed, received October 17.

² See Appendix, No. 11, n. 8.

³ Not printed. See, however, Series IA, Vol. I, Nos. 7, Enclosure and 12.

tonight. He would, therefore, not be able to give copies to the French Delegation until tomorrow morning. He hoped that he might be able to get copies into M. Berthelot's hands before the meeting of the conference at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow.⁴

He proceeded to explain that he hoped these *aide-mémoires* would not be regarded as formal documents in any sense. They were merely *aide-mémoires* of certain points which the German Delegation had in mind, mainly connected with the subjects discussed at the meeting in Mr. Chamberlain's room of two days ago. He said he did not propose that we should go through these *aide-mémoires* whilst he was with me; they were very technical, and he did not for one moment wish us to imagine that the German Delegation thought that here at Locarno we could dispose of such highly technical matters as those the *aide-mémoires* referred to. The question of troops of occupation, Rhineland Commission delegates, ordinances of the High Commission, the reappointment of a Reichskommissar in the Rhineland, all these were questions which obviously could not be disposed of summarily. But it had been suggested to his Delegation (on my pressing him, he admitted somewhat reluctantly that the suggestion had come from M. Hesnard, of the French Delegation) that there might be some general reference in the *Protocol de Clôture* of the Conference to the inevitable alleviations in the Rhineland which the entry into force of the pact would bring in its train. He begged that I would not give away the fact that he had disclosed M. Hesnard's name to me; he did not know whether the latter had spoken on his own authority or whether he had been inspired by M. Briand to do so; but in any case the suggestion, if adopted, would obviously ease the position for the German Delegation enormously. It was—he hated to go on repeating it, for we must be tired of the very name—a question of German public opinion. He doubted very much if we here realised the difficulties of his delegates on their return, and here he wished to make a point which was very probably new to us. Hitherto we had been accustomed to looking upon the Nationalists as the great obstructionists and danger; but he thought it only right to point out that it was highly desirable that these very Nationalists should be brought in and induced to endorse the policy which the German Delegation were now adopting; these Nationalists were in fact the best elements of the country, even of the Government.

He then turned to the latter of the two *aide-mémoires* which he had left with me, namely, the question of the rights of investigation enjoyed by the League of Nations under article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles. He said he would not trouble me to read the memorandum at present, but he did wish me to know that if Part 5 of the Council Resolution of September 27, 1924,⁵ was to be taken seriously, entailing as it did apparently a special

⁴ See No. 543, below, and Appendix, No. 13.

⁵ For the text, see *L./N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 1592-5. See also Vol. XXVI, Nos. 214, 227, 229 and 230.

permanent League régime in the demilitarised Rhineland, then the entry of Germany into the League would certainly be made very difficult. German public opinion would never admit that article 213 conferred any right upon the League to have resident commissions in any part of Germany, let alone the occupied Rhineland.

I said that I knew that he had discussed this very point with Mr. Chamberlain the other day.⁶ I knew this because in consequence of that conversation I had been looking up the previous papers. Here Herr von Schubert interrupted to say that Mr. Chamberlain had referred to a certain conversation which he, Mr. Chamberlain, thought he had had with the German Ambassador in London,⁷ in which he had explained to him the British attitude as regards the interpretation of article 213. The German records had been looked through and nothing of the kind could be traced. I said that I also had been looking up this very point, and had found nothing corresponding exactly to Mr. Chamberlain's recollection. My impression was that at that moment the position had been very delicate and Mr. Chamberlain had not felt himself in a position to tell Herr Sthamer exactly how H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] felt on this question. However, matters had now changed, and for his purely confidential information I could tell him that the British Government, acting on the highest legal opinion, had never admitted that article 213 conferred the right of *permanent resident* commissions of enquiry anywhere in Germany. I then rapidly ran over the history of this question, and said that to my mind the German government were really beating the wind. The position was that article 5 of the Council Resolution⁵ (which I understood was the particular article to which the Germans took such violent objection) had not yet been finished with. A permanent advisory commission had been instructed to study and elaborate the methods of putting it into execution,⁸ and as a result (this was an open secret, for it was known to all the members of the Council) there had been a difference of opinion, and consequently the application of article 5 was still in abeyance.⁹

Herr von Schubert said that might be so, but it would not meet his point. Germany could not enter the League unless something was done to meet their view. As things were, this resolution had been forwarded to them by the Secretary-General of the League, and the German Government had simply acknowledged its receipt, reserving the right to make a further answer. Germany could not enter the League without showing definitely that she did not admit the right of the Council to set up any system which, in Germany's view, was not covered by a concrete interpretation of article 213.¹⁰

⁶ See No. 535.

⁷ Cf. No. 594, below.

⁸ On December 11, 1924. See *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 139-43 and 229-30.

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 489 and 863-4.

¹⁰ Mr. Lampson here added: "To this I retorted that he would remember what the Secretary of State had already stated before the Conference. Unless Germany joined the

I informed Herr von Schubert that his two *aide-mémoires* would be submitted to the Secretary of State, and that we would, of course, study them and consider what was reasonable or possible. I repeated that, not having read them, I could express no opinion on their contents or hazard any view as to what our action upon them would be beyond the general statement that as regarded the Rhineland we clearly could do nothing without full consultation with our authorities on the spot, but if, as I understood, the German delegation were now giving us concrete instances of complaint, then those complaints would, of course, be gone into and, if there proved to be good cause, would be rectified; beyond that no reasonable person could expect us to go. The idea of some mention of these matters in the *Protocol de Clôture* did not seem to me personally easy of adoption for two reasons. Firstly, because Italy had no troops of occupation, and was not directly concerned in the Rhineland administration, and, secondly, because such mention might well do the very thing which both Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand had declared impossible in their talk the other day with the Chancellor and Dr. Stresemann,¹¹ namely, introduce that element of bargaining which was quite inadmissible. These were, however, my purely personal impressions, and must not be taken as reflecting the views of the Secretary of State in any way.

M. W. LAMPSON

League there was no question of the Pact going through. The whole British nation was solid on the point [see No. 523].'

¹¹ See Appendix, No. 11.

No. 543

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 15, 5.20 p.m.)

No. 39 Telegraphic [C 13050/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 15, 1925, 3.45 p.m.

Conference this morning finally approved draft of Pact.¹ M. Vandervelde took occasion to say that if Council of League of Nations should at any time be called on to act under Articles 4, 5 or 8 and if at that time Belgium should no longer be a member of the Council he presumed that Belgium would be called into Council to take part in discussion.² Conference unanimously agreed that this was in accordance with provisions of covenant.

We next turned to Franco-German and Belgian-German arbitration treaties and as arranged beforehand Czech and Polish Ministers for Foreign Affairs at this point joined us to hear our discussion as being of

¹ For the minutes of this meeting, see Appendix, No. 13.

² M. Vandervelde's declaration is printed in *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 122.

interest to them in connection with their own negotiations with Germany.

M. Fromageot rapidly explained principles underlying French and Belgian draft treaties text of which is identic and conference after brief debate concurred in their terms.

M. Benes and M. Skrzynski both stated that generally speaking they were ready to adopt the same text but that political aspect of certain portions still remained to be settled; they hoped however to be able to bring their treaties to conference settled tomorrow.

Position thus is that everything is practically settled and it is reasonably certain that unless an unforeseen hitch occurs Pact and its ancillary treaties will all be initialled tomorrow and a date fixed for their signature in London.

Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Rome, Warsaw and Prague.

No. 544

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno)

No. 17 Telegraphic [C 13060/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 15, 1925, 7.50 p.m.*

Following from Prime Minister.

Your colleagues and I hasten to congratulate you wholeheartedly on the brilliant accomplishment of the delicate task which you set yourself in entering the difficult conference at Locarno. We realise to the full that the constructive scheme now produced for maintaining European peace is your own personal creation, and we are confident that you have at last succeeded in an issue which has so far defied the efforts of every statesman since the war. Without your initiative and conviction, without your sustained work, patience and tact this could never have been brought about.

We recognise also that you have been loyally and ably supported by the members of your delegation, and we are convinced that the country, and indeed the world, will understand the debt it owes to your successful efforts on behalf of conciliation and peace.

No. 545

Record¹ by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with the Italian Prime Minister

LOC/181/B.D. [F.O. 840/1(9)]

BRITISH DELEGATION, LOCARNO, *October 15, 1925*

I called by appointment on M. Mussolini immediately on his arrival this

¹ A copy of this record was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 43

afternoon. He received me with great cordiality, and, indeed, his whole entourage repeat to Mr. Selby the message sent by Sir Ronald Graham that he had come only from a desire to meet me and because he knew that I wished to see him.²

We discussed at length the position of our two countries as guarantors of the Western Pact, the terms and conditions of which he finds eminently satisfactory. He said that he had formed a favourable opinion of the prospects of the conference immediately on receipt of information as to the way it had gone to work and the informality and, at the same time, business-like character of our proceedings.

I observed that I had drawn the same augury from our first sitting, and from the fact that we had no general discussion, which might easily have raised questions not directly pertinent to the objects of the Conference and liable to interpose obstacles in its path.

M. Mussolini replied that this was one of the reasons why he had not raised the question of the Brenner frontier. Another and equally powerful reason was that to raise that question with Germany was to suggest that Germany and Austria might be united, and thus, as it were, to invite the danger which he desired to avoid.

When we had exhausted the topics directly suggested by the Conference, I referred to the telegram which M. Briand and I had addressed to him from Geneva,³ but which had never reached its address until the other day I had given a copy of it to Marquis Torretta.⁴ I told him that I thought war much less likely in the Balkans if peace were assured among the Great Powers. Indeed, if the Great Powers were agreed, they could at need impose peace on a little state that showed a disposition to disturb it, but the situation in the Balkans was always troubled. The Balkans had been the scene of many wars, and the spark which had fired the Great War itself had started in the Balkans. Would it not be well, then, that France, Italy and Great Britain should from time to time exchange ideas upon the subject if any one of us thought that a dangerous situation was arising, or that united action by us might have a salutary effect? Perhaps some day the time would come when the Balkan Powers themselves might imitate our example and make a pact of mutual guarantee, but that time was not yet, and I thought it was wise to take precautions.

M. Mussolini gave me a rather non-committal answer. He expressed himself as not averse from the idea, but he reviewed the situation in the different countries and the causes of tension between them. On some of these he dwelt in detail. Albania was only mentioned at the end of the list, and without comment, but this silence was more eloquent than words. He

of October 17, not printed, received October 19.

² See No. 539.

³ No. 137.

⁴ Mr. Chamberlain sent a copy of the telegram in a letter of August 12 to Marquis Torretta which he acknowledged on August 13, stating that he had that day transmitted the communication personally to Signor Mussolini.

then observed that it would first be necessary to consider the general situation and to make up our minds whether we ought to tell anyone who tried to disturb it that he would not be permitted to do so, or whether the situation might be in some cases so unfair or intolerable for one or other of the parties that some change ought to be introduced. In developing this theme he was led to speak of the friction between Hungarians and Roumanians, upon which I remarked that it seemed to me more within the realm of possibility, or at any rate more possible at a not very distant date, to contemplate a pact of mutual security embracing Roumania and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria.

M. Mussolini was sympathetic, but we had obviously entered on a realm of conjecture in which we must for the present await the development of events. It will be seen that nothing of great consequence passed between us, but I regard the interview as valuable for the opportunity which it gave me of confirming the cordial personal relations between M. Mussolini and myself, which have certainly been a factor in settling some of the difficulties that have arisen between our two countries since I met him for the first time in Rome.⁵

A. C.

⁵ In December, 1924, when Mr. Chamberlain attended a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (see No. 28, n. 4).

A translation of Signor Mussolini's reply of October 7 to the Briand-Chamberlain telegram of June 10 was communicated in Marquis Torretta's letter of October 24 to Mr. Lampson, and ran as follows: '... In thanking Your Excellency for the communication made to me, I have much pleasure in assuring you that I shall welcome with a lively interest the proposals to be made to me with the object of meeting the events which might disturb the peace in the Balkans.

'I am replying in a similar sense to M. Briand.'

No. 546

*Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 16, 12 noon)*

No. 43 Telegraphic [C 13082/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 16, 1925, 11.50 a.m.

Your telegram No. 17.¹

Following for Prime Minister.

I am profoundly grateful to you and all my colleagues for your most generous message. I thank you all and yourself in particular for confidence which you have placed in me, without which I could never have contributed my share to the great work of appeasement and reconciliation accomplished at Locarno. May I add that I have been

¹ No. 544.

equally touched by kindness of all my colleagues in this conference? It has been a pleasure to work with such large minded men.

I thank you for well deserved tribute you pay to other members of the British delegation. One and all have worked with ungrudging devotion to secure this happy result.

At such a moment I cannot forget Sir William Tyrrell and the band of fellow workers in the Foreign Office, and the debt I owe to their experience, ability and zeal.

No. 547

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 16, 4.40 p.m.)

No. 41¹ *Telegraphic* [C 13091/459/18]

Confidential

LOCARNO, October 16, 1925, 2.25 p.m.

In my despatch No. 31² I sent you rough record of a conversation with M. Briand and myself when German delegates raised all manner of questions such as Cologne etc. on which they wanted pledges before they could guarantee ratification of Pact.

Since then Germans have put in two written memoranda³ in which they further elaborate their designs. Copies of them went to you in my despatch No. 39.⁴

Last night German Chancellor and Dr. Stresemann made an elaborate attempt to extort eleventh hour concession from us. Record of talk between them M. Briand, M. Vandervelde and myself which lasted almost an hour goes to you by bag tonight.⁵

After M. Briand had met them most generously as regards general assurance regarding our intentions in Cologne (? and) Rhineland, German delegation produced question of League scheme of military investigation under article 213 of treaty claiming that it was quite impossible of acceptance as it stood that (? owing to) terms of article 1 of covenant Germany could not join the League without by inference admitting that she accepted League scheme already drafted and that unless something could be done at Locarno to meet (consequent) difficulty Germany would be unable to join League.

You may readily imagine complete bewilderment I might say indignation which this pistol at our heads produced. M. Briand, who was admirably restrained, M. Vandervelde and I all pointed out enormity of this presentation of an entirely fresh and hitherto unsuspected condition of entry into the League and at one moment I had to use very direct

¹ This telegram was despatched after Locarno telegram No. 43 (No. 546).

² Not printed. See Appendix, No. 11.

³ See No. 542.

⁴ See *ibid.*, n. 1.

⁵ See Appendix, No. 14. See also *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 123.

language at apparent lack of good faith in these tactics. Finally by reading aloud chapter 1 of Council resolution of September 27th 1924⁶ I convinced the Chancellor that he was really battling with an imaginary difficulty seeing that by it it was united Council who orders an investigation. I hope therefore that we have turned what threatened to be a very dangerous corner. This attempt at blackmail by German delegation introduced a discordant note into our discussions here which have hitherto proceeded on a high level of good faith with noteworthy absence of any spirit of bargaining.

I think that the Chancellor who is by training a (? Civil Servant) over-rates parliamentary ?influence and is frightened by his two colleagues. They and especially Herr Stresemann were play-acting and Herr Stresemann in particular overdid his part.

This is only really unpleasant incident that has occurred since I have been here. I do not however wish you to attach too much importance to it. It shows once again how difficult it is to help a German or to make him understand any argument but a bludgeon but I believe incident is closed and that we (? shall have) no more follies of the same kind (? for the present).

Repeated to Berlin, Brussels, Rome and Paris.

⁶ See *L./N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 1592-5. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 230.

No. 548

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 17, 9 a.m.)

No. 45 Telegraphic [C 13118/459/18]

Private

LOCARNO, October 16, 1925

Date for signature of all Treaties has been fixed for December 1st in London.

Please make my humble submission to The King that delegates visiting London for the purpose might be the objects of His Majesty's hospitality and I would suggest for His Majesty's pleasure that he might feel disposed to invite them to lunch on December 1st. I would propose that His Majesty's Government should entertain them to dinner the preceding night under presidency of Prime Minister. I feel sure that if the King would agree to this suggestion it would be an act of high state policy which all signatory governments would highly appreciate.

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 17, 4.30 p.m.)

No. 47 Telegraphic [C 13119/459/18]

Urgent

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925, 3 p.m.

My telegram No. 44.¹

Documents concluded by conference yesterday are to be published in the press simultaneously in all countries concerned on morning of Tuesday next.² They are as follows:—

1. Final protocol to which are annexed,

A. Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy (Rhineland pact).

B. Arbitration treaty between Belgium and Germany.

C. Arbitration treaty between France and Germany.

D. Arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland.

E. Arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

F. Draft collective note to Germany regarding Article 16 of covenant of League of Nations.

2. Separate treaty (mentioned in final protocol) between France and Poland.

3. Similar treaty between France and Czechoslovakia.³

Copies of all these documents together with English translations (which should be regarded as unofficial) of 1, 1 A, and 1 F go to you by bag tonight⁴ reaching London on Monday morning. It is unfortunately not possible to Roneo them here. Please take necessary steps for their distribution to the Press.

A commentary which can be given to the Press at the same time as documents also goes to you by bag tonight.⁵

¹ Of October 16. This stated: 'All texts were initialled tonight.'

² October 20.

³ For the texts of these treaties, see Cmd. 2525, *Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, 1925 (and Annexes) together with Treaties between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia: Locarno, October 16, 1925* (H.M.S.O., 1925).

⁴ Locarno despatch No. 45 of October 17 (C 13125/459/18), not printed.

⁵ No. 550, below.

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 19)

No. 46: LOC/211 CON. [C 13126/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 47 of October 17th,¹ I transmit to you herewith a commentary on the treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy initialled yesterday at Locarno.

2. This commentary has been prepared for issue to the press simultaneously with the text of the treaty.

I am, etc.,

(for the Secretary of State)

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 550

*Commentary on the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee**

October 17, 1925

The central feature of the work of the Locarno Conference is the new Security Pact guaranteeing the inviolability of the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France.

Though this new Treaty of Locarno has not yet been actually signed, its terms are definitely fixed. They cannot now be altered, and when the members of the conference reunite in London on the 1st December to proceed to the formality of signature² they will come with all the force of the considered opinion of their respective countries behind them.

From the moment when the British Government indicated their unwillingness to accept the Geneva Protocol of 1924,³ Mr. Chamberlain has made no secret of the fact that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the most helpful method of solving the security problem was by an arrangement limited in scope but dealing effectively with the area from which trouble was most likely to spring. Establish a better state of affairs on the western frontiers of Germany, and the good result would radiate until general peace was assured. That is the policy enshrined in the Treaty of Locarno.

The scope of the treaty has been foreshadowed in the diplomatic correspondence between the British, French and German Governments since the publication of the German note of the 9th February, 1925,⁴ which initiated the negotiations.

¹ No. 549.

³ See No. 240, n. 13.

² See No. 534.

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

Article 1 embodies the guarantee by all the contracting parties of the inviolability of the frontiers between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium and the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* which these frontiers establish. It is this provision for the stabilisation of the situation created by the Treaty of Versailles which is the cardinal point of the treaty. The remainder provides the machinery by which the operation of the guarantee is ensured.

From the British point of view the most important of these provisions is article 4.

If the frontiers between Germany on one side and Belgium or France on the other are violated, it will be because one of the two parties makes an attack on the other.

Article 2 therefore contains an express undertaking by Germany that she will not make war on either France or Belgium and by France and Belgium that they will not make war on Germany.

The language of this article is carefully chosen. There are circumstances in which war is legitimate. These are provided for in the latter part of the clause.

First of all, there is the case of self-defence. If Germany attacks France, France is of course entitled to defend herself and to make war upon Germany for the purpose. There is also another case falling under this same heading. By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany agreed that a specified area in the Rhineland should be demilitarised and that she would abstain in it from military works and preparations for war. She also agreed that a breach of this undertaking should be regarded as a hostile act. Consequently, if Germany violates these undertakings with the clear intention of making war, France is entitled by the Treaty of Versailles (article 44) to resort to military action at once in order to defend herself.

Secondly, there is the case where, by the terms of the Covenant of the League (article 16) a member of the League is called upon to take action against a disturber of the peace—what is called the application of sanctions. The central idea of the Covenant of the League was the maintenance of peace by common action against a State which went to war in violation of its undertakings in the Covenant.

Thirdly, there is the case where, by the terms of the Covenant itself, a resort to war is legitimate, or where the Council or the Assembly decide that force must be applied.

The first case arises where a dispute comes before the Council and the Council cannot agree. In that case the Covenant provides that the members of the League may take such action as they think necessary for the maintenance of right and justice, *i.e.*, they may go to war. The text of the new treaty, however, restricts that right. It contains an engagement by France and Belgium, and by Germany respectively, that they will only resort to action under this paragraph against a State which has already made an attack.

As an example of the second may be taken the right which is given to

the Council under article 13 of the Covenant or under article 5 of the Treaty of Locarno, to propose measures for securing compliance with an arbitration award. A decision by the Council in such a case as this must be unanimous.

The general effect of the whole article is that both Germany on one side and France and Belgium on the other come under a definite pledge not to begin a war against the other. Only where a unanimous decision of the Council or the Assembly of the League calls for such action can either party initiate measures amounting to war against the other.

Article 3. If war is eliminated as the ultimate method of settling disputes, some other method must be found of achieving a settlement. For this purpose, by article 3, both France and Germany, and Belgium and Germany enter into comprehensive engagements providing, so far as is possible, for settling any cause of difference between them by peaceful methods. What are known as justiciable questions—questions which can be settled by the application of a rule of law, questions involving rights in the strict sense of the term—are to go before tribunals entitled to give a decision, and the decision will be binding on the parties. Disputes arising out of the clash of political interests, or cases where the action of one State, though strictly within its rights, is prejudicial to the interests of the other, are to go before conciliation commissions. No state can safely pledge itself for all time and for all cases to accept the recommendation of a conciliation commission. Where either party finds the recommendations of the commission unacceptable, the matter must come before the Council of the League as a dispute likely to lead to a rupture (article 15 of the Covenant), and the Council will deal with the situation accordingly. This is as near as it is possible to get towards a watertight system for the peaceful settlement of disputes arising out of the clash of political interests or domestic policies.

The technical conventions for carrying into effect the provisions of article 3 have also been drawn up at Locarno, and are to be signed the same day as the treaty.

Article 4 is the article which particularly affects Great Britain. It contains the guarantee that she, as one of the contracting parties, will come to the support of Germany if she is attacked by France or by Belgium, or of France or of Belgium if either of them is attacked by Germany.

An allegation that such an attack has been made is to be reported at once to the Council of the League, and if the Council holds that such an attack has been made, the guarantee is to come into immediate operation. Germany, Belgium and France also join in the guarantee. Hence it follows that were France to attack Germany in violation of her undertakings in the treaty, she would find herself opposed immediately by a combination of Great Britain, Belgium and Italy as well as Germany; were Germany to attack France, she would find herself immediately opposed by a combination of Great Britain, Italy and Belgium as well as France.

Article 4 also provides for a case where immediate action is called for.

The Council of the League is a body which must have time to arrive at a decision, and a sudden attack may call for instant measures of defence and of support. In such a case the guarantee is to operate at once if the guaranteeing Power is satisfied that an attack in breach of the Treaty of Locarno has been made. Nevertheless the case is not taken out of the hands of the Council of the League. The Council will proceed with its task and issue its findings in due course, and the States which have already taken action in pursuance of the guarantee will be bound to comply with the Council's findings.

Article 5 contains the guarantee of the arbitration conventions between Germany and Belgium and France respectively (see article 3). A distinction must be drawn between cases in which a failure to observe the terms of the arbitration convention is accompanied by resort to war and those in which it is not. In the first case all the other parties to the Treaty of Locarno, excluding the one making war, will come to the help of the Power attacked. In the second case the Council of the League will consider the situation and will decide what action ought to be taken to secure compliance with the arbitration convention, and the parties to the treaty undertake to carry out the measures proposed by the Council.

Article 6 is a saving clause intended to make it quite plain that the Treaty of Locarno does not invalidate any special rights enjoyed by any party under the Treaty of Versailles or under the agreements which have arisen out of the Treaty of Versailles. There are certain provisions in that treaty which confer special rights on the Allied Powers individually or as a group. These rights are safeguarded by article 6.

Article 7 is an important provision. It is intended to make it clear that the Treaty of Locarno does not undermine in the slightest degree the power, the authority or the position of the League of Nations. The treaty is intended to strengthen the League, not to weaken it. As the preamble says, it is to provide 'supplementary guarantees within the framework of the League' and constitutes one of that class of international engagements 'for securing the maintenance of peace' which enjoy the benefit of article 21 of the Covenant.

Article 8 deals with the duration of the new treaty. It is a case where a time limit would be inappropriate. It is a treaty which originates in circumstances which in time may pass away, but in any case if the League of Nations grows in strength it will itself provide that guarantee of security which the treaty is intended to ensure. As soon as the representatives of the Powers meeting in the Council of the League are satisfied that the League is strong enough to ensure the protection of the parties to the treaty, the Treaty of Locarno will have served its purpose and its existence can be terminated.

Article 10 contains the important provision that the treaty will not come into force unless and until Germany enters the League. It has been an essential part of the policy pursued by the British and French Governments since the initiation of the diplomatic discussions by the German

note of the 9th February, that no arrangement for ensuring peace by a guarantee of the western frontiers could be concluded except on the basis that Germany should enter the League.

Germany has always felt anxious as to how her position, if she joined the League, would be affected by article 16 of the Covenant. It is to calm these apprehensions that at the final meeting at Locarno the representatives of the other Powers agreed to send to the German Government a letter, of which the text was annexed to the Final Protocol, giving the interpretation which, for their part, they place on this article in the Covenant.

The guarantee treaties by which France guarantees the arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia are not mentioned in the Treaty of Locarno, but these two guarantee treaties were drawn up at Locarno and will come into force simultaneously with the arbitration conventions. In form they are reciprocal. Each of them provides that if Germany fails to observe the provisions of the arbitration treaty *and couples such failure with a resort to war*, the parties will reciprocally come to each other's help when attacked. As against Germany such action by France would fall either under article 16 or under article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant and would therefore be in strict conformity with article 2 of the Treaty of Locarno.

It is these two new treaties between France and Poland and Czechoslovakia to which M. Briand referred in the final meeting of the Locarno Conference⁵ and offered to communicate copies to any other members of the conference who desired them.⁶

⁵ For the minutes of the meeting of October 16, see Appendix, No. 15.

⁶ The conclusions of a Cabinet Meeting held on October 21 (Cab. 49 (25)) ran as follows: '1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs . . . gave his colleagues an appreciation of the Locarno Conference. He pointed out that the resulting Treaties, which had already been circulated by the Foreign Office, were absolutely within the limits of policy laid down by the Cabinet. Among the points emphasized in the course of a very full statement, Mr. Austen Chamberlain mentioned that France had taken the opportunity to revise her alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to reduce the obligations on both sides, so that the right to go to war under Article 15, para[graph] 7 of the Covenant was limited to the case where there was not only a breach of obligation but an actual attack by Germany: that the Germans had tried hard up to the last moment of the Conference to obtain pledges in regard to the evacuation of Cologne and a relaxation in the conditions of occupation in the Rhineland; and, although no such pledge could be given, it had been made clear that great efforts would be made both by France and Great Britain to meet German desires in this matter, on the understanding that the Germans played their part and did what was necessary to make this possible: that on this subject he hoped to have conversations with the Secretary of State for War [Sir L. Worthington-Evans] and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff [Lord Cavan] at an early date [see Series IA, Vol. I, No. 3, n. 7]: that, in order to avoid the necessity of a Treaty in four languages, with a risk of misunderstanding arising owing to the difficulties of translation, he had agreed to accept the French language as the official text. Mr. Chamberlain laid stress on the admirable atmosphere throughout the Conference, which, in combination with the general desire to reach agreement, had led to such satisfactory results. He also alluded to the tributes which other nations had paid to the British share in these proceedings, and to the high position which this country occupies in

Europe at the present time. He expressed especial satisfaction with the Eastern settlement.

'The Cabinet agreed:

'(a) To place on record their high appreciation of the patience and skill which the Foreign Secretary had displayed in the negotiations culminating in the Treaty of Locarno:

'(b) That a Resolution should be submitted to both Houses of Parliament as an authority for the signature of the Treaty of Locarno (which up to the present had only been initialled) with a view to its adoption in time for the signature of the Treaty in London on December 1, 1925.'

No. 551

Mr. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 19)

No. 49 [C 13131/13131/62]

LOCARNO, *October 17, 1925*

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 551

Memorandum

LOCARNO, *October 17, 1925*

At the close of the Conference yesterday, Monsieur Benes came to me to renew the expression of his thanks for my contribution to the work which we had just accomplished.

I told him that I had intended to seek him out, for I wanted to make a suggestion to him. I had foreshadowed in the House of Commons¹ my hope that, if the Great Powers successfully concluded such a Pact as we had just initialled, perhaps other nations might follow our example. I could not leave Locarno without begging Monsieur Benes, who had himself contributed so heartily and so effectively to our success, to reflect upon this suggestion. Was it not possible that Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia should come into some similar arrangement with Austria and Hungary? It would be a great thing if it could be accomplished, but if it was to be done Monsieur Benes was the man who must do it.

Monsieur Benes said that he was delighted that I had spoken to him on this subject. The idea had been already working in his mind, and he had gone so far as to have some conversation with his Jurist about it. There would be difficulties, but he thought that they might and ought to be overcome. He would work to that end. He was just now going to Italy, and he had invited Monsieur Nintchitch to meet him in Italy for the very

¹ In his speech of June 24 (see No. 388, n. 4).

purpose of sounding him upon the subject.² He could assure me that he would do his best to realise my hope, but he would need my help and the joint advice of the Great Powers.

I replied that if I could be of any assistance, my services were at his disposal, that I should myself take any opportunity that offered of suggesting the idea to the representatives in London of the states in question. I would only beg him before leaving Locarno to mention the matter to Monsieur Mussolini, who I felt sure would appreciate his confidence.

Monsieur Benes was quick to reply that he would certainly speak to Monsieur Mussolini. They must avoid any appearance of acting against Italy, or even without the goodwill of Italy.³

² Dr. Beneš met M. Ninčić at Bled (Serb–Croat–Slovenia) on October 21. For M. Ninčić's report of the meeting, see *D.D.I.*, vol. IV, No. 164.

³ On October 30, Mr. Chamberlain instructed his representatives in Prague, Vienna, Belgrade, Budapest and Bucharest in His Majesty's Government's policy in this matter, and instructed Sir R. Graham to broach the subject with Signor Mussolini (see Series IA, Vol. I, Nos. 39 and 40).

CHAPTER III

Military Control of Germany and the Evacuation of Cologne January–October 1925

No. 552

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 2 Telegraphic [C 19483/4736/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 1, 1925, 7 p.m.*

I gather from the press that German government are encouraging the idea that an unfavourable decision regarding Cologne¹ may have a disastrous effect on the working of the Dawes scheme.² I beg you to take the first opportunity to warn the German government against such folly. It is I think necessary that you should speak plainly to them. The allied decision to delay evacuation is based solely upon defaults in regard to disarmament and is wholly unconnected with Germany's reparation obligations which will be fully discharged for the purpose of article 429 by the loyal fulfilment of the Dawes scheme. It would be the height of unwisdom for the German government to wreck that scheme for reasons which have no connection with it.

German Ambassador called upon me on December 20th³ to protest against supposed intention of allies to delay evacuation without specifying defaults. French and Belgians take exactly the same line which shows the folly of the Germans. I was anxious not to make specific declarations of defaults till I knew all the facts and then to concentrate on important points, but I cannot resist combined demand of allies and Germans.

His Majesty's Government welcomed the improved prospects opened

¹ i.e. as to its evacuation by the Allies. See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 690, 712, 713, 717, 721, 722, 724–7, and 729.

² See Nos. 27, n. 8 and 343, n. 9.

³ See Vol. XXVI, No. 713.

by Dawes settlement which brought large alleviation of German burdens (though German government now foolishly talk as if it only imposed new obligations). We were glad to carry this improvement a step further by signature of commercial treaty,⁴ but the only possible basis for good relations is faithful fulfilment by Germany of her treaty obligations. Threat to default on Dawes scheme because Cologne area is not evacuated owing to Germany's failure to carry out military clauses of treaty creates worst possible impression here and if this spirit prevails in Germany they should be under no misapprehension as to the inevitable consequences of their bad faith. His Majesty's Government wish to advance steadily to better relations but the keynote of their policy as stated by Prime Minister in his first speech at the Guildhall⁵ is *strict fulfilment* of treaty obligations.

⁴ See No. 250, n. 2.

⁵ On November 10. For a report, see *The Times*, November 11, 1924, p. 9.

No. 553

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 3 Telegraphic [C 8/2/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 2, 1925, 4.25 p.m.*

My telegram No. 248 (of the 31st December: evacuation of Cologne).¹

Note on the lines foreshadowed in my telegram under reference has been approved by the allied governments and text will go to you by today's bag (Friday).² It has been agreed that it should be presented to the

¹ See Vol. XXVI, No. 728.

² Foreign Office despatch No. 11 to Berlin of January 2. The draft note of December 27 had been transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2864 of December 31, 1924, and ran as follows: 'L'article 428 du Traité de Versailles, du 28 juin 1919, stipule que, à titre de garantie d'exécution par l'Allemagne dudit traité, les territoires allemands situés à l'ouest du Rhin, ensemble des têtes de pont, seront occupés par les troupes des Puissances alliées et associées pendant un période de quinze années à compter de la mise en vigueur du traité.

'Aux termes de l'article 429, si les conditions dudit Traité de Paix sont fidèlement observées par l'Allemagne, l'occupation prévue à l'article 428 sera successivement réduite à l'expiration des 5, puis des 10 premières années.

'Dès à présent, les Gouvernements alliés se trouvent en mesure de faire connaître au Gouvernement allemand, sans attendre le 10 janvier 1925, qu'ils ont acquis la preuve que l'Allemagne n'a pas encore rempli et sera dans l'impossibilité d'avoir rempli à cette date les conditions posées par l'article 429 pour qu'elle puisse bénéficier de la clause d'évacuation partielle anticipée.

'C'est ainsi que, si l'on ne se réfère qu'à la Partie V du traité, les renseignements relatifs au degré d'exécution des clauses militaires, recueillis par la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle malgré certaines obstructions auxquelles elle s'est heurtée, suffisent à motiver cette décision des Gouvernements alliés.

'Par exemple, pour s'en tenir à quelques points essentiels parmi les faits déjà connus, les constatations suivantes ont été faites:

German Chancellor in the form of a collective note by Your Excellency and the other ambassadors of the principal allied governments and of Belgium in Berlin. The French government have suggested January 5th as the date for presentation,³ and I agree provided that the other ambassadors receive their instructions in time.

I am proposing subject to the concurrence of the allies to authorise publication on the day after presentation, viz., January 6th. Unless I hear from you to the contrary I shall assume that note has in fact been presented on the 5th.⁴

Repeated to Paris No. 1 (by bag), Rome No. 3, Brussels No. 1, Coblenz No. 1 and Washington No. 4.

'En violation de l'article 160, le Grand État-Major de l'Armée a été reconstitué sous une autre forme.

'En violation de l'article 174, des engagés volontaires à court terme ont été recrutés et instruits.

'Contrairement à l'article 168, la transformation des usines de matériel de guerre est loin d'être réalisée.

'Contrairement aux articles 164 à 169, il existe des excédents de toute sorte constatés dans les dotations de matériel militaire, et il a été découvert des stocks importants de matériel de guerre illicites.

'Contrairement à l'article 162 et à la décision de la Conférence de Boulogne du 19 [sic] juin 1920 [see No. 558, n. 7, below], la réorganisation de la police d'État n'a pas commencé.

'Contrairement à l'article 211, le Gouvernement allemand est loin d'avoir pris toutes les mesures législatives et administratives réclamées par les Gouvernements alliés dans leur note du 29 septembre 1922 [see No. 558, n. 8].

'Les Gouvernements alliés comptent recevoir, d'ailleurs, à bref délai le rapport de la Commission interalliée de Contrôle donnant les résultats d'ensemble de l'inspection générale en cours. Ce rapport leur permettra de déterminer ce qu'il restera à attendre de l'Allemagne pour que ses obligations en matière militaire puissent, aux termes de l'article 429, être considérées comme fidèlement observées; une communication sera adressée ultérieurement au Gouvernement à ce sujet.'

³ See Vol. XXVI, No. 729.

⁴ In Berlin telegram No. 8 of January 5, Lord D'Abernon reported: 'Representatives of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan called on German Chancellor this morning by appointment. Acting as senior Ambassador, I presented collective note on behalf of allied governments. I drew Chancellor's attention to special importance of this communication which proceeded direct from allied governments. I added that a further communication would be addressed to German government when military commission presented its final report [see No. 559, n. 4, below]. . . .'

No. 554

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 2 Telegraphic: by bag [C 8/2/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 2, 1925*

My telegram No. 3 to Berlin¹ (repetition of telegram to Berlin regarding evacuation of Cologne).

¹ No. 553.

Please inform your colleagues of the instructions I have addressed to Lord D'Abernon and request them if they see no objection to urge their governments to authorise publication of the note on January 6th, provided it is presented on the 5th.

I beg you at the same time to impress upon them once more the strong objection felt by His Majesty's Government to any information being given to the press regarding the details of Germany's infractions of the treaty which have not been officially communicated to the German government. If M. Laroche's statement² means that whilst the note to the German government only specifies summarily where Germany has defaulted, the French press is to publish particulars of such defaults, I hold strongly that such procedure is wrong in principle and tactically, as towards the German government, a mistake which may have unfortunate consequences. You should point out that the essential outstanding particulars will naturally be included in the later note to be addressed to the German government on receipt of final report from the commission, which note will doubtless be published in due course. If each of us independently supplies material for comment to our press in the meantime, is it not certain that the Germans will make capital out of the inevitable discrepancies arising from this form of propaganda? Apart from this our several governments may easily become committed to divergent views. Impress upon Monsieur Herriot great danger of new divergence between our governments unless every step is carefully concerted in advance and agreement reached before official or inspired statements are made public. I am most anxious to co-operate closely but there are many difficulties only to be solved by patience and frank exchange of views.

² To the Conference of Ambassadors on December 31, 1924. See Vol. XXVI, No. 729.

No. 555

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 5, 9 a.m.)*

No. 5 Telegraphic [C 134/2/18]

BERLIN, January 4, 1925, 8.25 p.m.

In execution of instructions in your telegram No. 2¹ I have had a long interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have impressed him with deplorable impression which would be made if it was even hinted that Germany's obligations under Dawes plan² were called in question on account of controversy regarding evacuation of Cologne area. I also urged upon His Excellency the other considerations contained in your telegram.

To make bearing of my representations quite plain I left with Ministry

¹ No. 552.

² See No. 27, n. 8.

of Foreign Affairs aide-memoire³ summarising principal points.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was absolutely categorical as to German government having no intention of throwing doubt upon Germany's obligations under London Agreement⁴ on account of Cologne evacuation difficulty. No member of the German government had said anything of the kind and no responsible Minister had any idea of such a policy.

In his own speech to the press⁵ His Excellency had specifically said that Dawes Report was not affected. Summaries of his speech in the press had not made this point sufficiently clear but a perusal of full text of his remarks left no room for doubt or ambiguity.

A memorandum⁶ which Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me today repeats these arguments and adds that German government had interpreted London agreements as opening responsible era in which the policy of unilateral dictation was to be replaced by one of negotiation. Failure to evacuate Cologne zone implies, to mind of German government, deviation from that policy and it is only in this sense that they have connected the two questions.

³ Copies of this *aide-mémoire* of January 2 and of the German reply of January 3 were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 12 of January 6, not printed.

⁴ See No. 343, n. 9.

⁵ On December 30. A translation of an account of the press interview was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 1 of January 1, not printed.

⁶ See n. 3.

No. 556

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 12 Telegraphic [C 338/2/18]

BERLIN, January 7, 1925, 12.38 a.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated following reply to joint note¹ regarding evacuation of northern Rhenish zone.

'Note confirms apprehensions which German government were bound to entertain in view of reports which had reached them of late. Despite urgent representations made by German government allied governments have decided not to evacuate northern zone on January 10th. Consequently German government are face to face with fact that allies do not intend to recognise date which according to system of Treaty of Versailles is to conclude first epoch of its fulfilment and bring Germany alleviations of different kinds, above all liberation of a large portion of occupied German territory.

Occupation of German territory by foreign troops for a series of years is

¹ See No. 553.

one of the most onerous provisions of the Treaty. Recent centuries scarcely contain a parallel for a military occupation of similar extent and duration. Measures of the kind have never proved helpful to peaceful co-operation of nations. If the allies are now desirous of prolonging that occupation in excess of treaty period they can scarcely be in doubt as to importance of that step and gravity of the situation arising therefrom. They have inflicted a heavy blow on feelings of German people as well as on their hopes of stabilising their position and co-operating peacefully with other countries.

Allied governments base their action on German defaults in disarmament question. They confine themselves for the moment to a general indication of these defaults. In the opinion of German government it would have been more in accordance with gravity of the matter were communication of facts on which allies base their decision not to have been postponed to a subsequent date.

An early communication of facts is all the more to be expected as conclusion to be drawn from them is clearly not dependent on one-sided and arbitrary view of allied governments. By their action allied governments have deprived German government of possibility of taking up an attitude in detail to charges made, so that German government must request that further communication notified be made with all possible haste. They will lose no time in furnishing an explanation of points to which allies have taken exception. German government are likewise ready in regard to those questions regarding which fundamental differences of opinion subsist between German authorities and allied control commission to do their share in order to attain necessary practical result as soon as possible. Even at this juncture German government must point out that attempt to base postponement of evacuation on German disarmament position is to be regarded as frustrated from the outset. Article 429 of treaty does it is true make evacuation of occupied area at date contemplated therein depend on faithful fulfilment of Germany's obligations. An impartial interpretation of this article could only justify claim of allies to postpone evacuation provided there were defaults on German side gravity of which corresponded with extraordinary severity involved in a prolongation of occupation. To deal loyally with international treaties it is an elementary axiom that no glaring disproportion should exist between non-fulfilment of points of detail and consequences to be drawn therefrom. It cannot be suggested that this pre-condition has been fulfilled in the case in point. Germany has been disarmed to such an extent that she no longer constitutes a military factor in any sense in European politics. In view of this indubitable fact it is impossible to extort from subsidiary details of disarmament question any justification for measures of reprisal such as allied governments have announced.

Accordingly German government enter a decided protest against the action of allied governments.

To appreciate justly present situation to its full extent one thing must be

borne in mind. In the case of a treaty such as that of Versailles which has not been the outcome of negotiation and which imposes immense burdens on all domains of one of the parties it is scarcely conceivable that disputes should not arise during its fulfilment. But that does not mean that reproach of partial disloyalty to the treaty can be construed straight away. A concrete settlement of points at variance is only feasible on basis of reciprocal understanding. The immense efforts which Germany has made under the Treaty of Versailles and more especially disarmament provisions of the treaty have furnished as far as she is concerned the precondition for a policy of peaceful understanding. The evolution during the year which has elapsed and especially proceedings at and result of London Conference² have shown that such a policy is well within realms of reality. It is only possible to achieve a rapid settlement of the conflict brought about by procedure of allied governments if said governments in further treatment both of evacuation question as well as disarmament question are guided by common interest of European countries in prosecution of policy alluded to above.'

² See No. 225, n. 17.

No. 557

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 8, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 10 Telegraphic: by bag [C 347/2/18]

PARIS, January 7, 1925

My telegram No. 4 (of January 4th¹—Evacuation of Cologne).

French government have replied to the representations I made² regarding the inadvisability of communicating supplementary information to the press. While appreciating the force of the objections raised by His Majesty's Government, they consider that it is none the less unsatisfactory to allow public opinion in the various interested countries—and German public opinion more particularly—to remain in ignorance of the precise reasons which justify the allied governments in deciding not to evacuate the Cologne zone.³ The French government however are anxious in this matter to proceed in closest agreement with His Majesty's Government. They do not therefore intend to press their point of view, and they agree that each of the interested governments should confine itself to publishing the note addressed to the German government³ without commentary of any kind. I am given to understand unofficially that the French government in reality appreciate our arguments, but that they have to explain to their press that silence is enforced by the majority of the powers, so that they themselves have no alternative but to agree.

¹ Not printed.

² As instructed in No. 554.

³ See No. 553.

The Italian Ambassador informs me that he has communicated the views of His Majesty's Government to his government, and has urged strongly upon the latter the importance of not supplying supplementary information to the press.

The Belgian and Japanese⁴ Ambassadors have expressed no opinion in the matter.

⁴ Viscount Ishii.

No. 558

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 14)

No. 24 [C 623/2/18]

BERLIN, January 8, 1925

Sir,

As stated in my telegram No. 7 of January 5th¹ the Collective Note² was presented to the Chancellor of the German Reich on January 5th at 12.30 p.m.

2. Newspaper comment upon it has followed the lines anticipated. The papers of the Right have denounced the Note in unmeasured terms and declare that non-fulfilment of the military clauses is a mere pretext, the real reason for action by England having been a desire to support the Ruhr occupation³ without becoming involved in legal approval of that operation. The papers of the Centre and Left have been more moderate, but there is general scepticism as to the reality of the motives behind English action. It is stated that while non-fulfilment of the military clauses may be a justification of non-evacuation, it cannot have been the reason for it. With a Power so practical and so untheoretical as England some interest of a more concrete nature must have been the real motive.

3. It is somewhat notable that the real advantage to Germany of the line taken by His Majesty's Government has been unduly left out of account. Critics here have missed the point that, since the Allied Governments, having based the present postponement of evacuation exclusively on the non-execution by Germany of the military clauses, cannot be charged with the motives usually attributed to them by German opinion but are intelligently following the policy of conciliation inaugurated at the London Conference.⁴ The Allies have left aside many arguments which might have been used on this occasion—they have treated the acceptance by the German Government of the Dawes scheme⁵ as fulfilment of Germany's reparation obligations and have not pursued the contention,

¹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

² See No. 553.

³ For the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January, 1923, see Vol. XXI. Chap. I.

⁴ See No. 225, n. 17.

⁵ See No. 27, n. 8.

originated by M. Poincaré, that the periods for evacuation of the various zones have not yet begun to run. In adopting this line they have clearly facilitated action of a reasonable kind by the German Government, which has only to carry through military disarmament in accordance with the treaty in order to obtain the relief it desires.

4. Notwithstanding hostile comment of the German press, I am convinced that the collective note has done a great deal to clear the air and to facilitate a solution of the problem. It has limited and clarified the controversy. Were it not for the preconception of the German public regarding the motives underlying Allied action, to which I have referred above, a settlement ought to be reached in a short time. Boldly stated this pre-conception is that even if military disarmament were carried out fairly and fully, some other pretext would be discovered for postponing the evacuation of the Northern Area in order to facilitate the further occupation of the Ruhr. It appears to me essential, if a settlement is desired, to remove this erroneous idea. It is important not to lose time in doing this lest the elements against fulfilment profit by the position.

5. Turning now to the Six Points—their essential merit consists in this, that the vague accusations of propaganda are replaced by a clear statement of claim.

Taking the points one by one—

(i) *'En violation de l'Article 160, le Grand État-Major de l'Armée a été reconstitué sous une autre forme'*

This is difficult to prove but has been to some extent the case. The German Government should find no difficulty in so modifying the organisation as to conform to the Treaty of Versailles, and should so modify it. Whether the point has much lasting importance is a matter of doubt, and German opinion is particularly apprehensive of any modification in this direction which would weaken the personal position of General von Seeckt.

(ii) *'En violation de l'Article 174, des engagés volontaires à court terme ont été recrutés et instruits'*

This accusation is undoubtedly justified by what was done in Germany in the autumn of 1923 at a time when communist danger threatened in Saxony and Thuringia.⁶ The Germans alleged that their action was of a temporary nature to meet a grave crisis, but it is certain that, to a lesser degree, some volunteers have at other times received military training in certain units. It is stated—but I have no confirmation of the fact—that difficulty is experienced in getting enough recruits to sign on for twelve years.

The German Government can certainly be required to conform to the treaty stipulations.

With a vast number of men trained to arms who still survive in Germany

⁶ See Vol. XXI, No. 631, n. 8.

from the time of the Great War, the importance of this point in the near future should not be exaggerated.

(iii) *'Contrairement à l'Article 168, la transformation des usines de matériel de guerre est loin d'être réalisée'*

In my judgment this is the most important point of all. I am strongly in favour of strict fulfilment. With goodwill on the part of the German Government, the necessary transformations could be carried out in two or three months.

(iv) *'Contrairement aux Articles 164 à 169, il existe des excédents de toute sorte constatés dans les dotations de matériel militaire, et il a été découvert des stocks importants de matériel de guerre illicites'*

This is a point of minor importance scarcely affecting military danger, but it may be held to indicate a general disregard of military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. A compromise should be possible between the extreme German claim and the probably insufficient allowance originally laid down.

(v) *'Contrairement à l'Article 162 et à la décision de la Conférence de Boulogne du 19 juin 1920,⁷ la réorganisation de la police d'État n'a pas commencé'*

There is a great deal in the German contention that their police force, to meet communistic danger, must be quickly available and must be kept well in hand. I can conceive nothing more foolish than to insist that, in certain Red districts, the police should be scattered in billets or placed under the control of a possibly communistic Mayor. Without giving way to the full German claim, a compromise here is certainly desirable in the general interest of law and order.

(vi) *'Contrairement à l'Article 211, le Gouvernement allemand est loin d'avoir pris toutes les mesures législatives et administratives réclamées par les Gouvernements alliés dans leur note du 29 septembre 1922'⁸*

This is a difficult and complicated question, but adequate safeguards could be established by the passing of several short acts by the German Government. The complementary measures required should not meet with any serious resistance but will require careful drafting and careful superintendence during legislative stages in order to be effective.

6. Reduced to their real proportions, it will be seen from the above that the questions at issue do not present any very grave difficulty. On many points the German Government can fairly be expected to take action as desired. On others a sensible compromise would be justified, the details requiring careful negotiation. A broad distinction must be made between what is essential as constituting military danger, and what is not.

Lord Crewe's proposal of December 27 to the Allied Military Committee⁹ appears to me particularly wise and sound.

⁷ The First Conference of Boulogne met June 21–22, 1920 (see Vol. VIII, Chap. V). The reference is to the Allied Note of June 22 to the German Government on disarmament (see *ibid.*, Nos. 33, Appendix 2 and 36, minute 1).

⁸ See Vol. XX, Nos. 270, n. 5 and 277.

⁹ See Vol. XXVI, No. 723.

7. I may add, in conclusion, that I have discussed the above comments on the Six Points with General Wauchope who concurs.

I have, etc.
D'ABERNON

No. 559

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 18 Telegraphic [C 338/2/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 9, 1925, 9 p.m.*

Berlin telegram No. 12 (of the 6th [sic] January.¹ Evacuation of Cologne).

The German answer² to the allied note of January 5th³ is unfortunate in that it cannot fail to invite a further reply on the part of the allies and it is particularly desirable not to accentuate the differences with the German government by a series of acrimonious notes. I see no reason why the question should not, if discreetly handled by both sides, be settled without bad blood. For that reason I should have been inclined to suggest that no reply at all be sent until after the receipt of the Military Commission's final report,⁴ were it not that such a course would lead public opinion here and in Germany to imagine that the allies acquiesce in or are without answer to the German contentions. This of course is not the case and I feel that a short interim reply must be sent, though it is essential that this should be couched in as uncontentious terms as possible. Rather than be faced by a draft reply put forward by the French government—which might proceed on rather more severe lines than I should consider politic at this stage—I would prefer that we should take the initiative of suggesting to our allies the form of reply. I therefore request that you will without delay raise the matter at the Ambassadors' Conference and propose a reply to the effect that while the allies are unable to accept the contentions advanced in the German note, they do not propose to reply to them in detail until the results of the general inspection have been received when, as already indicated, the German government will be informed of the matters which remain to be carried out before they can be considered to have fulfilled

¹ No. 556.

² See No. 556.

³ See No. 553.

⁴ Control operations had been resumed in Germany on September 8, 1924 (see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 701 and 703), and the Inter-allied Military Commission of Control in Berlin submitted a preliminary report on December 20 to the Allied Military Committee of Versailles (copy in Paris despatch No. 2863 of December 31: see Vol. XXVI, No. 730) which was used as a basis for the report by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles of December 22 to the Conference of Ambassadors (copy in Paris despatch No. 2802 of December 23, not printed). On the strength of this report, the Ambassadors' Conference decided that Germany would not have fulfilled its treaty obligations with regard to disarmament by January 10, 1925 (see Vol. XXVI, No. 722). For previous documentation on this subject, see Vol. XXVI, Nos. 709–11, 714–16, 723, and 730.

the terms of the treaty. Such reply would naturally have to be presented to the German government by the Ambassadors in Berlin in the same way as the previous note.

Repeated to Brussels No. 3, Rome No. 9 and Berlin No. 7.

No. 560

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 10, 3.15 p.m.)

No. 22 Telegraphic [C 492/2/18]

BERLIN, January 10, 1925, 2.10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 7.¹

As far as I can judge public opinion here no one will interpret omission to answer to last German note² as an admission of contention contained in it. Note is regarded as purely provisional.

Main anxiety is to obtain without delay second note of allies³ based on final report of commission.⁴

Expectation of German government is that second note will be received in ten days. This is clearly impossible (see my telegram No. 21).⁵

I consider it advisable however—(a) to expedite note as much as possible, (b) to let German government know unofficially probable dates so that there should be no later charge of intentional delay.

A further point I consider of essential importance if question is to be settled without acrimony is to allow no doubt that satisfactory execution of disarmament will be followed without delay or discussion by evacuation of northern zone. Nothing in allied communication⁶ justifies scepticism on this point but scepticism here is profound and general.

¹ No. 559.

² See No. 556.

³ See No. 553, n. 4.

⁴ See No. 559, n. 4.

⁵ Of January 9. This ran: 'Agreement has been come to amongst members of Military Commission that inspection of armaments is practically concluded and that inspection of effectives should finish in a week or so.

'It is hoped, therefore, that final report will be ready by end of the month. General Wauchope is confident that Armaments Sub-Commission report will be ready before that date.'

⁶ See No. 553.

No. 561

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 12)

No. 78 [C 482/2/18]★

PARIS, *January 11, 1925*

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a British Embassy memorandum to the Ambassadors' Conference dated the 11th January, 1925, respecting the provisional maintenance of occupation of Cologne zone.¹

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 561

PARIS, *January 11, 1925*

The British Government have considered the German Government's answer² to the Allied note of the 5th January³ announcing the provisional maintenance of the occupation of the Cologne zone. His Majesty's Government would have preferred that no answer should be sent to this note until after receipt of the Commission of Control's final report,⁴ but they fear that such a course would lead public opinion in Great Britain, as well as in Germany, to imagine that the Allied Governments acquiesced in, or were unable to answer, the German Government's contentions. In their opinion, therefore, the German note will require a short interim reply. It is essential, however, that this reply should be couched in as uncontentious terms as possible, so as to avoid the danger of accentuating the existing differences by the exchange of acrimonious notes. The British Embassy has the honour to submit herewith for the consideration of the conference the draft of a note which might, in the circumstances, be addressed by the Allied Governments to the British Government.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 561

The Allied Governments have considered the note from the German Government of the 6th January² regarding the decision of the Allied Governments to maintain provisionally, in virtue of article 429 of the Treaty of Versailles, the occupation of the Cologne zone, on the ground that the German Government had not, on the 10th January, faithfully observed the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Allied Governments are unable to accept the contentions advanced by the German Government, but they do not think it necessary to reply to

¹ This was submitted in accordance with His Majesty's Government instructions (see No. 559).

² See No. 556.

³ See No. 553.

⁴ See No. 559, n. 4.

them in detail in the present note. When the results of the general inspection now in progress have been reported by the Military Commission of Control, the German Government, as already indicated in the Allied Government's note of the 5th January,³ will be informed of the matters which remain to be carried out before they can be considered, in accordance with article 429 of the Treaty of Versailles, to have faithfully observed the terms of that treaty. It is the intention of the Allied Governments to make this communication at the earliest date possible.

No. 562

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

[C 369/2/18]

Private [and] Personal

January 12, 1925

My dear D'Abernon,

I have been reading the Aide-Mémoire which you handed to the German Minister on January 2nd in connection with the postponement of the Cologne evacuation.¹ I am a little sorry that you put our views in writing exactly in this form. Had I foreseen that you were likely to give him an aide-mémoire, I would have worded my telegram² a little more carefully. It is not that I have altered my view or that I wish to retract anything that I said in it to you, but our Allies are very susceptible and, although Monsieur Herriot did not indicate any dissent from my view that fulfilment of the Dawes obligations³ should be regarded as a full discharge of the duties of the Germans under the reparation clauses,⁴ I had not got his formal or written assent to this proposal, which, as you will have seen, he has since proposed should be subject to the concurrence of the Reparation Commission.⁵ I cannot conceive that he will wish to jeopardise his own work at the London Conference,⁶ but I think he might be disquieted and even annoyed if he knew that I had said so much to Berlin of my own motion. Let us, therefore, in future be very careful not to anticipate French assent.

I have been a good deal disquieted by the action which we have had to take towards Germany in the matter of disarmament before we have got full information as to the character and extent of their defaults⁷ and before I have obtained any reasoned appreciation of their importance and of the practicability of remedying them from our military authorities. The character and importance of these defaults are not easy of appreciation by

¹ See No. 555, n. 3.

² No. 552.

³ See No. 27, n. 8.

⁴ Mr. Chamberlain had expressed this view in his meeting with M. Herriot in Paris on December 5 (see Vol. XXVI, No. 608).

⁵ In a note of December 24, 1924, to Lord Crewe (copy in Paris despatch No. 2817 of December 24, 1924 (C 19288/4736/18), not printed).

⁶ See No. 225, n. 17.

⁷ See No. 559, n. 4.

a layman and my intention is to ask for a discussion of them by the Committee of Imperial Defence whenever we have the necessary information. At present such indications as I have of the opinion of our General Staff⁸ show that they take a grave view of the situation and they repeat to me privately and officially the most serious warnings. I admit that the instances which they give do not appear to my lay mind to bear out their arguments and it is for this reason that I want the matter discussed in the Committee of Imperial Defence.

When we have thus cleared our own minds and know exactly what we think it important and possible to secure, the next step, as it seems to me, would be to invite a Conference with Herriot and, if possible, to arrive at some agreement with him as to the points on which we might concentrate. If we succeed so far, I should then try to persuade him to agree to invite the Germans to a meeting and to discuss the matter in dispute with them, whilst maintaining the right of the Allies to insist upon their own solution if no agreement is reached with the Germans. But all this as you will see requires very careful consideration and very delicate diplomacy. Above all it requires time and will be impossible if the Germans make a grievance of our taking time for its consideration, but it equally requires that I should have a free hand while negotiating with the French and [that] they should be convinced that I am honestly striving to meet their point of view and to secure their safety and that I have not come under any conflicting obligations to the Germans or given them any reason to think that they can separate us from the French.

We must, therefore, walk very warily. It is right and necessary that you should know what is in my mind, but I might defeat my own purpose if I spoke too freely to the German Ambassador.

Yours sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁸ See e.g. War Office letter of January 2 to the Foreign Office (C 112/30/18), not printed.

No. 563

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 24 Telegraphic [C 493/2/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 13, 1925, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 23 (of the 11th January: evacuation of the Cologne zone).¹

I observe that the French government do not express a desire for any reply to be sent to the German note² and I take their memorandum³ to be

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 556.

³ Of January 8, addressed to the Ambassadors' Conference, a copy of which was

rather in the nature of comments on that note than as the basis for a reply. In any case the arguments adduced by the French are to my mind a kind which should best be held in reserve and not used at this stage. I request therefore that when the matter is discussed by the Ambassadors' Conference you will take the line that in the interests of public opinion we thought it desirable to send an interim reply to the German note without delay.⁴

But we feel strongly that such interim reply should be as uncontentious as possible, such as that which we have already proposed.⁵ We deprecate entering at this stage into the details and specific arguments put forward in the memorandum of the French delegates to the Ambassadors' Conference. Rather than replying to Germany on those lines His Majesty's Government would prefer to send no interim reply at all, although they would regret this.

Lord d'Abernon has meanwhile suggested (see his telegram No. 22)⁶ that the German government should be left in no doubt that the satisfactory execution disarmament will be followed without delay or discussion by the evacuation of the northern zone. There seems to be some force in this.

If therefore any reply now goes to Germany, please endeavour to get some such paragraph inserted in it.

Repeated to Brussels No. 5, Rome No. 11 and Berlin No. 8.

transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 79 of January 11, not printed.

⁴ See No. 559.

⁵ See No. 561, Enclosure 2.

⁶ No. 560.

No. 564

*Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 16, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 27 Telegraphic: by bag [C 705/2/18]

PARIS, January 15, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following questions:—

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 18 of January 9th,¹ I submitted to the Conference a draft reply² to be addressed to the German government on the subject of the non-evacuation of the Cologne zone. This draft corresponded to that indicated in your telegram No. 18 except that in order to give effect to the last paragraph of your telegram No. 24,³ I added to the last sentence the

¹ No. 559.

³ No. 563.

² See No. 561, Enclosure 2.

following words:— 'they trust that they may in return count on the German government showing all diligence and goodwill in carrying out the requirements of the allied governments thus defined, since it is their intention to evacuate the Cologne zone without delay as soon as they have received satisfaction in these matters'.

The French government on the other hand, put in a counter-draft, copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 125.⁴ This draft reproduces more or less closely my draft, except that it omits the last sentence and adds a further paragraph of an argumentative and juridical character.

Monsieur Cambon opened the discussion by raising the question as to whether it is desirable that an interim reply should be sent at all. The general opinion of the Conference was in favour of such a course, but the Belgian Ambassador opposed it on the ground that it would only lead to further undesirable discussions and correspondence. Marshal Foch also pointed out that it was clear that a certain amount of time would be required for the allied governments to agree upon a joint text, and by the time the joint text had been settled the need for sending an interim reply at all would have considerably lessened. Also, the fact that the allied governments were discussing the text of a reply was bound to be known to the Germans, and any delay would be interpreted as a sign of disagreement. In these circumstances, it would in his opinion be better that the allied governments should show their agreement by keeping silence rather than give the impression of disagreement by sending a belated reply. Marshal Foch's arguments made a strong impression on the Conference, and Monsieur Cambon confessed that personally he was convinced by them. As it was clear that in any case no joint draft could be agreed upon at today's meeting, it was proposed that the Conference should report the situation to the various governments and ask whether in the circumstances they still desired an interim note to be sent to the German government. I was personally not a little impressed by the weight of the arguments against sending an interim reply, all the more as it appears that the final report may be presented somewhat sooner than we had anticipated.⁵

The Italian Ambassador suggested that in the event of it being decided not to send an interim reply, the object of His Majesty's Government might be obtained by the conference issuing a communiqué to the press to the effect that they had studied the German note,⁶ and that although the allied governments did not accept the contentions of the German government, they did not think it necessary to reply to them forthwith seeing that they would be shortly addressing their further note to the German government on receipt of the Commission of Control's final report.

In the meanwhile an attempt is to be made to combine the French and British drafts, so that in the event of the allied governments still deciding

⁴ Of January 15, not printed.

⁵ See No. 560, n. 5.

⁶ See No. 556.

to send an interim reply, no time shall be lost in agreeing upon a joint text.

I shall be grateful to have the views of His Majesty's Government as soon as possible: (1) as to whether they still desire in the circumstances that an interim reply should be sent, (2) as to whether in that case they would agree to the inclusion in the reply of the last paragraph of the French text, and (3) as to whether if no interim reply is sent, they would approve the Italian Ambassador's proposal regarding a communiqué to the press.

Lastly, at my suggestion, the Commission of Control is to be asked to hasten its report as much as possible.

2. In accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 28 of the 3rd instant,⁷ I proposed that the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, the naval advisers and the Air Clauses Committee should be instructed to draw up a list of the various categories of material which, as being war material, Germany is forbidden by the treaty to manufacture, import or export. This was agreed to. I would suggest that the Admiralty and the Air Ministry should be informed of this decision. . . .⁸

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ The sections omitted referred to other matters.

No. 565

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 17)

No. 132 [C 734/2/18]

PARIS, January 16, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 27, section 1, of the 15th instant,¹ regarding the interim reply to be addressed to the German Government on the subject of the non-evacuation of the Cologne zone, I have the honour to report that as a result of a meeting of Secretaries a single draft has now been prepared which as far as possible combines the British and French drafts which were before the Conference yesterday. Copy of this further draft is enclosed herein.

You will observe that the first two paragraphs correspond to the British draft,² whereas the third paragraph embodies the less objectionable portion of the final paragraph of the French draft.³

The last two sentences of this paragraph represent an attempt to give effect to my proposal that a sentence should be added so as to show that the Allied Governments intend to evacuate the Cologne zone without further delay once their demands with regard to the execution of the Treaty have been fulfilled. The last sentence, however, beginning with the

¹ No. 564.

² See No. 561, Enclosure 2.

³ See No. 564.

words 'D'autre part' has not yet been definitely accepted by the Quai d'Orsay or by the other Embassies.

The present draft, which commits no one, has been prepared merely in order to gain time should the Allied Governments definitely decide in favour of an interim reply. In that event it will have to be approved by the Conference before being formally submitted to the Governments.

In this connection I have been informed today that the French Government, after further consideration of the question since yesterday's meeting of the Conference,³ have definitely decided in favour of an interim reply being sent.

You will recollect that it was proposed yesterday that if no interim reply was sent, a communiqué should be issued to the Press. A draft communiqué which might be used in such circumstances has now been drawn up, copy of which is enclosed herein. It too has been drawn up merely to gain time should the Allied Governments decide on issuing such a communiqué.

I have, etc.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 565

Projet de Réponse à la Note du Gouvernement Allemand du 6 Janvier 1925⁴

Les Gouvernements alliés ont pris connaissance de la Note que M. Stresemann a adressée aux Ambassadeurs Alliés à Berlin à la date du 6 janvier⁴ en réponse à la Note antérieure des Gouvernements alliés⁵ concernant le maintien *conditionnel* de l'occupation par leurs troupes de la portion des territoires situés sur la rive gauche du Rhin connue sous le nom de '[z]one de Cologne'.

Les Gouvernements alliés n'entendent pas, à l'heure actuelle, entrer dans une discussion avec le Gouvernement allemand à ce sujet, ni relever les allégations qu'ils ne sauraient accepter en aucune manière. Ainsi qu'ils le lui ont déjà fait savoir par leur note collective du 5 janvier,⁵ ils lui adresseront ultérieurement une nouvelle communication déterminant ce qu'il restera à attendre de l'Allemagne pour que ses obligations puissent, aux termes de l'article 429 du Traité de Versailles, être considérées comme fidèlement observées.

L'intention des Gouvernements alliés est de faire cette communication à une date aussi prochaine que possible. Dès maintenant, cependant, ils doivent faire observer au Gouvernement allemand qu'il paraît méconnaître la portée des articles 428 et 429 du Traité de Versailles: ces articles ont fixé à quinze ans la durée de l'occupation des territoires rhénans, et ils n'ont prévu une réduction de ce délai qu'au cas où l'Allemagne remplirait fidèlement ses obligations. Ces obligations n'ayant pas été remplies, les

⁴ See No. 556.

⁵ See No. 553.

Alliés ne pouvaient que s'en tenir aux termes du Traité. Il appartiendra donc à l'Allemagne, par l'empressement avec lequel elle s'aquittera desdites obligations, de mettre les Alliés en mesure d'apporter le plus tôt possible au régime de l'occupation l'atténuation prévue à l'article 429. D'autre part, il va sans dire que les Gouvernements alliés, soucieux de respecter les stipulations du Traité, ne manqueront pas dès que l'article pourra jouer, de l'appliquer sans retard.⁶

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 565

Draft Communiqué

La Conférence des Ambassadeurs a pris connaissance de la réponse du Gouvernement allemand⁴ à la Note collective du 5 janvier.⁵ Les Gouvernements alliés n'ont trouvé dans cette réponse aucun élément de nature à leur faire modifier leur attitude. Toutefois, considérant qu'ils seront à bref délai en mesure d'adresser à Berlin la note définitive annoncée par leur communication antérieure, ils ont estimé qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, pour le moment, d'entrer dans une discussion avec le Gouvernement allemand.

⁶ In Paris despatch No. 137 of January 17, Lord Crewe communicated certain modifications the French Foreign Ministry wished to make in the draft note. These were: 'In paragraph 1, instead of "concernant le maintien conditionnel," they wish to insert, "concernant l'exécution de dispositions de l'article 429 du Traité de Paix relatives à l'occupation".

'In the place of the three last sentences, they wish to propose, "ces obligations n'ayant pas été remplies, les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent que s'en tenir aux termes du traité; c'est à l'Allemagne qu'il appartient, en s'acquittant de ses obligations, de les mettre en mesure d'apporter au régime de l'occupation l'atténuation prévue par l'article 429, dont pour leur part les Gouvernements alliés entendent scrupuleusement observer les dispositions".'

Lord Crewe went on to state: 'The creation of the new German Government [see No. 189, n. 3] has increased the desire of the French Government that the Allies should send an interim reply, as they consider it desirable to strengthen the hands of the parties of the Left in opposition to the new Government, and they think that an interim reply on the lines now suggested would give the opposition a weapon with which to attack the Government if the latter show any inclination towards militarism. . . .'

No. 566

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 227 [C 588/588/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 19, 1925*

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Lordship herewith, for your information and guidance, copy of a letter from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,¹ respecting the armament of future German warships.

¹ Of December 22, 1924 (C 19328/19328/18), not printed.

together with an Admiralty memorandum² explaining the position with regard to this question.

2. His Majesty's Government are clearly bound by Mr. Bayne's arbitral decision³ to support their allies in insisting on the interpretation of article 192 of the Treaty of Versailles as thus enunciated, in the same way as the interpretation of any other of the military provisions of the peace treaties has consistently been claimed by the allied governments to be a matter for their decision.

3. I request that if and when this matter is raised at the Ambassadors' Conference you will be guided by the suggestions contained in the last paragraph⁴ of the Admiralty memorandum except that there does not appear to be any occasion to refer, in a communication to be made to the German Government, to the intervention of an American arbitrator in regard to a difference of opinion which was a matter concerning the allies alone. It is, in any event, undesirable however that you should take any initiative in bringing the matter before the Conference.

I am, etc.,

MILES W. LAMPSON

² Enclosed in Admiralty letter of January 12 (C 588/588/18), not printed.

³ A copy of a Report of May 25, 1923, of Mr. H. Bayne, the Legal Adviser attached to the unofficial United States delegation to the Reparation Commission, was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1350 of June 8 (C 10058/1616/18), not printed. See Vol. XX, Nos. 327, 332, 341-2, and 346 and Vol. XXI, No. 593.

⁴ This ran '... It is suggested that the Conference of Ambassadors should inform the Germans that the points raised by them were carefully considered by the Allies in 1922 and 1923; that in order to make certain of the proper interpretation of the treaty they submitted the question to an independent United States arbitrator, and that the action of the Allies has since been based on his decision. The Conference of Ambassadors should also make clear that we do not claim that the armament of future German ships should necessarily be the same as the armament of existing German ships. The matter is at the discretion of the Allies, and will be determined by them reasonably.'

No. 567

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received January 22)

*No. 43 [C 1003/35/18]**

BERLIN, *January 19, 1925*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I had a conversation with Dr. Stresemann today and discussed with him the position of the new Ministry.¹

2. He seemed extremely confident—much more so than the public is—that the new Ministry would remain in office a long time, and said that

¹ See No. 189, n. 3.

he now intended to fetch his furniture and his books from his own house to the official residence of the Foreign Minister—a step he had hitherto not ventured to take.

The Socialists, of course, were angry and would oppose the Government tooth and nail, but he did not think there was any chance of their getting adequate support to turn the Government out.

3. Dr. Stresemann was personally in favour of leaving the Socialists in power in Prussia. It was a mistake to press a beaten enemy too hard.

4. The newspapers had suggested that the debate in the Reichstag had been postponed from Friday² to Monday on account of divergences in the Cabinet. Nothing could be further from the truth—complete unanimity prevailed. Indeed, on the subject of foreign policy, the draft paragraphs he had prepared stating that the foreign policy of the last Government would be continued had been accepted almost with too little discussion. The concessions he had been prepared to make to his Nationalist colleagues had not even been asked for.

5. The Government had already shown how broad-minded and progressive it was by deciding to adopt the basis of the eight-hour day in blast furnaces instead of the twelve-hour day. A Government of the Left could not have ventured to do this; there would at once have been an outcry from the industrials that business was being ruined. The industrials would take from the present Government what they would not take from the Left.

6. With disarmament it would be the same. If the demands of the *Entente* regarding disarmament were accepted by a Socialist Government, the military party would feel that the country was dishonoured. With the Luther Government in office they would accept the Government's decision.

7. His own view about disarmament was quite clear. He could have understood taking a strong line about disarmament and refusing to disarm, but then that was a policy one must have followed from the beginning. There was no sense in disarming to the extent to which Germany was now disarmed and hesitating about putting the minor infractions right.

8. Dr. Stresemann hardly spoke at all about the non-evacuation of Cologne.³ He apparently thinks that this is one of the reasons why a Government from the Right has been accepted so easily in Germany. A less recognised, but not less potent, reason is that both the Socialists and the Centre are under the weather on account of the Barmat financial scandal.⁴

² January 16.

³ See No. 553.

⁴ Barmat Enterprises had collapsed with debts of 10 million marks after the arrest of Herr J. Barmat and associates on December 31, 1924. The enterprises had been financed by loans from the Bank of Prussia and indirect loans from the German Postal Service, and Social Democrat and Central Party politicians had been implicated in the scandal. See E. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. 1 (Harvard, 1962), pp. 326–9.

9. Stresemann also refrained from discussing the question of the commercial treaty negotiations between Germany and France.⁵

10. As regards the political relations between Germany and France, he said that Herriot had been astonishingly frank with the German Ambassador, and had said that he was obliged to take a strong line against Germany—had to be ‘rabiāt’⁶—in order to save the political position of his own party and to avoid new elections. If he made concessions to Germany he would be turned out. Stresemann was evidently touched by the frankness of Herriot in discussing his own political necessities.

11. He added that Herriot had been misled by his German Socialist friends, who made him believe that a Socialist Government would take office in Germany and would initiate a ‘millenium of the Left,’ in which Blum would lie down with Breitscheid and elaborate a new ‘Continental-Politik’, *i.e.*, the Continent *v.* England. These schemes had never much substance, but what substance they had was knocked out of them by the non-evacuation of Cologne and the financial scandals.

12. As regards the unfilled post of Finance Minister, Stresemann said that he was rather in favour of Luther himself taking over the work. Luther had achieved great success as Finance Minister,⁷ and had prepared all the draft laws regarding taxation. No one wished to succeed to such a heritage; there was little credit to be gained, since success would be attributed to Luther. On the other hand, Luther himself was disinclined to undertake the Ministry of Finance. In the first place, because he would have no time to do the work in addition to that of the Chancellorship. In the second place, because he had compromised himself somewhat too categorically against ‘Aufwertung’, *i.e.*, compensation to Germany’s old creditors, who had been deprived of their income by inflation.

13. Stresemann himself holds that, while no general measure of ‘Aufwertung’ is possible, there were certain classes who should and can be relieved.

I have, etc.,
D’ABERNON

⁵ See No. 221, n. 1.

⁶ *i.e.* ‘raging’.

⁷ He had been Minister of Finance since October, 1923. He was succeeded on January 19 by Herr O. von Schlieben.

No. 568

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D’Abernon (Berlin)

No. 10 Telegraphic [C 765/2/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 20, 1925, 7 p.m.*

My telegram to Paris No. 24 (of the 13th January: evacuation of Cologne zone).¹

¹ No. 563.

Considerable discussion has taken place in Paris in regard to the advisability of sending an interim reply to the German note of January 6th,² and also as to its possible terms. The French, who were at one time averse from sending any reply at all, have now changed their mind, their view apparently being that an interim reply of an uncontentious nature may encourage the socialist elements in Germany who, in opposition to the nationalists, are eager to carry out the disarmament clauses of the treaty. My view has been that the advantages of a reply on the whole outweigh the disadvantages so long as the reply contains nothing objectionably contentious. I have also been impressed by your view³ as to the advisability of showing the German government that the allies intend to evacuate Cologne so soon as the disarmament clauses are fulfilled. The draft now agreed on in Paris⁴ seems to meet all requirements. It begins on the lines suggested in my telegram to Paris No. 18⁵ and continues that the allies intend to send the later communication promised as soon as possible. Meanwhile they must observe that articles 428 and 429 of the treaty fixed the duration of the occupation at 15 years and only contemplated a reduction of the period in the event of Germany faithfully fulfilling her obligations. These obligations not having been fulfilled, the allies can only hold to the terms of the treaty; it is for Germany by fulfilling her obligations to permit the attenuation of the occupation foreshadowed by article 429, the terms of which the allies for their part intend scrupulously to observe.

I am instructing Lord Crewe to accept this draft,⁶ which I hope may now be approved by all the interested powers. Meantime you should regard the above as strictly confidential.

Repeated to Rome No. 15 and Brussels No. 7.

² See No. 556.

³ See No. 560.

⁴ See No. 565.

⁵ No. 559.

⁶ As modified by the French Government (see No. 565, n. 6). Lord Crewe was so instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 29 of January 20, not printed.

No. 569

*Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 21, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 30 Telegraphic: by bag [C 924/117/18]

PARIS, January 20, 1925

Your despatch No. 182 (of the 15th January):¹ Modification of the nine

¹ This transmitted a copy of an Air Ministry letter of January 3 and instructed Lord Crewe to 'take such action as may seem appropriate vis-à-vis the French authorities to carry the suggestions of the Air Ministry into effect'.

The Air Ministry letter, having referred to the 'desultory conversations' held between the

rules for discrimination between civil and military aircraft in Germany).²

As the Anglo-French compromise was drafted in the air clauses committee, it is essential that it should be formally approved by that body, so as to obtain the concurrence of other allied experts, and be presented to the Conference as a unanimous inter-allied recommendation. This is being done, but the French are going to make a reservation regarding the

British and French authorities in 1924 over the revision of the rules for discrimination between military and civil aircraft in Germany (see n. 2), outlined the various courses of action, and concluded: 'The Air Council would be glad to be informed of Mr. Secretary Chamberlain's views on the course which should be adopted. If he concurs that, having regard to all the circumstances, the balance of advantage lies with proceeding with the proposal for revision on the lines so far agreed with the French, the Air Council would propose that the British representative on the Inter-Allied Committee of Versailles should be instructed to take up with the French the question of waiving the requirement that Germany should undertake to adhere to the Air Convention in return for the limited concessions, as . . . they consider that insistence on this requirement would render impossible even an interim settlement of the questions at issue. . . . the proposed revision would then be ready for communication to the German Government, and the Air Council see no objection to the German technical experts being then allowed to state their views to the Air Clauses Committee'

² These rules were communicated to the German Government by the Ambassadors' Conference in a note of April 14, 1922 which established the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee (see Vol. XX, No. 208, Enclosure 1, Annexe A: see also Vol. XVI, No. 804, Enclosure). A draft of the Nine Rules as amended in the Anglo-French conversations held in 1924 (see n. 1) was transmitted to the Foreign Office in an Air Ministry letter of January 3. It ran as follows:

'Rule 1. Every single-seater aeroplane with a power exceeding 60 h.p. shall be deemed to be a military aircraft and hence to be war material.

'Rule 2. Every aeroplane which can fly without a pilot shall be deemed to be a military aircraft and hence to be war material.

'Rule 3. Every aeroplane with any form of armour or protection or with any fittings to take any form of armament, guns, torpedoes or bombs shall be deemed to be a military aircraft and hence to be war material.

Any additional mechanism permitting of increase of the engine-power, or any device facilitating the adaptation of civil aircraft to military uses, and any aeroplane or engine provided therewith shall be deemed to be war material.

NOTE.—The second paragraph of this rule is intended to strengthen the provisions in the existing rules 3 and 4 against devices which would facilitate conversion of civil machines to military uses. It is considered that this provision entails no grievance to the Germans and is reasonably concomitant to any increases in load and speed.

'Rule 4. The maximum ceiling at full throttle is 4,000 metres.

'Rule 5. Speed with full throttle at an altitude of 2,000 metres, 180 kilom[etres] an hour. (Engines at full throttle and consequently giving full power.)

NOTE.—This represents an increase of 10 kilom. an hour on present permitted speed.

'Rule 6. The maximum quantity of oil and petrol (best quality aviation spirit) not to exceed $\frac{N_1 \times N_2}{V}$ per horse-power, V being the speed of the machine at full throttle and full power at a height of 2,000 metres.

'Rule 7. Every aircraft with a useful load of more than 900 kilog[rammes], including pilot, mechanic and instruments, even though fulfilling the conditions laid down in rules above, will be considered as military aircraft and consequently war material.

NOTE.—This increases the useful load from 600 to 900 kilog.

Airships with cubic capacity exceeding the figures given below shall be deemed to be military airships, and hence to be war material. 1. Rigid airships: 30,000 cubic metres. II.

adhesion of Germany to the air convention.³ They still cling to the idea of making this a condition.

On the other hand they agree to the German experts being summoned to Paris to state their views, but they propose that the Conference when inviting them should ask that they should bring with them the answer of the German government as to whether the latter will adhere to the air convention, now that it has been modified in the sense they desire. If they agree to join well and good. If they refuse the French will have to consider further whether they wish to insist on maintaining their reservation. May I agree to this procedure?

Semi-rigid airships: 25,000 cubic metres. III. Non-rigid airships: 20,000 cubic metres.

'Rule 8.

'(a) The factories constructing aeronautical material of any description shall be registered, and the German Government shall furnish the Committee of Guarantee with the importation certificates (including importation in transit) and exportation certificates for all aircraft and aeronautical material, giving all details required by the said committee.

'(b) All pilots and pupil pilots and all aircraft (including aircraft constructed for export) which are either completed or in course of construction, shall be registered.

'(c) All registers shall be of a pattern approved by the Committee of Guarantee and shall be forwarded to the committee of the German Government quarterly.

'(d) In order to avoid the necessity for destroying a new type of aircraft or engine after construction, the documents setting forth the characteristics of such material shall be forwarded to the Committee of Guarantee before construction is commenced.

NOTE.—This rule is substantially the same as existing rule 8, with certain minor amendments introduced at the suggestion of the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee in order to facilitate its work.

'Rule 9. The number of aeroplanes and engines and the amount of aeronautical material on the one hand, and the number of pilots and pupil pilots on the other hand, shall not exceed the reasonable requirements of civil aviation in Germany.

NOTE.—This provides for the control of quantities and numbers, which is a corollary to the concessions in regard to performance.

The proposals of the Air Ministry for the revision of the nine rules put forward in September [6], 1924 [to the Conference of Ambassadors: copy in Paris despatch No. 1976 of September 8, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives] stipulated that any difference of opinion between the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee and the German Government as to numbers of aircraft required for civil aviation in Germany should be referred for decision to the League of Nations. This provision is understood to be entirely unacceptable to the French, and it is not considered possible to insist on it. It is doubtful whether the League of Nations would even be prepared to accept the responsibility. In view of the fact that the draft scheme of supervision of German armaments by the League of Nations has since been prepared and approved by the League [see No. 10, n. 2], there seems still more reason against introducing the League into a scheme which is based on purely inter-Allied control.

The German Government shall adhere to the Air Convention [see n. 3].

NOTE.—It is proposed to press the French to waive this condition. . . .

³ For the text of the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of October 13, 1919, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 931–70. Germany had been invited to adhere to the Convention by the Ambassadors' Conference on December 18, 1922 (see Vol. XX, No. 342) and had replied on December 27 that she was prepared to do so provided Articles 5 and 34 were modified (see Vol. XXI, No. 597, Enclosure 4). For the Protocol of October 27, 1922 amending Article 5 of the Convention, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 117, pp. 433–35; for the Protocol

of June 30, 1923, amending Article 34, see *ibid.*, pp. 440–46.

For the question of Germany's adhesion to the Convention, see Vol. XXI, No. 609.

No. 570

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 22, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 31 Telegraphic: by bag [C 972/2/18]

PARIS, January 21, 1925

Your telegram No. 29 (of the 20th January—Evacuation of Cologne).¹

All five allied governments have now approved of note being sent to German government. Final text (some slight drafting amendments have been introduced at the last minute) is being sent to you in my despatch No. 169 of today.²

I assume that as in previous case you will telegraph the text to His Majesty's ambassador at Berlin and instruct him to concert with his French, Italian, Belgian and Japanese colleagues with a view to the presentation of a collective note to the German government.³

¹ See No. 568, n. 6.

² Not printed.

³ Lord D'Abernon was so instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 13 to Berlin of January 23, not printed. The note was presented to the German Government on January 26 (Berlin telegram No. 42 of even date). In Berlin telegram No. 43 of January 26, Lord D'Abernon reported that the Chancellor had stated: "... "The government of Reich had of course expected in this very important matter not to receive a fresh provisional communication from allied governments but the promised material with which the non evacuation of Northern Rhenish zone was to be justified [see No. 553, n. 4].

"I take note of Your Excellency's declaration that allied governments will transmit this material as soon as possible to government of Reich and can only reiterate urgent request that present condition of uncertainty should be terminated as soon as possible."

A translation of the reply of the German Government of January 27 was contained in Berlin telegram No. 44 of January 27, not printed.

No. 571

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 24, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 35 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1093/2/18]

PARIS, January 23, 1925

The Italian Ambassador informed Mr. Phipps last night that his strong personal impression was that the French government have no intention of agreeing to the evacuation of the Cologne area in the near future. He thinks that they will endeavour to postpone it until some considerable time

after the evacuation of the Ruhr in August.¹ Mr. Phipps observed that this was a very depressing prospect and one that could only strengthen the hands of the already too powerful German nationalists. Baron Romano Avezana expressed the opinion that the French would be perfectly justified in demanding considerable delay in the evacuation of the Cologne area, for as Germany had not fulfilled and did not seem desirous of fulfilling the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, it became necessary for France, since Great Britain and America had not signed the Guarantee Pacts with her,² to hold the entire left bank of the Rhine until the vital question of her security had been settled. His Excellency added that information which he had received led him to believe that we were in for stormy times with Germany, who, together with Austria, was some time in the spring likely to wage an intensive campaign in favour of the Anschluss.³

French public opinion has certainly been considerably disturbed by the formation of the Luther Cabinet in Germany,⁴ which was described in the Chamber last night by an Alsatian deputy as a blow in the face of the French Government. M. Painlevé,⁵ whose pacific feelings are notorious, the other night expressed himself pessimistically on the subject in conversation with Mr. Phipps, but I have no reason to believe that Baron Avezana is rightly interpreting the views of the French Government in the matter of the evacuation of the Cologne zone.

¹ See No. 225, n. 16.

² See No. 185, n. 1.

³ See No. 74, n. 3.

⁴ See No. 189, n. 3 and No. 567.

⁵ President of the Chamber since June, 1924.

No. 572

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 34 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1060/117/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 24, 1925*

Your telegram No. 30 (of the 20th January:¹ modification of the nine rules for discrimination between civil and military aircraft in Germany).

You should point out to the French that in our opinion the one way effectively to *prevent* the adherence of Germany to the air convention² is to link up this question at the present stage with that of the modification of the nine rules with which it has no connection. From the German point of view, the present proposal for solving the latter question is already unsatisfactory.

Unless you are able to persuade the French to drop the air convention clause, we consider it wholly inadvisable to invite the German experts to come to Paris. Even if the French agree to drop this clause there does not

¹ No. 569.

² See *ibid.*, n. 3.

now seem any strong reason for inviting them unless you have good ground to believe that the oral discussions with the Germans would result in the French agreeing to make further concessions in the rules. You should be guided by your colleagues and if there is a general wish to invite the German experts you should agree. But if on the other hand there is any opposition you should drop the proposal. It is important that the rules should be settled as soon as possible and communicated to the German government and the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee.

No. 573

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 38 Telegraphic [C 1275/21/18]

Immediate

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 28, 1925, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 39 (of the 27th January.¹ Visits of inspection in Germany).

The War Office have instructed² General Clive to insist on this matter being referred to the Ambassadors' Conference. When it is discussed by that body Your Lordship should be guided by the considerations advanced in my telegram No. 32.³ I am averse from any compromise such as I understand may be suggested by the French. To my mind any possible advantages in embarking immediately upon inspections under the five points⁴ would be more than outweighed by the disadvantage of prejudicing the whole question which will never be satisfactorily settled unless it is approached with wisdom and restraint by both sides. All I am aiming at is that—without in any way prejudicing our right to visits under the five points as to which there can be no question—we avoid embittering the situation pending a final decision by the allies as to the particular demands pre-requisite to evacuation of Cologne.

¹ Not printed.

² Mr. Lamson had asked the War Office to do this in a telephone call of January 28.

³ Of January 23. This had instructed Lord Crewe as follows: 'When this matter comes before the Ambassadors' Conference you should propose that instructions should be sent to the Military Control Commission not to carry out any more visits of inspection, even under the five points [see No. 23, n. 4], pending a further decision of the Allied Governments. Such visits would be extremely difficult at a time when it is known that the final report [see Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5] is actually being prepared and discussed, and would be likely to give rise to incidents. Any such incidents or discoveries under the visits, even if insignificant in themselves, would only serve to complicate the clear issue which the report will present. We are anxious that nothing should be done to vitiate the atmosphere before the Allies have had time fully to consider the final report and to formulate their considered policy upon all further questions of military control.'

⁴ See No. 23, n. 4.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received January 30, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 41 Telegraphic [C 1395/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 29, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the Chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following questions:—

1. The Conference had before it the report of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles (copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 239 of today's date)¹ on the question as to whether the Commission of Control in Germany should suspend further visits in connection with the 'five points'² pending the decision of the Allied Governments on the report of the general inspection.³ I informed the Conference of the views of His Majesty's Government as given in your telegrams Nos. 32⁴ and 38.⁵ A lengthy discussion ensued in the course of which the French urged strongly that the draft telegram, prepared by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles,⁶ impressed upon the Commission the importance of avoiding incidents and of limiting the visits to essential cases and therefore should satisfy the requirements of His Majesty's Government on this head. Both Monsieur Cambon and Marshal Foch pressed strongly the argument that if the Commission of Control stopped all visits now it would be very difficult subsequently to resume them if occasion required. The German Government had always persisted in maintaining the view that when once the general inspection was finished there was no longer any further justification for the Commission of Control. If, therefore, while the report on the general inspection is being examined the Commission does not continue work on the 'five points', the Allied Governments will be giving the impression that they are acquiescing in the German Government's claim, whereas the French Government in no circumstances would abandon the 'five points'. I explained that there was no question of His Majesty's Government asking, or indeed wishing, the French Government to do so. It was merely on the ground of expediency that His Majesty's Government considered that the Commission should temporarily abstain from carrying out any further visits. I pointed out that although in Paris the distinction between visits under the general inspection and visits under the 'five points' was clear to everyone, this was not the case in Germany where the continuance of visits would be interpreted as an indefinite prolongation of the general inspection. I further laid stress on

¹ Not printed.

³ See Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5.

⁴ See No. 573, n. 3.

² See No. 23, n. 4.

⁵ No. 573.

⁶ A copy of this telegram was enclosed in Paris despatch No. 239 of January 29, not printed.

the point that there was no question of making any concession to the German Government, and that therefore there was no need to make any notification to them with regard to the course of action which we proposed to employ.

The Italian Ambassador was inclined to support my view and the Belgian Ambassador agreed that it might be advisable for the present to abstain from carrying out visits to factories. He urged, on the other hand, that the Commission of Control should not be prevented from continuing to discuss the execution of the 'five points' with the German Ministries and officials. I agreed with this point of view and made it clear that my objections were confined to actual visits of inspection. M. Laroche was unable to agree with the Belgian Ambassador as regards non-inspection of factories which he regarded as the most important of the points for which visits were necessary, whereas the Police question was one for which nothing more than work with the German Government offices is required at this stage.

However, in order to meet my objections, the French finally proposed to amend the draft telegram to the Commission of Control so that the Commission should be told:—

(1) that it was to make no communication to the German Government, and

(2) that until the Allied Governments have completed their examination of the final report on the general inspection it is desirable that all visits arising out of the 'five points' should be limited to such visits which could not possibly be postponed.

The text thus revised which was agreed to by all my colleagues is likewise enclosed in my despatch No. 239 of today's date.¹ I reserved my decision in order to have your views.

After the exhaustive discussion which took place this morning, I am convinced that this is the best compromise which can be obtained and I trust that you will authorise me to accept it. Incidentally I would point out that these draft instructions are better than no instructions at all, since failing definite orders to the contrary, the Commission of Control is entitled, and is indeed bound by its previous instructions of June 21st, 1924⁷ to continue to press on the execution of the 'five points' without any restriction (other than those contained in the instructions of August 8th)⁸ as to the number or character of the visits which it may consider necessary to make.

2. The Allied Military Committee of Versailles submitted to the Conference the result of the discussions which have taken place during the last week in the Air Clauses Committee and the Allied Military Committee of Versailles regarding the modification of the 9 rules⁹ for discriminating between civil and military aircraft in Germany. Copy of its report is enclosed in my despatch No. 240.¹⁰ The attitude adopted by my

⁷ See Vol. XXVI, No. 672, Enclosure.

⁹ See No. 569, n. 2.

⁸ See *ibid.*, No. 687, n. 6.

¹⁰ Of January 29, not printed.

Air Attaché,¹¹ in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch [*sic*] No. 34,¹² made it impossible for the Allied Military Committee to reach an unanimous conclusion with regard to the question of the linking up of the modification of the 9 rules with the adhesion of Germany to the Air Convention.¹³ This question, as also that of the proposal that the German experts should be heard by the Air Clauses Committee was accordingly submitted today for the Conference's decision. I informed the Conference at once of the views held by His Majesty's Government as set forth in your telegram No. 34¹² and pressed Monsieur Cambon not to insist upon linking up the two questions. I was met with the reply that in modifying the present rules, we were making an important concession to Germany so as to facilitate the development of her civil aviation, and it was only reasonable, therefore, that in return the German Government should make a corresponding concession to the Allied Governments, by assuming the same obligations in respect of civil aviation as had been assumed by the Allied Governments. I pointed out in reply, that in the first place, the Allied Governments were not making a concession at all to Germany in allowing her to develop her commercial aviation seeing that we had no treaty right to prevent her from having a civil aviation and that in any case the modification in the rules which we now proposed did not meet all the demands of the German Government.

As it seemed impossible to reach an agreement on this question of principle at today's meeting, it was finally decided to adjourn the question for further consideration. It seems evident, however, that the French will prefer to maintain the status quo rather than agree to the proposed modification of the present rules unless this modification is conditional upon the German Government's adhesion to the Air Convention. In practice, therefore, it would seem that the present rules will not be modified unless the German Government do adhere to the Convention. Perhaps it would be possible for His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin to sound the German Government on this subject.

The question of inviting the German experts to state their views before the Air Clauses Committee was only referred to indirectly but it is clear that the French view is that there can be no further modifications of the new rules as now drafted as a result of any oral discussions with the German experts.¹⁴ . . .¹⁵

¹¹ Squadron-Leader J. Sewell.

¹² No. 572.

¹³ See No. 569, n. 3.

¹⁴ In a letter of February 7, the Air Ministry commented: 'The Air Council are reluctant that matters should be left in this position. The Air Ministry's original proposals for a relaxation of the Nine Rules were considerably modified in deference to the strength of the opinion expressed by the French authorities on the subject of security, and it does not appear to the Council that it can be legitimately argued that there is any connection between French security and the adhesion of Germany to the Air Convention. It is clear that the imposition upon Germany of any rules for discrimination between German military and civil aircraft can only be justified in so far as they can be reasonably related to article 198 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides that "the armed forces of Germany must not

include any naval or military air forces”.

“The Air Council would therefore suggest that, if Mr. Chamberlain so approves, Lord Crewe should be instructed to refer the question to the French and to use every endeavour to get them to agree to present the modification in the Nine Rules to the German Government without further delay. They would further suggest that as an inducement to this His Excellency should concurrently inform the French of the willingness of His Majesty’s Government to address, in conjunction with the French Government, a further invitation to Germany to adhere to the Air Convention, provided that this is pursued as a separate issue from that of the Nine Rules. If, however, the French still insist on the question of modification of the Rules being linked with Germany’s adherence to the Air Convention, Lord Crewe should, the Air Council suggest, make it clear that His Majesty’s Government are not prepared to continue the discussion on that basis. In that event, regrettable as will be the *impasse* thus created, there would appear to be no alternative but to inform Germany that the Rules will not be amended for the present.

‘As regards the suggestion that the German technical experts should be heard by the Air Clauses Committee, it appears to the Council that it would be useless to ask them to come to Paris either to receive, without discussion, the modification of the Rules, or merely in order to state whether the German Government is prepared to adhere to the Air Convention.’

¹⁵ The sections omitted referred to other matters.

No. 575

Lord D’Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 3)

No. 88 [C 1600/1251/18]*

BERLIN, *January 31, 1925*

Sir,

I have the honour to submit a note prepared by Mr. Finlayson¹ in regard to the payment by the German Government of the liabilities due to the Rhine and Ruhr industrialists arising out of the occupation of the Ruhr by the Franco-Belgian forces.² You will observe from that statement that the total sum involved amounts to the equivalent of £35,750,000 and that disbursements amounting roughly to £32,000,000 have already been made out of the revenue surpluses accruing to the Reich during the current financial year.

2. During the discussions of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag the political parties of the Left took exception to the payment of such considerable sums out of the Exchequer funds without prior submission to a budgetary control of such disbursements, and in this connection it is interesting to trace the history of the negotiations between the Reich and the German industrialists, particularly with a view to establishing how far and in what form the Reich financial responsibility was originally engaged.

3. On the 7th October 1923,³ Herr Stinnes, writing in the name of the Rhine-Westphalian coal industry, addressed the following questions to the

¹ Financial Adviser to the British Embassy, Berlin.

² In 1923. See Vol. XXI, Chap. I.

³ A translation of this letter was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 723 of October 15, 1923, not printed.

then Reich Chancellor, Dr. Stresemann:—

‘(1) Is the Reich prepared to pay the costs of the coal (including transport) and to authorise the mine-owners to make the best bargain possible with the occupying authorities?’

‘(2) Is the Reich prepared to indemnify the mine-owners for the payment of the coal tax?’

‘(3) Is the Reich prepared to indemnify the mine-owners for the reparation coal delivered?’

‘(4) Is the Reich prepared to authorise the German Commission of Six⁴ to enter into direct negotiations with the occupying authorities?’

In Dr. Stresemann's reply of the 12th October 1923,⁵ the view was expressed that the present state of German finances did not give the Reich the opportunity of offering any guarantees to the mine-owners. Permission was given, however, to the German Commission of Six to enter into direct negotiations with the Franco-Belgian authorities.

4. Arising out of these negotiations the M.I.C.U.M.⁶ contract of the 23rd November 1923, was eventually signed,⁷ and on the 1st December [*sic*: November]⁸ the German Government addressed a note to the German Commission of Six stating that the Reich was prepared to compensate the mine-owners for the liabilities they would incur. The following conditions were, however, added:—

‘(1) The Reich recognises the obligation to reimburse such amounts in such measures that will be credited to the mines and will be subsequently compensated for, after the restoration of the Reich finances, by way of loan or in some other form.

‘(2) Until compensation of a different kind is effected, the mines are authorised to pay off the Reich corporation duty, the capital tax and the turnover tax by setting off such sums credited to them.’

5. From the foregoing it will be observed that the Reich financial responsibility was so far engaged that the obligation to reimburse the M.I.C.U.M. liabilities was made dependent upon the restoration of the Reich finances, and the fact that the Reich has already seen fit to pay off practically the whole debt during the current financial year must be taken as an indication that, in the opinion of the German Treasury, the finances of this country are now sufficiently restored to be able to meet such considerable obligations out of current surpluses. It is, however, significant of that laxity of control which permeates the financial administration of this country that the Treasury has apparently been in a position to make such considerable payments from the public purse without the prior approval of the Legislative Chamber, which, according to the Constitu-

⁴ Of the Federation of Mineowners.

⁵ For Dr. Stresemann's reply, see Vol. XXI, No. 398, n. 1.

⁶ I.e. the Franco-Belgian engineering commission in the Ruhr—Mission Interalliée de Contrôle des Usines et des Mines.

⁷ See Vol. XXI, Nos. 466, 467, 474, 479 and 482.

⁸ See *ibid.*, No. 489, n. 1.

tion, is charged with the safeguarding of all financial interests of the country. With Luther as Chancellor, it is not improbable that financial control will be tightened up.

I have, etc.,
D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 575

The M.I.C.U.M. Liabilities

At a meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag of the 29th January 1925, the subject of the M.I.C.U.M. contracts came up for discussion. Considerable surprise was expressed by the Socialist and Communist parties that such enormous sums had been paid to the Ruhr industry without any basis of budget control, and a motion was brought in that a special Reichstag committee be appointed to sit on the matter. This motion was rejected.

Secretary of State Fischer mentioned the sums which had thus been paid to the German mines and industries as a result of the M.I.C.U.M. engagements, viz.:—

- (a) The Ruhr mines received 550,000,000 gold marks (£27,500,000) for the M.I.C.U.M. deliveries and for the reparation deliveries in kind, which the mines were compelled to make to the Franco-Belgian authorities.
- (b) The chemical industries received 50,000,000 gold marks (£2,500,000).
- (c) The lignite and coal mines, the Aix-la-Chapelle mines and the Rhine navigation companies were paid the sum of 45,000,000 gold marks (£2,250,000).
- (d) As compensation for damages, which is the basis of a special agreement, the sum of 70,000,000 gold marks (£3,500,000) has been assessed. This latter sum remains largely unpaid.

It may be observed from the foregoing statement that the total sums involved to compensate the Ruhr industries for deliveries in kind and for damages amount to the equivalent of £35,750,000, of which that assessed as compensation for damages—namely, £3,500,000—still remains largely to be paid by the Reich.

Ministerialdirektor Dr. Ritter, of the Foreign Office, has promised me a copy of the contract made by the Reich and the Ruhr industries upon which the foregoing disbursements are based.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 2, 9 a.m.)

No. 53 Telegraphic [C 1550/21/18]

BERLIN, February 1, 1925, 8.45 p.m.

Your telegram No. 18.¹

Urgent.

It is not possible to put case more clearly than in your telegrams Nos. 32² and 38.³

I agree with Army Council in thinking suspension of visits now will not render more difficult inspections required after receipt of final report.⁴

From Luther's speech⁵ it is evident that he is determined to rectify any failures in the matter of disarmament which allies can point out. Verification of these rectifications must follow and cannot be resisted by Germany.

My considered view is that if effective execution of disarmament is the object in view a continuation of visits now is the wrong road. No positive advantage is conceivable: on the other hand there is considerable risk of vitiating the atmosphere if not of provoking incidents. Given genuine desire to settle, general outlook for a solution is distinctly favourable. I am now strongly against anything which would imperil this prospect.

Once Germany is persuaded that she is being treated fairly and that evacuation of northern zone will follow automatically from completion of disarmament many points which appear difficult today will disappear and a satisfactory solution should be obtainable.

The most arduous negotiation will be the police, where a compromise is justified.

General Wauchope has seen above and concurs. He considers however that with (? restrictions) contained in Army Council's letter of January 27th⁶ drawback of visits during limitation is greatly diminished. He holds

¹ Of January 31. This ran: '... Before deciding what further instructions to issue to Lord Crewe I should like your views upon compromise arrangement now before the Ambassadors' Conference, as reported in Paris telegram 41 [No. 574].

'Please consult General Wauchope and telegraph your observations urgently, repeating to Paris.'

² See No. 573, n. 3.

³ No. 573.

⁴ See Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5.

⁵ A translation from the German Press of January 31 of the speech made by Dr. Luther on January 30 to officials and journalists, in reply to M. Herriot's speech of January 28 in the Chamber (see Nos. 193 and 579, n. 4, below), was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 89 of January 31, not printed.

⁶ These restrictions were:

'(a) Visits to be confined to the "five points".

'(b) The number of visits to be reduced to the minimum considered absolutely necessary.

'(c) No visit to take place which would be likely to cause an incident.

'(d) No surprise visits.'

that on no account whatever must 'visites inopinés' or 'visites à maison privées' be agreed to.

Repeated to Paris.

No. 577

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 43 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1552/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 2, 1925*

Berlin telegrams Nos. 54¹ and 55² just repeated to you reveal a situation so gravely disquieting that I feel justified in requesting you immediately to see M. Herriot and tell him perfectly frankly and from me as friend to friend the lines upon which my thoughts are running.

It will be admitted by the French government that we here have behaved with the most scrupulous exactitude and loyalty in the policy which we have followed in regard to the evacuation of Cologne. Our attitude has consistently been that this question must be handled upon a pure treaty basis and nothing more nor less. We knew Germany to be in default under the disarmament clauses and we were, and are, ready to insist that Cologne shall not be evacuated until such of those defaults as are really vital, in the joint opinion of the allied governments, have been rectified to our satisfaction. But equally I trust that it has been clear from the outset that His Majesty's Government are not ready to pervert the treaty to ulterior ends. For instance we can never be parties to the presentation of the Final Report³ in such a form as to distort to Germany's disadvantage or to exaggerate such defaults as have, as questions of fact, been established. The Report must be a fair statement of questions of fact: it must not be used as a weapon to justify the indefinite postponement of the evacuation of Cologne: that must turn upon the terms of the treaty fairly interpreted—that is fairly to both parties—and on that alone.

Unfortunately Berlin telegrams Nos. 54¹ and 55² strengthen the suspicion which had already been growing in my mind that it is just some

¹ Of January 31. This ran as follows: 'Wauchope tells me privately that there has been a marked change in attitude of his colleague during past week. His draft report on armaments had been accepted, but he is now being pressed to make innumerable alterations in it. In this report General Wauchope had clearly stated that Germany had committed many infractions which he enumerated in detail, but he is now urged to go beyond what he considers fair. Unless he is in a position in last resort to send in a minority report, commission's main report [see Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5] will be such that it will paint a darker picture than is justified by facts as he sees them.'

'Wauchope is engaged on a most difficult task, and is showing great tact and strength of character.'

'There is little doubt that fresh instructions have been received from Paris.'

² Of February 1, not printed.

³ See Nos. 10, n. 4 and 560, n. 5.

such perversion of the treaty for which the French are now working. The Italian government have received the same impression and Marquis Torretta has already expressed to me⁴ the anxiety caused to them by the apparent change in M. Herriot's attitude. I cannot avoid suspecting that the French government, being nervous as to the fate of the Geneva Protocol,⁵ are now of set purpose so manœuvring as to keep the allies in Cologne until that Protocol or something equally satisfactory to their 'security' has been definitely accepted by this country.

Now whilst I sympathise with French anxiety and whilst I can even understand how such a course may suggest itself to so logical a people as the French, I think it only right to warn M. Herriot that if there is any foundation for my fears he is working in the worst possible way to achieve the end which he has in view. There is a British mentality just as there is a French mentality—and if the people of this country have any ground for thinking that they are being deliberately led on to false ground over Cologne then the chances of any settlement with this country regarding French 'security' at once become more remote.

As M. Herriot no doubt knows there is a growing feeling in this country in favour of the elaboration of some scheme which will give France once and for all that sense of 'security' for which she quite legitimately craves—but any endeavour to force our hand—such as I am inclined to read into the position revealed at Berlin by these two telegrams and by other indications⁶—is calculated directly to defeat that object. Any attempt to involve us in the perversion of our treaty rights vis-à-vis Germany will only strengthen the hands of those (and there are many) who are working against the fruition of the above scheme. I would accordingly venture in all friendship and sincerity to urge M. Herriot to move circumspectly and to do nothing liable to make the task of His Majesty's Government more difficult than it already is. In this spirit I appeal to him, leaving all petty detail aside, to cause immediate instructions to be despatched to General Walch to co-operate loyally with General Wauchope and to drop all endeavour to force upon the latter the signature of a report to which he cannot conscientiously agree and to which His Majesty's Government would certainly have to take exception when it came up for discussion between the governments.

His Majesty's Government are genuinely anxious to co-operate loyally with the French over the whole question of 'security' but they cannot be parties to any perversion for such a purpose of the Powers held by the allies under the Treaty of Versailles.

Repeated to Berlin No. 19.

⁴ In a conversation of February 2, an account of which was transmitted to Rome in Foreign Office despatch No. 153 of February 2, not printed. For Marquis Torretta's account of this conversation, see *D.D.I.*, vol. III, No. 703.

⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

⁶ See No. 571.

No. 578

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 44 Telegraphic [C 1550/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 3, 1925, 3.50 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 41, section 1 (of the 29th January. Continuation of control visits in Germany).¹

You will have seen from Berlin telegram No. 53² that opinion of our diplomatic and military advisers in Berlin is still against inspections under the five points³ pending consideration by the allied governments of the results of the general inspection.

We still adhere to this view. If however you are unable after further efforts to win over your colleagues you may agree to the despatch of the draft telegram as amended in Mr. Sargent's letter of the 30th January,⁴ subject to the addition of a clause definitely prohibiting surprise visits during the interim period. But we still consider, with Lord d'Abernon, General Wauchope and the War Office, that until the atmosphere has been cleared by a general consultation between the governments concerned on the facts revealed in the final report it is far better to avoid any further inspections by commission of control.

Repeated to Berlin No. 20.⁵

¹ No. 574.

² No. 576.

³ See No. 23, n. 4.

⁴ This letter to Mr. Lampson has not been preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁵ In Foreign Office telegram No. 21 of February 3 to Berlin the following instructions from the War Office were transmitted to General Wauchope: 'It is essential that in what you allow to go out under your authority there should be nothing with which you do not agree on points which you consider important. We share your hope that your insistence on this course will be effective in preventing the French from pressing any exaggerated demands. On the other hand if the French still insist, you are authorised in the last resort to refuse consent either to the covering letter or to the report either of the effectives or armaments sub-commission; in that case you would have to draw up your own independent report and request the president to submit it to the Versailles Committee.'

'In regard to the general attitude of His Majesty's Government please ask Lord d'Abernon to show you Foreign Office telegram No. 43 to Paris [No. 577].'

No. 579

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 5, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 50 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1682/21/18]

PARIS, *February 4, 1925*

Your telegram No. 43.¹

¹ No. 577.

I went to see the President of the Council this morning and had a long conversation with him on the points raised by you, leaving him a note² embodying those which it is specially desirable he should bear in mind.

M. Herriot said there was no foundation whatever for the statement he had seen in some English newspapers that he has changed his policy with regard to Germany.

At Geneva he had declared his belief that the three subjects of arbitration, disarmament, and security must be considered together, and they could not be disjoined.³ Now the socialist party appeared to be becoming weak on the third of those questions, whereas he, as *un patriote français*, could allow no compromise on this. M. Léon Blum might pursue an international ideal, but if there was danger for France he himself and the socialists would have to part company. It was, in fact, to the socialist party that his speech in the Chamber⁴ had been addressed. (It is interesting to compare this statement with that made by M. Léon Blum to Mr. Phipps and reported in his telegram No. 44.)⁵ As no doubt I knew, he had told his socialist allies that if they voted against the *affichage* of his speech he would at once resign, and they had not done so.

In the second place, he wished you to know that at no time had the French government sent any instructions whatever to General Walch. When that officer was in Paris he had supplied the President of the Council with the material which he had used in his speech in the Chamber on the subject of German defaults.⁴ But no shadow of a hint had been given to him on the manner in which the report⁶ should be framed. He was puzzled, therefore, to account for the impression that General Wauchope is being pressed to sign a report containing statements which he considered exaggerated or unnecessary. At the same time, he saw great difficulty in starting his communications with General Walch by such a message as you ask him to send. Not only would it appear that he was blaming the General without full knowledge of the facts, but it might lead to his having to take actual responsibility for the terms of the report. I suggested that as he had heard nothing of any difference of opinion at Berlin he might speak to Maréchal Foch with a view to some message being sent to General Walch, and to this he agreed.

M. Herriot disclaimed with indignation the smallest idea of distorting the treaty in order to obtain advantages not contemplated by its terms. Just as he had declined to mix up the question of the evacuation of the

² Of February 4, a copy of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 332 of February 7, not printed.

³ For M. Herriot's speech of September 5, 1924, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1924), pp. 51-4.

⁴ Of January 28. The text of that part of the speech which related to security was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 238 of January 29, not printed. See No. 193.

⁵ Of February 1, not printed.

⁶ See Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5.

Ruhr with that of a commercial treaty,⁷ so he would in no way confuse the duty of evacuating the Cologne zone with any consideration affecting the general security of France for the future. But he might say that M. Loucheur, who had drawn up article 429 of the treaty of Versailles, had called his attention to the last paragraph of that article, which contemplated delay in evacuation. I said that I am no lawyer, but that it seemed to me as a layman that this proviso referred only to sub-head 3 of the article and the final evacuation at the end of fifteen years, but not to those at the expiration of five and of ten years.⁸

Some conversation followed on the general questions of security, and this I will report separately.⁹

⁷ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 537, 540, 542 and 545 for the discussion of these questions at the London Conference (see No. 225, n. 17).

⁸ In Foreign Office despatch No. 496 of February 10, Mr. Chamberlain approved the language held by Lord Crewe to M. Herriot. On February 13, Lord Crewe embodied sections from this despatch in a note to M. Herriot, a copy of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 397 of February 13. The statements in question ran: 'You were quite correct in replying that the final paragraph of article 429 refers only to sub-paragraph (iii) of that article, and therefore to the final stage of the evacuation of the Rhineland, at the end of the fifteen-year period, and not to the interim stages at the expiration of five and ten years from the coming into force of the treaty. The text is quite clear; the words "at that date", which unequivocally refer to "the expiration of fifteen years", do not allow of any doubt on the point.

'You are authorised to intimate in the most categorical manner that His Majesty's Government could not for a moment agree to the clear wording of the treaty being called in question.'

⁹ In a letter of February 5 to Mr. Chamberlain (F.O. 800, vol. 257, ff. 245-7).

No. 580

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 50 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1682/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 5, 1925*

Your telegram No. 50 (of the 4th February).¹ Final report of Commission of Control in Berlin).

Please tell M. Herriot that I am much relieved and gratified by his assurance that he has no intention of allowing the question of the evacuation of Cologne to be mixed up with such general problems as French security or in fact to be decided otherwise than on its merits in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles.

I cannot however doubt from the reports which I have received² of the marked change in the attitude suddenly adopted by the French members of the Control Commission towards their British colleague—with whose views they had hitherto displayed cordial and practically complete

¹ No. 579.

² See No. 577, n. 1.

agreement—that some intimation must have been received from superior French authorities that such change of attitude was desired for political reasons. I can therefore only conclude that some other influence than that of M. Herriot has been brought into play, whether, as you have suggested, that of Marshal Foch, or some subordinate authority, either from the military or the political side. It is difficult otherwise to account for the change. For if the French officers at Berlin have hitherto seen eye to eye with ours on such technical questions as the degree of importance to be attached to certain points connected with German shortcomings or defaults, it is not easily understood how their opinion on these very points should have suddenly undergone a spontaneous and serious modification.

I should be glad if you could tactfully convey this to M. Herriot and urge upon him the importance of counteracting in any way open to him the influence which has evidently been brought to bear on the French officers in Berlin.

You may inform M. Herriot of the instructions General Wauchope has now received (see my telegram No. 21 to Berlin)³ so that he may rest in no doubt as to how undesirable it would be were the allied front to be broken at this moment by submission of majority and minority reports by the Commission of Control.

Please also say to M. Herriot that I feel that it would be a great mistake to assume that the present German government⁴ is less likely to be willing or able to meet our just requirements than its predecessors. I believe that the very contrary is the case (compare M. Streseman's conversations with Lord d'Abernon and latter's comments)⁵ and that if the allies will show them some consideration in points of form we have a better chance of securing satisfaction from Germany now than at any previous time. What I have specially in mind in point of form is that we should make our next communication verbally to them at our conference⁶ and not proceed by exchange of notes. You will have observed how much stress is always laid on this point in references to improved situation produced by invitation to

³ See No. 578, n. 5.

⁴ See Nos. 189, n. 3 and 567.

⁵ See No. 567.

⁶ See No. 562. In Foreign Office despatch No. 425 to Paris of Paris of January 30. Mr. Chamberlain had reported: 'At the conclusion of the conversation with the French Ambassador today [see No. 196] . . . he asked me when I thought we should be ready for a Conference of Ministers to consider the action to be taken on the final report of the Inter-Allied Military Commission [see Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5]. He suggested that a probable date might be early in March. I expressed the hope that we might be ready earlier, and enquired whether M. Herriot would be prepared to come to London for the purpose. M. de Fleuriau said that he was sure that M. Herriot would be glad to come here, but that the answer might depend upon the state of his health. I pointed out that I had already called upon him in Paris [in December, 1924: see Vol. XXVI, No. 608] and that I should be very pleased to welcome him in London, and that it would be an advantage if he could take this opportunity of making the acquaintance of the Prime Minister.

'M. de Fleuriau suggested, and I agreed with him, that, in the event of such a meeting, the representatives of Belgium, Italy and Japan must also be invited; but I added that I thought some previous interchange of views between the French Government and ourselves, possibly through his Excellency, would be of advantage.'

Germans to attend London conference.⁷

In regard to the penultimate paragraph of your telegram, your language is approved. I am considering the point and may shortly send you a memorandum to hand to M. Herriot in order to make him aware of the interpretation placed by His Majesty's Government on article 429 of the treaty.

Repeated to Berlin No. 22, Brussels No. 15 and Rome No. 28.

⁷ For the Allied invitation of August 2, 1924 to the German Government to attend the London Conference (see No. 225, n. 17), see Vol. XXVI, No. 526.

No. 581

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 6, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 51 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1732/21/18]

PARIS, February 5, 1925

My telegram No. 50 (of the 4th February:¹ Report of Military Commission of Control).²

As Monsieur Herriot disclaimed all knowledge of any instructions having been sent to General Walch regarding the drafting of the commission's report, I instructed the British member of the Versailles committee to ascertain whether Marshal Foch was able to throw any light on the subject.

General Clive, after an interview with the Marshal, reports that the latter told him that he has had no information of any difficulties having arisen in the drafting of the report on the general inspection; indeed that nothing had come at all from General Walch, until this morning when a telegram had just come announcing that the report would probably not be finished before the end of next week. The Marshal did not see how any great divergence of view could arise, in view of the fact that the report will do nothing but state results of the inspection, leaving all deductions to be made here. He evidently considered that the report on Armaments was a matter for General Wauchope as head of the sub-commission and nobody else. He agreed with General Clive that nothing could be more unfortunate than the submission of a majority and minority report.

General Clive is convinced of the correctness of the above statements, and feels sure that General Walch has had no encouragement or instructions from Marshal Foch, or his staff. It would therefore appear that if General Wauchope sticks firmly to his views, he will get his way.³

¹ No. 579.

² See Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5.

³ Mr. Chamberlain replied (telegram No. 54 of February 6): 'The cause of General Walch's sudden volte-face is of course no concern of His Majesty's Government. But I trust

the French do realise that unless he reverts to his previous attitude General Wauchope may and almost certainly will be forced, on the instructions we have given him, to submit a minority report. The French government and their military authorities should be left in no doubt about this. I should personally regret it as much as Monsieur Herriot.

'I have spoken most seriously to the French Ambassador upon this whole question this afternoon [reported in Foreign Office despatch No. 488 to Paris of February 6, not printed].'

Lord Crewe addressed a letter to M. Herriot on February 7 in order that he might be under no misapprehension as to the possibility of General Wauchope's refusing to sign the Final Report (copy in Paris despatch No. 334 of February 7, not printed).

No. 582

Mr. Wingfield¹ to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 10)

*No. 107 [C 1963/21/18]**

Confidential

BRUSSELS, February 7, 1925

Sir,

As reported in my telegram No. 10 of the 6th instant,² I was received yesterday evening by M. Hymans, who communicated to me verbally the reply of the Belgian Government to the representations I had made to him under the instructions contained in your telegram No. 12 of the 3rd instant.³ His Excellency read this answer from a paper, and subsequently permitted me to note its contents, which were as follows:—

'Le Gouvernement belge considère qu'en ce qui concerne le contrôle des armements d'Allemagne, il faut s'en tenir au traité. Il n'a jamais été dans sa pensée d'exagérer les manquements de l'Allemagne en vue de justifier un prolongement indéfini de l'occupation des territoires rhénans.

'Le Gouvernement du Roi tient en haute estime son délégué à la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle de Berlin. Il est persuadé que celui-ci ne se laissera guider que par sa conscience. Le Gouvernement belge a, d'ailleurs, fait connaître au Général Deguffroy son opinion quant à la nécessité de s'en tenir uniquement au traité. Il a ajouté qu'à son avis le rapport que prépare actuellement la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle⁴ aurait d'autant plus de poids qu'il s'attacherait aux faits ayant une réelle importance au point de vue militaire.'

After this official communication, M. Hymans spoke to me less formally on this subject. He said that he could tell me confidentially that he had mentioned to the French Ambassador the surprise caused by M. Herriot's recent alarmist speech.⁵ To my enquiry whether M. Herbet had given

¹ Chargé d'Affaires January 31–February 17.

² Not printed.

³ This had referred to No. 577, and had instructed the British representative to make similar representations to the Belgian Government.

⁴ See Nos. 559, n. 4 and 560, n. 5.

⁵ See No. 579, n. 4.

any explanation of it, he replied 'no'; but he at once added that he had warned the Ambassador that M. Herriot was making a psychological error if he expected to force the hands of His Majesty's Government by such means.

I told his Excellency in confidence that M. Herriot had denied having sent any instructions to General Walch;⁶ but that the sudden change in the latter's attitude respecting the draft report seemed to His Majesty's Government inexplicable unless someone had done something to influence him.⁷ I added that the Belgian Government would, I felt sure, realise how undesirable it would be that the commission should send in separate majority and minority reports, which might occur if this unfavourable influence were not counteracted.

M. Hymans agreed with this latter remark, and said that, speaking personally, he felt sure that the French military authorities, not M. Herriot, had influenced General Walch. He had been present in Paris during the peace negotiations, when Field-Marshal Foch was trying to obtain the Rhine frontier for France.⁸ Those efforts he then knew were foredoomed to failure; but, in the absence of that military barrier, a very real anxiety existed respecting security in France, as in Belgium. It was felt by many persons in both countries, and particularly in military circles, that it would be unwise to give up the guarantee they had in hand, namely, the occupation of the Rhine, until some correspondingly weighty guarantee was forthcoming to take its place. He agreed that they must not distort the present report to such ulterior ends; but there would be unending friction and difficulties with regard to this question so long as France and Belgium had fears for their security. He realised that the occupation of the Rhine could not be continued indefinitely; but, as he had explained to Sir George Grahame (see Sir George Grahame's despatch No. 53 of the 18th January)² and to the British statesmen whom he had met at conferences at various dates, the only means of tranquillising these fears and of avoiding the constant difficulties and friction which sprang from them was for His Majesty's Government to enter into some sort of pact affording a sense of security to this country and to France.

I have, etc.,
CHARLES WINGFIELD

⁶ See No. 579.

⁷ See No. 577.

⁸ See No. 205, n. 6.

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 503 [C 1969/2/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 9, 1925*

My Lord,

[I transmit to your Lordship, herewith, a record of a conversation which took place today between the French Ambassador and Sir Eyre Crowe on the subject of the procedure to be followed in approaching the questions of inter-Allied debts and the evacuation of the Cologne zone.]

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 583

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French Ambassador

February 9, 1925

The French Ambassador spoke to me today on the effect made in France by Mr. Winston Churchill's letter to M. Clémentel.¹ He read to me a telegram from M. Herriot expressing warm gratification at the friendly tone of the letter and the confident hope that it would lead to a satisfactory settlement of the question of inter-allied debts.

M. de Fleuriau thought M. Clémentel would himself shortly come over to London to negotiate such settlement. This, he added, might offer an opportunity to M. Herriot to come too. A visit so arranged could then be utilised in order to arrange for confidential conversations on the subject of the evacuation of Cologne, without the presence of Italian and Belgian Representatives, an arrangement to which M. Herriot continued to attach great importance. Possibly the visit could be so timed as to lead naturally to the larger conference in which Italian [and] Belgian Ministers would join.

M. de Fleuriau however considered that it would never do for M. Herriot and M. Clémentel to come to London for the purpose of negotiating a settlement on the subject of debts, unless the success of the negotiation were assured beforehand. This meant that the ground must be properly prepared. To this end he suggested a preliminary discussion between French and British Treasury experts, and he mentioned that a high financial authority, M. Boyer (?) was shortly arriving in London who could place himself at the disposal of the Treasury for this purpose.

M. de Fleuriau said he was not instructed to make any proposals, but he begged me to think over what he had suggested and to let him know in a

¹ See No. 299, n. 13.

few days' time whether I considered the matter worth pursuing. I promised to do this.

I presume it was a polite fiction on the Ambassador's part that he was speaking without instructions. The question will no doubt have to be considered at the Treasury.²

M. de Fleuriau then reverted to what had passed in conversation between him and Mr. Chamberlain at their present interview³ as regards the method of bringing Germany into the discussion respecting the evacuation of Cologne. He thought it would be quite inevitable that the demands of the Allies as to the measures of disarmament still [to] be carried out by Germany should be presented to the German gov[ernment] with or without a time limit within which, if such action has been taken by then, the evacuation will take place. This was really necessary because the demands were military demands, concerning which the allied gov[ernment]s must give effect to the requirements of their military authorities.

I begged M. de Fleuriau to remember that although the subject matter was a military question, the decision involved political aspects of wider significance, and that it can therefore only emanate, and go forth, under the authority of the governments themselves. Whether it would be necessary to fire off a note to the German gov[ernment] containing categorical demands, was just one of those questions which the allied ministers meeting in conference ought to examine. I thought it quite possible that such a demand note might take the form of a notification accompanied by a request for an expression of Germany's views on the points indicated, and an invitation to join the allied ministers in a conference where the whole matter could be amicably discussed. It was a procedure on something like these lines which had proved eminently successful in the case of the London conference for putting into operation the Dawes scheme.⁴

M. de Fleuriau objected that there was no analogy; for in the case of the Dawes scheme the Allies had to get Germany to consent to things which went beyond her obligations under the treaty of Versailles. I said that admitting this, there still was a certain analogy. For Germany had before the calling of the London conference definitely and formally accepted the Dawes Report,⁵ by which acceptance she was as much bound, as she was, in respect of disarmament, by the treaty. In both cases it was a question of settling the conditions in which Germany's obligations, as well as those of

² In a letter of March 12 to M. de Fleuriau, Sir E. Crowe stated: '... As I explained in my earlier letter [of February 19, not printed], it is felt that any discussion of principles between experts would scarcely be useful until the French Government have put forward in a definite form their proposals in response to Mr. Churchill's letter [see n. 1]. If, however, the French Government are in doubt as to the meaning of any passages in that letter and would prefer to seek explanations of those passages orally rather than by written enquiry, the Treasury would naturally be very ready to give any explanation in their power to any representative whom the French Treasury may wish to send for this purpose.'

³ See No. 581, n. 3.

⁴ See No. 27, n. 8.

⁵ In a note of April 15, 1924, to the Reparation Commission. See Vol. XXVI, No. 431.

the Allies—for the Allies on their part were bound to evacuate Cologne on conditions—were to be carried out.

I saw no difficulty, I observed, in following a similar procedure to that adopted in the matter of the Dawes scheme. In that case the allied conference appointed committees, which drew up an agreed set of conditions to which Germany was to be asked to conform. After that, German delegates joined the conference. The enlarged conference reconstituted the committees which had already reported to the restricted allied conference, but with the addition of German members. In these committees the final settlement was threshed out, leading to a definite Agreement concluded in the full conference.

M. de Fleuriau promised to give careful consideration to what I had suggested. I have no doubt he will report to M. Herriot on the subject.

I did not, of course, say anything about a possible reluctance on our part to conclude an agreement on debts before the questions of Cologne and of a Pact had been got out of the way. But I remain, on this point, of the opinion to which I have in a former minute given expression.⁶

E. A. C.

⁶ In a minute of February 2 to Mr. Chamberlain (F.O. 800, vol. 257, ff. 231–2), Sir E. Crowe had stated: ‘... it would be, from the political point of view, important that the debt question should not be settled before we have come to terms with France about the pact and the evacuation of Cologne. For, once the debt question out of the way, we have no lever of any kind by which to put pressure on France. ...’

No. 584

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 569 [C 2199/2/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 13, 1925*

My Lord,

M. de Fleuriau sought an interview with me this afternoon to continue our discussion on the procedure to be followed in regard to the evacuation of Cologne and to the consideration of the Control Commission's report.¹ He referred to his previous conversations with Sir Eyre Crowe² and with me,³ and to the note which he left at this Office on the 10th February.⁴ He said that he thought there was some little difference between the ideas of M. Herriot and myself. M. Herriot's plan was that, having received and considered the report of the Versailles Commission, our Governments should enter into communication, and that, when they were agreed, they should communicate their requirements to Germany. There should be no time limit fixed by us for the fulfilment of these requirements, nor

¹ See Nos. 559, n. 4, and 560, n. 5.

³ See No. 581, n. 3.

² See No. 583, Enclosure.

⁴ Not printed (C 2030/2/18).

anything in the nature of an ultimatum. It would be for the Germans to facilitate and secure the evacuation by making good the defaults which we should point out to them. The application of our requirements might very probably give occasion for conversations, and these conversations should, in M. Herriot's opinion, be held in Berlin. For example, I had mentioned the other day the question of the police.³ M. Herriot thought that some concession on this point might be possible and that it would be a natural subject and occasion for such a conversation.

I enquired by whom these conversations were to be held. Were they to be in the hands of the Military Control Commission, or of the Ambassadors, or of Ministers themselves? M. de Fleuriau said that he presumed that M. Herriot's intention was that they should be in the hands of the Commission of Control.

At this point I must observe that M. de Fleuriau's exposition of M. Herriot's intentions was not quite clear. He had begun by saying that M. Herriot contemplated two stages, and that it was in the second of these stages that such a consultation of Ministers as I had desired⁵ might take place; but when he proceeded to develop his thought, I was unable to distinguish his two stages or to apprehend at what point in the proceeding the meeting of Ministers was to be held. I therefore asked M. de Fleuriau to allow me to repeat his statement of the procedure which M. Herriot contemplated, in order that I might be certain that I had rightly understood his proposals. This I did in the following form:—

1. The report by the Control Commission to Versailles.
2. The report by Versailles through the proper channels to the Allied Governments.
3. After consideration of this report by the Governments and preliminary communications through our Ambassadors, there would be—
4. The meeting of the Allied Ministers in London.

I told him that I attached the very highest importance to this point. I was convinced that the Allied Governments would never be able to reach an agreement unless the Ministers met personally. I added that, though the deliberations of the Ministers must be founded on the military reports and must take account of the opinions of the military experts, our decisions would naturally raise great political issues, of which Ministers alone were in a position to judge. M. de Fleuriau accepted a correct statement of M. Herriot's intentions the order of proceeding which I have set out above.

I then turned to the question of the manner in which the Allied decision should be communicated to the German Government, and I said that to this point also I attached the highest importance. I believed that we had a better chance now of obtaining satisfaction from the Luther Government than we had ever yet enjoyed or might ever enjoy again, but that, in order to take advantage of their good disposition, we must take account of their

⁵ See No. 562.

difficulties, and, while insisting upon that which we thought to be essential, present our demands in the most acceptable form. There could be no doubt whatever of the importance attached by the German Government to receiving the communication from us across the table, as they had done at the London Conference,⁶ instead of having it sent to them in a note presented by our Ambassadors in Berlin. M. Herriot himself could not doubt that the fact that the Germans were admitted to conference with the Allies at the London Conference was one of the main elements in the success of that conference, and that without it no results as satisfactory to the Allies themselves could have been obtained.

M. de Fleuriau said that, speaking for himself, he agreed with me both as to the meeting of Ministers and as to the methods of communicating our decision to the Germans, and he would recommend to the French Government the solution which I so strongly pressed.

He then said that, assuming events proceeded in this way, it would, in his opinion, be inexpedient to fix any exact date for the evacuation. We should say merely that these were the things which had to be done and that when they were done, evacuation would take place. In that case, some later meeting among the Allied Ministers would probably be necessary in order to fix the exact date for the termination of the military control and the evacuation itself. I replied that I attached no importance to fixing an exact date, and had indeed never suggested that the Allies should fix a date, but only that the Germans should be invited to say by what date they would have carried out our requirements, in order that we might make our preparations for evacuation to begin when their obligations were discharged. I attached, however, no importance to this particular procedure, and should be perfectly contented to adopt M. Herriot's proposal, provided that the Germans were plainly informed that when they had fulfilled our requirements, the evacuation would take place.

The Ambassador then said that M. Herriot was very anxious to make a personal visit to London and particularly desired to come to an agreement with me, but he realised that a meeting between us at this moment was impossible as it would give umbrage to our Allies. Here M. de Fleuriau entered on an exposition (which I found it difficult to follow) of the various complications and passing phases of opinion and fact which rendered a little delay advisable. The questions of debts, he believed, would be settled within a year; the recent excitement of opinion in France over this question and over security was mingled somewhat confusedly in a rather lengthy but obscure statement, which I think was intended only to bring the conversation round to the question of security.

This gave me an opportunity to refer to the conversation recorded in your Lordship's telegram No. 61 of the 12th instant.⁷ No sooner had I mentioned M. Herriot's reference to my desire to keep distinct the two questions of the evacuation of Cologne and security, and referred to M.

⁶ See No. 225, n. 17.

⁷ No. 198.

Herriot's observation to your Lordship that though there might be no *rapport juridique* between them yet there was a *rapport de causalité*, than the Ambassador produced from his pocket M. Herriot's account of the same conversation and read to me the relevant passages as well as M. Herriot's reference to the concluding words of article 429.

This enabled me to say, in the first place, that the concluding words of article 429 obviously had no connection with the evacuation of the Cologne area at the end of five years and related only to the termination of the whole occupation at the end of fifteen years. M. de Fleuriau replied that that was obviously the case and that there could be no dispute about it.

I next observed that there was much in your Lordship's account of M. Herriot's conversation with which I had been highly gratified. I was glad to receive M. Herriot's renewed assurance that he intended to conform his action in relation to Cologne to the terms of the treaty. I was glad, too, to observe that he shared my view of the dispositions of the Luther Government, but I could not but feel some anxiety at the way in which he continued to link together the two questions of evacuation and security. I was no less *obsédé* by the question of security than M. Herriot himself. It was never out of my mind, and there was hardly a conversation which I held with the representatives of continental States into which this question did not obtrude itself. I told M. de Fleuriau that I must say frankly that I could give him no assurance as to the ultimate decision of the British Government upon this question. I could make no promises of any kind whatever. I had not concealed from him that any kind of guarantee offered much greater difficulties, and would command a much less general support in this country today than in 1918 or at the time of the Cannes Conference;⁸ but I must say with all seriousness that nothing would create a worse public opinion in this country than the idea that France intended to remain in Cologne in defiance of the treaty until, or unless, a guarantee were arranged.

M. de Fleuriau said that he appreciated my difficulties, but he would beg me to remember that M. Herriot also was a Minister in a parliamentary country, dependent in large measure on public opinion, and that he also had his difficulties. He added that M. Herriot had said that 'his hopes for the success of his policy are based on his hope of an agreement for security'.

M. de Fleuriau's language was, I think, intentionally vague,⁹ but, if I interpreted it rightly, it means that M. Herriot wishes to pursue a policy of moderation and appeasement towards Germany; that he recognises that the question of security has no bearing on our right to continue the occupation of the Cologne zone, which will be justified by him as long as it continues only on treaty grounds, yet the extent to which he will consent to overlook minor defaults or to waive impossible requirements depends

⁸ See No. 315, n. 4.

⁹ See No. 23.

upon the progress which has been made in respect of security, and that what the Ambassador wished to convey to me was that, unless the President of the Council could convince his public opinion that he had advanced the security of France, he would be obliged by that public opinion to adopt a rigid and unyielding attitude towards the observance of the military clauses of the treaty.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 585

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 19)

No. 445 [C 2410/117/18]*

Urgent

PARIS, February 18, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 530 of the 11th February,¹ regarding civil aviation in Germany. This question will come up for discussion at a meeting of the conference next Saturday,² when I hope it will be possible to make some progress on the lines you lay down.

In your despatch you evidently contemplate that the modified rules³ should be communicated to the German Government either after or simultaneously with the invitation to join the Air Convention.⁴ This is what I shall try for, but I am afraid that the French may wish the invitation to be sent off *before* the modified rules are communicated to the German Government. This, of course, would be less satisfactory, inasmuch as it would give the French an opportunity, in the event of the Germans declining the invitation, to withdraw their consent to the modified rules. If, however, they absolutely insist upon this procedure, I propose to agree. After all, if the French did subsequently back out (and it is not certain that they would) our position would be no worse than a continuance of the present deadlock, and then there is, on the other hand, always a chance that the Germans may consent to join the convention.

A more important point is that regarding the German Government's request to be heard. The Air Ministry, in its letter of the 7th February,⁵ definitely rejects the proposal to invite the German Government to send representatives to Paris. I am not quite clear whether you endorse this view to the extent of cancelling the instructions in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 34 of the 24th ultimo,⁶ whereby I was to exercise a certain

¹ Not printed.

³ See Nos. 569, n. 2 and 574.

⁵ See No. 574, n. 14. A copy of this letter had been transmitted to Lord Crewe in Foreign Office despatch No. 530.

⁶ No. 572.

² February 21.

⁴ See No. 569, n. 3.

discretion in the matter. On reflection I cannot help feeling that it would be most regrettable if the Allied Governments were to refuse the German Government's request to be heard, for it must be remembered, as reported in my despatch No. 2576 of the 26th November,¹ that they made a formal request which will have to be answered. I enclose a memorandum by the secretary-general of the Ambassadors' Conference⁷ showing how this request came to be made. Although the French would no doubt try to prevent all discussion with the German representatives in the manner indicated by the Air Ministry in its letter, there is always a possibility that once a meeting takes place a useful discussion will ensue, and at the worst the German authorities will have had the satisfaction of being able to state their case. Besides, it is, if I am not mistaken, the established policy of His Majesty's Government that whenever the German Government are to be called upon to carry out requirements by the Allied Governments these requirements should not be communicated to them in writing, but should be conveyed to them at a joint meeting of Allied and German representatives. As His Majesty's Government are, moreover, advocating this procedure at the present time in the case of the military control in Germany, it seems only logical that the German Government should be similarly heard in the case of aeronautical control. I would propose, therefore, when the question comes up, to invite the conference to inform the German Government that it accedes to the German request to be heard on the subject of the nine rules, and that their representatives will be received by the Air Clauses Commission for this purpose. They would at the same time be informed that the Allied Governments' decision as regards the modification of the nine rules will be communicated to the German representatives when they present themselves before the commission. If you object to this course, or if you need further time in which to consider it, I should be grateful if a telephone message to this effect could be conveyed to me before the meeting.

I understand that the Italian Embassy is strongly in favour of the Germans being heard.

I am, etc.,
CREWE

⁷ Of November 29, 1924, not printed.

*Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 20, 4.25 p.m.)*

No. 72 Telegraphic [C 2513/21/18]

PARIS, February 20, 1925, 2.15 p.m.

Report of military commission of control in Germany.¹

Since Mr. Sargent's letter to Mr. Lampson² was written yesterday Marshal Foch has informed General Clive that when Versailles committee meets on Monday³ he will propose that committee should pass on report at once to Ambassadors' Conference without comment or proposals. If you wish Versailles committee to analyse report and to draw up for subsequent consideration by Ministers' Conference⁴ a list of essential

¹ The Final Report had been signed in Berlin on February 15 and a copy had been transmitted to the Foreign Office by the War Office on February 18 (C 2355/21/18, not printed). For a summary, see No. 592, below.

In the communication of February 16 to the War Office, Major-General Wauchope commented: 'The report was signed at 4 p.m. . . . I trust and believe it will meet with your approval. I am confident it is a great improvement on the draft originally drawn up by General Walch. My single aim this last fortnight has been to frame the report so that it should give a true picture of the situation as it is, and I believe my colleagues, though not all the time in agreement with me, recognise that this has been my aim. . . .

'The main report even now is not framed exactly as I should wish, but it is my honest belief that it contains nothing that we cannot prove, and, if the picture is a little darker than I see it, I think it a fairly correct representation of the state of affairs of control. As you are aware I am not responsible for all the annexes. There are a number of statements in the fortification annex which I am not in a position to verify. I made it clear in council that I held myself responsible only for the main body of the report and for the report of the Armaments Sub-Commission.

'Almost all my many suggestions have been accepted in the last few days, but I call your attention to four insertions which we only agreed to add after considerable discussion yesterday. Expressed shortly they are as follows:

1. In the domain of armament there has been no increase or decrease in the military strength of Germany since 1922.

2. The report shows that Germany has not carried out the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

3. The present situation may make it advisable that concessions should be given, provided Germany definitely shows that she is willing to make good those infractions proved.

4. Beyond the demands mentioned in this report this commission has no other demands to bring forward.

'I consider these four insertions add to the value and weight of the report. It is curious that, while my colleagues dwell at great length on minor infractions, they should have hesitated to bring out the second point as a short clear statement of fact.

'A fifth point that I wished to add was that Germany is not in a position to make war today with modern armament. Though, I think, my colleagues agree that this is true, General Walch did not wish to insert any such statement, as he considered it a matter of opinion rather than a statement of fact. . . .'

² Not printed.

³ February 23.

⁴ See Nos. 562, 580 and 584.

requirements which from military point of view must be satisfied by Germany before military commission of control can be withdrawn, it will be necessary either to instruct General Clive to refuse to agree to Marshal Foch's proposal or else for me to insist when report does come before Ambassadors' Conference that it should be sent back to Versailles committee for analysis.

I should be glad of your views as soon as possible.⁵

⁵ Mr. Chamberlain replied (telegram No. 76 of February 21): 'I am at a loss to understand Marshal Foch's proposal and French Ambassador is unable to explain it. War Office are wholly opposed to it. Only justification would be if by eliminating this stage meeting of allied ministers could be held almost at once. I gather Herriot thinks this impossible. See my despatch of today [Foreign Office despatch No. 657 to Paris, not printed, reported a conversation with the French Ambassador of that date]. In this case you should insist that normal course is followed and that Ambassadors' Conference has proper assistance from Versailles Committee.'

No. 587

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 74 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2526/117/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 20, 1925*

Your despatch No. 445 (of the 18th February).¹ Modification of the nine rules).²

Air Ministry would much prefer that communications to the German government in regard to the modification of the nine rules and their adherence to the Air Convention³ be made simultaneously, and you should therefore urge this view. If however the French insist as a matter of importance that the invitation to join the Air Convention be sent off before communicating the modified rules, we see no insuperable objection.

As regards the German government's request to be heard in Paris, it is essential that, if it is agreed to, care should be taken not to raise their hopes unduly seeing that French are apparently determined not to discuss the modifications of the rules with German representatives but merely to hand them proposed modifications. So long as Germans understand this clearly we see no objection.

¹ No. 585.

² See No. 569, n. 2.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 3.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 75 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2557/2118]

PARIS, February 22, 1925

After the Ambassadors' Conference yesterday¹ my Belgian colleague told me he had heard that the President of the Council had communicated with the French Ambassador in London, suggesting a meeting of Ministers at Brussels.² In view of this fresh development, I thought it well to ask for an interview with M. Herriot, and I saw him in the afternoon. He had evidently anticipated the purpose of my visit, and he had all the relevant papers before him. After I had explained that I was not calling under instructions from yourself, but in order to keep in touch with the ideas of the French government, M. Herriot began by reading me the reply of which you have been so good as to send me a copy enclosed in your despatch No. [657].³ He laid special emphasis on special points, such as the disastrous effect of possible differences of opinion at a too early meeting of Ministers, which would create an exaggerated impression of a breach in the *Entente*, even if not serious in themselves. I said that one point to which you attach special importance is that there should be oral communications with the German government, and not merely an exchange of Notes such as has so often proved unsatisfactory in the past. It is not that you do not realise the difference between the position as it existed in August 1924⁴ and the present necessity of simply acting on article 429 of the treaty, but that you believe that the moral effect of communications by word of mouth, instead of by writing, might make the whole difference in producing a successful result. M. Herriot said he did not dispute this,—he is not M. Poincaré, and desires to treat the Germans with courtesy. On the other hand, he apprehended danger in opening conversations, because the Germans were sure to begin with a flood of complaints and suggestions. In fact Herr Stresemann had said to the French Ambassador at Berlin that he wished to initiate conversations on this very Article 429. There could, of course, be no question of this, but once the Allies are agreed on what the Germans have to do to satisfy their obligations, he would in no way object to their being summoned to give their views on the methods for effecting this. I gathered that he would be

¹ There appears to be some confusion over the dating of this meeting. In the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Conference of Ambassadors (F.O. 893, vol. 26), it is given as February 21. In the Paris Embassy telegrams summarising the proceedings, it is given as February 23 (see No. 589, below).

² In a note of February 21, not printed.

³ There is a gap here in the text. In another text, this read '657'. Foreign Office despatch No. 657 of February 21 is not printed. See, however, No. 586, n. 5.

⁴ i.e. at the time of the London Conference on Reparations (see No. 225, n. 17).

willing, when a Note is sent stating the requirements of the Allies, that their consent should be intimated to hear any observations that the Germans may wish to make on the methods of carrying them out.

I then asked M. Herriot what was in his mind concerning the question of time. I knew that Maréchal Foch believed that the examination of the report⁵ by the Versailles Committee would not take very long,⁶ and I understand that the Ambassadors' Conference would not be expected to deal with the details. It seemed, therefore, as though the governments would soon have to decide on their joint course of action. M. Herriot replied that in his opinion it would be desirable for the Ambassadors' Conference to devote fuller attention than this to the report.

I observe that in the French note handed to you by M. de Fleuriau the phrase '*un échange de vue par voie diplomatique*' is used in paragraph 2, and that, in the last paragraph of the note, the Ambassadors' Conference is actually mentioned. This undoubtedly means that the French government will not support Maréchal Foch's view of the limited functions of the Versailles Committee, but will expect that body to set out the technical facts for the information of the Ambassadors' Conference.

M. Herriot next spoke of his desire that the Conference of Ministers should meet at Brussels, regarding it as a half-way house between a conference in Paris or one in London. It will give pleasure to the Belgians that it should be held there. I asked whether he had any date in his mind. He did not think it possible to summon it before your journey to Geneva for the meeting on March 9th,⁷ because there were various preparations to be made, but, subject to this consideration, he did not wish it to be postponed longer than is necessary.

M. Herriot desired me to repeat to you the assurance that he was determined not to treat the evacuation of the Cologne zone as contingent on the attainment of security for France. He realised this, knowing that the terms of the treaty must be literally fulfilled. But, as a simple matter of fact, he could sleep soundly as long as the British hold the zone, but not after they quit it. To put it in a different way, he felt like a man who has to pass through a dangerous forest and is glad to have a friend with him. He may have to go alone, but he is happier so long as he can retain the friend's company. He could not see, therefore, why the two questions, though not in themselves connected, might not be dealt with on parallel lines, that is to say that both might be taken into consideration in the course of the same period of discussions.

⁵ See No. 586, n. 1.

⁶ See No. 586.

⁷ See No. 74, n. 4.

*Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received February 24, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 74 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2641/21/18]

PARIS, February 23, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following questions:—

...¹ 3. Marshal Foch was asked what arrangements had been made by the allied military committee of Versailles to consider the report² of the military commission of control in Germany. He explained, as already reported in my telegram No. 72,³ that he did not consider that the Versailles committee could usefully modify either the facts as given in the appendix to the report, or the conclusions set forth in the report itself. He agreed, however, that the committee should express an opinion wherever the report offers suggestions or proposes alternatives. I understand that there are over twenty of such cases. If this view is accepted by the committee, the latter's functions will be limited to clearing up these doubtful points and communicating the report to the Ambassadors' Conference. This could be done in the course of next week. Monsieur Cambon pointed out that in that case the Conference would have to ask the allied governments whether they wished the Versailles committee to draw up definite proposals for their information and guidance.

...¹ 5. I informed the conference of the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to the modification of the 'nine rules'⁴ as set forth in your despatch No. 530 of February 11th,⁵ and your telegram No. 74 of February 20th.⁶ As I foresaw the French at once proposed that the invitation to join the air convention⁷ should be addressed to the German government before the modified rules are notified to them. On the other hand everyone was agreed that the conference should accede to the request of the German government⁸ that German experts should be heard on the subject of the rules. It was finally agreed that two separate and simultaneous notes⁹ should be addressed to the German government, one inviting them to join the air convention, and the other informing them that they are at liberty to send experts to Paris to state their views to the air clauses committee. The modified rules on the other hand have been approved 'en principe', but in order that they may be notified to the

¹ The section(s) omitted referred to other matters.

² See No. 586, n. 1.

³ No. 586.

⁴ See No. 569, n. 2.

⁵ Not printed. See, however, No. 574, n. 14.

⁶ No. 587.

⁷ See No. 569, n. 3.

⁸ See No. 585.

⁹ Copies of these notes of February 28 were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatches Nos. 535 and 543 of March 3, not printed.

German government, another resolution of the conference will be necessary and this resolution will only be taken when the air clauses committee has reported to the conference whether as a result of its conversations with the German experts, it considers any further modifications desirable.¹⁰ . . .¹

¹⁰ Accounts of the meetings of March 27 and 31 between the Air Clauses Committee and the German experts in Paris were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatches Nos. 761 of March 29 and 796 of April 2, not printed.

No. 590

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 686 [C 2746/21/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 24, 1925*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador called this afternoon to give me the answer to the question which I had put to him on Saturday morning.¹

I had asked him whether, if I waived my strong wish to communicate our demands in respect of military defaults² to the German Government across the table, M. Herriot, on his side would be prepared to accompany the presentation of the note in Berlin with a statement that, if the Germans wished to make any representations in regard to it, the Allies would be ready to receive their delegates. The Ambassador read to me the terms in which he had put this question to M. Herriot and the terms of M. Herriot's reply, and left me a copy of the note from which he read (Annex (A)). M. de Fleuriau said that this was the whole of his instructions, but he proceeded to elaborate on his own account M. Herriot's position.³ He stated that he himself, in submitting the proposition to M. Herriot, had found some difficulty in drawing up a possible formula for transmission to the German Government.

I thanked his Excellency for the information which he had obtained for me, and said that I would consider it carefully and consult my colleagues in regard to it. He and I reviewed briefly the results of our conversations,⁴ with the result that we found ourselves in agreement up to the moment of the presentation of the note in Berlin. When we were in possession of the report of the Versailles Committee,⁵ the Allied Governments would endeavour to come as nearly to an agreement as possible through the medium of our Ambassadors. The Allied Ministers would then meet to

¹ On February 21 in the conversation recorded in Foreign Office despatch No. 657 (see No. 586, n. 5).

² See No. 586, n. 1.

³ Cf. No. 588.

⁴ On February 6 (see No. 581, n. 3), February 13 (see No. 584), and February 21 (see n. 1).

⁵ See No. 589.

settle any outstanding point, and, when complete agreement had been obtained, our communication would be made to Germany. There was, however, still some difference of opinion between M. Herriot and myself as to procedure at that stage. For the moment, I would only say that, whilst I could understand that M. Herriot had to consider French opinion and how the French public might most easily be brought to accept his policy, I on my side had to take similar account of British opinion and to consider in what form that national assent could be secured to Allied action upon which the strength of British support must depend. I would add, without desiring to press the matter further at the moment, that I myself was not afraid of the result of summoning the Germans to a conference, nor troubled about the form in which the invitation or permission should be given. It was always open to the Allies, and for my part I should be quite willing, if the Germans took up an obstructive attitude or presented unreasonable demands, to tell them that it was not for this purpose that they had been invited to meet us, and that we could not continue a discussion with them upon that basis. We might, indeed, make the invitation itself turn upon the assurance given in Dr. Luther's speech⁶ that his Government was determined to make good any defaults that were shown to exist. I did not see, therefore, how we could lose anything by inviting them, and I thought that we might gain much. But for the moment I said this merely because, just as he had developed his thoughts to me, so I put my thoughts into the common stock in the hope that, by this free interchange of opinion, we should facilitate eventual agreement. M. de Fleuriau suggested that this point might be left open for consideration when the Allied Ministers met.

He then read to me the note printed as Annex (B)⁷ dealing with the overtures recently made by the German Ambassador in Paris.⁸ This, he said, was almost an exact translation of the communication which he had received from M. Herriot. He remarked that the communication was 'very interesting'. I added that it was very important. I observed with pleasure how closely M. Herriot's reply coincided with that which I had made to the German Ambassador under similar circumstances.⁹ I thought that this advance on the part of the German Government merited our most serious consideration. It might very possibly render easier a solution of the great problem with which we were faced.

M. de Fleuriau told me that he ought to add that M. Herriot had noted upon his communication that he had discussed the German memorandum with the Council of Ministers. It was very unusual for M. Herriot to mention such a fact, and the Ambassador evidently felt that it was done to give additional importance to the communication which he was authorised to make to me. He himself felt that M. Herriot desired to proceed towards the same objects as myself, but that he was compelled to move cautiously

⁶ See No. 576, n. 5.

⁸ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁷ Not printed.

⁹ See No. 195.

for public opinion in France was not yet prepared for any sort of pact with Germany. The Ambassador had noticed in small but influential circles an approach to it, but he thought that it would be of great consequence that an arrangement should first be made between France, Belgium and Great Britain. It would be far easier to come to an arrangement with Germany after this had been done. He must, however, add that France could not abandon the question of the eastern frontiers of Germany. Upon this point I remarked that to me it seemed that one of the most significant features of the communications made to Lord D'Abernon¹⁰ and by the German Ambassador in Paris to M. Herriot⁸ was that, for the first time, Germany was apparently willing voluntarily to recognise the existing situation in the east as well as in the west. I thought it was of great consequence for our future security that we should take whatever steps we could in our power to link Germany up with our western system and prevent her from forming an anti-western block with Russia. In conclusion I repeated that I should like to consider seriously the communications which he had made to me, and that I would report them to my colleagues, with whom I should take counsel. M. de Fleuriau then suggested that perhaps I might be able to discuss these matters with M. Herriot on my way to or from Geneva.¹¹ M. de Fleuriau had said nothing to him upon the subject, but he was sure that the President of the Council would be delighted to see me. I replied that I had the possibility of such a visit in mind, but did not at present know whether it could be realised.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ANNEX A

Translation

M. de Fleuriau had asked M. Herriot if he would see any objection to letting the Germans know at the time of communicating to them the note on armaments that, if they made any observations which would require consideration, their delegates could be admitted to present those observations.

M. Herriot considers that in an affair of such delicacy the most prudent courses are also the most sure. In warning the Germans in advance of the possibility of their being heard, an indication would be given them that they would be thus brought into discussions at a conference; polemics would thus ensue of a kind to embitter the discussions in progress and to agitate public opinion. In M. Herriot's opinion, there will always be time when the Germans make their observations (which they will certainly do) to decide how and by whom these observations can be examined with the delegates of the Reich, in the event, of course, of the German observations being considered of a nature to require consideration.

¹⁰ See No. 189, Enclosure.

¹¹ See No. 74, n. 4.

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the French Ambassador

[C 2932/741/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 26, 1925

The French Ambassador called this afternoon and said he was instructed to leave the attached communication¹ regarding the moot question of the stationing of a permanent League organisation of control in the demilitarised Rhineland. He explained at length the point of view of his Government, which was, briefly put, that, under the powers given to the Allies by articles 42–44 of the Treaty of Versailles, coupled with the powers conferred upon the League under article 213, the council have the right to establish such measures of League control—including a permanent resident commission—in the Rhineland as they thought fit.

I said that I was extremely sorry to have to tell his Excellency that we had gone most carefully into this question; that we had taken the highest legal opinion available in the land,² and that the advice we had received was that the matter was governed by article 213, and that under that article the council only had power to carry out investigations in Germany, including the demilitarised Rhineland, from time to time and as occasion arose; in short, what we called here for convenience sake '*ad hoc* investigations'. I went on to assure him that this opinion had only been given after most mature consideration by all the competent authorities; that we fully understood France's particular preoccupation as regards the Rhineland, but that there it was, and with this legal advice before them the British Government clearly had no alternative but to act upon it. It would be quite wrong that, with this knowledge in their possession, they should agree to any organisation in the Rhineland which they were advised on the highest legal authority was not covered by the terms of the treaty. But, whilst this was so—and I was afraid it might be a matter of some disappointment to the French Government—was there not a brighter side to the picture? Our point of view was that the situation was governed entirely by the powers conferred upon the council by article 213 of the treaty; I showed his Excellency the wording of the article, and pointed out that under it the council would be in a position to send in a commission of enquiry whenever there was any suspicion that Germany was evading not only the general disarmament clauses of the treaty, but the special provisions of articles 42, 43 and 44. For example, supposing we should receive reports to the effect that Germany was making fortifications or moving troops in the demilitarised zone, then it would be open to the council to send a commission forthwith to see whether the reports were

¹ Of February 26 (C 2843/741/18), not printed.

² The Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown of January 16 is filed at C 741/741/18, not printed.

correct or not. I would call his attention to the fact that the organisation of these investigations³ was to be of a permanent character, though not resident in any of the ex-enemy countries; as he knew, we, the various Governments concerned, had already notified the council of the names of our respective officers who were to be the heads of the League commissions of investigation; in the case of Germany, it was to be an eminent French soldier, General Desticker.⁴ There would thus always be ready to hand the necessary League machinery for carrying out an investigation as and when considered necessary. Surely that ought to meet the French requirements. I found it difficult to imagine that any serious breach of articles 42–44 would occur in the Rhineland without our getting some inkling of the fact, and being thus in a position to set the League machinery in motion.

The Ambassador seemed to admit that there was some force in these observations, but he said that the legal advice given to the French Government (he added that it was not the advice of M. Fromageot) was different [from] ours. They were advised that under the treaty the League had full powers to appoint a resident commission of investigation in the Rhineland should they wish to do so. I said I was afraid this showed a direct difference of opinion between the legal advisers of the two countries, and, frankly, I was unable to suggest any means of getting over the difficulty; it must be a matter for discussion between the Secretary of State and the French delegation, and I fully agreed with his Excellency that it would be very desirable if by some means or other this divergence of opinion would be prevented from coming before the council.

His Excellency then said that it had occurred to him personally that we might have been guided by the analogy of the treaty with Turkey establishing a commission of control to reside at Constantinople and control the neutrality of the Dardanelles.⁵ I said I was afraid that the analogy was not a good one, for in that case the treaty specifically provided for the establishment of a resident commission of control. The whole difference in the present case was that the Treaty of Versailles contained no such provision.

The Ambassador then touched on another difficulty which was preoccupying his Government, namely, the question of what action was open to the Council of the League to take if and when they received from one of their commissions of investigation a report showing an infraction by one of the ex-enemy countries. M. Briand had referred to this question at the last meeting of the council,⁶ but final discussion had been postponed until the meeting on the 9th March.⁷

³ See No. 10, n. 2.

⁴ See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 270 and 282.

⁵ For the text of the treaty of July 24, 1923, between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Russia, and Turkey, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 117, pp. 592–600.

⁶ On December 10, 1924. See *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 138–9.

⁷ See No. 74, n. 4.

I said we were well aware of this delicate question. We had gone into it very thoroughly, and we had now come to the conclusion, upon legal advice,⁸ that the League had no right under the treaties or under the covenant to take action against any of the ex-enemy countries to enforce any infractions of those treaties. Our view now was that, when such a report was received by the council, all the council could do would be to publish it to the world at large. Thereupon the various signatories under the treaty would have such rights as they already possessed under the treaty to take action against Germany to enforce those rights, but, if such enforcement entailed anything in the nature of a threat of war, then article 11 of the covenant would come into play, and the League would be called in to endeavour to prevent an actual conflict.

M. de Fleuriau appeared to agree generally with this statement of the position. But he put forward, as a private suggestion, that, if and when an ex-enemy country were convicted before the League of an infraction of the disarmament clauses of one of the peace treaties, then, in addition to publishing the report, the council might well address a formal note of protest to the culprit. It seemed to him that that might be not a bad course of procedure.

I said the idea was a new one to me. Speaking off-hand, I knew no reason why the League should not address such a note of protest, but there, again, I presumed that the rule of unanimity would apply, and that no such note could be sent unless all the members of the council were agreed.

On leaving, the Ambassador said he would at once inform his Government of what I had told him regarding our views of the question of a permanent commission in the Rhineland. He would like very much to find some way out of this *impasse* before the meeting at Geneva on the 9th March, but it certainly seemed to him very difficult to do so; anyway, if anything helpful occurred to him or his Government, he would at once come down and lay the suggestion before the Secretary of State.

MILES W. LAMPSON

⁸ Given by Sir C. Hurst in a minute of January 16, 1925 (C 70/70/62), not printed.

No. 592

Summary of the Final Report of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control into the General Inspection of German Armaments, February 15, 1925

[C 2853/21/18]★

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 27, 1925*

I—Introduction

Negotiations between the Allies and the German Government leading

up to the agreement on a general inspection. Negotiations between the Commission of Control and the German Government as to the method of conducting the inspection (the 17th July—the 10th September). Difficulties raised by German Government. Agreement finally reached.¹

II—General atmosphere attending the Inspection

Difficulties placed in the way of the general inspection. Little obstruction met with as regards police and effective[s] or from the civil authorities. Strong resistance was on the other hand put up by the military authorities. This was largely overcome after some time in regard to the inspection of armaments, but continued to the end in the case of the effectives. The inspecting officers met with both obstruction and dissimulation, and this was so general that the inference is that it was part of an organised plan.

III—Results of General Inspection

(A)—Armaments

(i) *Factories, Depots, Arsenal*s—Various kinds of war material have been manufactured without authorisation by the commission (though not for the most part beyond the quantities allowed). Certain destructions require to be carried out in unauthorised private factories. Some of the old State factories (Deutsche Werke) have illegally extended their works. Among the authorised factories, important transformations are still required in Krupps, the W.A.S.A.G. (Reinsdorf), the Rheinmetall (Ehrhardt) and Dortmunder Union; the two latter now seem prepared to carry out the demands of the commission. The condition of the military establishments (depots, arsenals, etc.) is much the same as in 1922² and much needs to be done in the way of transformation and alienation.

(ii) *Allotments and Reserves of Arms*—Troops are armed generally on the scale prevailing in 1922, but the reserves have improved in quality and in some cases in quantity. The stocks are often above those authorised by the commission, sometimes also above those authorised by the German Government. The latter admit that they have not reduced the allotment of arms to the figures laid down by the commission. The police, too, possess unauthorised equipment.

(iii) *Hidden Depots*—Certain finds were made during the course of the inspection, one of considerable importance being that at Wittenau.³

(iv) *Coastal Fortifications*—Mounting of coastal guns on fixed emplacements remains to be carried out.

(v) *Associations*—There are unauthorised arms still in possession of the civilian population, *e.g.*, artillery formations were used in the *coup d'Etat* in November 1923,⁴ but no guns have since been handed in.

¹ See No. 559, n. 4.

² For documentation on the state of German disarmament in 1922, see Vol. XX, Nos. 202, 238, Enclosure 1, 242, Enclosure 2, and 263.

³ See No. 575.

⁴ For this right-wing *coup* in Munich (the Hitler–Ludendorff *putsch*), see Vol. XXI, Nos.

- (vi) *Legislation*—There still remain to be carried out laws forbidding—
 - (a) Import and export of arms.
 - (b) The illicit manufacture and possession of, and traffic in, arms.

(B)—*Effectives*

(i) *Reichswehr*—In regard to organisation, the Reichswehr, instead of being organised for internal purposes as laid down in the treaty, is being built up under the direction of the High Command to prepare the nation for war. The High Command is itself contrary to the treaty, as is also the Great General Staff which is still in existence. The various arms are instructed and organised in ways forbidden by the treaty, *e.g.*, no essential modification has been made in the pre-war military railway organisation. In regard to numbers, supplementary cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers and short-term recruits have been observed. The treaty is infringed by the system of short-term recruiting, and other infringements have been noted, such as an undue percentage of discharges per annum.

(ii) *Police*—The organisation remains as it was in 1922; the numbers are 180,000 (*viz.*, 30,000 too many).

(iii) *Associations*—Great difficulties have been experienced in finding out anything about military associations, but members of them have been found receiving military instruction.

(C)—*Fortifications*

Certain changes have been made in the coastal fortifications, but their importance is difficult to determine exactly, owing to German obstruction.

IV—*Progress made in the Execution of the Five Points*⁵

(i) *Police Reorganisation*—Not yet begun. Conversations in progress.

(ii) *Transformation of Munition Factories*—Some very slight progress.

(iii) *Delivery of Excess War Material*—Certain destruction has been carried out by Krupps, and a few other deliveries have been promised by the German Government.

(iv) *Documents*—The commission has not yet informed the German Government that this point may be dropped. No documents have been delivered.

(v) *Legal and Administrative Measures*—Practically none of the laws hitherto passed are wholly satisfactory.

V—*Cases of Discovery of Rearmament, etc.*

(A)—*Armaments*

Certain factories have recommenced making war material or have enlarged their military works. Provision has been made for increasing the arms allotted to certain units (*e.g.*, six instead of four heavy machine guns for cavalry squadrons), and the budget allows unduly large sums for the upkeep and replacement of armaments.

632 and 637. See also Vol. XXVI, No. 646.

⁵ See No. 23, n. 4.

(B)—*Effectives*

The situation has deteriorated generally since 1922; see the cases quoted in the results of the general inspection.

(C)—*Fortifications*

Certain new constructions have been effected.

VI—*Summary and Conclusions*

The object of the general inspection was to show the military condition of Germany today in comparison with that prevailing in 1922. Apart from certain cases, where the Deutsche Werke have ceased manufacture, the reductions are small in comparison with the extensions. While it is true that the situation as regards armaments, with certain exceptions, is much the same as in 1922, on the other hand, deterioration has been noted in regard to effectives, recruiting, military instruction and fortifications. It may generally be said that almost all that was outstanding in every line in 1922 is still outstanding, while as regards the effectives the situation has deteriorated.

The report ends by summarising the important outstanding points in two categories, according as they fall or do not fall within the five points. All these infractions taken together are, in the opinion of the commission, sufficiently important to require putting right, and the commission will not on its own initiative be able to declare the military clauses fulfilled until these points are sufficiently advanced as to have attained the degree of disarmament required by the treaty, which is now far from the case.

*Annex I*⁶

Annex I contains copies of the correspondence between the German Government and the Control Commission on obstruction to control. The question dealt with is not of obstruction in general, but of a dispute that arose between the German Government and the Control Commission in regard to the latter's right of access to all documents that might be required. The commission claimed that the question was settled by article 208 of the treaty, by which 'the German Government must furnish to the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the military clauses'.

The German Government, on the other hand, argued that—

- (1) The general inspection was not an automatic continuation of control, but was based on a special agreement between themselves and the Allies for enquiry into the *present* military condition of Germany; article 208 was therefore not applicable.
- (2) In any case, article 208 must be read in conjunction with article 203, which limited the commission's functions to controlling the time-limit clauses.
- (3) For these reasons the German Government could not allow the

⁶ None of the Annexes listed below is here printed. See No. 586, n. 1.

commission access to any and every document, though they were ready to produce particular documents which bore upon single and concrete facts. No agreement was reached on the principle involved.

Annexes II and III

Annexes II and III are extracts from reports of inspections, giving examples of the complaints referred to in annex I.

Annex IV

Annex IV is a series of extracts from reports of inspections by the Armaments Sub-Commission showing what difficulties were met with in getting information requested. Out of a total of 421 visits to units, difficulties were met with in twenty-nine cases.

Annex V

Annex V contains similar extracts from reports of the Effectives Sub-Commission. A very large number of examples [is] given which indicate that a plan of deception had been worked out throughout the army. Documents previous to 1924 had been largely destroyed, and those produced were in many cases obvious forgeries. The following extract from a report of an inspection at Lindau is only typical of the rest:—

‘Il y a lieu de noter:

‘Que toutes les pièces et documents présentés étaient intégralement et complètement neufs. Ils ne ressemblent en rien à ceux que nous avions l’habitude de feuilleter autrefois. Ils ont si beaux, si propres, si bien tenus et si exacts, qu’ils ont été, sans aucun doute, fabriqués de la première page à la dernière, pour les besoins de la cause.’

Annex VI

Annex VI is a report (Armaments Sub-Commission) of a surprise visit to a regiment in Potsdam. In spite of all protests access was refused to a room in which stocks of arms could be observed through the windows.

Annex VII

Annex VII is the final report (Armaments Sub-Commission) of the visit to the Wittenau factory.³

Annex VIII

Annex VIII is a treatise on the action taken by the German Government against persons who divulged infractions of the treaty in Parliament or in the press. Examples are given of the cases of Herr Zeigner, former President of Saxony, who was given three years’ imprisonment; Herr Fechenbach, who received five years; Professor Quidde, who was arrested though never tried.

Annex IX

Annex IX is the report of the Armaments Sub-Commission.

(A) *Letter of the President—*

(1) Results up to September 1922. The letter, after saying on what scheme the report is based, sketches what had been done up to September 1922.

Of 6,930 factories, all but 187 had been visited and authorised to do civil work. Of the remainder, the most important were the old State factories, the factories authorised to produce war material and those which formerly specialised in war material. Figures were then given of the numbers of guns, rifles, etc., destroyed. In spite of this the Reichswehr was known to possess larger quantities of arms than were authorised.

(2) General inspection. In spite of individual cases of obstruction, no general or organised plan of obstruction was observed. At first the military authorities refused all information relating to matters previous to April 1924, but this improved after November. The authenticity of some documents produced seemed doubtful, but fraud was impossible to prove. The inspection of factories indicated that in regard to war material the military situation had only slightly been improved by new manufactures since September 1922. Several factories seemed desirous of coming to an arrangement, *e.g.*, the Rheinmetall, Dortmunder Union. On the other hand, resistance was still shown by Krupp, the W.A.S.A.G. at Reinsdorf, Mauser at Obersdorf, the Berlin Karlsruher Industrie at Wittenau and Karlsruhe and the Deutsche Werke.

(3) Further paragraphs deal with military depots, coastal defences, equipment of army, police and Zeugämter,⁷ material in the depots of the Reichstreuhandgesellschaft⁸ in September 1922, telephonic and wireless material and surprise visits.

(4) *Conclusions*—In September 1922 German disarmament was far enough advanced to prevent Germany waging war under modern conditions with any chance of success. The same is true today. The general inspection shows that Germany has not seriously increased or decreased her armaments or capacity for construction since September 1922. On the other hand, she has committed numerous infractions of the treaty, and failed to obey the demands of the commission in respect of the transformation of factories and delivery of excess war material. The transformation of the important factories is essential to prevent Germany from rapidly and dangerously developing her military resources. Provided that she shows a clear intention of conforming to the demands of the commission, certain concessions might be granted on less important infractions.

(B) The report itself is divided into three parts dealing respectively with—

(1) Factories, depots and workshops;

(2) Stocks of material existing in depots, units, etc; and

(3) Coastal defences.

To the report are attached numerous appendices⁹ showing the position in the greatest detail. Finally there is a statement of the material delivered and destroyed up to February 1925, and a statement of the material discovered in surprise visits during the general inspection.

⁷ Ordnance depots.

⁸ State Trust Company.

⁹ Not here printed.

Annex X

Annex X is the report of the Effectives Sub-Commission.

The report begins with an introduction showing how the inspection was handicapped by a regular plan of obstruction organised by the High Command and faithfully carried out by the military authorities. Consequently the facts obtained are of varying significance; as regards the police they are complete and exact, but as regards the army they can only be approximative, while as regards military associations it was impossible to get information from the military or even the civil authorities.

The report itself is divided into three parts dealing with (A) the general inspection; (B) progress in the execution of the five points; and (C) conclusions; twenty annexes are added to prove various allegations made.

Part (A)—*General Inspection*

In regard to the army, every effort is made to prove that a system is carefully worked out to divert the army from the task allotted to it by the treaty (*i.e.*, police and frontier work), and to make it into a cadre of leaders to prepare the nation for war. The chief responsibility for this rests upon the High Command, itself an illegal institution. Endless examples are given of the various ramifications of the system.

(1) Building up of a Great General Staff with central organisation and staff courses much on the pre-war model.

(2) The instruction of the various arms in ways forbidden by the treaty, *e.g.*, aeroplanes for observation, heavy field guns made of wood for use in manœuvres, etc.

(3) The existence of an air council not unconnected with military matters.

(4) The retention of all essentials of the pre-war military railway organisation; the pre-war statute remains and all the rolling-stock is still marked off for military use.

(5) The preparation of complementary cadres of officers for the Reichswehr.

(6) The existence in the units of men illegally incorporated and not shown on the regimental lists.

(7) A regular system of preparing the youth for war. This was started under the direction of the High Command during the interruption of control, and may be seen in the association with the Reichswehr of military societies, and the system of instruction of their members.

(8) *Military Administration*—The number of civilian officials and employees far exceeds that authorised by the commission; the whole of the pre-war store-houses have been placed at the disposal of the Reichswehr; the stocks of clothing and food are infinitely larger than could be required for a police force (which is the Reichswehr's proper rôle).

As regards the police, little is said that has not been said elsewhere. The old pre-war police remain with their statutes and a slight increase of effectives, and the Schutzpolizei is a mobile force with a military character, superimposed on the old police; it is governed by an *imperial* law and

four-fifths of its expenses are covered by the Reich. It is 30,000 above the authorised strength. Several States too in 1923–24 organised auxiliary police, which is contrary to Allied demands on the subject.

In regard to military associations, in spite of the impossibility of getting any information either from the military or civil authorities, it is clear that their illegal activities have continued and that they have relations with the army.

Part (B)—*Progress in the Execution of the Five Points*⁵

(1) Police, no progress, but negotiations have begun with the Prussian Government.

(2) Legislation. Two laws have been passed—

(a) Annuling an old law regarding military service, but the necessary administrative measures still remain to be taken.

(b) A law ordering the partial destruction of military archives held by the civil authorities.

Part (C)—*Conclusions*

The conclusions, which are divided into two parts:—

(1) incomplete execution of military clauses,

(2) increase in military resources.

sum up the foregoing.

Annex XI

Report on the general inspection of fortifications. Certain improvements have been carried out in the coastal fortifications, but the German Government refused to hand over any plans, and otherwise obstructed the inspection. Certain developments have been made also in fortresses on the eastern frontier.

No. 593

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 4, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 92 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3110/21/18]

PARIS, March 3, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning, under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following questions:—

1. The Conference had before it the allied military committee of Versailles' appreciation of the report of the commission of control¹ on the state of German armaments. Copy of this appreciation was forwarded to you in my despatch No. 518 of the 28th February, 1925.² I received your telegram No. 80³ in time for the meeting and read out the substance of it

¹ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592.

² Not printed.

³ Of March 2. This ran as follows: 'If, as I understand from today's papers, the Versailles

to the Conference. But, I had already in anticipation of today's discussions, distributed to my colleagues on the Conference a memorandum,⁴ copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 544 of today,² proposing that the question should be referred back to the allied military committee of Versailles in order that it should formulate the definite conditions subject to which the allied governments will be ready to remove the commission of control. In this memorandum I considered it advisable to lay stress upon the withdrawal of the commission of control rather than the evacuation of Cologne since the general inspection⁵ was originally instituted in order to enable the commission of control to be withdrawn and the question of the evacuation of Cologne has only been grafted on to it subsequently. Also the allied governments are, in respect of the withdrawal of the commission of control, bound by the assurances they have given at different periods to limit their demands to be made on the German government and it is desirable if possible that demands made in respect of the evacuation of Cologne should be the same.

From the remarks made by Monsieur Laroche at today's meeting, I have some fear lest the French government may wish to make the evacuation of Cologne dependent on further conditions than those required for the withdrawal of the commission of control, but I hope that by keeping to the forefront the undertakings given by the allied governments in the matter of the withdrawal of the commission of control it will be possible when the Versailles committee comes to formulating the conditions for the evacuation of Cologne, to press for these to be not more far reaching than those laid down for the withdrawal of the commission of control.

You will also observe that in my memorandum I have drawn a distinction between those features in the armament of Germany which constitute violations of the Treaty and those others, often more important, for which the Treaty offers no remedy.

The Conference was generally agreed this morning to invite the allied military committee of Versailles to furnish a further report, but it was not

Committee's appreciation of 28th February is to come before the Ambassadors' Conference tomorrow, I think it important that in thanking them for this valuable contribution you should at once move that the matter be referred back to them with instructions to continue their labours and formulate, in precise terms suitable for textual presentation to the German Government, a concise statement of the several defaults under the treaty which will have to be made good before evacuation can take place. The demands should as far as possible be classed under the different heads of the "five points" [see No. 572, n. 4], and should not include minor points which are not of real and practical importance. I earnestly hope that your colleagues will agree to this step, which would save time.

'It will naturally be impressed upon the committee that it must be stated in each instance exactly which clause of the treaty has been broken or not fulfilled, and that nothing can be included in the demands which is not clearly and indisputably covered by the terms of the treaty. The German Government will be on the look-out for any non-treaty demands on the part of the Allies; it is essential that no excuse of any kind be given them for accusing the Allies of bad faith.'

⁴ Of March 2, not printed.

⁵ See No. 559, n. 4.

found possible during the meeting to formulate the precise instructions which would define the requirements of the Conference. It was accordingly decided to entrust the secretaries with the task of preparing a draft resolution for this purpose for submission to the various ambassadors. . . .⁶

⁶ The sections omitted referred to other matters.

No. 594

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 413 [C 3146/2/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 3, 1925*

My Lord,

The German Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon. I repeated my condolences on the death of President Ebert,¹ and his Excellency said that his first object in coming was to thank me for the messages which I had already sent. The death of the President was a great blow to Germany and increased the difficulties and uncertainties of her situation.

This brought him to the question of disarmament, in regard to which he desired to say that the Government maintained its attitude. There were probably points which would arouse no controversy and could be easily adjusted. There would, no doubt, be others which were controversial and suitable for discussion in the same way as reparations were discussed at the London Conference.² If, however, Germany was to be treated as a criminal arraigned for offences, such treatment would not promote settlement or make compliance easy. He hoped that there might be a round table conference to discuss these questions, starting from the point that the German Government was willing to remedy whatever was in arrear; but this would take time. Much time seemed already to have been spent and little progress made. He pressed, therefore, for publication in full of the report of the Control Commission.³ He believed the withholding of it prejudiced public opinion outside Germany against Germany, and in Germany against the Allies. He thought that publication would be fairer to Germany and would give her the opportunity to offer explanations and to know at least of what she was accused.

The Ambassador went on to say that it was impossible to speak on disarmament without dealing with the date for the evacuation of Cologne. If the German Government and people had no assurance that even when they had complied with the Allies' demands evacuation would take place, compliance would certainly be rendered more difficult and might be

¹ See No. 217, n. 2.

² See No. 225, n. 17.

³ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592.

made impossible, for any Government which attempted it would probably be overthrown. The German Government had shown its readiness to discuss the question of security and to find means for assuring it, but it could not consent to treat the evacuation as dependent on security or to enter on the discussion of disarmament on that basis.

Here the Ambassador dealt with some points of importance but of detail. He contended that the rules for the control of Germany's disarmament issued by the League last December⁴ were not in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of the treaty, namely, that article 213 should be applied to the demilitarised Rhineland area. Article 213, he contended, referred only to the special part of the treaty applicable to the operations of the inter-Allied control before the League of Nations took up their task. It could not, he held, be applied to articles 42-44, which dealt with the demilitarised area. Further, he had observed that a great deal was being said in the French press, and particularly by M. Boncourt,⁵ about the *éléments stables* of the League's control. He contended that the permanent location of the control in the demilitarised area was both illegal and unnecessary: illegal because it was not sanctioned by the treaty, and unnecessary because, in an area so much frequented and so open to the day as the Rhineland, no breaches of the treaty stipulations could take place without being at once apparent. Any insistence on this point by the League would present in every respect a great impediment to progress. Particularly, it would act as a strong deterrent to Germany entering the League, a course which was already sufficiently unpopular in consequence of some past decisions of the League to which he need not refer. He added that he would not say that the German Government would not be prepared to talk this matter over with the Allies, but they could never accept it as a condition which it was competent for the League to impose in terms of the treaty.

In reply, I repeated to the Ambassador what I had already publicly said,⁶ and what, as I mentioned, Lord Curzon was probably repeating in the House of Lords⁷ at that moment, that our object was to secure satisfaction for the just demands of the Allies and thus to facilitate the early evacuation of Cologne. We viewed the question of publication as one to be decided solely by reference to the effect it would have in promoting or defeating this object. I took note, however, of his view and the view of the German government that publication was desirable. I added that, in our opinion, the evacuation was to be considered solely in terms of the treaty, and though the question of security was of great importance, it was not upon that issue that the date of the evacuation ought to turn.

⁴ For discussions of the League scheme of control (see No. 10, n. 2) at the Thirty-Second Council (see No. 28, n. 4), see *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 133, 136-9, 139-43, 147, 155, and 223-30. See also No. 596, below, and Vol. XXVI, Nos. 262, 268, 270 and 282.

⁵ Presumably the reference is to M. Paul-Boncour.

⁶ On February 19 to the House of Commons. See 180*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 1271-2.

⁷ For Lord Curzon's speech of March 3, see 60*H.L. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 355-61.

I then turned to the German proposals on the question of security.⁸ I reminded him that immediately after receiving them I had expressed to him my satisfaction at this new step on the part of the German Government, and had shown the importance which I attached to it.⁹ Now that, in accordance with what he had told me of the intentions of his Government, they had communicated the same memorandum to Paris, Brussels and Rome, I attached even greater importance to it. It seemed to me to offer the best chance that we had yet had of really making progress, of putting the peace of Europe on a stable basis, and of sensibly improving the relations between Germany and the Allies. Holding this view of the German *démarche*, I would tell him frankly that the object of British policy would be to secure the most favourable conditions for the further consideration of the German suggestions, and to regulate our conduct in regard to the questions of Cologne and disarmament with a view to prevent any untoward incident bringing the negotiations to an end. I urged upon him strongly that, if the German Government were sincere, they should act in the same spirit, and that they should make a real effort to fulfil Dr. Luther's pledge that they would make good the defaults which were shown to exist.¹⁰

The Ambassador repeated his assurances of the sincerity and goodwill of the German Government. He used the expression that they desired to turn over a new page, but for this there was required not merely an order from the Allies but an agreement between the Allies and Germany in the settlement of the matters still outstanding; in particular, for instance, upon the number of police required to maintain internal order and the equipment necessary to be left in factories for ordinary commercial purposes. There was, he argued, nothing in the treaty to decide such questions. Why not, then, discuss them, let the Germans go into details and give their reasons for the case which they would submit?

I then told the Ambassador that I could make him no promises, and that I could obviously take no decisions with the Allies, but assuming, as I did assume, that the German Government sincerely desired to make good its defaults and to adopt a new attitude towards the Allies and the treaties, His Majesty's Government would use whatever influence they possessed to obtain for the representatives of the German Government an opportunity of meeting the representatives of the Allies. It must, however, be clearly understood that the meeting would be only for the purpose of seeing how the treaty stipulations could best be carried out, and that any attempt to rewrite its clauses or dispute its provisions would at once bring the meeting to an end.

The Ambassador expressed his thanks for this announcement, and said that it would be a great help. If I were averse, on the grounds I had suggested, to the publication of the Control Committee's report, he would

⁸ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁹ See No. 195.

¹⁰ See No. 576, n. 5.

suggest that we should consider whether, at any rate, a copy might not be handed to the German Government without publication.

I repeated that I had taken note in my mind of the stress which he laid on publication, and I should not forget this further suggestion.

In conclusion, I again impressed upon him in general terms that I thought the German memorandum offered at any rate a chance of affording a basis for new and better relations between Germany and the Allies, and for securing the peace of Europe, and that therefore it behoved all parties to act with prudence and moderation in the meantime so that these suggestions might receive a fair consideration and that the prospects which they opened out might not be clouded by fresh misunderstandings. He must remember that the attitude of Germany in many matters, since peace was signed, had created a profound distrust in public opinion here and elsewhere.

The Ambassador replied that this distrust of the sincerity and good faith of Germany was most discouraging to the German Government, and that it was a relic of the period of revolution and of the weak and unskilled Governments which for a time ruled, but the present governors of Germany were sincere and honourable men. They meant what they said, and their good faith could be trusted.

I had declined to go into the detailed but very important points about the meaning of the treaty which the Ambassador raised, preferring for the moment to turn to the broader aspects of the situation presented by the German memorandum; but, as I think your Lordship is aware, His Majesty's Government have been advised on the highest authority¹¹ that the treaty gives the League no authority to establish those *éléments stables* in the demilitarised area for which French opinion contends, and to which the Ambassador objected. On the other hand, the Council of the League, at their meeting in Rome, proceeded upon the basis that article 213 was of general effect and not confined to Chapter V.

The Ambassador repeatedly returned to the question of the delay in dealing with the evacuation of Cologne. Upon this point he evidently laid the greatest stress. He referred to it again and again. I could say nothing more than that His Majesty's Government had no desire to prolong the suspense or the occupation, but that time must be allowed for the Allied Governments to obtain the necessary advice and to concert their action. I added that it would be easy to call upon the Germans to fulfil, without further examination, every requirement indicated by the Control Commission, but it was surely as much in the interest of Germany as of the Allies that the latter should have time to consider whether it was necessary to insist upon every detail.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ See No. 591, n. 2.

No. 595

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 84 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3110/21/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 5, 1925*

Your telegram No. 92¹ and despatch No. 544.² Cologne.

I am perplexed at the difficulty which may arise from your having in your memorandum of March 2nd³ raised the question of the withdrawal of the Commission of Control. This is a subsidiary matter, which I think it would have been better not to raise until the major issue of the conditions on which Cologne is to be evacuated had been disposed of.

I am not quite clear whether you have succeeded in getting explicit instructions issued to the Versailles Committee to proceed at once with the work of drawing up a concise statement, in a form suitable for communication to the German government, of the various defaults under the treaty which Germany must make good before evacuation can take place. That is the point upon which we ought to concentrate for the moment. The withdrawal of the Commission is no doubt a cognate problem but it can well stand over until the main question is definitely settled.

Please see (if there is any doubt about it) that Committee are instructed to work on this at once and that they are given no pretext—such as question of when the Commission of Control shall be withdrawn etc.—upon which to delay producing what we want.

¹ No. 593.

² Of March 3, not printed.

³ Not printed. See, however, No. 593.

No. 596

*Application to the Rhineland of the League of Nations Scheme of
Investigation in Ex-enemy Countries¹
Statement prepared for the British Representative at the League of
Nations Meeting in March 1925²*

*[C 3209/741/18]**

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 5, 1925*

His Majesty's Government have given the most careful consideration to the majority report of the Permanent Advisory Commission dated the 10th February, 1925,³ which was prepared in virtue of the council's resolution of the 11th December 1924,⁴ and contains practicable proposals for the application to the Rhine zone demilitarised by the Treaty of

¹ See No. 10, n. 2.

² See No. 74, n. 4.

³ A copy of this is filed at C 2237/741/18, not printed.

⁴ See *L.N.O.J.* 1925, p. 143.

Versailles of chapters 1 and 5 of the council resolution of the 27th September 1924,⁵ concerning the right of investigation. They note the view expressed by the majority of the Permanent Advisory Commission that 'owing to the capital importance attached in article 44 to the strict observance of the provisions laid down in articles 42 and 43, and to the rapidity with which certain serious infractions may be committed, continuous supervision is essential, and this supervision should be entrusted to an organ of investigation permanently established in the demilitarised zone'.

His Majesty's Government, while fully aware of the obligations devolving upon them under article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, must point out that the question at issue turns not upon articles 42 to 44 but upon article 213,⁶ under which Germany is bound 'to give every facility

⁵ See *L.N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 1592-5.

⁶ On March 5, Mr. Headlam-Morley submitted a memorandum on the origin of this article. This ran as follows: 'In view of the serious practical difficulties which have arisen regarding the interpretation and application of this article, it seemed worth while to investigate its origin. The result is curious and instructive, but, I fear, not helpful. It would appear to show that on this point something went wrong with the drafting of the treaty.

'2. The practical difficulties seem to be two in number. Inasmuch as the article is printed as part of Part V of the treaty (military, naval and air clauses), it is contended by the Germans that the investigation by the League of Nations which it authorises applies only to this part of the treaty, and in consequence does not apply to article 43 (demilitarisation of the left bank of the Rhine); for the Allies, however, and especially for France, it is of great importance that there should be some supervision of the execution of this article.

'3. The question has arisen as to the interpretation of the word "investigation". Does this give authority to the League of Nations to exercise continued supervision and control, or does it only authorise them to initiate an enquiry from time to time when there is *prima facie* evidence that the disarmament clauses are being violated?

'4. Let us now turn to the history of the clause. Part V of the treaty was drafted during the month of March by the Military Commission and submitted by them to the Council of Ten [the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the five Allied and Associated Powers, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and U.S.A.]. Succeeding drafts were the subject of prolonged, careful and systematic examination and discussion. One of the most important and difficult problems placed before the council was the method of supervising the execution of the articles. There was a general agreement that it was no use forcing Germany to agree to this elaborate scheme of disarmament unless some provision was made for keeping her to her promises. There were two alternatives: supervision by the Allies or supervision by the League of Nations. Against both very serious objections could be and were made. Eventually it was quite rightly seen that a distinction must be drawn between those clauses to which a time limit was attached and those which were of a more permanent nature. It was agreed then that the first should be placed under the Commission of Control, and this is clearly stated in article 203. It may be noted that at that time Marshal Foch anticipated that the commissions of control would have finished their work in about three months. What was to happen after the commissions of control were withdrawn? This problem the Council of Ten never solved, and it remained unsolved when, by the establishment of the Council of Four [the Heads of Delegations of the British Empire, France, Italy and U.S.A.], the work was taken out of their hands. It was, however, never taken up again by the Council of Four. They devoted the very smallest attention to the disarmament clauses, which had already been almost completed, and never on any occasion discussed this particular matter.

'5. We must now turn to a different section of the treaty, section III of the political clauses, the left bank of the Rhine, articles 42–44. This section, which is of the highest importance, was part of the general settlement regarding the territorial limits of Germany on the west, arrived at after prolonged and acute political controversy between the French on the one side, the English and Americans on the other. The negotiations had been carried on outside the formal meetings of the council, and in the official record we hear nothing of them until the 22nd April, when M. Clemenceau laid before the council the result of the private conversations [see *F.R.U.S. The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. V, p. 113]. They consisted of three agreements, the demilitarisation of the left bank of the Rhine, the section on guarantees—articles 428–432 of the treaty—and the text of the proposed guarantee treaties between France and Great Britain and America. All three together form an essential part of the political settlement.

'6. The part dealing with the left bank of the Rhine was laid before the Council of Four by M. Clemenceau in the following form, and in this form was accepted, apparently without discussion:

"APPENDIX III

"Instructions to Drafting Committee for the 'Demilitarisation' of German Territory West of the Rhine.

"The maintenance or building of fortifications west of a line drawn 50 kilom[etres] east of the Rhine forbidden to Germany.

"The maintenance of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, forbidden within the area defined above, as well as all military manœuvres of every kind and the maintenance of physical facilities for mobilisation.

"Any violation of these conditions to be regarded as a hostile act against the signatories of the treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

"As long as the present treaty remains in force, a pledge by Germany to respond to any enquiry that the Council of the League of Nations may deem necessary."

'Sir Maurice Hankey [British Secretary to the Peace Conference] was in the ordinary course instructed to send this to the secretary-general for the Drafting Committee.

'7. Now, among a collection of papers containing records of the Drafting Committee, lent to me by Sir Cecil Hurst [attached to the Peace Congress Delegation 1918–19], there is one which deals with this matter. It is as follows:—

"21 avril 1919

Articles à placer à divers
endroits du traité

*"Engagements militaires imposés à l'Allemagne et visés par les
Traités franco-américain et franco-anglais.*

ou bien section 3 des clauses
politiques,

"1. Il est interdit à l'Allemagne de maintenir ou de construire des fortifications (*soit sur la rive gauche du Rhin, soit sur la rive droite*) à l'ouest d'une ligne tracée à 50 kilom[etres] à l'est du Rhin.

ou bien clauses militaires,

"2. Sont également interdits, dans la zone définie à l'article 1^{er}, l'entretien ou le rassemblement de forces armées, soit à titre permanent, soit à titre temporaire, aussi bien que toutes manœuvres militaires de quelque nature qu'elles soient et le maintien de toutes facilités matérielles de mobilisation.

en queue des clauses mili-
taires.

"3. Aussi longtemps que le présent traité restera en vigueur, l'Allemagne s'engage à se prêter à toute investigation que le Conseil de la Société des Nations (*votant à la majorité*) jugera nécessaire."

The document itself is typed, but the marginal notes and the passages inserted in the text (indicated above in brackets and [italicised]) are written in by hand. The handwriting is certainly French. It is impossible to identify it with certainty, but it is on the whole probable that the insertions in the text and the second of the marginal notes are in the handwriting of M. Fromageot, the French representative on the Drafting Committee. The first and the third of the marginal notes seem to be in a different writing, which cannot be certainly

for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations may consider necessary'.

It is not possible under that article to claim for the council the right to establish an organisation of control permanently resident in Germany.

identified, but is quite possibly that of M. Tardieu [a French Plenipotentiary Delegate to the Peace Conference].

'8. For our purposes, however, it is the first and the third of these notes which are of essential importance, and especially the last, for this records the decision made by someone or other that the final clause of this section should be incorporated, not in this section of the treaty, but at the end of the military clauses. Now it is to this decision that all our present difficulties are due. It was quite clearly the intention of the Council of Four when the draft was approved that the investigation of the League of Nations should apply to the demilitarised zone on the left bank of the Rhine, and at that time the disarmament clauses of the treaty were not in their minds at all. This decision, therefore, by whomever it was made, in reality frustrated the intentions of the Council of Four and put them into the position of having decided the other outstanding question as to the permanent control of the disarmament of Germany.

'8A. The curious thing is that the Drafting Committee seem to have worked not on the draft submitted to and accepted by the Council of Four, which was in English, but on a French draft, dated the 21st April, a draft which, moreover, omits the important third paragraph of the official draft. How this came about it is now impossible to find out. The official draft, which Sir Maurice Hankey certainly sent, is not among the file of papers, though the covering letter is, and also the official draft of the guarantee clauses. Somehow or other they got an earlier French draft, and there could be little doubt that whoever it was that supplied them with this was also the person who wrote on it the misleading marginal notes. I expect it was M. Tardieu.

'9. There is no evidence that the Council of Four were ever informed of this important alteration which had been made. On the 28th April the clauses about the left bank of the Rhine were referred to them again [see *F.R.U.S.* op. cit., vol. V, pp. 318-9] with regard to the special point as to whether the action of the League of Nations should require a unanimous vote or whether a majority vote was sufficient. The matter was discussed and the majority vote authorised. But the record of the discussion makes it quite clear that what the council had before them were simply the three clauses about the left bank of the Rhine, of which the third, dealing with the League of Nations, seems still to have been regarded as an integral portion.

'10. The matter never came before them again and their attention was never drawn to this important change. There can, I think, be no doubt that had their attention been called to the matter it would have been rectified, for clearly the right of investigation secured to the League of Nations over the demilitarisation of the left bank of the Rhine was an essential part of the general political settlement. However, we have now to deal with the treaty as it was presented to and signed by the Germans, and there is no express provision for this.

'11. These facts explain also the obviously defective wording of article 213. Had this article been drafted with special reference to the military clauses, it would certainly have been much more precise and explicit and would have been brought into immediate connection with article 203. What we should have expected would have been something of the following nature: "With regard to the military, naval and air clauses contained in the present treaty, for the execution of which no time limit is prescribed, it is agreed that the right of supervision (or the right of investigation) shall be exercised by the Council of the League of Nations, etc." In the drafting of this clause it would not have been possible to avoid a definite decision as between supervision and investigation, but the clause as it now stands is in reality merely a memorandum of agreement, having to do with something quite different which has been inserted in the military clauses without the necessary redrafting.'

The right of the council is clearly confined to the institution of such specific investigations as may in its judgment be called for in regard to particular matters from time to time. It would be contrary to both the spirit and the letter of article 213 to turn Germany's obligation to afford facilities for such enquiries into an obligation to allow a standing committee of control, composed of alien officials, to function for ever on German territory.

There is nothing in the Treaty of Versailles which would justify any distinction being drawn in this respect between the demilitarised zone along the Rhine and the rest of Germany. Under article 213, nothing can be claimed in respect of the demilitarized zone that would not be equally enforceable anywhere within the German frontiers. His Majesty's Government cannot therefore agree to the installation of a permanent organ of investigation in the demilitarised zone, nor to the suggestion which has been made that such an arrangement might be veiled under the guise of periodically renewing the mandate conferred on officers or a commission charged with a specific investigation into a particular matter of complaint. This would be an illegitimate straining of the clear meaning of article 213, to which His Majesty's Government cannot be a party.

There is a further line of argument indicated in the majority report of the Permanent Advisory Commission of the 10th February. The suggestion appears to be that, on the one hand, a violation by Germany of articles 42 and 43 of the treaty constitutes by article 44 a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the treaty and one calculated to disturb the peace of the world; on the other hand, in the event of any war or threat of war, it is the duty of the League of Nations, under article 11 of the covenant, to 'take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the nations'. From this it is apparently argued that the council is entitled to take effectual steps to prevent the contingency contemplated in article 44 from arising, and accordingly to set up, in virtue of article 213, a permanent commission of investigation in the demilitarised zone in the Rhineland. His Majesty's Government are unable to admit the cogency of this argument, which appears to them to rest upon a confusion of thought. It is true that once Germany has in fact violated any provision of articles 42 and 43 the Allies are entitled to take certain action under article 44, and the League may well be entitled to take action under article 11; but in both cases the right to act results from the fact that a violation has been committed. No right can be claimed, in virtue of those articles, to take special action in the nature of supervision with the object of *preventing* such violation. On the same argument the League of Nations would have the right of stationing resident commissions anywhere that it might think a threat of war was likely to arise—a thesis which is clearly untenable.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Sir E. Crowe¹ (Received March 9, 8.30 a.m.)

*No. 98 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3300/21/18]**

PARIS, March 8, 1925

Your telegram No. 84 of the 5th March:² General inspection by Commission of Control in Germany.

Difficulties have arisen in drafting the resolution instructing the Allied Military Committee of Versailles to reconsider the Commission of Control's report³ on the lines laid down in your telegram No. 80.⁴ But these difficulties, far from being caused by my having raised the question of the withdrawal of the Commission of Control, would, I am convinced, have been still more serious if I had eliminated all discussion on this question. In that event, I should have been unable to insist, as you wish that I should, that the Versailles Committee should work on the basis of the five points,⁵ since the French are committed to the latter only as far as the withdrawal of the Commission of Control is concerned. In the case of the evacuation of Cologne, they can argue that the vague and comprehensive terms of the treaty 'if the conditions of the present treaty are faithfully carried out' entitle them to claim the right to range over all the present and potential violations of the treaty, and to review not only actual violations but also the symptoms of duplicity and bad faith as revealed by the Commission of Control's report; and it is, I think, evident that they are determined to exercise this right by making full use of the fatal word 'faithfully'. They will, however, find it somewhat more difficult to make out a case if they have in the meanwhile agreed, on the basis of the five points and of the various undertakings given to the German Government, that as soon as a definite list of direct and important violations of the treaty have been made good, the military clauses of the treaty can be considered as satisfactorily fulfilled for the purpose of the withdrawal of the Commission of Control.

The difficulty which has now arisen in drafting the conference's resolution shows how anxious the French are not to be limited by the five points, or, indeed, by any definite list. They have insisted that the Versailles Committee should be asked whether, for the purpose of the Cologne evacuation, any further requirements, over and above those required for the withdrawal of the Commission of Control, will be necessary, and they have refused, in the case of the evacuation of Cologne, to agree that the Versailles Committee should limit itself to drawing up a list of direct infractions of real and practical importance. They want a

¹ Sir E. Crowe was in charge of the Foreign Office in the absence of Mr. Chamberlain (see No. 74, n. 4).

² No. 595.

⁴ See No. 593, n. 3.

³ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592.

⁵ See No. 23, n. 4.

general commentary on every case reported by the Commission of Control, with a view, one may conclude, to seeing how far Germany is not 'faithfully' observing the terms of the treaty. On this latter point a deadlock has been reached, and I am sending you in my despatch No. 590⁶ the draft resolution showing the British and French texts of the paragraph in dispute.

In view of the fact that almost a week has now elapsed and that further delay is highly undesirable from our point of view, I think it would be wise to accept the French draft, while making it clear to the French Government that with ensuing discussions at the Allied Military Committee of Versailles General Clive will continue to be bound by the restrictions laid down in your telegram No. 80.⁴ The result will probably be that the recommendations under paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of the resolution will be agreed upon unanimously and without difficulty, but that General Clive may have to decline to discuss some proposals put forward by the French under paragraph 3 (c), on the ground they go beyond the limits laid down in your telegram No. 80.⁴

(Repeated to Geneva, No. 2, by bag).

⁶ Of March 8, not printed.

No. 598

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 19)

No. 673 [C 3948/21/18]*

PARIS, March 18, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith an account¹ by the British member of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles of a conversation which he has had with Dr. Nord, of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who is at present in Paris, on the subject of the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles by the German Government.

Dr. Nord's remarks may be interpreted as the first expression of the impatience which the German authorities are beginning to feel at the delay in informing them of the conclusions which the Allied Governments are going to draw from the general inspection by the Commission of Control.² As I have already pointed out in my telegram No. 101,³ the French Government are likely in present circumstances to try to delay any communication to the German Government on the subject of the evacuation of Cologne, which might have the effect of compelling them to agree to evacuation before the security question has been settled.

¹ Of March 17, not printed.

² See Nos. 559, n. 4, 586, n. 1 and 592.

³ No. 245.

On the other hand, it is certainly desirable that all progress in the execution of the remaining requirements in the matter of German disarmament should not be delayed solely on that account. Both Dr. Nord's remarks and Lord D'Abernon's telegram No. 103⁴ show that the German authorities are anxious to get on with the work, but this new spirit of co-operation may be easily checked if the Allies do not respond to it with alacrity.

Another fact to bear in mind is that it is essential, if Germany is to apply at the assembly in September⁵ for admittance to the League of Nations, that by that time the Commission of Control should be in a position to declare, for the purpose of article 1, paragraph 2, of the covenant, that Germany has fulfilled the military requirements of the Treaty of Versailles.

These considerations seem to militate in favour of the procedure which I have advocated in my telegrams No. 92, paragraph 1,⁶ No. 98⁷ and No. 104,⁸ namely, that the Allied Military Committee of Versailles should at once, and irrespective of the Cologne question, draw up the list of measures which the German Government must take in order that the military clauses of the treaty can be considered as executed. Once this list has been approved by the Allied Governments and the details worked out with the German authorities, it should be possible, if the goodwill of the German authorities is forthcoming, to complete the disarmament of Germany in time for the assembly in September. So much the better if at the same time we can induce the French Government to commit themselves as regards the conditions to be demanded in return for the evacuation of Cologne (which we no doubt consider ought to be the same as those required in the case of the withdrawal of the Commission of Control). But in their present frame of mind this is almost too much to hope for, and if we insist on a decision being taken as regards Cologne, before settling the question of the work still to be done, by the Commission of Control, I foresee an immediate deadlock which will result in the concluding stages of the work of German disarmament being to a large extent paralysed and its completion indefinitely delayed.

I have, etc.,
CREWE

⁴ Of March 14, not printed.

⁵ See No. 165, n. 4.

⁶ No. 593.

⁷ No. 597.

⁸ Of March 16, not printed.

No. 599

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 90 Telegraphic [C 3964/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 19, 1925, 1.45 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 103¹ and 104.²

Matter has now been considered in all its aspects and in the circumstances there is nothing open to us but to accept draft contained in your despatch No. 637.³ But before doing so the word 'approuver' in paragraph 2 should be altered to 'prendre acte': we attach importance to this as we do not wish to commit ourselves to endorsing the appreciation of the Versailles Committee of March 1st [*sic*];⁴ such endorsement might be used against us later. In paragraph 3 (d) we also wish to strike out the words at the end 'comme aussi de leur redressement' and to substitute for them the words 'dont le redressement est d'une réalisation pratique'. Please use your best endeavour to have this amendment agreed to, though I do not make it an absolute condition of our consent.

¹ Of March 15. This stated: 'I certainly had agreed to the resolution as given in my despatch No. 637 [see n. 3] but I now have withdrawn my assent and have asked that the resolution should not be communicated to the C[omit ] M[ilitaire Inter-] A[ll   de] V[ersailles].'

² Of March 16, not printed.

³ Of March 13. This had transmitted a further draft (see No. 597) of the resolution to be submitted to the Ambassadors' Conference of instructions to the Versailles Committee.

⁴ See No. 593.

No. 600

Mr. Lampson to Mr. Sargent (Paris)

[C 3964/21/18]

Private

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 19, 1925*

Dear Sargent,

The Secretary of State has now returned¹ and we have had an opportunity to discuss with him the draft resolution of the Ambassadors' Conference enclosed in your despatch No. 637.² A telegram embodying his decision goes to you today (our telegram No. 90).³

I may say quite frankly that I still think that we have got on the wrong rails over this question; and I am interested to find that Wauchope entirely shares my view. He had hitherto been under the impression that the memorandum⁴ with which you waltzed in, raising the whole question

¹ See No. 256.

³ No. 599.

² See No. 599, n. 3.

⁴ See No. 593.

of the withdrawal of the Commission of Control, had been based on instructions from home; I disillusioned him,⁵ and he then said that in the circumstances he fully agreed with our view here that the net result had been to draw a red herring across the trail. I am absolutely clear in my own mind that that is right. We have now got on to what I hold to be unsound lines; the net result will be that instead of discussing the conditions on which we are to get out of Cologne we are giving the French an excellent opportunity of discussing what is really an irrelevant issue, namely, the conditions upon which the Commission of Control is to be withdrawn.

The future alone, I suppose, will reveal who is right; but I really do not know quite what we are going to say in Parliament when we are asked what questions we have put to the Versailles Committee and if there is any prospect of getting a definition from them of the conditions to be demanded from Germany; for the answer really is, so far as I can understand it, that we are not even now asking them to formulate those conditions. All that we are asking them is to say whether the five points⁶ still apply or whether the withdrawal of the Commission of Control is to be dependent upon further points in addition to the original five points. In a word, we are no longer discussing the evacuation of Cologne but the separate though cognate question of the withdrawal of military control. Of course we here realise we are too far committed to go back on it now; we did consider giving you an entirely fresh draft resolution to move on the Ambassadors' Conference; but in view of the fact that the present draft resolution before the conference is largely based on a British Embassy memorandum such a move on our part was really impossible; in short, the ground has been cut from under our feet.

I expect you will say that all this is based on a completely false reading of the situation, and that we here, on our Olympian heights, do not realise the snags and pit-falls from which you, with your local knowledge, are saving our blind footsteps. Possibly you are right. Looking at it from the point of view of the main issue, that is, from the point of view of the evacuation of Cologne, I cannot help feeling that the French have very successfully manœuvred us away from it and drawn us on to the discussion of a subsidiary and really unnecessary point.

Yours ever,
MILES W. LAMPSON

⁵ Cf. No. 595.

⁶ See No. 23, n. 4.

Foreign Office to War Office

[C 3198/741/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 20, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 5th March,¹ I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to inform you that he has given careful consideration to the views of the General Staff as expressed therein. It is observed that the Army Council concur in the view that the scheme of investigation into the armaments of ex-enemy States, as approved by the Council of the League of Nations in September last,² is not adequate to preclude the possibility of infractions by Germany of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. It is accordingly suggested that the Council of the League should enter into negotiations with the German Government with a view to organise some scheme of continuous observation in the Rhineland.

2. It will already have been observed from the Foreign Office letter of the 10th March,¹ enclosing a copy of the statement prepared for the Secretary of State on the subject of the application of the scheme of investigation to the Rhineland,³ that no right can be claimed by the council in virtue of article 11 of the covenant to take special action in the nature of supervision with the object of preventing violation by Germany of articles 42 and 43 of the treaty. The suggestion that the council should take steps to obtain Germany's consent to some such arrangement may possibly indicate a way of satisfactorily disposing of the difficulty. But the Secretary of State does not consider that it would be prudent to come forward with any such suggestion at the present juncture. He would prefer that all negotiations with Germany on these and kindred subjects should, if at all, be conducted not between the present Council of the League and the German Government, but within the council itself after Germany has become a member of it. For the confidential information of the Army Council I am to add that this was also the view of the French representative on the Council of the League of Nations as expressed in secret sessions of its recent meeting at Geneva.⁴

I am, etc.,

MILES W. LAMPSON

¹ Not printed.³ No. 596.² See No. 596, n. 5.⁴ See No. 74, n. 4.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received March 28, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 115 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4371/10/18]

PARIS, March 26, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following questions. Mr. Phipps attended on my behalf.

...¹ 2. The Conference considered the various modifications which His Majesty's Government desire to introduce into the agreement drawn up by the Mixed Committee² for valuing the services in kind under Articles 8-12 of the Rhineland Agreement³ (see your despatch No. 952 of March 18th).⁴ No objection was taken to the modifications themselves, but Monsieur Cambon pointed out that if the allied members of the Mixed Committee now ask the German members to accept these modifications, he was afraid that the latter would put forward impossible counter demands. The French Government were particularly anxious that the whole agreement should not be jeopardized through an attempt to make what were after all comparatively unimportant modifications in the matter of procedure. The object desired by these modifications might be equally achieved by various roundabout means, which were set forth in the memorandum which he had communicated to the Conference, and copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 744.⁵ Mr. Phipps doubted whether there was any real danger of the Germans refusing to accept the modifications or attaching impossible conditions. In any case he felt that an attempt should be made to ascertain how the land lay before considering the question of adopting the ingenious make-shifts proposed by the French Government. It was accordingly agreed that the Germans should be sounded privately on the subject, and that the results should be reported to the Conference.

The French memorandum enclosed in my despatch No. 744⁵ contains the following suggestions with regard to the putting into force of the Agreement (1) that it should be promulgated by the Rhineland High Commission (2) that an arrangement should be made for keeping the

¹ The section(s) omitted referred to other matters.

² See Vol. XXVI, No. 568 and 706. The Mixed Committee, composed of allied and German representatives, had been set up by a decision of the Ambassadors' Conference of November 7, 1924 (Paris telegram No. 617 of November 7, section 15, not printed). A copy of the Report of the Mixed Committee of December 15 was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2835 of December 29, 1924, not printed. The Report transmitted, in the form of an agreement dated December 2, the unanimous conclusions of the Committee on the organisation of commissions for the valuation of the services in kind under Articles 8-12 of the Rhineland Agreement.

³ See No. 330, n. 5.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Of March 26, not printed.

Rhineland High Commission informed of the decisions of the various committees set up under the Agreement, and (3) that the creation of these committees should not involve an addition to the present number of officials. In view of your despatch No. 1031 of the 24th instant,⁴ Mr. Phipps agreed to the first of these suggestions. No decision was taken on the other two, with regard to which I should be glad of your views.

The Secretary General drew the attention of the Conference to the fact that the rules formulated by the Mixed Committee, as well as the arbitral decisions given by M. Patijn,⁶ are being embodied in a code, which the Committee, which has now adjourned, will consider on its re-assembly on the 6th April. The question will then arise as to whether the French, English and German texts of this code are to be all equally authentic. In the case of the agreement already signed² the Germans insisted upon the three texts being equally authentic, and the Committee acquiesced, much to the annoyance of the French Government, who maintain that this constitutes a dangerous precedent, which they certainly do not want to see repeated in the case of the Code. They argue that in the case of the Versailles Treaty and the London Agreement of last year,⁷ only the French and English texts are authentic. If the Germans refuse, as they undoubtedly will, to agree to such a rule in the present case, it was suggested this morning that a compromise should be arrived at by establishing a Code in the three languages, on understanding that only the French text would be authentic. I hope that you will be able to agree to such an arrangement. . . .¹

⁶ The neutral Chairman of the Mixed Committee (see n. 2). M. R. Patijn had been Secretary-General of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1919-22.

⁷ See No. 343, n. 9.

No. 603

*Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 1)*¹

No. 120 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4570/10/18]

Urgent

PARIS, March 31, 1925

My telegram No. 115 paragraph 2² (of the 26th March; Agreement drawn up by the Mixed Committee for valuing the services in kind under articles 8-12 of the Rhineland Agreement).³

Chief German delegate on being sounded privately agreed to all the amendments desired by His Majesty's Government except that proposing that the Rhineland High Commission rather than the Ambassadors' Conference should agree with the German Government as to the appointment of a President of the Arbitration Commission. He strongly objected to any mention being actually made to the Rhineland High

¹ No time of arrival is given.

² No. 602.

³ See No. 330, n. 5.

Commission in the Agreement, on the ostensible ground that since the abolition of the post of German High Commissioner in the Rhineland,⁴ the German Government had no contact with the Commission. As a compromise, therefore, it was suggested that the word 'Ambassadors' Conference' should be changed not into 'Rhineland High Commission' but into 'Allied Governments', it being understood that on the entry into force of the Agreement, the Allied Governments would inform the German Government that they had delegated their powers in this particular matter to the Rhineland High Commission.

German Delegate, who has since left for Berlin, has now written to say that his Government would agree to this and to all the other amendments, but that they maintain their objection to any direct mention in the Agreement of the Rhineland High Commission.

The result of this private discussion will be reported to the Conference which meets on Thursday,⁵ and I should be very grateful if you would let me know in time for the meeting whether I can agree to the suggested compromise. It appears to attain the object desired by His Majesty's Government, whereas continued insistence on the actual mention of the Rhineland Commission in the text may endanger the whole agreement, and will certainly delay its entry into force.⁶

⁴ In April, 1923. See Vol. XXI, Nos. 102, Enclosure, 177 and 183.

⁵ April 2.

⁶ Mr. Chamberlain replied (Foreign Office telegram No. 99 of April 1): 'We dislike proposed compromise and should prefer that the Rhineland High Commission should specifically be mentioned in agreement; but in view of delay which may occur if we insist on our rights and the fact that our allies are apparently indifferent on this point, we agree to proposed compromise on essential condition that the Ambassadors' Conference, in notifying the German Government, make it perfectly clear to the latter that the Allied Governments, in accordance with article 2 of the Rhineland Agreement, will act in the matter of the nomination of the president of the Arbitration Commission through the Rhineland High Commission.'

'We attach special importance to insertion of reference to Rhineland Agreement.'

'We are consulting War Office and Treasury with regard to the other matters raised in section 2 of your telegram No. 115 of the 26th March and are not yet in a position to reply.'

No. 604

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1130 [C 4577/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 31, 1925*

My Lord,

M. de Fleuriau called upon me this morning to give me a general account of what had passed between himself and M. Herriot during and since his visit to Paris.¹ M. Herriot had asked him a series of questions as to

¹ See No. 266, n. 2.

my attitude, to which he had replied as indicated in the note dated Paris, the 24th March, a copy of which I attach to this despatch.

I accepted M. de Fleuriau's account of my views as correct, except in one particular, in which his mind had travelled rather further than I had gone at present. This was in relation to the possible reoccupation of the Rhineland territories under article 430. Upon this point I said that I had not taken any decision; indeed, it had hardly been present to my mind when I saw M. Herriot. My recollection was that, as explained by M. Tardieu in his book,² this right of reoccupation was introduced to provide for the case of the non-ratification of the Anglo-American Pact.³ If we were now to consider a new pact in lieu of the Anglo-American Pact, we must consider also its bearing upon this stipulation. M. de Fleuriau told me that he thought that any alteration of the treaty in that respect would place M. Herriot in great difficulties. The right of reoccupation was one which would never, in fact, be exercised, but its abandonment would excite and alarm French public opinion. I again said that I had formed no definite conclusion on the subject. I mentioned it only as it was the single point upon which he had inferred a definite agreement on my part with a proposition which I had not considered.

M. de Fleuriau further told me that M. Herriot had consulted him as to the nature of the reply which he should send to the German Government.⁴ M. de Fleuriau had strongly urged that the French Government should send such a reply after consultation with their allies and with an indication of at least the general concurrence of the Allies in its terms. His suggestion was that the French Government should welcome the German overture and should then ask for explanations. What exactly had the German Government in mind in their reference to the United States? No doubt it would be a good thing if America was willing to lend its support to the guarantee, but was this likely, and what was the connection between the sentence referring to America and the opening of the second paragraph of the German memorandum, in which Germany declared that it would consider acceptable a pact which would formally guarantee the actual territorial *status quo* on the Rhine? He had suggested that the Germans should also be invited to explain more precisely what they meant by their proposal that the pact should guarantee the execution of the obligations relating to the demilitarisation of the Rhine territories, and what were the forms and conditions of arbitration which were contemplated in the different references to that subject in the German memorandum? He regarded it as quite indispensable that Germany should enter the League unconditionally as a condition of any pact and the covenant already provided for arbitration. What other scheme of arbitration had the German Government in view? He would not reject the

² See A. Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty* (London and New York, 1921), pp. 209-12. This was an English translation with additional chapters of *La Paix* (Paris, 1921).

³ See No. 185, n. 1.

⁴ i.e. to the German note of February 9 (see No. 197, n. 1).

idea that for some purposes it might be more advantageous to adopt the old Hague procedure⁵ instead of recourse to the International Court of Justice.⁶ Speaking generally, he had suggested that it should be emphasised that nothing in the new convention should invalidate anything in the Treaty of Versailles. The new agreement should complete rather than repeat the terms of that treaty, and, in order not in any way to diminish the security of other nations, he would prefer not to use again the formulas adopted in the Treaty of Versailles, such, for instance, as that in article 44 relating to the demilitarised zone. He believed that the more the new pact could be made comparable to the old guarantee of Belgian neutrality⁷ the more acceptable it would be to French opinion. Finally, he did not like the German phrase that the United States should engage not to make war for a prolonged period. He would prefer that their engagements should be to preserve peace.

I told M. de Fleuriau that these suggestions did not seem to me to offer any difficulty from my point of view. I was entirely in favour of the course which he had suggested, namely, that France should send her reply after consultation with her allies, and I did not think that any difficulty would arise between France and ourselves as to the terms of that answer. I gathered from what M. de Fleuriau said—and perhaps still more from what he did not say—that the French Government were not contemplating any simultaneous pact about the eastern frontiers of Germany, but that they certainly did not now anticipate as great difficulties from the side of Poland as when the question first came under discussion. I called his attention to the fact that, in my speech,⁸ I had specially guarded myself against any idea that, in endeavouring to make peace more secure in the west, we should license or legitimatise changes in the treaty position in the east. I did not believe that any sensible man in Germany wished for a new partition of Poland or contemplated an attack upon her, and it was so much in the interest of Poland to be on good terms with Germany that, if we could once get away from the bitterness and hatred left by past history, I believed that Poland and Germany would find their common interest in coming to terms. Germany was beginning to appreciate the fact that it was in her interest to retain a buffer between herself and Russia. The fear of Russia had always been a great factor in German policy and was as present to the mind of German statesmen today as it ever had been to Bismarck. M. de Fleuriau said that he disliked talking about an alteration in frontiers or treaties. It was not a thing to talk about, but a matter which settled itself in time if it were not raised prematurely.

⁵ As established by The Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of October 18, 1907. For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 100, pp. 298–314. See also Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII (London, 1932), chap. LXV.

⁶ For a text of the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, of December 16, 1920, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, pp. 862–72.

⁷ See No. 22, n. 3.

⁸ To the House of Commons on March 24. See 182*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 307–22.

Before M. de Fleuriau left I begged him to press upon M. Herriot the urgency of coming to a decision about Cologne. It was obvious that nothing could come of the German negotiations, and there could be no pact, unless we settled the Cologne question. I was much concerned at the way in which it was dragging on without any decision being taken. I believed that, if the negotiations for the pact went forward satisfactorily, it would be found that the Germans would make a much greater effort than ever before to fulfil our requirements, but time would be necessary even with the best will in the world and we had none too much in front of us. I begged him to explain my anxiety to M. Herriot and to press him very strongly to do all in his power to hasten a decision.

Lastly, I turned to quite a different subject. If Germany entered the League she would, of course, have a permanent seat upon the council. This would bring to a head the demands of other powers, and notably Spain, for similar treatment. Up to the present time I had reserved my complete liberty on this matter; but I should be glad if I could have any indication of M. Herriot's views upon the Spanish claim. M. de Fleuriau said that he would transmit my enquiry. He was afraid that it would be much more difficult for France to support Spain under the Directory⁹ than would have been the case at any previous time. The relations with the Directory had been very difficult, and but for the influence and authority of M. Quiñones de León recent frontier incidents might have led to serious trouble.

For convenience of reference, I attach as Annex (B) to this letter a copy of the memorandum handed by the German Ambassador to the French Government.¹⁰

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ANNEX A

Note de M. de Fleuriau

PARIS, le 24 mars 1925

1. *Entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations*—Le Ministre britannique s'est mis d'accord à Paris avec le Président du Conseil¹¹ pour considérer l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations comme une condition essentielle, non préalable, du pacte éventuel avec l'Allemagne.

2. Mr. Chamberlain estime que la Belgique doit être partie audit pacte.

3. Il n'est pas hostile à l'adhésion des Pays-Bas audit pacte; mais il doute que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas y consente. Cette question devra être étudiée au cours des conversations qui vont s'ouvrir.

(La question de la frontière germano-néerlandaise envisagée en dehors

⁹ A military coup on September 12/13, 1923 had resulted in the establishment of the Military Directory under the Presidency of General Primo de Rivera on December 15.

¹⁰ Not here printed.

¹¹ See Nos. 225 and 251.

de celle de l'adhésion des Pays-Bas au pacte éventuel n'a pas été examinée le 19 mars.¹² Le Ministre britannique en aurait certainement renvoyé l'examen aux conversations ultérieures.)

4. Mr. A. Chamberlain est d'accord pour ne pas admettre un abandon quelconque des droits confiés par le Traité de Versailles touchant l'occupation ou la réoccupation des territoires rhénans.

5. *Frontières orientales de l'Allemagne*—Le Ministre britannique estime que le pacte éventuel ne doit pas porter atteinte à la situation créée par le Traité de Versailles des frontières orientales de l'Allemagne.

Il renvoie aux conversations ultérieures le soin de déterminer les moyens de réaliser ce dessein.

6. *Autriche*—Son avis est le même quant au maintien de l'article 80 du Traité de Versailles.

7. *Procédure*—Mr. A. Chamberlain s'était déjà mis d'accord avec M. le Président du Conseil sur la question de procédure en ce sens que les Alliés devraient se mettre d'accord entre eux avant de négocier avec l'Allemagne.

¹² See No. 258.

No. 605

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 2)

*No. 790 [C 4601/21/18]**

PARIS, April 1, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 1033 of the 24th ultimo,¹ and to state that the position as regards the preparation of the list of war material which Germany is forbidden to manufacture, export or import, is at present as follows:—

As a result of a resolution of the Ambassadors' Conference reported in my telegram No. 27, section 2, of the 15th January,² the Versailles Committee, on the 22nd January, addressed letters to the Committee of Naval Experts, the Military Commission of Control in Berlin and the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee, requesting to be supplied with all necessary information. Replies have been received both from the Commission of Control and from the Committee of Naval Experts, but that from the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee has been held up in the Air Clauses Committee pending instructions, which the British member is awaiting from the Air Ministry. As soon as the Aeronautical

¹ Not printed. This had referred to No. 564, and had asked what progress was being made on the preparation of a list of war material which Germany was forbidden to import, manufacture or export.

² No. 564.

Committee's reply is received by the Versailles Committee, the latter will be able to proceed with the compilation of the comprehensive list.

On the other hand, I would point out that the list which has been submitted by the Military Commission of Control in Germany is already forming the basis of negotiations, which are actually in progress between the Commission of Control and the German Government, and, according to Dr. Nord, the representative of the German Foreign Office in charge of all disarmament questions, who has recently been in Paris,³ these negotiations have resulted in an agreement being reached on all but about ten items. Thus, greater progress has been made in the execution of article 170 of the treaty than in that of the other disarmament clauses. As regards the latter, the demands which the Allied Governments propose to make have not yet been formulated, whereas in this particular case they are already the subject of negotiations with the German authorities. In fact, the list on which the Commission of Control is working, while not necessarily an irreducible minimum, and while applying to naval and military material as distinct from aeronautical material, must be considered as representing the view of the Allied Governments, as far as it goes, and, if modifications are thought desirable, these should only apply to those points on which the agreement of the German Government has not yet been obtained. If it is desired to hasten the issue, a report by the Commission of Control could be called for, which would indicate the points still under discussion, and so render possible the initiating of concessions which the Commission of Control could not offer of their own accord.⁴

I have, etc.,
CREWE

³ See No. 598.

⁴ A copy of this despatch was sent to the War Office under cover of a Foreign Office letter of April 9 which ran: ' . . . 2. In view of the satisfactory progress reported in the negotiations between the Commission of Control and the German Government, the Secretary of State is inclined to doubt the necessity for calling for a report from the commission at the present stage. He would, however, be glad to learn whether the Army Council concur in this view. '3. A similar letter has been sent to the Admiralty and Air Ministry.'

No. 606

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 3, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 124 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4655/10/18]

PARIS, April 2, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions. Mr. Phipps attended on my behalf.

1. The Conference was informed of the result of the unofficial discus-

sions with the chief German Delegate on the Mixed Commission for the evaluation of services in kind under Articles 8–12 of the Rhineland Agreement,¹ as reported in my telegram No. 120.² It was agreed to accept the proposed compromise as regards the amendment dealing with the Rhineland High Commission, and it is to be made perfectly clear to the German Government that in accordance with article 2 of the Rhineland Agreement, the Allied Governments, in the matter of the nomination of the President of the Arbitration Commission, will act through the Rhineland High Commission. The Mixed Committee will now be asked officially to introduce the various modifications into the argument.

As regards your telegram No. 99,³ I would point out that the French far from being indifferent on the subject of asserting the rights of the Rhineland High Commission, have maintained strongly throughout the same views as those expressed by His Majesty's Government. They have, however, hesitated to press the matter in the present instance on the ground that to do so might give the German authorities an opportunity of re-opening all the questions which have been settled after laborious discussions, by means of the agreement drawn up by the Mixed Committee. . . .⁴

¹ See No. 330, n. 5.

² No. 603.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 6.

⁴ The sections omitted referred to other matters.

No. 607

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 6)

*No. 817 [C 4764/21/18]**

PARIS, April 5, 1925

Sir,

In execution of the resolution of the Ambassadors' Conference, as enclosed in my despatch No. 774 of the 31st March,¹ the Allied Military Committee of Versailles is now about to define what the Allied Governments shall require in the matter of the disarmament of Germany, in order that the work of the Commission of Control may be considered as terminated, and in order that the Cologne zone may be evacuated. Assuming that the Versailles Committee succeeds in elaborating a list of essential requirements, the question will then arise as to how the German authorities are to be consulted as to the practical carrying out of these requirements.

The original idea of His Majesty's Government was, if I understand it aright, that when the question had reached this stage a meeting should be convened between the Allied Foreign Ministers and representatives of the

¹ Not printed. The resolution was dated March 3. See No. 593.

German Government, and that this conference, assisted by military experts, both German and Allied, should work out the necessary details. The French Government, however, have never favoured this idea, and I gather that for the present, at any rate, it has been abandoned by His Majesty's Government.²

The French Government, when the time comes, will doubtless argue that according to the treaty the proper body for discussing these matters with the German Government is the Commission of Control itself. Now, whatever the treaty rights of the Commission of Control may be, it may not be the most suitable body to which these discussions should be entrusted; for although the actual details to be discussed will be purely military, the subject as a whole is one of great political importance, and cannot be dealt with in the last resort by military experts. Quite apart from this, the past relations of the Commission of Control with the German Government during the last five years, and the suspicion with which this commission is viewed in Germany, render it a most unsuitable body to negotiate a final settlement. In any case, such a procedure would not attain the object that His Majesty's Government have in view, of giving the German Government an opportunity of treating this question direct with the Allied Governments, on an equal footing.

But between His Majesty's Government's proposal for an international political conference, and the French Government's probable alternative of a mere discussion between the Commission of Control and the German military authorities, there are two possible compromises which it might be worth while to examine:—

1. The Allied Governments might invite the German Government to send military experts to discuss matters with the Versailles Committee, who could, if necessary, summon representatives of the Commission of Control to Paris to advise it. These discussions would take place under the direction of the Ambassadors' Conference, and the conclusions come to would be subject to its approval. The recent meeting between the Air Clauses Committee and the German experts affords a precedent for such a procedure.³

But it must be confessed that the employment of the Versailles Committee as the negotiating organ of the Allied Governments is open to much the same objection as that of the Commission of Control, although to a lesser degree. More particularly, this procedure, while bringing together the military experts on both sides, would provide no direct contact between the Allied Governments and the German Government. Nor is this capital, for obvious reasons, a good place for such meetings, and the German Government might make difficulties about sending to Paris the really important people, such as General von Seeckt, who ought to take part in these negotiations.

2. The Allied Ambassadors in Berlin, when communicating the

² See Nos. 562, 580, 584, 588, and 590.

³ See No. 589, n. 10.

requirements of the Allied Governments to the German Government, might invite the latter to meet and discuss with them the actual steps to be taken for their execution. The Allied Ambassadors would, in that case, constitute themselves informally into an *ad hoc* conference in order to discuss with the German Government the political questions involved, while the Commission of Control would continue to act as the executive organ of the Allied Governments in technical matters. This arrangement would have the great advantage of establishing direct political contact with the German Government, while at the same time making it possible to use the expert knowledge of the Commission of Control, whose face would thereby be saved. The negotiations, too, would probably benefit by taking place on the spot, where all the technical facts and information are at once available, instead of being carried on in a foreign capital.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the French Government would strongly object to this scheme. They would resent the creation of a new Allied body to replace the present Ambassadors' Conference and the Versailles Committee. They would dislike the idea of the discussions taking place in Berlin instead of the German representatives being summoned to an Allied capital. And lastly, the fact that His Majesty's Ambassador, as doyen of the Allied representatives, would probably preside at the meetings would undoubtedly fill them with alarm.

I have, etc.,

(For the Ambassador)

ERIC PHIPPS

No. 608

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received April 14)

*No. 880 [C 5027/21/18]**

PARIS, April 13, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the report¹ which the Allied Military Committee of Versailles has now submitted to the Ambassadors' Conference in execution of the latter's resolution² requesting it to state what further measures in the matter of the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles the German Government should be required to take in order that the work of the Military Commission of Control may be considered as completed, and in order that the Cologne zone may be evacuated in accordance with article 429, section 1, of the treaty.

You will observe that General Clive has succeeded in inducing the Versailles Committee to accept in their entirety the views of the War

¹ Of April 10, not printed.

² See No. 593.

Office, as set forth in your despatches Nos. 725 and 782 of the 27th February and of the 5th ultimo.³

Three further requirements are added to the original 'five points',⁴ and the whole list is now rearranged under twelve headings, which represent the cases where specific clauses of the treaty are not executed, where execution is of real importance, and where at the same time such execution is possible in practice.

In a further section, the committee defines the precise measures that the German Government should be required to take in order that the clauses in question may be satisfactorily executed. In various cases it leaves it to the Commission of Control to indicate the details of the measures; for instance, in regard to the destruction of surplus war material and to the legislation for prohibiting the import, export and manufacture of war material. The extent to which the details of the measures to be taken in these questions will in practice have to be left to the Commission of Control is dealt with by General Wauchope in his letter to the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence of the 15th February⁵ and in my despatch No. 790 of the 1st April.⁶ In the case of the police, the Versailles Committee confines itself to requiring the essential reorganisation of this body, on the understanding that once this is accomplished, the concessions demanded by the German Government will be considered. This procedure is in accordance with the policy laid down in the Allied Government's note to the German Government of the 18th April, 1923.⁷

Further on, the committee enumerates the possible concessions which the Allied Governments might make. These apply to—

- (a) Certain doubtful points submitted by the Commission of Control in its report.
- (b) Certain definite infractions of the treaty which are nevertheless not of primary importance, and
- (c) The concessions (unspecified) to be made eventually in the police organisation.

Later, the Versailles Committee definitely states that it does not consider that there are any infractions, over and above the twelve important infractions enumerated in its report, which the Allied Governments need bear in mind when taking their decision as regards the evacuation of Cologne. In other words, the committee is of opinion that as soon as the German Government have made good the twelve infractions (either in their entirety or to the more limited extent which the suggested concessions would permit), and provided that no further infractions have in the meantime come to light, there will be no further military reason, as far as the execution of specific clauses of the treaty is concerned, for not withdrawing the Commission of Control and for not evacuating the

³ These transmitted copies of War Office letters of February 25 (C 2745/21/18) and March 3 (C 3107/21/18), not printed.

⁴ See No. 23, n. 4.

⁶ No. 605.

⁵ Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

⁷ See Vol. XXI, No. 564.

Cologne zone in accordance with article 429, paragraph 1, of the treaty.

The date on which the Ambassadors' Conference is to examine this report has not yet been fixed, and, in any case, it will be difficult for any definite decisions to be taken until the new French Government is formed⁸ and in the saddle.

In the meanwhile, a study of the report shows, I think, the necessity of my being in possession of the views of His Majesty's Government on the following points, when it does come up for examination:—

1. Do His Majesty's Government approve the list of twelve infractions and the list of measures to be required in order that these infractions may be made good?

2. Which of the concessions which the Versailles Committee indicate as either desirable or possible do His Majesty's Government wish to adopt?

3. The Versailles Committee has left to the Ambassadors' Conference the decision to be taken as to whether the German army is to be allowed to have gas masks or not. The committee was faced with the following considerations: On the one hand, it might be argued that a gas mask is merely a defensive weapon, and that, therefore, a concession might be made on this point. On the other hand, the Ambassadors' Conference has already on two occasions upheld the Commission of Control's decision against gas masks, on the ground that their use is contrary to article 171, and that, in practice, they can only be required in order to carry on war against a foreign army as distinct from the maintaining of order in the interior, which ought to be the sole function of the German army. I should be glad to know what attitude I should adopt at the Ambassadors' Conference on this question.

4. Should the note communicating the requirements of the Allied Governments state the concessions which the Allied Governments are prepared to make?

If these concessions are thus made straight away, the list communicated to the German Government will represent an absolute minimum, in regard to which no further bargaining will be possible. If, on the contrary, the infractions concerning which the Allied Governments are prepared to make concessions are embodied in the list of their requirements, it will be possible to modify this list in the course of subsequent discussions with the German government by inducing some or all of the concessions now suggested. If there is to be a special meeting between the representatives of the Allied and German Governments to discuss the list, the second course would certainly give more reality to the discussion and more satisfaction to German *amour-propre*. The procedure, however, by which an absolute minimum was straightway communicated to the German Government would lead to quicker results, and it would also avoid the danger of one or other of the Allied Governments trying to reopen questions which otherwise would have been definitely settled from the

⁸ See No. 292, n. 5.

moment that the list was presented to the German Government.

5. Is the Ambassadors' Conference to be entrusted with the task of drawing up the note to be presented to the German Government, and, if so, should I propose for the purpose the draft which Sir Eyre Crowe sent to me privately in his letter of the 6th March?⁹

6. Is it the desire of His Majesty's Government that this note, when drafted and approved, should be presented to the German Government by the Allied representatives in Berlin jointly, as was done in the case of the notes of the 5th¹⁰ and 26th January?¹¹

7. Are His Majesty's Government prepared to leave it to the Commission of Control to decide the points of detail left unsettled by the Versailles Committee, including the extent of the concessions to be made eventually in the matter of the police?

8. Do His Majesty's Government still desire that there shall be a special meeting between representatives of the Allied and German Governments to discuss the requirements of the Allied Governments as set forth in their note? This is implied in the last paragraph of the draft note enclosed in Sir E. Crowe's letter of the 6th March.⁹ If so, should I explain to the conference the character of the meeting desired by His Majesty's Government and define the scope of its discussions? I have already dealt in my despatch No. 817 of the 5th instant¹² with the different forms which such a meeting might assume.

9. What are the views of His Majesty's Government as regards the publication of the report of the Commission of Control on the general inspection?¹³

I have, etc.,
CREWE

⁹ See No. 613, Enclosure 1, below.

¹⁰ See No. 553.

¹¹ See No. 570.

¹² No. 607.

¹³ In Paris telegram No. 165 of April 29, section 4, Lord Crewe reported that he had been obliged to ask for the postponement by the Ambassadors' Conference that day of the question of military control, being without the requested instructions.

No. 609

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1299 [C 4764/21/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 17, 1925

My Lord,

I have received your despatch No. 817 of the 5th April¹ relative to the procedure whereby the Allies should communicate to the German

¹ No. 607.

Government their requirements in regard to the defaults to be made good by Germany in her military obligations under the treaty in order that the evacuation of the Cologne zone may take place. As your Lordship points out, the original idea of His Majesty's Government was that, as soon as the Inter-Allied Military Committee of Versailles had furnished their comments on the report of the Commission of Control in Berlin,² a conference of the Allied Powers should be summoned to which German representatives should also be called in as soon as the Allied representatives had reached agreement among themselves.³

2. This plan has, however, been necessarily modified by later events. Throughout February, a series of conversations, records of which were communicated to you from time to time,⁴ took place with the French Ambassador in London, as a result of which it was generally agreed that when the Allies were in possession of the report of the Versailles Committee, they should endeavour to come as nearly to an agreement as possible through the medium of their Ambassadors. The Allied Ministers would then meet to consider any outstanding point, and when complete agreement had been obtained the communication of the Allied demands would be made to the German Government. At this stage, however, there was some difference of opinion. It was my great desire that the Allied demands should be handed to German delegates across the table. But in deference to the wishes of the French Government I subsequently agreed that the demands should be communicated in the form of a note, provided that the note contained a statement that the Allies were ready to discuss the methods of executing those demands with German delegates. You will recollect that during my conversation with M. Herriot in Paris on the 7th March⁵ he refused to commit himself as to the precise moment at which the Germans should be admitted to make observations.

3. With the exception of one small point, the procedure discussed with the French Ambassador and outlined above still appears to me to be that best calculated to secure a satisfactory solution of the question. I remain convinced of the extreme importance of inviting the German Government to send representatives to discuss the methods of executing the Allied demands at some stage or other. On the other hand, a meeting of Allied Ministers to formulate those demands might well be difficult in existing circumstances, and, all things considered, it seems to me unwise to seek to name at this stage the particular body which the German representatives should be invited to meet. In any case, I agree with you that neither the Versailles Committee nor the Allied Ambassadors in Berlin can be regarded as satisfactory for the purpose.

4. Without wishing to lay down any hard and fast procedure in advance, the following plan might so far as possible be aimed at:—

² See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592.

⁴ See Nos. 581, n. 3, 584, and 590.

³ See Nos. 562, 580, 584, 588, and 590.

⁵ See No. 225.

(a) The Ambassadors' Conference receives the report of the Versailles Committee and passes it on to the respective Governments.

(b) The Governments examine the report and give their Ambassadors in Paris the necessary instructions; the conference again meets and draws up a note to the German Government, for the approval of the respective Governments, setting forth the Allied requirements before evacuation can take place.

(c) This note (which will be presented to the German Government by the Allied Ambassadors in Berlin in the name of their Governments, and not in that of the conference, on the analogy of the previous notes regarding Cologne)⁶ will contain an expression of the willingness of the Allied Governments to meet the representatives of Germany if the Government of the Reich desire an opportunity to discuss the methods of executing the demands. In this connection you will not overlook the draft of such a communication to Germany which was enclosed in Sir Eyre Crowe's letter of the 6th March⁷ to show you the lines on which His Majesty's Government would be glad to see the note to Germany run.

[5.] Finally, you should not omit to impress upon the French Government as and when opportunity offers, that I have gone very far in my desire to meet the wishes of the French Government and to ease their position over this question: indeed, I have gone so far to help them in their inherent difficulties as to have incurred no little criticism from public opinion in this country, which is becoming more and more impatient at the apparent delay in dealing with the question of Cologne. In return I feel that I am entitled to expect, and I certainly hope to receive, reciprocal consideration from whatever French Government may be in power;⁸ I can hardly believe that it can be their intention to make my task more difficult than it already is by rejecting the compromise which I offered in my earnest desire to go as far as possible to meet their wishes. I attach the greatest importance to the question being dealt with in a conciliatory spirit and to the avoidance of any unnecessary display of harshness to the German Government. Given a certain degree of tact, my impression is that we shall find the German Government prepared to make good their military defaults under the treaty with expedition; and should this favourable disposition be rendered nugatory by the adoption of hectoring methods, I feel convinced that public opinion here would be gravely perturbed with immediate reaction upon other and possibly more vital problems than Cologne now under discussion between our two countries.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁶ See Nos. 553 and 570.

⁸ Cf. No. 292, n. 5.

⁷ See No. 613, Enclosure 1, below.

No. 610

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 1359 [C 5240/117/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 21, 1925*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 1300 of the 17th April,¹ relative to the modification of the nine rules² for distinguishing between civil and military aircraft in Germany, I have to inform Your Lordship that information has reached the Air Council that, when this matter is discussed by the Ambassadors' Conference, the French representative, while no longer insisting on any connection between this question and that of Germany's accession to the Air Convention,³ may urge that the notification to the German Government of the new rules should be made conditional upon the previous undertaking by that government to permit the flight of allied civil aircraft over Germany.

2. If the proposal is made, I request that you will take the line that the Ambassadors' Conference having already approved the new rules in principle⁴ and the Air Clauses Committee having recommended their immediate notification to the German Government,⁵ they should now be communicated to them without further delay or condition. No pretext should be given and no loophole opened for further needless delay in the settlement of this question and you should therefore oppose any suggestion that it be referred to the allied governments for further consideration.

I am, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

¹ Not printed.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 3.

² See No. 569, n. 2.

⁴ See No. 589.

⁵ In a report of April 9, a copy of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 879 of April 13, not printed.

No. 611

*Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Addison (Berlin)*¹

No. 89 Telegraphic [C 5635/35/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 27, 1925, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 173.²

¹ See No. 292, n. 1.

² Of April 27. This gave the latest official figures in the second ballot of the presidential

Election of Hindenburg will almost certainly have unfavourable reaction in foreign countries more especially France. In the circumstances German government would clearly be well advised to make a formal declaration with the minimum of delay, preferably by the new President himself, to the effect that his election as head of the state will in no way alter the policy of the Luther government,³ and more particularly will not affect the security proposals already made by the German government⁴ which the President definitely and categorically endorses and reaffirms.

If I understand constitutional position correctly, election of a new President should not in fact affect the policy of the government. Apart from that my understanding of the situation is that the security proposals put forward by the Luther government last January⁴ are backed by the Nationalist party which is well represented in the present cabinet; if this is so, the election of the Nationalist candidate as President of the Reich certainly should not adversely affect proposals already made with Nationalist concurrence.

I am requesting Lord D'Abernon to return to Berlin⁵ as soon as possible and am directing him to speak in the competent quarter on the above lines as soon as he gets back, and to urge an immediate declaration such as I have suggested. Meantime I do not wish that you should make the suggestion, pending his return; but if you are asked for the views of His Majesty's Government, or for advice, you are at liberty to speak in the sense of this telegram. You should, however, be careful not to volunteer anything; it is only if asked for advice that you should give it. It is of course always possible that the German government, with their usual lack of perspicacity, may contemplate some untimely declaration or act; and if anything justifying such fear should come to your knowledge you should endeavour to restrain them and get them to make it clear to the world that the election of Hindenburg does not affect the proposals they have already made, nor so far as they are concerned in any way prejudice their relations with foreign countries, and that newly elected President will support declared policy of conciliation of Luther government.

election, which showed a majority for Field-Marshal von Hindenburg (see Nos. 217, n. 3 and 292, n. 8). He took the oath to the Constitution as German President in the Reichstag on May 12.

³ See No. 567.

⁴ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

⁵ Cf. No. 299.

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain

No. 175 Telegraphic [C 5719/35/18]

Urgent

BERLIN, April 28, 1925, 11.44 p.m.

Your telegram No. 89.¹

It is perfectly correct that according to such constitutional practice as may be said to exist, election of President should not alter the course of foreign policy provided of course that the Chancellor continues to command the approval of the Reichstag.

With regard to the formal declaration mentioned in paragraph 1 of your telegram it could probably only be made by the Chancellor and not, as suggested, by the President (see article 56 of constitution). The power of the President—in so far as general lines of policy are concerned—is theoretically so limited and precedents are so few that it is doubtful whether he could make pronouncement of policy as coming from himself. For ordinary conduct of affairs the President would appear to be at the mercy of the Cabinet, who may give or withhold information at will. For instance after Rapallo treaty² President Ebert and Chancellor Wirth quarrelled violently whereupon latter refused to see the President for a fortnight. The President had no constitutional remedy for this extraordinary state of affairs and eventually had to submit.

In view of your instructions I felt unable to make any enquiry which might have led to a discussion but I happened to learn from an unimpeachable source, that the Chancellor, who is with Hindenburg in Hanover today, intends to make a public speech tomorrow morning in which he will make a statement practically tantamount to the declaration advocated in your telegram under reply.

From the same source I learn that Hindenburg is proving most amenable to Cabinet guidance, and as proof of his desire not to make violent change, has invited Doctor Meissner, late President's Secretary of State and a convinced democrat, to remain at his post.

View of Cabinet and particularly of Stresemann would appear to be that on the whole Hindenburg's election is an excellent thing from point of view of continuance of Cabinet's foreign policy in spite of bad effect it may have had on public opinion abroad.

The Field Marshal is extremely devout and once he shall have sworn allegiance to constitution on the Bible it is anticipated that no power on earth will influence him to violate it as equally once he shall have agreed to pursue a certain line of policy he will not depart from it.

In well-informed circles here it is said to be a mistake to assume that he will be a mere cat's paw in hands of his nationalist associates. He declined to sign an electoral manifesto drawn up by German Nationals and issued

¹ No. 611.

² See No. 211, n. 3.

one in which he declared that he accepted basis of constitution and did not believe Germany could correct fortune by a fresh war.

In short whether rightly or wrongly, competent opinion in official circles is that Hindenburg will change nothing in foreign policy and that on the contrary his acquiescence in Luther policy will do much to remove any public opposition on the part of those who have elected him.

No. 613

Foreign Office to War Office

[C 5262/21/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 29, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 18th April,¹ relative to the report of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles on German disarmament,² I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to express his general concurrence in the views of the Army Council.

2. As already explained semi-officially, Mr. Chamberlain considers that it would be of great assistance if a memorandum could now be prepared by the General Staff to form the basis of the Allied list of demands to be made upon the German Government, just as the memorandum enclosed in your letter of the 3rd March last³ so happily formed the basis of the report of the Military Committee of Versailles now under consideration. If this commends itself to the Army Council they would perhaps cause such a memorandum to be drawn up as soon as possible. As stated in your letter under reply, it is desirable that it should be complete in itself; that it should leave no point of principle undecided, and that, if accepted by the other interested Governments, it should be suitable for textual communication to the German Government in the form of an enclosure in a brief Allied note (see paragraph 4 below).

3. With regard to the form of the memorandum, Mr. Chamberlain considers that it should preferably be drawn up in four sections: The first section to be a statement showing the extent to which Germany has already complied with the disarmament clauses of the treaty; the second section to show exactly what remains to be done by Germany before those clauses can be held to have been fully executed; the third section to be a list of the specific measures which the Allies now intend to insist that Germany should carry out before the evacuation of Cologne can take place; and the final section to be a list of the concessions which the Allies have already made and are now prepared to make in the interests of a

¹ Not printed.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 3.

² See No. 608, n. 1.

speedy and amicable settlement, provided that the demands contained in the third section are carried out.

4. For the information of the Army Council, I am to transmit the enclosed copy of a letter sent by Sir Eyre Crowe to Lord Crewe on the 6th March last, forwarding a suggested draft of an inter-Allied note, under cover of which the memorandum enumerating the Allied demands, as set forth above, might be communicated to the German Government. The Secretary of State has approved this draft as a basis of discussion when this question comes before the Ambassadors' Conference, with the exception of the last paragraph, which refers to a possible meeting between Allied and German representatives to discuss the methods of executing the Allied requirements. This paragraph should be deleted, as, in view of the attitude recently adopted by the French authorities, Mr. Chamberlain is no longer convinced that such a conference will be necessary.⁴

5. On the other hand, it is for consideration whether a paragraph should not be added referring to the withdrawal of the Military Commission of Control. The paragraph might be to the effect that, as soon as the Allied demands have been fulfilled, the task of the Control Commission will be completed and it will be withdrawn. Meanwhile, its work will be limited to supervising the execution of the Allied demands formulated in the note, and its numbers will be progressively reduced as the various infractions are made good. Mr. Chamberlain would welcome the views of the Army Council on this point.

6. Finally, the attention of the Army Council is drawn to the question of the German police. It is noted that they have suggested in the annexes to your letter under reply certain concessions; but the extent of these concessions is to be decided almost entirely by the Military Control Commission. It is clearly preferable, if differences are to be avoided on the Control Commission, that the latter should be given precise instructions by the Versailles Committee regarding the wishes of the Allied Governments in this matter, and it is therefore suggested that, simultaneously with the preparation of the demands to be made upon Germany, the Versailles Committee should be invited to draw up for the approval of the Ambassadors' Conference draft instructions to the Control Commission, which would be despatched at the same time as the Allied requirements were communicated to the German Government.

7. It is proposed to defer sending any reply to Lord Crewe's despatch No. 880 of the 13th April⁵ until the receipt of your reply to this letter, copies of which are being sent for information to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Berlin.

I am, etc.,
MILES W. LAMPSON

⁴ See No. 609.

⁵ No. 608.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 613

Sir E. Crowe to Lord Crewe (Paris)

[C 3259/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 6, 1925*

Dear Lord Crewe,

The Department has been considering the form in which the Allied requirements in regard to Germany's disarmament obligations should best be communicated to the German Government, and the enclosed draft represents our suggestions as to the lines on which the note should finally run. In the rush of the last few days there has been no time to submit the draft to the Secretary of State before his departure,⁶ and it has consequently not yet received his approval. You might perhaps find an opportunity to show it to him while he is in Paris⁷ and ask his general approval of the draft as indicating the line which you might take when discussing the matter with your colleagues on the Ambassadors' Conference. It is, of course, not meant to bind you as to particulars, but to give you an indication of the line on which our thoughts are moving. It is also, as you will see, no more than a suggestion for a covering note. The really important thing will be the enclosure, which will be the detailed list of defaults to be made good by Germany before evacuation can take place.

Yours, etc.,

EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 613

Draft Note to the German Government

In their note of the 5th January⁸ the Allied Governments informed the German Government that they would be unable to proceed with the partial evacuation of occupied territory at the date contemplated in article 429 of the Treaty of Versailles. This decision was necessitated by the fact that Germany, by her failure to fulfil the terms of the treaty in respect of her disarmament obligations, had not executed the conditions upon which such evacuation depended. The Allied Governments at the same time declared their intention of awaiting the final report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control before furnishing the German Government with a specific statement of those obligations which must be satisfactorily fulfilled by Germany before the evacuation of the Cologne zone could be proceeded with.

The report of the Commission of Control has now been received.⁹ It provides convincing proof that the German Government ha[ve] in numerous instances failed to meet obligations which, under the Treaty of

⁶ See No. 74, n. 4.

⁸ See No. 553.

⁷ See Nos. 224, 225, and 227.

⁹ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592.

Versailles, they pledged themselves to execute. The Allied Governments have been at pains to differentiate between incidental evasions of less importance and such as constitute serious breaches of the letter of the treaty. The German Government should realise that the breaches of the treaty thus singled out are the most serious, but not the only, evidence of the non-fulfilment by Germany of this essential portion of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Allied Governments, having sifted the report, are now in a position to inform the German Government of their specific requirements. A memorandum is accordingly attached as an annex to this note detailing the measures which must be taken before Germany's disarmament obligations can be considered as sufficiently fulfilled to secure the partial evacuation contemplated by article 429 of the treaty. The Allied Governments are confident that, given goodwill on the part of the German Government and the German authorities, the fulfilment of these points should necessitate no protracted delay. It rests with the German Government themselves to create the conditions to which evacuation can speedily be accomplished.

It is desirable at this stage to correct certain misapprehensions which are implied in the German notes of the 6th¹⁰ and 27th January.¹¹ In the first place, and in order to prevent all possibility of misunderstanding and misrepresentation in the future, the Allied Governments solemnly reiterate their intention, as already expressed in their note of the 26th January,¹¹ scrupulously to observe for their part the terms of article 429 of the treaty. They will be ready, waiving any reservations which they might have been entitled to make in respect of Germany's obligations under other parts of the treaty, to give orders for the evacuation of the first zone of occupation in the Rhineland so soon as the military defaults detailed in the attached memorandum are satisfactorily made good.

In the second place, the Allied Governments cannot leave unchallenged the allegation contained in the German note of the 6th January that the non-evacuation of the Cologne zone on the 10th January 1925, constituted a reprisal. Such a contention, as has already been indicated in the Allied note of the 26th January, is a perversion of the treaty position. It is for the German Government, by faithfully fulfilling their obligations under the treaty, themselves to earn the benefit of the evacuation of the first zone occupation in the Rhineland as provided for under article 429. Nor can the Allied Governments agree that their decision is an act of severity out of all proportion to the disarmament obligations, described by the German Government as subsidiary details, which still remain to be fulfilled. On the contrary, points are still outstanding which the German government were informed so long ago as September 1922¹² must be executed, but which they have made little or no attempt to rectify in the interval. These points, taken in conjunction with the other matters dealt

¹⁰ See No. 556.

¹¹ See No. 570, n. 3.

¹² See No. 558, n. 8.

with in the attached memorandum, far from being subsidiary details of disarmament, are grave infractions of the military clauses of the treaty, and the Allied Governments must remind the German Government that if the Allies for their part have solemnly declared their intention of carrying out the obligations devolving upon them by article 429 of the treaty, they expect the German Government to do the same.

The Allied Governments are anxious, however, to avoid all controversial discussion, and for this reason they welcome the assurance given in the German note of the 6th January to the effect that in regard to any fundamental differences of opinion the German government are ready to do their share in order to attain the necessary practical result as soon as possible. Equally strong is the desire of the Allied Governments that the outstanding points embodied in the annex to this note may be settled with all despatch, and they therefore call upon the German Government in all earnestness to carry out these remaining matters with all the speed and goodwill which the gravity of the situation demands, and thus, in their own words, to conclude the first stage of the fulfilment of the treaty and bring alleviation to Germany in the shape of the liberation of an important portion of occupied German territory.

The Allied Governments are prepared, for the purpose of facilitating the rapid and smooth execution of the demands now presented, to meet such delegates as the German Government may choose to appoint and to discuss with them verbally the actual methods and the requisite steps to be taken for their execution.

No. 614

War Office to Foreign Office (Received May 1)

[C 5855/21/18]*

Secret

WAR OFFICE, May 1, 1925

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to refer to Foreign Office letter dated the 29th April, 1925,¹ on the subject of the report of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles on German disarmament.

2. With reference to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the above letter, I am to forward a memorandum² drawn up in four sections, as suggested by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain. Schedule IV has been divided into two parts:—

(i) Concessions already granted.

(ii) Concessions which the Allies are now willing to grant.

3. With reference to paragraph 5, the Army Council agree that it would be advisable for the withdrawal of the Commission of Control to be

¹ No. 613.

² Not printed.

mentioned, but this withdrawal is the natural corollary of the execution by Germany of the military clauses of the treaty.

In referring to the Commission of Control, the Army Council, while agreeing that the future work of the commission will be mainly that of verification, consider that it would be inadvisable so to inform the German Government. The commission will remain in Germany with its full powers under the treaty, but its activities should be limited, under instructions from the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, to supervising the execution of the Allied demands formulated in the note, and its numbers should be progressively reduced as the various infractions are made good.

4. With reference to paragraph 6, the Army Council agree with the views of Mr. Chamberlain on the subject of the extent of the concessions to be made to Germany, and instructions have already been sent to the British representative on the Allied Military Committee of Versailles to endeavour to obtain agreement with our Allies on all concessions which may involve a possible difference of opinion.

I am, etc.,

B. B. CUBITT³

³ Assistant Under Secretary of State at the War Office.

No. 615

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 1570 [C 5814/10/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 5, 1925

My Lord,

Since the receipt of your despatch No. 744 of March 26th¹ and telegram No. 115 (section 2) of the same date² relative to the valuation of services under Articles 8–12 of the Rhineland Agreement,³ the question of the modification of the Agreement drawn up by the Mixed Committee on December 2nd last⁴ has been settled satisfactorily by the authorisation contained in my telegram No. 99 of April 1st⁵ to accept the compromise suggested in Your Lordship's telegram No. 120 of March 31st,⁶ concerning the nomination of the president of the Arbitral Commission. There is therefore no longer any need to consider the various suggestions contained in the French memorandum of March 25th¹ (of which a copy was transmitted under cover of your despatch under reference) for securing the objects aimed at by the amendments proposed by His Majesty's Government without the actual alteration of the agreement.

¹ Not printed.

⁴ See No. 602, n. 2.

² No. 602.

⁵ See No. 603, n. 6.

³ See No. 330, n. 5.

⁶ No. 603.

2. Apart from these suggestions however, the French memorandum contained certain recommendations concerning two of which you desired to be furnished with the views of His Majesty's Government. The first of these was that the Allied members of the Assessment Commissions should keep the Rhineland High Commission informed of the decisions of these commissions; that the decisions of the Arbitral Commission should be notified by the President to the High Commission and to the German Government simultaneously; and that it should be the duty of the High Commission to establish liaison with the Reparation Commission and the Agent-General for Reparation Payments.

3. No objection is seen in principle to the notification to the High Commission of the decisions of the various commissions. It is, in fact, important that the High Commission should be kept informed of the proceedings of all Allied or semi-Allied bodies in the occupied territory in which the Rhineland High Commission is the supreme representative of the allied Powers. In the present case the application of this principle should in the opinion of His Majesty's Government be subject to two conditions. In the first place it must be understood that notification is made for information only and not for the purpose of confirmation since the awards of the Commissions are final and there can be no question of their requiring confirmation by any other body. In the second place it is probable that the Assessment Commissions will elaborate a very large number of decisions on questions which are merely of local interest and minor importance. The main business of the Commissions will be the fixing of prices in particular cases and it does not appear that any useful purpose will be served by the communication to the High Commission of all decisions of this nature. At the same time, especially at the outset, the Assessment Commissions will be called upon to take decisions of general interest or principle which should be communicated to the High Commission for information. In the circumstances His Majesty's Government suggest that a decision be taken to the effect that in principle the Assessment Commissions shall notify the High Commission of all their decisions but that with a view to the reduction of labour and correspondence to a strictly necessary minimum, it is desirable for the two bodies to come to some arrangement regarding the nature of decisions actually to be communicated to the High Commission.

4. The last part of the French proposal appears to be more doubtful. Its meaning is not, in fact, altogether clear. If what is intended is merely that the High Commission shall be responsible for seeing that proper arrangements are made for liaison, His Majesty's Government would see no objection to assenting to the French suggestion. They are not, however, prepared to agree that the High Commission shall itself be the channel of communication between the Reparation Commission and the Agent-General for Reparation Payments on the one hand, and the Armies and the Assessment and the Arbitral Commissions on the other hand. Such a procedure might lead to much practical difficulty and to delay in the

despatch of business while resulting in no obvious compensatory advantage.

5. The second French suggestion, on which you asked for an expression of the views of His Majesty's Government was that the organisation of the various commissions should, as far as possible, not involve any addition to the present number of officials in the Rhineland. It is understood that this question has already been discussed by the Mixed Committee and that it has been made clear that the number of such officials must be very restricted. The Allied Governments are liable for the cost of the members of the local assessment commissions and of the arbitral commissions, but not for the cost of any other officials. Accordingly, while I am in agreement that the number of officials employed under the new scheme should be as small as experience may show to be possible, it would appear superfluous for the Ambassadors' Conference to refer to the matter in any communication that they may make to the German Government. Such a reference might give rise to the mistaken impression that the Allied governments would be liable for the cost of officials appointed by the German authorities other than the members of the local and arbitral commissions.

6. Authorisation to accept the compromise by which the authenticity of the French text of the code embodying the arbitral decisions of Monsieur Patijn⁷ is established was conveyed in Mr. Lampson's private letter to Mr. Sargent of April 8th,⁸ and is hereby confirmed. As has been already intimated to you, His Majesty's Government consent to this arrangement only in order to surmount the practical difficulties which may arise in this particular case from the existence of three texts, and I request that Your Lordship will be particularly watchful that the circumstance is not utilised to further the introduction of the pre-eminence of a French text in any future arrangements which may be concluded under the Treaty of Versailles.

I am, etc.,
(For the Secretary of State)
C. HOWARD SMITH

⁷ See No. 602, n. 6.

⁸ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 616

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblentz) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 11)

*No. 184 [C 6306/6306/18]**

COBLENTZ, May 8, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that a Rhineland millenary celebration

is being organised, and will find expression shortly throughout the occupied territories, and more especially in Cologne, the chief town of the Rhineland, in exhibitions, official visits of Reich and State Ministers, athletic meetings and other functions.

The celebration of the millenary of the year 925 A.D., when Henry I¹ defeated Duke Gisbert of Lotharingia,² and joined this province to the Empire of the East Franks, is intended to mark the incorporation and the unity of the Rhineland with Germany for a thousand years.

The programmes of the celebrations are being arranged locally by the various municipal authorities. It is evident, however, from a letter addressed by the Minister of the Interior³ to the Regierungspräsident of Düsseldorf⁴ (a French translation of which I attach)⁵ that the German Government is, at least to some extent, organising and financing the manifestations.

The celebrations are to commence about the middle of this month, and will continue until September. The programmes of the municipalities have not yet all been drawn up, but such as have been submitted to the High Commission, though differing in detail, bear the same general character. In all the large towns it is proposed to hold a series of indoor celebrations, such as receptions, theatrical or musical displays, and exhibitions dealing with the past history of the Rhineland. These will be accompanied by outdoor celebrations, such as processions and athletic meetings.

2. While the ostensible reason for the millenary is the celebration of an historical date in the past of the Rhineland, there is no doubt that the underlying intention is political and aims at arousing the patriotism of the occupied territories. One of the motives, no doubt, is the combating of Separatist ideas, but, from reports which I have received from the British zone, there is, at the same time, little doubt that the festivities are generally anti-Allied in nature, and are taking the forms of a protest against the continued occupation of the northern zone, and of a demonstration in favour of the ultimate complete freedom of the occupied territories from Allied control.

The most objectionable feature is the intention of the German authorities to bring into the occupied territories by special trains large numbers of persons from unoccupied Germany to take part in the celebrations. In the little village of Burg, near Solingen, in the British zone, it is intended to hold an open-air theatrical representation, which it is expected will draw an attendance of 150,000 people, of which a large proportion will come from unoccupied Germany. Similarly, large numbers are expected to arrive in Cologne from the unoccupied territory, and

¹ King of Germany 919-36.

² He had been elected 'King' in 920. He was confirmed in the dukedom in 928, and died in 939.

³ Of Prussia, Herr Severing. The letter was signed by a Ministry official, Dr. Löhrrs.

⁴ Herr Bergemann.

⁵ Of April 14, not printed.

there is reason to believe that special arrangements are being made to bring considerable numbers from Bavaria to attend the celebrations in the Palatinate.

It is evident that these patriotic demonstrations will be attended by Nationalists, rather than by the members of parties of the Left, and that the presence of large numbers of reactionaries from unoccupied Germany, who have little knowledge of the special régime in the Rhineland, presents grave dangers of the outbreak of disorders. This appears to be realised by the local authorities, as is instanced by an application from the police president of Cologne for a temporary increase of 100 police to deal with the crowds which are expected in that town.

3. The whole question has been receiving the earnest attention of the High Commission. Several interviews have taken place with the representative of the Oberpräsident of the Rhine Province,⁶ and the High Commission has impressed on this official the necessity of avoiding all outdoor demonstrations of a nature to inflame passions and provoke disorder.

The action taken by the Oberpräsident has not, however, been productive of much result, and he has informed the High Commission that, since the celebrations are being organised locally, he is unable to exercise much influence on the programmes which are being arranged.

While the High Commission is apprehensive of the danger which may arise by the influx of large numbers of strangers of anti-Allied feelings into the Rhineland, it considers that, for political reasons, as well as for reasons of fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, to take any action other than to keep itself fully informed of the programmes to be carried out, and to forbid such items in the programmes as seem likely to disturb public order. It would seem that there is little danger to be apprehended from indoor functions or manifestations, and the High Commission, therefore, does not propose to intervene as far as these are concerned. On the other hand, there is an inherent danger in outdoor manifestations, and the High Commission is proposing to give its representatives power to prohibit these in cases where the local situation would appear to make this necessary.

4. If, however, the danger of disorder and friction between the population and the members of the occupation are to be avoided, it would seem necessary that a restraining influence should be brought to bear on the celebrations by the German Government. As stated in the first paragraph of this despatch, the Government itself is organising the celebrations to some extent, and if, in the course of the celebrations, excesses occur, the responsibility for them must be borne by the Government.

I cannot but regret that at the present time, when the general political situation is so delicate, that the German Government should have thought

⁶ Dr. H. Fuchs.

fit to encourage throughout the whole of the occupied territories these Nationalist demonstrations.

I would venture to suggest that His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin should be instructed to point out to the German Government the responsibility which they are incurring, and to request them to take the necessary measures to ensure that the celebrations are carried out in a moderate and non-provocative manner.

5. I would add that the General Office[r] Commanding-in-chief,⁷ as far as the British zone is concerned, views the celebrations with disfavour, and desires that every effort should be made to have the celebrations postponed until the army has left Cologne.

I doubt whether this is possible, in view of the advanced state of the preparations for the celebrations, or, if possible, whether, for general political reasons, it would now be opportune, but it is clearly desirable that the celebrations should be carried out in such a manner as not to arouse national antagonisms.

I attach copy of the letter of the British military authorities for information.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, etc.,
KILMARNOCK

⁷ Lieut-General Sir J. Du Cane.

No. 617

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 101 Telegraphic (C 6306/6306/18)

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 13, 1925, 7.30 p.m.*

Lord Kilmarnock's despatch No. 184 of May 8th,¹ of which a copy has been sent you direct. (Rhineland Millenary).

I cannot disguise my astonishment and indignation that German government should countenance and even encourage a celebration which is not only bound to exacerbate feeling between inhabitants and the occupying forces but is apparently expressly intended for that purpose. I draw your particular attention to the last two paragraphs of the letter from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to Dusseldorf² where the object of the demonstrations is clearly disclosed. I can conceive no greater folly at a time when extreme discretion and tact is more than ever necessary if evacuation of Cologne and success of 'security' negotiations³ are really

¹ No. 616.

² Of April 14, not printed.

³ See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197, n. 1.

desired by the German government. It really makes me doubt their sincerity and justifies every suspicion entertained by the French public. I am seriously alarmed at what the results may be.

For the moment I am not confiding my fears to other allied governments: I feel it better that I should tell you of my preoccupation in the hope that you may be able, even at this late hour, to convince the German government of the criminal folly of these proceedings. It is an occasion on which you should speak to them in the plainest language. We have tried to help them. They seem determined to render all our efforts fruitless.

Copies to Paris, Brussels, Coblenz.

No. 618

Colonel Ryan¹ (Coblenz) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 16)

*No. 189 [C 6610/6306/18]**

COBLENZ, May 13, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that since the date of Lord Kilmarnock's despatch No. 184 of the [8]th May,² relative to the Rhineland Millenary, further light has been thrown on the political significance of the celebrations by information which the High Commission has received.

2. On the 27th April a meeting of the local section of the Nationalist party took place at Düsseldorf, at which the members of the party emphasised the necessity of developing the Nationalist movement in the occupied territories, and decided to make every use of the Millenary celebrations to further this purpose.

Professor Moldenhauer (leader of the German People's party in the occupied territories), in a recent number of the 'Kölnische Zeitung', expresses the opinion that although the recent events in the internal politics of Germany and France have relegated to the background the question of the evacuation of the northern zone and the problem of security, the Rhineland has not forgotten for a single instant that contrary to the Treaty of Peace this region has not yet been evacuated. The Millenary celebrations will take place in such a way as to make not only the occupied territories, but also the whole German Empire feel the cruel injustice of which the Rhineland is a victim.

The 'Kölnische Zeitung', in its number of the 7th May, in referring to the Millenary celebrations, says that, like all German races, the Austrians are organising festivities on the occasion of the Millenary of the

¹ Deputy British High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

² No. 616.

attachment of the Rhineland to the Reich. They are making use of the actual moment to make clear their unshakable fidelity to the idea of a great German Empire, and to manifest before the world their desire to be attached to their mother country.

The Austrian colony in the Ruhr, which amounts to over 100,000 miners, will take part in the manifestation to be held on the 22nd May at Dortmund in favour of an united Germany.

The 'Frauenthaler Neueste Nachrichten' of the 28th April says that the French Rhineland policy, which was developed during the French invasion under Louis XIV,³ was for the Palatinate a period of evil, of which the present generation is still feeling the effects. In the year 1689, the year of the destruction of Speyer and Heidelberg by the armed bands of the 'Christian King', this period of political dismemberment, war, plague, misery and religious struggle did not shake the fidelity of the Palatines to the Reich.⁴ The Palatinate, whose attachment to the Reich has been severely tested, will continue to support German unity, and will bear witness to this promise on the occasion of the Millenary.

3. The High Commission has also received information to the effect that certain Nationalist associations are planning manifestations of a provocative nature in the neutral zone, in particular, in the localities situated between the bridgeheads. Manifestations of this nature took place in 1922, and formed the subject of a protest by the three Allied Governments to the German Government.⁵

In connection with the arrival in occupied territories of persons from unoccupied Germany, a report has been received that the German Railway Company has decided to offer reduced fares to visitors wishing to attend the Millenary celebrations. Associations of thirty members of more will benefit by a reduction of 25 per cent. on journeys above 50 kilom[etres]. This reduction will affect not only the normal mileage tariff, but also the supplement for tickets for express trains.

4. The High Commission held a special sitting yesterday to consider what action it should take with regard to the celebrations. I attach for your information copy⁶ of the decision taken. You will observe that it proposes to leave to its representatives the task of arranging amicably with the Germans the programmes which are to be carried out in the various localities; at the same time, the decision lays down the general lines on which the chief representatives are to act, and confers on them for a period of one month the special powers provided for by Ordinance No. 173,⁷ which they are to use within the limits of the instructions addressed to them. Finally, the High Commission decided to address a letter to the

³ King of France 1643-1715.

⁴ See C. Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son Administration Politique et Militaire* . . . , vol. IV (Paris, 1863), pp. 155-84, 223-30, and 244.

⁵ See Vol. XX, Nos. 284, 310, 314, and 319.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Of May 12, 1923. For the text, see *Official Gazette of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission*, Part 5 (1923), pp. 417-19.

Oberpräsident of the Rhine Province and the presidents of the other provinces of the occupied territories, exposing its point of view on the question of the Millenary, and drawing their attention to the necessity of collaborating with the High Commission in the interests of the population and the maintenance of public order. I attach a copy of this letter⁶ for information.

5. I am informed today by the chief representative of the High Commission at Cologne that on the 16th May the German Chancellor, the Reich Ministers Stresemann and Frencken,⁸ and the Prussian State Ministers Braun⁹ and Severing are coming to Cologne to take part in the opening of the Cologne celebrations. After consultation with my colleagues, I have sent instructions to Colonel Birch¹⁰ requesting him to make an official call on Dr. Luther, and to express to the latter the hope that any speeches made by him or by the other Ministers will be moderate in tone. I attach a copy of these instructions to this despatch.⁶

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, etc.,
R. S. RYAN

⁸ Minister of Justice, and for the Occupied Territories.

⁹ Prime Minister of Prussia.

¹⁰ Commissioner at Cologne, Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

No. 619

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received May 15, 7.50 p.m.)

No. 194 Telegraphic [C 6574/6306/18]

BERLIN, May 15, 1925, 6.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 101.¹

I have spoken strongly to German government in accordance with your instructions. They reply after investigation that supposed letter from Prussian Ministry of the Interior enclosed in Lord Kilmarnock's despatch No. 184² is a palpable and clumsy forgery. This is alleged to be proved by reference numbers which are all wrong and by internal style of the document. Nothing even remotely similar to letter has been written by Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

As regards celebrations themselves German government state that they are of local origin and have always been looked on somewhat coldly by Berlin. If at the time idea of these celebrations was started it had been considered probable that Cologne would still be occupied, celebrations would have been postponed. It is now too late to do this, but German

¹ No. 617.

² No. 616.

government will exercise their influence to keep celebrations on moderate and sensible lines and avoid anything which can be construed into an attack on allied troops of occupation or as being likely to cause disorder.

Luther and Braun are speaking in the Rhineland tomorrow.³ They are fully acquainted with views of His Majesty's Government.

Repeated to Coblenz.

³ See No. 618.

No. 620

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1719 [C 6566/21/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 15, 1925*

My Lord,

I have received your despatch No. 1122 of the 12th May¹ and your telegrams Nos. 179¹ and 182¹ of the 13th and 14th May, relative to the note which is to be addressed to the German Government² regarding military control and the evacuation of the Cologne zone, and after consultation with the War Office³ I am able to give you the following instructions as to the attitude which you should adopt towards the proposals of the French Government as expressed in the French delegation's note of 12th May.⁴

2. In the first place, though to my mind the British draft⁵ is the better document, I concur in your view that the best hope of reaching a speedy agreement now lies in taking the French draft as the basis of the note to the German Government. It is therefore necessary to consider the French draft note paragraph by paragraph.

3. I concur in your view that paragraphs 1 and 2 may be accepted as they stand. In regard to paragraph 3, more than one argument leads me to approve your proposal to press for the elimination of the words 'accompagné de la documentation fournie par la commission', which I, too, took to refer to the annexes to the Commission of Control's report of the 15th February.⁶ In the first place, General Walch's letter to Marshal Foch of the 13th March,¹ a copy of which accompanied my despatch No.

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 613.

³ Mr. Lampson minuted on May 15 that the draft of this despatch had been gone through with the War Office and General Wauchope.

⁴ A copy of this note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1122.

⁵ In Foreign Office despatch No. 1561 of May 5, Mr. Chamberlain had furnished Lord Crewe with instructions concerning the communication to be made to the German Government and had transmitted a War Office memorandum, divided into four sections, to serve as a draft for discussion (see No. 614), and a revised version of the draft covering note sent to Lord Crewe on March 6 (see No. 613, Enclosure 2).

⁶ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592.

1126 of the 1st April,¹ furnishes to my mind unanswerable arguments against the publication of Annexes IX, X and XI, viz., the reports of the Armaments and Effectives Sub-Commissions and of the Fortifications Section. I observe, however, from your telegram No. 182¹ that it is not the intention of the French to press for the communication to the German Government of the whole of the annexes, but rather of a bowdlerised version. This proposal appears to me open to even stronger objection. It seems to me most objectionable that there should be two versions extant of the same document, one in the possession of the Allies and the other in that of the Germans and of the world at large. Whether discovered or not, this does not strike me as straightforward; if discovered, the motives of the Allies would certainly be misjudged. For these reasons I cannot see my way to agree to the proposal, but must beg you to insist upon the report of the Commission of Control alone being communicated to the German Government without annexes.

4. Again, in regard to paragraph 4 of the French draft, there is to my mind every advantage in confining our complaints against the German Government to definite breaches of the treaty for which there is chapter and verse, and in refraining from statements which must to a great extent be matters of conjecture. The paragraph as it stands does not in any case, in the view of His Majesty's Government, present a true picture of the situation, for, while it may be true to say that the facts as revealed by the Commission of Control's report permit the conjecture that the German Government may be in a position to reconstitute a national army at some future date, the same cannot be said of the position today as would be inferred from this paragraph in the French draft. The terms of the British draft (beginning with the words: 'The Allied Governments have carefully sifted the report' and continuing to the end of paragraph 3) seem to me greatly preferable, and you should strongly press for their substitution for paragraphs 4 and 5 of the French draft. If the French insist on the retention of a paragraph in the sense of paragraph 4 of their draft, you are authorised in the last resort to agree to a sentence on the following lines:—

'The German defaults, taken on the whole, give the impression that the German Government have in view the possible reconstitution of the army at a future date on the basis of a nation in arms.'

You should, however, only consent even to this modified statement if you find the French absolutely insistent.

5. Paragraph 6 of the French draft raises the question whether the notification to the German Government of the concessions that the Allies are prepared to grant are to be made in the Allied note or subsequently by the Commission of Control in Berlin. I am convinced that far from breeding distrust abroad their inclusion in the note would have the most salutary effect not only on that section of opinion in Germany upon the support of which the German Government must rely in the measures necessary to satisfy your requirements, but also on public opinion at large.

It would show that the Allies, without holding to the letter of their bond, were making their demands in as moderate a spirit as was compatible with their national safety. I need not point out to your Lordship how important it is to the Allies that Germany should receive no encouragement from other nations and notably from the United States of America to adopt an attitude of resistance and obstruction to our just demands. My object is to enlist world opinion on our side. M. Briand, I am sure, will be quick to appreciate the importance of this factor not only in its effect on the questions immediately at issue but equally upon those larger conceptions of policy which France and Great Britain pursue in common.

I may add that logically the French proposal is unsound. The object of the Allied note is to make certain demands upon Germany on the fulfilment of which the Allies for their part agree to evacuate the Cologne zone and withdraw the Commission of Control from Germany. It would clearly be illogical to include among these demands points upon the fulfilment of which they do not intend to insist. Again, it is argued that the mention of concessions in the Allied note would lead the German Government to beg for more and more relaxations. This, to my mind, would, on the contrary, be the inevitable result were the concessions to come without previous warning from the Commission of Control; nor is it in any case easy to see at what point the commission could well offer the concessions to the German authorities if the latter were unaware from the outset of the Allied readiness to make them. In fine it seems to me from every point of view a far sounder policy to lay down minimum requirements and to refuse any discussion of them, and, much to my regret, I find myself bound to insist upon this point of view as opposed to the proposal of the French Government. You should therefore insist on sub-section 3 of this paragraph of the French draft being modified on the lines of the similar passage in the British draft.

6. I have no comments to offer on paragraphs 7 and 8. In regard to paragraph 9, you are authorised to agree to the Reparation Commission being invited by the conference to make a formal declaration to the Allied Powers that the acceptance by Germany of the Dawes scheme⁷ and the punctual fulfilment of that scheme up to date may be considered as exonerating Germany from a charge of default on that head for the purpose of article 429 of the treaty. The precise terms of reference to the Reparation Commission must be left to your Lordship's judgment, on the assumption that you will consult the British assistant delegate,⁸ and, if necessary, Sir J. Fischer Williams.⁹ Secondly, I request that you will press strongly for the insertion of the word 'immédiatement' before the words 'l'ordre d'évacuer la première zone'. This addition, which, as you will remember, has been pressed by Lord D'Abernon,¹⁰ makes no real difference in our intentions, but the clear statement of those intentions

⁷ See No. 27, n. 8.

⁸ Sir B. Kemball-Cook.

⁹ British Legal Representative on the Reparation Commission.

¹⁰ In Berlin despatch No. 287 of May 2, not printed.

may be decisive for the execution by Germany of our requirements for the judgment which the world forms of our action.

7. Paragraph 10 you are authorised to accept on condition that agreement is recorded in the minutes of the meeting that any new default liable to cause delay in evacuation must be one of demonstrably grave importance. I should also like to see the words 'de fond' added after 'nul manquement nouveau' in the text.

8. In regard to paragraph 11, I approve your suggested amendment. Paragraphs 12–15 largely reproduce passages in the British draft, and I have no comments to offer. I have no objection to paragraph 16, and I leave it to your discretion to ask an explanation of any passage that seems to you obscure. Paragraphs 17 and 18 are unobjectionable.

9. As regards the procedure whereby the draft note is to be drawn up and agreed upon by the Ambassadors' Conference, I am content to leave the matter to your discretion. I see no objection to the proposal of the French Government that the Versailles Committee should be invited to review the annexes to the note; indeed, it seems only right and proper that they should do so, but you should express the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that no undue delay will be caused thereby. Lastly, I request that, in communicating to the French Government the views expressed in this despatch, you will assure them that any criticisms on their proposals that I have to offer are made in no controversial spirit but solely with a view to obtain as speedy and satisfactory a settlement of this question as possible; subject to that consideration, I have every desire to meet their wishes so far as lies in my power. You may add, for their confidential information, that His Majesty's Government are subject to continuous pressure in Parliament with regard to this question. I have hitherto succeeded in averting what might well prove to be an embarrassing debate, and at my request Lord Oxford¹¹ has agreed to postpone a motion for the publication of papers which he had put down for Monday, the 18th May. I cannot, however, indefinitely shelve this demand for a statement of the position, and my earnest hope is that the French Government, realising as they must do the delicacy of the situation, will do what they can to place His Majesty's Government in a position to come before Parliament with the agreed text of an inter-Allied note to Germany without further delay. Otherwise matters certainly become more difficult for all concerned.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹¹ Leader of the Liberal Party. As Mr. Asquith he had been Prime Minister 1908–16.

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 889 [C 6561/21/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 15, 1925

My Lord,

Your Lordship will have observed, from my despatch No. 797 of the 30th April last¹ and my despatch to Paris, No. 1561, of the 5th May,² that I no longer consider it necessary to urge the other Allied Governments to agree to a ministerial conference to discuss with the German Government the details and methods of execution of the Allied requirements in the matter of disarmament.

2. I had originally favoured the plan of communicating the Allied demands to the German Government across the table,³ as being the procedure most likely to secure a satisfactory settlement of the question. In deference, however, to the wishes of the French Government I later modified this proposal and agreed that the demands should be communicated in the form of a note,⁴ on condition, however, that the note should contain an expression of readiness on the part of the Allied Governments to discuss with German delegates the methods of executing the Allied demands.

3. I do not now consider this course necessary for it happily appears probable that complete agreement may now be expected among the Allied Governments on the nature of the demands to be made, and that no demands will be presented which are not in the opinion of our own military advisers essential. They will thus be an irreducible minimum upon the fulfilment of which all the Allies will feel bound to insist and such discussions as will be necessary in regard to details and methods of execution will be more practically and expeditiously treated by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Berlin. Even if a meeting of Ministers were called, the matters to be discussed would at once have to be referred to the military advisers on both sides, and the rôle of the Ministers would be confined to registering the agreements reached by their advisers.

4. I request that as soon as the Allied requirements are in the hands of the German Government you will take an early opportunity to explain to them the reasons which led me to modify my original view as to the advantage of calling a conference of Ministers to agree upon the method of settling this question. You should make it clear that my change of view indicates no lack of courtesy to the German Government. It has been determined solely by considerations of practical expediency. My fundamental object remains what it has always been, viz. in the words I used

¹ No. 300.

³ See Nos. 562, 580, and 584.

² See No. 620, n. 5.

⁴ See Nos. 588 and 590.

in the House of Commons on the 5th March,⁵ 'to obtain at the earliest possible moment from the German Government and people the fulfilment of those things which may justly be demanded of them under the treaty, in order that the contemplated shortening of the period of occupation may take place as early as possible'.⁶

5. You will naturally take no action on this despatch until the Allied demands have been presented to the German Government. In order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding upon this point, I will telegraph as soon as the moment to make these explanations seems to me to have arrived.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ For Mr. Chamberlain's speech, see 181*H.C. Deb.* 5 s, cols. 700-08 and 713-15.

⁶ For this quotation, see *ibid.*, cols. 705-6.

No. 622

Colonel Ryan (Coblenz) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received May 19, 8.30 p.m.)

No. 12 Telegraphic [C 6817/6306/18]

Urgent

COBLENZ, May 19, 1925, 5.40 p.m.

On the receipt of Lord D'Abernon's telegram No. 194,¹ I asked French High Commissioner² for full details as to original circular.³ All he could tell me at the moment was that it came to him from French army. He promised to let me have full details which will take two or three days to obtain. I have also instituted enquiries with a view to finding out if meeting referred to in circular actually took place.

Circular was submitted to High Commission by French High Commissioner together with a number of other papers dealing with Millenary celebrations³ and was noted without comment; since it merely confirmed general impressions I had formed of active interest taken by German authorities in Millenary and since it did not appear of sufficient value or importance in itself to warrant a forgery no suspicion entered my mind as to its authenticity until I received Lord d'Abernon's telegram, although I have learned from experience to accept German documents submitted by French only with reserve.⁴

Fact that officials in occupied territories have been in close touch with Berlin in connection with this question came out clearly in conversations which took place between representatives of Ober Praesidents of Rhine province and High Commission.

In spite of denial of German government there is I think little doubt

¹ No. 619.

² M. P. Tirard.

³ See No. 616.

⁴ Mr. Lampson here commented in the margin: 'He sh[oul]d have said so then!!'

that celebrations have received considerable encouragement from Berlin, and it is significant that Oberburgomaster of Cologne⁵ in his speech on May 16th (opening day of celebrations) thanked Reich and Prussian governments for their particularly energetic support.

It is also hard to reconcile statement of government, that they have regarded celebrations coldly, with fact that there were present at the opening no less than eight Reich and state ministers including Chancellor.⁶

Sent to Berlin No. 9.

⁵ Dr. K. Adenauer.

⁶ Colonel Ryan added (Coblentz telegram No. 13 of May 19): 'The Cologne Peoples Gazette reporting on discussion by Reichstag Committee of budget of occupied territories states that three hundred thousand marks have been set aside by Reich for Millenary celebrations of Rhine Province and that further demands will receive greatest possible consideration. . . .

'There is this [*sic*] no doubt that occupied territories are receiving considerable sums from the Reich and state governments and that there [*sic*] subventions afford a reason for visit of Commission mentioned in circular.'

On May 22, Colonel Ryan reported (Coblentz telegram No. 15): 'French High Commissioner informs me it is certain that letter is authentic. Original was seen in files at Dusseldorf by an absolutely reliable person and a copy was made. This information comes from French secret service. . . .'

No. 623

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 105 Telegraphic [C 6827/6306/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 20, 1925, 5.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 194 (of the 15th May; Rhineland Millenary).¹

French government have asked that you should associate yourself with démarche to be made to the German government by the French Ambassador in Berlin on the subject of the Rhineland Millenary.² The representations will apparently largely follow lines of representations already made by you. I have explained to French Ambassador here³ what instructions you had already received.⁴ Please keep in touch with your French and Belgian colleagues on this subject and inform them of the representations you have made and of the German reply.⁵

Repeated to Paris No. 142 (By Bag) and Brussels No. 36.

¹ No. 619.

² The request was made in a *note verbale* of May 18 from the French Ambassador.

³ In a letter of May 20, not printed.

⁴ See No. 617.

⁵ See No. 619.

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 21, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 186 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6893/21/18]

PARIS, May 20, 1925

Military Control in Germany.

Your despatch No. 1719 of May 15th.¹

The position of the negotiations is now as follows:

Immediately upon the circulation by the Secretariat General of the French delegation's observations (my despatch No. 1122 of May 12th)² upon the proposals contained in your despatch No. 1561 of May 5th,² the military experts met to consider the schedules which are to be forwarded, under cover of a note, to the Germans. The military discussions, which were highly technical, continued uninterruptedly until May 18th and it was only late last evening that the typed copies of the schedules, revised as the result of these discussions, were available.

A copy of the schedules³ as revised is enclosed in my despatch No. 1182⁴ as well as a copy of a letter from General Clive,⁵ which goes to the War Office direct, together with copies³ of the schedules by tonight's bag. As is explained in General Clive's letter, the important point about the revised schedules is that Schedule III ('measures which must be taken by Germany before the military clauses of the treaty of Versailles can be held to have been satisfactorily fulfilled') is no longer as in the enclosure to your despatch No. 1561,² divided into two parts, viz. part 1 'Infractions on which complete satisfaction must be given' and part 2, 'Infractions on which the allies have the right to demand complete satisfaction but on which they are willing to give certain concessions'. Instead, practically all the concessions recommended by you have been in principle accepted, and there is now one statement only of the whole of the measures which must be taken by Germany before the military clauses of the treaty can be considered to have been fulfilled. The result is therefore that so far as Schedule III is concerned, the concessions recommended by you have been accepted and will be evident to the initiated, though not to the general public in the manner which I presume you intended.

The next question is that of the instructions which are to go to the Military Control Commission. The draft of these instructions² is contained in my despatch No. 1182.²

The next question is the covering note to the German government. In your despatch No. 1719¹ you authorised me to take as the basis of that note the French draft contained in my despatch No. 1122.² You instructed me, however, to endeavour to obtain certain modifications. The extent to which these modifications have at present been obtained is as follows:—

¹ No. 620.

² Not printed.

³ Missing from the file.

⁴ Of May 20, not printed.

⁵ Of May 19, not printed.

1. Paragraph 3 of the French draft note. The French continue to insist on the maintenance of the words 'accompagné de la documentation fournie par la Commission' although the representative of this embassy has urged to the best of his ability the arguments contained in paragraph 3 of your despatch No. 1719.¹ In view, therefore, of the apparent deadlock on this point, whilst the standpoint set forth in paragraph 2 of your despatch has been entirely maintained, the French delegation has been asked to produce a draft, or at least some fuller explanation, of what it does want to communicate to the German government. It has been explained that you will then be able to consider the situation in the light of such a statement. The French contention continues to be that the Control Commission's report is not clear without some résumé of the annexes, and they maintain that the recent speech of Dr. Stresemann⁶ strengthens them in their belief that the Control Commission's case must be absolutely clear to the Germans.

2. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the French draft.

Every effort was made to induce the French delegation to accept a wording in the sense of the British draft, but they claimed that this would imply the complete suppression of what they consider it important to state to the world, i.e. the danger of the possible recreation of the nation in arms on the basis of the present German military organisation. As therefore it seemed useless to continue the discussion on these lines, it was suggested that you might possibly be willing, as a great and final concession, to accept the alternative wording given in paragraph 4 of your despatch No. 1719.¹ Even this wording, however, the French delegation has so far refused to accept, but they are, it is understood, seeking a new formula which I hope to send you over by Thursday⁷ night's bag. It has been made quite clear to the French delegation that the alternative wording of paragraph 4 of your despatch No. 1719¹ is the very most you are likely to concede on this point.

3. Sub-section 3 of paragraph 6 of the French draft.

The arguments contained in paragraph 5 of your despatch No. 1719¹ were all urged upon the French delegation last week, but in view of the modified nature of schedule III, certain of them would now seem to fall to the ground, and I should be glad of fresh instructions as to what precise amendments you now wish made in this sub-section. Great emphasis has been laid with the French delegation upon the importance of making the reasonable nature of the present demands clear beyond all doubt to public opinion, but as I have already explained in my telegrams Nos. 179⁸ and 182,⁹ this is exactly what the French government dislike.

I can try again if you wish to get a reference to the concessions in the covering note, but I cannot help feeling that it would be well to face the

⁶ See No. 327.

⁷ May 21. The new formula was communicated in Paris telegram No. 189 of May 21, not printed.

⁸ Of May 13, not printed.

⁹ Of May 14, not printed.

fact that it will be extremely difficult to get this in view of the present opposition not only of the French but also of the other three delegations.

4. Paragraph 9 of the French note.

I hope that I have now, after consultation with the British delegation to the Reparation commission, found a satisfactory formula for the conference communication to the commission. The relevant passage of that communication would read: 'The conference has to request the commission to inform it whether at the present time the conditions of the treaty, as now fixed, as to the question of reparation (including all connected questions which are recognised as falling within the jurisdiction of the commission) are faithfully carried out by Germany'. This formula is based upon a draft originally communicated by the French conference delegation, and the only difficulty now is to ascertain definitely that the French commission delegation would be able to give an unqualified answer to an enquiry based on such a formula. The French conference delegation has today explained that its only wish is to find a formula which will cause the least difficulty to all concerned.¹⁰

With regard to the insertion before the words 'l'ordre d'évacuer la première zone' of the word 'immédiatement', which you instructed me to urge in paragraph 6 of your despatch No. 1719,¹ the French delegation claims that the insertion is unnecessary. They state that the words 'dès que' which are already in the French draft imply your insertion, and that in good French the word 'immédiatement' would be superfluous. I am inclined to think we might accept this.

5. Paragraph 10 of the French draft.

The French will agree to 'nul manquement nouveau sérieux'. 'De fond' would in this context be objectionable to the purist.

6. Paragraph 11 of the French draft.

The French will accept my suggested amendment approved in paragraph 8 of your despatch No. 1719.¹

General Clive will be available for consultation in London on Friday morning, and I trust that, after you have seen him, I may have your

¹⁰ In Paris telegram No. 191 of May 21, Lord Crewe reported: '... The French conference delegation states this evening that the French Reparation Commission delegation is now satisfied with the formula contained in ... my telegram No. 186. I take this to mean that an enquiry on the lines of that formula would produce an unqualified answer. Would you please, if possible, let me know by Friday night's bag whether, in these circumstances, I may agree to a communication on these lines being made to the Reparation Commission? The conference ought then to have the Reparation Commission's reply early next week, and it would be possible to embody the substance in the draft note to the Germans before the conference meets. If this procedure were not adopted, there might be some slight further delay on this account.'

Mr. Chamberlain replied (Foreign Office telegram No. 145 of May 22): 'I am prepared to agree to any formula provided it will draw from the Reparation Commission the definite answer which we require. It is essential that their reply be an unqualified affirmative and I could accept no form of question which would draw unsatisfactory answer from Commission.'

instructions in the light of the instructions to the Control Commission and of the schedules as now framed.

You need not, I think, be afraid that the French government is now seeking to delay the despatch of the note. What they are trying to do at the moment is rather to put the blame for the delay upon us. It has, however, this afternoon been pointed out to the French delegation that the delay is at the moment in no sense the fault of His Majesty's Government, or due to the fact that I am compelled to refer for instructions. It is due entirely to the technical difficulties of the military discussions and to the fact that it has not yet been possible to bring into complete accord the British and French views regarding the note.

No. 625

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 22, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 190 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6914/117/18]

PARIS, May 21, 1925

*Rules for discriminating between civil and military aircraft in Germany.*¹

Your telegram No. 132 of May 15th² and your despatch No. 1763 of May 18th.³

I am afraid that a statement at the Ambassadors' Conference on the lines detailed in your telegram No. 132 might give the impression that we were trying to conceal the fact that, having obtained all we ourselves required from Germany, we were unwilling to help the French to obtain similar advantages. I should therefore prefer to state baldly (as explained below) that we had by an independent negotiation obtained from

¹ See No. 569, n. 2.

² This referred to the French memorandum of May 11 (see n. 5, below) and reported His Majesty's Government's position regarding the flight of allied aircraft over German territory as it had been put to the French Ambassador on May 13: '... Germany had this one effective lever in her hands to induce the Allies to modify the nine rules: it seemed pure waste of time for the Allies to sit round and solemnly discuss the possibility of a joint representation when we knew in advance that short of meeting the German point of view over the nine rules German government would agree to nothing we might put forward. Emphasis was laid upon the manner in which His Majesty's Government were dealing with the problem. Following the analogy of the commercial treaty just signed with Germany [see No. 250, n. 2] we had gone ahead with our own arrangements and had met the German attempt to force us to agree to the modification of the nine rules by the riposte that since she was making these difficulties we were prepared to accept the nine rules which would be conformed to by any British aircraft flying over Germany. As His Excellency probably knew we were in fact now flying over Germany with machines complying with that standard. In short so long as the existing deadlock over the nine rules continued there seemed really no object in agreeing to the study of the question proposed by the French government in paragraph 2 of their draft resolution. ...'

³ Not printed.

Germany civil flying rights,⁴ as we considered the question of the granting of such facilities a commercial matter, and not one for discussion by the Ambassadors' Conference. I should therefore be glad to know whether you would approve a statement by me the text of which would be as follows:

Begins:

'His Majesty's Government have had under the most careful and sympathetic consideration the French delegation's memorandum of May 11th,⁵ in which it is suggested that the Ambassadors' Conference should resolve (1) to notify to the German government the discriminatory rules, respecting which agreement was reached in principle at the session of the conference held on February 21st [*sic*],⁶ and (2) to study without delay, with a view to a joint communication to the German government, the question of the flight over German territory of allied machines on the basis of complete reciprocity.

The British Embassy is now authorised to agree to the first paragraph of the above draft resolution, subject to the insertion of the word 'immediately' after 'to notify'.

As regards the second paragraph of the draft, the British Embassy is instructed to explain that an arrangement is already in force under which British machines, complying with the discriminatory rules, are in fact now

⁴ The representatives of the British Air Ministry and the German Government met in Berlin April 30–May 2. In Berlin telegram No. 184 of May 2, Lord D'Abernon reported: 'Representatives of Air Ministry have reached agreement with German Government on following lines:

'Sanction of services London–Berlin and London–Cologne on existing basis for five years firm.

'Pending formal ratification, which is not at present possible, the spirit of above agreement will govern current practice.

'As regards use of big machines on London–Cologne line no formal approval by German Government is possible, but no objection to big machines will be raised.

'Machines on London–Berlin service must conform to existing rules, but service may become daily on reciprocal basis.

'German Government will not agree to service of Cologne–Prague, as it would place them in invidious position towards France.

'A suggestion was discussed that it might be possible at later date to obtain facilities for through service, London–Amsterdam–Hanover–Prague, if interested terminal countries desired it, or alternatively for us to run a service London–Amsterdam–Hanover–Leipzig, with Germans or Czechs running a Leipzig–Prague service.

'The German delegates, however, replied that no such service would be practicable until they had come to terms with Czechoslovakia. This they had no intention of doing until the nine rules [see No. 569, n. 2] were modified. Indeed, outside our agreement, they intended to grant no further facilities to any country until they had been met over the nine rules.

'Representatives of Air Ministry state that negotiations have been conducted by German delegates with extreme frankness and cordiality.'

Copies of the English texts of a protocol signed on May 2, the proposed agreements, and the identic notes to be signed, are filed at C 10368/51/18, not printed.

⁵ A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1110 of May 11, not printed.

⁶ See No. 589.

flying over Germany. In view [of this and]⁷ of the fact that the matter in any case appears to be purely commercial, it is felt that the study of a joint representation to the German government on the lines suggested in the draft resolution is scarcely a matter for the Ambassadors' Conference.

In these circumstances the British Embassy has the honour to express the hope that the discriminatory rules in their modified form may be notified to the German government without further delay.⁸

Ends.

⁷ A marginal note on this telegram read that the Air Ministry wished to omit the words marked by the bracket.

⁸ In Foreign Office telegram No. 148 of May 26, Mr. Chamberlain replied: 'Your proposed statement is approved subject to the omission between the words "In view" and "of the" of the words "of this and" in the penultimate paragraph. The fact that some arrangement already exists as regards the flight of a British machine to Germany is not in itself a reason why the Ambassadors' Conference should not concern itself with obtaining at least equal facilities for other allied powers.'

No. 626

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 146 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6893/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 23, 1925

Your telegrams Nos. 186,¹ 189² and 191³ of the 20th and 21st May. Allied note to German Government regarding evacuation of Cologne.

1. *Inclusion of Concessions in Schedules.* I still think that my proposal⁴ was the better way of dealing with this matter, for we should thus have gained with the general public both in this country and in neutral countries, more especially America, the kudos of the alleviation which we are actually prepared to give Germany. Moreover it would in my view have certainly made the position of the German government and their compliance with our demands easier if they could have pointed to a written document showing that the allies were not insisting on the last iota of their treaty rights. But if the French are not ready to agree, I do not press the matter further. I therefore agree to the presentation of the demands in one schedule as recommended by the Versailles Committee on the definite understanding that I reserve full and absolute liberty to use the concessions which have in fac[t] been made in such way as I may judge necessary and best fitted for the enlightenment of British, neutral and German public opinion. Unless this is definitely agreed to by the French Government I must insist on a list of these concessions being included in the schedules. If need be you should speak personally to M. Briand on this

¹ No. 624.

² See *ibid.*, n. 7.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 10.

⁴ In Foreign Office despatch No. 1561 of May 5. See No. 620, n. 5.

point insisting on the goodwill which I have shown the French in going thus far.

2. *Details of Schedules and Instructions to Military Commission of Control.* General Clive has been in consultation with War Office and has received instructions as to the few modifications we want. The two most important are (a) question of police in barracks and (b) the training of staff officers. As to these General Clive will if necessary ask your support. The essential point—and one upon which you should insist—is that the instructions to the Commission of Control should be sufficiently precise to prevent all risk of disputes arising among the various delegations on the Commission, as to the extent to which they can meet what are already known to be the German proposals.

3. *Publication of Commission of Control's Report.* I still think that the original course which I proposed⁴ was the right one, that is to say, the publication of the report alone without any annexes. In the first place what allied body do the French propose should be responsible for the accuracy and contents of what they propose to publish? Secondly do they realise how great will be the labour of translating into English and setting up in type documents of so great a length? The French Government will certainly appreciate that publication here and in France must be simultaneous. Consequently the less that is communicated to the Germans and the more closely it corresponds to the actual texts of the documents we already possess (and of which we have translations), the easier will be the purely mechanical part for us. The matter has been again discussed with the War Office and General Clive, and they strongly concur in my view that the report itself is a sufficient basis for our demands and is all that need be published. If however the French press for the publication of more documents as annexes, it is not easy for me to hold out. I am therefore ready to agree either:

(a) to publication of *summaries* of the annexes, but only on the distinct understanding that they are specifically marked as summaries and that the documents communicated to the Germans bear that heading, or

(b) to the communication of an *expurgated* edition of the annexes but again only on condition that places where passages are omitted are shown clearly with asterisks so that the German Government and the world at large may be aware that the documents do not profess to be the complete texts.

I am quite clear that we cannot agree to anything in the nature of a bowdlerised version. Apart from other reasons of a moral nature it would be most unsafe to communicate anything of the sort to the German Government as it is a practical certainty that some day or other they will see the actual text, if indeed they have not already done so.

It is of course understood that whatever is published must be absolutely fair and accurate and such as I could defend without difficulty if called on in the House of Commons or elsewhere for explanations.

4. *Paragraph 4 of French draft—re-creation of Germany as a nation in arms.*

We agree to French formula given in your telegram No. 189² subject to omission of sentence 'Il est, d'autre part, manifeste que les dépenses militaires de l'Allemagne, compte tenu des frais occasionnés par le service à long terme, sont fortement exagéré[e]s'. War Office and General Clive agree with us that this sentence cannot be substantiated under the Commission of Control's report and not being covered by the terms of the Peace Treaty is irrelevant in a note to Germany which solely refers to the execution of the Treaty.

5. *Sub-section 3 of paragraph 6 of the French draft.* In view of what I have said earlier in this telegram regarding the concession point, no alteration of the original French draft is now required provided the French agree to my condition regarding liberty of action.

6. *Reparation Commission.* This has already been covered by my telegram No. 145 of May 22nd.³

7. *Paragraph 9 of French draft—'immediate evacuation of Cologne'.* Provided that the correct translation of the words 'dès que' is 'as soon as' I agree to French text. Should there be any doubt on the matter perhaps 'aussitôt que' would meet the point which is that I want no loophole left for doubt either by ourselves or Germany that the allied governments are definitely committed to leave Cologne the moment that the defaults have been made good. It would be disastrous if there were any possibility of subsequent hair-splitting over this. It would of course be a thousand times better if the word 'immédiatement'—or its equivalent—could be put in as I had proposed,⁵ for it makes it absolutely clear to the German people that once they have done their part the allies go out of Cologne. The point should in any case be made clear in the minutes of the Ambassadors' Conference.

8. *Paragraph 10 of French draft—Fresh infractions.* I agree to insertion of the word 'sérieux' which meets my point.

⁵ See No. 620.

No. 627

*Lord Kilmarnock (Coblenz) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received May 27, 9.10 p.m.)*

No. 16 Telegraphic [C 7197/6306/18]

COBLENZ, May 27, 1925, 4.45 p.m.

German authorities have asked us whether High Commission would raise objections to visit of Reich president to Cologne on June 19th. This visit forms part of the tour reported by Colonel Ryan in his despatch No. 193 of May 20th.¹ German government anticipate that difficulties may be encountered owing to fact that Hindenburg is on war criminal list. In

¹ Not printed.

regard to this point I would say that High Commission has up to now never taken action as regards question of war criminals which it considers as not being within its competence unless security of armies is directly affected.

On the other hand, I see grave objections to anything of the nature of a tour being undertaken in occupied territory. General du Cane is at present in London, but I understand that British military authorities hold the opinion in which I concur that even visit to Cologne is inadvisable.

It is preferable that High Commission should not be called upon to take action such as vetoing visit and I therefore suggest that it should recommend to German government that idea be abandoned.²

Sent to Berlin.

² In a letter of May 28 to Mr. Addison, Mr. Lampson wrote: '... there has been a suggestion that Hindenburg should visit the Rhineland in connection with this. Such a trip would hardly be in the interests of peace and we very much hope that nothing of the sort will actually take place. As you are aware the President of the Reich is a war criminal and he really is too old to risk being laid up anywhere except in Berlin. I send you this letter at the express direction of Mr. Chamberlain, whose actual words I have adopted.

'Let us hope there is nothing in the rumour. If there is, I think you should not hesitate to have it nipped in the bud: and it would be as well to let the authorities know the untoward results that might accrue—not only to Germany's foreign relations but to the poor old soldier himself.'

No. 628

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

*No. 1884 [C 7209/21/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 28, 1925*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 146 of the 23rd May,¹ the procedure I have contemplated in regard to the presentation of the Allied demands to the German Government respecting the evacuation of the Cologne zone is the same as that followed in the case of the Allied notes of the 5th² and 26th³ January. My idea is that the note will, as before, be presented by the Ambassadors in Berlin of the principal Allied Governments and of Belgium, who will receive their instructions not from the Ambassadors' Conference but from the Governments themselves.

2. In regard to the publication of the note, the precedent may well be followed of issuing it to the press on the day following presentation.

3. I request that your Lordship will lay these suggestions before your colleagues on the Ambassadors' Conference, and enquire whether they have any objections. For their information I enclose a copy of the instructions which I have issued to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.⁴

¹ No. 626.

² See No. 553.

³ See No. 570.

⁴ Foreign Office despatch No. 994 of May 28, not printed.

4. It is understood that you will submit the final draft of the note for my approval before actually concurring in it.⁵

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ In Paris telegram No. 200 of May 29, Lord Crewe reported: 'Your despatch No. 1884.

'In the last paragraph you instruct me to submit the final draft of the note for your approval before actually concurring in it. As I have obtained your approval for each sentence of the note as now drafted, I had thought that I might assume your concurrence of the whole, and had accordingly agreed as soon as the Versailles Committee had settled the schedule to attend a meeting of the conference at which the note be finally and formally approved. In the unlikely event of the Belgian, Italian or Japanese Ambassadors proposing amendments I would naturally not accept them without consulting you.

'It is hoped that the Versailles Committee will finish its work in time for this meeting to take place tomorrow. The Quai d'Orsay have told the press as much.

'I am now sending you by tonight's bag the draft note in its final form [enclosed in Paris despatch No. 1241 of May 29, not printed] as it is to be presented to the conference, and shall be glad to receive your definite concurrence as soon as possible. If I do not receive it in time for the meeting which is provisionally fixed for tomorrow morning, I shall have to ask the conference to adjourn its final decision and to meet again after Whitsuntide [May 31] when I shall have received your final concurrence. I hope that such an adjournment will not be necessary, as it would be difficult to explain to the press and might give rise to all sorts of rumours.

'If, of course, the Versailles Committee does not reach a complete agreement today on the schedule, the conference will not meet tomorrow morning.'

No. 629

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 111 Telegraphic [C. 7197/6306/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 29, 1925, 4.40 p.m.

Coblenz telegram No. 16 (of the 27th May: visit of Field Marshal Hindenburg to Rhineland).¹

It is almost incredible that the Marshal himself or the German government can have lent any countenance to such a visit by Field Marshal Hindenburg to occupied territory. I therefore request you to take an immediate opportunity to draw Dr. Luther's attention confidentially but in unmistakable terms to the extreme inconvenience and indeed real perils of such a project. It would be the depth of folly on the part of the German government to force upon the notice of the allies the fact that the name of the President of the Reich stands on the list of war criminals. We are ready to forget it if the German government refrain from forcing it on our attention, especially at a time when it is vital to keep the atmosphere unclouded in view of the forthcoming negotiations on security,² which offer a fair prospect of a satisfactory solution. You should urge Dr. Luther

¹ No. 627.

² See Nos. 189, Enclosure and 197-318, *passim*.

to use his personal influence to prevent this regrettable step, if it is indeed contemplated, which would almost inevitably bring to an immediate end negotiations to which his government rightly attach such vital importance.³

Repeated to Coblenz No. 10, Paris No. 154 (By Bag) and Brussels No. 42.

³ On June 5, Mr. Gregory wrote as follows to M. R. Cambon: 'Many thanks for your letter of the 30th May [not printed] on the subject of the proposed visit of Marshal Hindenburg to the Rhineland. Since the receipt of your letter Lord D'Abernon has been assured officially by the German Government that the suggested visit will not take place [reported in Berlin telegram No. 208 of May 30, not printed]. For our part we are of course, like you, respecting the wishes of the German Government that the pressure put upon them by the allies in this matter will be kept secret.'

No. 630

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received May 30, 7.45 p.m.)

*No. 206 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 7290/21/18]**

PARIS, May 30, 1925

Evacuation of Cologne zone.

The Ambassadors' Conference at today's meeting approved draft note and schedules to be communicated to German Government, as shown in my despatch No. 1241,¹ subject to the following modifications:—

(a) In paragraph 3 it was decided not to enclose copies of Commission of Control's report in the note to German Government. Paragraph 3 has been accordingly redrafted as follows:—

'Ayant reçu et examiné ce rapport, qui établit les manquements nombreux du Gouvernement allemand aux termes de la Partie V du Traité de Versailles, les Gouvernement alliés sont aujourd'hui en mesure de faire le communication par eux annoncée.'

(b) In the first sentence of last paragraph it was agreed that the request that German Government should act with rapidity might give rise to the retort that in this respect the Allied Governments might themselves have set a better example during the last five months. The sentence has accordingly been redrafted:—

'C'est pourquoi ils adressent un nouvel et pressant appel au Gouvernement allemand pour qu'il donne, avec le bon vouloir nécessaire, aux questions encore en suspens le règlement qu'exige la gravité de la situation.'

(c) Various small drafting amendments, both in the note and the schedules, which will be communicated in the final text which I propose to send you by Monday's bag.²

As regards the omission of the Control Commission's report from

¹ See No. 628, n. 5.

² June 1. See No. 631, below.

among the enclosures to the note, I would explain that this procedure was strongly pressed both by the Belgian Ambassador and Marshal Foch and supported by M. Cambon on the ground that it was unsuitable to communicate to German Government a document which was drawn up purely for the information of the Allied Governments; the schedules contain all the information required by the German Government, whereas the report is in certain aspects already out of date; and that if both schedules and report were communicated to German Government the latter would try and play off one against the other. I insisted, on the other hand, that His Majesty's Government desire to publish the report to satisfy public opinion in England and elsewhere, and it was finally agreed that, although the report would not be communicated to German Government as an enclosure to the Allied note, the Allied Governments should be at liberty to publish it as a separate document twenty-four hours after the note to German Government had been published. I hope to be able to send you by Tuesday's bag the list of passages which, in the opinion of Versailles Committee, ought to be omitted from the report when it is published.³

I made to the conference a declaration,⁴ copy of which I forwarded to

³ Paris despatch No. 1280 of June 3, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁴ This ran as follows: 'I am ready, subject to the following observations, to agree, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to the draft note to the German Government, in which are enumerated the requirements of the Allied Governments, which must be fulfilled in order that the Cologne zone may be evacuated and the Military Commission of Control withdrawn:-

'His Majesty's Government originally proposed [see No. 626], as is known to the conference, that the concessions which the Allied Governments have decided to make in the matter of the execution of the military clauses should be set forth in a separate schedule to be annexed to the note to the German Government. In order, however, to meet the wishes of the French Government, His Majesty's Government have agreed that this special schedule should be omitted and that the concessions should be implicit in the general schedule enumerating the requirements of the Allied Governments. His Majesty's Government, however, can only agree to the presentation of the Allied Governments' requirements in one schedule on the definite understanding that they reserve full and absolute liberty to use the fact that these concessions have been made in such a way as they may judge necessary and best fitted for the enlightenment of British, neutral and German public opinion.

'Again I would call attention to the sentence in paragraph 9 which runs as follows: "1 . . . les Gouvernements alliés sont prêts, malgré les réserves que l'état d'inexécution d'autres dispositions du traité justifierait de leur part, mais en considération de l'importance capitale qu'ils attachent à l'exécution des clauses militaires du traité, à donner l'ordre d'évacuer la première zone d'occupation dès que les manquements énumérés dans la troisième partie du mémorandum ci-joint auront été redressés."

'I am instructed to invite the conference to interpret this to mean that as soon as the German Government have fulfilled the requirements of the Allied Governments, the latter will not be entitled for any other reason to postpone further the evacuation of the Cologne zone, and that the order for such evacuation shall be given and acted on immediately. In order that the evacuation when thus ordered may be completed as quickly and as smoothly as possible, the competent Allied military authorities will beforehand work out a scheme which will be ready to be applied as soon as the order for evacuation is given.

you in my despatch No. 1241. It was duly accepted by the conference subject to the following observations by M. Laroche:—

(a) As regards the right of His Majesty's Government to publish these concessions made to German Government, he asked that His Majesty's Government should use all possible discretion in making use of this right.

(b) He insisted that evacuation must not take place until whole of the present list of requirements are completely executed, and that there must be no question of evacuating when and because German Government have carried out all the more important points in the present note.

(c) If a serious new default does occur, it is understood that evacuation will be delayed until it is set right. On other hand, the occurrence of such a new default will not be a ground for delaying evacuation once it has been remedied.

The note and enclosures will be despatched to Allied representatives in Berlin by a special messenger leaving Sunday night. It was agreed that Allied Governments should publish the note and enclosures twelve hours after their reception by German Government. I am informing His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin accordingly.

The conference also approved the instructions to be sent to Commission of Control. Copy of these will be sent to you by Monday's bag.⁵

'Lastly, in paragraph 10 it is stated: "Ils ne doutent pas en effet que, pendant la période nécessaire à l'exécution des redressements dont il s'agit, nul manquement nouveau sérieux de l'Allemagne à aucune des obligations que lui prescrit le traité ne viendra faire obstacle au jeu de l'article 429 (1)."

'I am instructed to invite the conference to interpret this sentence to mean that any new default liable to cause delay in the evacuation must be one of demonstrably grave importance, and that, as soon as the default in question is remedied, it will not serve as a reason for delaying further the evacuation.'

⁵ Paris despatch No. 1255 of May 30, not printed.

No. 631

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 2)

No. 1254 [C 7293/21/18]★

PARIS, May 30, 1925

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the note to the German Government respecting the evacuation of the Cologne zone.¹

¹ See No. 630.

le 30 mai, 1925

Dans leur note du 5 janvier dernier,² les Gouvernements alliés ont fait connaître au Gouvernement allemand que l'état d'exécution du Traité de Paix par l'Allemagne ne leur permettait pas de faire bénéficier celle-ci de l'évacuation partielle anticipée envisagée par l'article 429 (1) dudit traité.

2. Les Gouvernements alliés déclaraient en même temps leur intention d'attendre le rapport définitif de la Commission interalliée de Contrôle³ pour faire connaître au Gouvernement allemand 'ce qui restera à attendre de l'Allemagne pour que ses obligations en matière militaire puissent, aux termes de l'article 429, être considérées comme fidèlement observées'.

3. *Ayant reçu et examiné ce rapport, qui établit les manquements nombreux du Gouvernement allemand aux obligations lui incombant aux termes de la Partie V du Traité de Versailles, les Gouvernements alliés sont aujourd'hui en mesure de faire la communication par eux annoncée.*

4. Les Gouvernements alliés considèrent comme capital de mettre au premier plan l'observation générale que l'ensemble des manquements de l'Allemagne, s'il n'y était promptement remédié, permettrait ultérieurement au Gouvernement allemand de reconstituer une armée conçue d'après les principes de la nation armée, en contradiction formelle avec le Traité de Paix, aux termes duquel l'armée allemande doit être exclusivement destinée au maintien de l'ordre *sur le territoire* et à la police des frontières. Ce sont ces circonstances qui, mettant en lumière l'importance de chacun des manquements constatés, donnent à leur ensemble un caractère si dangereux pour la paix générale.

5. Pour appliquer le Traité de Versailles dans ses dispositions fondamentales, il y donc lieu de redresser les importants manquements qui ne permettent pas, tant qu'il n'y aura pas été remédié, de considérer comme accomplies les obligations militaires de l'Allemagne. Il importe de bien se rendre compte que les manquements ainsi retenus constituent le témoignage le plus grave, mais non le seul, de la non-exécution par l'Allemagne de cette partie essentielle du Traité de Paix.

6. Les Gouvernements alliés ont consigné dans le mémorandum ci-joint:⁴

- (1) L'état d'exécution des obligations incombant à l'Allemagne en matière militaire, tel qu'il résulte du rapport de la Commission de Contrôle, en date du 25 janvier 1925;³
- (2) Un relevé des *principaux points* des clauses militaires sur lesquels les Alliés n'ont pas encore reçu satisfaction;
- (3) La liste détaillée des redressements nécessaires au sujet desquels les

² See No. 553.

³ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592.

⁴ Not here printed.

Gouvernements alliés ont donné toutes instructions utiles à la Commission de Contrôle, qualifiée à cet égard par le traité.

(4) La liste des concessions déjà faites par les Alliés, liste destinée à compléter l'exposé de la situation.

7. Les Gouvernements alliés ont la conviction qu'il dépend du bon vouloir du Gouvernement allemand et des autorités allemandes que le redressement des manquements visés dans la troisième partie du mémorandum soit effectué dans un délai relativement court.

8. En définitive, c'est maintenant au Gouvernement allemand lui-même qu'il appartient de réaliser les conditions qui permettraient de procéder rapidement à l'évacuation. C'est lui-même qui est appelé à bénéficier de l'empressement avec lequel il procédera aux redressements demandés et du soin qu'il apportera par ailleurs à se conformer strictement aux dispositions du traité.

9. Constatant que la Commission des Réparations, par la lettre que le Gouvernement allemand trouvera ci-jointe,⁵ a déclaré que, à la date de ce jour, l'Allemagne s'acquitte fidèlement de ses obligations de réparation, telles qu'elles sont actuellement fixées, les Gouvernements alliés sont prêts malgré les réserves que l'état d'inexécution d'autres dispositions du traité justifierait de leur part, mais en considération de l'importance capitale qu'ils attachent à l'exécution des clauses militaires du traité, à donner l'ordre d'évacuer la première zone d'occupation dès que les manquements énumérés dans la troisième partie du mémorandum ci-joint auront été redressés.

10. Ils ne doutent pas en effet que, pendant la période nécessaire à l'exécution des redressements dont il s'agit, nul nouveau manquement sérieux de l'Allemagne à aucune des obligations que lui prescrit le traité ne viendra faire obstacle au jeu de l'article 429 (1).

11. À ce moment, rien ne s'opposera à ce que la Commission de Contrôle, dont la tâche pourra être considérée comme achevée, soit retirée. Ce retrait sera notifié au Conseil de la Société des Nations à l'effet d'appliquer les mesures décidées par lui en vue de l'exécution de l'article 213 du Traité de Paix.⁶

12. Enfin, les Gouvernements alliés ont constaté que, aux termes des notes des 6⁷ et 27 janvier,⁸ le Gouvernement allemand paraissait apprécier inexactement les raisons qui ont dicté leur attitude. Soucieux d'éviter toute possibilité de malentendu à l'avenir, ils tiennent à affirmer de nouveau, comme ils l'ont fait dans leur note du 26 janvier, qu'ils entendent se conformer scrupuleusement aux termes de l'article 429 du traité.

13. Les Gouvernements alliés ne sauraient également laisser passer, sans la relever, l'allégation contenue dans la note allemande du 6 janvier, à savoir qu'en n'évacuant pas la zone de Cologne le 10 janvier 1925, les

⁵ Of May 29, not here printed.

⁷ See No. 556.

⁶ See No. 596.

⁸ See No. 570, n. 3.

Alliés se livraient à une mesure de représailles. Une pareille thèse, réfutée déjà dans la note alliée du 26 janvier,⁸ constitue une méconnaissance complète de la portée des articles 428 et 429 du traité. Il appartenait au Gouvernement allemand, en exécutant fidèlement ses obligations, de s'assurer le bénéfice de l'évacuation de la première zone d'occupation, dans les conditions prévues par l'article 429.

14. Les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent pas davantage reconnaître que leur décision constituait un acte dont la sévérité était hors de toute proportion avec l'importance de celles des obligations militaires qui attendent encore leur exécution. En effet, parmi ces obligations que le Gouvernement allemand représente dans sa note comme d'ordre secondaire, figurent au contraire des clauses sur l'importance essentielle desquelles les Alliés ont, depuis longtemps, et en particulier dans leur note collective du 29 septembre 1922,⁹ vainement attiré l'attention du Gouvernement allemand.

15. Bien plus postérieurement à cette note, à plusieurs reprises et tout récemment encore, le Gouvernement allemand a commis de nouvelles violations graves du traité, notamment en procédant à l'incorporation dans la Reichswehr de volontaires engagés pour de courtes périodes, en autorisant de nombreuses associations (illicites aux termes du traité) à poursuivre une instruction militaire, en favorisant le développement de certains outillages dans les usines.

16. Toutefois, les Gouvernements alliés, soucieux d'éviter toute controverse, après avoir ainsi relevé ces erreurs, ne veulent retenir que l'affirmation contenue dans la note allemande du 6 janvier,⁷ à savoir que le Gouvernement allemand est prêt à faire tout ce qui dépend de lui pour arriver promptement au résultat pratique nécessaire.

17. C'est pourquoi ils adressent un nouvel et pressant appel au Gouvernement allemand *pour qu'il donne, avec le bon vouloir nécessaire, aux questions encore en suspens le règlement qu'exige la gravité de la situation*. C'est pour lui le seul moyen d'apporter, d'après ses propres paroles, un soulagement à l'Allemagne par la libération d'une partie du territoire occupé.¹⁰

⁹ See No. 558, n. 8.

¹⁰ In Foreign Office telegram No. 113 to Berlin of June 2, Mr. Chamberlain stated: 'I accept text of note as finally approved by Ambassadors' Conference on 30th May, and you are authorised to sign it and participate in its presentation to the German Government.'

Lord D'Abernon replied (Berlin telegram No. 216 of June 2): 'Joint note signed today by representatives of France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and myself, for communication to German Chancellor on Thursday [June 4].'

The text of the note, together with the Annexes, was published as Cmd. 2429, *Note presented to the German Government by the British, French, Italian, Japanese and Belgian Ambassadors at Berlin. June 4, 1925* (H.M.S.O., 1925).

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received June 6, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 211A Telegraphic: by bag [C 7608/117/18]

PARIS, June 4, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the Presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Ambassador being also present, and considered the following subjects:

...¹ 7. The Conference dealt with the question of communicating to the German Government the modified rules for discriminating between civil and military aircraft as well as the French Government's proposal that the Allied Governments should exchange views for the purpose of formulating a common policy for obtaining from the German Government the right for Allied aircraft to fly over German territory.² The French representatives were in a particularly intractable frame of mind owing to the fact that the French and the Belgian Government had just been informed by the German Government that the latter intend to seize and punish any aeronaut competing in the Gordon-Bennett cup³ whose balloon might be compelled to land in Germany. Monsieur Cambon expressed considerable disappointment at our refusal to discuss a common policy, and it was pointed out that if His Majesty's Government object to this discussion taking place under the ægis of the Ambassadors' Conference, some other channel of communication should easily be devised. I was strongly pressed to urge you to reconsider your opinion and I must acknowledge that I found it somewhat difficult to justify the non-possumus attitude which I have been instructed to adopt.⁴ Even if we are convinced that the proposed discussion will lead to no definite result, it would seem somewhat churlish to refuse to co-operate with the French in this matter.

It must also be remembered that the French in inviting such a discussion are probably doing so in order to be able to save their face when it becomes known that they have made concessions to the German Government so as to facilitate the development of the German aviation industry. I trust, therefore, that you will allow me to meet the French half way in this matter and to agree to some sort of exchange of views on the subject if necessary independently of the Ambassadors' Conference.

I was unable to induce the French representatives to agree today to the communication of the modified rules to the German Government pending the settlement of this point and I doubt very much whether it will

¹ The sections omitted referred to other matters.

² See Nos. 569, 572, 574, 585, 587, 589, 610, and 625.

³ An annual balloon race for a cup given by the Aero Club of Belgium. The balloons were launched at Brussels on June 7, and the results declared on June 19.

⁴ See No. 625, n. 2.

be possible to obtain a decision of the Conference to this effect if His Majesty's Government maintain their refusal to discuss a common policy with the French Government. On the other hand, if we agree to the principle of an Allied discussion we should be able to get the Conference to communicate the modified rules to the German Government before the allied discussion takes place.

...¹ 11. I explained to the Conference the views of His Majesty's Government on certain points of procedure in respect of the working of the Patijn Agreement, as set forth in your despatch No. 1570 of May 5th.⁵ As regards the communication to the Rhineland High Commission of the decisions of the Valuation Committees, the Conference agreed to the stipulation made by His Majesty's Government. As regards the proposal that the High Commission should act as liaison between the Valuation Committees and the Agent-General for the Reparation Commission, the French urged strongly the necessity of centralising in some sort of way this correspondence in view of the fact that there will be six valuation Committees working independently and that direct communication would result in overlapping and confusion. In view of the insistence of the French in this matter, I finally agreed that the views of the Rhineland High Commission itself should be obtained since it is obviously in a better position to form an opinion on a matter of local procedure than the Conference. As regards the proposal that the Conference should express to the German Government the hope that the putting into force of the Patijn Agreement would not necessitate the appointment of any fresh officials, the French pointed out that the object of the proposal was to discourage the German Government from appointing fresh officials to act as members of the local arbitral committees instead of employing already existing officials at their present salaries as the allied governments intend to do. In view of this explanation I agreed to a communication being made to the German Government provided it is so worded as to prevent the Germans drawing the erroneous conclusion which you fear. ...¹

⁵ No. 615.

No. 633

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 169 Telegraphic: by bag [C 7881/117/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 11, 1925

Your telegram No. 211A section 7 (of the 4th June.¹ Flight of allied aircraft over Germany).

I agree that a non-possumus attitude might be calculated to put His

¹ No. 632.

Majesty's Government in the wrong and the French government in unnecessary difficulties. When therefore the matter is raised in the Ambassadors' Conference, you are authorised to say that the Civil Aviation Department of the Air Ministry is fully prepared to discuss the question of facilities for international flying over Germany with the representatives of civil aviation of the other allied countries concerned.² On the other hand His Majesty's Government feel that such a discussion should not be undertaken under the ægis of the Ambassadors' Conference within whose competence it does not appear to lie.

At the same time I request that you will strongly urge the Conference to communicate to the German government without further delay the nine rules as modified. Several months have now passed since the terms of the modifications were agreed,³ and the date vis-à-vis the German government for the first biennial reconsideration of the rules is now 13 months overdue.⁴

² The Air Ministry had so informed the Foreign Office in a letter of June 11, not printed.

³ See No. 589.

⁴ In Paris telegram No. 222 of June 12, section 4, Lord Crewe reported: 'I informed the conference, in accordance with your telegram No. 169, that the Civil Aviation Department of the Air Ministry was prepared to discuss the question of facilities for international flying over Germany with the representatives of civil aviation of other allied countries concerned, but that this discussion should not be undertaken under the ægis of the Ambassadors' Conference. In return the French agreed that the modified rules discriminating between German military and civil aircraft should be communicated forthwith to the German government, and a decision was adopted by the conference in this sense.'

In Paris despatch No. 1425 of June 25 Lord Crewe transmitted to the Foreign Office a copy of a note from the Ambassadors' Conference to the German Government of June 24 enclosing a copy of the modified nine rules.

Representatives of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Czechoslovakia met in Paris on August 10. See No. 649, n. 2, below.

No. 634

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 2136 [C 8176/10/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 20, 1925*

My Lord,

I have to inform you that the Agent General for Reparation Payments has asked the Reparation Commission to call the attention of the Powers concerned to the urgent necessity of fixing the amounts to be assigned out of the second Dawes annuity to the prior charges for the expenses of the armies of occupation, the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission and the commissions of control, as until this has been done Mr. Parker Gilbert cannot allocate between the Powers the German payments coming in as from September 1st next.

2. It will be recollected that the Paris agreement of January 14th last¹ fixed the amounts to be assigned for these purposes for the first annuity only, that is up to August 31st next. A fresh agreement will therefore be necessary to fix the figures for the second annuity and possibly for a longer period beginning on September 1st, 1925. As negotiations within this object may prove arduous and as it is most desirable that the basis of allocation should be settled before the termination of the first Dawes year on August 31st next, it would appear essential that early steps should be taken to arrange for a meeting between the representatives of the Powers concerned in the distribution of the Dawes reparation payments.

3. It would appear unnecessary in view of the comparatively small sums involved that a further meeting of Finance Ministers² should be convoked. Moreover such a meeting might give undesirable prominence to the somewhat acute differences which may well arise over these matters. His Majesty's Government would therefore propose as the most convenient course that each of the three Powers represented on the Rhineland High Commission should give their deputy delegates on the Reparation Commission, in their personal capacity, a mandate to discuss together all three of the above-mentioned questions with a view to the submission of agreed proposals for the approval of the governments interested. His Majesty's Government would suggest that in these circumstances Paris would be the appropriate place in which the proposed meeting should be held.

4. While only the French, Belgian and British Governments are directly responsible for the armies of occupation and represented on the Rhineland High Commission, the amounts allotted to those prior charges must of course affect the amount of the second Dawes annuity ultimately available for distribution among all the governments entitled to receive reparation from Germany. His Majesty's Government are accordingly of the opinion that the Italian, Japanese and United States Governments should be invited to be represented at the proposed discussions.

5. I request that Your Lordship will explain to the government to which you are accredited the situation and proposals of His Majesty's Government with regard to this matter and that you will at the same time urgently invite their attention to the desirability of securing a settlement early in August so that the fixation of the programmes for the second Dawes year may not be retarded. His Majesty's Government venture to hope that the French Government will be able to agree to the procedure proposed without delay in order that the discussions may be commenced at a very early date.

¹ For the text of the agreement see Cmd. 2339, *Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the United States of America, Brazil, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Czechoslovakia regarding the Distribution of the Dawes Annuities. Signed at Paris, January 14, 1925* (H.M.S.O., 1925). See also Vol. XXVI, No. 616, n. 4.

² See No. 11, n. 3.

6. When making the above communication you should add that His Majesty's Government would welcome the suggestions of the French Government as to the advisability of inviting the smaller powers also to be represented at the proposed conference. While His Majesty's Government realise that the interest of these latter powers is small, they consider that it might be difficult not to invite them not only because their interest in the questions to be discussed is the same in principle as that of the non-occupying great powers, but since it is expressly provided in article 2 of the agreement of January 14th that 'the allied governments and the government of the United States of America will discuss before September 1st, 1925, arrangements for army costs in the future'. The 'allied governments' referred to in the above passage are presumably those governments whose representatives signed the agreement of January 14th last. It would however appear more convenient to defer inviting the participation of the minor powers until an agreement has been reached between the greater powers concerned. The question can then be considered of admitting representatives of the former in order that they may be in a position to be informed of the proposals which it has been decided to adopt.

7. A similar despatch has been addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Brussels.³

I am, etc.,
(For the Secretary of State)
HAROLD NICOLSON

³ Foreign Office despatch No. 705 to Brussels of June 20.

No. 635

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 9)

*No. 1532 [C 9153/2806/18]**

PARIS, July 8, 1925

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from His Majesty's military attaché,¹ dated the 7th July, respecting the evacuation of troops from the Ruhr.

¹ Lord D. Graham was Assistant Military Attaché at Paris, Madrid and Lisbon.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 635

Lieutenant-Colonel Lord D. Graham to Lord Crewe

No. 20

PARIS, *July 7, 1925*

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that the French War Office informed me today that the evacuation of troops from the Ruhr would begin on the 15th July in order to be completed within the London Conference time-limit, *i.e.*, the 15th August;² the three towns Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf³ will continue, however, to remain occupied.

I have, etc.,

D. M. GRAHAM

Military Attaché

² Copies of the notes exchanged between the Belgian, French, and German delegations at the London Conference on August 16, 1924 are filed at C 13734/11495/18 (1924), not printed. The texts of these notes were published in *The Times*, August 18, p. 16. See Vol. XXVI, Nos. 537, 540-2 and 544.

³ See No. 399, n. 5.

No. 636

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 2399 [C 9102/2/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 14, 1925*

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 1501 (33/249) of the 6th July,¹ I have to inform Your Lordship that the question of the arrangements to be made for the evacuation of the Cologne zone has for some time past been receiving the attention of His Majesty's Government.

2. The first step clearly is for the allied governments to decide upon the re-distribution of the allied forces in the remaining areas under occupation. As to this I hope shortly to inform you of the considered views of His Majesty's Government and my present intention is that instructions shall at the same time be sent you to raise the matter in the Ambassadors' Conference with a view to an agreement being reached with the French and Belgian Governments.

3. My present idea is that the decision finally reached by the governments of the occupying powers will be notified by the Ambassadors' Conference in the first place to the Rhineland High Commission and

¹ Not printed. This transmitted a copy of a report of June 25 by the British member of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles regarding the competency of the Committee to elaborate the necessary scheme for the evacuation of the Cologne zone.

secondly, through the Interallied Military Committee of Versailles, to the General Officer Commanding in Chief the allied forces on the Rhine,² who will be instructed to work out, in conjunction with the Allied military and civil authorities on the spot, the *military* measures for moving the Allied troops into the zones allotted. The plan will then be submitted through the Versailles Committee to the Ambassadors' Conference for final approval. The Versailles Committee may thus be held to be the 'competent Allied military authority' referred to in the Ambassadors' Conference resolution of the 30th May.³ While not themselves working out the details of the scheme of military evacuation, they will be the channel through which the scheme passes to the Allied governments, and will naturally be competent to modify it as they may think fit.

4. In notifying the Allied decision to the Rhineland High Commission, the Ambassadors' Conference would similarly invite that body to work out all *civil* arrangements for evacuation with the German authorities.

I am, etc.,

HAROLD NICOLSON

² General A. Guillaumat.

³ For the meeting of the Conference on May 30, see No. 630. A copy of the resolutions taken was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 1338 of June 12, not printed. Resolution C ran as follows: 'Il est décidé:

'1. De prier les Gouvernements alliés de charger les autorités militaires compétentes de mettre à l'étude le plan d'évacuation de la zone des territoires rhénans, dite zone de Cologne, afin que l'évacuation de ladite zone puisse être effectuée sans délai dès que l'ordre en aura été donné;

'2. En ce qui concerne l'interprétation qu'il y a lieu d'attacher aux paragraphes 9 et 10 de la note au Gouvernement allemand [see No. 631, Enclosure], d'approuver les considérations faites à ce sujet par l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne [see No. 630, n. 4] . . . ainsi que les déclarations faites sur les mêmes points par le Directeur politique au Département français des Affaires étrangères telles qu'elles figurent [see No. 630]. . . '

No. 637

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

*No. 2422 [C 9218/2806/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 16, 1925*

Sir,

I have received Lord Crewe's despatch No. 1532 of the 8th July,¹ and I observe that, according to the French War Office, it is the intention of the French Government to remain in occupation of the three towns—Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort—after the evacuation of the Ruhr has been completed. You will have seen from my despatch No. 2331 of the 7th July² that before the receipt of this information I had already broached

¹ No. 635.

² Not printed.

the subject in conversation with the French Ambassador, and expressed the hope that, in order not to endanger the success of the security negotiations, the French Government would see their way to evacuate those three towns. Mr. Lampson used similar language in conversation with M. de Fleuriau on the 10th July (see my despatch No. 2370 of that date),² and found the latter in apparent general agreement with the view that any value in retaining them was quite incommensurate with the reaction which would certainly result from their retention.

2. The information contained in Lord Crewe's despatch under reference has led me to consider afresh whether it would be advisable to address formal representations to the French and Belgian Governments on the question. But I am clear that the action hitherto taken is for the moment sufficient. In case, however, you are consulted on the matter, it may be useful to remind you of the position as it was left at the end of the London Conference last August.³

3. On the last day of the conference the German delegation expressed the verbal hope that His Majesty's Government would associate themselves with a request which they proposed to address to the French and Belgian Governments for the evacuation of the three towns at the same time as the territories occupied by France and Belgium since January 1923.⁴ While His Majesty's Government were unable to agree to the request in that precise form, they nevertheless took the opportunity to address notes on the one hand to the German Government, and on the other hand to the French and Belgian Governments making it clear that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the three towns ought to be evacuated forthwith, as the reason for their occupation had long ago ceased to operate, and their continued operation was in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.⁵ For the text of these notes I may refer you to my predecessor's despatch No. 2787 of the 2nd September, 1924.⁶ The above still remains the view of His Majesty's Government, and if the question is broached in conversation you will, of course, make no secret of their opinion.

4. At the same time I transmit to you herewith a copy of a note⁷ just received from the German ambassador here which confirms the impression with which His Majesty's Government were left last summer—that the French and Belgian Governments had then undertaken not to oppose the evacuation, simultaneously with the Ruhr, of the territory on the right bank of the Rhine occupied in the spring of 1921. It is true that, so far as I am aware, no French or Belgian confirmation of the said undertaking is

³ See No. 225, n. 17.

⁴ i.e. the Ruhr. See Vol. XXI, Chap. I.

⁵ See Vol. XXVI, No. 558.

⁶ Not printed. See, however, *ibid.*, Enclosure 1.

⁷ This note of July 9, not printed, transmitted a copy of a memorandum communicated to the French Government on July 6 which enclosed a statement signed by Dr. Marx, the then German Chancellor, on August 16, 1924, to the effect that the French and Belgian Governments would be ready to secure the evacuation of the 'sanction' areas at the same time as the evacuation of the Ruhr.

on record, and certainly nothing of the kind is in the possession of His Majesty's Government. But be that as it may, I cannot disguise my feeling that it would be the height of folly for the two Governments now to make difficulties about the evacuation of these three towns.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Brussels for his information and guidance.

I am, etc.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 638

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 18, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 245 Telegraphic: by bag [C 9490/2806/18]

PARIS, July 17, 1925

Having seen in this evening's 'Temps' a report from Brussels to the effect that it had been decided that the evacuation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort would be effected simultaneously with the towns of the Ruhr basin,¹ I enquired of Monsieur Berthelot what truth there was in this statement.

2. Monsieur Berthelot informed me confidentially that he himself had for a long time past been urging Monsieur Briand to agree to the evacuation of the three towns. The French Cabinet had hitherto been opposed thereto. Now, however, Monsieur Berthelot was glad to say that his views had prevailed, largely owing to the fact that he had ascertained from Monsieur Herriot that the latter had indeed, as the Germans maintained,² given them a verbal promise during the London conference that the evacuation of the three towns would be simultaneous with that of the Ruhr. Monsieur Berthelot added that a circular despatch to the French Ambassadors in London, Brussels and Rome would be despatched tomorrow enquiring whether the allied governments concerned agreed to the evacuation of the three towns.³ He told me, moreover, that orders had already been given that these towns were to be evacuated immediately after the French troops had left the Ruhr basin.

3. I told Monsieur Berthelot that I felt sure you would receive this information with particular satisfaction as this action of the French government was calculated to remove any excuse which the German

¹ See No. 635.

² See No. 637, n. 7.

³ In Foreign Office despatch No. 2481 to Paris of July 22, Mr. Chamberlain stated: '... I transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence [not printed] with the French Ambassador relative to the decision to proceed with the evacuation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort.'

'2. When the question is raised on the Ambassadors' Conference, I request that you will agree to the Inter-Allied Military Committee of Versailles being invited to give the necessary orders for the evacuation of those three towns.'

nationalists might have for opposing the signature of the pact.

4. I have no doubt that Monsieur Vandervelde's continued efforts here in favour of the evacuation of the three towns has largely contributed to this decision of the French government.⁴ The Belgian Ambassador, whom I saw this morning, and who was then unaware of the decision come to, told me that Monsieur Vandervelde's efforts towards this end had been practically continuous.

⁴ In Brussels telegram No. 76 of July 17, Sir G. Grahame reported: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that, when in Paris [July 8–10], he had strongly urged on French Minister for Foreign Affairs the desirability for evacuating Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort as soon as possible [see *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 77]. . . .'

No. 639

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received July 24, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 256 Telegraphic: by bag [C 9798/2806/18]

PARIS, July 23, 1925

Your despatch No. 2481 (of the 22nd instant¹ regarding evacuation of the three towns).

Procedure proposed is that Secretariat General of the Ambassadors' Conference should at next meeting of the Conference submit a memorandum to the effect that inasmuch as all the Allied Governments concerned are agreed as to the evacuation of the three towns, the Conference should now instruct the Versailles Committee to give the necessary instructions for the evacuation.

The French Government have already approached the Italian and Japanese Governments on the subject and hope that their replies will be forthcoming in time for the Conference to take its decision when it next meets on July 27th.

¹ See No. 638, n. 3.

No. 640

Mr. Chamberlain to the Italian Ambassador

[C 9732/10/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 24, 1925

Your Excellency,

With reference to your note No. 2260 A 68 of the 21st July,² I have the honour to inform you that I am now in a position to give you the further

¹ Not printed.

information foreshadowed in my note of the 20th July,² regarding the views of His Majesty's Government on the provision to be made out of the second Dawes annuity for the costs of the armies of occupation and interallied commissions, and for restitution.³

2. In the first place I hasten to reassure Your Excellency as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government in regard to the procedure whereby three questions are to be discussed. It has never been the intention of His Majesty's Government that the representatives of the occupying powers should first come to a preliminary agreement and the other interested governments only be invited to take part in the discussions after that preliminary agreement had been reached. Any information which the Italian Government may have received to that effect is inexact. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government some weeks ago approached the French and Belgian Governments on the question and expressed the view that the Italian, Japanese and United States Government should be invited to be represented at the proposed discussions from the outset.

3. I am now happy to be able to inform you that the French and Belgian Governments have concurred in the British proposal,⁴ and I understand that the French Government are issuing invitations to the Belgian, British, Italian, Japanese and United States Governments to appoint representatives to discuss the question in Paris, the discussions to commence on the 27th instant.⁵ His Majesty's Government propose to accept this invitation and to appoint the British Deputy Delegate on the Reparation Commission in a personal capacity to represent them in the discussions,⁶ and they venture to hope that a similar course will be adopted by the Italian Government.

4. As regards the distribution of the one per cent. allocated to restitution, I have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact that article 5 (b) of the Paris Agreement of the 14th January last,⁷ provided that this allocation 'shall be distributed between the powers having a claim under this head as accepted by the Reparation Commission'. This question, therefore, is entirely within the competence of the Reparation Commission and the reference to it in the Reparation

² Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

³ See No. 634.

⁴ Lord Crewe transmitted a French note of July 7 concurring in the British proposal in Paris despatch No. 1533 of July 9, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives, and Belgian concurrence was transmitted in Brussels telegram No. 71 of July 14, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁵ His Majesty's Government was so informed in Paris telegram No. 250 of July 21, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁶ In a Treasury letter of July 25 to the Foreign Office, not printed, was enclosed a copy of a letter of July 25 to Sir B. Kemball-Cook, appointing him British representative to the Paris conference.

⁷ See No. 634, n. 1.

Commission's decision of the 29th May last,⁸ was an error which, His Majesty's Government understand, is being corrected.⁹

I have, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

HAROLD NICOLSON

⁸ The text of the decision has not been preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁹ An agreement was signed at Paris on September 21, 1925. See Cmd. 2558, *Agreement regulating the Amounts to be allocated out of the Second Dawes Annuity for the Armies of Occupation in the Rhineland, the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission and the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany: Paris, September 21, 1925* (H.M.S.O., 1925).

No. 641

Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris)

No. 205 Telegraphic: by bag [C 9991/2118]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1925

Your telegram No. 260 (of July 28th: military control in Germany).¹

I agree that suggested instructions to Control Commission might be very useful and I request that you will propose to the Ambassadors' Conference that they should be despatched.

I feel that the suggestion will be more palatable to the French if it is represented that the German government have themselves already taken the initiative in appointing the Pawelsz Commission² to carry out the measures of disarmament required by the allied note of the 4th June.³ The instructions to the Control Commission would therefore be not to take the initiative in the matter but to respond to an initiative already taken by the German government, and to agree to meet the Pawelsz Commission in order to discuss the necessary measures to execute the allied demands.⁴ This is so clearly a reasonable procedure and so much in

¹ In this Mr. Phipps stated: '... I would suggest that the Ambassadors' Conference should, through the Versailles Committee, instruct the Commission of Control to take the initiative in starting forthwith official discussions with the Pauwelz [*sic*] Committee [see n. 2] for the purpose of carrying out the demands of the allied governments. ...'

² A War Office letter of July 30 to the Foreign Office transmitted a copy of a letter of July 25 from Herr Stresemann to General Walch which ran: '... the German Government has formed a commission of representatives of the Reich Ministries, under the presidency of Major-General von Pawelsz, and has delegated to it the examination, elaboration and execution of the demand contained in Part III of the collective note of the 4th June, 1925. ...'

³ See No. 631, Enclosure.

⁴ General Wauchope had reported in a note of July 20 to the War Office that the French members of the Military Commission of Control were showing the same change of attitude as when the Final Report was prepared (see No. 577, n. 1) and were in no hurry to discuss proposals for the execution of the Allied Note. He stated that he considered that there was nothing to prevent the Commission of Control from dealing direct with the von Pawelsz Commission despite the failure of the German Government to send an official reply to the

the interest of the allies as leading to early compliance with their requirements that I do not doubt the French government will readily concur in the proposal. Both their and our object must be to get those demands fulfilled with the least possible delay.

Repeated to Berlin No. 148, Brussels No. 61 and Rome No. 230.

Allied Note, and went on to say: 'His [General von Pawelsz] proposal that German experts should meet experts of this commission to discuss specific demands seems to me reasonable, and would overcome many difficulties provided the experts on both sides were instructed to get on with the work and deal with facts—not phantoms.'

In a letter of July 27 to Herr Stresemann (copy in War Office letter of July 30 (see n. 2)), General Walch stated: 'La commission considère que cette communication [see n. 2] marque l'intention du Gouvernement allemand d'exécuter les redressements fixés par les Gouvernements alliés dans leur note collective du 4 juin dernier, Partie III.

'Elle comprend également que le Generalmajor von Pawelsz devient, auprès d'elle, le représentant qualifié du Gouvernement allemand prévu par l'article 206 du Traité de Versailles.

'C'est dans ces conditions que la commission est prête, conformément aux dispositions de la note du 4 juin, à recevoir de cet officier général les propositions que le Gouvernement allemand doit formuler touchant certains points de la note, et à lui indiquer, de son côté, les détails d'exécution concernant certains autres.

'Je suis moi-même prêt, pour faciliter les opérations ultérieures se déroulant dans ce cadre, à prendre personnellement contact avec le Generalmajor von Pawelsz.'

No. 642

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 206 Telegraphic: by bag [C 10027/21/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 29, 1925*

Your telegram No. 262 (of the 29th July.¹ Points to be discussed by the Ambassadors' Conference).

We are as yet unable to give you the instructions promised in my despatch No. 2399² as certain points are still under consideration at the War Office. You are however authorised to agree that the Versailles Committee may be considered the 'competent allied military authority' referred to in the Ambassadors' Conference resolution of the 30th May.³

A separate telegram has been sent you as to instructions to the Commission of Control regarding Pawelsz Commission—see my telegram No. 205 of today.⁴

You may agree to the Versailles Committee's report enclosed in Lord Crewe's despatch No. 1574⁵ in regard to which we observe that he did not ask for instructions.

¹ Not printed.

³ See *ibid.*, n. 3.

⁵ Of July 14, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

² No. 636.

⁴ No. 641.

*Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 1)*¹

No. 271 Telegraphic: by bag [C 10130/2806/18]

Private [and] Very Confidential

PARIS, July 31, 1925

Your despatch No. 2481 of July 22nd.²

Owing to the delay in carrying out the procedure indicated in my telegram No. 256 of July 23rd,³ I recalled to M. Berthelot today, in the course of conversation, the fact that His Majesty's Government, as they had informed M. de Fleuriau on July 22nd,⁴ had agreed that the Interallied Military Committee of Versailles should be invited to give the necessary orders for the evacuation of the three towns.⁵

M. Berthelot thereupon informed me very confidentially that M. Herriot was now trying to go back on his admission, reported in my telegram No. 245 of July 17th,⁶ that he had given the Germans a verbal promise during the London Conference in the matter. This, of course, as M. Berthelot remarked was a question of internal political intrigue. M. Berthelot spontaneously declared that the evidence against M. Herriot was overwhelming. He had, therefore, prepared a file of all the appropriate documents which M. Briand has forwarded to M. Herriot, who, however, has not yet replied thereto. M. Berthelot then gave me the most positive assurance that M. Briand had no intention of going back on his word in the matter. He had therefore taken action without awaiting M. Herriot's reply. The Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces on the Rhine having reported that a total evacuation of the three towns would take nearly three weeks to complete, orders were being given to him to begin taking the necessary steps forthwith, and the three towns will be evacuated by August 16th. As I can hardly believe that the period mentioned will be necessary for the evacuation I feel convinced that the decision now arrived at not to evacuate before the last limit possible is due to fear on M. Briand's part lest he should later on be reproached publicly by M. Herriot for having made an unnecessary surrender to the Germans.

I urged, however, how desirable it would be to evacuate the three towns as soon as possible. M. Berthelot again repeated that nearly three weeks would be required and added, for my confidential information, that the necessary orders had been issued directly after this morning's Ministerial Council.

M. Berthelot said that M. Briand might not wish that I should be informed of such a delicate point of internal politics affecting M. Herriot's position, and he therefore again urged the need for secrecy.

¹ No time of receipt is given.

³ No. 639.

⁵ i.e. Duisburg, Düsseldorf and Ruhrort.

² See No. 638, n. 3.

⁴ In a letter of that date, not printed.

⁶ No. 638.

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 2629 [C 10148/21/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1925

Sir,

With reference to Lord D'Abernon's telegram No. 290¹ which has been repeated to you direct, I transmit to you herewith a copy of the telegram,¹ referred to by Lord D'Abernon, addressed by General Wauchope to the War Office on the subject of the fulfilment of the Allied demands² regarding German disarmament.

2. You will observe that the position is still far from satisfactory, for while it is by no means clear whether the Commission of Control, in spite of General Walch's letter to M. Stresemann of the 27th July,³ does in fact intend to co-operate with the Pawelsz Commission with a view to the execution of the Allied demands, it is, on the other hand, only too apparent that the members of the commission are themselves not agreed as to what these demands should be taken to mean. This is the more surprising in view of the fact that it is now two clear months since the demands were notified to the German Government, and that, according to my information, the French section of the Versailles Committee is, in general, in complete agreement with the views of the British military authorities as to their interpretation. In this connection I would invite your attention to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Colonel Heywood's despatch to the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence of the 9th July,⁴ which makes this point quite clear.

3. Telegraphic instructions⁵ are being addressed to General Wauchope by the War Office in reply to his telegram of the 1st August⁶ instructing him to explain the issues at stake in detail direct to General Clive by telegram, and the latter is at the same time being instructed to raise the whole question in the Versailles Committee with a view to instructions being issued to the Control Commission to take up without delay with the Pawelsz Commission all matters on the interpretation of which the members of the Control Commission are themselves agreed, and to refer all disputed points to Paris for a decision by the Versailles Committee.

4. It will doubtless expedite a solution if, in accordance with your suggestion,⁷ the Ambassadors' Conference are also seized of the question. I therefore request that you will invite the conference to take a decision on

¹ Of August 1, not printed.

² See No. 631, Enclosure.

³ See No. 641, n. 4.

⁴ Presumably enclosed in War Office letter of July 11 to the Foreign Office, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁵ Mr. Troutbeck minuted on August 4 that the situation, and the draft of this despatch had been discussed at the Foreign Office with Colonel McGrath and Major McDougall.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ See No. 641, n. 1.

the following lines, the decision being notified to the Versailles Committee for their general guidance. The present delay should be brought to an end and all possible means adopted to expedite the execution of the Allied demands; the initiative taken by the German Government in setting up the Pawelsz Commission⁸ is therefore to be welcomed as a practical step and as showing the intention of the German Government to take the matter of fulfilment promptly in hand. The Control Commission, on their side, should respond to this initiative by doing all that is possible to facilitate the task of the Pawelsz Commission in carrying out the demands without delay. Should points of difficulty arise incapable of local solution—whether between the Control Commission and the Pawelsz Commission or between the members of the Control Commission itself—the commission will naturally refer the matter at once and by telegram to the Versailles Committee for a ruling.

5. As regards the precise terms of the decision to be taken by the Ambassadors' Conference, this must in large measure be left to your judgment, but the general view of His Majesty's Government on this question is, as you are already aware, that they are disturbed at the continued delay and at the apparently obstructive tactics of certain members of the Control Commission. They accordingly welcome and indeed press for any action on the part of the Ambassadors' Conference calculated to expedite matters.

6. In regard to the points raised in your despatch No. 1704 of the 30th July,⁹ your view that oral discussions between the Control Commission and the Pawelsz Commission are likely to be of greater effect than written communications is approved, as also that such discussions should not be confined to Generals Walch and von Pawelsz to the exclusion of other members of the respective commissions. Indeed, it is not altogether evident that anything to the contrary is to be read into the exchange of notes between the Control Commission and M. Stresemann,¹⁰ and you will observe that neither Lord D'Abernon nor General Wauchope refer to any such difficulty in their recent telegrams.

7. Finally, you should make it clear to your colleagues that if a deadlock arises during the adjournment of the Ambassadors' Conference, the solution of which requires action by the conference, His Majesty's Government may unwillingly be compelled to insist on a special meeting being called for the purpose. It is in order to prevent any such necessity arising that it is especially desirable that the instructions to the Commission of Control from the Versailles Committee should be so drawn up as to leave no loophole for further doubt and no pretext for further delay.

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁸ See *ibid.*, n. 2.

¹⁰ See No. 641, nn. 2 and 4.

⁹ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Chamberlain (Received August 6, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 277 Telegraphic: by bag [C 10279/2/18]

PARIS, August 5, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires being also present, and considered the following questions.

1. It was agreed that the Allied Military Committee of Versailles should be considered as the competent Allied military authority which is to be entrusted with the task of making arrangements for the evacuation of the Cologne zone (see your telegram No. 206 of July 29th).¹

2. In accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 2629 of August 4th² regarding the unsatisfactory attitude of the Commission of Control in its dealings with the German authorities for the execution of the allied demands of June 4th,³ I invited the Conference to adopt a resolution drawn up in the terms laid down in paragraph 4 of your despatch. General Desticker declared himself in entire agreement with my proposal, which was duly adopted by the Conference and the Versailles Committee will accordingly issue instructions to the Commission of Control in this sense. I would add that the question of issuing some such instructions to the Commission had already been discussed between Colonel Heywood and General Desticker, as reported in my despatch No. 1745 of today.⁴

3. Monsieur Cambon made a statement to the Conference regarding the evacuation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort, copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 1746 of today.⁵ At Monsieur Cambon's invitation, a resolution was adopted inviting the Versailles Committee to issue the necessary instructions for the evacuation of these three towns. It would appear from a statement made by General Desticker that, contrary to the assurance given me by Monsieur Berthelot (see my telegram No. 271 of July 31st)⁶ no orders to this effect have yet been given. The General, on the other hand, confirmed Monsieur Berthelot's statement to the effect that it would be three weeks from now before the evacuation could be completed, General Guillaumat having stipulated that he would require a week's notice before being able to commence the actual evacuation. I would explain that before the meeting I was approached privately with a request that I should take the initiative at the Conference in proposing the evacuation of the three towns, and that I should base my request on the undertakings given by Monsieur Herriot last year.⁷ After what Monsieur Berthelot told me the other day, it was fairly obvious that

¹ No. 642.

² No. 644.

³ See No. 631, Enclosure.

⁴ Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ No. 643.

⁷ See No. 637, n. 7.

the Quai d'Orsay wished to be able, if necessary, for purposes of internal politics to represent His Majesty's Government as holding the present French government to the undertakings given by Monsieur Herriot last year.

I did not much relish the idea of being dragged into an intrigue of this kind, but agreed to raise the question at the conference by means of a statement based upon the facts as given in Monsieur de Fleuriau's note to you of July 20th.⁵ This, however, did not meet with the wishes of the Quai d'Orsay, and in the end, as above explained, it was Monsieur Cambon himself who raised the question. Copy of the communiqué which has been issued to the press is enclosed in my despatch No. 1746 of today.⁸ . . .⁹

⁸ Not printed. In Coblenz despatch No. 314 of August 27, Lord Kilmarnock reported: ' . . . the evacuation of Düsseldorf and the sanctions area of 1921 was completed at 9.30 a.m. on the 25th August.

'The evacuation took place without incident.'

⁹ The sections omitted referred to other matters.

No. 646

Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

*No. 2757 [C 10617/21/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 14, 1925*

Sir,

During the course of M. Briand's visit to this country¹ I brought up in conversation the question of the execution by Germany of her disarmament obligations, and observed that it was very much to the interests of all the Allies to proceed quickly with the discussions of this question in Berlin. I added that it might be wise to make our representatives on the Commission of Control aware that we do not wish difficulties to be made or delays created.

2. M. Briand replied that he had already so informed the French members of the commission. He added that he was also exerting himself with the Polish Government to moderate the expulsion of Germans from their territory and to avoid creating difficulties in the way of the security negotiations.²

I am, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ See Nos. 428, 434, n. 3, 438, 441, and 443.

² See Chap. II, *passim*.

Air Ministry to Foreign Office (Received September 3)

[C 11381/19/18]

AIR MINISTRY, *September 2, 1925*

Sir,

I am commanded by the Air Council to refer to Mr. Lampson's letter of the 9th July (C 8883/19/18)¹ enclosing a Memorandum² in regard to the future of the Inter-Allied Committee of Guarantee in Germany, and to say that they concur generally with its conclusions.

2. The Council note that the Memorandum recognises that it might be possible legally to maintain that there is no obligation to withdraw the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee when the Cologne bridgehead is evacuated, but they realise that the continued retention of the Committee in Berlin would probably be regarded as *politically* indefensible after the withdrawal of the Military Commission of Control. If all future military supervision is to be exercised only by the League of Nations under Article 213³ it would be undesirable that aeronautical supervision should continue to rest on some other basis, and it would be preferable that the transference to the League of Nations of the responsibility for future aeronautical supervision should take place no later than the transference of military supervision.

The Air Council nevertheless feel that it is necessary for H[is] M[ajesty's] Government to bear in mind that the handing over of aeronautical control to the League of Nations presents problems different from those attaching to the transfer of military control. The Military Commission of Control, as the Air Council understand the position, can cease to exist when the Commission is once satisfied that the measures of disarmament etc. required by the Peace Treaty have been carried out. The Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee on the other hand exercises under the Nine Rules⁴ continuous 'post-disarmament' functions, such as the registration of pilots and of factories constructing aeronautical material, the examination of new designs, the scrutiny of imports and exports. It would appear to be necessary for the League of Nations first to determine whether it will accept the existing Rules for differentiating between civil and military aircraft either in their entirety or with some modifications, and in the next place to decide what provision it will make for the future discharge of such administrative duties under the Rules as are at present carried out by the Committee of Guarantee.

For these reasons the Air Council feel it necessary to take into account the possibility that it may not in practice be feasible for the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee to be withdrawn simultaneously with the

¹ Not printed.

³ See No. 596.

² Of July 2, not printed.

⁴ See Nos. 569, n. 1 and 633, n. 4.

Military Commission of Control, and that some further time may be required to enable the League to make provision for carrying out any functions which will be imposed upon it by the withdrawal of the Committee of Guarantee.

Their only other remark on the Memorandum is that as regard paragraph C (IV) they have usually been given to understand that any intransigence in air supervision emanated from the French General Staff and not from the civil aviation interests in France.

I am, etc.,
J. A. WEBSTER⁵

⁵ A Principal Assistant Secretary at the Air Ministry.

No. 648

*Mr. Addison¹ (Berlin) to Mr. Chamberlain
(Received September 9, 8.50 p.m.)*

No. 329 Telegraphic [C 11593/2806/18]

BERLIN, September 9, 1925, 6 p.m.

Press reports that President of Reich will visit Bochum with Chancellor and various Ministers on 17th instant. A great demonstration is to take place at which speeches will be held by President Chancellor and local officials. On the 18th President and Ministers are to be in Essen where there is to be a further great demonstration of same nature. On the 19th President is to be at Düsseldorf where those officials are to be presented to him who have distinguished themselves in struggle during French occupation or have particularly suffered as a result of this occupation. A further big demonstration is to be held immediately afterwards.

It would seem that present is hardly the appropriate moment to choose for celebrations which are bound to degenerate into demonstrations hostile to France on the eve of negotiations aiming at better relations with that country.²

Repeated to Geneva No. 16.

¹ Chargé d'Affaires September 1-21.

² See Appendix.

Foreign Office to Air Ministry

[C 11605/117/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 17, 1925*

Sir,

In your letter No. 611004/25/S.8 of the 9th September,¹ you stated that the Air Council were now anxious to introduce certain amendments into the agreement regarding European Airways which was signed in Paris on August 10th last.² The Secretary of State infers from your letter that His Majesty's Government are not, as yet, definitely committed to the terms of this Agreement; and he would desire therefore, before approaching the French Government in the sense requested, to be reassured on certain points which will already have been fully considered by the Air Council, but on which he would none the less be grateful to receive a formal expression of their views.

2. Mr. Chamberlain understands that it is the policy of the German Government to refuse permission for allied civil aircraft to fly over their territory until the nine rules have been modified to their satisfaction,³ and, further, that it is unlikely that the French Government will ever consent to any such modification.⁴ The Agreement in question was devised to solve this deadlock. In view of the fact that no contractual or legal obligation derives on Germany to admit foreign aircraft over her territory, it is intended by the creation of a united allied front to put such pressure upon the German Government as shall oblige them to submit to the allied demands. In other words, it is hoped to obtain by force what has hitherto been found impossible to secure by negotiation.

3. The Secretary of State would wish in the first place to call the serious attention of the Air Council to the consideration that this policy of encirclement, these methods of united pressure, constitute a reversion to the post-armistice attitude towards Germany, an attitude which it has been the constant endeavour of successive British Governments to attenuate and to supplant by the saner processes of negotiation, conciliation and

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 633, n. 4. A copy of this agreement, not printed, regarding common action in connection with the flight of allied aircraft across Germany, between representatives of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Czechoslovakia, was communicated to the Foreign Office by the French Ambassador on September 1.

³ See No. 625, n. 2. In Paris despatch No. 1942 of September 8, Mr. Phipps transmitted a report of September 5 of a conversation between the Air Attaché and Dr. E. Nord (see No. 605) who stated that the German Government were very disappointed on receiving the modified rules (see No. 633, n. 4) and that they would probably refuse to accept them in view of the harshness of Rule No. 9.

⁴ See Nos. 569, 572, 574, 585, 589, 610, and 632.

consent. It is to be apprehended that this Paris agreement² will, as such, be widely and intensely resented in Germany, and will be severely criticised by neutral, and even by British, opinion. The possibility that the date is not far distant when the Council of the League of Nations will, under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles,⁵ assume the supervision of German aircraft, is also a factor in the situation, and one which, Mr. Chamberlain feels assured, the Air Council have taken into careful account.

4. These objections to the spirit and principle of the Agreement will of course have been weighed by the Air Council, who have doubtless satisfied themselves that they will be counter-balanced by the rapidity and certainty with which, under the policy of the united front, the allied objectives will be attained. It is observed, however, that under paragraph 2 of the Agreement, His Majesty's Government would be bound, subject to the exception mentioned, not to admit German aircraft over British territory until Germany has given permission to every one of the seven other signatory states to operate certain unspecified air-routes over German territory. Such an obligation may at first sight seem of little practical importance, but Mr. Chamberlain cannot but apprehend that inconvenience will result from thus identifying in binding solidarity the interests of British civil aviation with the possibly exaggerated requirements of other nations, such as France and Poland, from whom the German authorities might be obliged by their public opinion obstinately and persistently to withhold all facilities. On the other hand, whereas these two countries are not in this respect exposed to reprisals on the part of the German Government, British aviation is the only important allied service against which the German Government could at present counter-attack. It is surely possible that the immediate effect upon Germany of the Paris agreement, would be the cancellation of the facilities accorded to the London-Berlin and London-Cologne services.⁶

5. The Secretary of State would for these reasons be grateful if the Air Council would inform him whether, in the light of the above observations, they still desire to approve the agreement. Should they decide to give this approval, it is for consideration whether some clause should not be added whereunder His Majesty's Government would reserve their right to denounce the agreement within some specified period of six months or even within some shorter period.⁷

I am, etc.,

C. HOWARD SMITH

⁵ See No. 596.

⁶ See No. 625, n. 4.

⁷ An Air Ministry letter of November 3 to the Foreign Office ran: '... I am commanded by the Air Council to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, that they are impressed with the force of the arguments he has advanced in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the first mentioned letter against the approval by His Majesty's Government of the Agreement in its present form and they hesitate to urge him to adopt a course to which he is evidently opposed.'

'Moreover, in view of the stage which the negotiations regarding the Treaty of Mutual

Guarantee have reached [see Chap. II], the Council are hopeful that an amelioration of the aerial relations between Germany and the other signatory States may well be an early outcome of the conclusion of the Treaty and make it possible for the results expected from the Paris Agreement to be achieved in a manner more consonant with the policy to which Mr. Chamberlain has called attention.

'In these circumstances the Council suggest that the reply to the French Government should propose a postponement of the further consideration of the Paris Agreement until it has become apparent what effect the Locarno Pact will have on future aerial relations with Germany.'

A copy of this letter was enclosed in Foreign Office despatch No. 3764 to Paris of November 13 which instructed Lord Crewe as follows: 'I request that the French Government may be informed that their note [of August 25, not printed, enclosed in Paris despatch No. 1889 of September 1, not printed] and the enclosed draft agreement [see n. 2] have been receiving the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government. The latter feel, however, that circumstances have changed very considerably since the time when the agreement was drawn up, and they cannot believe that it would now serve the best interests of the Allies to endeavour, by methods of encirclement and united pressure, to force the German Government to grant to Allied civil aircraft concessions which they are otherwise not prepared to give. The French Government will no doubt agree that there is reason to hope that the settlement of the difficulties and disputes which have arisen with Germany in the matter of civil aviation may well be one of the results of the amelioration of the relations between Germany and the Allies consequent upon the conversations at Locarno [see Appendix]. The results expected from the Paris agreement of August 10th may thus be achieved by other and more conciliatory methods.'

'In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the further consideration of the Paris agreement might profitably be postponed until it has become apparent what effect the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and its consequent reactions will have upon future aerial relations with Germany.'

A copy of a British Embassy note of November 17 to the French Government in which Lord Crewe acted on these instructions, was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2428 of November 17, not printed.

No. 650

War Office to Foreign Office (Received September 29)

[C 12381/21/18]*

Secret

WAR OFFICE, *September 29, 1925*

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to refer to Foreign Office letter, dated the 26th September 1925,¹ relating to the fulfilment by the German Government of the Allied disarmament demands,² and to forward copy of General Wauchope's notes No. 36, dated the 19th September 1925.

2. The Army Council consider that these notes will furnish Mr. Secretary Chamberlain with the information he requires, but should there be any points upon which further elucidation is required, the Army

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 631, Enclosure.

Council will instruct General Wauchope, by telegraph, to furnish such information.

I am, etc.,
B. B. CUBITT

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 650

Notes No. 36

Secret

BERLIN, September 19, 1925

I do not think I have acknowledged receipt of letter of the 21st August 1925, from the War Office,³ giving me extracts from Foreign Office despatch No. 2757, dated the 14th August 1925.⁴

Since the French members of this commission changed their attitude and consented to meet the von Pawelsz Commission,⁵ matters here have been making steady though somewhat slow progress. None the less, the promise of assistance made in your letter of the 21st August is very helpful to me, though I trust the occasion may not arise when I shall have to make use of this help.

2. I am obliged for the letter from Colonel McGrath, dated the 14th September.³ As he says, the rôle of prophet is a thankless one. That would not deter me from making a prophecy as to when the Germans will have carried out the demands made in the Allied note² had I any very clear ideas myself. You will remember I have always said that, with goodwill on both sides, I think these demands could be fulfilled within about four months. There is no doubt that during the last month or two the Germans have shown a willingness to carry out our demands which they have never shown before. General Walch informed me yesterday that this was his considered opinion. At the same time, we must remember that there are a number of important points which still remain unsettled. I attach a paper showing the principal points I have in mind, with some remarks as to the difficulties of an early settlement of each question. On some of these the Germans threaten to be obstinate, and if they continue so, then my estimate of four months must be extended. On the other hand, were my French colleagues to resume the attitude which they showed when we were drawing up the Final Report⁶ last January⁷ and again before entering into negotiations with General von Pawelsz last June,⁵ then again my estimate would have to be extended.

What exact effect the passing of the Security Pact (if it does pass)⁸ will have on the speeding up of our work, you know better than I. But without considering any such external causes, on looking back on the past history of this commission—remembering that the Germans seem sometimes to

³ Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

⁴ No. 646.

⁶ See Nos. 586, n. 1 and 592.

⁸ See Nos. 549 and 550, and Appendix.

⁵ See No. 641, n. 4.

⁷ See No. 577, n. 1.

be singularly lacking in political sense and that my French colleagues sometimes seem to suffer from waves of remarkable emotionalism—I think the work of this commission (excluding the actual completion of certain tasks, the winding up of the commission and the handing over to the League of Nations) could hardly be done before Christmas, and I think March or even the 1st April is a more probable date.

I regret if such a forecast be distasteful. But the good thorn pricketh betimes. If the Security Pact is agreed to, events might then be made so to move that M[ission I[nter-] A[llié de] C[ontrôle] would be instructed to give concessions on minor points provided the German Government ceased resistance to the execution of essential points.

There are, I know, a number of points within the spirit of the Allied note on which General Walch is quite ready to give concessions provided we could be sure that the Germans had the clear intention of fulfilling all other demands in the Allied note.

The passing of the Security Pact may enable the German Government to hasten not only the transformation of factories, but of words into deeds.

A. G. WAUCHOPE

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 650

Progress with regard to Allied Demands

Part III of Foreign Office White Paper 'Germany No. 2 (1925)'⁹

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties ¹⁰
I	<p>Several meetings have been held between Commandant Durand and the German representatives dealing with this subject.</p> <p>Lieut.-Col. Norris attended the last of these meetings.</p> <p>Further meetings are to be held on September 22 and 25.</p> <p>The Germans have</p>	<p>Commandant Durand tells me that he does not think that the Germans will give way on the two following points and that both questions will probably, therefore, have to be referred to Paris:</p> <p>(a) Retention of military ranks by police officers:¹¹</p> <p>The Germans claim that military rank is necessary</p>

⁹ See No. 631, n. 10.

¹⁰ In answer to a Foreign Office query regarding 'probable difficulties' (Foreign Office letter of October 5, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives), the War Office replied on October 6: '... From reports received from General Wauchope, it appears to the Army Council that negotiations between the Commission of Control and the German Government are now proceeding satisfactorily, and that, therefore, it would be a mistake to interfere with or interrupt these negotiations at the present juncture. ...'

¹¹ See No. 541.

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
	<p>promised to meet the Allied demands so far on the following points:</p> <p>(a) Reduction to 150,000</p> <p>(b) Giving the police personnel the status of life officials</p> <p>The Germans agreed to</p> <p>(a) on the basis of the proposals submitted by Commandant Durand to the C[omit��] M[ilitaire] [inter-]A[lli��] de V[ersailles] in Paris. Now that the numbers of police to be allowed in the occupied zone have been reduced, General Walch fears that the Germans will be less ready to meet us on other outstanding points in connection with the police, and he fears a settlement may be thus delayed.</p>	<p>for disciplinary reasons and to maintain authority, not only over the policemen, but over the public. Further, that the abolition of military rank would lower the social status of police officers. It would lower his military status, and a very good thing too.</p> <p>(b) Numbers of police in barracks: The Germans claim, after prolonged discussions with police chiefs of 'L��nder', that the minimum they require is 40,000 in barracks, 27,000 of whom should be in Prussia. These claims are excessive.</p> <p>The Germans claim that all our demands other than the above can be fulfilled without great difficulty.</p>
<p>II</p> <p>(a) Private factories other than authorised factories</p>	<p>The Germans have informed me privately that the dispersion of the machines referred to in this subsection will be carried out forthwith, except that the firm Mauser, of Oberndorf, wish to retain some 200 of the 885 for dispersal. They claim that these machines are all working on peace production now, and that the contracts under which they are working cannot be completed without them.</p> <p>The Germans have issued orders for the dismantlement of the 4 sets of nitrification plant and 1 crystallising plant at the Bayerische Sprengstoff A.G., Thansau.</p>	<p>The situation as regards the S��chsische Gusstahl-fabrik is not yet settled.</p>

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
(b) Former State factories	<p>I am informed also that orders have been issued for the destruction of the 11 buildings at the Pulverfabrik Walsrode, Domitz. I am informed that full details as regards the dispersal and destruction of machines in the Deutsche Werke, Spandau and Haselhorst, will be sent to this commission within a few days, and that orders have been given for the immediate destruction of the 4th Siemen-Martin furnace at Spandau.</p>	
(c) Authorised factories—Krupp, Essen and Meppen	<p>General von Pawelsz has written in to say that the destruction of the installations at Hanau has been carried out.</p> <p>1. The question of the heavy machines in shop 10 still awaits the arrival of Lieut.-Col. Pilleux who is one of the three members appointed by the M.I.A.C.C. to consider the question of the 34 machines ordered to be destroyed. Meanwhile the Germans are taking up 24 of the 34 machines from their foundations and stacking them outside shop 10 in a separate place until instructions are received from us as to their disposal.</p> <p>2. General von Pawelsz informs me that the 11 presses here have been ordered to be destroyed.</p> <p>3. This ammunition has been destroyed in the presence of control officers with the exception of 46 rounds of 21 cm. Other rounds of 21 cm. are being</p>	<p>The difficulty as regards the 10 remaining machines of the 34 will be fought by the Germans to the end, but it may be possible, after receiving Colonel Pilleux's report, to make some slight concession by way of arranging for the destruction of two</p>

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
	<p>destroyed in lieu of these elsewhere.</p> <p>A plan of manufacture for authorised supplies in war material has been submitted. This matter is awaiting Colonel Pilleux's arrival.</p>	or three other machines in place of two or three of these 10.
Ehrhardt (Rhine Metall)	It is hoped that this firm will be done with by the middle of October. I am told that some progress has been made with a view to satisfying our requirements.	
Polte (Magdebourg) ..	The Germans have written in promising to limit the manufacture of war material to the authorised establishment of machines in this factory. It remains to verify this.	
Simpson, Suhl ..	<p>The Germans claim that we have authorised two separate arrangements for manufacture—one by the District Committee and one by this headquarters.</p> <p>Captain Doberg is visiting this establishment to-day, and I hope the matter will be cleared up in the course of the next month.</p>	
Dortmunder Union ..	<p>General von Pawelsz has written in reporting progress as regards this factory and enclosing photographs of what has been achieved.</p> <p>The demand to the German Government to cast (instead of forging) a proportion of their practice shell involves a reconsideration of the plan of manufacture.</p>	
(c) Authorised factories—(contd.)— W.A.S.A.G., Reinsdorf	There is a considerable difference between the German claim and our demand for machinery for

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
Factories not yet selected	<p>this factory chiefly owing to the fact that some of the machinery can be used for commercial and war production.</p> <p>A committee of Allied and German experts was to visit this factory on the 21st, but this had to be postponed owing to a German expert falling sick and a new expert not being up in the subject. The Germans have now appointed another man, and I hope the inspection will take place within the next 10 days.</p> <p>General von Pawelsz has written giving a list of factories for the manufacture of war material which had not yet been designated. This is satisfactory except as regards the selection of the Deutsche-Werke, Kiel, which we have had to refuse. There may be difficulty as regards this.</p> <p>There may be difficulty as regards the selection of the Deutsche-Werke, Kiel, for the manufacture of armour plates and armoured cars.</p>
<p>(d) Military establishments—Various establishments to be suppressed</p> <p>Wehrkreis Workshop, Desching Zeugamt, Königsberg</p>	<p>The inspection of various establishments is proceeding slowly, the local Verbindungsstelle notifying the local District Committee as soon as any establishment on our detailed list is ready for inspection. Our demands may be considered as fulfilled.</p> <p>.. .. .</p>	<p>This was inspected by representatives of this commission in conjunction with representatives of the Reichswehr about three</p>

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
<p>Artillery depots authorised for coast fortifications</p>	<p>.. .. .</p>	<p>weeks ago, and was found to be not satisfactory. Captain Doberg promises that the Haberberger Grund will be given up to the town of Königsberg entirely, and that the Munitions Werkstätte will be transferred from Ponarth to Karschau. It seems probable that if this is done we shall be able to make a minor concession and arrive at a settlement. The Germans wish to retain machinery for reshaping artillery cartridge cases at three of these depots: one for the Baltic, one for the North Sea and one for Königsberg, in order to avoid the delay and expense entailed in sending the used cartridge cases to the firm of Polte for reshaping.</p> <p>This may cause difficulty.</p>
<p>Gasschutzlager, Hanover</p>	<p>General von Pawelsz has written promising to suppress this.</p>	
<p>(e) and (f) Military and police workshops</p>	<p>I do not anticipate difficulty in connection with these.</p>	
<p>III Surrender of surplus war material</p>	<p>So far, the following have been dealt with:—</p> <p>Small arms, spare parts: Nothing surrendered.</p> <p>Minenwerfer, spare parts: Amended scales submitted by the Germans have been approved.</p> <p>Machine guns, spare parts: A certain number have been surrendered.</p> <p>Spare parts for field</p>	

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
	<p>guns and carriages: A considerable number have been surrendered.</p> <p>Minenwerfer limbers and similar carriages: The Germans have explained their figures, and the explanation has been accepted by this commission.</p> <p>Horse shoes: No communication has yet been received from the Germans.</p> <p>Blank cartridges: I am informed privately that the Germans are prepared to reduce their scale to 15 million blank cartridges per annum, and to limit the manufacture of these to the authorised machinery.</p> <p>Pioneer tools in pioneer battalions and garrison and camp headquarters: A certain number of tools from pioneer battalions have been surrendered, but none as yet from camps.</p> <p>Police armament: 4 machine-gun mountings have been surrendered.</p> <p>Signalling and lighting material: The Germans claim that there was an error in printing, and that no surplus exists.</p> <p>Material for use with explosives: The amended scales demanded by the Germans have been approved.</p> <p>Harness (saddles, breast and pack har-</p>	

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
<p style="text-align: center;">IV</p> <p>(a) The High Command</p>	<p>ness): The Germans have now written in complying with our demands except as regards two pack saddles per squadron of cavalry. The latter item will be approved if the Germans can give a reasonable explanation why they are required.</p> <p>Stocks of clothing and equipment: This question is under discussion.</p> <p>Bogies (Wilhelmshaven): I understand that orders have been given for the destruction of the 22 bogies for railway gun-carriages.</p> <p>Gas-masks: The German demands for gas-masks, etc., have been received and are excessive. A letter is being sent to them within the next day or two informing them of what they may have.</p> <p>This decision gives a slight additional number of masks for annual replacement to the numbers allowed by the note.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">.. .. .</p>	<p>I anticipate considerable difficulty with regard to the High Command. The Germans having used the argument that it is necessary to amend the law to achieve what we require has increased the difficulty of the situation, and I doubt whether the French would agree now to accept the assurances referred to in my notes No. 34, dated</p>

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
(b) General Staff ..	<p>1. These questions are still under discussion, but the Germans appear ready to comply with our demands.</p> <p>2. The necessary administrative and legislative measures have not yet been received and will require study.</p> <p>I hope that the question of the training of staff officers will be settled in accordance with the War Office views.</p>	<p>August 20, 1925.¹ I think that either an amendment to the 'Wehrgesetz' or a new decree will be required, and this may lead to both difficulty and delay.</p>
(c) Military organisation of the railway system	<p>1. The question of T.7 and the Linienkommissionen has not been settled as yet, but I do not anticipate difficulty.</p> <p>2 and 3. General von Pawelsz has written in asking to keep 70,000 of the 210,000 covered trucks for the transport of personnel. This commission has replied authorising 35,000 fitted trucks and 5,000 mobile loading ramps and other separate stores.</p> <p>I think that a solution will be arrived at of this question.</p> <p>4. The question of amending the regulations is now being studied by the Germans.</p>	
(d) Arms and effectives	<p>1. The question of establishments is still under discussion between Generals Walch and von Pawelsz.</p> <p>General von Seeckt in-</p>

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
<p>(e) Services</p> <p>(f) Coast Artillery School, Wilhelmshaven</p> <p>V Recruiting and military training</p>	<p>The questions raised in this sub-section are still under discussion between the Effectives Sub-Commission and representatives of General von Pawelsz's Commission.</p> <p>I understand that instructions in conformity with the Allied demand regarding this school are in course of preparation and will be issued very shortly.</p> <p>(a) General von Pawelsz, in discussions with General Walch, admitted that infractions had been committed and promised that the Government would take steps in connection with the application of the law.</p> <p>(b) General von Pawelsz has admitted irregularities and promised to remedy them.</p> <p>Both the above questions will require further discussion.</p> <p>(c) General von Pawelsz admitted that the associations were in touch with the military authorities, including the Reichswehr-</p>	<p>sists on his right to train cavalry with the light machine gun and infantry with an infantry gun. I think it would be improper to give way on the important principle now raised.</p> <p>2. The question of the decree forbidding co-operation with aircraft remains to be dealt with.</p> <p>Texts of laws and orders, when received, will require careful study.</p> <p>I gather that considerable difficulty will be met with in enforcing the promulgation and putting into effect of the necessary laws and decrees with regard to associations.</p>

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
	ministerium, but added that the German Government was prepared to prohibit all military training of members of associations. General Walch insisted on the dissolution of the associations, but General von Pawelsz argued that dissolution is not demanded by the Allied note.	
VI Export and import of war material	I have not yet received the Geneva list of war material of which the import and export is prohibited. ¹² The Germans say it will be impossible for them to pass a list prepared by us through the Reichstag in addition to the Geneva list. I understand the latter differs from our list on important points.
VII Possession, etc., of war material	Colonel Senechal gives to this section a very wide interpretation. It should not, in my opinion, be stretched so as to include everything to do with manufacture or possession of all war material not specifically mentioned in the note.
VIII Forbidden zones	The Germans have sent us a copy of a law, passed in May this year, dealing with forbidden zones of fortresses in the occupied territories. They claim that

¹² As established in the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War of June 17, 1925, resulting from the Arms Traffic Conference (see No. 364, n. 1). For the text of the Convention, see *L./N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 1119-53. Germany was a member of the Conference.

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
IX War requisitions	.. I understand the Germans are sending us the instructions issued to the 'Länder' and reports from the latter as to what has been done. The Germans consider that this settles the question, but until their report has been studied, I cannot say.	the exceptions in this law were made at the request of the occupation authorities, but I understand that this is disputed by the fortification representatives on this commission, and that there may be other fortresses in unoccupied Germany concerning which these zones still require to be dealt with.
X Fortress of Königsberg	The Germans claim that all the artillery spare parts of the fortress have now been surrendered, and considerable quantities have been sent to Schwarz and Co. for destruction, but until this has been checked at Königsberg no definite decision can be given.	The Germans have been told that the 34 guns must be on fixed mountings. General von Pawelsz pressed the question, and was told that if he wanted a concession he must write in officially to this commission.
XI (A) Coast defences	.. The batteries at Norderney, Juist, Cuxhaven, Geestemünde and Swinemünde have been inspected.	The Germans have got to work on these without waiting for our approval, and have made some minor changes in their original proposals, which had been approved by the M[ilitary] I[nter-]A[llied] C[ommission of] C[ontrol]. In this way they have made certain additions, such as increasing the thickness of concrete and construction of command

Section No.	What has been Done	Probable Difficulties
XII	I understand, privately that the Germans will comply with these demands.	posts and ammunition recesses. The council has noted the infractions and told the Germans not to make any alterations in future until such have been first approved.

No. 651

Foreign Office to Air Ministry

[C 12188/117/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 15, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. S 24786/S. 8 of the 25th September,¹ enquiring whether the new rules² for differentiating between civil and military aircraft in the ex-enemy countries became automatically enforceable as soon as they were communicated to those states or whether a formal acceptance of them must be awaited, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to state that, with regard to Germany, he is advised that her only legal obligation under the treaty is that her armed forces 'must not include any military or naval air forces'. The question whether and how far civil aircraft conform to this definition is one of fact rather than of law, and, from a legal point of view, the negotiations for the acceptance of the nine rules should have been conducted as between two parties to a stipulation who are endeavouring to arrive at an understanding. Actually however the Allied notes, beginning with the note of January 29th, 1921,³ the acceptance of which by the German Government was enforced by the ultimatum of May 5th, 1921,⁴ have taken the form of peremptory demands and subsequent negotiations have been conducted in the same spirit.

2. It might have been open to the German Government to have challenged this attitude and insisted on the necessity of obtaining their consent, but the fact that they never did so would make it possible for the

¹ Not printed.

³ See Vol. XV, Nos. 11, Appendix 2 and 12, minute 1.

⁴ See *ibid.*, No. 85, Appendix 2.

² See No. 633, n. 4.

Allies to defend themselves against any complaint the German Government might now make by referring to the terms of their acceptance of previous notes.

3. It would appear, therefore, in the case of Germany, that the Allied Governments can regard the new rules as coming into force from the date of their communication to the German Government, and that there is no need to await German consent. If, however, a protest on the part of the German Government is subsequently received, it will be open to the Allies to reconsider the situation in the light of that protest.

4. In the case of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria the position is somewhat different. In these countries the Allies are no longer exercising aeronautical supervision, and, as the air clauses of the respective peace treaties have been executed, the Allies have no treaty or other right to re-impose control for the purpose of securing the observance of the new nine rules. The question whether these ex-enemy governments are or are not bound to observe the new rules as from the date of their communication is therefore of little practical importance.

5. In these circumstances, Mr. Chamberlain is of opinion that, so far as Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria are concerned, there can be no objection to the view that British aircraft-constructing companies can tender for aircraft, the specifications of which are in accordance with the revised rules.

I am, etc.,
HAROLD NICOLSON

No. 652

Foreign Office to Air Ministry

[C 12655/19/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 16, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to your letters Nos. S 17593.Pt.III (S.4)¹ and S 24853 (S.4)² of the 5th and the 7th October, relative to the future of aeronautical control in Germany, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to inform you that he is advised, for reasons which follow, that it will be for the Council of the League of Nations, when it assumes its responsibilities under article 213³ of the Treaty of Versailles, to define the difference between military aircraft, which are forbidden to Germany by the Treaty, and civil aircraft.

2. The legal position would seem to rest upon articles 1, 198 and 213 of the Treaty of Versailles. In view of the last named of these articles the

¹ Not printed.

² Not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

³ See No. 596.

League Council has already drawn up a scheme of organisation⁴ with a view to the exercise of its rights of investigation. The investigations are, under the scheme, to 'cover . . . any or all of the military, naval and air clauses of the said treaties'. The powers of the Council must include such right of interpretation as is necessary to ensure the efficient execution of its duties. For example, article 170 of the Treaty forbids the import into Germany and the export of 'arms, munitions and war material of every kind'. The Council of the League must ultimately be entitled to say what constitutes arms, munitions and war material of every kind. Similarly, in respect of article 198, which forbids Germany to possess any military or naval air forces, the Council must be entitled to lay down such regulations as are necessary to define a military aeroplane.

3. A further point of importance is that of the means which the League Council will be entitled to employ to supervise the observance of its regulations. The present system, under which the Allied Committee of Guarantee registers all pilots and factories, examines new designs of aircraft, and scrutinises imports and exports, entails a permanent resident control which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, cannot be claimed by the League of Nations under article 213. Unless the consent of the German Government is obtained to such a system of permanent resident control, the Council of the League will have to devise some means of supervising Germany's air policy by means of ad hoc investigations undertaken from time to time.

4. It should perhaps be added, with regard to the legal position of the Committee of Guarantee, that the question now under consideration is not precisely identical with that which was discussed in Foreign Office memorandum of the 23rd April 1924.⁵ That question was whether, if the military or other commissions of control were still properly in existence under the Treaty at a time when Germany became a member of the League, the effect of Germany becoming a member would involve their abolition. This is not now the position as regards the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee. The existence of that committee does not depend upon the Treaty for the time-limit air clauses have long since been executed and the Aeronautical Commission of Control, which was the only body provided for by the Peace Treaty, ceased to function some years ago.⁶ The Committee of Guarantee exists not in virtue of any provision in the Peace Treaty but in consequence of the agreement reached in 1922,⁷ and its future depends on paragraph (d) of that agreement, under which, when the Cologne zone is evacuated, the allied governments are to examine whether circumstances render the continuance of the committee

⁴ See No. 10, n. 2.

⁵ Not printed (C 4641/2616/18).

⁶ On May 5, 1922. See Vol. XX, Nos. 169 and 208, Enclosure 1.

⁷ The establishment of the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee was set out in the Allied note of April 14, 1922, and was accepted in the German note of May 1, 1922 (see *ibid.*, Nos. 208, Annexe A, 209 and 212).

necessary or permit of its withdrawal. From the purely legal point of view, therefore, the decision rests with the allies, though such decision must necessarily be taken on political grounds.

5. Finally, the Secretary of State agrees with the procedure proposed in your letters under reply, but would suggest that every effort be made to bring the matter before the Permanent Advisory Commission to the League of Nations in sufficient time to enable that Commission to report to the Council of the League before the next Council meeting.⁸ He agrees, moreover, that reconsideration of the existing rules should be left to the League and that it is unnecessary to approach the French and other allied governments before bringing the matter before the Permanent Advisory Commission.

I am, etc.,
HAROLD NICOLSON

⁸ The next ordinary session of the Council (the Thirty-Seventh) met December 7-16, 1925.

APPENDIX

Proceedings of the Conference of Locarno and Records of Conversations connected therewith October 5–16, 1925

No. 1

LOC/69/CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the First Meeting between the British, Belgian, French, German, and Italian Delegations, held at Locarno on October 5, 1925, at 11 a.m.*

[F.O. 840/1(5)]

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett.

Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen,¹ M. de Ruelle,² Count du Chastel.³

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.⁴

Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner,⁵ Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.

Italy: M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici,⁶ M. Buti.⁷

The proceedings were opened by M. Rusca, Mayor of Locarno, who welcomed the delegates. Mr. Chamberlain replied in suitable terms.

The Mayor of Locarno then withdrew.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN then made the following declaration:—

‘En réponse au désir unanime que vous avez bien voulu exprimer, j’ai pris la

¹ Head of the Northern Department of the Belgian Foreign Ministry.

² Assistant Director General of Political and Commercial Affairs at the Belgian Foreign Ministry.

³ A Secretary of Legation. ⁴ Head of the Press Section at the French Embassy in Berlin.

⁵ State Secretary at the Chancellery.

⁶ A Minister Plenipotentiary.

⁷ A member of the Italian Diplomatic Service.

responsabilité de convoquer notre première réunion, puisqu'il fallait que quelqu'un d'entre nous en prit l'initiative. Mais ce que je souhaite, c'est que ces conversations conservent un caractère aussi libre et aussi peu formaliste que possible: lorsque nous aurons déterminé les grandes lignes de notre procédure et arrêté nos dispositions pour la convocation des réunions, je me permets de suggérer que nous renoncions à la formalité d'une présidence et que nous nous rencontrions sur un pied de parfaite égalité, chacun contribuant de son mieux au succès de notre œuvre commune, qui tend à la paix et à la prospérité de l'Europe.'

The other delegates signified their agreement, DR. LUTHER adding that he trusted that the conference would succeed in bringing real peace to Europe.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN then proposed that the following telegram be sent to the Swiss Government:

'Au moment d'inaugurer leurs travaux, les ministres réunis à Locarno représentant les gouvernements d'Allemagne, de Belgique, de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie tiennent à adresser au Président de la Confédération Helvétique⁸ et aux membres du Conseil Fédéral leurs plus sincères remerciements pour l'hospitalité que le territoire de la Confédération offre si libéralement, une fois de plus, à une œuvre de pacification et de concorde internationale.'

This telegram was agreed to and despatched.

M. BRIAND then referred to Mr. Chamberlain's opening statement and agreed that the less formality there was the sooner would the desired object be reached. He hoped that everyone would speak with complete frankness. Some procedure, however simple, would nevertheless have to be agreed upon if indiscretions were to be avoided. He was of opinion that there should be no official *procès-verbal*. He suggested that each delegation should have a Secretary present who would take notes and that the Secretaries should afterwards compare notes. There should also be a communiqué to the press giving the decisions reached.

This procedure was agreed to.

No other question of procedure being raised, MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that the report of the jurists' meeting in London (September 1st-4th, 1925)⁹ [(Annex)]¹⁰ should be taken as a basis for the discussions.

This was agreed to.

DR. STRESEMANN expressed his satisfaction that a German jurist had participated in the jurists' meeting, and had become acquainted with the draft pact prepared by the French, British and Belgian jurists. At that meeting certain questions of political significance had been excluded or reserved, as, for example, the Preamble and the question of the eastern arbitration treaties. Nevertheless, on other points, a measure of agreement had been reached and there was, therefore, a basis for the discussion. The German delegation did not desire a general discussion, but proposed that the draft prepared by the jurists should be taken article by article.

The other delegations signified their concurrence in this procedure.

Preamble

DR. STRESEMANN said that at the meeting of the jurists, discussion of the Preamble had been postponed. He therefore suggested that the Preamble should

⁸ Dr. J. Musy.

¹⁰ Not printed.

⁹ See Nos. 464, 466, and 467.

be reconsidered by the conference after a prior discussion between the jurists.

This was agreed to.

Article 1

DR. STRESEMANN proposed that in article 1, for the phrase 'ainsi que le statut des régions rhénanes tel qu'il est fixé par les articles 42, 43 et 180, alinéas 1 et 3, dudit traité,' the following should be substituted: 'ainsi que les dispositions des articles 42, 43 et 180, alinéas 1 et 3, dudit traité concernant la zone démilitarisée'.

His reasons for this modification were:—

(1) He did not wish to refer to the 'status of the Rhineland,' since the pact under negotiation might last longer than the status as at present fixed.

(2) Those who drafted treaties were often reproached with alluding to articles with which the general public was imperfectly acquainted. It was therefore necessary to add some phrase to explain the substance of the articles.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN and M. BRIAND requested the German delegation to submit in writing the text of the proposed amendment.

It was agreed to remit the matter to the jurists.

M. VANDERVELDE proposed that, for the phrase: 'l'inviolabilité des frontières entre la France et la Belgique, d'une part, et l'Allemagne, d'autre part,' the following should be substituted: 'l'inviolabilité des frontières entre la France et l'Allemagne et entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne'. This alteration was put forward out of regard for Belgian public opinion, since the relations between France and Belgium were so intimate that there was perhaps a tendency among foreign powers to refer to the two countries as though they formed a single legal unit.

It was decided that M. Vandervelde's amendment should be examined by the jurists.

Article 2

DR. STRESEMANN said he had no observations to make.

M. VANDERVELDE intimated in reply to a question by MR. CHAMBERLAIN that he desired a modification similar to that which he had proposed in the case of article 1.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that special attention would have to be devoted to the drafting of the formula so that it might not appear to include a liability undertaken by France towards Belgium.

M. VANDERVELDE agreed to submit a text which could be examined by the jurists.

Article 3

No observations.

Article 4

DR. STRESEMANN submitted the following amendments in the third paragraph.

Existing Text

'En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent Traité ou des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles, par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, chacune des autres Parties Contractantes qui reconnaît qu'une telle violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression

German Amendment

'En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent Traité ou des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, chacune des autres Parties Contractantes prêterait immédiatement son assistance à celle d'entre elles contre laquelle l'acte

et qu'en raison de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire, prêterait immédiatement son assistance à celle d'entre elles contre laquelle l'acte incriminé est dirigé . . .'

incriminé est dirigé, pourvu qu'il s'agisse d'un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées, soit allemandes, soit françaises ou belges dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate soit nécessaire. Le Conseil . . .,' etc.

DR. STRESEMANN drew attention to the insertion of the words 'soit allemandes, soit françaises ou belges' after the phrase 'rassemblement de forces armées'. This was with the object of bringing the article into conformity with the mutual character of the treaty. He also explained that it was self-evident that each state which concluded an alliance must itself decide when to fulfil the obligations accruing out of that alliance.

M. BRIAND said that he did not wish to pronounce an opinion without seeing the text. While he appreciated the need of making the treaty reciprocal, the question of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone was a question of the application of the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles must not be impaired under a pretext of granting equality. While, therefore, he was willing to consider the proposed modification, it would require the most careful examination, and he proposed that it should be referred in the first instance to the jurists. He got the impression that the proposed modification substituted the idea of neutralisation for that of the demilitarisation imposed on Germany. The article could be re-examined in detail when the jurists had considered it.

DR. STRESEMANN assured M. Briand that the German delegation were not attempting to obtain a modification of the Treaty of Versailles under cover of a drafting alteration.

It was agreed to leave detailed discussion of the article until the jurists had examined the German modifications.

Article 5

No observations.

Article 6

DR. STRESEMANN said that the second part of the article concerning the suggested arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia, was unacceptable to the German government. He did not know whether it was desired to go into this point straight away or to reserve discussion until later.

M. BRIAND said that as the discussion would probably be prolonged he was willing to postpone it.

DR. STRESEMANN said that for his part he would prefer to go through the whole treaty, article by article, in the present meeting, reserving discussion of details.

M. VANDERVELDE said that he regarded the proceedings of the present meeting purely in the light of a preliminary survey.

Article 7

DR. STRESEMANN said that the German delegation desired to raise various questions of a legal nature on this article. He therefore asked that the article be referred straight away to the jurists. Dr. Gaus had informed him that with regard

to the meaning and the scope of the article, he entertained doubts which could most easily be elucidated in conversation with his colleagues.

The proposal was agreed to.

Article 8

DR. STRESEMAN observed that, according to the article as at present drafted, the treaty was to remain in force until the Council of the League of Nations took a certain decision at the instance of at least *two* of the contracting parties. He proposed that it should be sufficient for *one* of the parties to take action. He explained that the negotiations had been on the footing of the allies on the one side and Germany on the other. If this grouping were to continue it would, in the eyes of German public opinion, be easy for an allied power to find another power willing to act with it, while the German government, on the other hand, could not so easily find another power. Therefore, the provision that action by *two* Powers should be necessary constituted a slight inequality. Dr. Stresemann explained that the raising of the point was not to be interpreted as an indication that Germany had any thought of denouncing the treaty. On the contrary, Germany wished the treaty to remain in force as long as possible; but the point was one which had been raised in the German Cabinet.

M. BRIAND said he understood Herr Stresemann's anxiety, but believed that the nature of the contemplated pact should be sufficient to reassure the German Minister. The article in question did not in fact contemplate a denunciation of the treaty. If the edifice which they were trying to build was so fragile that one, two or even three of the contracting parties could pull it down, public opinion would feel little assurance; the case, however, was entirely different. The question at issue was to arrange a procedure allowing the Council of the League of Nations to take a decision as a result of which the pact, far from disappearing, would be merged in a wide arrangement assuring the general security of Europe without any need of particular agreements. M. Briand himself would have been disposed even to substitute *three* powers for the proposed *two*. In view, however, of the German government's observations, he hesitated to do so, but he was unwilling to have a lesser number than that specified in the article.

M. VANDERVELDE said that the treaty must be as durable as possible. He was personally in favour of providing that three powers should approach the League, but he was prepared to accept the German proposal if a further guarantee were introduced by requiring not a simple majority, but a two-thirds' majority, when the Council of the League voted on the question whether the League ensured sufficient protection. In addition, M. Vandervelde thought it necessary to arrange that there should be an interval of perhaps a year between the decision of the Council of the League and the lapse of the treaty, unless the signatories unanimously decided otherwise. It was important that the lapse of the treaty should not find the Powers unprepared.

DR. LUTHER asked permission to explain the attitude of the German Government on this point once more, as he thought that Herr Stresemann's real meaning had not, perhaps, been quite accurately represented in the translation of his speech. He emphasised that the question was not one of principle. The German delegation wished the pact to be as durable as possible. They understood perfectly well that the decision on which the lapse of the treaty would depend lay with the Council. They were not attempting to change this so as to make the lapse of the treaty dependent on the action of a single power. But the fact remained that

the allies represented a single group and Germany another group. The Germans thought, therefore, that article 8 as it stood did not give them the same facility as it gave to the allies to bring the matter before the Council. He repeated that it was a question not of principle, but of procedure, but from the German point of view it represented a real difficulty which he hoped would be sympathetically considered.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN assured Dr. Luther that the object of the Allies was to obtain perfect equality between themselves and Germany.

M. BRIAND observed that if public opinion existed on one side only the task would be easy, but there were several public opinions, each of which must be taken into account to arrive at a balance. He considered that in making the proposal of February 9th, the German Government had acted courageously. He himself had long reflected on the consequences resulting from that act by Germany. If there had been in his mind that least tendency to continue the present grouping of powers or to keep Germany a kind of prisoner in a network of pacts directed against herself, he would not be present at the conference. He wished to assure Dr. Luther that he had come to Locarno without *arrière-pensée*, and with a real desire to settle this question of security so that it would not arise again. His only desire was that the work of the conference should be durable. He and Dr. Luther had both their particular anxieties, but these could be reconciled.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA suggested that the difficulty might be overcome by omitting the words in article 8 'sur la demande de deux au moins des Hautes Parties contractantes'.

M. BRIAND proposed that the whole question should be referred to the jurists.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN observed that if the division of the parties to the pact into two groups were to continue after its signature, the pact would have achieved nothing. He desired strongly to support what M. Briand had said on this subject. He was also prepared to accept M. Vandervelde's proposal for perhaps a year's interval between the decision of the Council of the League and the lapse of the pact.

DR. LUTHER, having stated that the declarations of Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand were of vast importance and would greatly facilitate the labours of the conference, it was agreed to refer article 8 to the jurists.

Article 9

No observations.

Article 10

No observations.

Article 11

DR. STRESEMANN proposed that this article be referred to the jurists for reconsideration of the drafting of it. He thought there was no longer time at the present meeting to discuss the relation between the conclusion of the pact and Germany's entry into the League.

This was agreed to.

It was agreed to issue a communiqué to the press containing:

1. Mr. Chamberlain's reply to the speech by the Mayor of Locarno;
2. Mr. Chamberlain's remarks on the subject of the presidency; and
3. The following remarks:—

'Before commencing its labours it was decided, upon the proposal of Mr. Chamberlain, to address a telegram of thanks to the Federal Government for

the hospitality and the kind welcome which the conference had met in Switzerland.

'Each of the delegations then affirmed the spirit of sincerity in which it entered upon the common work of the conference.

'It was decided by mutual agreement to waive any discussion of a general nature in order to commence immediately the discussion of the articles of the draft pact which were drawn up in London by the legal advisers.

'Agreement was at once reached in regard to a certain number of articles of this draft which did not give rise to any objection. Other articles gave rise to draft amendments reserved for fuller examination by the legal advisers, and some others were reserved for later examination by the conference.'

It was arranged that the jurists should meet during the afternoon to consider all the points referred to them and that the next meeting of the conference should be held at 10.30 a.m. on October 6th.

No. 2

LOC/39/B.D.] Notes¹ of the Meeting of the Lawyers on October 5, 1925, at 3 p.m.

[F.O. 840/1(2)]

Preamble

Query: Substitute 'fléau' for 'choc'?

Third paragraph: M. Gaus urged addition of words: 'en répudiant toute idée de guerre'. He will probably withdraw the suggestion.

Fourth paragraph: M. Gaus urged the suppression of the words at the end: 'et des traités en vigueur entre elles'. M. Fromageot objected.

Article 1

New text agreed [(annexed)].

Article 2

New text agreed [(annexed)].

Article 4 (3)

German amendment as distributed [(annexed)]. Long discussion ending with urgent request by M. Fromageot to M. Gaus to accept existing text.

Eighth line of text to read: 'et qu'en raison soit du franchissement de la frontière, soit de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement', etc.

Article 8

New text agreed [(annexed)].

Article 9

To read: 'Les conventions particulières sur les modalités des méthodes de règlement pacifique visées à l'article 3.'

¹ Copies of the notes were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 5 of October 6, not printed, received October 8.

[ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties severally and collectively guarantee, in the manner provided in the following articles, the maintenance and inviolability of the frontiers between France and Germany and between Belgium and Germany, as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, and also the observance of the provisions of articles 42, 43 and 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the said treaty, concerning the demilitarised zone.]

[ARTICLE 2

France and Germany, and Belgium and Germany mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of resistance to action in violation of the above undertaking or in the case of action undertaken in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations, or in case of a flagrant breach of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone, immediate action is necessary.]

[ARTICLE 4 (3)

(German Amendment.)

In case of a flagrant violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of article 2 of the present treaty or of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles, each of the other Contracting Parties will come at once to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed, provided that such violation constitutes an unprovoked act of

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes garantissent individuellement et collectivement, ainsi qu'il est stipulé dans les articles ci-après, le maintien et l'inviolabilité des frontières entre la France et l'Allemagne et entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne, telles qu'elles sont fixées par ou en exécution du Traité de Paix, signé à Versailles, le 28 juin 1919, ainsi que l'observation des dispositions des articles 42, 43 et 180, alinéas 1 et 3, dudit traité, concernant la zone démilitarisée.

ARTICLE 2

La France et l'Allemagne et de même la Belgique et l'Allemagne s'engagent réciproquement à ne se livrer de part et d'autre à aucune attaque ou invasion et à ne recourir de part et d'autre en aucun cas à la guerre.

Toutefois cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit de s'opposer à une violation de l'engagement ci-dessus, ou d'agir avec l'agrément du Conseil ou de l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, ou encore en cas de contravention flagrante des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles, lorsqu'une telle contravention constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire.

ARTICLE 4 (3)

(German Amendment)

En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent traité ou des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, chacune des autres Parties Contractantes prêterait immédiatement son assistance à celle d'entre elles contre laquelle l'acte incriminé est dirigé, pourvu qu'il s'agisse d'un acte non provoqué d'agression et

aggression and that by reason of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces, whether German, French or Belgian, in the demilitarised zone, immediate action is necessary. The Council, etc.]

[ARTICLE 8

The present treaty shall be deposited with the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting at the request of one or other of the High Contracting Parties, and voting, if need be, by a two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties; the treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision.]

qu'en raison de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées, soit allemandes, soit françaises ou belges, dans la zone démilitarisée, une action immédiate soit nécessaire. Le Conseil, etc.

ARTICLE 8

Le présent traité sera déposé à la Société des Nations conformément au Pacte. Il restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce que sur la demande de l'une ou de l'autre des Hautes Parties Contractantes, le Conseil, votant, s'il y a lieu, à la majorité des deux tiers, reconnaisse que la Société des Nations assure aux Hautes Parties Contractantes des garanties suffisantes, et le traité cessera alors ses effets à l'expiration d'un délai d'une année.

No. 3

LOC/41/B.D.] *Notes of a conversation between Members of the British Delegation in Mr. Chamberlain's Room at the Grand Hotel, Locarno, on October 5, 1925, at 10.30 p.m.*

[F.O. 840/1(2)]

PRESENT: Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett.

Sir Cecil Hurst reported that at the meeting of the Jurists in the afternoon,¹ the main difficulty had arisen over the German proposal for the modification of article 4 (3) (see Annex A). The point of difficulty was not that which related to the demilitarised zone (concerning which M. Briand had made a reservation during the meeting of the conference that morning).² On that point the Germans had given way and had withdrawn their proposed addition of the words 'soit allemandes soit françaises ou belges,' after the phrase 'rassemblement de forces armées'. The difficulty related to the operation of the guarantee. The position taken up by Dr. Gaus was as follows. According to article 4 (3) the guaranteeing power was to come to the help of the wronged party immediately, only if it recognised that certain circumstances existed. German public opinion would at once say that this was no guarantee at all; for, if the power attacked were France, then Great Britain would at once come to her aid, while if the power attacked were Germany the article would enable Great Britain to find all sorts of excuses for not acting. The object of the German amendment was to obviate this criticism by imposing a more definite obligation on the guarantor and restricting his liberty of judgment.

¹ See No. 2.

² See No. 1.

The German amendment was of course not unwelcome to the French delegation, as it was on the lines of what the French had originally pressed for before the Hurst-Fromageot conversations in July.³

Sir C. Hurst had taken the line that it was extremely unlikely that Mr. Chamberlain would accept the German amendment since public opinion in England had also to be considered, and was not disposed to agree to any automatic obligation prior to the decision of the Council of the League.

Mr. Chamberlain asked whether there was really any material difference between the original text of article 4 (3) and the German amendment, since it was clear that in any case the guaranteeing power would not in practice act unless it were convinced that the circumstances contemplated had actually arisen.

Sir C. Hurst thought that there was to some extent a material difference, in that if in any given case Great Britain did not act, she would be more open to complaints of bad faith under the German amendment than under the original text.

It was agreed that from the point of view of British public opinion it would be preferable to retain the original wording, though Mr. Chamberlain said he was prepared to ask the Cabinet to accept the German amendment if it proved necessary. If the point were raised in conference on the following day, he would simply reserve it. In the meantime he instructed Sir C. Hurst in his next meeting with the jurists to press for the retention of the original wording on the ground that he had consulted Mr. Chamberlain and found him absolutely opposed to the German amendment.

Article 5

Article 5 (Annex B) was also considered as its precise effect was thought to be obscure. The sections numbered (1) and (2) are intended to describe the operation of the guarantee of the arbitration treaties referred to in article 3. It may be inferred from section (1):

A. That where there has been a failure by one party to carry out an arbitration treaty, the guarantor is bound to compel the other party (i.e., the non-recalcitrant party) to bring the matter before the League even though that power is prepared to let the matter drop. This might lead to a somewhat ridiculous situation. Or

B. That the guarantor is bound to carry out the measures which the Council of the League prescribes.

Section (1) does not, however, in terms impose any obligation on the guarantor, and it was felt therefore that the position ought to be clarified.

Section (2), on the other hand, does not impose any obligation on the guaranteeing power beyond the obligations already undertaken by that power in article 4.

Sir C. Hurst admitted that the preamble and section (2) of article 5 were really superfluous, but he thought it would be very difficult to delete them from the treaty on account of the prominence which had been given, since the negotiations started, to the idea of the guarantee of an arbitration treaty.

Mr. Lampson pointed out that section (1) was really out of place in article 5. It was true that article 5 reproduced almost textually two paragraphs of the French note to Germany of June 16⁴ (paragraphs 3 and 4 of section IV of the French note (Annex C)), but in point of fact the order of these two paragraphs had been inverted in the process of their insertion in the treaty. Paragraph 4 of section IV

³ See Nos. 412 and 423.

⁴ See No. 382, n. 2.

of the French note (which had become section (1) of article 5) had really nothing to do with the obligations of the guaranteeing power.

It was decided that the best solution would be to transfer section (1) of article 5 to article 3, leaving the preamble and section (2) as a single article whose logical place was perhaps between articles 3 and 4. Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir C. Hurst to raise the point with his colleagues, with discretion to accept such solution as seemed best to him.

ANNEX A

Existing text

'En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent Traité ou des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, chacune des autres Parties Contractantes qui reconnaît qu'une telle violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire, prêterait immédiatement son assistance à celle d'entre elles contre laquelle l'acte incriminé est dirigé. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, saisi de la question conformément au premier paragraphe du présent article, fera néanmoins connaître le résultat de ses constatations. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent en pareil cas à agir en conformité avec les recommandations du Conseil qui auraient recueilli l'unanimité des voix à l'exclusion des voix des représentants des Parties engagées dans les hostilités.'

German Amendment

'En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent traité ou des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, chacune des autres Parties Contractantes prêterait immédiatement son assistance à celle d'entre elles contre laquelle l'acte incriminé est dirigé, pourvu qu'il s'agisse d'un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées, soit allemandes soit françaises ou belges, dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate soit nécessaire. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, saisi de la question conformément au premier paragraphe du présent article, fera néanmoins connaître le résultat des ses constatations. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent en pareil cas à agir en conformité avec les recommandations du Conseil qui auraient recueilli l'unanimité des voix à l'exclusion des voix des représentants des Parties engagées dans les hostilités.'

ANNEX B

Article 5 *English Text*

The provisions of article 3 above are placed under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided by the following stipulations:—

- (1) Where one of the Powers referred to in article 3, without committing a breach of article 4, paragraph 1, refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral decision, the other party shall bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken.
- (2) If one of the Powers referred to in article 3 refuses to submit a dispute to

peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral decision, and commits a breach of article 4, paragraph 1, the provisions of the said article 4 shall apply.

ANNEX C

Extract from French note to Germany June 16, 1925

The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States parties to the Rhineland Pact arbitration treaties guaranteeing 'a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts'.

France considers that an arbitration treaty of the kind which Germany proposes would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that, as between France and Germany, such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes, and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties, or of the Rhineland Pact or in virtue of the guarantee given to an arbitration treaty by the parties or by any one of them. An arbitration treaty of the same kind between Belgium and Germany would be no less necessary.

To give full effect to these two treaties, their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties, refusing to submit a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures.

Where one of the contracting parties, without resorting to hostile measures, fails to observe its undertakings, the Council of the League of Nations shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty.

No. 4

LOC/46/CON.] Note¹ of the Meeting of the Lawyers, on Tuesday, October 6, 1925, at 10.30 a.m.

[F.O. 8401(3)]

Preamble

Paragraph 2, text to read as follows: 'Soucieux de satisfaire au désir de sécurité et de protection qui anime les nations sur lesquelles s'est abattu le fléau de la guerre de 1914-1918';

Paragraph 3 to read: 'Constatant l'abrogation des traités de neutralisation de la Belgique, et conscients de nécessité d'assurer la paix dans la zone,' etc.

Article 1

Amended as per new text annexed.

Article 2

Question for consideration (consequent upon discussion of article 7): Whether 'agrément du Conseil' is a correct phrase. The difficulty pointed out is as follows:

Suppose after the conclusion of this Pact a war between France and Spain, France having attacked Spain in breach of the Covenant. Under article 16 of the

¹ A copy of this note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Locarno despatch No. 7 of October 6, not printed, received October 8.

Covenant all Members of the League thereupon become entitled to regard themselves as at war with France and to take military measures if they so wish. Does article 2 of the draft Pact override Germany's right under article 16 of the Covenant to take such measures, or does article 7 of the proposed Pact result in article 16 overriding article 2, or is the right of a Member of the League to apply sanctions under article 16 of the Covenant to be regarded as an act of war taken 'avec l'agrément du Conseil'? If so, what is the position if the Council cannot arrive at unanimity in any decision it takes under article 16? 'Agrément' implies a decision.

Article 4

Verbal modifications in paragraphs 1 and 2.

Paragraph 3: New formula agreed on to meet German proposal for suppression of 'qui reconnaît'. (Copy of new text of article 4 annexed.)

Article 5

Discussion as to precise nature of guarantee implied by former paragraph 1. Agreement to recommend addition of phrase obliging the parties to carry out the Council's recommendations where there is no resort to war. Order of paragraphs reversed. (Copy of new text annexed.)

Article 7

See note on article 2.

ANNEX

ARTICLE 1

Les Hautes Parties contractantes garantissent individuellement et collectivement, ainsi qu'il est stipulé dans les articles ci-après, l'inviolabilité des frontières entre la France et l'Allemagne et entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne, telles qu'elles sont fixées par ou en exécution du Traité de Paix signé à Versailles le 28 juin 1919, et le maintien du *statu quo* territorial de ces régions, ainsi que l'observation des dispositions des articles 42, 43 et 180, alinéas 1 et 3, dudit Traité, concernant la zone démilitarisée.

ARTICLE 4

1. Si l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes estime qu'une violation de l'article 2 du présent traité ou une contravention aux articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles a été ou est commise, elle portera immédiatement la question devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

2. Dès que le Conseil de la Société des Nations aura constaté qu'une telle violation ou contravention a été commise, il en donnera sans délai avis aux Puissances signataires du présent traité et chacune d'elles s'engage à prêter, en pareil cas, immédiatement son assistance à la Puissance contre laquelle l'acte incriminé aura été dirigé.

3. En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent traité ou de contravention flagrante aux articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes, chacune des autres Puissances contractantes s'engage dès à présent à prêter immédiatement son assistance à la partie contre laquelle une telle violation aura été dirigée dès que ladite Puissance aura pu se rendre compte² du fait que violation constitue un acte

² Note on the document: 'Has been able to satisfy itself.'

non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison soit du franchissement de la frontière soit de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations saisi de la question conformément au premier paragraphe du présent article, fera néanmoins connaître le résultat de ses constatations. Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent en pareil cas à agir en conformité avec les recommandations du Conseil qui auraient recueilli l'unanimité des voix à l'exclusion des voix des représentants des parties engagées dans les hostilités.

ARTICLE 5

La stipulation de l'article 3 ci-dessus est placée sous la garantie des Hautes Parties contractantes ainsi qu'il est prévue ci-après:

Si l'une des Puissances mentionnées à l'article 3 refuse de se conformer aux méthodes de règlement pacifique ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale et commet une violation de l'article 2 du présent traité ou une contravention aux articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles, les dispositions de l'article 4 s'appliqueront.

Dans le cas où, sans commettre une violation de l'article 2 du présent traité ou une contravention aux articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles, une des Puissances mentionnées à l'article 3 refuserait de se conformer aux méthodes de règlement pacifique ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale, l'autre partie saisira le Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui proposera les mesures à prendre; les Hautes Parties contractantes se conformeront à ces propositions.

No. 5

LOC/114/CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the Second Meeting between the British, Belgian, French, German, and Italian Delegations, held at Locarno on October 6, 1925, at 4.30 p.m.*

[F.O. 840/1(7)]

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett.

Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen, M. de Ruelle, Count du Chastel.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.

Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner, Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.

Italy: M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici, M. Buti.

M. VANDERVELDE said he desired to draw attention to an article which had appeared that morning in 'Il Popolo d'Italia' purporting to give an account of what had passed at yesterday's meeting.¹ In particular, an account was given of the amendment which he had proposed in article 2, and it was stated that there was a divergence between France and Belgium. The end of the Franco-Belgian alliance was even spoken of. This was untrue and absurd. He protested against the

¹ See No. 1.

interpretation given to his words. The amendment in question was one of pure form and was inserted after M. Briand's formal agreement had been given. Between France and Belgium there existed a defensive alliance.² The pact under negotiation, being a complement to that alliance, could not do otherwise than strengthen it. What was most disturbing, however, was the breach of the undertaking not to give accounts to the press of the proceedings of the meetings of the conference. He thought it necessary to draw attention to the article since, if further reports appeared, there would be no more liberty of discussion.

M. SCIALOJA had not read the article. He much regretted its appearance in an Italian newspaper and would try to find out how it came to be published.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that it was essential that the undertaking not to communicate accounts of the proceedings should be loyally observed. In the course of the discussions words might be used without their full significance being weighed, particularly as certain delegates were using a foreign language. There must be liberty of discussion and any indiscretion might seriously handicap the work in hand. The report referred to by M. Vandervelde was regrettable and an effort must be made to prevent its recurrence.

Mr. Chamberlain then asked what would be the best procedure. Was it the wish of the meeting that article 6 should be discussed?

M. BRIAND thought that there was no object in deferring the discussion of difficult points. Article 6 afforded excellent ground for a beginning.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked Dr. Stresemann to give his views on article 6.

DR. STRESEMANN said that the object of the German memorandum of February 9th³ had been the conclusion of a treaty of security on the west and the German Government had declared themselves ready to conclude both a western treaty and supplementary arbitration treaties with all the Powers concerned. The ensuing correspondence, by bringing in the question of Poland and Czechoslovakia, resulted in a large extension of this programme. The German idea was accepted in principle, but at the same time the point was raised of a special guarantee of the eastern arbitration treaties. As this idea had first been raised from the Allied side he thought it most fitting that M. Briand should develop it more fully than the correspondence had [d]one. There were two points: (1) how the arbitration treaties were to be concluded, and (2) whether it was possible for one State which was allied to another to guarantee a treaty to which the second State was a party.

M. BRIAND saw no difficulty in giving explanations. They must all know how far each of them could go. After the communication of the German memorandum of February 9th³ conversations had taken place at the Quai d'Orsay with the German Ambassador in order to elucidate certain obscure points, in particular those of the arbitration treaties to be concluded with Germany's eastern neighbours. After his interviews with the Director of Political Affairs, Herr von Hoesch could not be ignorant of France's position. In 1920 and 1921 France felt bound by articles 15 and 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to conclude special agreements in the spirit of the above articles with several States.⁴ These agreements had been registered with the League of Nations and they were binding on France. It could not be imagined that, her anxieties allayed as regards her own frontiers, France could forget or diminish the importance of the obligations contracted towards her

² A military agreement had been signed on September 7, 1920, and confirmed by an exchange of letters of September 10 and 15 between the Belgian and French Prime Ministers, M. L. Delacroix and M. A. Millerand. See *D.D.B.*, vol. I, Nos. 175, 182, and 184.

³ See No. 197, n. 1.

⁴ See No. 187.

Allies. Her word and her signature had been given. The French Government expressed themselves very clearly on that score six months ago. Consequently, if the difficulty raised by the question of guarantee was one of form and if it were a question of doing the same thing in another way in order to satisfy German public opinion, agreement should be possible. If, however, the objection were fundamental and if France were asked to abandon the idea of giving a guarantee, he wished to say frankly that it would be impossible to conclude the pact. What was the difficulty? There should be none if the question were approached in the spirit of the Covenant of the League. It was not intended to give to the guarantee the character of an alliance after the old type, aimed against this or that Power. It was rather the idea of mutual protection that prevailed throughout the pact now being negotiated. The German representatives had repeatedly said that in no case did their country contemplate resorting to force to obtain the modification of this or that frontier. Should difficulties arise, they would be settled by peaceful means or by arbitration. There were to be treaties of arbitration between France and Germany concerning the western frontier. There must exist also treaties of arbitration between Germany on the one side and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other. If it were agreed that these treaties ruled out resort to force in all cases, M. Briand could not see why the German Government should be perturbed at the obligations thus assumed being specially guaranteed by an agreement in the spirit of the Covenant between one nation and another. Of course public opinion must be taken into consideration, and a statesman could not always go straight to the goal at which he aimed. He was, however, willing to do everything possible to facilitate the task of the German Government, but he must request them not to forget that he also had a public opinion to consider. In addition, every effort had already been made to give to the French guarantee the form most acceptable to the German Government. Germany must enter the League of Nations, for it was only within the framework of the League that the two nations could become on friendly terms. The spirit of the League Covenant dominated article 6 to such an extent that, even if the guarantee were not inserted in that article, M. Briand would almost be entitled to say that it was there all the same. If the impossible happened and there occurred the eventuality for which this guarantee was provided, nobody would be surprised that the moral obligation contained in article 16 of the Covenant should be interpreted by certain Powers as involving for them the obligation to act with armed force.

Finally, M. Briand begged the German delegation to observe what a considerable change had taken place since 1919 in the way of looking at the Rhineland guarantee. The 1919 treaties provided for a unilateral guarantee. Now there was envisaged a sort of mutual association, in which the guarantee came into play against whatever State failed to discharge its obligations. The German representatives must understand how determinedly the French Government had to work to get French public opinion to accept a change in the situation and adopt the views of certain parties. He must ask that similar steps be taken on the German side, for there was no reason why the principles applied to one frontier should not be applied to the other. He repeated that there was nothing in the text arranged which was inconsistent with the spirit of the League Covenant.

DR. STRESEMANN said he would explain his views in detail regarding the relation between the Security Pact and the arbitration treaties with Germany's eastern neighbours, in order to show how German public opinion had undergone development. There had been two offers of a pact: the first had been made by Dr.

Cuno⁵ and the second by himself. The French Ambassador in Berlin had made it clear in conversation that France could only conclude a pact of security if the relationship of Poland to France were taken into consideration. The reason for the refusal of the German offer was the absence of any proposal for the security of France's eastern allies. The German Government adopted the idea of arbitration treaties in their second proposal, in spite of very keen opposition in Germany, because they knew that France would revert to the question of Poland and Czechoslovakia. France had, however, gone a step further, and had demanded that Germany should guarantee peace on the east and enter the League of Nations. This latter demand had occasioned hard conflicts in Germany, but nevertheless Germany signified her agreement in order not to imperil the Security Pact, because the proposal contained in the memorandum was not merely tactics, but had sprung from the sincere desire to secure peace. If Germany waived her objections to entering the League the Allies would have two guarantees in addition to the Security Pact: (1) arbitration treaties and (2) Germany's entry into the League. If, as M. Briand said, the proposed guarantee was not likely to be called into operation, he would like to be clear on two points: (1) how would the guarantee be effective within article 16 of the Covenant, and (2) if France's guarantee fell under the provisions of the League Covenant, and if it were clear that the constitution of the League should always prevail, why then was a guarantee necessary, particularly when, as M. Briand emphasised, the treaty with Poland was directed against an eventuality which he himself did not think could be translated into fact? Matters were otherwise in the west. The question in the west was long-standing. This was not the case in the east. It seemed to show a distrust of the prestige and power of the League of Nations to set up a supplementary special guarantee for the arbitration treaties. Dr. Stresemann repeated that out of regard to the security requirements of the eastern States the German Government had offered treaties, treaties of arbitration, and had declared their willingness to enter the League of Nations. Up to the last efforts had been made to wreck the conference by means of agitation against the League of Nations. The German Government desired the pact. They had made a great effort, but more than what was necessary should not be required of them.

M. BRIAND observed that Dr. Stresemann had asked why France thought it necessary to give a guarantee in view of an eventuality which might not occur. The same question might be raised concerning the guarantee to be given to the Rhine frontier. Regarding the relation between article 16 and the contemplated guarantee, M. Briand was quite willing to give explanations. If the system of sanctions contemplated in article 16 were fully organised, and if there existed a general system of security, Herr Stresemann's question would be more difficult to answer. The present organisation of the Covenant, however, did not give all necessary guarantees. The terms of article 16 of the Covenant were not as clear-cut as those of the pact. The security which it was desired to attain was not fully safeguarded by article 16, and it was therefore natural and logical that a special guarantee should be given to ensure the execution of the contracts to be concluded. Moreover, France had signed agreements with Poland⁴ and Czechoslovakia⁴ and was bound by her signature. She could not for the sake of her own personal security disinterest herself in Poland and Czechoslovakia. If the French Government had any such idea, French opinion—not merely chauvinist

⁵ See No. 189, n. 7.

but pacifist—would rise against them. Every effort had been made to draft article 6 so that it should be in harmony with the Covenant. But if the French correspondence with Germany and Great Britain⁶ were read attentively it would be seen that it was impossible for France not to interest herself in the eastern question. Herr Stresemann might say that there was no risk on the eastern frontier. That might be the case while the present German Government were in office, for M. Briand did not doubt their desire for peace. One day, however, there would be a change of Government. There might be some public outcry; and when public opinion became heated it was impossible to say what might happen. It was therefore necessary that precautions should be taken against certain eventualities even if it were believed that they might never be translated into facts. If the difficulty was one of form alone, he was absolutely ready to seek the best formula, namely, that which approached most nearly to the Covenant.

HERR STRESEMANN asked permission to put one more question, a question which he had already asked, but which had not perhaps been fully brought out in the translation of his remarks. How was the proposed guarantee to operate within the framework of article 16 of the Covenant?

M. BRIAND replied that the guarantee proceeded from the general provisions of article 16, and was framed in the spirit of that article. Article 16 did not suffice in itself. The Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations had attempted to organise a system of sanctions, but the attempt came to nothing. The obligations of article 16 therefore remained in a great measure moral obligations, and were not sufficiently explicit to make a special guarantee superfluous.

DR. LUTHER said he would try to describe the situation as it appeared to him. The Germans thought that as regards substance the problem was sufficiently regulated by the proposed treaties of arbitration and the proposed entry of Germany into the League. M. Briand, on the other hand, thought that the system was not sufficient, and that a third material guarantee was necessary. Regarding the form of this guarantee, he understood that M. Briand was ready to consider other solutions. The question at issue seemed to be therefore whether the difficulty was one of form or of principle. The German Government had discovered no formula for the solution of the problem, but perhaps the French Government would be able to submit some proposal.

M. BRIAND said that the solution contained in article 6 of the draft treaty had been sought with a desire to meet the Germans and to link the idea of the pact with that of article 16 of the Covenant. If, however, article 6 would make it difficult to secure the assent of the German people, he was sure that each side would use its ingenuity to seek another solution. He recalled that the draft pact provided for its own lapse when the Council of the League of Nations should decide that the Covenant itself ensured sufficient security to the signatory Powers. Germany accepted this provision, which showed that the German Government realised that some special system was necessary until the League gained sufficient strength. So long as this gap existed it was logical to consider measures for filling it. M. Briand observed that a little extra guarantee was not to be neglected if conceived in the spirit of the League of Nations.

⁶ This had been printed in Cmds. 2435 and 2468, op. cit., and *Pacte de Sécurité: Neuf pièces relatives à la proposition faite le 9 février 1925 par le Gouvernement allemand et à la réponse du Gouvernement français (9 Février 1925–16 Juin 1925)* (Paris, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1925), and in the German White Book, *Materialien zur Sicherheitsfrage* (Berlin, 1925).

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he desired to define more exactly the position of the British Government towards this question. It was, of course, understood that His Majesty's Government could not take upon themselves any new obligation on the east of Germany. Nevertheless, they could not disinterest themselves in the situation on the east. Their greatest interest was peace, just as it was the greatest interest of all the world. Once war started, no one could say where it would finish. But in addition to this general consideration, His Majesty's Government had signed the Covenant and had assumed all the obligations of the Covenant, including those imposed by article 16. His Majesty's Government had, therefore, certain obligations under this article in the case of war arising between any two nations which were members of the League or even between a nation a member of the League and another nation outside the League. Herr Stresemann had asked M. Briand why these obligations were not in themselves sufficient and had explained and justified the British guarantee of the western pact as being the natural historical development of the proposals first for an Anglo-American guarantee of France⁷ and later for a Franco-British treaty of alliance.⁸ If the British guarantee were that and nothing more, it would be only an interesting historical curiosity. But it was in fact much more. The obligations of article 16 were at once certain and uncertain. They were obligations which applied to every sort of conflict between members of the League and also to conflicts between members of the League and non-members. At the same time the obligations were not exactly defined and might be interpreted differently by nations according to the particular circumstances of a given case. The effort which His Majesty's Government would make, for instance, in a South American dispute would obviously not be the same as that which they would make in the event of a dispute in Western Europe. What His Majesty's Government were prepared to do in the event of a dispute involving Germany's western frontier was, in effect, to put all their forces at the disposal of the League of Nations for the support of Germany if France had committed the act of flagrant aggression defined in the draft part or, in the contrary case, for the support of France if Germany had committed the act of flagrant aggression. This was, in fact, assuming a greater and a far more definite obligation than those of article 16. In the same way it seemed necessary that article 16 should be supplemented by a special guarantee in the case of Germany's eastern frontier.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that it would be best that the delegates should think about the question and meet again on the following morning to continue the discussion.

M. SCIALOJA though[t] it would be preferable to fix the next meeting in the afternoon so as to allow of private conversations on the subject.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the conference should be held at 4 p.m. on October 7th.

The following communiqué was agreed upon for issue to the press:

'The conference assembled for the second time at 4.30 this afternoon, October 6th, and continued the study of the project of the pact. It commenced with the discussion of questions, the examination of which had been reserved at the previous meeting. A general discussion took place on these questions and will be continued on Wednesday, October 7th, at 4 o'clock.'

⁷ See No. 185, n. 1.

⁸ See Cmd. 2169, *Papers respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact* (H.M.S.O., 1924).

No. 6

LOC/117/CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the Third Meeting between the British, Belgian, French, German, and Italian Delegations, held at Locarno on October 7, 1925, at 4 p.m.*

[F.O. 840/1(7)]

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett.

Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen, M. de Ruelle, Count du Chastel.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.

Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner, Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.

Italy: M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici, M. Buti.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked Sir C. Hurst to explain the various changes suggested by the jurists in the draft treaty.

SIR C. HURST said that the modifications proposed by the jurists were included in the new text of the treaty which was being distributed (Annex A). The jurists had not prepared a written report, but he proposed to explain the suggested alterations verbally.

Preamble

In section 1 of the preamble the list of the participating Powers remained unchanged as the Italian Government did not desire that their name should yet be mentioned.

In section 2 the word 'fléau' had been substituted for the word 'choc'.

In section 3 it was proposed not to mention the territorial *status quo* since a new wording had been suggested for article 1. The phrase 'conscients de la nécessité de stabiliser le *statu quo* territorial' had therefore been replaced provisionally by the phrase 'conscients de la nécessité d'assurer la paix'.

The remainder of the preamble was unchanged.

Article 1

In the original article 1 France and Belgium had been linked together, and the Belgian proposal on this point, made at the first meeting of the conference,¹ had been introduced into the new text. At the first meeting, also, the German delegation had proposed that the reference to the status of the Rhineland should be omitted. This had been done, and instead the guarantee had been made to extend to the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in the Rhineland. The German delegation had also wished to specify the subject of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles, and this had been done by adding to the end of the article the words 'concernant la zone démilitarisée'. Sir Cecil Hurst added the request that article 1 should still be considered as provisional.

Article 2

In the first paragraph the Belgian delegation had at the opening meeting proposed a modification corresponding to that which they had proposed in article 1. Effect had been given to this proposal. The jurists asked that the second

¹ See No. 1.

paragraph of article 2 might be regarded as reserved, since it was intimately connected with article 6, which was still under discussion. One small drafting alteration had been made in the article. As originally drafted, the word 'violation' had been used three times, and when it was used for the third time there was some doubt as to whether the reference was to a breach of article 2 of the pact or to a breach of certain articles of the Treaty of Versailles. The word 'contravention' had therefore been introduced to denote a breach of articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles. The same modification had been made where necessary in other articles.

Article 3

No modifications in this article had been proposed at the first meeting and the jurists were not called upon to comment upon it.

Article 4

In the first and second paragraphs the word 'contravention' had been added. In the third paragraph the words 'de contravention flagrante' had been inserted before the words 'aux articles 42, 43 ou 180'. At the first meeting the German delegation had proposed two modifications. The first had been to delete the words 'qui reconnaît'. The jurists had made an effort to find a more objective text, and it was hoped that the changes which they suggested would satisfy everyone. The second German proposal had been to add the words 'soit allemandes, soit françaises ou belges' after the phrase 'rassemblement de forces armées'. This proposal had been withdrawn, but an effort had been made to meet the Germans by inserting the phrase 'soit du franchissement de la frontière' to denote one of the conditions which might justify immediate action.

M. SCIALOJA suggested that this phrase should read 'soit du franchissement d'une des frontières'.

M. ROLIN said that in that case the words 'visées à article 2' should be added, the whole phrase thus reading 'soit du franchissement d'une des frontières visées à l'article 2'.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed, and it was agreed, that the jurists should be asked to consider this amendment.

Article 5

[SIR C. HURST said that] no modification of this article had been proposed at the first meeting, but the jurists had taken it upon themselves to reconsider the article. There was some doubt as to the exact scope of the section numbered 1 of the original article 5. What, in fact, was the exact nature of the obligation imposed upon the guarantor by that section? It was perhaps doubtful. The jurists therefore suggested that the following words should be added to the end of that section: 'les Hautes Parties Contractantes se conformeront à ces propositions'. The original sections numbered 1 and 2 had also been inverted as the new order was more in conformity with the correspondence exchanged, out of which the article had grown. Further, in both the sections the reference to article 4, paragraph 1, had been replaced by a reference to article 2 and to articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN here intervened to say that it had been felt that the original section numbered 1 might give rise to the difficulty that if one of the parties to an arbitration treaty refused to comply with the arbitration treaty, the guarantor might be obliged to compel the non-recalcitrant party to take the matter before

the League of Nations, even against his will. This would clearly be a ridiculous situation.

SIR C. HURST then resumed his report.

Article 6

This article was still under discussion.

Article 7

The jurists thought it preferable to reserve this article because it was connected with articles 2 and 6, which were still under discussion.

Article 8

A new text was suggested by the jurists. Three amendments had been proposed at the first meeting. The Belgian delegation had proposed that the decision required of the Council should be taken by a two-thirds majority if necessary, and also that there should be a period of a year between the decision of the Council and the lapse of the treaty. The German delegation had proposed that the decision of the Council should be taken at the instance of one and not two Powers. Thirdly, the Italian delegation had proposed the omission of the words 'sur la demande de deux au moins des Hautes Parties Contractants'. Effect had been given to the Belgian proposals in the new text and an amendment had been introduced to meet the German proposal. Satisfaction had not, however, been given to the Italian proposal because that proposal would have the effect of giving the right to bring the matter before the Council to a Power which was not a party to the pact. It seemed to the jurists absurd that China, for example, should have power to propose the cancellation of a contract to which she was not a party.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked what exactly was the meaning of the phrase 's'il y a lieu'. Did it mean that if the Council could not reach unanimity, then there was to be a two-thirds majority? Or would there have to be a decision of the Council as to whether it was necessary to vote by a two-thirds majority?

M. FROMAGEOT said that from the French point of view the text was defective in two particulars:

1. The phrase 's'il y a lieu' was not clear.

2. The word 'reconnaissance' was not a good word and he proposed to substitute 'convienne' or 'constate'.

M. BRIAND thought the phrase ought to run: 'le Conseil, votant au moins à la majorité de deux tiers'.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that if, as he understood, there was no objection of principle, it should be left to the jurists to find the best form of words.

M. SCIALOJA said that he did not understand the need for a delay of one year between the decision of the Council and the lapse of the treaty. It seemed to him to be dangerous because it might happen that the Council of the League, in arriving at the decision contemplated, would be tempted to act in anticipation of events if it knew that its decision would have no effect until a year later. During that interval of one year circumstances might change, and the provision seemed to him therefore to introduce an element of uncertainty; or the Council would decide on the basis of what the situation would be a year ahead, and would maintain in force for a year a treaty acknowledged to be unnecessary.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought he could give an answer of a practical nature to M. Scialoja. The pact contained more than a mere guarantee of security, and if it was to lapse it was necessary to have time to recast it. If this were not done, not only

would the guarantee contained in the pact disappear, but the arbitration treaties which were bound up with it would disappear also.

SIR C. HURST remarked that article 3 would lapse and that this article provided for the pacific settlement of all disputes.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether M. Scialoja thought that the Council would consent to declare the pact no longer necessary if it thought that it might be necessary in a year's time.

M. SCIALOJA said he did not think so. The question was not one of great importance.

M. BRIAND said that the decision of the Council and the effect of that decision must correspond exactly to the state of security at the time. It might be that three months after the Council's decision one or more of the most important members might retire from the League and the whole structure of the League might be shaken thereby. Was not a delay of a year a good thing therefore in order to allow time to see what might happen?

M. ROLIN said that the object of the Belgian proposal was to introduce greater safety. The Council was to decide whether the guarantee afforded by the pact was no longer necessary. It might happen that one of the signatories of the pact might not be voting on the Council. Were the parties to be deprived at once of the guarantees which they enjoyed without stay of execution? Once it was admitted that the treaty could lapse it was indispensable that the necessary time should be given to adapt it to changed circumstances. Otherwise the impression of security given by the pact would be diminished.

M. BRIAND remarked that the pact was intended to last until it was merged in a wider security arrangement. What inconvenience was there in the delay of a year? On the other hand, the matter might be brought before the Council by a single party at any moment, even on the very eve of the meeting of the Council. The Council might have no time for a proper consideration of the matter and the parties might have no time to agree on the attitude to be adopted and the arguments to be brought forward. He thought that at least three months' notice of intention to raise the question ought to be given in order to allow the parties concerned to prepare their case.

DR. LUTHER signified his agreement with M. Briand.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he thought that M. Briand's proposal was in the interest of general security. Security lay at the basis of disarmament, and there could be no security if the pact could be terminated by one party from one day to another without giving reasonable notice.

M. BRIAND's proposal was referred to the jurists.

Article 9

SIR C. HURST said that the jurists had found a small error in the first four lines of article 9, which had accordingly been changed.

Article 10 and 11

The jurists had no observations and SIR C. HURST concluded his report.

M. BRIAND suggested that, in the light of the explanations which had been given, the delegates should examine the new texts before giving their final approval to them. Points which occurred to them might be brought up at a further meeting.

M. Briand then referred to the discussions on article 6. He proposed that article 6 might now be referred to the experts who had heard the explanations given by

the French and German delegates, and who, by the exercise of their ingenuity, might perhaps arrive at a formula. He thought that a discussion between experts would greatly advance matters.

It was agreed to refer article 6 to the jurists.

M. VANDERVELDE said that at the first sitting he had reserved the right to propose further amendments. On examining article 3 it occurred to him that the arrangements proposed therein bore a great similarity to the system of conciliation and arbitration contemplated by the Covenant. But it seemed to him that it would be more convenient to word article 3 in the terms of the Covenant. He therefore wished to propose a new text (Annex B), according to which judicial disputes were to be dealt with by the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, while the Council was to be the conciliation body. If the Council failed to settle the dispute, he thought that it should be submitted to some kind of arbitration.

M. Vandervelde read an explanation of his proposal from a memorandum (Annex C).

DR. LUTHER said that he did not quite understand M. Vandervelde's proposal and MR. CHAMBERLAIN admitted that he was in the same case. He therefore asked M. Vandervelde to be good enough to circulate his proposed text together with the explanatory memorandum from which he had read (Annexes B and C). M. Vandervelde undertook to do this and it was agreed that the matter should be considered by the jurists.

Next Meeting

The next meeting was fixed for 2.30 p.m. on October 8th.

Press Communiqué

The following communiqué was agreed to for issue to the press:—

'The Conference, having resumed the general discussion, heard the jurists' report on the drafting work entrusted to them during the first plenary meeting.

'Fresh suggestions having been made which must form the subject of fresh examination by the jurists, the Conference decided to have a supplementary report from the jurists in the course of a later meeting.'

The next meeting was fixed for Thursday, October 8th, at 2.30 p.m.

ANNEX A

Proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, October [7], 1925

French Text

Le Président de la République allemande, Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges, le Président de la République française, Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des territoires britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes;

Soucieux de satisfaire au désir de sécurité et de protection qui anime les nations qui ont eu à subir le fléau de la guerre de 1914-1918;

English Text

The President of the German Republic, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India;

Anxious to satisfy the desire for security and protection which animates the peoples upon whom fell the

Constatant l'abrogation des traités de neutralisation de la Belgique,² et conscients de la nécessité d'assurer la paix dans la zone qui a été fréquemment le théâtre des conflits européens;

Et également animés du sincère désir de donner à toutes les Puissances signataires intéressées des garanties complémentaires dans le cadre du Pacte de la Société des Nations et des traités en vigueur entre elles;

Ont résolu de conclure un traité à ces fins et ont désigné pour plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu les dispositions suivantes:

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Les hautes parties contractantes garantissent individuellement et collectivement, ainsi qu'il est stipulé dans les articles ci-après, le maintien du *statu quo* territorial résultant des frontières entre la France et l'Allemagne et entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne et l'inviolabilité desdites frontières telles qu'elles sont fixées par ou en exécution du Traité de Paix signé à Versailles le 28 juin 1919, ainsi que l'observation des dispositions des articles 42, 43 et 180, alinéas 1 et 3, dudit traité, concernant la zone démilitarisée.

ARTICLE 2

La France et l'Allemagne et de même la Belgique et l'Allemagne s'engagent réciproquement à ne se livrer de part et d'autre à aucune attaque ou invasion et à ne recourir de part et d'autre en aucun cas à la guerre.

Toutefois cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit de s'opposer à une violation de l'engagement ci-dessus, ou d'agir avec l'agrément du Conseil ou de

scourge of the war of 1914–1918;

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium,² and conscious of the necessity of ensuring peace in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts;

Animated also with the sincere desire of giving to all the signatory Powers concerned supplementary guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties in force between them;

Have determined to conclude a treaty with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following articles, the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between France and Germany and between Belgium and Germany, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, and also the observation of the stipulations of articles 42, 43 and 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the said treaty concerning the demilitarised zone.

ARTICLE 2

France and Germany, and Belgium and Germany mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of resistance to action in violation of the above undertaking or in the case of action undertaken in agreement with the Council or the

² See Nos. 22, n. 3 and 316, n. 1.

l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, ou encore en cas de contravention flagrante des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles, lorsqu'une telle contravention constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire.

ARTICLE 3

Prenant en considération les engagements respectivement pris par elles dans l'article 2, l'Allemagne et la France et l'Allemagne et la Belgique s'engagent à régler par voie pacifique et de la manière suivante toutes questions de quelque nature qu'elles soient qui viendraient à les diviser et qui n'auraient pu être résolues par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires.

Toutes questions au sujet desquelles les parties se contesteraient réciproquement un droit seront soumises à des juges, à la décision desquels les parties s'engagent à se conformer.

Toute autre question sera soumise à une commission de conciliation et, si l'arrangement proposé par cette commission n'est pas agréé par les deux parties, la question sera portée devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, statuant conformément au Pacte.

Les modalités de ces méthodes de règlement pacifique sont l'objet de dispositions particulières.

ARTICLE 4

Si l'une des hautes parties contractantes estime qu'une violation de l'article 2 du présent traité ou une contravention aux articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles a été ou est commise, elle portera immédiatement la question devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Dès que le Conseil de la Société des Nations aura constaté qu'une telle violation ou contravention a été commise, il en donnera sans délai avis aux

Assembly of the League of Nations or in case of a flagrant breach of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone, immediate action is necessary.

ARTICLE 3

In view of the undertakings entered into in article 2, Germany and France and Germany and Belgium undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy.

Questions with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision, and the parties undertake to comply with such decision.

All other questions shall be submitted to a conciliation commission. If the proposals of this commission are not accepted by the two parties, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which will deal with it in accordance with the Covenant.

The detailed arrangements for effecting such peaceful settlement shall be the subject of special arrangements.

ARTICLE 4

If one of the high contracting parties alleges that a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of article 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to

Puissances signataires du présent traité et chacune d'elles s'engage à prêter, en pareil cas, immédiatement son assistance à la Puissance contre laquelle l'acte incriminé aura été dirigé.

En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent traité ou de contravention flagrante aux articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles par l'une des hautes parties contractantes, chacune des autres Puissances contractantes s'engage dès à présent à prêter immédiatement son assistance à la partie contre laquelle une telle violation ou contravention aura été dirigée dès que ladite Puissance aura pu se rendre compte que cette violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison soit du franchissement de la frontière, soit de l'ouverture des hostilités ou du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations saisi de la question conformément au premier paragraphe du présent article, fera néanmoins connaître le résultat de ses constatations. Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent en pareil cas à agir en conformité avec les recommandations du Conseil qui auraient recueilli l'unanimité des voix à l'exclusion des voix des représentants des parties engagées dans les hostilités.

ARTICLE 5

La stipulation de l'article 3 ci-dessus est placée sous la garantie des hautes parties contractantes ainsi qu'il est prévu ci-après:

Si l'une des Puissances mentionnées à l'article 3 refuse de se conformer aux méthodes de règlement pacifique ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale et commet une violation de l'article 2 du présent traité ou une contravention aux articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles, les dispositions de l'article 4 s'appliqueront.

the Powers signatory of the present treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.

In case of a flagrant violation of article 2 of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which is to be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the high contracting parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council, provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the parties which have engaged in hostilities.

ARTICLE 5

The provisions of article 3 above are placed under the guarantee of the high contracting parties, as provided by the following stipulations:—

If one of the Powers referred to in article 3 refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral decision, and commits a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles, the provisions of article 4 shall apply.

Dans le cas où, sans commettre une violation de l'article 2 du présent traité ou une contravention aux articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles, une des Puissances mentionnées à l'article 3 refuserait de se conformer aux méthodes de règlement pacifique ou d'exécuter une décision arbitrale, l'autre partie saisira le Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui proposera les mesures à prendre; les hautes parties contractantes se conformeront à ces propositions.

ARTICLE 6

Les dispositions du présent traité ne portent pas atteinte aux droits et obligations résultant pour les hautes parties contractantes du Traité de Paix de Versailles ainsi que des arrangements complémentaires, y compris ceux signés à Londres le 30 août 1924,³ *non plus qu'aux droits pour l'une quelconque des hautes parties contractantes d'agir, dans la mesure qui ne serait pas contraire au Pacte de la Société des Nations, en exécution d'une garantie donnée par elle à l'observation des conventions d'arbitrage conclues à la date de ce jour entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne ainsi qu'entre l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie, si la partie contrevenante recourt à la force.*

ARTICLE 7

Rien dans le présent traité ne portera atteinte aux droits et obligations des hautes parties contractantes en tant que membres de la Société des Nations, et ne sera interprété comme restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre les mesures propres à sauvegarder efficacement la paix du monde.

ARTICLE 8

Le présent traité sera déposé à la Société des Nations conformément au Pacte. Il restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce que sur la demande de l'une ou de l'autre des hautes parties contractantes,

Where one of the Powers referred to in article 3, without committing a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles, refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral decision, the other party shall bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken; the high contracting parties shall comply with these proposals.

ARTICLE 6

The provisions of the present treaty do not affect the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties under the Treaty of Versailles or under arrangements supplementary thereto, including the agreements signed in London on the 30th August, 1924,³ *nor yet the right of any of the high contracting parties to take action, in so far as such action is not inconsistent with the Covenant, in fulfilment of a guarantee given by it to the observance of the arbitration conventions concluded this day between Germany and Poland and between Germany and Czechoslovakia, if the party which violates such a convention resorts to force.*

ARTICLE 7

Nothing in the present treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties as members of the League of Nations, or shall be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 8

The present treaty shall be deposited with the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting at the request of one or other of the high

³ See No. 343, n. 9.

le Conseil, votant s'il y a lieu à la majorité des deux tiers, reconnaisse que la Société des Nations assure aux hautes parties contractantes des garanties suffisantes, et le traité cessera alors ses effets à expiration d'un délai d'une année.

ARTICLE 9

Les conventions particulières sur les modalités des méthodes de règlement pacifique, visées à l'article 3 et signées en date de ce jour, ainsi que les conventions d'arbitrage visées à l'article 6 entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne et l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie, seront, avant la ratification du présent traité, communiquées à chacune des hautes parties contractantes qui ne seraient pas parties auxdites conventions.

ARTICLE 10

Le présent traité n'imposera aucune obligation à aucun des Dominions britanniques ou à l'Inde, à moins que le Gouvernement de ce Dominion ou de l'Inde ne signifie qu'il accepte ces obligations.

ARTICLE 11

Le présent traité sera ratifié, mais n'entrera en vigueur que lorsque l'Allemagne sera devenue membre de la Société des Nations.

contracting parties, and voting, if need be, by a two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the high contracting parties; the treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision.

ARTICLE 9

The special agreements embodying the detailed arrangements respecting the methods for peaceful settlement referred to in article 3 and signed this day, and the arbitration conventions referred to in article 6 between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia, shall, before the ratification of the present treaty, be communicated to each of the high contracting parties who are not parties to the said conventions.

ARTICLE 10

The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions or upon India, unless the Government of such Dominion or of India signifies its acceptance thereof.

ARTICLE 11

The present treaty shall be ratified, but shall not come into force until Germany has become a member of the League of Nations.

ANNEX B

Amendement à l'Article 3 proposé par la Délégation belge

Paragr[aphe] 1—Ne varietur.

Paragr[aphe] 2—Toutes questions concernant des situations ou des faits postérieurs à l'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention et qui seraient relatifs à l'interprétation d'un traité, à tout point de droit international, à la réalité de tout fait qui, s'il était établi, constituerait la rupture d'un engagement international, ou à l'étendue ou à la nature de la réparation due pour une telle rupture, seront soumises à la Cour permanente de Justice.

Paragr[aphe] 3—Toute autre question sera soumise à une Commission de Conciliation et, si l'arrangement proposé par cette commission n'est pas agréé par les deux parties, à des arbitres statuant conformément au Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Paragr[aphe] 4—Ne varietur.

Mémoire du Délégué belge relatif à l'Article 3

L'article 3 du projet issu des délibérations des juristes appelle les observations suivantes:

Première Observation: Limitation de l'Arbitrage

Le projet limite l'arbitrage, c'est-à-dire la procédure aboutissant à un règlement final des litiges, aux contestations de droits. Toute autre question est laissée à la conciliation et au Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont les décisions doivent être unanimes pour avoir force obligatoire. Cette solution, qui s'écarte assez notablement des premières propositions allemandes, est de nature à causer une sérieuse déception dans les milieux favorables à l'arbitrage. Il est à remarquer que deux des parties contractantes, l'Italie et la France, ont, dans des conventions conclues avec la Suisse, adopté des formules d'arbitrage beaucoup plus larges: la Convention italo-suisse⁴ donne compétence pour tous les différends à la Cour permanente de Justice; la Convention franco-suisse⁵ donne compétence à la Cour permanente de Justice pour les conflits d'ordre juridique et soumet les autres à des tribunaux d'arbitrage *ad hoc*, constitués par les parties.

Cette dernière formule aurait les préférences du Gouvernement belge.

Deuxième Observation

Si le principe d'une division des litiges en deux catégories doit être maintenu afin que chaque catégorie soit soumise à une procédure différente, le Gouvernement belge préférerait voir libeller autrement la catégorie des questions soumises à des juges. Pour des motifs scientifiques, sans doute respectables, le projet propose une rédaction qui diffère de la définition des conflits juridiques donnée tant par le Pacte de la Société des Nations que par les statuts de la Cour permanente de Justice.⁶

Cette méthode paraît présenter un double inconvénient: d'une part, elle risque d'être mal comprise par l'opinion publique, le mot 'droit' étant employé couramment comme synonyme de 'revendication juste,' sans que le public se préoccupe de savoir si une pareille revendication est fondée sur le droit international positif ou simplement sur l'équité. Toute prétention quelconque d'un État sera considérée par son opinion publique comme l'invocation ou la contestation d'un droit et la distinction voulue ne sera pas comprise. D'autre part, les Parlements et l'opinion publique ont été saisis, dans la plupart des pays et notamment chez les trois Puissances contractantes pour lesquelles des engagements d'arbitrage sont prévus, de convention d'arbitrage qui, pour déterminer les conflits juridiques, se servent de l'énumération du Pacte de la Société des Nations, reproduite par les statuts de la Cour. Si, même, cette énumération peut, aujourd'hui, apparaître à certains yeux comme défectueuse, on risque, en s'en écartant, de jeter le trouble dans les esprits et de perdre le bénéfice de la jurisprudence de la Cour, qui ne doit pas manquer de s'établir d'ici à peu d'années pour l'interprétation de la définition, devenue classique, des conflits juridiques.

Troisième Observation

Un grand nombre de conventions d'arbitrage, ainsi que d'adhésions données à la compétence obligatoire de la Cour permanente de Justice par voie du protocole

⁴ See No. 190, n. 6.

⁵ See No. 299, n. 6.

⁶ See No. 604, n. 6.

spécial ouvert à cet effet, ont précisé que ces engagements étaient donnés et cette compétence acceptée pour les conflits futurs ou, pour employer une expression plus précise, pour tous les différends relatifs à des situations ou des faits postérieurs à la ratification desdites conventions ou desdits engagements. Cette précision a pour but d'éviter qu'en l'absence de toute prescription les États signataires n'aillent chercher, dans un passé parfois lointain, quelque sujet de réclamations sur lesquelles, depuis longtemps, l'apaisement s'était fait. Une pareille précision paraît correspondre à l'objet du présent projet de Traité.

No. 7

LOC/65/B.D.] *Notes of a Conversation between Members of the British Delegation in Mr. Chamberlain's Room at the Grand Hotel, Locarno, on October 7, 1925, at 10 p.m.*

[F.O.840/1(4)]

Guarantee of Eastern Arbitration Treaties

SIR C. HURST showed Mr. Chamberlain a revised text of article 2, paragraph 2,¹ which he had suggested to Dr. Gaus and M. Fromageot as providing a way out of the difficulty of the guarantee of the eastern arbitration treaties. The effect of the amended text was to add two items to the list of cases where war between France and Germany and Belgium and Germany would not be illegitimate, i.e. action (1) in pursuance of article 16 of the Covenant, or (2) in the circumstances contemplated by paragraph 7 of article 15 of the Covenant, provided that the action taken in such circumstances was taken against a state which had already resorted to war against another state. The proposed text is annexed.

SIR C. HURST said that Dr. Gaus had at first objected that if France was to retain the right to go to war which she possessed under paragraph 7 of article 15 of the Covenant, the pact seemed really valueless. Sir C. Hurst had pointed out however that under his proposed text France could only act against Germany under paragraph 7 of article 15 if Germany herself had first gone to war in virtue of the same paragraph. If Germany claimed that she herself could benefit by paragraph 7 of article 15 while France was to be stopped from doing so, it would be clear to all the world that Germany was trying to bind France in the west so as to leave herself with a free hand in the east. Finally Dr. Gaus and M. Fromageot had gone to consult their ministers. Sir C. Hurst added that if the new text of article 2 were adopted, the jurists were satisfied that there would be no need for the disputed portion of article 6, which could thus disappear from the treaty.

SIR C. HURST had seen Dr. Gaus later in the day and the latter had said that his delegation were studying Sir C. Hurst's proposal. Dr. Gaus seemed to think there was some change that they might accept it.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that in that case there was no need for the present to consider other solutions. If Sir C. Hurst's plan were not accepted then the other suggestions which had been put forward could be further examined and elaborated. He would like to put forward as many as possible if he had to put forward any at all.

M. Vandervelde's suggested amendment of article 3²

SIR C. HURST explained that the underlying reason of this amendment was that

¹ See No. 6, Annex A.

² See No. 6, Annex B.

the Belgian government' were just about to adhere to the optional clause³ of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague and they felt that they might be unfavourably criticised in Belgium if, about the same time, they were to sign an arbitration arrangement differing to some extent in form from that contemplated by the Hague Statute.

It was agreed that it would be unfortunate to reopen the consideration of article 3 on which agreement had already been reached and that if the Belgian government wished to amplify article 3 or to specify more clearly the procedure which they wished to follow in different classes of dispute, the proper place to do so was in the separate arbitration treaties which article 3 contemplated.

Italian objections to mention of article 180 of the Treaty of Versailles

SIR C. HURST said that the Italians were causing some difficulty over the reference in certain articles of the pact to article 180, paragraphs 1 and 3. Sir C. Hurst recalled that article 180 had not appeared in conjunction with articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles in the earliest editions of the draft pact. It had been introduced because it appeared in the military clauses of the Treaty and its introduction had been thought to be a possible advantage because of the doubt whether article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles applied only to the military clauses of the treaty or to other clauses (including articles 42 and 43) as well. Sir C. Hurst thought that it was not vital to retain the reference to article 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, as in substance these paragraphs were covered by article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless it might be difficult to induce the French government to agree to the deletion of the reference. The Italian preoccupation arose from the fact that only paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 180 were mentioned. This article consists of four paragraphs. Number 2 is of ephemeral interest only; but paragraph 4 reads:

'The system of fortified works of the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany shall be maintained in its existing state.'

In this paragraph the Italians had an interest, and they feared that to mention only paragraphs 1 and 3 of the article would in effect diminish the force of the fourth paragraph.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that if the exclusion of the reference to article 180 would make no material difference and M. Briand did not object to its deletion, he was quite prepared to see it deleted. He would, however, be inclined to take the line with the Italians that we were not prepared to make the alteration for its own sake though we were prepared to consider it if Italy proposed to become a party to the pact.

Article 16 of the Covenant

A discussion took place on the German objections to article 16 of the Covenant and it was agreed that the conference had no power to promise any amendment to the Covenant. The furthest that the government concerned could go would be to use their best endeavour to get certain modifications introduced; but whether it was wise or necessary to go even as far as this could only be decided when the Germans had stated, as it is expected they will state tomorrow, exactly what it is that they want.

³ Belgium ratified the optional clause (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 114, p. 862) for fifteen years on March 10, 1926.

ANNEX

New text of Article 2 (2) suggested by Sir C. Hurst

Toutefois cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit de s'opposer à une violation de l'engagement ci-dessus, ou d'agir avec l'agrément du Conseil ou de l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, ou en application de l'article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations, ou de l'article 15, paragraphe 7, si dans ce dernier cas l'acte est dirigé contre un Etat qui recourt à la guerre, ou encore en cas de violation flagrante des articles 42, 43 ou 180, alinéas 1 et 3, du Traité de Versailles, lorsqu'une telle violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression et qu'en raison du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of resistance to action in violation of the above undertaking or in the case of action undertaken in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of League of Nations, or in pursuance of article 16 of the Covenant, or of article 15, paragraph 7, provided that in this latter case the action is directed against a state which has had recourse to war against another or in case of a flagrant violation of articles 42, 43 or 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles, if such violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone, immediate action is necessary.

No. 8

LOC/163/CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the Fourth Meeting between the British, Belgian, French, German, and Italian Delegations, held at Locarno on October 8, 1925, at 2.30 p.m.*

[C 13094/459/18]*

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Bentinck.¹
Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen, M. de Ruelle, Count du Chastel.
France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.
Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner, Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.
Italy: M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici, M. Buti.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that it had been agreed yesterday to discuss at today's meeting questions arising out of the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. Speaking for Great Britain this was the question to which the greatest importance was attached. Since the beginning it had been made clear that we could not contemplate the conclusion of the pact without the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. Germany had made reference to the question in the note which she had sent to France,² and it had been raised in conversations in

¹ Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck was a Second Secretary in the Foreign Office, and an Assistant to the British Delegate to the League of Nations.

² Of July 20. See No. 418, n. 1.

London.³ He asked the German delegation to explain the difficulties with which Germany found herself confronted on this subject.

DR. STRESEMANN said he would take the opportunity to outline the history of Germany's attitude towards the League of Nations. The German Government had been ready to enter the League in 1919, but the Allies had rejected their request.⁴ The question again entered the region of practical politics after the London Conference of August 1924⁵ when Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister, said in a speech at Geneva⁶ that he regarded it as desirable that Germany should enter the League; and when Dr. Nansen⁷ asked Herr Marx in 1924 whether Germany would enter the League of Nations, at that meeting. Under the presidency of Herr Ebert, the German Cabinet had met and determined its attitude and had expressed a desire to enter into conversations on certain points which required elucidation. The German Government had then addressed a note dated the 29th September, 1924,⁸ to the Powers represented on the Council, in which the following questions had been raised:

1. The representation of Germany in the Council of the League and in the secretariat.
2. Two questions of a moral order, namely, her claim in principle to have colonial mandates, and whether the recognition of her international treaty obligations on entry into the League was to be considered as a new recognition on Germany's part of any kind of moral responsibility.
3. The application of article 16 in view of Germany's disarmed condition.

In due course replies had been received from all the nations represented on the Council of the League,⁹ but these replies did not sufficiently clarify the situation. It was true that a seat on the Council and participation in the secretariat were practically assured to Germany, but on the other points satisfaction was not given. The question of article 16, for instance, remained open. On that point there had not been agreement between the German point of view and that of the other Powers represented on the Council. The German Government had therefore addressed themselves to the secretariat of the League to obtain an authentic interpretation of article 16.¹⁰ The reply of the secretariat,¹¹ in the opinion of the German Government, did not afford sufficient elucidation. With regard to this matter he reserved his right to make an exhaustive statement of his attitude. The question of Germany's entry into the League had next arisen in the exchange of notes regarding the Security Pact. In this exchange of notes the present German Government had adhered to the line taken in their previous notes on the subject of Germany's entry into the League. Dr. Stresemann wished to explain the special situation of Germany concerning article 16. The present disarmed situation of Germany was such that she could not make a war of aggression, and was even incapable of defending herself. This fact was of the utmost importance as regards

³ See, for example, No. 300.

⁴ See No. 523, n. 2.

⁵ See No. 225, n. 17.

⁶ To the Fifth Assembly (see No. 205, n. 10) on September 4, 1924. For the passage relating to Germany and the League, see *League of Nations: Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1924) p. 42.

⁷ Arctic explorer, and Norwegian Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations.

⁸ See No. 219, n. 5.

⁹ Cf. No. 219, n. 6.

¹⁰ In a letter of December 12. For the text, see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 323-6. See also No. 219.

¹¹ See No. 261, Enclosure.

the attitude of Germany to the problem not being dealt with which was perhaps not always clearly understood. As regards the co-operation of Germany in action taken by the League under article 16, he distinguished three cases:—

1. Direct participation in military action.
2. Indirect participation in military action (the passage of foreign troops in transit across Germany).
3. Participation in economic sanctions (*e.g.*, rupture of economic and commercial relations with the offending countries).

The Allies had said in reply¹¹ that the German objections to these obligations were purely theoretical, as Germany would have a permanent seat on the Council whose decisions had to be unanimous. Germany could therefore easily veto any action which was unwelcome to her. The German Government did not understand the meaning of this argument. There were cases in which it must be decided which country was the aggressor. If it was clear which country was the aggressor and what were the facts, Germany could never for personal reasons prevent the action of the Council. To do so would only lead to that isolation of Germany which the German Government wished to replace by co-operation. The German veto could only operate, therefore, where there was doubt concerning the aggressor. In the light of these remarks, Germany must ask if, in existing circumstances, she could participate in the three types of action instanced above which Dr. Stresemann said he would pass in review. In the existing state of German disarmament Germany could not take part in direct military action. In other negotiations the question had been raised whether the existing German forces could be considered as an army or merely as a police force for the maintenance of internal order.¹² In order to enable Germany to co-operate in a military sense it was necessary that her forces should be better armed, and present circumstances rendered that impossible.

In the same way, under existing circumstances, it was impossible to imagine indirect military action by Germany, for if Germany were to admit the passage of foreign troops through her territory this would lead to all sorts of domestic and foreign political complications which would imperil to the utmost the peaceful development so necessary for Germany. It had, however, been stated that in an economic respect, Germany had vast resources at her disposal. They could not, therefore, allow Germany to refrain from participating in a boycott. He did not consider such co-operation to be possible. With regard to this point there were various eventualities which might arise; for example, economic sanctions against the neighbours of Germany, or more distant countries. He would only deal with one case, namely, the possibility of a war between Poland and Russia. He did not cite this example because Germany was bound to Russia by any sort of secret agreement. On the contrary, there were no agreements between Germany and Russia of which the world was not aware. Beyond the Treaty of Rapallo¹³ Germany was not bound to Russia in any way. But what would be the result of the participation of Germany in economic sanctions against Russia? The thing that Germany must at all costs avoid in view of her powerlessness was a declaration of war against herself. Without a doubt a German boycott of Russia would be answered by Moscow with a declaration of war. Dr. Stresemann recalled the events of 1920 and the Russian advance almost to the German frontier during the

¹² See No. 631.

¹³ See No. 211, n. 3.

war with Poland,¹⁴ which had involved Germany in considerable difficulties only overcome by the breakdown of the Russian advance. If the Russians advanced again there was nothing to defend Germany. Her eastern fortresses had been razed to the ground and could no longer defend her from attacks to the east. Germany would thus have to pay for the economic boycott by the advance of Russia into the centre of Germany. They would have to count with Bolshevism right up to the Elbe. Germany therefore was in an exceptional position. She did not ask for privileges, but only for special treatment during a transitional period. If the discussions in the League of Nations aiming at general disarmament had been further advanced there would be no difficulty; but so long as there were two categories of nations, the one armed and the other unarmed, every country must itself decide regarding the extent of its participation in action taken by the League under article 16. The question of article 16 had not merely been raised by Germany. M. Briand had drawn from its insufficient nature the conclusion that particular agreements were necessary. Again, at Geneva an attempt had been made to discuss whether and how far the obligations of article 16 were applicable. In the Geneva Protocol¹⁵ regard had been paid to the military and geographical situation of each country in considering the active measures to be taken by every member of the League against the aggressor. The same regard must, however, be paid in respect of the economic measures and also in respect of the question of the right of transit. They must therefore defer the question of Germany's participation in action taken by the League under article 16 until disarmament was complete. That would not impair the system of the League, especially as article 16 was so little organised that M. Briand saw the need of special arrangements.¹⁶ Mr. Chamberlain also had said that the obligations of article 16 were at once certain and uncertain.¹⁶ If in the further exchange of notes which must take place on this question Germany were assured that the League of Nations would concur in the German interpretation of article 16 to the effect that decision regarding the extent of participation was a matter for Germany alone, then Germany would be willing to promise co-operation to the utmost of her power, and the situation might be cleared up.

M. BRIAND thought he could say that they had arrived at the central point of all the negotiations. All combinations which they could contemplate for the pact of guarantee turned on the League of Nations, which was, so to speak, a pivot. If this pivot were broken or put out of joint they would be forced to say that their combinations were either impossible or inoperative. The League of Nations was not merely a formula; it was a reality. It was an association of nations for the purpose of ensuring security from war by a system of mutual assurance. It was an association which was trying to bring in a system based on that equality which appeared to dominate the minds of their German colleagues. He found the German point of view quite comprehensible, but equality must apply all round. The only basis of membership of the League was respect for treaties. Equality was one and indivisible. It was not compatible with choosing what was pleasant and rejecting that which was unpleasant. They must all take the same obligations or the spirit of association would be broken. The object of the League of Nations was the organisation of world security against all possibility of war. In the realm of the ideal many things have been done. But this ideal sometimes lacked the organised

¹⁴ Of 1919-20. See Vol. XI, Chap. II, *passim*.

¹⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

¹⁶ See No. 5.

force, the *bras séculier* necessary to back it up. The past had shown that article 16 did not provide a sufficient *bras séculier*, and therefore last year an attempt had been made at the Assembly to provide a more comprehensive system of sanctions. Security was not yet organised. How could it be assured? The equality of nations would be greatly impaired if one country was treated in one way and another in another way. Each must give what he could. Only when an organisation had been set up by co-operation could that possibility be envisaged which Germany contemplated, namely disarmament. If a nation could dispose of 100,000 men, it was not negligible from the military point of view. One hundred thousand men and a number of guns was at least something. If each had the same it helped the *bras séculier*. But if one or other withdrew its support that was a motive for the better armed not to reduce their armies. The result would be that there would be no disarmament. If Germany said she could not help because she had not got the force, the League could not ask other countries which had the forces to disarm. The German delegation went further, however, and refused in addition to associate themselves with the economic sanctions decreed by the League. But Germany was strong from the economic point of view. If Germany could not give anything, even in this way, her position would not merely be negative. It would particularly encourage the aggressor and would weaken the League of Nations. To say that there were the Russians and that there was no treaty with Russia save the Treaty of Rapallo,¹³ the contents of which were not known.

DR. STRESEMANN and DR. LUTHER intervened to say that the Treaty of Rappallo had been published.

M. BRIAND withdrew his remark. If, he said, Russia were the aggressor, the League of Nations would be at war with her. If Germany gave no help to the League of Nations it would be equivalent to giving economic support to Russia. The German point of view was the point of view of the individual and not of the whole body. Without a doubt, certain countries had urged within the League their special situation, and it was quite true that the League did not forbid discrimination between its members. It could not, however, submit to being confronted in advance with a *non possumus* attitude. A nation could not take what it liked for its own security and not give anything on the pretext that its situation was peculiar. Any such idea would be badly received by the League.

The questions raised by Germany were outside the competence of the delegations present. Other nations had asked to enter the League and had had to conform to the ordinary conditions. What would they say if we accepted the idea that a great country could obtain special treatment just because it was a great country? The German delegation were in error if they imagined that the Great Powers could do what they liked at Geneva. At the last Assembly (1924)¹⁷ it was evident that the entry of Germany into the League was almost unanimously desired. As soon as the German conditions were known, however, it was agreed that Germany had better not try to come in on those conditions, and when the Council deliberated upon the terms of the reply to the German note of the 12th December,¹⁰ it was, so to speak, invested with an imperative mandate. It was from the inside of the League that Germany could make her views prevail regarding her military and geographical situation. More could not be said in advance. M. Briand wished to take the opportunity to say that they were not doing anything against Russia. They had a great consideration for Russia, and their agreements

¹⁷ See No. 205, n. 10.

were inspired by a desire for mutual protection not against Russia, but against war. The League of Nations remained open for Russia. It was not possible for Germany to have one foot in the League of Nations and one foot in another camp in which the sentiments were very different. If Russia became a member of the League and had no aggressive intentions, there was no problem. If Russia had aggressive intentions, how was it possible to hesitate? Herr Stresemann must know the terrible consequences of a war which Russia might let loose and what would be the result for Germany. It would be in Germany's own interests to have the protection of the League. The members of the League would not refuse their help to Germany. Germany would be in a much stronger position inside the League to discuss article 16 on a footing of equality in order to get disarmament. She could bring up her disarmed condition. The League did not want war against anyone. It wanted peace for the whole of Europe, and it was certain that Germany's views would be heard. If, however, Germany started in a position of wilful inequality, and if she refused her help, her voice would suffer a singular loss of force. The representatives of the nations present could not bind the League. All that was possible had been done. Germany had practically been promised a seat on the Council. She had mentioned the question of colonies. Her attitude was absolutely legitimate. He appealed to Germany to give her support so far as she could and to consider the problem further. He hoped it would be possible to come to an agreement on this as on all other questions.

M. VANDERVELDE declared that, although he was the representative of a country which was once called into the councils on account of its special interests, he wished to say how much Belgium was in agreement with the French point of view which M. Briand had explained so forcefully. He thought it specially necessary in a discussion on so important a point to express himself with complete frankness. He confessed that the words of the German Ministers had been a deception to him. When he heard them declare on the day before yesterday that they were prepared themselves to give two guarantees in the east, namely, treaties of arbitration and entry into the League of Nations, he supposed that the latter point was settled, and he had not expected the objections which had been raised that day.

He recalled that he had always considered the entry of Germany into the League as a necessity. He had only had one care for Belgium, namely, to ensure her security. From this point of view he valued the alliance of France and England, but, fearing to see Europe divided into two camps, he had always wished Germany to enter also into a system of mutual protection which was very much to her own interests.

His political opinions were such that he could not be suspected of partiality in international politics. He had been one of the first to point out that Germany must enter the League of Nations with rights equal to those of the other Powers, but he was no more able than M. Briand to understand why Germany should demand inequality of treatment in her own favour.

The cases of danger which they were discussing were very unlikely to occur, and the discussions were of rather an academic nature, since the dangers could not occur unless Russia committed an act of aggression.

He wished to emphasise that the pact was not directed against any Power, and that, if he had thought that it was directed specially against Russia, he would not be present at Locarno.

As for the special circumstances invoked by Germany concerning her possible

participation in action undertaken by the League of Nations, it seemed to him that there was nothing to prevent her from having her observations considered within the League of Nations once she had entered the League.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN observed that yesterday and the day before there had been talk of French and German public opinion. He now proposed to speak of British public opinion. The idea of a pact between the Powers represented at the conference had been at first regarded with some misgiving in Great Britain. It had been objected that he was trying to substitute the pact for the League of Nations, thus reducing the position and power of the League. Opinion in Great Britain had now, however, decided for the pact practically unanimously, and sincerely desired the real success of the Locarno meeting. This was largely due to the fact that it was a part of the scheme that Germany should join the League. This development might easily be changed if what was done at Locarno seemed to change or diminish the force of the Covenant. He understood quite well Germany's anxieties, and he would not say that the German arguments were without force. He understood that they were considerations to which a German must attach great importance. But while understanding and sympathising in a certain measure with the German point of view he did not see any way of changing the views of the other parties concerned or of getting them to agree with the German argument. He imagined that in any case of war which might arise the League of Nations must necessarily consider the situation of each country upon whom it made demands. The League must take into consideration the armed force of each country, the dangers to which that country was exposed and its military, geographical and economic situation. But for a nation to say that it would join the League and enjoy all the privileges and guarantees which the League afforded, and at the same time in advance to refuse all help to the League or the members of the League in certain cases, was to take up an absolutely impossible position. If the League were to give its consent to such a proposition, where was the process to stop? It was not merely nations like Germany which had been disarmed that had small forces at the moment. What was the army of Denmark? What was Denmark's situation? Every one of such nations would say: 'We are not a great nation like Germany. We have not the same resources as Germany. You ought at least to accord to us the same right of neutrality as you accord to Germany.' That would really be the end of the League of Nations. Mr. Chamberlain wanted also to direct attention to another consideration of which M. Briand had spoken. It was perhaps inferred that because His Majesty's Government and the other Allied Powers formed part of the Council and because they had a very considerable influence, they had only to say in the League that a thing should be done and it would be done. Such was not the case. M. Scialoja had not yet spoken, but Mr. Chamberlain was sure that he knew as well as himself how jealous the Assembly was of the Council. The Assembly regarded with the utmost jealousy every effort to extend the powers of the Council and every tendency to take upon itself decisions which must rest in the hands of the Assembly. Even if the council could do anything in this matter they would meet with opposition from the small nations in the Assembly, and it was precisely the smallest nations who would unite in saying: 'No exceptions in the League of Nations.' If he had been a German, Mr. Chamberlain said he would no doubt have the same ideas as the German Government and would have sought to do what they were doing. All the same, it was certain that it would not be possible to get the League of Nations to accept the German view. He hoped that when the German delegation had given further

consideration to the subject they would be able to find a solution and accept the obligations of the Covenant. It was a case of equality not merely before the law but of equality in spirit also.

M. SCIALOJA desired to support what Mr. Chamberlain had said. If Germany entered the League it was a practical certainty that she would enter the Council also. According to the second paragraph of article 4 of the Covenant the Council might by a majority increase the number of members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for permanent representation on the Council. In selecting such additional members the Assembly would also act by a majority. Germany could be sure of a majority vote in the Council, and once the Council was in agreement it was certain that there would be a majority in the Assembly. Germany would be a very influential member. In fact, she would have almost a determining influence. It would be easy for her to make her views felt in every case. If her armed forces were insufficient it would be impossible to impose too much upon her. The same applied to participation in economic sanctions. Moreover, article 16 did not operate except in the case of aggression directed against a member of the League. He supposed that Germany had not promised to aid Russia in aggression. If that was so he saw no insurmountable difficulty.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that lest silence might give rise to misunderstanding, he desired to follow the example of M. Briand and M. Vandervelde and to state clearly, frankly and categorically at this point that it had never entered into the head of His Majesty's Government to make, either through the League of Nations or through the pact, an[y] kind of alliance or *bloc* against Russia.¹⁸ His Majesty's Government would not lend themselves to any such idea.

M. BRIAND and M. SCIALOJA indicated their entire concurrence.

DR. LUTHER recalled that M. Briand had said that it was impossible to have one foot in the League of Nations and the other in another camp where a different order of things existed. He entirely agreed, and Germany had never thought of such a thing. It was far from Germany's thoughts that she should not be a complete member of the League. She wanted to be a member in the fullest sense. M. Briand had proclaimed the difference between the ideal and the real. One fact of reality was Germany's geographical situation. He wished to emphasise again that there were no bonds with Russia. There was nothing of any kind which obliged Germany to do anything. She was politically absolutely free. But she could not change her geographical situation, which was made worse by the fact of her disarmament. Nevertheless, the German Government were ready to follow the ideas of the League of Nations as far as possible. The Allies on their side must consider the geographical situation of Germany, which it was not in his power to change. The German people acutely felt the danger resulting from that situation. The dangers of article 16 did not exist for England and France.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN and M. BRIAND intervened to dispute this statement. Mr. Chamberlain observed that it was not Russia which menaced Great Britain, but did not Dr. Luther think that there were dangers for Great Britain as a maritime Power as well as for Germany?

DR. LUTHER admitted that this might be so, all the same, article 16 really applied in a special way to Germany. It was necessary to find a formula which gave to Germany safety and the feeling that safety existed. That was the great problem, the solution of which perhaps did not lie with Germany. The German

¹⁸ See No. 521.

Government did not think that, as a member of the Council, Germany would be strong enough to ward off all these dangers. A formula must be found which would safeguard Germany from moral isolation. He had never said that Germany would not help to the best of her ability. As a matter of principle, the point of view of the League of Nations must prevail over the point of view of the individual member. There were certain limits, however, which the individual could not pass. His endeavour was to find a solution between these two points of view.

M. BRIAND said he was in no way insensible to the German arguments. He knew how delicate and sensitive public opinion was on such a question. But, owing to a very courageous and noble initiative on the part of the German Government, they were undertaking a work which far transcended those minor considerations which pressed upon Ministers of State. If difficulties of current politics were to be allowed to hinder the march of international affairs, it was not worth while continuing. He was sure in advance that whatever he did would be criticised and found insufficient. But the politician who had been able to count on unanimity did not exist. He wished to reply to the objection made by Dr. Luther that the German people could not accept the idea that their country should become a battlefield. In what circumstances could it become a battlefield? Germany entered the League of Nations, which accepted her reservations. War broke out. Where? Without designating from what country it would come, he would suppose from the east. But how could it come as far as Germany? It would not be an ordinary war. It would mean more than political and economic threats. The other members of the League would do their utmost to avoid the dangers, while Germany sitting on the Council would regard passively what was taking place and would help the common enemy without perhaps being desirous of so doing, but, nevertheless, would render effective assistance, because in certain circumstances failure to act was in itself action. The countries which separated Germany from the war zone would be fighting not only for themselves, but for Germany also. Could the Germans imagine that because they wanted to maintain neutrality the war would respect them? No; she would reap all the economic and political consequences. What frightened him was that, for the benefit of public opinion, which was badly misinformed, obstacles were being created which were mirages. From whatever point war came, it would be impossible for Germany to stand by with her arms folded. To take another case; did Dr. Luther suppose that Germany could remain indifferent when a certain flag marched to the east of her? Did he think that his own people would then stand by with folded arms? Dr. Luther was too experienced a statesman to believe that. Germany would have worse than war; she would have civil war. He begged Dr. Luther to reflect on this. Germany was coming into a society where there were both rights and obligations. She was coming into an organisation for mutual security. She would be among the directors of the society. Yet she did not wish to take on herself the obligations. German public opinion had various shades, and the great majority would not be able to understand it if the German Government did not take advantage of this opportunity. He did not deny the force of the German arguments. On the contrary, he recognised the value of certain sentimental arguments. But considerations of reality must be looked at also. Because there was one eventuality in which Germany could become a battlefield, how could the German Government think of preventing the passage of troops across their territory if they were really logical? In such a case the League of Nations would be on Germany's side, and every member of the League would come to Germany's aid. If Germany acted

in the spirit of reciprocity which dominated the Covenant she would run no risk.

DR. LUTHER said he wished to make a few remarks in reply to M. Briand. M. Briand had said that if Germany did not participate in sanctions her attitude would be positive and not negative and she would be aiding the aggressor. That was not the object of Germany.

M. BRIAND interjected that he was sure of it.

DR. LUTHER said that he wanted to find means of avoiding the effect which M. Briand had foreseen. It was impossible to foresee all the cases that might arise. If there was a concrete case to consider they could say what Germany could do. All that Germany now asked was based on the transitory nature of the situation in which she found herself. The obligations of Germany under the Covenant could only become effective in their entirety when disarmament was universal and complete. While this transitory situation existed, Germany felt the necessity of provisions which would shelter her from bearing the general dangers of the League of Nations.

DR. STRESEMANN said that the central point of view of the Allied Powers was that a country enjoying equal rights in the League could not have special treatment in the way of obligations. As Dr. Luther had said, Germany did not want to make moral reservations or to evade obligations. The Allies said that Germany had only to employ her position in the Council to stop all action which was unwelcome to her. Germany did not wish to do this. M. Briand's argument that Germany wished to remain disinterested was without foundation. If the League designated a given Power as an aggressor Germany would stand by the League. Germany would give her moral co-operation and would not wish to contract out. If Russia was the aggressor Germany could not consider herself disinterested and must fulfil her obligations in spite of difficulties if in the future she was not to suffer. He would say frankly that Germany could not avoid war if it took place. His feeling was that the principle of disarmament had been exaggerated in the case of Germany. Germany was in a state in which she could not help. Bolshevism expanded quickly in an industrial country like Germany. M. Briand talked of Nationalist societies. He must not forget that armed Red societies existed also, and in case of war with Russia, Germany would need all her own forces within her own frontiers to prevent risings breaking out in Dresden, Hamburg or Thuringia. The German Government would not be free to send troops to assist a foreign country. They would only have enough troops for internal defence. This point of view could not be left out of the discussions. Would M. Briand as a responsible statesman send troops in such circumstances to take part in a war outside the country? M. Briand reproached Germany with her obstinacy regarding participation in economic sanctions. He asked M. Briand to reflect a little. The moment there was war with Russia it would no longer be possible to carry on business with Russia. Economic relations would be broken off. The British fleet would blockade the Baltic. There would be a complete economic boycott and it would be a practical impossibility for Germany to aid Russia. M. Briand had spoken of the 'wilful inequality' of Germany. The inequality was not wilful. It was rather a fact for which Germany was not responsible, but a fact which must be taken into account. Mr. Chamberlain had remarked that other countries like Denmark were in the same position as Germany in the matter of armies. This was not the case. The geographical position of Denmark was not the same. The difficulty lay in the fact that the League of Nations was not universal. Germany had too often been the theatre of war and was naturally anxious to avoid it in the future. Coming to the practical

side of the question, M. Briand had said that he did not think it possible for the Council to modify its statutes. Germany did not ask for modification. Following up a suggestion made during a conversation with Mr. Chamberlain, Dr. Stresemann said that the Covenant and the text of the Covenant could remain intact and Germany would be satisfied if it could be adapted to her special situation. It was only a temporary question, and it could perhaps be met by a special interpretation of the article in question. If he was not mistaken the Geneva Protocol had provided that the Council might take into consideration the military and geographical position of a country in making demands upon it. If a declaration by the secretariat of the League of Nations on these lines could be sent in reply to Germany this would give satisfaction to Germany and would not impair the statutes of the League. Germany was not disinterested. She was morally bound and fully intended to collaborate loyally as a member of the League.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he would give another illustration besides the example of Denmark. There was Finland, which was in a much more perilous position than Denmark, because she had a common frontier with Russia. Germany's case was that she had been disarmed by the Allies, and could not for that reason participate with other members of the League in a conflict starting with an act of aggression by Russia. But supposing the contrary case happened. Supposing Germany did participate. She then became by that very fact allied with every other nation in the League of Nations. Mr. Chamberlain read the following passage from article 16 of the Covenant:—

'The members of the League agree further that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the Covenant-breaking State. . . .'

Germany would become the ally of all other States members of the League. Her strength would become their strength. Her weakness would be their weakness. Honour and their own interests would compel all the other nations to aid Germany and equip her, and those who had disarmed her would be the first then to rearm her.

M. BRIAND said that that was self-evident.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he thought the discussion had been of considerable value. Without wishing to prevent other delegates from speaking, he thought they would perhaps all like to reflect on what had been said. He thought they were getting nearer to one another and that they had the desire to get nearer. He would like to think the matter over and try to find the solution of which Dr. Luther had spoken.

Next Meeting

It was agreed that there should be no meeting of the conference on the following day, in order to allow time for private conversations on the subjects which had been discussed. It was agreed that there should be two meetings on the 10th October at 10.30 a.m. and 2.30 p.m., and that the jurists should continue their meetings on the 9th October.

Communiqué

The following communiqué was agreed upon for issue to the press:—

'The fourth meeting of the conference was devoted to the consideration of

the questions raised by the participation in the League of Nations of the eventual signatories of the Security Pact.

'This consideration gave rise to a general discussion, in which the representatives of Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain and Italy set forth in turn the views of their respective Governments.

'The conference adjourned until Saturday, the 10th October. It was decided to hold two meetings on that day, at 10.30 a.m. and 2.30 p.m.'

No. 9

LOC/186/CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the Fifth Meeting between the British, Belgian, French, German, and Italian Delegations, held at Locarno on October 10, 1925, at 10.30 a.m..*

[C 13241/459/18]*

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Bentinck.

Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen, M. de Ruelle, Count du Chastel.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.

Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner, Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.

Italy: M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici, M. Buti.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that the conference should hear the report of the jurists on the work which they had been asked to do.¹

SIR C. HURST said that there were two questions on which he had to report on behalf of the jurists. The first was a simple drafting modification of article 8 due to a suggestion by M. Briand that the members of the Council ought to be notified three months in advance of the intention of any State to ask the Council to take the decision contemplated in the article. Besides this the words 's'il y a lieu' had been taken out and the words 'au moins' substituted as suggested by M. Briand. The new text of article 8 therefore reads as follows:—

ARTICLE 8

Le présent traité sera déposé à la Société des Nations conformément au Pacte. Il restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce que sur la demande de l'une ou de l'autre des hautes parties contractantes, notifiée aux autres Puissance signataires trois mois d'avance, le Conseil, votant à la majorité des deux tiers au moins, constate que la Société des Nations assure aux hautes parties contractantes des garanties suffisantes, et le

ARTICLE 8

The present treaty shall be deposited with the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting at the request of one or other of the high contracting parties, who shall notify the other signatory Powers three months in advance, and voting by at least a two thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the high contracting parties; the

¹ See No. 6.

traité cessera alors ses effets à l'expiration d'un délai d'une année.

treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he thought the new draft contained a little of everyone's proposals.

In answer to a question by Mr. Chamberlain the other delegates signified agreement in principle.

SIR C. HURST, continuing his report, said that the second question related to the Belgian amendment to article 3. The Belgian delegation had already embodied their views in a memorandum (Annex) which had been circulated to the conference. He did not know whether the Belgian delegation wished to amplify that memorandum.

M. VANDERVELDE then addressed the conference on the subject of the amendment regarding article 3 which had been proposed by him at the third plenary meeting, held on the 7th October.¹

This amendment had a triple object:—

1. The extension of arbitral procedure to all differences, including those of a political nature.
2. The adoption, for the settlement of disputes of a legal nature, of the wording of article 3 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.²
3. The restriction of judicial procedure, properly so called, to disputes regarding circumstances or facts occurring after the ratification of the present conventions.

The following were the jurists' conclusions with regard to the above-mentioned amendment:—

As regards point 3, the jurists appeared to be willing in principle to recognise its justification and had worded accordingly the treaties of arbitration, but, for motives of expediency, the opinion had been expressed that it was preferable that a decision of this nature should rather appear in the special convention envisaged in paragraph 4 of article 3 of the draft.

M. Vandervelde stated that the Belgian delegation were quite willing to adopt this opinion.

As regards the second point, the further discussions which had taken place among the jurists had shown the precise meaning of the terms of article 3 of the draft and their utility.

Turning more especially to the relationship between the text in question and that of the Belgian amendment, it had been observed that the third class of disputes figuring in the latter was too restricted in definition. The disputes under review were those relating to the reality of any fact which, if established, constituted the violation of an international engagement. This wording appeared to exclude, wrongly, disputes regarding:—

- (a) The reality of facts constituting not the violation but the failure to observe, perhaps involuntarily, an international obligation.
- (b) The reality of a fact which, if established, would constitute the violation of an international obligation derived from customary international law, and not of an engagement.
- (c) The reality of a fact which, if established, would constitute not the violation

² See No. 604, n. 6.

of an international obligation, but the exercise of a right giving rise to a reciprocal obligation, such as the use by one State of material or services belonging to another and involving the payment of certain sums by way of hire, compensation or toll.

M. Vandervelde stated that the Belgian delegation recognised the accuracy of these observations, and, in consequence, agreed to the retention of the present text of article 3 of the draft. In order to remove all doubt, however, they requested that it might be clearly stated in the special arbitration convention that the definition of the disputes submitted to arbitration which figured in the first draft should particularly include the various categories of disputes specified in article 13 of the pact and article 36, paragraph 2, of the statutes of the court.

M. Vandervelde then explained in addition that if the pact was concluded in its present terms there might arise a conflict for which there might be no solution. Disputes of a legal nature were to be submitted to judges whose decision would be final. Disputes of a political nature were to be submitted to conciliation commissions. If these commissions could not agree the dispute was to be taken before the Council. But if the Council failed to agree there was the risk of an *impasse*. There would be the undertaking not to resort to war, but the dispute would still remain. The Belgian Government had therefore proposed that if the Council could not decide the matter, it should be submitted for final decision to some other form of arbitration. The object of the Belgian Government was to avoid all excuse for the outbreak of war. Therefore Belgium was ready to submit all disputes, even those of a political nature, to arbitration. This had been made clear at Geneva³ by the Belgian representatives. He was sure that in submitting the amendment he was acting in conformity with the sentiment of all the nations represented at the conference. Perhaps, however, all the countries concerned were not yet ready to send all disputes to compulsory arbitration. He bowed to the opinion of his colleagues, but he felt it his duty to state that a gap still remained, which he looked to the future to close.

M. BRIAND said that he was altogether in agreement with M. Vandervelde in trying to ensure that war should in no case break out. He did not think, however, that the gap spoken of by M. Vandervelde really existed because of article 2, under which 'France and Germany and Belgium and Germany mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other'. It was clear, therefore, that all conflicts must be settled peacefully.

M. VANDERVELDE agreed, but pointed out that, nevertheless, the article did not provide for dealing with the case, when it arose, where no settlement could be reached.

M. BRIAND replied that political disputes were sometimes of such a delicate nature that it was sometimes difficult to fix in advance the system by which they would be settled. One thing, however, was certain. Under the provisions of the pact they were not to be settled by war. They could not legislate for a case which was in the region of the absurd. He did not see that Belgium could have any real anxiety about war if her amendment was rejected. It would be a bad thing if the Belgian reservations became known. The impression might be created that the conference had not done all that was necessary to prevent war breaking out. If this impression got abroad it would be a bad thing from the point of view of pacification. To betray anxiety of that sort would be to weaken what had been

³ See No. 165, n. 4.

done. When the question of arbitration treaties had been further examined it would be possible for everyone to pronounce upon the Belgian amendment with greater certainty, and if certain members of the conference considered that the work done did not in fact correspond with the idea of ruling out war, then the position could be dealt with. That was why he asked M. Vandervelde to postpone his amendment.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN supported M. Briand. He said that M. Vandervelde, if he understood him aright, agreed that there was no possibility of war, but thought, nevertheless, that in certain eventualities a solution might not be assured if the parties did not agree to compulsory arbitration. But if war was excluded, if forcible measures were put outside the bounds of possibility, then the case where a settlement was not reached, while possible, would be very improbable. Though all the parties to the pact—Great Britain for example—were not prepared to make an absolute agreement to refer every issue to compulsory arbitration, that did not prevent them from having recourse to arbitration in particular cases, even though in those cases arbitration was not obligatory. It was difficult to enter into an absolute agreement to submit every dispute to arbitration in conditions which could not be foreseen with certainty. His Majesty's Government were in a special position on account of the peculiar constitution of the British Empire. That constitution was not unitary. The Empire consisted of five or six great nations with equal liberty and enjoying self-government. Acceptance in advance of compulsory arbitration was not therefore in all cases possible. The British Empire might perhaps find itself unable to keep its word. Nevertheless, although His Majesty's Government could not consent to the principle of universal compulsory arbitration they had practised arbitration as much as, and perhaps more, than any other country. Even at this moment they had before the League of Nations a question of the highest importance to them—the question of Mosul.⁴ They had excluded war by referring the dispute to arbitration. His Majesty's Government did not exclude the idea of arbitration, even in the cases where they had accepted no obligation to arbitrate in advance.

M. VANDERVELDE said that if his amendment had had only the result of drawing the above declaration from Mr. Chamberlain, he congratulated himself. He repeated that according to the system contemplated in article 3 there might be no issue and the conflict would remain unsettled. It had been stated that the engagement not to resort to war made it necessary that by whatever means were possible a solution must be found. In the circumstances, however, he did not think he could insist on the Belgian amendment, and he would accede to M. Briand's request for postponement until the special arbitration treaties came up for discussion. His only desire was that they should not be in a position where a question could be left without solution.

DR. LUTHER associated himself with Mr. Chamberlain. He thought that the very fact that war was ruled out would be an additional reason for reaching a settlement in all cases by peaceful means.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that it would be necessary to explain in the separate arbitration treaties that the word 'rights' in the second paragraph of article 3 covered all cases where disputes had to be submitted to judicial arbitration as contemplated in article 13 of the Covenant and in article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.²

⁴ See No. 468, n. 7.

M. ROLIN said that in the jurists' meeting he had raised the same question as M. Scialoja. It was in order to take the above fact into consideration that the wording adopted was to the effect that the definition of the disputes submitted to arbitration particularly included the various categories specified in article 13 of the Covenant and in article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court. The Belgian proposal thus avoided a certain vagueness in the present text to which reference had been made by M. Scialoja.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought it would be best if the point were examined in connection with the separate treaties of arbitration. He asked whether the jurists had anything further to report.

SIR C. HURST replied they had nothing.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN then said he thought it would be a good thing if the conference read through the draft treaty once more to see exactly what the situation was. He took it that there was general agreement in the preamble.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that Italy's name was not included in the list of parties contained in the first paragraph of the preamble. He proposed in confirmation of previous declarations,⁵ that it should be added.

This declaration was received with great satisfaction by all the delegates.

M. CHAMBERLAIN then asked whether anyone had any observations to make on article 1.

M. SCIALOJA reserved the right to return to this article, because it was still under discussion whether article 180 of the Treaty of Versailles should be referred to therein.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether everyone was agreed upon article 2.

SIR C. HURST said that the jurists asked that this article might still be reserved since its second paragraph depended on the discussions which were in progress regarding article 6.

The delegates intimated their agreement in article 3.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether article 4 was accepted.

M. SCIALOJA said that he might have a drafting amendment to propose dependent on article 1, which was reserved.

Article 5 was agreed.

Article 6 was reserved.

Article 7 was reserved.

As regards article 8 the delegates signified their agreement in the text which had been distributed at the meeting and which is quoted above.

Articles 9 and 10 were agreed.

Concerning article 11, MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that there was no difficulty provided that agreement was reached on article 7.

Mr. Chamberlain said that this concluded the second reading of the draft treaty. On the proposal of M. Briand, two meetings had been arranged for that day, and so much progress had been made that he would be glad if M. Briand would indicate how the rest of the time was to be spent.

M. BRIAND said that when he had made his proposal he was in the position not of a man who was not otherwise than optimistic but of a man who wished to make certain reserves regarding his optimism. It was an insurance against himself that led him to propose two meetings. He was not a man who worked for the sake of work. If the afternoon could be spent in any other way there would be no

⁵ See No. 515.

objection from his side. In fact, he would support it with invincible ardour. Perhaps, however, it was desired to proceed with the text of article 6 or to exchange views on the subject of the League of Nations in continuation of the not altogether contradictory discussions which had already taken place. But he wondered whether the discussion had reached a sufficient state of maturity for continuation. Every time he made a Ministry he always reserved a portfolio which he never gave to anyone in the flesh. He reserved it for a moral personality—time. It might be necessary to reflect further on certain possibilities of accommodation. The private conversations of the previous day had possibly shown the way to a solution.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said there was still a great work to be done in which he was not immediately interested. He referred to the separate arbitration treaties. These must first be discussed outside the conference. At a certain moment the parties immediately concerned would no doubt present to M. Scialoja and himself the resolutions which they had taken in order to give them an opportunity to ask for explanations, and perhaps to make observations, since the pact depended on these arrangements. Articles 6 and 7 were still outstanding, and they would require a further general discussion. Nevertheless, M. Briand thought it better that he should continue in the meantime to work by means of private conversations. Mr. Chamberlain wondered whether the other delegates were not of the same opinion.

DR. LUTHER said he agreed with M. Briand.

M. BRIAND said that the point now reached was that there was agreement on a fundamental principle, but for reasons connected with public opinion, which were not negligible, it was necessary to seek a formula in which the principle could be wrapped up. It was a question of clothing. It was not necessary to have a general discussion. Private conversations were better for coming to an agreement on the question of the guarantee, and on the other outstanding question, that of Germany's entry into the League of Nations. They had made great progress. Let them see if they could not agree upon a formula.

DR. LUTHER said that he was in entire agreement that it was a question of finding a formula for pacification. If the formula were found, everything would be changed.

M. VANDERVELDE thought that agreement might be reached by a means rather between private conversations and the conference procedure. He proposed that the outstanding questions should be referred to a small body of five or six people.

M. BRIAND: 'You think that with a smaller table we shall be nearer to one another.'

It was decided to continue private conversations for the time being.

Next Meeting

The next meeting of the conference was fixed for the 12th October at 10.30 a.m.

Press Communiqué

In the discussion on the press communiqué, M. SCIALOJA said that he particularly desired that the adherence of Italy to the pact should be represented not as a new decision, but as a confirmation of earlier declarations by himself.

The following communiqué was agreed upon for issue to the press:—

'The conference today gave a second reading to the articles of the pact on the basis of the amendments submitted by the jurists. In the preamble the name of

Italy, which did not figure in the draft text drawn up in London,⁶ was added to the number of the contracting parties. This addition confirms the declarations which had already been made by the Italian delegate concerning the intention of Italy to participate in the pact as a guarantor in the same conditions as Great Britain.

'The examination of the articles resulted in the adoption of a definite text on the majority of points, the remainder being reserved for a later discussion.

'The conference adjourned until Monday, the 12th October, at 10.30 a.m.'

ANNEX

Mémoire de la Délégation belge consécutif aux Discussions du Comité de Juristes relatives à l'Article 3

L'amendement de la délégation belge proposé à la séance plénière du 7 octobre¹ avait un triple objet:

1. L'extension de la procédure arbitrale à tous les différends, fussent-ils politiques;
2. L'adoption, pour la détermination des conflits d'ordre juridique, de la rédaction usitée à l'article 13 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et à l'article 36, paragraphe 2, des statuts de la Cour permanente de Justice;²
3. La limitation de la procédure judiciaire proprement dite aux différends relatifs à des situations ou à des faits postérieurs à ratification des présentes conventions.

Quant au premier point, la délégation belge prend acte des objections émises par certaines délégations à une extension de la procédure arbitrale à l'universalité des différends éventuels.

Quant à la deuxième observation, les nouvelles discussions qui ont eu lieu au sein de la Commission de Juristes ont fait apparaître la portée exacte de la rédaction de l'article 3 du projet et son utilité.

En ce qui concerne spécialement la relation entre cette rédaction et celle visée dans l'amendement belge, il a été observé que la troisième catégorie de différends figurant dans cette dernière est formulée d'une façon trop limitative. Il s'agit des différends relatifs: 'à la réalité de tout fait qui, s'il était établi, constituerait la rupture d'un engagement international. Cette rédaction paraît exclure, à tort, les contestations relatives:

'1. A la réalité de faits constituant non la rupture, mais l'inobservation, peut-être involontaire, d'un engagement international;

'2. A la réalité d'un fait qui, s'il était établi, constituerait la rupture d'une obligation internationale dérivant du droit international coutumier, et non d'un engagement;

'3. A la réalité d'un fait qui, s'il était établi, constituerait non la rupture d'un engagement international, mais l'exercice d'un droit donnant naissance à une obligation synallagmatique telle, l'utilisation par un État de matériel ou de services relevant d'un autre État et entraînant paiement de certaines sommes à titres de location, indemnité ou péage.'

La délégation belge reconnaît l'exactitude de ces observations et accepte, en conséquence, le maintien de la rédaction actuelle figurant à l'article 3 du projet.

⁶ See No. 466.

Elle demande, cependant, pour dissiper toute équivoque, qu'il soit clairement indiqué, dans la convention spéciale d'arbitrage, que la définition des différends soumis à des juges, figurant à avant-projet, comprend notamment les diverses catégories de différends énumérées à l'article 13 du Pacte et à l'article 36, alinéa 2, des statuts de la Cour.

Enfin, quant à la troisième observation de la délégation belge, le Comité de Juristes a paru disposé en principe à reconnaître son fondement et à préciser en ce sens le portée des engagements d'arbitrage; mais, pour des motifs d'opportunité, l'avis a été émis qu'il était préférable que pareille précision figurât plutôt dans la convention spéciale prévue au paragraphe 4 de l'article 3 du projet. La délégation belge se rallie volontiers à cette manière de voir.

No. 10

LOC/122/CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the Sixth Meeting between the British, Belgian, French, German, and Italian Delegations, held at Locarno on October 12, 1925, at 10.30 a.m.*

[C 13637/459/18]*

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Bentinck.

Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen, M. de Ruelle, Count du Chastel.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.

Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner, Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.

Italy: M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici, M. Buti.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the difficulty in connection with article 16 of the Covenant had been discussed on Saturday (the 10th October) between the heads of the French, German and British delegations.¹ The outcome of the conversation was the text of a note which the Allied Powers might address to Germany. This contained a little of the ideas of everyone and combined all their views. The text had been communicated yesterday to the Italian and Belgian delegations.

(The text was distributed. Annex.)²

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked the German delegation whether they had examined the proposal.

DR. STRESEMAN said that on the general attitude of the German Government towards Germany's entry into the League of Nations and on the effect of the obligations resulting from article 16 and the articles connected therewith, he had already spoken on the 8th October.³ Although the new proposal could be said to change the position taken up by the League of Nations, it still entailed a very serious situation for Germany. The declaration stated what was evident to Germany, namely, that there existed an obligation to collaborate loyally; and it

¹ See Nos. 532 and 533.

² Not here printed. See No. 532, n. 2.

³ See No. 8.

defined at the same time in a practical manner what this collaboration was to consist of. The proposal took into account Germany's preoccupations only by saying that the measure of her participation should conform to the military and geographical situation of Germany. The German delegation understood this to mean that the extent of the participation in the economic sphere would be adjudged in accordance with the military situation. It would be extremely difficult for the German Government to go before the Reichstag and German public opinion with this text. It would be one of the most difficult points in the defence of the pact. If the German Socialists advised them to renounce their reservations regarding article 16, that did not really help their position, which would be much weakened. They had not spoken much of the German internal political situation, but the position was very difficult. Nevertheless, they would do their utmost to get Germany to appreciate the text and the spirit in which it was conceived in the right light, rather than endanger the work which they wanted to perform in Locarno. For this reason they would not propose any amendment to the text except for a small drafting modification. One question, however, preoccupied the mind of the German delegation. That was the contrast between armed and disarmed nations. That was why they had suggested a transitional arrangement until general disarmament was complete. If they presented to Parliament the text of the note now proposed, one of the first questions would be whether disarmament would really be dealt with in earnest. It would be asked whether the League of Nations was going to continue its theoretical discussions of the subject or whether it was really going to take practical steps to bring about general disarmament. The German public regarded with a certain distrust the work of the League of Nations, partly for technical reasons, because they could not imagine such a clumsy apparatus performing efficient work, and partly for material reasons, because the results hitherto attained were so negligible. The German Government could only rest satisfied with the proposal if they were convinced that the next great accomplishment of the League would be disarmament, and if the Powers represented at the conference had really serious intentions of translating disarmament into fact.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN summarised as follows the foregoing remarks: The German delegates asked that they might be authorised to say to their Parliament on their return to Berlin that everyone at the conference was in agreement, not merely to continue theoretical discussions on the question of disarmament, but to get to work practically and to push on the work with all possible speed.

M. BRIAND observed that all who had studied the work of the last two Assemblies of the League and of the Council would know that disarmament was a question on which no doubt existed. The Covenant contemplated general disarmament. The idea corresponded to the general sentiments of France because the French Government wished to diminish the very heavy personal and financial burdens which armaments entailed. But one of the essential reasons which might work most strongly towards the result which Dr. Stresemann desired was that each member of the League should contribute to the forces required to apply sanctions. If, however, out of fifty-two members about twenty said they could not participate, and if among those twenty were found some of the most important members, it was evident that the others would have to make up the difference. The difficulty of disarmament would thus be increased. The question was how to give satisfaction to the German preoccupations. At the last Assembly but one it had been decided to create an organisation which was to prepare a statement as to

what were the conditions of disarmament and what constituted that *bras séculier* to which he had referred.⁴ All nations must take part so that the special organisation created might have the greatest amount of support in its work from every single country. It was precisely before this organisation and before the Council, which would specially consider the question of disarmament, that Germany could submit all the arguments advanced at the last meeting, to show why she was obliged to limit herself to an effort compatible at once with her loyalty and capabilities. In fact, she could demand all the guarantees for which she had asked at the last meeting. He hoped that by a general effort the object by the German delegation might be attained in as short a period as possible. By a special agreement like the pact, or by general agreements, it would be possible to arrive at the realisation of that article of the Covenant which contemplated general disarmament. So far it had not been possible to reach this position. Nevertheless, France had already played a rather large part. She had reduced the period of military service and had agreed to far-reaching naval restrictions. It went without saying that she viewed with goodwill the great work of disarmament, but, on the other hand, she must have constant anxiety regarding her security. If the German Government had difficulties to face, the French Government were in a like position. The statements made before one Parliament might have their repercussion on the other. Dr. Luther's speech would no doubt be criticised. So would his own. If they could make a speech on the same lines at the same moment, it would be a great advantage. He did not think it could be said that they were disagreed on the subject.

DR. STRESEMAN said that he felt bound to say that M. Briand's remarks had caused him grave preoccupation at least in so far as the first part of the speech was concerned. M. Briand had said that if twenty of the fifty-two members of the League declined to co-operate the others were placed in the necessity of maintaining their armaments in order that the action undertaken by the League might be carried out. This attitude signified the stabilisation of the inequality of armament. Inequality of armament was justified by the plea that assistance must be given to the League.

M. BRIAND: 'No! That is a misunderstanding.'

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that it would be better to allow the translation of Dr. Stresemann's speech to be completed and to make the correction later.

M. BRIAND: 'Yes, but it is an entire misinterpretation.'

(The translation of Dr. Stresemann's speech was then continued.)

It seemed to DR. STRESEMAN that the conditions contemplated by M. Briand would amount to the stabilisation of inequality for all time. He thought that this was contrary to the underlying principles of the League of Nations. M. Briand had spoken of the development of article 16. He was no doubt referring to the Geneva Protocol.⁵ The fate of that effort meant that disarmament remained a hope and not a reality. M. Briand suggested that because Germany was completely disarmed others must arm more so as to be in a position to replace the efforts which Germany was unable to make. The Reichstag would undoubtedly decline to concur in such an argument, which also contradicted an earlier remark of M. Briand concerning the military participation of Germany in the efforts of the League of Nations. M. Briand had said that the capacity of Germany was not so feeble as the German delegation seemed to think and that if everyone put 100,000

⁴ i.e. the Co-ordination Committee (see No. 414, n. 4).

⁵ See No. 10, n. 4.

men at the disposal of the League of Nations it was already something. The German principle, and what they wanted, was an equality of armaments sufficient for each country. M. Briand had spoken of French disarmament. He had mentioned the reduction of military service. He (Dr. Stresemann) did not know whether M. Briand had intended to make an allusion to the reduction of effectives. These efforts must be acknowledged, but the principle of individual disarmament was not sufficient. That was not an argument which would have weight with German public opinion and the Reichstag. No one thought of a conflict between France and Germany. Besides if he used that argument, the answer would be given—he asked permission to speak quite frankly—that the number of troops in the occupied area was larger at the present moment than the German forces kept in that territory before the war. The German Government wished to transform the intentions of an individual Power into the deeds of all the nations united in the League of Nations. If their idea was realised, it was not only military force, but also moral force which must continue to back up the law of the League of Nations. The German Government held the opinion that the Conference of Locarno marked the beginning of a new era in political matters and in economic matters. Above all, they wanted it to be a new era in moral matters. In order that this might come about they must agree to disarm and try to establish the principle of disarmament. This would allow the German Government to reply to the questions which would be put to them and that was why the German delegation would be very grateful if M. Briand's remarks could be considered as reflections on the existing situation rather than as a programme for the future.

M. BRIAND said that he was certain that Dr. Stresemann would have discontinued his argument if he had known that it was based on an error. He desired to correct that error. He had not said that a certain number of nations must make a greater effort as the result of the failure of others to participate in action by the League of Nations. On the contrary, he had said that such a state of affairs would arise in consequence of the League accepting the *non possumus* formula put forward by the German delegation at a previous meeting; this was by no means an ideal to which he was looking forward, but a danger to which he was calling attention. Neither had he said that the reduction of military forces should be carried out by the individual initiative of the various States and that it was unnecessary to arrange for action by the League in this matter. In support of this assertion it would be sufficient to quote the resolution which the French delegation had proposed at the last Assembly and which was accepted.⁶ It was the initiative of the French delegation which had been responsible for that resolution, which was entirely in accordance with the ideas expressed by Dr. Stresemann. M. Briand then read the following resolution:—

‘The Assembly,

‘Taking note of the declarations submitted to the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations in respect of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,⁵ and of the fact that the said protocol has not up to the present received the ratifications necessary for putting it into operation immediately;

‘Convinced that the most urgent need for the present time is the

⁶ On September 25, 1925. See *League of Nations: Records of the Sixth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1925), p. 130.

re-establishment of mutual confidence between nations;

'Declaring afresh that a war of aggression should be regarded as an international crime;

'Regards favourably the effort made by certain nations to attain those objects by concluding arbitration conventions and treaties of mutual security conceived in the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in harmony with the principles of the protocol (arbitration, security, disarmament);

'Records the fact that such agreements need not be restricted to a limited area, but may be applied to the whole world;

'Recommends that, after these conventions and treaties have been deposited with the League of Nations, the Council should examine them in order to report to the Seventh Assembly⁷ on the progress in general security brought about by such agreements;

'Undertakes again to work for the establishment of peace by the sure method of arbitration, security and disarmament;

'And, in conformity with the spirit of article 8 of the Covenant, requests the Council to make a preparatory study with a view to a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions have been assured from the point of view of general security as provided for in resolution XIV of the Third Assembly,⁸ the said conference may be convened and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realised.'

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that, as Dr. Stresemann had unfortunately not been at Geneva, he would draw his attention to the following resolution adopted at Geneva on the 26th September, 1925:—⁹

'The Council, in view of the report of the Third Committee¹⁰ to the Sixth Assembly and of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly relating to security, arbitration and disarmament, dated the 25th September, 1925;¹¹

'Decides to refer the report, resolutions and minutes of the Assembly, of the Third Committee¹² and of the Sub-Committee of the Third Committee¹² to the Committee of the Council for examination, requesting it to meet as soon as possible during the interval between the September and December sessions in order—

'(1) To examine the observations made during the Sixth Assembly relating to the constitution and working of the Co-ordination Commission¹³ and submit definite proposals to the Council on the following questions:—

'(a) The composition and name of the co-ordination commission.

'(b) Status of its different members.

'(c) Procedure.

'(2) To make the necessary studies for determining the questions which need to be submitted to a preparatory examination with a view to a possible conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments, and to draft definite proposals to be submitted to the Council on this subject.

⁷ See No. 469, n. 5.

⁸ See *ibid.*, n. 6.

⁹ See *L./N.O.J.* 1925, p. 1390.

¹⁰ See No. 482, n. 10.

¹¹ See n. 6.

¹² See *League of Nations: Records of the Sixth Assembly: Meeting of the Committees: Minutes of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments)* (Geneva, 1925).

¹³ See No. 414, n. 4. See *League of Nations: Records of the Sixth Assembly: Text of the Debates* (Geneva, 1925), p. 119.

‘The Committee of the Council is requested to submit a report on this matter in time for examination by the Council at its session in December.’

Thus, a co-ordination commission was to be set up which would be the instrument for carrying out the preparatory work for disarmament. This resolution had been pressed by the French delegation, and not by himself, as he thought it better not to proceed with the question of disarmament until security had been further discussed. He had thought that disarmament would have more chance of success after the Locarno Conference than before. He had, however, yielded to the French arguments, which had been supported by all the other delegations, and Lord Cecil, with the approval of His Majesty’s Government, had gone further than originally intended. He drew Dr. Stresemann’s attention, therefore, to the fact that the Council had already started work. It was of the greatest importance that in the preparatory committee a German delegate should take part.

M. BRIAND interposed that France was most desirous of this.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN declared that, if the pact and the treaties which were being discussed at Locarno were concluded, His Majesty’s Government would do their utmost to arrive at a practical result as soon as possible. His view had been that without security there could be no disarmament. The moment there was a sense of security, the Allies were bound to work to the utmost for the general disarmament foreshadowed by the resolutions which had been read, by article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and by the founders of the League.

M. VANDERVELDE said that the ‘Texte du Bateau’² had the inestimable advantage that it represented an agreement reached between three Great Powers. The Belgian delegation had not been represented at the conversations, but desired to support the solution. He wished, however, to ask for certain explanations. The first paragraph of the collective note said that the German delegation had asked for explanations. Therefore the collective note was presumably a reply to the German observations made at the meeting of the 8th October.³ The Germans had insisted on the impossibility of direct or indirect military action or of participation in economic sanctions. That was the question to which a reply had to be given. In his opinion, the latter should be afforded by Germany without reservation. First the note said that the Allies were not competent to speak in the name of the League. Then it added that, as a result of the discussions of the Assembly, and of the preparatory work of certain commissions of the League, the Allies were able to give their support to a certain unanimous interpretation by the League.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN intervened to point out that this was not the effect of the proposed note. The Allies were not supporting an interpretation which had the unanimous consent of the Assembly. They were simply stating the interpretation which for their part they put upon article 16.

M. VANDERVELDE remarked that this was a difficult and delicate question. In the third paragraph of the proposed note they had practically taken a passage from the Geneva Protocol⁵ and the note did not therefore go further than the Assembly had previously gone. There was, however, one question which Dr. Stresemann had asked and on which he would like explanations. It was not quite clear whether the third paragraph of the document included the case of economic sanctions. He then read article 11, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Protocol:—

‘Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the

League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree in which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow.'

Paragraph 3 of the proposed note therefore said something which was bound to have the agreement of the Assembly and which at the same time gave a satisfactory reply to Dr. Stresemann. The report of Dr. Benes on article 11 of the protocol showed that the authors of that article had in mind military and not economic sanctions. For his part he had a real repugnance to the exclusion of economic sanctions. He could not understand how any member of the League, in the event of an aggression against the Covenant, could, in view of its declarations of solidarity, fail to participate in economic sanctions. The Council could adjourn the putting into effect of economic sanctions. The proposed interpretation went much further, for its effect was that the decision did not depend on the Council but on each of the individual members. On the question of disarmament, which for a country like this was very important, his reply would be clear and precise. The forces of Belgium were only intended for defence. The operation of the pact would create a sense of appeasement in Europe. It was unnecessary for him to add that Belgium would do all in her power to bring about general disarmament.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that it was important that there should be no misunderstanding on this question. After what M. Vandervelde had said he must explain again in order that no doubt might remain in the mind of anyone.

It was impossible to return to London and to say to the British Parliament that what had been done in the proposed collective note was to give to Germany a right to neutrality in regard to article 16. As far as he understood, they had not and did not demand neutrality. All that they asked was that in a given case the present situation of Germany in the present situation of Europe might be taken into account. It was impossible to demand of anyone a contribution outside his capacity. It was evident that Germany could not be asked to send troops which she did not possess. No country could be asked to send abroad military forces which were necessary for the preservation of order at home. Only the surplus after internal exigencies had been met could be put at the disposal of the League. As for economic sanctions, Mr. Chamberlain interpreted them in the light of the following resolution amending article 16 of the Covenant and adopted by the second Assembly of the League on the 4th October, 1921:—¹⁴

'The fourth paragraph of article 16 shall read as follows:—

'Nevertheless, the Council may, in the case of particular members, postpone the coming into force of any of these measures for a specified period where it is satisfied that such a postponement will facilitate the attainment of the objects of the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, or that it is necessary in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience which will be caused to such members.'

It was true that this resolution had not been ratified by a sufficient number of members of the League, but on the same day the Assembly had adopted the following resolution:—

'The resolutions and the proposals for amendments to article 16 which have been adopted by the Assembly shall, so long as the amendments have not been put in force in the form required by the Covenant, constitute rules for

¹⁴ See *League of Nations: The Records of the Second Assembly: Plenary Meetings . . .* (Geneva, 1921), pp. 807–8.

guidance which the Assembly recommends, as a provisional measure, to the Council and to the members of the League in connection with the application of article 16.¹⁵

What Mr. Chamberlain had done for his part in consenting to the draft was to recognise the evident fact that no nation could give what it did not possess or more than it possessed, and that in making an appeal to a nation to come to the aid of another member of the League one must take account of the special situation of each nation, and even in economic questions one must accept what the Assembly had laid down as a rule for the guidance of the Council. He hoped there would be agreement on the explanations he had given of what they had tried to do.

M. SCIALOJA said that he completely accepted Mr. Chamberlain's explanation.

DR. LUTHER said that he agreed with Mr. Chamberlain that there must be clearness. Germany had never said that she wanted to remain inert in all cases. All that she had asked was that the difficulty of her special military and geographical situation should be taken into account in the three kinds of action contemplated in article 16. These two special factors might also affect the economic situation. He thought that the discussions which had just taken place had given a new impetus to the great problems referred to by Herr Stresemann. That was what the German Government wanted. Apart from the internal political situation, it was a necessity of high politics that the one thing that must come from the Locarno meeting should be a new *essor* to disarmament. He thought that a formula of reconciliation had been found. But in the whole of the discussion he had been conscious that the feeling was expressed that Germany was not in exactly the same situation as all the other Powers, and a wish had been expressed that she should enter on the same plane. But Germany was disarmed and must remain disarmed. She could not change this state of affairs. It could only be changed by other Powers in the League of Nations. The German delegation had been very glad to hear the explanations of M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain in regard to disarmament. The question had, however, only been dealt with as a question of procedure. M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain had related what the League of Nations was doing. But the important thing to Germany was not the procedure, but the object. Germany wanted a new *essor*. They wanted agreement as to the object. They wished that all members of the League should be in a state of armament—not disarmament—for armaments must remain for a certain number of years—which should be as small as possible, but proportional. If they could say in Berlin to the Reichstag that all the States with whom they had worked at Locarno were firmly resolved to accept this object, he thought it would be a great step forward, not only from the point of view of internal politics, but from the point of view of the attainment of the great object for which all were working.

M. BRIAND remarked that what they were now saying was only an extended interpretation of article 8 of the Covenant. The object of the Powers in the League of Nations could not be better defined than in article 8. The task of the League was more difficult because certain great nations like Germany were not members of the League. The entry of Germany would do more for the realisation of article 8 than all the speeches in the Assembly of the League of Nations. If, therefore, Germany wished to fulfil article 8 she could best do so by entering the League.

DR. LUTHER thought it necessary to seek means to make clear to the whole world that the new *essor* was being brought about, not indirectly, but by a new method. Was it not possible to find something which would really constitute an advance?

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 813-4.

M. BRIAND said that once Germany was in the League she would be able to propose anything she liked in order to speed up the work.

DR. LUTHER asked whether it would not be possible to agree to some formula at the conference. Could he not make a definite proposition?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought that it might be possible after reflection to find a solution acceptable to all. For his part, he saw no difficulty in making a declaration at Locarno that, the pact being concluded, the Powers represented at the conference considered that a point of security had been reached which obliged them to try to realise as soon as possible the general disarmament foreshadowed by article 8. Was it not something of that sort that was desired?

DR. LUTHER said that no doubt such a statement would have a certain value. His object, however, was a minimum of armaments, but proportionate.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he was desirous of going as far as possible, but—since they were talking frankly—he would say that he found difficulty in the word 'proportionate'. German disarmament remained a thing apart. The other Powers could not agree to disarm in a measure proportionate to Germany's disarmament. Nevertheless he was willing to do something to show that the realm of theory had been left.

M. BRIAND said they must have a formula. They had made a great effort to agree upon the pact. If they embarked on so difficult a subject as general disarmament they would go a long way out of the scope of the conference, and he would be greatly exceeding his mandate. Disarmament was a problem which must be considered by a conference called for that purpose. Nevertheless he thought it quite possible that following the signature of the pact they might make a very clear declaration about disarmament. To go beyond that was asking the impossible. It was difficult to change the *terrain* of the conference.

M. VANDERVELDE asked whether it would not be possible to add the following sentence to the proposed collective note:—

'Nous vous confirmons que nous considérons la conclusion du Pacte de Sécurité comme de nature, à raison du renforcement de la sécurité à hâter considérablement la réduction générale des armements prévue à l'article 8 du Pacte.'

M. BRIAND said that they might by all means seek a formula for a declaration, but he thought the note should not be complicated.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN agreed and said that what he had thought of was a separate declaration.

M. BRIAND said he would not refuse to examine the possibility of issuing at the close of the conference a solemn declaration to all peoples calling attention to the moral effect of what had been accomplished and to the repercussion which it should have from the point of view of disarmament.

M. VANDERVELDE agreed.

DR. STRESEMANN then referred to the drafting alterations which he wished to make in the third paragraph of the collective note. He proposed that instead of the phrase 'qui ne soit pas hors de proportion avec sa situation militaire', the following should be substituted: 'qui soit compatible avec sa situation militaire'.

A discussion followed in which it was pointed out by the German delegation that the object of the amendment was to avoid the difficulty of translating the double negative into German. The following text was agreed to: 'dans une mesure qui soit compatible avec sa situation militaire, et qui tienne compte de sa position géographique'.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN then asked what further subjects the delegates wished to discuss.

M. BRIAND said that there was still much to do, but not much that it was possible to do at the moment.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought that the best thing was to have further private conversations on the subject of the eastern guarantee.

It was agreed that there should be no sitting of the conference that afternoon and that the next meeting might be fixed perhaps for the following afternoon.

Press Communiqué

The following communiqué was agreed to for issue to the press:—

‘The conference continued the general discussion of the questions raised by the participation in the Covenant of the League of Nations of the eventual signatories of the security pact.

‘The request for supplementary explanations formulated by the German delegation gave rise to an exchange of views between the various delegations which caused the work of the conference to progress towards the adoption of a satisfactory solution of the point under examination.

‘The conference adjourned until Tuesday afternoon, the 13th October.’

No. 11

LOC/137/B.D.] *Notes of a Meeting held between the Heads of the British, French and German Delegations in Mr. Chamberlain's Room at the Grand Hotel, Locarno, October 12, 1925, at 4 p.m.*

[F.O. 840/1(8)]

Very Confidential

As a consequence of the conversation which took place on the pact on Saturday October 10th,¹ between the heads of the British, French and German delegations, a meeting was held today in Mr. Chamberlain's room to give the German delegates an opportunity to raise points which there had not been time to reach on October 10th. The following were present:—

Mr. Austen Chamberlain, M. Briand, Mr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann,

ACCOMPANIED BY—

M. Berthelot, Herr von Schubert, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby.

M. Hesnard, of the French delegation, was present as French translator.

The following note is merely a rough record of what passed and should not in any sense be taken as a verbatim account of the discussion.

M. BRIAND began by saying that, as he understood it, the meeting was of an absolutely informal character. Everything that passed was to be regarded as entirely non-official.

DR. STRESEMANN then began by stating the German point of view and declaring the particular concessions which the German delegation wished to obtain in order to render their position in Germany easier. He said that certain specific points arose. The first of these was the question of the evacuation of Cologne. Could we

¹ See No. 533.

treat this here? Or could we agree that matters were sufficiently advanced to fix a date for evacuation? This matter had a great bearing on the question of ratification of the pact. Developing his point in somewhat greater detail, he said that the three items which were causing him particular preoccupation were:—

(a) The questions of the general staff, of the training of troops and of the number of police in barracks.

(b) The question of the Rhineland régime. He put in a plea that the occupying troops should be reduced to the number which Germany had previously maintained there before the war. Could not the black troops be withdrawn?

(c) The question of legislation in the Rhineland. Could that not be modified; could we not in principle agree to the setting up of a mixed commission to study this and see how far the Rhineland ordinances could be limited strictly to matters concerning the maintenance, safety and requirements of the troops of occupation? In this connection he referred to the letter signed by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, etc., on June 16th, 1919,² which foreshadowed the possibility of an earlier evacuation in given circumstances. This was doubtless what had led to the insertion of article 431 in the treaty, to which his attention had already been drawn by Lord D'Abernon.

In addition, there were two further items which he had in mind:—

(i) the question of prisoners from the Ruhr, a few of whom had been taken away; and

(ii) certain actions outstanding against officers *in contumaciam*.

There were two more points. Part 5 of the League scheme³ for the control of the demilitarised zone when inter-Allied military control was withdrawn. It was understood that the scheme contemplated the establishment of permanent elements of control in Germany. This they held to be contrary to the treaty. Further, the scheme contained, for example, the right of house-to-house search. It seemed, in fact, to result in an aggravated form of military control under the League when once inter-Allied control had ceased.

There was also the question of air traffic. Germany did not wish to be so handicapped as she was at present. She wished to be on a par with others. This question of differentiation between civil and military aircraft was impossible to maintain. At present Germany was hampered and burdened with restrictions. Again, the Germans could not at present even fly over the Rhineland, nor could they erect radio stations there.

M. BRIAND said that it was quite natural that with the prospect of the Security Pact we should consider everything for the realisation of which we hoped. The German delegates were, however, starting subjects which might well outlast the meeting at Locarno. They almost included the question of the Treaty of Versailles. If the German points were agreed to and submitted to French public opinion it might prove too strong fare for the latter. 'Escompter une espérance c'est autre chose qu'escompter une réalité.' If the pact went through, there were

² See No. 523, n. 2.

³ On September 27, 1924, the Council of the League of Nations approved a draft of the organisation to be established in the execution of the Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of the Treaties of Peace. See *L.N.O.J.* 1924, pp. 1324-32, 1340-43, 1348-9, and 1592-95. See also Vol. XXVI, Nos. 227, 229, 230, and 698-700.

The Council adopted a report on the ways and means of assuring to the Commissions of Investigation free and complete execution of their duties on March 14, 1925 (see *L.N.O.J.* 1925, pp. 489 and 609-11).

many such possibilities as Stresemann had foreseen. Once signed and in force, there would be an immediate *détente*. This would render impossible a state of affairs which was possible before. Quite certainly a modification would follow in the conditions of occupation. It was Clemenceau who had introduced the provisions for mollification (he evidently referred to article 431). But this was not the moment. He had not the mandate and his position would be untenable. Nevertheless, he did not disguise that the first thing he would face once the pact was realised was an alleviation of the conditions. He quoted the evacuation of the Ruhr and of the three towns.⁴ It was certain that the first thing to do would be to give another character to the occupation, to reduce the number of troops and to simplify the ordinances. Among other things, the question of aviation would have to be examined. He was not *au courant* with that matter, but it was amongst those which all interested countries would have to study. He must remind the Germans that there was another question—the economic question. They would remember that at the present moment a commercial agreement was under discussion at Paris,⁵ and here he alluded to the somewhat rigid attitude adopted by the German negotiators. No doubt that would be modified also as a result of the pact.

Now he came to a special point—Cologne. That sprang from the application of the treaty, as did also inter-Allied control. Satisfaction must be given by Germany on a certain number of points. He did not know exactly where we stood as regarded that. His reports were not so hopeful as Stresemann seemed to think. Indeed, he gathered that nothing positive had been realised in September. There had been exchanges of view, but no formal agreement on any point had been come to with the Germans. However, he would go so far as to say that once agreement had been reached and a serious beginning made, he would accept the German word as to its execution, and thus accelerate the evacuation. He understood well that the execution of the Pact was slightly incompatible with the existing situation. If there was general security we could make certain allowances. It depended largely on the Germans whether this matter could be expedited. In a general way, Dr. Stresemann's list did not *a priori* seem impossible of realisation. Quite the contrary. He would say for himself that he could even conceive further points which might be considered. They were doubtless in Dr. Stresemann's mind, though he was grateful to Dr. Stresemann for not having mentioned them. But what was impossible was to bring it into the Conference. It was impossible for him to make promises, etc., before the Pact had been put into execution. It was outside the notes which had been exchanged; it was outside his mandate. Surely the Germans, when they returned to their country, could quite well enlarge on the effects of the general reaction on all sorts of things, with the practical certainty that it would have these concrete results. But he could not sign anything of that sort; it was not possible. Here he enlarged upon the effect upon his public opinion, and quoted the phases through which that opinion had passed in the matter of reparation.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN wished to add a few words as to the British attitude. He was whole-heartedly with M. Briand in the programme which he hoped would be realised. If the Pact materialised, public opinion in England would naturally not understand it if everything was maintained just as at present when no *détente* had

⁴ See Nos. 635 and 645.

⁵ A provisional commercial arrangement between France and Germany was signed on February 12, 1926 (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 124, pp. 407–14), and an agreement additional to the arrangement on April 8, 1926 (see *ibid.*, pp. 414–16).

taken place. Once security had been attained, once peace had been assured, other things would follow naturally. He was not prepared to enter into details on such questions as aviation. He agreed with M. Briand that it would be impossible to enter into any binding agreement in regard to these matters in advance, as it would be very difficult for his own public opinion to accept such an arrangement, nor could he possibly sign such an agreement *as a condition of the Pact*. What the Allied Governments might do as a result of the signature of the Pact was a very different thing from what they could do as a condition precedent to the Pact; but he could see no objection to stating quite frankly in Parliament the conclusions which might be drawn in the sense of the wishes of the German Chancellor as flowing from the pact. It would be perfectly possible to give clear expression to hopes which would coincide with the wishes of the German representatives. He felt he could say in advance that he could secure the approval of his Cabinet at home for such a statement, but he did not see his way to give the impression that he had, so to speak, bought the Pact by promises outside the programme of the Conference.

DR. LUTHER declared himself very grateful for all that had been said both by M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain. He said that he understood perfectly that it was very difficult to connect the two points, but at the same time it was necessary to realise that he had counter-difficulties of his own in Germany to meet. Article 16 of the Covenant, for instance, presented a difficulty from the internal point of view which very few outside Germany could possibly understand. It was inevitable that on his return to Germany from Locarno the first question with which he would be met was what concrete result did he bring with him for the alleviation of Germany's condition. Unless he was able to produce something that would satisfy that opinion his position would be a very difficult one in the Reichstag. Would it not be possible, asked Dr. Luther, to agree on the ideas which had been formulated by Mr. Chamberlain and to find a somewhat more precise formula which M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain could see their way to carry in their own countries? He did not wish to speak of details. Perhaps Dr. Stresemann could go more fully into that. In the course of the discussion reference had been made to the method of conveying ideas, but he must emphasise that, so far as he was concerned, it was something concrete he wished for as well, something on which to base the conviction which he would express that something very real had been achieved by the participation of Germany in the Pact. He wished to meet the complaint which would certainly be addressed to him that he had returned empty-handed.

M. BRIAND said that evidently there was a slight difference of opinion here, perhaps even something more than a slight difference. It must not appear that there had been any sort of bargain about the Pact behind the scenes. That would at once so arouse public opinion in France as to make the position impossible. On the other hand, he saw the German difficulty. The German delegation could not be satisfied with mere expressions of hope; otherwise they would be called illusionists. He was able to see himself in the tribune of the Chamber going so far as to say in a carefully prepared impromptu that it was obvious that the conditions of the occupation must be reviewed as a consequence of the Pact, and that such and such changes would naturally derive from its ratification. Surely that was enough for the German representatives. They spoke of arriving in Germany empty-handed. He asked them at this stage to look at their hands and to note that the main interest of this present conference was that a departure was being made

from the old system of alliances to that of mutuality. There were many people in France who would reproach M. Briand that he had weakened the position of France. They would point out to him that they were already secure in their existing alliances and under the Treaty of Versailles, and that there was no reason to alter that state of affairs. The German delegation could make the point that they were already on a footing of complete equality amongst the nations and in the League. In future they would be concerned on that footing in all international questions. If France and Great Britain were forgoing certain advantages it was because they realised that they were getting back to this spirit of equality. Surely this could be easily explained and comprehended by the German public. It was so fully borne out by the facts of the position. M. Briand, on his side, argued that concrete effects would follow very quickly, more quickly, indeed, than the German public could at present anticipate. There was a really concrete case already which the German representatives could make to their public opinion, but it was impossible for M. Briand to enter into a discussion of the programme elaborated by Dr. Stresemann or to arrive at an agreement in regard to it in connection with the present negotiations. He proceeded to elaborate a good deal of what he had already said, suggesting to Herr Luther that he was perhaps more secure in his position in Germany than he (M. Briand) was in his country.

DR. STRESEMANN said that he would refer again to the question of the Cologne zone. German opinion regarded the failure to evacuate on January 10th⁶ as a breach of the treaty and an injustice. He feared that if that question was not decided before ratification, the German Government would be told that it must be. The German delegation did not wish to connect the two questions. M. Briand had said that not much had been settled regarding the Allied requirements for evacuation. That did not tally with his information, and he had gathered from something Mr. Chamberlain had said to him that his reports were to the same effect. (At this point Mr. Chamberlain interjected that his reports on the latest phases of this question were much more favourable; perhaps they were later than those which M. Briand received.) Continuing, Dr. Stresemann said that the remaining points regarding disarmament were quite small. He again pressed the request that a mixed commission should be immediately instituted to see what could be done to alleviate the conditions in the occupied area. For the German people the alleviation of the conditions in the Rhineland was the only thing on which their eyes were rivetted, and, that being so, it was necessary to have something beyond mere words to satisfy that anxiety.

At this stage MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he would permit himself yet another indiscretion. After all, it was his rôle. Herr Stresemann had spoken of the control to be exercised by the League after the Control Commission in Berlin had been withdrawn. He would point out that the Council of the League had not yet decided on the exact nature of the control to be exercised, and in this connection he said that the discussion had three times been adjourned on the initiative of M. Briand himself for the very reason that M. Briand considered that the question could be better discussed when the Pact had been disposed of and when the Germans were present to take part in the discussion.

There was one other observation he had to make, and that was in connection with the interior politics of Germany, on which he would permit himself a word. He said that the German representatives had spoken of German public opinion,

⁶ See No. 553.

but had not a great change come over public opinion since the delegation left Berlin? The effect of this change was proved by the relations between the various press representatives here, where there was no division into camps. If that was the position here, it would surely spread to Germany, and they would find it when they went there, just as he hoped it would be found in London.

Now, as to Cologne, M. Briand would agree with him that the evacuation of that area had nothing to do with the negotiation of the Pact. It only depended on the satisfaction of the Control Commission's demands, but Mr. Chamberlain thought it most important to hasten evacuation as much as possible. He fully recognised the impossibility of the German Government securing the ratification of the Pact unless they knew the occupation was drawing to a close. General Wauchope, the British representative on the Control Commission in Berlin, had reported⁷ that the Commission were on the point of agreement on the matters mentioned by [Dr.] Stresemann, but what was important at the moment was to know how we stood in the matter, and he had telegraphed to enquire⁸ and would ask M. Briand and M. Vandervelde to do the same. At all costs we must avoid that after we had agreed on the Pact we should find obstacles in our way owing to the question of Cologne and disarmament; and, therefore, he had begged General Wauchope to urge his colleagues to proceed as quickly as possible and to report if there was any question which they could not settle at Berlin. That was all we could do at the moment. When we had our reports we could meet again and see whether there was any question so important that our representatives on the spot could not settle it.

Now as to the proposal to set up a mixed commission. That seemed to him to be getting pretty near to a bargain. He did not absolutely refuse without reflection, but he saw great difficulties in the way.

M. BRIAND agreed that it would be fatal so far as his position was concerned, as it was altogether outside his mandate.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN, continuing, reminded the Germans of the relief which was secured to them in the Rhineland in 1924 in the matter of the then existing Rhineland ordinances, as the result of the Dawes Conference last summer.⁹

DR. LUTHER said he really did not know how to formulate any precise proposal, but it was essential to find something. He must point out that the situation of the German people in this matter was different from that of the peoples in other countries. The whole German population suffered under the existing occupation. So far as he could see, there was practically no difference of opinion between us.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN again emphasised the fact that to give undertakings in advance as regards the general position of the Rhineland was impossible. Cologne, however, stood on a different footing, and, if we heard that everything had been settled, and, say, only the settlement of police in barracks was outstanding, then it might perhaps be possible to settle matters here in Locarno.

DR. LUTHER said that this was possibly more encouraging from his point of view and might make things go easier, but he still entertained apprehensions.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN repeated that his offer marked a great advance. If the evacuation of Cologne was effected, it was absurd to suggest that the German delegation had returned to Germany empty handed.

⁷ Berlin telegram No. 360 of October 3, not printed.

⁸ Locarno telegram No. 24 of October 12, not printed (No. 8 to Berlin).

⁹ See No. 225, n. 17.

M. BRIAND undertook to send instructions at once to the French military representative in Berlin, urging an early settlement of the outstanding points, but he appealed to the German representatives to send similar instructions to their commission negotiating with the Control Commission.

The German representatives agreed to do so.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN again said that what preoccupied everyone was to bring things to a satisfactory settlement as soon as possible, and that our military representatives in Berlin should know that we attached the highest importance to their coming to an agreement. Otherwise they held up matters here.

DR. LUTHER here said that there was a certain apprehension in Germany lest, in evacuating Cologne, the only result would be that the troops so evacuated were transferred to the remaining parts of the occupied zone. Could that apprehension not be shown to be baseless?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that, as he understood it, it was to the interest of all and the desire of all that the British troops, when evacuated from Cologne, should still continue to take part in the occupation. As to the question of the actual numbers to be retained and the consequent arrangements, etc., he naturally must be guided by the Secretary of State for War. He could not commit himself to a discussion of that here.

DR. LUTHER interposed to say that he certainly did not object to the presence of the British troops. All he desired was that the *total* number of troops in the remaining zones should not be increased when Cologne was evacuated.

M. BRIAND said that he was unaware of what the actual ideas of the general staffs might be on this point, but he personally was ready strongly to support the thesis that withdrawal from Cologne should not lead to an augmentation of troops in the remaining zones. He would support that strongly, and believed that the French Minister of War (who incidentally was M. Painlevé, the Prime Minister) would agree in this view.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that after all the Powers concerned had a definite economic interest in diminishing the number of troops, and M. BRIAND added that from the electoral point of view there was also advantage in such a reduction.

As regards the announcement to be made to the press, it was agreed to state merely that the meeting had discussed the question of the arbitration treaties and that of security.

No. 12

LOC/143/CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the Seventh Meeting between the British, Belgian, French, Italian, and German Delegations, held at Locarno on October 13, 1925, at 5 p.m.*

[C 13053/459/18]*

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Bentinck.

Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen, M. de Ruelle, Count du Chastel.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.

Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner, Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.

Italy: M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici, M. Buti.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the jurists had been working on article 2 and had a report to make.

SIR C. HURST said that it was not merely a question of a new draft of article 2. The jurists hoped that they had finished their work on the draft of a Rhineland Pact, and that the report they were now submitting would be the final one. He pointed out that at an earlier meeting¹ certain points in article 1 had been reserved. Since the date of that meeting the Committee of Jurists had discussed those points. The first concerned the reference to the maintenance of the territorial *status quo*. After a profound discussion the delegation, which had proposed the suppression of those words, found it possible to withdraw its proposal. The second point concerned not only article 1 but also some other articles. In the original of article 1 there had been a mention of articles 42, 43 and 180, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Treaty of Versailles. It was proposed to delete the reference to article 180, paragraphs 1 and 3. From the juridical point of view the jurists were satisfied that the suppression of this reference would not impair the thesis of the various parties regarding that article.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN explained that the Italian delegation had asked for this modification. He himself was willing to consent to it as it did not change the pact in any way.

M. BRIAND stated that as article 180 had the same object as article 42 and 43 he was willing that no mention should be made of it, if it were clearly understood that the modification involved no legal consequences.

The modification proposed by the jurists was accepted by all the other delegates. (For text see Annex (A).)

SIR C. HURST recalled that when the jurists made their first report² the following articles had been reserved:—

Article 2, which forbade war between France and Germany, and Germany and Belgium.

Article 6, which concerned the eastern arbitration treaties.

Article 7, which maintained the rights and obligations of members of the League.

There was a connection between these articles, and for that reason the jurists could not submit the text of article 2 until article 6, which had not been accepted at London,³ had been approved. If the new text of article 2 were accepted it would be possible to delete the last part of article 6 which Herr Gaus had explained in London that the German Government could not accept.

Sir C. Hurst then read the new text of article 2 (Annex (B).) He wished to add a short explanation about the paragraph numbered (3). The first part of this paragraph referred to action in virtue of a decision by the Assembly or the Council. These words contemplated the case where the Council was to propose measures to ensure the observations of arbitral or judicial decisions. Article 13 of the Covenant entailed the obligation to submit differences to arbitration whenever they fell within the categories suitable for arbitration laid down in the second paragraph of article 13. Words to the same effect appeared in article 3 of the pact. Just as in article 13 of the Covenant, so in the third paragraph of article 2

¹ See No. 1.

² See No. 6.

³ See Nos. 464, 466, and 467.

of the pact, the Council was to propose measures in the event of a failure to give effect to an award.

SIR C. HURST recalled that in article 15 of the Covenant which dealt with the settlement of disputes by the Council there was a paragraph which read: 'If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the disputes, the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.'

In fact, if a dispute were submitted to the Council and the Council could not agree on a report unanimously (excluding the votes of the parties to the dispute), the members of the League resumed their sovereign right to make war. But the last phrase in the third paragraph of article 2, '*pourvu que dans ce dernier cas cette action soit dirigée contre un État qui le premier s'est livré à une attaque,*' excluded all possibility of war unless the other party had begun war. This made it possible without difficulty or danger to suppress the last part of article 6 which the German Government had been unable to accept. The jurists thought that with this draft of article 2 the right claimed by France to help Poland and Czechoslovakia in case of need was completely safeguarded.

M. CHAMBERLAIN, on suggestions made by M. Rolin and M. Scialoja, proposed that, in order to avoid confusion, the words '*du Pacte de la Société des Nations*' should be inserted after the reference to article 15.

This was agreed to.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he understood that if article 2 were accepted there would be no further need for the last paragraph of the original article 6. Perhaps DR. STRESEMANN would say whether he accepted this.

DR. STRESEMANN indicated his acceptance.

M. BRIAND said that he accepted in principle. Article 6, however, concerned the question of guarantees, and out of a sense of loyalty he must consult the parties interested before giving a final reply.

M. VANDERVELDE and M. SCIALOJA, having indicated their concurrence in the new text, MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that it was accepted subject to M. Briand's consultation with the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Article 3

SIR C. HURST said that a small modification had been made in the third paragraph, whereas the original text had read '*statuant conformément au pacte,*' the new text read '*statuant conformément à l'article 15 du pacte*'. The jurists had thought it best to specify article 15. Two articles of the Covenant permitted the Council to consider questions which threatened to disturb the peace of the world—articles 11 and 15. There was this difference between the two. In the case of article 11 the recommendations of the Council were not obligatory unless accepted by both parties. When the Council acted under article 15, however, the votes of the two parties were not counted. It was therefore most desirable to mention article 15 because that made it clear that when the Council considered the question the votes of the contending parties would not be counted.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that in this article also the words '*de la Société des Nations*' should be added after the reference to article 15 of the '*pacte*'.

SIR C. HURST said there was a further modification. Article 9 of the original text had been drawn up at a time when it was thought that the arbitration treaties between Germany and France, Germany and Belgium, Germany and Czechoslo-

vakia and Germany and Poland would be concluded at perhaps a considerable interval after the pact itself. As it now seemed clear that the arbitration treaties would all be signed on the same day as the pact there was no need to have an article providing for the communication of the treaties prior to ratification. The jurists proposed, therefore, to suppress article 9 and to amend the last paragraph of article 3 so as to read: 'Les modalités de ces méthodes de règlement pacifique sont l'objet de conventions particulières signées en date de ce jour.'

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that His Majesty's Government had foreseen the case where they would have no knowledge of the arbitration treaties when signing the pact. They wanted to provide for seeing them before ratification. Since, however, the work at Locarno was going to be complete, he thought that, as proposed by the jurists, there was no necessity for article 9, and that the same result could be obtained by adding those few words to paragraph 4 of article 3. Of course, His Majesty's Government could not ratify until they had the arbitration treaties before them.

The new text of article 3 (Annex (C)) was accepted.

SIR C. HURST said that in article 6, which had been reserved, the part beginning 'nor yet the right' down to the end would be omitted.

This was accepted. (For new text see Annex (D).)

Article 7

SIR C. HURST said that the original text had provoked the criticism that it was inconsistent with article 2. In certain cases the Covenant made war legitimate. Article 2, however, restricted the number of such cases. It was thus not quite correct to say that the rights of the parties were not affected. For that reason a new draft was proposed which Sir C. Hurst read (Annex (E)). The advantage of the article as thus drawn up made it clear that the pact did not diminish in any way the influence and prestige of the League of Nations.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the parties to the pact had agreed to restrict their rights to make war. His Majesty's Government had attached great importance to the original article. He accepted the new draft, however, because it gave an even greater assurance of peace.

M. BRIAND asked whether there was any serious reason for the disappearance of the first part of the article.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN replied that when the jurists had discussed this article and article 2 they thought that there might be a certain ambiguity, if not a contradiction. There was a certain restriction of the right to resort to war in article 2 which was not contained in the Covenant. The jurists asked themselves whether article 2 or article 7 was to prevail. The two articles were now in conformity with one another.

In a further explanation to M. Briand, Mr. Chamberlain said that Sir C. Hurst had drawn his attention to the section of the preamble which spoke of supplementary guarantees within the framework of the Covenant. They had given supplementary guarantees of peace in the framework of the League, but in doing so had restricted a little their right to make war.

Article 7 was accepted.

Article 10

SIR C. HURST said that the last article of the original text, which now became article 10, was very short and had been expanded. He read the new text (Annex (F)). He wished to point out two consequences of article 10. If the delegates

proposed to sign a convention at Locarno they would have to have full powers. It was customary at international conferences for the full powers of each plenipotentiary to be submitted to a small committee to see that they were in order. Secondly, there was a point on which the jurists required instructions. That was the question of language. The Treaty of Versailles had been drafted in two languages, the Treaty of Saint-Germain in three. What was desired with regard to this pact?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the Treaty of Versailles was in French and English, and the League of Nations also employed French and English. It seemed to him that for the benefit of the peace of the world and in order to avoid misunderstanding, it was necessary to have one text. If the text were signed as he would have liked, in both French and English, the German delegates and the Italian delegates would be justified in asking for a German and an Italian text. He had therefore decided to sacrifice his own language and proposed to accept one text, namely, French.

M. BRIAND and DR. LUTHER thanked Mr. Chamberlain for his proposal.

M. SCIALOJA desired to raise one point. By whom would the treaty be deposited with the League of Nations.

Both M. BRIAND and DR. LUTHER suggested that His Majesty's Government should deposit it, and to this there was general agreement.

M. BRIAND said that he did not think it necessary to specify this in the treaty. It could be done in a separate document.

SIR C. HURST said that the point had been considered by the jurists. They thought that the conference would decide to draw up at its last meeting a final protocol in which could be designated the delegation charged with the task of depositing the treaty with the League of Nations.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN invited the conference to thank the jurists, who by their good personal relations had so powerfully aided them in concluding their work.

The other delegates supported Mr. Chamberlain.

M. BRIAND proposed that a full text of the treaty should be prepared and that the conference should read through it once more after his consultations with the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that each delegation should appoint a representative to examine the full powers.

M. BRIAND said that there was not entire agreement on the form of signature. They must decide whether the treaty was to be initialled or signed at Locarno.

DR. LUTHER said that when the German Government had received and accepted the invitation to the conference they had not quite realised that the conference would be definitive. They had not therefore full power to sign. They were considering whether it was not possible to get full power without returning to Germany.

M. BRIAND said that he too had come without full powers, but he had taken steps to get them. It appeared to him that the text should be at least initialled.

DR. LUTHER said that at first sight he was ready to agree though he had not studied the question fully.

M. BRIAND said that the public wanted something certain. If there was anything indefinite a great deal of anxiety would be caused and all sorts of discussions would begin in the hope that something might yet be done by the opposition parties to prevent signature. But if they agreed to initial subject to approval, that was something definite for public opinion. The act of initialling fully reserved the

rights of the German Government and the Reichstag.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he attached great importance to not leaving Locarno without putting something on paper. He would regret it deeply. At the same time he understood the difficulty. He did not, however, want the draft of a pact which carried no signature. He wanted at least to initial.

DR. LUTHER said he would give the most favourable consideration to the matter.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that even if they signed ratification would be necessary. There was also the question of parliamentary approval. It would be necessary in his case and in that of M. Vandervelde and M. Briand. He thought in fact that it was only M. Scialoja who had absolute authority to sign.

M. SCIALOJA said that he also had need of ratification according to the Italian constitution.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked Sir C. Hurst to explain the scheme which had been followed in the case of the application of the Dawes Plan.⁴

SIR C. HURST said that the London Conference⁵ had terminated on the 16th August 1924. It was not possible for the delegates to sign at the moment without the approval of their Parliaments. At its last sitting the London Conference had adopted a solemn resolution approving the text of all the instruments *ne varietur* which excluded the possibility of any country demanding a modification in the text. A fortnight later a further meeting had been held to sign, but the signatories were not in every case the same persons who had initialled the final protocol.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he invited the delegates to come to London to sign the agreement. Nothing would please him more than that a document so important for the peace of the world should be signed in London. He himself attached so much importance to it that he wished to sign personally.

M. BRIAND and DR. LUTHER indicated that it was their wish also to sign personally.

M. BRIAND asked how the conference was to proceed as regards the remainder of its labours. There remained the texts of the arbitration treaties to be drawn up.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that His Majesty's Government were not a party directly interested. But if he could aid in the performance of the work he would be only too glad to do so.

M. BRIAND gladly accepted Mr. Chamberlain's offer.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he would put at their disposal his own services and those of Sir C. Hurst.

DR. LUTHER expressed his appreciation.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he hoped that the conversations with the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives could be speeded up so that they could have all the instruments before them before signature. When the separate agreements were made they must invite the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia to the last sitting when the signature of the pact would perhaps take place.

M. FROMAGEOT stated that the Franco-German and Belgo-German arbitration treaties were almost completed and would almost certainly be ready during the course of the following day. But it was otherwise with the Polish-German and Czechoslovak-German treaties and the special conventions between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia. These were not only technical conventions; the two arbitration treaties must contain provisions of principle, analogous to those of the Rhineland Pact. It was therefore indispensable that these political conventions of a technical nature should form the subject of discussion.

⁴ See No. 27, n. 8.

⁵ See No. 225, n. 17.

M. SCIALOJA raised the question of the title of the treaty. The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee was not a very satisfactory title.

M. BRIAND said that no title would be necessary. The treaty would be named after the place where it was signed.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that although the treaty might be signed in London they should take a resolution to speak of it as the Treaty of Locarno, in order to perpetuate the memory of the good relations established between the Powers at Locarno.

This matter was referred to the jurists for arrangement.

Next Meeting.—The next meeting was fixed for 5 p.m. the 14th October, when it was hoped that the conference would be able to read the full text of the pact and of the Franco-German and German-Belgian arbitration treaties.

Press Communiqué.—The following communiqué was agreed to for issue to the press:—

‘The conference met at 5 p.m. on Tuesday, the 13th October, to hear the full report of the jurists on the present state of the work of revision which had been entrusted to them with a view to the final draft of the security pact.

‘The conference decided to adopt the greater part of the text which was examined, only a few points being reserved for further discussion. The next meeting was fixed for Wednesday, the 14th October, at 5 p.m.’

ANNEX A ARTICLE 1^{er}

Les hautes parties contractantes garantissent individuellement et collectivement, ainsi qu'il est stipulé dans les articles ci-après, le maintien du *statu quo* territorial résultant des frontières entre l'Allemagne et la Belgique et entre l'Allemagne et la France et l'inviolabilité desdites frontières telles qu'elles sont fixées par ou en exécution du Traité de Paix signé à Versailles le 28 juin 1919, ainsi que l'observation des dispositions des articles 42 et 43 dudit traité, concernant la zone démilitarisée.

ANNEX B ARTICLE 2

L'Allemagne et la Belgique et de même l'Allemagne et la France s'engagent réciproquement à ne se livrer de part et d'autre à aucune attaque o[u] invasion et à ne recourir de part et d'autre en aucun cas à la guerre.

Toutefois, cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit:

1. De l'exercice du droit de légitime défense, c'est-à-dire de s'opposer à une violation de l'engagement de l'alinéa précédent ou à une contravention flagrante aux articles 42 ou 43 du Traité de Versailles lorsqu'une telle contravention constitue un acte non provoqué d'aggression et qu'en raison du rassemblement de forces armées dans la zone démilitarisée une action immédiate est nécessaire;
2. D'une action en application de l'article 16 du Pacte;
3. D'une action en raison d'une décision prise par l'Assemblée ou par le Conseil, ou en application de l'article 15, alinéa 7, pourvu que dans ce dernier cas cette action soit dirigée contre un État qui le premier s'est livré à une attaque.

ANNEX C
ARTICLE 3

Prenant en considération les engagements respectivement pris par elles dans l'article 2, l'Allemagne et la Belgique et l'Allemagne et la France s'engagent à régler par voie pacifique et de la manière suivante toutes questions de quelque nature qu'elles soient qui viendraient à les diviser et qui n'auraient pu être résolues par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires:

Toutes questions au sujet desquelles les parties se contesteraient réciproquement un droit seront soumises à des juges, à la décision desquels les parties s'engagent à se conformer.

Toute autre question sera soumise à une commission de conciliation et, si l'arrangement proposé par cette commission n'est pas agréé par les deux parties, la question sera portée devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, statuant conformément à l'article 15 du Pacte.

Les modalités de ces méthodes de règlement pacifique sont l'objet de conventions particulières signées en date de ce jour.

ANNEX D
ARTICLE 6

Les dispositions du présent traité ne portent pas atteinte aux droits et obligations résultant pour les hautes parties contractantes du Traité de Versailles ainsi que des arrangements complémentaires, y compris ceux signés à Londres le 30 août 1924.⁶

ANNEX E
ARTICLE 7

Le présent traité, destiné à assurer le maintien de la paix et conforme au Pacte de la Société des Nations, ne pourra être interprété comme restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre les mesures propres à sauvegarder efficacement la paix du monde.

ANNEX F
ARTICLE 10

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications seront déposées à Genève dans les archives de la Société des Nations aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Il entrera en vigueur dès que toutes les ratifications auront été déposées et que l'Allemagne sera devenue membre de la Société des Nations.

Le présent traité, fait en un seul exemplaire, sera déposé aux archives de la Société des Nations, dont le secrétaire général sera prié de remettre à chacun des hautes parties contractantes des copies certifiées conformes.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent traité.

Fait à Locarno le octobre 1925

⁶ Sec No. 343, n. 9.

No. 13

LOC/180/CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Locarno Conference, held on October 15, 1925, at 10.30 a.m.*

[C 13095/459/18]*

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Bentinck.
Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen, M. de Ruelle, Count du Chastel.
France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.
Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner, Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.
Italy: M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici, M. Buti.
Poland: Count Skrzynski.
Czechoslovakia: Dr. Benes.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that the pact should be read for the third time. He asked whether the delegates would like to go through it article by article.

M. BRIAND suggested that it was unnecessary to read the entire text, and that delegates should only make any necessary observations, thus limiting the discussion.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that there were a few small corrections to be made which he would ask Sir C. Hurst to explain.

SIR C. HURST said that corrections should be made in articles 5 and 8. In the second and third paragraphs of article 5 the words 'ou judiciaire' should be added after the words 'décision arbitrale'. The object was to bring the pact into conformity with amendments which had been made in the Covenant of the League. In article 8 the word 'enregistré' should be substituted for 'déposé'. The reason for this was that the word 'déposé' was used in the final article of the treaty in a different sense.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN believed that everyone was in agreement in accepting the proposed amendments. He asked whether anyone had any observations to make.

No observations being made, the amendments were adopted.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the conference could now turn to the arbitration treaties between France and Germany and Belgium and Germany.

M. VANDERVELDE said that he first wished to make some supplementary observations, which particularly concerned Belgium, on the subject of the pact. Articles 4, 5 and 8 of the pact provided for certain deliberations by the Council of the League:—

Article 4 for the establishment of violations of article 2 of the treaty or of breaches of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

Article 5 for the indication of the steps to be taken in order to ensure the execution of arbitral decisions.

Article 8 for the examination of the guarantees given by the League of Nations.

It might happen that Belgium would not be a member of the Council when these deliberations took place, since Belgium was only a temporary member. According to the terms of paragraph 5 of article 4 of the Covenant of the League

of Nations 'any member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member of the League'.

He thought that it ought to be understood between them that the deliberations mentioned in articles 4, 5 and 8 had a particular interest for Belgium, and that, if when they took place, she was not a member of the Council, she should be invited to take part in the deliberations. He had thought of embodying this agreement in an exchange of notes, but it would be sufficient if it could be mentioned in the minutes of the various delegations.¹

M. BRIAND said that the issue of such an invitation to Belgium would be in complete conformity with the jurisprudence of the League of Nations. He enquired whether Signor Scialoja, as a member of the Council, shared his view.

M. SCIALOJA replied in the affirmative.

The other delegates signified their concurrence.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that they should now turn to the arbitration treaties. He believed the time had come, in accordance with what had been previously arranged,² to invite the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives to hear the treaties of arbitration between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium. It might be useful and interesting to them to be present, as they had to discuss similar treaties with Germany.

(Count Skrzynski, representing Poland, and Dr. Benes, representing Czechoslovakia, entered at this point.)

MR. CHAMBERLAIN, addressing the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia, said that the work on the text of the pact to be signed by the Powers hitherto represented at the conference had been finished, and the conference was about to examine the text of the Franco-German and German-Belgian arbitration treaties. They thought it would be useful and interesting to the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia to be present at that time, since they had arbitration treaties with Germany under discussion.

Mr. Chamberlain said that the Franco-German treaty and the German-Belgian treaty were drawn up in identic terms (see Annex). He asked the delegates in turn whether they had any observations to make upon them.

None of the delegates wished to make any observations, and Mr. Chamberlain requested M. Fromageot to give a brief explanation of the scope of the treaty.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the treaties which France and Germany and Belgium and Germany were about to sign were those contemplated in article 3 of the Rhineland Pact³ and applied the principles of that article. Any dispute concerning a right which had not been settled by diplomatic means was to be submitted either to the Permanent Court of International Justice or some other arbitral tribunal. It was provided in article 1 that this procedure should not apply to questions anterior to the entry into force of the treaty. Provision was made in article 2 for a preliminary enquiry by a conciliation commission prior to submission to arbitration. Two alternatives had been considered:-

- (a) Obligatory conciliation before judges; and
- (b) Conciliation by agreement between the parties.

The last alternative had been accepted. The work of conciliation was to be

¹ M. Vandervelde's declaration is printed in *D.D.B.*, vol. II, No. 122.

² See No. 541.

³ See No. 12, Annex C.

entrusted to a permanent commission consisting of five members. Of these, three were to be neutral, and, in addition, each side was to be represented by a commissioner of its own nationality. One of the three neutral members would be president. M. Fromageot dwelt on the advantage of this system over that of submitting disputes to a body with a single neutral member, since such a course too often led to the latter person becoming in the end the sole judge. In particular, he said that the presence of a commissioner from each of the parties would ensure that the procedure adopted by the commission would be acceptable to both parties. If the conciliation commission did not succeed, the matter was to be taken before the Permanent Court of International Justice or before a special arbitral tribunal. M. Fromageot outlined the various kinds of disputes which it would be advantageous to submit to each of these two bodies. The Permanent Court had greater authority and was less costly than a special tribunal, because its judges received fixed salaries. In some cases the question at issue might suitably be submitted to a single arbitrator of recognised authority or to technical arbitrators. If a solution acceptable to all parties were not attained, either could bring the matter before the Permanent Court of International Justice, and eventually before the Council of the League, which would act in accordance with article 15 of the Covenant. There were two special points to which M. Fromageot desired to draw attention. In the first place, each party must be able to count on the other party maintaining the *status quo* and not doing anything to prejudice or hinder the procedure for peaceful settlement. This was ensured by article 19. Secondly, there was the provision in article 20 that the treaty should remain applicable as between the contracting parties even where third parties were also concerned in the dispute. M. Fromageot also pointed out that, in virtue of article 21, ratifications would be deposited at Geneva at the same time as those of the Rhineland pact, and the treaty would remain in force in the same conditions as the Rhineland pact.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN, in the name of all the delegates, thanked M. Fromageot for his clear explanation.

Mr. Chamberlain then presented a copy of the Rhineland pact to Count Skrzynski and Dr. Benes.

M. FROMAGEOT wished to draw attention to certain small modifications which should be made in the arbitration treaties which he had just explained.

In article 1, 'l'Allemagne et la France,' in the case of the Franco-German treaty, and 'l'Allemagne et la Belgique,' in the case of the Belgian-German treaty, should be substituted for 'les hautes parties contractantes'.

In the last sentence of the first paragraph of article 1 the word 'notamment' should be inserted between the words 'comprennent' and 'celles que'.

In article 16, the words 'd'un commun accord' should be deleted.

In article 19, 'le Tribunal arbitral de la Cour permanente' should read 'le Tribunal arbitral ou la Cour permanente'.

M. SCIALOJA drew attention to paragraph 2 of article 1. It seemed to him that the phrase 'ayant leur origine dans des faits qui sont antérieurs à la présente convention' was rather widely drawn and somewhat perilous. It might give an excuse for withdrawing a large number of disputes from arbitration.

After some discussion it was decided to replace the phrase 'ayant leur origine dans des faits' by the phrase 'nées de faits'.

The full text of the German-French treaty is annexed to the minutes of the ninth meeting.⁴

⁴ See No. 15, below. This sentence presumably did not form part of the original notes of

MR. CHAMBERLAIN then asked Count Skrzynski and Dr. Benes to say what the position was in their negotiations with Germany.

DR. BENES said that, after discussion with the German representatives, it had been decided that the German-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty should be identic with the Franco-German treaty as regards articles 1 to 20. The preamble would have to be different, as in the French treaty the preamble referred to the Rhineland pact. There was also a political question which remained to be discussed between the jurists, but he thought that they would arrive very rapidly at a solution. He hoped that at the next meeting the discussion of the German-Czechoslovak treaty would be practically the same as the discussion at the present meeting, namely, that the treaty would go through without discussion.

COUNT SKRZYNSKI said that he was in a position similar to that of Dr. Benes. He anticipated no difficulty regarding the Polish-German treaty, and hoped on the following day to be able to present the document to the conference.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN hoped that, in that case, it would be possible to initial on the afternoon of the following day (the 16th October). The question had been raised whether this should take place at a public session—that was, whether the press and the photographers should be present. For his part, he was entirely opposed to this. He would be very ready and happy to have a photograph of the conference. That was another thing. But he did not wish to give a theatrical turn to a matter of such importance. He was quite willing for the press and the photographers to come in after signature. Another point which it was necessary to consider was the question of publication. It seemed to him that they must fix a date when publication of all the treaties resulting from the conference should be published in the various countries. It would have to be after the return of the delegates to their respective countries, and on a date fixed with due regard to the journey which each of them had to make and the preparatory work which must be done before publication.

Mr. Chamberlain also proposed that the Mayor of Locarno should be asked to come into the last meeting of the conference when the photograph was taken.

Mr. Chamberlain suggested also that the jurists should draw up the final protocol.

M. BRIAND thought that M. Fromageot had already put something on paper.

M. FROMAGEOT read a draft.

DR. LUTHER said that in principle the draft seemed satisfactory, but he asked that it might be referred to the jurists.

M. BRIAND readily agreed. What M. Fromageot had read was simply a rough draft which might serve as a basis.

M. FROMAGEOT undertook to send copies of the final protocol to all the delegations.

Press Communiqué

The following communiqué was agreed to for issue to the press:

‘The conference at its eighth plenary meeting adopted the text of the draft Security Pact.

‘The question of the arbitration treaties was then taken up.

‘The conference invited the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia to

the Eighth Meeting, which survive only in Confidential Print. The text here printed is taken from the Proceedings of the Locarno Conference October 1925 (Confidential Print 12877) in which the draft Franco-German treaty is attached to the notes of the Eighth Meeting.

join the meeting in order to hear the statement regarding the work of the jurists on the draft treaties of arbitration between Germany and France on the one part and Germany and Belgium on the other, the texts of which drafts had been adopted by the delegations concerned.

'The representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia then gave the conference an account of the advanced state of their own negotiations with the representatives of the German Government in regard to the drafting of arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland on the one part and Germany and Czechoslovakia on the other.

'It was decided to defer to a later meeting the discussion of the date of publication of all the agreements submitted to the conference for final adoption.'

ANNEX

Arbitration Treaty between Germany and France

Les soussignés dûment autorisés,

Chargés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs de fixer les modalités suivant lesquelles il sera, ainsi qu'il est prévu dans l'article 3 du traité conclu en date de ce jour entre l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie, procédé à la solution pacifique de toutes les questions qui ne pourraient être résolues à l'amiable entre l'Allemagne et la France,

Ont convenu des dispositions suivantes:

PARTIE I

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Toutes contestations, entre les hautes parties contractantes, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, au sujet desquelles les parties se contesteraient réciproquement un droit, et qui n'auraient pu être réglées à l'amiable par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires seront soumises pour jugement soit à un tribunal arbitral soit à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ainsi qu'il est prévu ci-après. Il est entendu que les contestations ci-dessus visées comprennent celles que mentionne l'article 13 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Cette disposition ne s'applique pas aux contestations ayant leur origine dans des faits qui sont antérieurs à la présente convention et qui appartiennent au passé.

Les contestations pour la solution desquelles une procédure spéciale est prévue par d'autres conventions en vigueur entre les hautes parties contractantes seront réglées conformément aux dispositions de ces conventions.

ARTICLE 2

Avant toute procédure arbitrale ou avant toute procédure devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, la contestation pourra être, d'un commun accord entre les parties, soumise à fin de conciliation à une Commission internationale permanente, dite *Commission permanente de Conciliation*, constituée conformément à la présente convention.

ARTICLE 3

S'il s'agit d'une contestation dont l'objet, d'après la législation intérieure de l'une des parties relève de la compétence des tribunaux nationaux de celles-ci, le différend ne sera soumis à la procédure prévue par la présente convention

qu'après jugement passé en force de chose jugée rendu, dans des délais raisonnables, par l'autorité judiciaire nationale compétente.

ARTICLE 4

La Commission permanente de Conciliation prévue à l'article 2 sera composée de cinq membres, qui seront désignés comme il suit, savoir: les hautes parties contractantes nommeront chacune un commissaire choisi parmi leurs nationaux respectifs et désigneront, d'un commun accord, les trois autres commissaires parmi les ressortissants de tierces Puissances; ces trois commissaires devront être de nationalités différentes et, parmi eux, les hautes parties contractantes désigneront le président de la commission.

Les commissaires sont nommés pour trois ans; leur mandat est renouvelable. Ils resteront en fonctions jusqu'à leur remplacement; et, dans tous les cas, jusqu'à l'achèvement de leurs travaux en cours au moment de l'expiration de leur mandat.

Il sera pourvu, dans le plus bref délai, aux vacances qui viendraient à se produire, par suite de décès, de démission ou de quelque autre empêchement, en suivant le mode fixé pour les nominations.

ARTICLE 5

La Commission permanente de Conciliation sera constituée dans les trois mois qui suivront l'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention.

Si la nomination des commissaires à désigner en commun n'intervenait pas dans ledit délai ou, en cas de remplacement, dans les trois mois à compter de la vacance du siège, le président de la Confédération suisse sera, à défaut d'autre entente, prié de procéder aux désignations nécessaires.

ARTICLE 6

La Commission permanente de Conciliation sera saisie par voie de requête adressée au président par les deux parties agissant d'un commun accord ou, à défaut, par l'une ou l'autre des parties.

La requête, après avoir exposé sommairement l'objet du litige, contiendra l'invitation à la commission de procéder à toutes mesures propres à conduire à une conciliation.

Si la requête émane d'une seule des parties, elle sera notifiée par celle-ci sans délai à la partie adverse.

ARTICLE 7

Dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la date où l'une des hautes parties contractantes aurait porté une contestation devant la Commission permanente de Conciliation, chacune des parties pourra, pour l'examen de cette contestation, remplacer son commissaire par une personne possédant une compétence spéciale dans la matière.

La partie qui userait de ce droit en fera immédiatement la notification à l'autre partie; celle-ci aura, dans ce cas, la faculté d'agir de même dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la date où la notification lui sera parvenue.

ARTICLE 8

La Commission permanente de Conciliation aura pour tâche d'élucider les questions en litige, de recueillir à cette fin toutes les informations utiles par voie d'enquête ou autrement et de s'efforcer de concilier les parties. Elle pourra, après

examen de l'affaire, exposer aux parties les termes de l'arrangement qui lui paraîtrait convenable et leur impartir un délai pour se prononcer.

A la fin de ses travaux, la commission dressera un procès-verbal constatant, suivant le cas, soit que les parties se sont arrangées et, s'il y a lieu, les conditions de l'arrangement, soit que les parties n'ont pu être conciliées.

Les travaux de la commission devront, à moins que les parties en conviennent différemment, être terminés dans le délai de six mois à compter du jour où la commission aura été saisie du litige.

ARTICLE 9

A moins de stipulation spéciale contraire, la Commission permanente de Conciliation réglera elle-même sa procédure qui, dans tous les cas, devra être contradictoire. En matière d'enquêtes, la commission, si elle n'en décide autrement à l'unanimité, se conformera aux dispositions du Titre III (Commissions internationales d'Enquête) de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.⁵

ARTICLE 10

La Commission permanente de Conciliation se réunira sauf accord contraire entre les parties, au lieu désigné par son président.

ARTICLE 11

Les travaux de la Commission permanente de Conciliation ne sont publics qu'en vertu d'une décision prise par la commission avec l'assentiment des parties.

ARTICLE 12

Les parties seront représentées auprès de la Commission permanente de Conciliation par des agents ayant mission de servir d'intermédiaire entre elles et la commission; elles pourront, en outre, se faire assister par des conseils et experts nommés par elles à cet effet et demander l'audition de toutes personnes dont le témoignage leur paraît utile.

La commission aura, de son côté, la faculté de demander des explications orales aux agents, conseils et experts des deux parties ainsi qu'à toutes personnes qu'elle jugerait utile de faire comparaître avec l'assentiment de leur Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 13

Sauf disposition contraire de la présente convention, les décisions de la Commission permanente de Conciliation seront prises à la majorité des voix.

ARTICLE 14

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à faciliter les travaux de la Commission permanente de Conciliation et, en particulier, à lui fournir dans la plus large mesure possible tous documents et informations utiles, ainsi qu'à user des moyens dont elles disposent pour leur permettre de procéder sur leur territoire et selon leur législation à la citation et à l'audition de témoins ou d'experts et à des transports sur les lieux.

ARTICLE 15

Pendant la durée des travaux de la Commission permanente de Conciliation, chacun des commissaires recevra une indemnité dont le montant sera arrêté, d'un commun accord, entre les hautes parties contractantes qui en supporteront chacune une part égale.

⁵ See No. 604, n. 5.

ARTICLE 16

A défaut de conciliation devant la Commission permanente de Conciliation, la contestation sera soumise d'un commun accord par voie de compromis soit à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans les conditions et suivant la procédure prévues par son statut, soit à un tribunal arbitral dans les conditions et suivant la procédure prévues par la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907⁵ pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

A défaut d'accord entre les parties sur le compromis et après un préavis d'un mois, l'une ou l'autre elles aura la faculté de porter directement par voie de requête la contestation devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

PARTIE II

ARTICLE 17

Toutes questions sur lesquelles le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand seraient divisés sans pouvoir les résoudre à l'amiable par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires, dont la solution ne pourrait être recherchée par un jugement ainsi qu'il est prévu par l'article 1^{er} de la présente convention et pour lesquelles une procédure de règlement ne serait pas déjà prévue par un traité en vigueur entre les parties, seront soumises à la Commission permanente de Conciliation, qui sera chargée de proposer aux parties une solution acceptable et, dans tous les cas, de présenter un rapport.

La procédure prévue par les articles 6 à 15 de la présente convention sera appliquée.

ARTICLE 18

Si, dans le mois qui suivra la clôture des travaux de la Commission permanente de Conciliation, les deux parties ne se sont pas entendues, la question sera, à la requête de l'une ou de l'autre partie, porté devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui statuera conformément à l'article 15 du Pacte de la Société.

Disposition générale

ARTICLE 19

Dans tous les cas, et notamment si la question au sujet de laquelle les parties sont divisées résulte d'actes déjà effectués ou sur le point de l'être, la Commission de Conciliation ou, si celle-ci ne s'en trouvait pas saisie, le Tribunal arbitral de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale statuant conformément à l'article 41 de son statut,⁶ indiqueront dans le plus bref délai possible, quelles mesures provisoires doivent être prises. Il appartiendra au Conseil de la Société des Nations, s'il est saisi de la question, de pourvoir de même à des mesures provisoires appropriées. Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à s'y conformer, à s'abstenir de toute mesure susceptible d'avoir une répercussion préjudiciable à l'exécution de la décision ou aux arrangements proposés par la Commission de Conciliation, et en général à ne procéder à aucun acte de quelque nature qu'il soit susceptible d'aggraver ou d'étendre le différend.

ARTICLE 20

La présente convention reste applicable entre les hautes parties contractantes encore que d'autres Puissances aient également un intérêt dans le différend.

⁶ See No. 604, n. 6.

ARTICLE 21

La présente convention sera ratifiée. Les ratifications en seront déposées à Genève à la Société des Nations en même temps que les ratifications du traité conclu en date de ce jour entre l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie.

Elle entrera et demeurera en vigueur dans les mêmes conditions que ledit traité.

La présente convention, faite en un seul exemplaire, sera déposée aux archives de la Société des Nations, dont le secrétaire général sera prié de remettre à chacune des hautes parties contractantes des copies certifiées conformes.

Fait à Locarno, le octobre 1925.

No. 14

LOC/189/B.D.] *Notes of a Meeting held between the Heads of the British, French, and German Delegations in Mr. Chamberlain's Room at the Grand Hotel, Locarno, on October 15, 1925, at 6.30 p.m.*

[F.O. 840/1(9)]

PRESENT: Mr. Chamberlain, M. Briand, Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, M. Vandervelde.

ACCOMPANIED BY:

M. Berthelot, Herr von Schubert, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby.

M. Hesnard, of the French delegation, was present as French translator.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN opened the proceedings by referring to the undertaking which [all] had given [at the last meeting] that instructions would be telegraphed to Berlin to ascertain the position of the question of military control.¹ According

¹ See No. 11.

² In Berlin telegram No. 368 of October 14, Lord D'Abernon reported: 'The position appears to be as follows:—

'Progress has been satisfactory only with regard to Armaments Sub-Commission question, but if German Government gave instructions to meet the views of commission on six following questions, French Ambassador would consider disarmament as being satisfactorily carried out.

'The six points, which all concern "effectives" and not "material", are as follows:—

1. High Command.
2. General Staff.
3. Relations of associations with Ministry of War.
4. Police.
5. Training with unauthorised weapons.
6. Prohibition of instruction of reserve officers.

'As regards first two questions, the French and German points of view remain entirely divergent. General Wauchope considers French are right to insist as regards High Command, but that Germans should be allowed to have General Staff officers.

'As regards No. 3, the Germans will agree, but they will not consent to abolish associations. General Wauchope does not consider that we should demand dissolution of associations.

'As regards No. 4, if German Government agree to abolish military titles and accept life service for Schutzpolizei, General Wauchope considers that we should allow them 30,000 or 35,000 police in barracks in order to reach a settlement.

to the report which he had just received,² pretty numerous and, indeed, in some respects serious points still remained, but all in that room were no doubt agreed that we must endeavour to find some solution, and he himself hoped that the work here in Locarno would make it easier for the Germans to do what remained outstanding and for the ex-Allies to find some means of meeting the Germans, which, but for the meeting in Locarno, they might not have been able to do.

M. BRIAND explained that in so far as military control and matters in the Rhineland were concerned, he had no competence to discuss details. He had seen the reports of the Control Commission in Berlin and had, indeed, read them, but considering that he was no expert there were many points which were still obscure to him. He referred to a report of October 2,³ and said that as far as he could understand, a good deal of progress had been made since and many points were on the way to a practical solution. The problem which presented itself was how to hasten matters. He thought that the best solution would be at this stage that the German Government should address a note to the Ambassadors' Conference in response to the last note⁴ which had been addressed to them reviewing the position. They could state what points had already been liquidated, what points were on the way to settlement, and those points on which a settlement had not yet been reached. This would give the Governments, acting through the Ambassadors' Conference, an opportunity of considering the position and deciding what might be done to achieve the object which the Germans and we had in view—the early evacuation of Cologne.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that his information from General Wauchope was to the effect that there were six or seven points of importance on which it was unlikely that a settlement could be reached in Berlin between the Allied Control Commission and the German Commission with which they were negotiating. These points should be disposed of without difficulty with goodwill on both sides. But it was essential, if a settlement was to be reached, that the German Government on their side must intervene with their authorities.

M. BRIAND said that he understood that General Wauchope, the British representative on the Control Commission in Berlin, was on his way to London in connection with these outstanding points.

DR. LUTHER said that he was very much in the same position as M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain; that he had not the detailed technical knowledge to be able to discuss the difficulties which remained. He would therefore call on Herr von Schubert to give a more detailed explanation.

'Regarding No. 5, General Wauchope considers prohibition of training in unauthorised weapons should be maintained.

'No. 6. General Wauchope understands that Germans are prepared to meet our views.

'He informs me that there is a seventh difficulty, *i.e.*, the question of fixed mounting for guns at Königsberg, which German Cabinet consider of supreme importance.

'It goes without saying that after agreement has been reached on above, some time is necessary for execution and verification, but this delay would correspond in part with time required to prepare for evacuation of Cologne area.

'The importance of present attitude of French Ambassador is that he recognises necessity of a generous interpretation in order to obtain solution, and accepts as adequate the performance outlined in above programme.

'It is to be hoped that military authorities will be instructed to conform to his view.

'Also that instructions of German Government to their representatives should be categorical.'

³ Cf. No. 650, Enclosure 2.

⁴ See No. 631.

HERR VON SCHUBERT said that in the matter of military control a great number of things had certainly been done, especially in the industrial domain. A large measure of destruction of material had been carried out—some still remained to be executed, but that would necessarily take time. For example, a certain number would be complete by November 15, others would take longer. He imagined that General Wauchope's points were the following:—

1. The High Command.
2. Effectives.
3. Königsberg.
4. Police (the latter being concerned more particularly with the question of barracks, status and military gradings).
5. The fifth point was probably that of organisation.

Continuing, Herr von Schubert said it was difficult to find a solution between the two commissions. He declared that the greater part of the conditions formulated in the Allied note of June 4th had either been already executed or were in a fair way to execution.

M. VANDERVELDE said that he must associate himself with everything that M. Briand had said. Herr von Schubert had declared that it was difficult to get the military authorities of the two sides to agree. Well, why not let the matter be studied from the political point of view? For example, the question of the destruction of material; the Governments were more likely to understand the political difficulties of the German position. He could see that extensive destructions of material might have an economic reaction on the German population. Again, the question of the grading of the Schutzpolizei. He could understand that this might make recruiting more difficult; therefore those of us who wished to see the present régime in Germany maintained had an interest in seeing that the police were not unduly weakened. Once these things were settled the evacuation of Cologne would of course follow easily.

DR. LUTHER again developed the German point of view. Practically speaking, the disarmament of Germany was complete. It was now only a question of a certain residuum outstanding between the Allied and German military authorities. Really only a small and infinitesimal number of points remained outstanding, and the German people therefore considered that the refusal to evacuate Cologne was altogether out of proportion to the undischarged obligations of the German Government. Unless a date for evacuation were fixed he would not be able to get German public opinion to understand the work the German delegation had done in Locarno.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN admitted that he too saw a certain contradiction between what had been done at Locarno and the prolongation of the occupation of Cologne. He would be prepared to evacuate as soon as possible. He would like to go out tomorrow if he could, and, indeed, to announce tomorrow that he was going out. He fully understood the difficulties of the Chancellor on his return to Germany, but he thought he was voicing the opinion of M. Briand and M. Vandervelde when he said that what we desired was to light on some solution acceptable to all parties, and to do that we must first have reached a settlement on the big outstanding points of control. These points were not so small as Herr von Schubert seemed to think. Some were perhaps small, but others were important, and, just as the Germans argued that it was foolish to insist on what they termed small points, so it was to the same degree, or even more so, stupid of the Germans to refuse to carry out these small points and thus render evacuation impossible.

However, the only question of importance really was to reach some solution acceptable to all. How was this to be done?

DR. LUTHER repeated that Germany was effectively disarmed and the German people had never acquiesced in the non-evacuation of Cologne on January 10⁵ on what they regarded as a purely theoretical point. After Locarno they would understand it still less. Now only questions of principle remained outstanding. It was absolutely impossible for him to get the Reichstag to adopt the pact unless evacuation had taken place. No doubt the German Government could begin to prepare German public opinion before the date was actually known publicly, and the German Government could, of course, send a note as proposed to the Ambassadors' Conference, but that mere fact would not have the slightest echo in Germany. He would not dare to ask the Reichstag to ratify if Cologne had not been evacuated, and, he might point out that, looking at this matter from a practical point of view, Cologne was not the only zone occupied by the Allies; there were the remaining two zones. He had worked during this conference soberly; that was the pure truth, but his position would become impossible.

M. VANDERVELDE interposed that he had no authority to assume the responsibility for agreeing to the evacuation of Cologne.

HERR STRESEMANN pointed out that there had been considerable delay between January 10 and the date of the Allied note. The delay had not all been on the side of the Germans. Could we not agree at Locarno that Germany should give an undertaking that the outstanding points should be settled and that the Allies, on their side, should agree to evacuate by a given date. This would greatly facilitate matters in Germany.

M. BRIAND said that this suggestion was certainly worthy of consideration. He quite saw the German position, but we here had a mandate which we could not exceed. To him, the formula proposed by Dr. Stresemann seemed perfectly acceptable. Let Germany send in the suggested note classifying the various points. That would bring a political answer from the Allied Governments through the Ambassadors' Conference. M. Briand said he would strongly support a solution acceptable to Germany, even to the point of his own resignation. He added that there must be no idea of any sort of 'marchandage'. Let things be dealt with in a perfectly normal manner through the Ambassadors' Conference; they might then even be able to fix a date for evacuation.

DR. LUTHER then raised the question of how the German Government was to act in the interval between their return and the meeting of the Ambassadors' Conference. During that time they would have enormous difficulties. He must state quite frankly that there were certain elements in Germany which were opposed to the pact policy. There was a very important party in Germany he wished to carry with him, but if there was an interval before some sop such as he had suggested was given to German public opinion, how were such questions as, for example, the entry of Germany into the League, to be dealt with? His idea was to get the pact voted by the entire Reichstag and not by a mere majority. To do this there must be a certainty that the date of evacuation was fixed, otherwise a large number of Deputies would never vote for ratification.

M. BRIAND enquired when the Reichstag met. (Herr Stresemann said in November.) Well, even supposing German papers did get excited about non-evacuation, could not the German Government point out that it was wise to wait a little before working up propagandist agitation? Then we would have time to get the problem settled before the Reichstag met.

HERR STRESEMANN interposed that it was not only a question of the Reichstag, but of the Foreign Affairs Committee, before which he would be called almost at once on his return, and the first question he would be asked would be: 'What about Cologne?' The 'Vorwärts' had already said that the Allies had fixed a date, and it was difficult to dissipate that belief. However, Germany could, of course, send the note to the Ambassadors' Conference and could do so very quickly but could the Ambassadors' Conference answer in, say, 10 days?

M. BRIAND said he thought so, 10 to 12 days. As to the German Foreign Affairs Committee, surely Herr Stresemann could induce them to wait until he had something definite to tell them. He repeated that he had no mandate to settle the question of Cologne at Locarno. If he did so he would be disavowed. But if the matter were dealt with through the Ambassadors' Conference, as proposed, it might be possible, as already suggested, to fix a definite date. We must, however, remember that there was a technical impossibility of any quick move. The military authorities were concerned and they would have to be consulted as to how long evacuation would take and by what date it could be completed.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested at this point that it was perhaps more important to fix a date for the beginning than for the end of the evacuation. Not that he wished to suggest that there was any idea of stopping half-way once evacuation had begun.

DR. LUTHER said he understood that there were two important points. The first, procedure. Germany would write as soon as possible to the Ambassadors' Conference as proposed. The Governments would instruct the Ambassadors' Conference to reply and we could then fix such and such a date for evacuation.

M. BRIAND said he found that a perfectly normal procedure. But, of course, the German Government, on their part, would undertake to carry out those matters of [a] certain gravity which still remained unfulfilled?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN begged the Chancellor to instruct the Germany military authorities with some insistence that they must come to terms as soon as possible so that only a minimum of points should remain outstanding when the note was sent.

DR. LUTHER said that a certain number of questions really entered into the political sphere, especially those regarding organisation. It followed that these could hardly be settled by the date of the Ambassadors' reply to the proposed German note.

He now turned to his second point. How far was it possible for him to explain to German public opinion that arrangements to fix a date had been made? If he was authorised to say that there was agreement on the method and that that would lead to evacuation, then his position would be very greatly eased.

M. BRIAND said that he saw no objection to something being said on these lines, but he must repeat that Cologne was out of the cadre of Locarno. The proper course was for the Germans to write to the Ambassadors' Conference, as he had indicated. The respective Governments would then give their Ambassadors a mandate, and the plan which had been sketched could be put into effect. This should give the Germans entire satisfaction. After all, he had given the Germans proof already of his goodwill in the matter of the evacuation of the three towns.⁶ Perhaps, as matters had developed, he would have been better advised to hold it as a bargaining counter, but he had done it loyally, and it was proof to the

⁶ See No. 645.

Germans of his sincerity. After all, it was not to the interest of the Allies that the Reichstag should ratify the Pact in a bad temper. It was desirable that if the Pact was ratified it should be ratified when the Reichstag was in a good temper, and it was a wish of the Allies to facilitate this. There was no desire to put the Germans in a false position.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN and M. VANDERVELDE both agreed entirely.

HERR STRESEMANN said that M. Briand had stated that the machinery would be put in motion with the utmost possible despatch, but he must draw attention to the fact that the Ambassadors' Conference was sometimes very slow in moving, and it was important that on this occasion there should be no delay.

M. BRIAND pointed out that on occasion the Conference could act quickly.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN intervened to ask Herr Stresemann to explain to those present the point which he had made to him in conversation on the previous day,⁷ namely, the difficulty which the Germans experienced in accepting the title of 'inspector' for the police in the place of the generally accepted titles recognised in Germany for the police.

HERR STRESEMANN said that the point was not a negligible one from the German point of view. It must be remembered that as a general rule the men were badly paid, but that a counter advantage lay in a certain social standing. The demand put forward by the Allies that the word 'inspector' should be substituted for 'Hauptmann' was to the German a degradation, and would greatly complicate the recruiting of the police force, for whom it was essential to obtain the best men.

M. BRIAND said that he quite understood, and that as far as he was concerned they could call the men generals if they liked.

DR. LUTHER said that he did not want to go into all those matters of detail raised in the last conversation, since all these questions have been discussed in accordance with [the wishes of the German delegation], but could he speak openly in the same sense in Germany on his return?

M. BRIAND said that he had repeatedly said that the consequence of the Pact would be a mitigation of the conditions of occupation. It would be his first task to press this on the French Cabinet on his return to Paris, and if his views were not accepted, he would be prepared to resign at once. The German leaders must really try to do something to control their Right, and their excited elements. The facts which would follow on the Pact would be sufficient proof that what the German leaders had done here was justified. In a few days, when the Ministers returned to their respective countries, diplomatic conversations could be started on the various points, but the Germans must give him a list.

Here MR. CHAMBERLAIN interposed to say that, speaking of a list, what M. Briand had in mind was not the list that Herr von Schubert had already communicated here [(see Herr von Schubert's conversation with Mr. Lampson of the 14th October 1925)];⁸ and was possibly not even a written list.

At this point M. BRIAND said that, in a conversation which he had that morning with the German delegation, they had raised the question of a soldier who had been condemned for some offence (he believed bicycling without a passport). He had called for an enquiry from Paris, and he now understood that the soldier would be free in 48 hours. He reaffirmed that he was most anxious to carry out a [programme of appeasement] as soon as he got back to Paris.

DR. LUTHER asked if he could state that on his return to Germany?

⁷ See No. 541.

⁸ See No. 542.

M. BRIAND said that he would certainly help matters for Dr. Luther in a speech which he would make in the Chamber before the Reichstag met.

DR. LUTHER asked whether he could say in Germany that discussions had been started on questions arising out of the Pact, and that all these things would be dealt with by diplomatic channels?

M. BRIAND replied that his diplomatic powers were limited, that some of these questions entered the military sphere, where M. Painlevé came in, but he felt convinced that he would be able to persuade M. Painlevé to accept his view of this matter, and he repeated that he saw no difficulty. As soon as he returned he would take this question of the Rhineland up and deal with it *au fur et à mesure*, but he would be placed in a very difficult position if the Germans pressed him too far.

HERR STRESEMANN [asked whether some general reference to this could not be made] in the Protocole du Clôture of the conference.

M. BRIAND said he could not agree to any definite mention of the Rhineland. Some general phrase might be introduced, to the effect that a certain 'détente d'ordre économique et d'ordre politique' would follow as the result of the Pact.

HERR STRESEMANN again referred to the proposal for a mixed commission to overhaul the Rhineland legislation which he had made at the preceding meeting.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN raised an objection to this [proposal]. He would not say it was an impossible proposal, but he would make no promise. He had no knowledge himself of the Rhineland ordinances. He had seen in Herr von Schubert's memorandum many acts of legislation specified which were necessarily a little more strict in occupied territory than they would be in normal conditions. But he was quite ready to study this question, though he could make no promise. He added a reflection which occurred to him. If we succeeded in acting on the lines which M. Briand had indicated, perhaps no mixed commission would, after all, be necessary.

HERR STRESEMANN interposed that, if that was so, so much the better.

M. BRIAND agreed.

DR. LUTHER then said that he understood that the discussion could be continued through diplomatic channels.

M. BRIAND said that, while that was so, he could not, of course, undertake in any sense to override the military authorities, but everything that could be done in the Rhineland would be done, and difficulties which resulted could perhaps be dealt with by [diplomatic methods].

DR. LUTHER said that a diminution of effectives [in the Rhineland] was perhaps the most important point. It was important that the number of troops in occupied territories should be brought at least as low as those kept there by Germany before the war.

M. BRIAND said this must largely depend on technicalities.

DR. LUTHER again reverted to the question of public opinion in Germany, and he said that the position would be that his critics would say to him that he had proposed the Pact, and that the Allies had then added other conditions such as the League, and that he had little to show for the concessions which had been made at Locarno.

M. BRIAND said it seemed to him that there was one factor which the Chancellor had overlooked. Surely opinion in Germany was easier than when the Conference began. He had himself observed a considerable *détente* from the tone of the German press. He again summed up the very effective weapons which had already been placed in Dr. Luther's hands for meeting criticisms on his return to

Germany. He could quote Cologne, and further a lightening of the régime in the occupied territories.

DR. LUTHER enquired whether he could say this.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN interposed to say that the British Parliament [would meet] later than the Reichstag, but he could no doubt make a speech [somewhere] expressing his hopes and the consequences he thought must flow from the Pact.

M. BRIAND said he would take an early occasion to go before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber and to say the same. Here, he interposed that it was of course understood that the conversation here was purely non-official and that no formal *procès-verbal* was being kept.

HERR STRESEMANN at this point made a strong appeal as regards the position of the German representatives at Locarno. It was absolutely essential that in what they should say on their return to Germany they should have full support from England and France.

At this stage Herr Stresemann raised a new point. He brought up the question of the League's scheme of investigation of Germany's armaments under article 213 of the Treaty, and referred specifically to the resolution adopted by the Council of the League on September 27, 1924.⁹ He was anxious to discuss this matter specifically.

M. BRIAND at once replied that here the solution did not lie in the hands of the delegates at Locarno. But he might add that he himself had taken the initiative in having this matter adjourned when it last came up at Geneva, in order that it might be more favourably discussed at a later date [in more promising circumstances].

MR. CHAMBERLAIN interposed that he himself had been going to suggest to the German delegation that they would be well advised to send no detailed answer to the Secretary-General of the League in reply to the letter in which the latter had communicated to the German Government a copy of the Council resolution now under discussion. It seemed to him better that the German Government should wait until they had joined the League and had a seat on the Council.

HERR VON SCHUBERT interjected that the difficulty was that, in joining the League, Germany had under article 1 of the Covenant to reaffirm all her international obligations. Would she not therefore by inference be admitting that the Council resolution was accepted and regarded as binding by Germany?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN did not understand the position in that way. No doubt what preoccupied the German delegation was the question of the 'éléments stables'. He himself had stated frankly that, according to the advice given to the British Government, there should not be any resident 'éléments stables' in the Rhineland.

M. BRIAND said that evidently these matters lay in the hands of the League. Here at Locarno the delegates had no right to impinge on the domain of the Council, more especially as this particular matter had far-reaching consequences. Under the Covenant a certain degree of control of disarmament was imposed upon the League. Now that did not only apply to Germany. It applied to other countries as well.

M. VANDERVELDE reminded the German delegation that they must always remember that no final decision had, in fact, been taken.

M. BRIAND acquiesced so far as 'éléments stables' was concerned, but, as regarded the general system of League investigation, a resolution had, in fact,

⁹ See No. 11, n. 3.

been adopted. This applied not only to Germany, but to other countries, such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria. That could not possibly be altered here.

DR. LUTHER stated that there were really two questions: (1) 'éléments stables'. As to that, he understood from Mr. Chamberlain no definite decision had been come to; (2) general surveillance. That would have to be settled before Germany could enter the League.

M. BRIAND said that here was a question suddenly raised at the very close of the Conference. The question had never been touched upon in the notes leading up to the Conference—in short, a new condition against Germany's entry into the League—and the German delegation were reopening the whole matter again. They were facing the Allied delegations with an impossibility. None of them had any power to discuss this question here.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said the only place it could be discussed was at the Council. He had not hesitated to state openly the opinion of the British Government on one point, the 'éléments stables'. But he could not discuss that question here. It must be reserved until Germany entered the League.

HERR STRESEMANN, at this point, enquired whether any consideration had been given to the question of the date of Germany's entry into the League.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN replied that he had written to Sir Eric Drummond and just received his reply, which he had not had time to consider adequately.¹⁰ He would study it and see what the necessary steps were.

DR. LUTHER said Germany wished to enter the League as soon as possible. He was anxious to find a basis on which all outstanding questions could be settled quickly, and on which Germany could at once enter the League.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he understood the position to be that a month's notice must be given in advance. It was then necessary to call together the Council and the Council decided to call together a special meeting of the Assembly. He did not know whether it might be possible to set machinery in motion at once, and the matter come before the Council in December, with a view to summoning a special meeting of the Assembly.

M. BERTHELOT said that if that was to be done the ratification of the Pact must take place at the latest by November 20. On December 7 the Council was to meet, and within one month the Assembly could be called together.

M. BRIAND said that if the German delegation were now to start new conditions on which their entry into the League was to be dependent, we should find ourselves back where we were, that was to say, if he understood correctly what the Chancellor had said.

DR. LUTHER said that he did not mean to maintain that the difficulty in this case was comparable with that regarding article 16 of the Covenant. There was a difficulty, and the German delegation could not reconcile the Council resolution of September 27 with the correct interpretation of article 213 of the Treaty.

M. BRIAND said that if that was so, the German Government must raise it on the Council.

M. VANDERVELDE and MR. CHAMBERLAIN both agreed.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN here declared that the Allied delegations had gone very far

¹⁰ In an unnumbered telegram to Geneva of October 13, Mr. Chamberlain had asked Sir E. Drummond to outline the best procedure for securing Germany's entry into the League of Nations with the minimum of delay. Sir E. Drummond's reply of October 14 (W10371/9803/98), is not printed.

to meet the German point of view, but it was impossible to produce one question after another. That ended by changing the whole aspect and tone of the present conversation. Let Germany come into the Council. Let her adduce her arguments there. She would always find the other members of the Council sensible of what had passed at Locarno. We were just as anxious as they were that the new spirit engendered at Locarno should continue and bear fruit.

DR. LUTHER said that all he was anxious to achieve was to surmount the difficulties that now faced him.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN reminded the Chancellor that when the British delegation came to Locarno he, Mr. Chamberlain, had said that he could deal with the Pact only. No doubt it was true that other matters would be discussed, but he had never made any secret that he could not deal with them here. They were not within the limits of the authority of the Allied delegates either as members of their own Governments or of the League.

M. BRIAND said we were now up against a stone wall. The demand of the German delegation could not be met, and the German attitude would prove a great surprise to public opinion.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he fully concurred.

A long and somewhat tense silence ensued at this point.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN, resuming, said that he had never expected to find such a difficulty at the last moment. He was painfully struck that such a difficulty should have been brought forward at the end of this conversation. He indicated to Dr. Luther that the Allied delegations could not be pressed in this exacting way by the German representatives. They were as interested as the Germans in finding a solution, but there were concessions which were not in the [domain] of practical politics.

DR. LUTHER endeavoured to maintain that the demand was no new one. Herr Stresemann had spoken of it at the conversation the other day,¹¹ and it was thought that the position of Germany had then been made perfectly clear.

M. BRIAND made the point that in the German application to the League of September 1924¹² there had been no mention whatsoever of any such difficulty.

This DR. LUTHER thought to meet by maintaining that at that date they had not been aware of the Council resolution of September 27, 1924, which had only been communicated to them in February last.

This brought from M. BRIAND the retort that Germany knew perfectly well the duties imposed [on] the League by article [213] of the Treaty of Versailles. When the German delegation came to the Conference, they had only spoken of article [16] of the Covenant. They made no mention of this fresh difficulty. Now Dr. Luther was raising an entirely new condition. He asked who could possibly accept such a thing. At the last moment the most serious difficulty of the Conference was suddenly brought forward as an essential condition for Germany's entry into the League. He spoke with great depth of feeling.

HERR STRESEMANN interposed that he was not asking for a decision of the Council, and, replying to Mr. Chamberlain, he said that he had in fact been prepared to speak about this point during a previous conversation, but at the very moment when he was going to embark upon it they had been interrupted by the jurists and there had been no time to raise it. He could assure his hearers there had been no intention on the part of the German delegation suddenly to bring

¹¹ See No. 11.

¹² See No. 219, n. 5.

this matter up on the last days of the Conference.

After some hesitation, DR. LUTHER said that he did not wish to create difficulties, that his idea was that some explanation could be furnished about the scheme in question.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN stated that he was almost certain that, once Germany was in the League, some arrangement could be come to as regards the League's scheme of inspection, but it was impossible to discuss that here. He personally would certainly not oppose a discussion on the Council. He did not take the view that further discussion was closed. The matter could be rediscussed.

Here HERR STRESEMANN suggested that it was a question of an obscurity of the text. Could not the Jurists be turned on to that?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that obviously the Jurists were not League Jurists, and

M. BRIAND added that he was sure that the Jurists would quite properly refuse to discuss anything of the kind for which they had no mandate. M. Briand stated that the application of the scheme after all mainly concerned Great Britain, France and Belgium, and in considering this what reason was there to suppose that they would adopt a different attitude than that they had already explained to the German representatives would flow from the conclusion of the Pact? The scheme could be modified to suit the new conditions.

DR. LUTHER maintained that the difficulty rather concerned the practical application of the scheme. To this M. BRIAND agreed, but repeated again that they could not discuss it here as they had no competence.

DR. LUTHER enquired whether it was to be understood that M. Briand thought the practical application of the scheme would be under the general disposition of the Covenant and the rights conferred under it.

M. BRIAND replied in the affirmative.

DR. LUTHER said he now understood that the Allied representatives at Locarno had no competence to discuss the details of the scheme, but he merely wished to discuss the possibility with them of its juridical effect.

M. BRIAND said that what had alarmed him was that he had understood that the Germans had made their entry into the League conditional on some satisfactory explanation. That seemed to him to become a condition of entry. If so, it was the destruction of all that we had done at Locarno. Now, if the Germans looked at the objective side, the League had had to draw up a scheme to carry out its duties under the various articles of the peace treaties regarding inspection of disarmament conditions. Now, how had they set about their task? Here he described in rough outline the scheme as elaborated at Geneva. Now look at this from the practical point of view. Supposing a specific case arose regarding Germany. If the German representative on the Council gave a satisfactory reply, then clearly the scheme would not come into play. Possibly it would have to be applied as between, say, Roumania and Hungary, between Italy and Austria. M. Briand said that, so far as he was concerned, he had no wish to put the machinery in action. Any points which might arise in Germany, after all, could be settled directly between Governments.

Here MR. CHAMBERLAIN interposed the remark that, if the German delegation tried to foresee every possible contingency, they were in danger of wrecking everything. If they sought to clear the whole path before starting, we should never reach a settlement. He produced the text of the League resolution [of September 27, 1924],⁹ and proceeded to read the provisions of Chapter 1, which are to the effect that, though any individual Government that is a member of the League of

Nations can bring any report to the knowledge of the League through the Secretary-General, yet on each occasion it rests with the Council to decide whether or not they will exercise the right to investigate conferred upon them by the treaties. This seemed to allay the alarm of the German delegation, and

DR. LUTHER said it seemed now clear to him that a decision of the Council was required as regards the scheme. After a certain amount of desultory conversation, he did not press the point further.

[(The meeting came to an end at 9.45 p.m.)]

No. 15

[LOC/ /CON.] *British Secretary's Notes of the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Locarno Conference, held on October 16, 1925 at 4 p.m.*

[C 13638/459/18]*

PRESENT: *Great Britain:* Mr. Chamberlain, Sir C. Hurst, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Selby, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Bentinck.
Belgium: M. Vandervelde, M. Rolin, M. van Zuylen, M. de Ruelle, Count du Chastel.
France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Fromageot, M. Léger, M. Massigli, M. Hesnard.
Germany: Dr. Luther, Dr. Stresemann, Dr. von Schubert, Dr. Kempner, Dr. Gaus, Herr von Dirksen.
Italy: [M. Mussolini], M. Scialoja, M. Grandi, M. Pilotti, Marquis Medici, M. Buti.
Poland: Count Skrzynski.
Czechoslovakia: Dr. Benes.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked Sir C. Hurst to make a report on behalf of the jurists on the treaties of arbitration between Poland and Germany, and Germany and Czechoslovakia.

SIR C. HURST recalled that at its last sitting¹ the conference had approved the Belgian-German and Franco-German treaties. The treaties between Germany and Czechoslovakia and Germany and Poland remained to be approved. The jurists had examined the texts of these treaties and had no observations to make upon them.

DR. BENES said that the Czechoslovakia delegation had had conversations on the political side of the treaties in question with Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann. They had now agreed upon a preamble different from that in the Franco-German and Belgian-German treaties, and the preamble explained the difference there was between their position and that in the west. He drew attention to the formula which appeared in the fifth paragraph of the preamble, which, he said, satisfied everyone. This paragraph reads:—

‘Et considérant que la sincère observation des procédés de règlement pacifique des différends internationaux permet de résoudre sans recourir à la force les questions qui viendraient à diviser les États.’

¹ See No. 13.

COUNT SKRZYNSKI said that the text of the Polish-German arbitration treaty responded to the desires of Dr. Stresemann and himself, and was in accordance with the spirit of the other agreements before the conference.

No further observations being made on the Polish-German and Polish-Czechoslovak treaties—

MR. CHAMBERLAIN declared that the texts were approved.

M. FROMAGEOT begged leave to draw attention to the omission in the German-French and German-Belgian treaties in article 19 of the words 'ou par le Conseil de la Société des Nations'. It would be necessary to add these words not only in the two treaties mentioned, but in the German-Polish and German-Czechoslovak treaties as well.

This addition to article 19 of the arbitration treaties was accepted.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that Sir C. Hurst had a further report to make.

SIR C. HURST said that the conference had at its last session¹ charged the jurists to draw up a final protocol which should take into account the observations made at that session. The jurists had proposed a draft which was being distributed to all the delegations and for which Sir Cecil Hurst asked the formal approval of the conference. There would be annexed to the protocol five draft treaties and one draft note. Since a slight modification has been introduced into four of these treaties, it was perhaps desirable that, as the protocol was practically prepared, the words to be added should be added in writing and initialled.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he thought the protocol had been studied by all the delegates who had given their assent to it.

DR. LUTHER said that there were still two points unsettled. The first was the date of the signature of the treaties.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that this point would be gone into later.

DR. LUTHER said there was a second point regarding the wording of the two final paragraphs.

On his proposal and after some discussion the words 'soit compatible' were substituted in the last paragraph of the draft note for the words 'ne soit pas hors de proportion'.

Signature of Treaties

It was agreed that the signature of the treaties concluded at Locarno should take place in London on the 1st December 1925.

Publication

It was agreed that the instruments concluded at Locarno, *i.e.*, the final protocol with its six annexes, and the separate treaties concluded between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia, should be published simultaneously in all the countries concerned on the morning of Tuesday, the 10th October.²

Telegram to Swiss Government

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that at the termination of the labours of the conference a telegram should be sent to the Swiss Government thanking them for the hospitality which the conference had enjoyed. It was left to the secretaries of the delegations to prepare a text.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that as the texts of the instruments to be initialled were not quite ready the conference should adjourn until 6.30 p.m. Meanwhile, an official photograph would be taken, and he proposed that the Mayor of

² See No. 549.

Locarno should be invited into the conference for this purpose.

(The Mayor of Locarno entered at this point.)

MR. CHAMBERLAIN, addressing the mayor, said that at the end of the conference he wished to express the profound thanks of all the delegates to the mayor and the town of Locarno for all that the authorities had done to make the stay of the delegates pleasant and their work easy.

The Mayor of Locarno replied in suitable terms.

(The official photograph was then taken.)

(The conference adjourned and reassembled at 6.30 p.m.)

The final protocol (Annex)³ was read by M. Berthelot and signed. The treaties annexed to it were then initialled.

HERR STRESEMANN then spoke as follows:—

'Permit me to say a few words on behalf of the Chancellor and myself at this moment when the initialling of the treaties has taken place. The German delegates are in agreement with the text of the final protocol with its annexes and have signified their approval by initialling the instruments. We welcome with sincere joy the great impetus given at Locarno to European peace as incarnated in the Treaty of Locarno, which forms an important landmark in the history of the relationship of States and nations to one another. We are particularly glad to observe the conviction expressed in the final protocol that tension between nations has been relaxed and to know that the settlement of so many political and economic questions will thereby be accomplished. We have taken upon ourselves the responsibility of initialling the treaties because it is our opinion that only peaceful co-operation can assure that development of States and nations which to no part of the globe is more important than to the great land of European culture whose people has suffered so interminably during the years just past. We have undertaken this responsibility particularly because we are entitled to believe that the treaties concluded will have political effects which will accrue to the benefit of the German nation in the shape of alleviations of the conditions of its political existence. However important the agreements are which have been drawn up here, the treaties of Locarno will only retain their profound significance in the career of nations if Locarno proves to be not the end but the beginning of an epoch of co-operation in mutual confidence. The sincere wish of the German delegates in this weighty hour is that these possibilities and these hopes may be translated into fact.'

M. BRIAND spoke as follows:—

'As the representative of France I am anxious to associate myself with all my heart with the sentiments expressed by the delegate of Germany, and I should be lacking in a sense of justice if I did not recall and salute the courageous gesture which is at the basis of this conference. I do not forget the memorandum addressed to the French Government by the German Government on the 9th February⁴ on the initiative of M. Stresemann. That was the point of departure of our efforts, and it is the result of this gesture, to which I wish to pay homage, that we are registering today.

'I have just initialled the treaties and conventions which have been prepared at Locarno. My mandate is thus finished. It is therefore in my own name that I now speak, but I am certain that I am reflecting the feeling not only of my Government but also of the great majority of my fellow countrymen. If we had done nothing

³ Not printed.

⁴ See No. 197, n. 1.

here but negotiate the terms of a treaty, and if we were then to return each to his own country, trusting to the hasards of fortune to realise the promises which it contains, we should have done nothing but make a futile gesture. If this gesture does not correspond to the new spirit, if it does not mark the beginning of an era of confidence and collaboration, it will not produce the great effects which we expect of it. From Locarno it is necessary that a new Europe should arise.

'M. Luther and M. Stresemann, with whom I have had, outside this conference, semi-official conversations in which we explained our points of view frankly, told me with what hope they contemplated the work which we have accomplished here, and I replied to them with complete loyalty.

'Between our two countries there remains a certain friction on the surface; there are difficult points. The pact signed here must be a balsam on these wounds. The difficulties which remain must be smoothed over.

'M. Stresemann, with a discretion for which I am grateful to him, made allusion to certain districts of your country in which you have not the right to disinterest yourselves. For my part I too have no right to disinterest myself in them.

'I am certain that France will understand all the scope of this pact, and that she will wish to do everything in her power in order that they may result from it a feeling of appeasement and *détente* between us. Those who represent her will have at heart the task of doing as far as they can what depends upon them in order that so far as we are concerned those conditions may be realised which will allow of a policy of real *détente* between our two countries and, I hope, of frank collaboration.

'When that has been done, when the questions which it remains to solve have been solved, we shall be able to work in common in all spheres to realise that ideal which we have of a Europe working out its destiny by remaining faithful to all that is representative of its past civilisation and nobility.

'It is in that spirit that all of us have come here.

'I hope that our two countries will soon feel the benefits of this policy and that it will not be long before we can register the happy results of the instrument that we have just initialled.'

MR. CHAMBERLAIN spoke as follows:—

'I hardly dare to add anything to the declaration made by Herr Stresemann and to the reply which that declaration has drawn from the representative of France. But I wish to associate myself in the name of my Government and my country with the hopes and wishes expressed at this table. For me also, what we have done today is not the end; it is the beginning.'

M. VANDERVELDE spoke as follows:—

'As the representatives of Belgium I associate myself with profound emotion with the words which we have just heard.

'Among those here there is no one who is not happy and proud to have had a share, however modest it may be, in the great work which has just been accomplished.

'In order to attain this result each has contributed something of his own, and no praise can be too great for the far-sighted loyalty of Mr. Chamberlain, for the persevering desire for pacification of M. Briand, for the legal skill of M. Scialoja, and—this I particularly desire to say—for the steadfast courage with which MM. Luther and Stresemann have ceaselessly defended the real and permanent interests of Germany against those of their fellow countrymen whose eyes are fixed rather on the past than on the future.

'But I make bold to say that the great force which has carried us to our goal is the tremendous aspiration of the nations, of all the nations, towards reconciliation and peace.

'It so happens that out of the members of this conference I am the only one who signed the Treaty of Versailles.

'I signed it with a perfectly clear conscience because it enshrined the reconquered independence of my country and its right to lawful reparation.

'But looking back over those six years I still see the vision of men with the same social ideals as myself adhering on behalf of Germany under the compulsion of necessity.

'Today, on the contrary, it is with a feeling of common happiness that we conclude this treaty.

'It does not entail sacrifices upon anyone.

'It ensures to all advantages which the lapse of time can only develop.

'But from today it is an event of incalculable moral significance to see the nations upon whom fell the scourge of the war taking the solemn undertaking no longer to resort to force, but to place their mutual guarantees under the sovereign guarantee of that League of Nations where there are no longer enemies, where there are no longer conquerors and conquered, but nations united under the banner of equality.

'Between these nations henceforth associated the relations of tomorrow will by the force of things be essentially different from what they were yesterday.

'Yesterday what reigned amongst them was mistrust and mutual fear which generate hardships and sorrows.

'Tomorrow I am convinced that it will be relaxation, confidence and moral disarmament—the necessary and sufficient conditions of material disarmament.

'M. Stresemann in noting this fact has told us his hopes.

'I associate myself with MM. Briand and Chamberlain in echoing their hopes and in giving in my turn the pledge of our goodwill.'

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI spoke as follows:—

'I am happy to associate myself in the name of Italy with the words exchanged at the final meeting of a conference which has been so practical and useful. This is due to the methods of confidence employed. Thus it has been possible to accomplish the work in an atmosphere of cordiality. I believe that when the treaties become, as they must become, a living reality, a new era must open in the history of the world.'

The following message was approved for despatch to the Swiss Government:—

'Les représentants des Gouvernements allemand, belge, britannique, français, italien, polonais et tchécoslovaque, réunis en conférence à Locarno du 5 au 16 octobre, se font un devoir et un plaisir d'exprimer leurs remerciements empressés au Président de la Confédération helvétique et au Conseil fédéral pour l'hospitalité si délicate et si attentive qui leur a été assurée en Suisse.

'Ils sont heureux d'avoir pu réaliser à Locarno une œuvre de pacification qui répond aux traditions séculaires comme aux vœux présents du peuple suisse.'

Press Communiqué

The following communiqué was approved for issue to the press:—

'The conference, which met for the last time in a plenary session this afternoon, the 16th October, began by approving the text of the arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland and between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

'The conference then proceeded to examine and adopt the text of the final protocol on the work of the conference and the tasks which it had undertaken to perform, the results which it had achieved and the consequences which must result in restoring peace and security in Europe.

'The treaties and conventions drawn up by the conference which, initialled *ne varietur* at Locarno, will bear this day's date are the following:—

'Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy.

'Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium.

'Arbitration Convention between Germany and France.

'Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland.

'Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

'The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, moreover, informed the conference of the conclusion between France, Poland and Czechoslovakia of agreements with the object of securing to these countries the benefit of the arbitration treaties above mentioned, which will be deposited in due course with the League of Nations and of which copies will be held at the disposal of the Powers represented at the conference.

'The 1st December 1925 was fixed as the date for the formal signature of the agreements arrived at and initialled at Locarno. This formality will take place in London.

'The above agreements will be published on the morning of Tuesday, the 20th October.

'The conference despatched a telegram to the President of the Swiss Federal Council conveying warm thanks for the hospitality accorded to it in Switzerland.

'M. Rusca, Mayor of Locarno, was then invited into the conference hall, and Mr. Chamberlain, on behalf of all the delegates, renewed to him the expression of their sentiments of gratitude for the welcome given to them and the facilities which they had enjoyed in the town of Locarno. The meeting adjourned for an hour and a half to allow the secretaries of the delegations to complete the technical preparation of the diplomatic instruments submitted for the signature of the Governments concerned.

'The treaties and the conventions were initialled at 7 p.m.

'Before the conference came to a close speeches were made by MM. Stresemann, Briand, Chamberlain, Vandervelde and Mussolini.'

At the close of the proceedings M. Briand said:—

'I desire on behalf of all the delegates present to thank you, Mr. Chamberlain, for the tact, the delicacy, and the ability with which you have, in fact, presided, although we have had no president. We are profoundly grateful.'

MR. CHAMBERLAIN replied:—

'I am deeply touched. It has been to me a great pleasure to have done what I have done, and to have taken a part in a great work such as we have accomplished today.'

